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

TIMOTHY J. STAPLETON, EDITOR

Encyclopedia of African Colonial Conflicts

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Encyclopedia of African Colonial Conflicts

Volume I: A–H

Volume II: I–Z

Timothy J. Stapleton, Editor

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Introduction

For the purposes of this encyclopedia, the broad concept of "colonial war" refers to a conflict fought by a power to create a colony in another territory or continent, as well as to expansionist wars fought in these colonies by foreign settlers against indigenous people. From around 1500, Africa was the scene of many such colonial wars fought by European states and settlers of European origin against local African forces. The Portuguese were the first Europeans to attempt to conquer an overseas empire in sub-Saharan Africa. During the 1400s, Portuguese mariners began to explore the Atlantic coast of northwestern Africa and West Africa, and by the end of the century, they had rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Indian Ocean. By the mid-1500s, they had founded a chain of small coastal and island colonies around Africa that became part of a worldwide trading empire, including Brazil and enclaves in Asia.

Portuguese overseas expansion was motivated by many factors, including militant Christians' desire to continue warfare against Muslims in northwest Africa and the search for an oceanic route to the abundant trading available in Asia. In this late medieval period, the Portuguese, who did not offer many new products for which Africans were willing to trade, would sometimes attempt to gain direct control over sources of valuable materials such as gold and silver mines, which drew them into wars and alliances with mainland African states in such places as present-day Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the Portuguese became involved in warfare between Christian Ethiopia and neighboring Muslim states.

However, these early Portuguese colonial military endeavors were difficult and ultimately limited, as their numbers were small, they suffered terribly from tropical disease, their early firearms did not work well in wet tropical conditions, and they faced well-organized African adversaries with iron weapons. Portuguese conquistadors in Africa were tenacious but far less successful in creating territorial empires than were their Spanish counterparts in the Americas, where the factors of disease and technology were more favorable. By the mid-1600s, the Dutch had emerged as a global commercial power and challenged their Portuguese competitors in Africa. As also happened in the Americas, this meant that some of the early colonial conflicts in Africa involved Europeans fighting each other, with African allies on both sides.

The Transatlantic Slave Trade, which operated from around 1530 to the early 1800s, involved the capture and forced removal of around 12 million Africans from their homeland to the Americas, where they were put to work on plantations producing sugar, cotton, and other items for export to Europe. This became a vital component of the emerging Atlantic economy. While the Portuguese initiated the Atlantic slave trade by shipping West African slaves to Brazil, it was further developed and ultimately dominated by the Dutch, French, British, and other powers during the 1600s and 1700s. As a result, many European powers and companies gradually claimed small colonies or enclaves along the West African coast that functioned as places of exchange between the African rulers, who used their armies to capture slaves in the interior, and European and American slavers arriving by ship. It became much more profitable for Europeans and Americans to provide African states with firearms and other trade goods in exchange for slaves than to try to conquer areas of Africa that produced valuable resources.

Generally, the European and American slaving powers were not interested in acquiring large territorial colonies in Africa, which limited the number and scale of colonial wars fought on the continent in the 1700s and early 1800s. The same situation continued when, in the 19th century, the European and American demand for African slaves shifted to a desire for such raw materials as palm oil and rubber, required by emerging industries. Of course, some of the European settler colonies established in the earlier period still existed, and settler societies such as Dutch-speaking Boers (later called *Afrikaners*) in the Cape had their own interests in controlling African land and labor, which led to persistent colonial warfare in some places. The creation of settlements for freed black slaves from the Americas in Sierra Leone and Liberia during the early 19th century resulted in similar expansionist warfare against local peoples.

Until around 1870, the European presence in Africa, with the exception of the settler colonies in the far north and south where tropical disease was less prevalent, was limited to the coast, and most African people lived in different types of independent communities in the vast interior. However, between around 1880 and 1910, in a process called the “Scramble for Africa,” almost the entire continent fell under European colonial rule. The only parts of Africa that remained independent were Ethiopia, which through its defeat of Italy in 1896 became the only African state to defend itself successfully from European invasion during the Scramble, and Liberia, a settlement of free black slaves from the United States that declared itself a republic in 1847. At the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, at which no African representatives were present, European powers claimed parts of Africa (often without much specific knowledge of what was there) and agreed on a principle called "effective occupation," which meant that these claims would have to be ratified by officials on the ground. Although many African states accepted colonial rule through treaties, many others were conquered by invading, European-led colonial armies from the 1870s to 1890s. In addition, the imposition of colonial taxation, land alienation, and violent oppression led to a series of African rebellions from roughly the 1890s to the 1920s, which were brutally suppressed.

During the Scramble, Europeans and Africans held very different understandings of this process of colonial conquest. European powers were competitors in the rush for African territory, but they had already decided on how the continent would be divided and agreed not to fight over it among themselves. On the other hand, African rulers did not have the means to organize their own international conferences or engage in long-distance diplomatic negotiations. Consequently, they usually had a narrow and local vision, in which they sometimes tried in vain to play different European invaders against one another and attempted to involve them in existing African conflicts, which meant Africans remained divided in their response to the Scramble.

The Second Industrial Revolution of the mid-19th century gave Europeans technological advantages that helped them conquer Africa. These included rapid-firing and more accurate firearms that defeated African armies, steam-driven trains and riverboats that opened up the African hinterland for economic exploitation, telegraphs that speeded up European communications, and medical improvements that reduced the deadliness of tropical disease. With reference to firepower, the armies of many African states possessed guns that were mostly obsolete compared to new inventions like the Maxim gun (the first true machine gun), which Africans had not had a chance to acquire. Furthermore, in the Brussels Agreement of 1890, which mostly focused on eliminating the slave trade as an excuse for colonization, the European colonial powers had conveniently banned the export of guns to Africa.

Many factors stimulated and facilitated the Scramble. The late 19th century saw the emergence of a particularly extreme version of European racism, in which black Africans were seen as occupying the bottom of a pseudoscientific social Darwinist racial hierarchy. This feeling of racial supremacy was expressed in different ways, with some Europeans believing that they had a natural right to conquer and exploit Africans and others expressing a supposedly more generous desire (called the "white man's burden") to uplift allegedly less fortunate beings. Jingoist European nationalism and competition was also important; for example, the newly unified Germany eventually wanted a global empire that included parts of Africa so it could rival imperial Britain. Similarly, France sought to compensate for its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 and the subsequent rise of Germany by conquering the vast, but largely unprofitable, Sahara Desert. Although European and American Christian missionaries had been active in Africa for a long time before the Scramble, their growing frustrations with a shortage of African converts and influence from the intense white racism of the time made many of them advocate direct European intervention.

Almost since it happened, writers have tried to explain the sudden European conquest of Africa that took place in the late 19th century and happened in the broader context of a renewed interest in Western overseas empire building around the world, known as the "New Imperialism." At the time, British social reformer Thomas Hobson claimed that the lust for colonial conquest originated with the decline of what he saw as healthy, small-scale capitalism in favor of a new economy dominated by a few greedy and parasitic magnates. Vladimir Lenin, the Marxist leader of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, saw the Scramble as evidence that capitalism was beginning to tear itself apart as large-scale capitalists rushed to claim new areas in which they could invest surplus capital. Although Lenin recognized the acquisition of raw materials as motivating conquest, he gave primacy to investment opportunities that ultimately made little sense, given the fact that European powers tended to invest very little in their African colonies that were conquered and ruled as cheaply as possible.

Rejecting economic explanations associated with Marxism, Cold War–era British historians Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher understood the Scramble as having been driven by the perceived strategic interests of the European powers which, through several key conquests such as the 1882 British occupation of Egypt, set in motion a domino effect of territorial seizures. For example, in 1885, the British signed treaties with Tswana leaders to create the Bechuanaland Protectorate (today's Botswana), not for economic reasons, but to block potential contact between the recently arrived Germans in South West Africa (today's Namibia) and the nearby Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State republics.

In the materialist academic context of the 1970s and 1980s, Africanist historian A. G. Hopkins pointed out that while the European powers had no strategic interests in West Africa, they raced to occupy this region during the late 19th century. According to Hopkins, the conquest of West Africa was stirred by an economic depression in the 1870s that prompted European merchants to reduce the cost of West African raw materials—long acquired through coastal trade—by eliminating the African middlemen and gaining direct control over producers in the interior. Of course, the same events often can be interpreted through the lenses of both strategic and economic theories. Some historians see the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902 as resulting from the British need to control the strategically important Cape shipping route from emergent Boer republics in the interior, while others explain it as stemming from the British desire to control the gold mines of the Transvaal, and hence the capitalist development of the region.

This encyclopedia is meant as a resource for those seeking basic information on the many wars of colonial conquest fought by Europeans and settlers in Africa. The term *settler* can be controversial (how many generations does it take to become an African?), but for the purposes of this work, it will be taken to mean any distinct society of non-African origin, such as the Boers of southern Africa and the Americo-Liberians of West Africa. In effect, the temporal scope of this work covers the broad period from the first Portuguese colonial campaigns in West Central Africa in the 1500s to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.

While the encyclopedia offers rudimentary coverage of the early period of Portuguese overseas expansion in parts of Africa during the 1500s and 1600s, the main focus is on the 19th century, with particular emphasis on the Scramble for Africa. The last colonial invasions and many anticolonial armed rebellions of the early 20th century are also covered. There are entries on wars, rebellions, battles, themes, military units, and individual leaders. Some entries are longer than others, reflecting that the extent of the scholarship and available information on these topics varies enormously. Some wars and engagements are well studied, while others are not. For instance, the late-19th-century British campaigns in Sudan and South Africa are covered in detail, while information on the events that concluded the long history of Portuguese conquest in Angola during the same period is less easy to find, so there is less to present. To compare the respective British and Belgian experiences, historians know a great deal about the famous battles of Isandlwana in 1879 and Omdurman in 1898, but much less about the battles of Shangi, which took place in southern Rwanda in 1896, and Rejjaf, which happened in South Sudan in 1897.

Typical of colonial history, there is also a major imbalance in the nature of the primary sources that historians use to reconstruct knowledge of the past, with the literate European invaders having left behind a great deal of documentary information and the mostly nonliterate Africans producing very little from their perspective. What historians of these colonial wars know about the African experience is most often filtered through European accounts that sometimes contain inaccuracies based on language difficulties and racist bias. African oral histories of these wars have been looked at by some historians, but their value in terms of empirical reconstruction has been limited by the passage of time. As such, there is an abundance of information on many of the European officers involved in leading these colonial campaigns, but it is usually much more difficult to write detailed entries on their African allies and opponents. There is so much material on European leaders in these colonial wars that it is impossible to include all of them, and only the prominent ones—particularly those who were involved in multiple campaigns—have been included. Unfortunately, many Africans who played important roles in the defense of their homes from colonial conquest are now little known. That said, as far as possible, this encyclopedia contains many entries devoted to Africans who led indigenous military forces against colonial invasion or in rebellion against early colonial oppression. For reasons of space, the African campaigns of World Wars I and II, which represented a reorganization of the colonial map of Africa, have not been included.

Timothy J. Stapleton

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A

Abd al-Qadir (1808–1883)

Algerian political and military leader and Muslim scholar. Abd al-Qadir, also known as Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza'iri (Abd al-Qadir the Algerian), Abd-el-Kader, and Add-al-Kadir, has been given the titles of emir, prince, and sheikh. He was born near the town of Mascara, near Oran in northwestern Algeria, on September 6, 1808. His father was a sheikh in the Qadiri Rafai Sufi order of Islam and a Berber who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad. As a youth, Abd al-Qadir memorized the Qur'an (Koran) and received an excellent education. He was also well trained in horsemanship. In 1825, he undertook the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) with his father and then visited religious sites in Damascus and Baghdad, cementing his own strong religious beliefs. Abd al-Qadir returned home a few months before the French invasion of Algeria in June 1830.

The French captured the city of Algiers on July 5, 1830, and then gradually expanded their hold over the rest of Algeria. In 1832, having been confirmed as emir of Mascara after his father's death that same year, and with the support of a number of groups in western Algeria, Abd al-Qadir proclaimed a jihad (holy war) against the French. During the course of the next ten years, until 1842, he led a highly successful guerrilla campaign against them.

Despite his victory at La Macta on June 28, 1834, Abd al-Qadir was unable to prevent the French sack of Mascara the following December. His forces were defeated by the French under Général de Division Thomas-Robert Bugeaud at Sikkah on July 6, 1836. On June 1, 1837, Abd al-Qadir signed the Treaty of Tafna with Bugeaud. Under its terms, Abd al-Qadir recognized French sovereignty in Oran and Algiers, while he was recognized as controlling perhaps two-thirds of the country (chiefly the interior). Although the treaty was justified by the situation on the ground, there was great opposition to it in France, and Bugeaud was widely criticized for selling out French interests. The government of King Louis Philippe now agreed to send to Algeria the troop reinforcements previously denied Bugeaud and to make a major military effort in the eastern part of the country, at Constantine, which the French took by assault on October 13, 1837. Meanwhile, Abd al-Qadir organized an efficient theocratic government in the territory under his control.

When French troops crossed into territory recognized as controlled by Abd al-Qadir on October 15, 1839, fighting resumed. The French practiced a scorched-earth policy, and Abd al-Qadir was unable to secure support from important groups in eastern Algeria. His army of 40,000 men was scattered by 2,000 French troops in the

Battle of Smala (May 10, 1843) and then crushed by Bugeaud in the Battle of the Isly River (August 14, 1844). Although Abd al-Qadir continued to win battles—notably that of Sidi Brahim (September 1845)—French military pressure forced him into Morocco, where he sought to rally the Rif groups. Moroccan government action prompted by suspicions regarding his intentions pushed him back into Algeria, and on December 21, 1847, he surrendered to Général de Division Louis de Lamorcière under the agreement that he would be allowed to go into exile in the Levant. The French failed to honor that pledge, and he was exiled to France, first Toulon, then Pau, and finally, during 1848–1852, at the Château of Amboise. Released by French emperor Napoleon III with a pension of 200,000 francs on the pledge that he not return to Algeria, Abd al-Qadir settled first in Bursa in the Ottoman Empire (today Turkey) and then in 1855 in Damascus, where he devoted himself to the study of theology and philosophy and wrote several books.

In 1860, fighting in Damascus, Abd al-Qadir saved some 1,200 Christians, taking them into his residence. For this, the French government increased his pension and bestowed on him the Grand Cross of the Légion d'Honneur. In 1865, Abd al-Qadir became a Mason, and the next year he was received by Emperor Napoleon III in Paris. Abd al-Qadir died in Damascus on May 26, 1883. His remains were returned to Algeria in 1966.

A highly effective guerrilla leader, Abd al-Qadir was also chivalrous toward his adversaries, on occasion releasing French prisoners when he did not have sufficient food for them. Many Algerians regard him today as the greatest national hero of their struggle for independence. There are a number of monuments to him in Algeria, and a university is also named for him. His green and white flag standard was adopted as the flag of the independence movement against France and is today the national flag of Algeria.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Thomas-Robert (1784–1849); Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

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Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi, Muhammad ibn (1882–1963)

Moroccan Berber leader and religious scholar, known as "The Wolf of the Rif," who led a liberation movement against French and Spanish rule in Morocco. Born in Ajdir, Morocco, in 1882, the son of a qadi (caid, local administrator) of the Aith Yusuf clan of the Aith Uriaghel (Waryaghar) group, Muhammad ibn Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi received both a traditional Muslim and a Spanish education. Fluent in Spanish, he became a secretary in the Bureau of Native Affairs in the protectorate government. In 1915, Abd el-Krim was appointed *qadi al-qadat* (chief Muslim judge) for the Melilla district, where he also taught at a Spanish-Arabic school and was editor of an Arabic section of the Spanish newspaper *El Telegrama del Rif.*

Disillusioned with Spanish control of his country, Abd el-Krim came to speak out against Spanish policies. He was imprisoned in 1916–1917 by the Spanish for an alleged conspiracy with the German consul during World War I. He returned to Ajdir in 1919.

In 1921, Abd el-Krim, joined by his brother, who became his chief adviser and commander of the rebel army, raised the standard of resistance against foreign control of Morocco. This marked the beginning of the Rif War (1921–1926), though some date its start in 1920.

In July 1921, determined to destroy the rebels, Spanish general Fernandes Silvestre moved into the Rif Mountains with some 20,000 men, but he failed to carry out adequate reconnaissance or take sufficient security precautions. At Anual on July 21, Silvestre's column encountered Spanish troops fleeing the next post at Abaran. In the ensuing confusion, Rif forces fell on both flanks of the Spanish column, leading to widespread panic and the death of up to 12,000 Spanish troops. Silvestre committed suicide, and several thousand Spaniards were taken prisoner. News of this military disaster created a political firestorm in Spain and brought strongman General Miguel Primo de Rivera to power the following September. With the support of King Alfonso XIII of Spain, Rivera established a virtual military dictatorship until his resignation in January 1930.

In Morocco in 1923, Abd el-Krim proclaimed the Republic of the Rif, with himself as president. He began organizing a centralized administration based on traditional Berber tribal institutions, but one that would override tribal rivalries. Fighting continued, and by the end of 1924, the Spaniards had been forced to withdraw to the coastal enclaves of Melilla and Tetuán.

On April 12, 1925, Abd el-Krim opened a major offensive against the French in their portion of Morocco. Although he had only limited resources, French Général de Division Hubert Lyautey was able to stop the Rifs short of their objective of Fez in July. Meanwhile, on July 26, representatives of the French and Spanish governments met in Madrid and agreed to set aside their rivalry over Morocco and cooperate against Abd el-Krim. The French assembled up to 150,000 men under Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, while the Spanish put together 50,000 men under General José Sanjurjo. Facing overwhelming force and technological superiority in the form of modern artillery and aircraft, Abd el-Krim surrendered to the French on May 26, 1926, bringing the Rif War to a close.

The French sent Abd el-Krim into exile on the island of Réunion in the Indian Ocean. Receiving permission in 1947 to live in France, he left Réunion and was granted political asylum by the Egyptian government. For five years, he headed the Liberation Committee of the Arab West (sometimes called the Maghrib Bureau) in Cairo. With the restoration of Moroccan independence in 1956, King Muhammad V invited Abd el-Krim to return to Morocco, but he refused to do this so long as French troops remained in the Maghrib (Northwest Africa). Abd el-Krim died in Cairo on February 6, 1963.

Well educated and a skilled tactician and capable organizer, Abd el-Krim was a forerunner of the successful post–World War II wars of liberation in the Maghrib against European rule. His guerrilla tactics also influenced 20th-century revolutionary leaders in Latin America and Asia. Abd el-Krim was defeated largely owing to the size and technological superiority of the European armies marshaled against him.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Lyautey, Louis Hubert (1854–1934); Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934); Rif War (1920–1926)

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Abu Klea, Battle of (January 16–18, 1885)

The fierce Battle of Abu Klea was fought between British soldiers of the Gordon Relief Expedition and dervishes in the Sudan. The dervish onslaught, aided by British command and control problems, broke the British units deployed in the square formation in a battle characterized by courage on both sides.

A British expeditionary force was formed in the fall of 1884 under the command of General (later Field Marshal Viscount) Lord Garnet J. Wolseley to rescue Major General Charles G. Gordon, who was besieged in Khartoum. Gordon had been sent on a mission to assess the feasibility of evacuating Egyptians from the Sudan after the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. In December 1884, to hasten the relief, Wolseley divided his force into two elements. The first was the River Column, which was to follow the Nile River, and the second was the Desert Column, under the command of Brigadier General (later Major General) Sir Herbert Stewart, with Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick G. Burnaby as second in command. The camel-mounted Desert Column was to cross the Bayuda Desert from Korti and reach Metemmeh on the Nile by January 7, 1885.

The Desert Column was delayed due to water and supply shortages, and Stewart planned to reach the wells at Abu Klea on January 16, 1885. Dervish forces contested his advance, and Stewart's force halted and built a zareba (a stone redoubt enclosed by a thorny mimosa bush hedge) that night.

Stewart left soldiers wounded by dervish harassing fire, as well as baggage, in the zareba and formed his 1,450-man force into a hollow square formation to advance. The front face of the square contained two Mounted Infantry Regiment companies, guns, and Coldstream and Scots Guards companies. Guards and Grenadier troops, Royal Marines, and soldiers of the Royal Sussex Regiment formed the right face of the square. On the opposite side were two companies of the Mounted Infantry and one of the Heavy Regiment, and the rear had four companies of the Heavy Regiment and the naval brigade with its rapid-firing Gardner gun in the center. The soldiers were formed in double ranks on each side of the square and numbered 235 rifles on the left face and 300 or more on each of the other three faces. Staff and supply elements, with about 150 camels, were in the center of the square.

The square advanced slowly over the undulating ground and soon halted to re-form because the camels in the center were delaying the rear side of the square. As this was taking place, about 5,000 dervishes in two columns attacked the left front corner of the square. British fire forced the dervishes to veer off course and join other dervishes, who were attacking the left rear corner of the formation.

The ensuing action was chaotic. It seems that Burnaby ordered the companies on the left face of the square to open up a gap to permit the Gardner gun to move outside the square and open fire. As the dervishes assaulted, the Gardner gun jammed and was overrun. The dervishes poured through the gap in the square, killing Burnaby by a spear thrust to the neck, and forced Heavy Regiment soldiers back against the camels in the center of the square. This stopped the momentum of the dervish onslaught. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting took place, and the rear ranks of the soldiers on the square's right face turned around and began firing rapidly into the densely packed groups of dervishes inside the square. As the dervishes in the rear saw the piles of their dead comrades to their front, they wavered and finally broke off their attack. Dervish cavalry made a last attempt on the right rear corner of the square, but withering rifle fire drove them off.

After this sharp, fifteen-minute engagement, about 1,100 dead dervishes were found in and near the British square. The Desert Column lost 74 all ranks (officers and enlisted ranks) killed and 94 wounded, two of whom later died. These significant losses did not prevent the Desert Column from continuing to advance the next day and had little overall impact on the outcome of the campaign.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Gordon, Charles (1833–1855); Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah) (1844–1885); Stewart, Herbert (1843–1885); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Wilson, Charles (1836–1925); Wolseley, Garnet (1833–1913)

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Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889)

The Abushiri Revolt, also known as the Mrima War, was a military uprising by the notables of the East African coast against the German colonial authorities and their assumed Zanzibari support. The revolt was ultimately unsuccessful, as the local resistance was too fragmented to successfully resist the Germans. The conflict is notable for marking the demise of the private *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft* (DOAG), the imposition of direct German control of the claimed territory, and the initial formation and successful operation of the *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Schutztruppe*.

The roots of the Abushiri Revolt predate the attempted imposition of German control in 1884–1885. The powerful Swahili mercantile communities on the East African coast had dominated the trade networks spanning from the interior to the Indian Ocean for decades, marginalizing their inland brethren. However, these dynamics had begun to change initially with the imposition of Omani rule in the 17th century, and then precipitously accelerated with the creation of the Zanzibar Sultanate under Sultan Said in 1856. The local notables were swiftly undermined by the new Arab traders, whose easier access to markets and capital offered a decisive advantage. By the time the DOAG began to try to assert its authority (with the blessing of the sultan) in 1884–85, there were already extreme tensions in the region, which the harsh methods of the Germans served to exacerbate.

The revolt itself started in August 1888 and initially centered around the city of Pangani, a mercantile center in the northern section of the German-claimed coast. The DOAG officer, Emil Zelewski, precipitated an argument with the local governor over the right to fly the sultan's flag. This public struggle eventually kindled a riot, from which Zelewski and his troops extricated themselves. Zelewski returned several days later with more troops and attempted to arrest the town's governor, who was in Pangani's central mosque at prayers. A general revolt erupted when Zelewski and his men entered the mosque with their boots on and accompanied by a dog, and at this point, the violent response of the crowd could not be suppressed. A local notable, Abushiri Salim al-Harthi, used the local outrage to weld together a coalition around Pangani to expel the Germans, and other local power brokers such as Bana Heri, the sultan of Zigua, began their own revolts. By September 1888, the DOAG had been driven out of all of its posts except for Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam.

With their control of the colony effectively destroyed, the DOAG called upon the German government for help. A relief force under Captain Hermann von Wissmann was quickly constructed out of mercenary Sudanese and Shangaan troops under German officers and dispatched to the coast to deal with the revolt. Wissmann's forces arrived outside Bagamoyo in May 1889 and faced the forces of Abushiri, which had fractured along internal fault lines in the interim. Wissmann's force of slightly over 700 African troops managed to storm the fortified settlements of Abushiri's roughly 1,000–1,600 followers, driving them from the region around Bagamoyo and badly damaging Abushiri's legitimacy within his remaining coalition. Abushiri retreated to Pangani and was followed there by the Germans, who on July 8 managed to wrest the town from the local forces in an amphibious operation.

By this point, Abushiri could call upon no local support, so he retreated to the interior and recruited several thousand freebooting Mafiti with promises of plunder. With this new force, he attempted to divide the Germans' attention, luring them into the interior with an attack on their Mpwapwa station and then attacking their vulnerable coastal holdings. While this strategy saw initial success, destroying the station and Mpwapwa and drawing the German forces inland, the follow-up strike at Dar es Salaam ended in failure. Despite having several thousand Mafiti, Abushiri lost the element of surprise and was repelled from the town, suffering heavy losses. During their retreat, the Mafiti were attacked at Yombo by the German forces returning from Mpwapwa, crushing the last vestiges of support for Abushiri. The rebel leader was captured while trying to flee to British East Africa and was executed in Pangani on December 15, 1889.

The remaining major rebel force was that of Bana Heri, who controlled the area by Sadaani. The Germans turned their forces against Bana Heri's fortified base at Mlembule on January 4, 1890, capturing it in a difficult assault. This led Bana Heri, who had greater local popular support than Abushiri, to pursue a guerrilla war against the Germans. Wissmann's forces responded with a scorched-earth policy to deny any supplies or aid to Heri's warriors. While this caused widespread famine and death, even among ostensibly friendly groups, it was undeniably effective. Bana Heri slowly lost his base of support, and eventually his previously concealed headquarters at Palamakaa was discovered. In early March 1890, Wissmann concentrated the majority of his forces in the Palamakaa Valley and launched a series of assaults against the Zigua warriors who supported Heri. The Germans encountered stiff resistance and were repelled from the Zigua fortifications several times before finally driving Heri's men off on March 9. Although Heri still had significant support, he was facing an increasingly tenuous position, and on April 8, he surrendered to Wissmann's forces. In return, he was confirmed as sultan of Zigua and given a civil servant's salary to govern the region for the Germans.

With the defeat of Abushiri and Bana Heri, the majority of the remaining Omani and African notables along the coast offered their submission to the Germans. The example of Heri was especially instructive, as he was allowed to retain his previous authority just by reaching an accommodation with the Germans. While Wissmann's troops continued to campaign against local forces such as those of the Nyamwezi leader Machemba, with the surrender of Bana Heri, the Abushiri revolt was effectively over, and German rule was secured along the coast. Following the Abushiri revolt and the subsequent imposition of direct German control, the conquest of German East Africa was essentially assured as the colony now had a strong foothold and an efficient central administration that would serve as a springboard to further conquest.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; *Schutztruppe*

(1889–1918); von Wissmann, Hermann (1853–1905); von Zelewski, Emil (1854–1891)

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Addis Ababa, Treaty of (1896)

The Treaty of Addis Ababa, signed on October 23, 1896, brought an end to formal hostilities between Ethiopia and Italy in the First Italo-Ethiopian War. This treaty ensured Ethiopia's preservation as one of just two independent African territories during the so-called Scramble for Africa.

The Treaty of Addis Ababa was a result of the successful military defense of Ethiopia at the Battle of Adowa. Italian troops had invaded Ethiopia from positions in Eritrea to enforce the Italian understanding of the Treaty of Wichale. Differing interpretations of the Treaty of Wichale had led to war between the two nations. The Ethiopians believed the treaty to be the basis for a mutual friendship, while the Italians believed that the treaty made Ethiopia a client-state, if not an outright Italian possession. At root, these problems were due to differing wording or faulty translations in different versions of the treaty. The Italian text indicated the Ethiopians "must" rely on Italy in dealing with other powers, functionally making Ethiopia an Italian protectorate, while the Amharic only noted that the Ethiopians "could" rely on Italy. After the defeat of the Italian expedition, Menelik II, emperor of Ethiopia, whose forces were at the limits of their own logistical capabilities, did not invade Eritrea; instead, he proceeded to wait out the Italians. As the Italian public was highly divided over the imperial venture, Italy's loss at the Battle of Adowa brought these domestic fissures to the surface. Riots broke out in several Italian cities, while demonstrators in Rome marched on the government offices chanting "Viva Menelik!" and threw rocks at the house of Prime Minister Francesco Crispi. Amid crumbling public support for renewed military action, along with a converse increase in public and religious cries to end the war to ensure the return of Italian prisoners of war, the Italian government collapsed, and a new government opened negotiations to end the conflict.

Menelik II was able to achieve his two primary aims from the Treaty of Addis Ababa. First, the treaty recognized the independence of Ethiopia as a sovereign country. Not only did the Italians recognize this fact, but the British and French governments, who also possessed colonies bordering Ethiopian territory, did the same, only a few short years after the end of the war. Second, the treaty recognized the territorial boundaries of the Ethiopian kingdom. While there would be several territorial adjustments before the outbreak of World War

I, these disputes would be settled diplomatically and peacefully rather than militarily. Finally, Menelik II also received a massive payment of 10 million lire from the Italian government. While this money was not defined as an indemnity or a bribe for diplomatic reasons—the treaty, in fact, specified no monetary amount, beyond appealing to the "sense of fairness" on the part of the Italian government to pay the costs of holding onto Italian prisoners of war—it did ensure the successful end to the war and the release of 1,587 Italian prisoners.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Adowa, Battle of (1896); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Menelik II (1844–1913); Wichale, Treaty of (1889)

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Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896)

In the last decade of the 19th century, a scramble by the major European powers occurred as they sought to carve up Africa. The newly unified Italy joined the race for African colonies, and beginning in 1884, Emperor Yohannes IV of Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia) found himself fighting a two-front war with the Mahdist state to the west in the Sudan and the new Italian colony of Massawa on the Red Sea. In the Battle of Dogali on January 26, 1887, some 7,000 Ethiopians destroyed an Italian battalion of 500 men, killing 420 and wounding 80, who however managed to escape. This defeat temporarily thwarted Italian expansion, but the Italians were determined to exact revenge. In 1889, Yohannes IV was killed fighting the Mahdists and Menelik II became emperor.

Menelik sought to convince the Italians that he was their client, signing the Treaty of Wichale in 1889. He became suspicious of the Italians, however, when they wooed the pretender to the Abyssinian throne, Ras Mengesha, and became friendly with leaders in Tigray, which bordered Eritrea. Menelik was also angered by Italian claims to a protectorate over Abyssinia. The Treaty of Wichale existed in both Italian and Amharic versions, with the Italian version containing a clause to that effect.

In 1889, the Italians expanded their occupation of Massawa, and on January 1, 1890, they organized the territory as Eritrea. In 1889, Italy also established a new colony in Somaliland on the east coast of Africa, southeast of Ethiopia. Menelik now saw clearly that the Italian government was seeking to expand its East African holdings.

In February 1893, confident in the consolidation of his authority, Menelik denounced the Treaty of Wichale. Having acquired a fair stockpile of modern weapons from the various European colonial powers (including the Italians themselves), he commenced a military campaign across the Mareb River into Tigray in December 1894. An outpouring of pro-Abyssinian nationalist and anti-Italian sentiment followed. Nonetheless, the governor of Eritrea and commander of Italian colonial forces,

BATTLE OF ADOWA, MARCH 1, 1896


N
Mount Eshasho
Baratieri's position at 0900 hours
Italian batteries
Italian batteries
Ellena's reserve brigade
Spur of Mount Bellah
Darbormida's advance
Arimondi's advance and Baratieri's main defense lines
Mount Bellah
Hill of Chidane Mares
To camp at Sauria
Albertone's advance
Ethiopian lines of attack
Mount Semaita
Hill of Enda Chidane Meret
Italian batteries
To Adowa
Retreating Askazi of Albertone
To Abba Garima
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General Oreste Baratieri, crushed the rebellion with 9,000 troops. The Italians then occupied the Tigrian capital of Adowa.

Baratieri suspected that Mengesha would attempt to invade Eritrea, and he marched to meet him. In the Battle of Coatit in January 1895, the Italians were victorious. Pursing Mengesha's retreating forces, the Italians captured documents proving Menelik's complicity with Mengesha.

Baratieri's victory over Mengesha and his early success against the Sudanese Mahdists led him to underestimate the difficulties of a war with Menelik, however.

Ethiopian forces were victorious over the defending Italians at Amba Alagi on December 7, 1895, forcing the Italians to withdraw into Eritrea. The Ethiopians then attacked the unfinished Italian fortress at Mekele, held by 200 Italian and 1,150 African troops under Major Giuseppe Gailliano. Following several unsuccessful Ethiopian assaults and a three-week-long siege, the defenders ran out of food and ammunition and were forced to surrender on January 21. The Italians were taken prisoner, while the African auxiliaries were branded on the arm and released with a warning not to fight against Menelik again.

Italian Premier Francesco Crispi, seeking a scapegoat for the military reverses, ordered the recall of Baratieri and his replacement by General Antonio Baldissara. Goaded by his official disgrace or ordered by Crispi to advance (accounts differ), and convinced that the well-trained and effectively equipped reinforcements arriving in Massawa from Italy would be sufficient to overwhelm the Ethiopian forces opposing him, Bararieri gathered half of the Italian forces in East Africa and began a new advance into Tigray with four brigades totaling 20,000 men and 54 guns.

The decisive battle occurred near Adowa (also known as Adwa, or by the Italian name of Adua) on March 1, 1896. Emperor Menelik was waiting with a force that approached 100,000 men, some 70,000 of whom were armed with rifles. They also had some 40 artillery pieces, although some of these were antiquated. On the night of February 28, Baratieri advanced his brigades. Poor maps and faulty communication led one brigade to be some three miles ahead of the others, and early on March 1, Menelik overwhelmed it by sheer force of numbers. As the remaining Italian brigades advanced to the rescue, they were defeated handily. The Italians were utterly routed. By the time they began their retreat that afternoon, perhaps 6,500 of the original force were dead (4,500 of them Italians) and another 2,500 (1,600 Italians) had been taken prisoner. Baratieri's army, in effect, ceased to exist. On Menelik's orders, some 800 Askaris (African colonial troops) found to have been branded after the Battle of Mekele had their right hands and left feet amputated. Ethiopian casualties totaled some 4,000–6,000 dead and 8,000 wounded.

Adowa was the worst defeat for a European army by an African army since the time of Hannibal Barca and the Carthaginian Wars. Fortunately for the Italians, the Ethiopians did not attempt any serious pursuit, as their huge army was difficult to feed. Menelik also did not try to invade Eritrea. In 1914, Ethiopia and Liberia were the only African nations free of European conquest.

Dr. William T. Dean III and
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See also: Alula Engida, Ras (1827–1897); Askari; Baratieri, Oreste (1841–1901); Coatit, Battle of (1895); Dogali, Battle of (1887); Eritrea; Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Italo-Ethiopian War, Second (1935–1936); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah) (1844–1885); Mekonnen, Welde Mikael (1852–1906); Menelik II (1844–1913); Wichali, Treaty of (1889); Yohannes IV (1837–1889)



Italian and Ethiopian soldiers fighting during the Battle of Adowa on March 1, 1896. This engagement represented the worst defeat inflicted upon a European army by Africans since ancient times and meant that Ethiopia was the only African state to successfully defend itself during the "Scramble for Africa." (Leemage/UIG via Getty Images)

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Afonso I (d. c.1542)

Afonso I ruled the Kongo Empire from 1506 until his death in roughly 1550. A devout Catholic, his efforts to Christianize and modernize his empire left him vulnerable to exploitation by Portugal.

Although his birth date is unknown, Afonso was born Nzinga Mbemba and first appears in the historical record in 1506, when he became the king of the Kongo Empire. During the 15th century, the Kongo Empire emerged along the estuary of the Kongo River in a region that today is located in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, and Angola. The kings of the Kongo Empire had built a powerful, centralized state that exacted tribute from peoples throughout the region. The Portuguese had arrived on the West African coast in the 15th century to trade and to convert the coastal peoples to Christianity.

Afonso adopted his royal name when he was approached by Portugal for trade, becoming the first in a long line of Portuguese vassal kings. His father, Nzinga Nkuwa, who had taken the name João I, was converted to Catholicism by Portuguese missionaries. He proved to be a halfhearted convert, however, and later reverted to his traditional religion. Afonso was a more devout Catholic, and after his father's death, he defeated a non-Christian rival to seize the throne. He built churches throughout his kingdom and tried to stamp out elements of traditional religion. Afonso had his son Henrique ordained as a priest and later sent him to Rome to become the first black bishop.

During the reign of João, Portuguese merchants had supplied Kongo with priests and military aid in exchange for slaves and ivory. Afonso also welcomed the Portuguese merchants and priests, and shortly after becoming king, he asked the Portuguese monarch to send more priests, artisans, and military advisers to aid in his efforts to Christianize and modernize his realm. In 1512, the king of Portugal devised a plan called the Regimento, which promised that his agents would modernize the Kongo Empire in exchange for tribute to be paid in precious metals, ivory, and slaves.

While Afonso ultimately received little support from the Portuguese monarchy, trade with the Europeans (especially in slaves) grew rapidly. Portuguese merchants had an insatiable demand for slaves, who were exported out of Africa to work on the sugar plantations in the New World. Over the three decades of Afonso's reign, thousands of slaves were taken annually from the Kongo Empire by Portuguese traders. Initially, the slaves provided were criminals from Kongolese society and captives taken during wars with Kongo's neighbors. However, as the demand outstripped the supply, Kongolese traders began purchasing or raiding slaves from neighboring areas.

Eventually, Afonso recognized the dangers posed by the slave trade. Slave raiding was increasing the amount of conflict between the Kongo Empire and neighboring states. In some cases, Portuguese merchants aided Kongo's enemies in an effort to create more captives for the slave trade. Increasingly, profits from the trade, which were controlled by the Kongolese aristocracy, created a wide social and economic gulf between the classes in the Kongo. Portuguese merchants began subverting Afonso's authority and traded directly with local villagers. Afonso also appears to have been concerned that too many slaves were leaving the country, which left his regime short of labor. Despite his reservations, which he expressed in a series of letters to the Portuguese monarchy, Afonso's efforts to curb the slave trade proved ineffective. The Kongolese aristocrats and Portuguese merchants, whom he relied on to remain in power, simply ignored him.

By 1540, the Portuguese monarchy had forgotten about Afonso and lost interest in his plans to modernize the Kongo Empire. Throughout his long reign, Afonso received only a few of the advisers and priests he had requested. Later in the 1540s, Portuguese merchants tried to have him assassinated while he was in church. He survived, but he was too politically weak to expel the Portuguese from the country. Afonso died around 1542 under unknown circumstances. He was succeeded by one of his grandsons, who reigned as Diogo I.

James Burns

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (c. 1575–1648)

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Africa Squadron (United States Navy)

The Africa Squadron was a halfhearted attempt by the U.S. navy to address British demands to assist in the suppression of the transatlantic slave trade after its abolition in the early 19th century.

The beginning of the 19th century was characterized by a renewed interest in the suppression of the transatlantic slave trade. In 1808, the year after this trade was made illegal in both Britain and the United States, Britain was sending naval vessels to the west coast of Africa in an effort to intercept slavers. By 1833, slavery was abolished in the British Empire, and most western European powers had been cajoled, bribed, or bullied by Britain into agreeing to the equipment clause and the right of search. The right of search allowed British officers on slave patrol vessels to halt and search other vessels suspected of being slavers. The equipment clause allowed these officers to seize the intercepted vessels if there was sufficient evidence that the craft was fitted out to carry slaves. Indications that a vessel was destined to carry slaves included the presence of large cooking pots, shackles and manacles, and additional planks of wood that could quickly be constructed into a makeshift slave deck.

Although Britain had the permission of nearly every other relevant power to search suspicious vessels, the United States consistently refused to allow any person, other than U.S. naval officers, to interrupt the journey of any ship flying the U.S. flag. This intransigent attitude can be traced to the impressment of American sailors before and during the War of 1812 and the determination by the American people that they would never again allow vessels belonging to their countrymen to be subject to any type of unauthorized search by British naval officers. As understandable as this position was, it effectively allowed the illegal traffic to flourish, as slavers from countries such as Portugal and Brazil simply switched to the U.S. flag when they suspected that British cruisers might be in the area.

In an effort to quash the illegal use of the U.S. flag and to improve Anglo-American relations, the government of the United States agreed to Section VIII of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. This provision established that a regular U.S. naval squadron, consisting of a minimum of 80 guns, would patrol the west coast of Africa to intercept any vessels suspected of being slavers and flying the U.S. flag. Theoretically, the presence of U.S. cruisers—designated the "Africa Squadron"—would solve the problem of British officers boarding suspicious U.S. craft. In reality, the effectiveness of the squadron was negligible compared to the results achieved by their British counterpart. Although American officers and men generally performed their duties diligently under extremely trying conditions, their force was never great enough to effectively guard the 3,000 miles of coastline used by slavers. The squadron rarely had more than a few ships on patrol at any given time, and the vessels sent to the area were usually too large to patrol the rivers and inlets favored by slavers for embarkation. In addition, the U.S. supply base at Porto Praia was approximately 2,000 miles north of the main slaving areas. This meant that by the time any U.S. cruisers reached the principal slaving grounds, they were almost immediately forced to turn back, or else they would run out of supplies before the end of the voyage.

The orders sent to the first commander of the squadron, Captain Mathew Calbraith Perry, by Secretary of the Navy A.P. Upshur, also compromised the initial aims of the treaty. Upshur instructed Perry that his first responsibility was to protect the rights of American citizens engaged in lawful commerce, and that this directive should take precedence over all other considerations. Upshur, in one brief, yet concise, set of orders, changed the primary purpose of the Africa Squadron from suppressing the slave trade to the protection of U.S. nationals engaged in lawful commercial operations. For Upshur and many other Americans, it seemed more prudent to protect U.S. citizens and commerce from British interference than to devote all their energies and resources to what was, essentially, a moral issue that had so far bitterly divided the country. This division extended to the U.S. judicial system, and members of the Africa Squadron were repeatedly disheartened by the lack of convictions in cases brought against slavers.

Knowing that American cruisers were rarely encountered in slaving waters, traffickers simply flew the U.S. flag, all but guaranteeing safe passage for their hapless human cargo. Frequent complaints registered by the British condemned the American efforts as wishy-washy and completely insufficient. Indeed, Royal Navy officers argued that since the Africa Squadron had been formed, the trade in slaves had actually increased due to the protection afforded by the U.S. flag to those not legally entitled to fly it. The British government refused to officially relinquish the right of impressments, and so the U.S. government continued to deny the Royal Navy the right of search—the one allowance necessary to effectively police the trade.

This situation continued until 1861, when all but one vessel were recalled to home waters to assist in naval blockades during the Civil War. In January 1862, that remaining ship left the west coast of Africa as well. Fearful that Britain might enter the war in support of the South, and realizing the total impracticality of sending a squadron to police the west coast of Africa during a time of war, Secretary of State William H. Seward agreed to sign a mutual right of search treaty on March 23, 1862. With the much-needed authority of the British to search all suspect vessels back in place, the transatlantic slave trade was all but over within three years. In comparison to the British West Africa Squadron, the American efforts proved disappointing. Although firm figures are difficult to determine, it is estimated that during the period that the Africa Squadron was in existence, it captured approximately 24 slavers, and few of those were condemned. The Royal Navy captured 566 slave ships, and well over 90% were condemned. For over half of its period of service, the Africa Squadron did not even fulfill its 80-gun requirement.

Claire Phelan

See also: British Anti-Slavery Squadron

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Alexandria, Bombardment of (July 11, 1882)

The British naval bombardment of Alexandria, Egypt, on July 11, 1882—the first and last time a British ironclad squadron went into action—marked an escalation of hostilities in the Urabi Rebellion. This engagement paved the way for the decisive defeat of the Egyptian army two months later, as well as the British occupation of Egypt and control of the Suez Canal.

On May 20, 1882, British and French warships entered Alexandria Harbor in Egypt to support the faltering Egyptian khedive (viceroy) and protect British and French citizens and interests.

As tensions increased and the political situation became more volatile in Egypt, the Egyptians began strengthening the seaward fortifications at Alexandria Harbor. The Egyptian defensive line, containing about 180–200 guns, stretched about 7 kilometers, from the Pharos in the north, around the harbor, and along the shore to Fort Marabout in the southwest. The strong point of Fort Meks, with its 31 guns, was at the center of the Egyptian line of fortifications.

Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, concerned about the safety of his squadron, demanded that the Egyptians cease reinforcing their fortifications and dismantle their gun batteries. Although the Egyptians appeared to comply with Seymour’s order, British searchlights revealed the Egyptians working frantically on their positions at night. Infuriated by this duplicity, Seymour (with the permission of the British government) issued an ultimatum to the Egyptians on July 10, 1882, to surrender selected threatening forts within twelve hours or face a possible bombardment within twenty-four hours. The French ships, unwilling to become embroiled in hostilities, sailed away that night.

But there was no response from the Egyptians. At 7:00 A.M. on July 11, 1882, Seymour's eight battleships and eleven gunboats opened fire on the shore fortifications. Two of his battleships, H.M.S. *Invincible* (Seymour's flagship) and H.M.S. *Inflexible,* each had four 80-ton, 16-inch main guns mounted in pairs in two turrets, designed to fire ahead and astern, as well as broadside. Shells from these guns "wobbled in the air with a noise like that of a distant train" (Padfield 1981, p. 173). The five-year-old H.M.S. *Alexandra,* another of Seymour's ships, mounted two 11-inch and ten 10-inch muzzle-loading, rifled-barreled guns. While many of Seymour's vessels were older and less heavily armed, and the British had some difficulties in aiming, adjusting, and controlling their naval gunfire, the outcome of the bombardment was never in doubt. The Egyptians, although generally manning their guns bravely (albeit somewhat ineffectively), could not withstand the thunderous barrage indefinitely. After about 900 men were killed and wounded (out of the 8,000 defending the forts), the Egyptians abandoned their positions. The Egyptian guns were silent that afternoon. The British fleet suffered 10 men killed and 27 wounded, with no ships receiving substantive damage.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Egyptian Army; Urabi Pasha, Ahmed (1841–1911); Urabi Rebellion (1882)

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Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857)

The conquest of Algeria was initiated in the last days of the Bourbon Restoration by Charles X as an attempt to increase his popularity among the French people, bolster patriotic sentiment, and expand French influence in North Africa.

In 1827, a diplomatic incident led to Algiers being blockaded by the French navy for three years. On April 28, 1827, Hussein Dey of Algiers, while demanding an explanation from Pierre Deval, the French consul, for France's failure to pay a 30-year-old debt, struck the consul with a fly whisk and called him a wicked rascal. King Charles X of France used this slight against his diplomatic representative to first demand an apology from the dey, and then to initiate a blockade against the port of Algiers. The blockade lasted for three years, until

Charles X ordered an invasion. The French army of 38,000 men, led by General Louis Auguste Victor de Ghaisne, comte de Bourmont, landed near Algiers on June 14, 1830. During a three-week campaign, it inflicted a series of defeats on Algerian forces, capturing Algiers on July 5 and ending more than 300 years of Ottoman presence in the region. However, this was not the end of local resistance to the French. Ahmed Bey ben Mohamed Chérif, the bey of Constantine, led the local Berber population in fierce resistance to the French occupation forces, as did Abd al-Qadir, emir of Mascara, who established his base in western Algeria and staged a large number of raids against the French. In 1834, France formally annexed the occupied areas of Algeria and created a colonial administration led by a governor general who was responsible to the minister of war.

The French then directed their attention to defeating the continued Algerian resistance. Despite their attempts to crush Abd al-Qadir's insurgency, it endured, compelling the French to accept the Treaty of Tafna in May 1837, which recognized French conquests in Algeria but also surrendered much of Algeria to al-Qadir's sovereignty. But the French effectively broke the terms of the agreement when they stormed Constantine in October 1837. This led to Abd al-Qadir's launching fresh attacks, and by 1839, he effectively controlled two-thirds of the country. To put an end to this, in 1840, King Louis Philippe appointed a new commander-in-chief, Thomas-Robert Bugeaud, who pursued a vigorous campaign using mobile columns that struck at the supply centers of Abd al-Qadir. In May 1843, the French army inflicted a heavy defeat on the Algerians at Smala, forcing Abd al-Qadir to withdraw into Morocco and continue his campaign from there. However, Bugeaud again defeated Abd al-Qadir and his Moroccan allies at Isly (1844) and then at Sidi-Brahim (1845), effectively ending the resistance. While al-Qadir's forces were being subdued, the French also led a series of expeditions into the Aurès Mountains, where Berber resistance remained strong until late 1849. By then, nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control, and the government of the Second Republic declared the occupied lands an integral part of France, creating three *départements* (local administrative units) under a civilian government. The last stronghold of Algerian resistance was the mountainous area of Kabylia, which the French eventually conquered in 1856–1857. This victory effectively ended the conquest of Algeria, although isolated resistance continued for many years.

Ralph Martin Baker

See also: Abd al-Qadir (1808–1833); Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Thomas-Robert (1784–1849); Faidherbe, Louis (1818–1889); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

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Alula Engida, Ras (1827–1897)

Born of humble origins in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia, Alula Engida became a local customs official. Reputedly, he first came to military prominence in an Ethiopian civil war when, at the Battle of Assam on July 11, 1871, he was among those who captured Wagshum Gobaze, who was leading a faction against Tigray's ruler, Kasa Mercha, who then became the Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV. To improve his social status, Alula then married the daughter of the emperor's uncle.

At the battles of Gundat in November 1875 and Gura in March 1876, Alula commanded Tigrayan forces that defeated the invading Egyptian armies and captured many of their modern Remington rifles and artillery. These engagements led to the end of Egypt's interest in trying to control the Horn of Africa's Red Sea coast. Subsequently, Alula was promoted to the rank of Ras and dispatched to subdue a rebellious vassal ruler. In October 1876, the emperor made him governor of part of what is now Eritrea.

In 1884, Ethiopian forces under Ras Alula rescued the garrisons of five towns in the neighboring Sudan from Mahdist forces during the Egyptian withdrawal. In turn, the British, who had occupied Egypt in 1882, recognized Ethiopian control of the Bogos area and the Red Sea port of Massawa, where Alula had built a palace. On September 23, 1885, in the Battle of Kufit, Ras Alula led a 10,000-strong Ethiopian army that defeated a Mahdist force of about the same size, led by Osman Digna, which stabilized the Sudan-Ethiopia border. While at least 3,000 Mahdists were killed, the Ethiopians lost 1500 men and Ras Alula was wounded.

Contradicting their recent agreement with Ethiopia, the British encouraged Italian ambitions in the Horn as a counter to the French in what is now Djibouti. Ethiopia was once again cut off from the coast. On January 25, 1887, a 25,000-strong army under Ras Alula attacked the fort at Sahati, which was held by 167 Italian and 1,000 African colonial troops. The Ethiopians withdrew after hundreds of them were killed by Italian firepower. The next day, at the Battle of Dogali, Ras Alula led around 10,000 men who ambushed 500 Italian soldiers under Colonel Tommaso De Cristofori, marching to relieve Sahati. All were killed except 80 wounded men, who escaped. The Italians abandoned Sahati and several contested villages in the area, and massively reinforced their colony of Eritrea with 18,000 soldiers. In turn, they retook Sahati and other inland villages, constructed a series of frontier forts, fortified Massawa, built a railway from Massawa to Sahati, and imposed a complete trade embargo on Ethiopia.

In March 1889, Yohannes IV was killed in battle with the Mahdists. Subsequently, Menelik II, the ruler of Shewa province, ascended to the imperial throne with the help of Italian firearms. He then signed the Treaty of Wuchale, in which Italy recognized him as emperor, and he ceded Italy the territory that they had already taken in

Eritrea. Ras Alula was now isolated, as Yohannes, his patron, was dead and much of his land had been given to the Italians. In 1893, Menelik renounced the Treaty of Wuchale, as the Italian version (but not the Amharic one) stated that Ethiopia had to conduct its foreign relations through Italy. This led to the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895–1896, in which all nobility and military leaders, including Ras Alula, rallied to Menelik's cause.

On March 1, 1896, at the climactic Battle of Adowa, Ras Alula commanded one of the major contingents of the 100,000-strong Ethiopian army, which defeated the 20,000-man Italian invasion force. Although Ras Alula wanted to pursue the Italians to the coast, Menelik refused, as his army was starving and the Italians at Massawa were ensconced in a fortified island. In January 1897, Ras Alula, while leading an Ethiopian force against the rebellious Ethiopian leader Ras Hagos, was shot in the leg and died from his wound on February 15.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); De Cristofori, Tommaso (1841–1887); Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah) (1844–1885); Menelik II (1844–1913); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Yohannes IV (1837–1889)

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Amazons, Dahomey

A female military regiment that existed in the West African kingdom of Dahomey (the present-day Benin Republic) from the eighteenth century until 1892, when they were defeated and disbanded by French forces who established foreign rule over Dahomey. There are no known dates for the creation of this exclusive female regiment. Their first recorded engagement in battle occurred in 1729 during a campaign by King Agaja of Dahomey (1673–1740) to recapture Whydah (Ouida). Having suffered

The West African kingdom of Dahomey maintained an elite corps of female warriors called "Amazons" by Europeans. They were founded in the eighteenth century and disbanded after defeat by French colonial forces in the 1890s. (Chris Hellier/Getty Images) heavy losses in a prior war with the Yoruba and determined to retake Whydah, Agaja created companies of female soldiers to boost the number of his troops.

Other accounts trace the origins of the Amazons to Dahomey's famed female hunters, the Gbeto, and the female corps of royal bodyguards who resided in the Dahomean palace. The Amazons comprised of both Dahomeans and foreign slaves from neighboring kingdoms. They lived in the palace and were considered the king's wives, so they could not have intimate relations with other men. Whatever their beginnings, however, Dahomey's female warriors were an important military force in West African history and facilitated the expansion of Dahomey.

The enlargement of this corps of female soldiers occurred with the accession of Gezo (d.1858) to the throne of Dahomey. Impressed by their courage and loyalty, he expanded the recruitment of female soldiers and gave them an elite position in the army. New recruits were required to renounce all family ties and pledge loyalty only to the king. Their entry into the army was marked by a blood oath, in which they drank from a skull containing the recruits' blood and swore allegiance to each other. Young girls of the age of thirteen or fourteen were attached to each company of female soldiers to learn the warriors' craft. However, they did not participate in warfare until they were mature enough to handle firearms acquired through coastal trade. Amazons received rigorous and often challenging drills geared toward endurance, survival, and apathy about death. They were aptly trained in the use of weapons (mostly muskets, short swords, bows, and poisoned arrows). They were described by European observers as shooting muskets with accuracy and reloading with great speed.

By the nineteenth century, this corps of female soldiers had acquired a reputation as the most skilled, disciplined, and loyal regiment in the Dahomean military. They led the Dahomean army to numerous victories. Some of their notable battles occurred in 1849 against their northern neighbors from Atakpame and in 1851, 1864, and 1871 against the Egba. Their final battles were against the French, who claimed Dahomey and the territories around it as a sphere of influence for them during the European "Scramble for Africa" in 1884. The first Franco-Dahomean war ensued in 1890 on the Bight of Benin, following a Dahomean attack on a French stockade. The French army emerged victorious, which was not surprising given their superior firepower. A final war between the Amazons and the French occurred in 1892 and lasted for three weeks. Despite their valor, the Amazons and their male counterparts were no match for the better-equipped French forces. The formidable female warriors were the last to surrender, and their bravery was recorded by French legionnaires. This defeat ended the long existence of Dahomey's female warriors and ushered in total French dominance in the region.

Ogechukwu C. Ezekwem

See also: Firearms Technology; Franco-Dahomey Wars (1890–1894); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900)

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Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874)

Throughout the 19th century, the Asante Empire and the British struggled over control of the coastal communities and trade along West Africa's Gold Coast (now Ghana). The 1871 British purchase of Dutch forts along the Gold Coast threatened Asante's supply of firearms. Consequently, Asante invaded the coast in 1873 and besieged the small British garrison at Cape Coast Castle. Although the war faction within Asante had gained the upper hand, those who favored negotiations included the Queen Mother and the state's top military leader, Asamoa Nkwanta.

In August 1873, newly promoted Major-General Garnet Wolseley, at 40 years old the youngest general in the British army, was placed in command of a punitive expedition against Asante and appointed administrator of the Gold Coast Protectorate. For Wolseley, it was important that the military power of Asante be crushed by a force composed primarily of British troops, not African allies, in order to compensate for the defeats inflicted by Asante in the 1820s and 1860s and to assert European dominance over Africans. Aware that British soldiers would be vulnerable to tropical diseases, Wolseley planned a quick invasion and had his men issued with quinine, a light uniform to replace the traditional scarlet tunic, and a pamphlet instructing them on jungle survival (including sleeping off the ground and keeping one's head covered).

To lead the expedition, Wolseley selected a group of officers, some of whom he had come to know while subduing the Metis in western Canada in 1870 and others who had reputations for bravery or intellect that would later be called the "Ashanti Ring." To get the British troops in and out during the short dry season of January and February 1874, Wolseley arranged the improvement of the road that ran from the coast 112 kilometers inland to the forward-staging area at Prahsu, on the Pra River, which included the construction of 237 bridges and a supply/rest base every 16 kilometers. Once the army reached the Pra, it made a lightning strike on the Asante capital of Kumasi, another 100 kilometers inland. Since pack animals were vulnerable to tropical disease, supplies were transported by thousands of carriers press-ganged from coastal communities. The expedition itself consisted of 1,500 British regulars and 700 black troops from the West Indian Regiment and Nigeria, supported by several artillery pieces and rockets. Given that the thick forest meant that small units could easily become separated from the main body, Wolseley's expedition had a disproportionally high number of officers—1 for every 20 men.

Suffering from smallpox and dysentery, the Asante army withdrew inland across the Pra River and sought to fight a delaying action to lure the British to a strongly defended position at Amoafo, 30 kilometers from Kumasi, where they would be outflanked and trapped by the destruction of a bridge. Although the Asante army at Amoafo numbered some 10,000 men, they were armed with obsolete muzzle-loading smoothbore muskets fired from the hip, and they were so low on ammunition that they resorted to using pebbles and snail shells.

On the other side, the British troops were armed with the up-to-date Snider breech-loading rifle. Wolseley's spies and scouts had informed him about Asante dispositions. The British expedition, formed into a loose square with the artillery in the center, advanced on Amoafo, where it clashed with the Asante army on January 31. While the Black Watch highlanders at the front of the square pushed ahead slowly, troops on the left flank struggled through the forest, which created a gap that was almost penetrated by Asante attack. Taking heavy casualties, the Asante slowly withdrew, although they launched a determined counterattack that came to within 100 meters of the British headquarters and other attacks in the rear of the square cut off British supplies. A supply column was overrun and its commander, George Pomeroy Colley, was saved by the arrival of British and West Indian soldiers. The British lost four men and suffered several hundred casualties and believed that they killed some 3,000 Asante. Also present at the battle was journalist and explorer Henry Morton Stanley, who Wolseley praised for fighting like a veteran.

Although defeat at the Battle of Amoafo propelled the peace party to power in Kumasi, harsh British surrender terms were rejected, and another Asante army mobilized under Asamoa Nkwanta. Despite mounting fierce resistance, the Asante were defeated by the advancing British at the Battle of Odahsu, and Wolseley's expedition entered nearby Kumasi on the evening of February 4. Two days later, after waiting in vain for Asante leaders to arrive to surrender, the British burned the capital and began marching back to the coast before the arrival of the rains. Asante emissaries eventually caught up with Wolseley and agreed to surrender. This resulted in the Treaty of Fomena, in which the Asante renounced claims to the coast, agreed to pay an indemnity to Britain, and promised to open the area to free trade. Both sides wanted to end the war, as the British expedition was unable to stage further operations and the weakened Asante wanted to prevent its provinces from declaring independence.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Asamoa Nkwanta; Colley, George Pomeroy; Kofi Karikari; Stanley, Henry Morton; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); Wolseley, Garnet; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

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Anglo-Aro War (1901–1902)

In 1885, Britain, having gained treaty rights to control the foreign affairs of local states in what is now southeastern Nigeria, declared the Oil Rivers Protectorate, which was renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893. In 1887, Jaja, who had refused British traders free access to his town of Opobo, was lured into negotiations by the British, where he was arrested and exiled to the Caribbean.

With the removal of the dominant Jaja, the British signed treaties with 25 rulers of Igbo towns between 1887 and 1897. Further British expansion inland was blocked by the powerful Aro confederation between the Niger and Cross rivers. In 1896, a force of 130 Royal Niger Company troops moved into Aro territory but was intimidated into turning back. In September 1899, Sir Ralph Moor, British commissioner of the Niger Coast Protectorate, recommended to the Colonial Office that a military expedition should be dispatched to break Aro power. He recommended that the proposed expedition consist of 87 European officers, 1,550 African soldiers, and 2,100 supply carriers. The British objectives for the invasion were to abolish slavery, destroy the wide influence of the Aro oracle called the "Long Juju," encourage local people to engage in trading natural resources, and introduce currency to the area.

The expedition was delayed by the Second Anglo-Boer War in South Africa and the Asante rebellion in the Gold Coast. In the meantime, the Niger Coast Protectorate and the nearby territory formerly ruled by the Royal Niger Company were amalgamated into the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, with Moor as high commissioner, and British colonial forces in West Africa were reorganized under the umbrella of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF).

In November 1901, Aro forces attacked Obegu because the town had been friendly with the British; they killed some 400 people there. This massacre provided the British with just the excuse they needed to launch an invasion. By the end of 1901, the Aro Field Force had been assembled under Lieutenant-Colonel A.F. Montanaro and consisted of 14 British officers, 317 men from the Northern Nigeria Regiment, 262 men from the Lagos Constabulary, 1,150 soldiers from the Southern Nigeria Regiment, and 2,334 carriers. These were supported by several mountain guns and Maxim machine guns, as well as gunboats on the waterways.

At the end of November, four British columns, sometimes traveling on boats and sometimes marching overland, invaded Aro territory at different points. For the next few weeks, they were harassed by sniping and skirmishing, and overcame entrenched defensive positions. After some fierce fighting, British forces entered Arochukwu, the Aro capital, on December 24, where they encountered stiff resistance until December 28. The British then destroyed the Long Juju shrine.

During January and February 1902, the British columns fanned out across Aro territory and overcame further opposition. Some Aro leaders were tried and hanged by the British. In late 1902, a force under Canadian major W. C. G. Heneker (who had commanded one of the original Aro Field Force columns) consisting of 15 Europeans, 262 African soldiers, 39 gun carriers, and 250 supply carriers was dispatched to subdue the Igbo town of Afigbo. On December 28, Heneker's column used machine gun fire to defeat courageous attacks by Afigbo warriors, and the town surrendered.

In March 1905, a British force under Captain E. C. Margesson comprising 16 European officers and noncommissioned officers and 273 African soldiers left Calabar near the coast and proceeded north to pacify the Abakaliki district. By early June, after the British expedition defeated limited resistance, the area was under colonial control. Over the next several years, British colonial forces sent out small patrols to crush local resistance and confirm their authority over Igboland. In 1914, the protectorates of southern Nigeria and northern Nigeria were combined into the single colonial territory of Nigeria. For many historians, the Anglo-Aro War of 1901–1902 represented the single most important event in the imposition of British authority over southeastern Nigeria.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Nigeria Regiment; Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (1897–1903); Royal Niger Company; Royal Niger Constabulary; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); West African Frontier Force (WAFF)

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Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874)

This was the third armed conflict that broke out between British forces and the Asante Empire from 1873 to 1874. The Asante Empire (1670–1957) was an African kingdom that existed in the Akan region of what is now Ghana and stretched up to the contemporary Ivory Coast. In 1701, a sophisticated Asante army won the empire's independence from Denkyira, another Akan state. In this way, the empire gained access to the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic coast, where it engaged in trade with Europeans (notably the British, Portuguese, and Dutch). Further territorial expansion made the Asante a military and economic force to reckon with in the region. Direct clashes with British forces started in 1823 over British attempts to enforce the end of the Atlantic slave trade, on which the Asante economy depended. Many British policymakers and merchants also believed that Asante expansion posed a threat to British political and economic control of Ghana's coast. Eventually, Anglo-Asante conflicts advanced to struggling over domination of the Gold Coast (part of modern Ghana) and its ultimate administration as a Crown colony in 1902.

Prior to the British gaining a foothold in the Gold Coast, the Dutch had a considerable presence in the region. In 1871, however, the Dutch sold their Gold Coast territory to Britain. This territory included the port of Elmina, which had historically been claimed by the Asante and gave them access to the sea. Due to the Asante's fear that British possession of Elmina meant loss of sea access except through British ports, they invaded the new British protectorate. Under the command of Colonel Garnet Wolseley (1833–1913), and believing that a British victory would result in the acquisition of adequate gold to cover the cost of the expedition, thousands of British, African, and West Indian troops were dispatched against the Asante. This expedition reached the Gold Coast on January 1874, and the third Anglo-Asante War commenced in Amoafo on January 31. The Asante army was commanded by Asamoa Nkwanta (d. 1875), a reputable Asante general and tactician. Asamoa Nkwanta stationed Asante troops under the cover of forests and ridges that overlooked bogs that the British had to wade through. From this vantage position, they attacked British forces. However, the Asante were significantly mismatched by heavily armed British troops and were defeated during the Battle of Ordashu on February 4, 1874. The Asante abandoned their capital, Kumasi, which was then looted and burned by the British. Much of Kumasi's wealth, including the Asante's impressive gold regalia, was carted off to Britain.

At the conclusion of the Anglo-Asante campaign, Britain and the Asante signed the Treaty of Fomena on July 1874. The treaty robbed the Asante of all claims to Elmina, including any payments from the British for the use of the forts. The Asante were also required to pay 50,000 ounces of gold as indemnity. Prior to this Anglo-Asante War, the Asante Empire had military alliances with other states, such as Denkyira and Akyem. The terms of the treaty required that they abandon these alliances, as well as withdraw all Asante troops from the coast. They were also forced to recognize the independence of all states south of the Pra River. They renounced all rights to tributes from Adansi, an older state than Asante but nonetheless a member of the empire, whose troops served in the Asante army but denied any participation in the war following the British victory. The Asante also agreed to keep the trade routes open and put an end to human sacrifice, a common practice in the empire.

British forces withdrew to the coast after the Anglo-Asante War of 1874. However, the effects of this campaign long endured in the Asante Empire. The Asante economy was in disarray, and parts of the empire were affected by famine. Many tributary states no longer feared the once formidable Asante Empire and sought or already declared independence. Alongside the states south of the Pra River, several northern states, such as Gonja, Dagomba, and Brong, seized the opportunity of the Asante loss to assert their independence. The Dwaben (Juaben), a significant component of the empire, broke away and asserted their independence from Asante, taking with them their army of about 20,000 men. As this crisis brewed, the British preferred Dwaben over Kumasi as their new point of entry into the Gold Coast interior. The Dwaben committed acts of war against Kumasi until the situation deteriorated to total war in November 1875 and eventually resulted in an Asante victory. Asante triumph over Dwaben did not put an end to the incessant threat against the empire's sovereignty, but it reunified parts of the realm.

Asante was able to rebuild and even flout some terms of the Fomena treaty, especially regarding the indemnity of 50,000 gold ounces, which was never paid in full. The

British did not leave an occupation force or appoint any representative in Kumasi to enforce the terms of the treaty. Thus, any deviations by the Asante from the treaty required another punitive expedition. The British adopted a policy of noninterference in local affairs after the war of 1874, as they believed that a total breakup of the Asante Empire might result in a chaotic atmosphere unconducive to trade. Nonetheless, British officials took several steps to weaken the empire's position by supporting its opponents, encouraging tributary states to rebel, and giving refuge to the empire's enemies. Britain continued to support the dismantling of the Asante Empire as an economic power in order to bring all the Gold Coast under British influence. Tensions between the British and the Asante continued, eventually resulting in other wars.

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See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Anglo-Asante Wars (1823–1826 and 1863–1864); Asamoa Nkwanta; Kofi Karikari; Wolseley, Garnet

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Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900)

Throughout the 19th century, the Asante Empire and the British struggled over control of the Fante communities and oceanic trade along West Africa's Gold Coast (now Ghana). The British also disliked the fact that after the abolition of the coastal slave trade, Asante redirected much of its commerce to the Muslim states of the north. The 1871 British purchase of Dutch forts along the Gold Coast threatened Asante's supply of firearms through Elmina. Consequently, Asante invaded the coast in 1873 and besieged the small British garrison at Cape Coast Castle as the African inhabitants of the former Dutch enclaves rebelled in support. In January and February 1874, British major-general Garnet Wolseley led a well-prepared force of 1,500 British regulars and 700 West Indian and Nigerian troops, supported by thousands of local supply carriers, in an invasion of the Asante Empire. After the British won several key battles (such as the one at Amoafo) and burned the Asante capital of Kumasi, the Asante agreed to the Treaty of Fomena, in which they renounced claims to the coast, agreed to pay an indemnity to Britain, and promised to open the area to free trade.

Since it had recovered militarily under its new ruler, Prempeh, Asante rejected a British offer to become a protectorate in 1890 and launched a campaign to subdue the Nkoranza people in 1893. In 1894, Prempeh rejected a British proposal to pay him a stipend in exchange for accepting a British resident at Kumasi and not attacking coastal groups. An Asante delegation to London in 1895 failed to prevent British invasion. In January 1896, fearing that the French in the Ivory Coast to the west or the Germans in Togo to the east would intervene, British forces, including West Indian troops and African auxiliaries led by Robert Baden-Powell, occupied Asante without a fight. The British declared a protectorate, built a fort at Kumasi to serve as a base for a British resident, and exiled Prempeh, his family, and his main advisors to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.

In late March 1900, after Gold Coast governor Sir Frederic Hodgson refused to return the exiles and insisted on the surrender of the sacred Golden Stool, the Asante rebelled under the leadership of Queen Mother Yaa Asantewa and besieged the British fort at Kumasi, which was defended by several Maxim guns. The Asante cut the British telegraph wires, built stockades on each of the roads leading out of Kumasi, and encircled the town with a path cut through the forest so that men could be dispatched quickly to wherever they were needed. Each Asante military unit was assigned a position in the cordon and a reserve held at headquarters. While most Asante fighters were still armed with their old muzzle-loading muskets, a unit of snipers was created from professional hunters with up-to-date rifles, who were placed in trees and trenches around the fort to pick off British officers. Given the ongoing British campaign against the Boers in South Africa, the organization of a substantial relief force from the coast was delayed. In late April, a small relief force of 250 soldiers armed with one field gun and two Maxims, which had been rushed to the Gold Coast from Lagos, fought its way through a series of Asante ambushes and entered the fort at Kumasi (although 5 were killed and 139 wounded, including all 6 officers). Another small relief force of around 200 African soldiers pushed through to the fort from the north in May, but all it achieved was to provide more mouths to feed with rapidly diminishing supplies. Within the fort, deaths from hunger and smallpox amounted to two or three dozen a day. In late June, the governor and most inhabitants of the fort broke out of the siege, leaving behind about 100 men too sick to march. Every morning, those abandoned men carefully opened the gate and rolled fresh corpses into a nearby trench.

On July 15, the main relief force from the coast, consisting of 1,000 African soldiers and 1,600 porters led by Colonel James Willcocks, arrived at Kumasi, assaulted the Asante stockades, and relieved the fort's desperate defenders. By September, British colonial troops at Kumasi had increased to 2,000 and nearby Asante towns were attacked; and in October, some Asante leaders surrendered when offered amnesty. The last battle between the British and Asante took place on September 30, 1900, at Aboasu, just northwest of Kumasi. Supported by field guns and Maxim guns, Willcocks led 1,200 men mostly from the Central African Rifles, West African Regiment, West African Frontier Force (WAFF), and Sikhs from India. With intense hand-to-hand fighting, the Asante were slowly driven up a hill, where they were outflanked and fled into the forest to avoid being completely surrounded.

Kobina Chere, a defiant rebel leader accused of killing prisoners, was later captured and brought to Kumasi, where he was tried by the British military and publically hanged. Yaa Asantewa and 15 other rebel leaders were also captured and sent to join Prempeh in the Seychelles. The British administration quietly dropped the sensitive issue of the Golden Stool. In this last Anglo-Asante War, the British lost 692 soldiers and carriers, and 732 troops were wounded. The Asante estimated their dead at over 1,000, and the number of wounded remains unknown to this day. In 1902, Asante was incorporated into the Gold Coast Protectorate; in 1925, Prempeh was allowed to return home as a private citizen; and in 1935, the monarchy was restored under his successor, Prempeh II, who ruled under British supervision.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Asante Wars; Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Baden-Powell, Robert; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); Wolseley, Garnet

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Anglo-Asante Wars (1823–1826 and 1863–1864)

During the first decade of the 19th century, Asante, a well-established kingdom in the interior of what is now Ghana in West Africa, invaded and conquered Fante on the coast to control the oceanic trade with Europeans, which was particularly important as a source of firearms. At this time, Asante could raise a total force of 80,000 men, of which about 50,000 had guns.

In the late 1810s, the Asante imposed a trade blockade on the British, refusing to pay rent for their coastal castles, encouraging the Fante to suspend sending tribute north to Kumasi, and failing to ratify a treaty that recognized Asante sovereignty over the Fante. In late 1823, Brigadier General Charles MacCarthy, British governor of Sierra Leone, led an invasion of the southern part of the Asante Empire. His plan was that four separate British colonial columns would link up and defeat the Asante. However, on January 21, 1824, before the rendezvous took place, MacCarthy's column, consisting of 80 British soldiers of the Royal African Corps, 170 Cape Coast militia, and 240 Fante allies, was confronted by an Asante army of 10,000 men on the banks of a tributary of the Pra River. The two forces shot at each other across a 60-foot-wide stream until the British ran out of ammunition, their supply carriers having fled, and the Asante then attacked and overwhelmed them. Only 20 members of the British force escaped the Battle of Nsamankow, and the decapitated heads of MacCarthy and another British officer were brought to Kumasi as trophies.

The Asante advanced south and attacked Cape Coast Castle but were repelled. On August 7, 1826, at the Battle of Katamanso (also called Dodowa), a few kilometers north of Accra, the Asante attacked a larger force of 12,000 men from various coastal states, supplemented by 120 British soldiers and marines and a few cannon and rockets. Leading the Asante army, Osei Yaw ignored the advice of his officers to stage a night attack; instead, he launched a daylight assault across the open coastal plain, which did not favor the usual Asante forest tactics of ambush. During their approach, the Asante took heavy casualties from British cannon fire until they were close enough to respond with their own musket volleys. When the Asante began to push back the coastal fighters, the British opened fire with rockets, the sound and flash of which panicked the Asante. In the confusion, the sacred Golden Stool was almost lost. In Asante's worst military disaster, hundreds were killed or captured and 60 leaders were killed. Consequently, Kumasi lost control of the coast, the Fante gained independence, and the Pra River was recognized as the southern border of the Asante Empire.

Defeat by the British weakened the king's authority and caused the rise of a prowar faction among Asante leaders. Tensions again escalated in the early 1860s, when the British gave sanctuary to several Asante fugitives. As a result, in 1863, Asante armies raided the coastal communities allied with the British and pulled back before the start of the wet season. Although the British responded by sending West Indian troops to the Pra River in preparation for a strike into Asante territory, half of them succumbed to tropical disease, by in July 1864, they had withdrawn. This bolstered Asante confidence and set the stage for future conflict.

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See also: Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Royal African Corps; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Anglo-Asante Wars

During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Asante Empire ruled over much of modern Ghana in western Africa. However, Great Britain had established a presence on the Gold Coast, and the Asante Empire was to be defeated in the course of three wars against the British.

Historically, the Asante had exercised a considerable influence in the Gold Coast region and governed a large territory. The Asante people's determination to preserve their empire posed a threat to the British, who also wanted to control Ghana's coast for strategic, political, and economic reasons. However, Great Britain's commitment to stopping the slave trade made it impossible for the British to maintain good relations with the Asante, who by 1820 had become the largest slave traders on the coast. Many British policymakers believed, moreover, that it was their duty to promote Christianity and Western civilization. Some British merchants also believed that if Asante power could be destroyed, a vast market would be opened to them.

The First Anglo-Asante War began after the Asante executed a Fante soldier who served in a British garrison for insulting their asantehene (Asante ruler). The British launched a military expedition against a 10,000-member Asante force near the village of Bonsaso. The Asante not only outnumbered the British, but also used superior tactics. The fighting began on January 22, 1824, and initially favored the Asante, who encircled the British force and killed Governor Charles MacCarthy. Eventually, however, the British drove the Asante back to Kumasi.

After reorganizing, in 1826, the Asante again invaded the coast and attacked the British and their allies. During the fighting on the open plains of Accra, the British used Congreve rockets, which frightened Asante warriors, who believed that the enemy was using thunder and lightning against them. The Asante panicked and fled to Kumasi. According to a peace treaty concluded in 1831, the asantehene recognized the independence of the coastal states and agreed to refer all future disputes to the British for adjudication. In exchange, the coastal states promised to allow the Asante to engage in legal trade on the coast and to respect the asantehene.

After the British government resumed responsibility for the administration of the coastal forts in 1843, relations with the Asante gradually deteriorated. In addition to assaults on Asante traders, the asantehene believed that the British and their coastal Fante allies no longer treated him with respect. When British governor Richard Pine refused to return an Asante chief and a runaway slave to the asantehene, the Asante prepared for war. In April 1863, the Asante invaded the coast and burned 30 villages. Pine responded by deploying six companies along the Pra River, the border between states allied with the British and the Asante. The deployed force built a network of stockades and a bridge, but it returned home without engaging the enemy after inexplicably having lost its guns, ammunition, and supplies.

Commercial pressures persuaded the British to remain on the coast, and in 1872, they took over former Dutch trading enclaves. The Asante claimed a right to the Dutch outposts and invaded the territory that acted as a buffer between their kingdom and the coast. That attempt to preserve the Asante Empire's last trade outlet to the sea at the old coastal fort of Elmina resulted in the Second Asante War from 1873 to 1874.

In early 1873, a 12,000-member Asante army crossed the Pra River and invaded the coastal area, but it suffered a defeat at Elmina. The British government then appointed Major-General Garnet Wolseley administrator and commander in chief and ordered him to drive the Asante from the coastal region. In December 1873, Wolseley's African levies were reinforced by the arrival of several British units. Approximately one month later, Wolseley sent an advance party across the Pra, warning the asantehene that he intended to begin hostilities. Wolseley, however, also offered an armistice. When negotiations failed, both sides prepared for war.

The most significant battle of the Second Anglo-Asante War occurred at Amoafo, near the village of Bekwai. Although the Asante performed admirably, superior weapons allowed the British to carry the day. Asante losses are unknown; the British lost four men and had 194 wounded. In the following days, Wolseley captured the villages of Bekwai and then Kumasi, which resulted in the two sides' signing of the Treaty of Fomena on March 14, 1874. The treaty required the Asante to pay an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold, to renounce claims to Elmina and to all payments from the British for the use of forts, and to terminate their alliances with several other states, including Denkyera and Akyem. Additionally, the asantehene agreed to withdraw his troops from the coast, to keep the trade routes open, and to halt the practice of human sacrifice.

The British victory and the Treaty of Fomena ended the Asante dream of bringing the coastal states under its power. The northern states of Brong, Gonja, and Dagomba also took advantage of the Asante defeat by asserting their independence. The Asante Empire was near collapse. During the abbreviated Third Anglo-Asante War (1895–1896), Britain declared a protectorate over the Asante Empire to forestall French ambitions in the region and exiled the asantehene, Prempeh, his immediate family, and several close advisers to the Seychelles Islands.

The last skirmish between the Asante and the British, known as the Yaa Asantewaa War for Independence or the Fourth Anglo-Asante War, occurred during 1899–1900, when the British twice tried to take possession of the asantehene's Golden Stool; the Golden Stool was the symbol of Asante power and independence and had been kept in hiding since the exile of Prempeh. In April 1900, the Asante reacted to those attempts by launching an armed rebellion and by laying siege to the Kumasi fort, where the British governor and his party had sought refuge. The British eventually defeated the Asante and captured and exiled the rebellion's leader, Yaa Asantewaa, and 15 of her closest advisers. The result of that last encounter was the formal annexation of the Asante Empire as a British possession.

Ian Beckett

See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Anglo-Asante Wars (1823–1826 and 1863–1864); Asamoa Nkwanta; Baden-Powell, Robert; Kofi Karikari; West Africa; British Conquest of (1851–1903); Wolseley, Garnet; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

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Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881)

The First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881), also called the Transvaal Rebellion or the First War of Independence by the Boers, was caused mainly by the collision of British imperial aspirations and the South African Boer desire for independence. This was a relatively short campaign, best known for the humiliating defeat suffered by the British at the Battle of Majuba Hill and for setting the stage for another and much more significant war two decades later.

In 1877, the British annexed the Transvaal as part of a plan to bring together the region's British colonies and Boer republics into a settler-dominated confederation, the economy of which would be driven by recently developed diamond mining in the northern Cape. British colonial officials believed that the Transvaal would welcome British annexation, but this was a tremendous miscalculation: the Boers bitterly resented it. The Boer nationalists were becoming increasingly militant, especially after the 1880 election in Great Britain, when the prime minister stated that the Transvaal could only be independent as a member of a South African confederation. Finally, the insurgent Boers proclaimed the Transvaal a republic on December 16, 1880. Hostilities began immediately, with the Boers investing the two British Army companies at Potchefstroom. Other Boers rode to besiege British garrisons at locations in the Transvaal, including Pretoria, Wakkerstroom, Standerton, Marabastadt, Rustenburg, and Lydenburg.

This led directly to the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). This was a short, sharp conflict in which the British, under the command of Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley (who had been promoted to major-general and became the governor and commander in chief of Natal and the Transvaal and high commissioner for South-East Africa in April 1880), were defeated and humiliated by the Boers in four engagements.

The first action of the war took place on December 20, 1880, when a British column was intercepted by the Boers at Bronkhorstspruit, about 50 kilometers east of Pretoria. In the short battle, characterized by accurate and rapid Boer rifle firing, the British saw about 57 soldiers killed and more than 90 wounded out of a total force of 263. The survivors surrendered. This was the first devastating defeat for the British in the conflict.

Pomeroy Colley learned on Christmas Day, 1880, that a debacle had occurred at Bronkhorstspruit and that the British garrisons in the Transvaal were in various stages of being surrounded. At the time, the British had 1,759 troops in the Transvaal and 1,772 in Natal. Headquartered in Pietermaritzburg, Natal, he knew he would have to lead a force to quell the Boer unrest and relieve the British garrisons in the Transvaal. The only pass in the Drakensberg Mountain range through which an army could enter the Transvaal from Natal was at Laing's Nek, which the Boers were expected to defend. The 1,400-man composite Natal Field Force departed Pietermaritzburg on January 10, 1881.

On January 28, 1881, Pomeroy Colley's force was at a farm named Mount Prospect, 5 kilometers south of Laing's Nek, where an estimated 2,000 Boers were in defensive positions. Pomeroy Colley intended to turn the Boer position by a frontal attack, but the British were stopped by a fierce Boer fusillade. The attack was a dismal failure, and the British casualties were 83 killed and 111 wounded.

The British withdrew to Mount Prospect to await reinforcements. On February 7, 1881, the Boers started a flanking movement to isolate the British force. The Colonial Office was also pressuring Pomeroy Colley to defeat the Boers quickly or end hostilities before they spread further. The next day, he personally led a five-company force on the road to Newcastle to ensure that the route was still open and apparently to frighten the Boers known to be in the area. Some 12 kilometers south of Mount Prospect, near the Ingogo River, the British encountered and fought a large Boer force. In this fiasco, the Battle of Ingogo, 76 British men were killed and another 67 wounded.

Pomeroy Colley learned that the Boer positions at Laing's Nek had been strengthened considerably. He thought that he would be able to outflank the Boers by seizing the undefended mountain of Majuba, to the west of and dominating Laing's Nek, and from that vantage point force the Boers to abandon their positions. After conducting a night march on February 26–27, 1881, Pomeroy Colley's soldiers reached Majuba's unoccupied summit by 5 A.M. on February 27. The British soldiers, uninformed about the situation and plans, did not dig defensive fighting positions. Pomeroy Colley then became inactive and possibly fatalistic, perhaps through complacency or fatigue.

The Boers, after seeing British soldiers on Majuba Hill, were surprised not to receive a British artillery barrage on their positions. A number of Boers, while covered by supporting fire from comrades, ascended toward the British positions. It took about five hours, during which heavy rifle fire was exchanged, before about 400 Boers reached positions within striking distance of the summit. In the early afternoon, the Boers fired at close range at Gordon's Knoll and occupied it in a few minutes, then began pouring fire into the main body of soldiers. The Boers continued to advance, increasing their accurate rifle fire, and confusion reigned. Soon many of the demoralized British soldiers panicked, threw down their rifles, and stampeded to the rear. The Boers were close behind, shooting the fleeing soldiers. Only a half hour had gone by since the Boers had seized Gordon's Knoll. In the ensuing melee, Pomeroy Colley was shot and killed instantly. There were 285 British soldiers, out of a force of about 365 on the summit, killed or wounded at the Battle of Majuba Hill.

The Boer victory at Majuba Hill effectively ended the war. Major-General (later Field Marshal) Sir (Henry) Evelyn M. Wood, V.C., who had brought reinforcements and had become the British second in command, signed a truce with the Boers on March 6, 1881, that was ratified by the Convention of Pretoria six months later. This action largely restored independence to the Transvaal, subject to British "suzerainty." This convention was replaced by the London Convention of 1884, in which all mention of suzerainty was removed but to which Britain retained the right to veto external treaties.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Bronkhorstspruit, Battle of (December 20, 1880); Ingogo, Battle of (February 8, 1881); Laing's Nek, Battle of (January 28, 1881); Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Pomeroy Colley, George; Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902)

The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), known commonly as the Boer War and more recently as the South African War, has frequently been dismissed as one of "Queen Victoria's little wars." In reality, it was Britain's longest (lasting over 32 months), most expensive (costing over 200 million pounds), and bloodiest war (with about 22,000 British, 25,000 Boers, and 12,000 Africans losing their lives) fought from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914.

The primary issue that sparked the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War was the political rights of the *uitlanders* (foreigners) in the Transvaal or South African Republic. Gold was discovered in 1886 on the Witwatersrand, west of Johannesburg, and this attracted large numbers of *uitlanders* to the area. This in turn upset the stability of the area, and the Transvaal government was unwilling to give full political rights to these immigrants, concerned that the Boers would become the minority and be outvoted by the mainly British foreigners, who would then surrender their independence to London. Furthermore, the owners of the gold mining industry were frustrated with the inefficiency and taxation of the Boer republic.

Cape Colony prime minister and mining magnate Cecil Rhodes was the driving force behind an unsuccessful raid conducted by Dr. Leander Starr Jameson in 1895–1896 to support a planned uprising of *uitlanders* and overthrow the Transvaal government. This episode led directly to confrontation between the Transvaal and Great Britain. In light of increasing pressure, and after an ultimatum issued by the Transvaal, war broke out on October 11, 1899.

At the start of the war, the strength of the entire British Army (not including the Indian Army and colonial forces) was about 235,500. Of that number, only around 22,000 of these soldiers were in or en route to South Africa. A total of about 15,000 British soldiers were in or on their way to Natal, and 7,400 were in or in transit to the Cape Colony. Including local colonial units, the British initially had about 27,000 men present for duty in South Africa.

Boer forces, organized into commandos of various sizes, included a 17,500-man force deployed on the Natal border at the beginning of the war. There were another 6,000 burghers in the Western Transvaal, 1,700 men on the Northern Transvaal border, and 4,800 Boers in the Western Orange Free State. Other mobilized Boer elements totaled another 3,500 men or so.

The Second Anglo-Boer War, based upon the nature of the operations, can be divided into four main phases. The first phase of the war (October 11–30, 1899) consisted of limited Boer offensives in the Cape Colony and Natal after the outbreak of hostilities. The Boers, under the command of Assistant Commandant-General Jacobus De la Rey, won the first skirmish at Kraaipan on October 12–13, the Boer siege of Mafeking began on October 13, and that of Kimberley followed the next day. The ill-prepared British forces were defeated at a number of engagements and retreated from other positions. On "Mournful Monday," October 30, the British were beaten at Nicholson's Nek and Lombard's Kop. While the Boers planned to prevent



Boer fighters posing with an artillery piece during the Siege of Mafeking. Between October 13, 1899 and May 17, 1900, during the Second Anglo-Boer War, Boer forces besieged a small British garrison at the railway town of Mafeking. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

the deployment of British reinforcement by seizing all of Natal and the important rail lines in the Northern Cape, they became bogged down in a series of futile sieges.

General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., commanding the British 1st Army Corps at Aldershot since 1898, was designated the commander in chief of the South African Field Force in October 1899. He arrived in South Africa on October 31, 1899, which began the second phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War. This phase, also known as the Buller phase, consisted of the first unsuccessful British counteroffensives. Buller was under tremendous political pressure to relieve the besieged British garrisons at Mafeking, Kimberley, and Ladysmith (which was surrounded by Boer forces on November 2, 1899).

Buller divided the British forces in South Africa into three main elements in November 1899, commanding one himself, to accomplish three different missions. The westernmost force, the 10,000-man 1st Division commanded by Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal) Lord Paul S. Methuen, was given the task of relieving Kimberley. On November 21, his force began to advance north from Orange River Station, winning engagements at Belmont (November 23) and Graspan (November 25). His force was pinned down by Boers at the Modder River, south of Kimberley, on November 28. This battle was characterized by poor command and control on Methuen's part and a lack of British appreciation of Boer marksmanship, firepower, and ability to fight from camouflage defensive positions. The Boers abandoned their positions that night, giving the British an expensive victory.

Lieutenant General Sir William F. Gatacre, who had arrived in South Africa in November 1899, was in nominal command of the 3rd Division. With a small ad hoc force, he was asked to take control as much of the northeastern section of Cape Colony as he could and prevent any Boer advances from Stormberg. Gatacre, even though instructed to remain on the defensive until reinforced, was determined to seize Stormberg in a dawn attack after a night march. He failed to conduct a reconnaissance, changed the route and direction of attack (or got lost en route) at the last minute, and then led tired troops in rugged terrain in an attempt to surprise the Boers. At daylight on December 10, 1899, Gatacre's exhausted column was caught in a pass with Boers on the high ground. The Boers opened fire on the British, some of whom were able to occupy nearby high ground, but most were worn out and withdrew hastily. The Battle of Stormberg, the first of three significant British defeats constituting Black Week, resulted in British casualties of 28 killed, 51 wounded, and 634 captured.

Methuen continued to advance to relieve Kimberley. He attempted a night attack on December 11, 1899, to defeat Boers entrenched at Magersfontein, south of Kimberley. This assault turned into a horrible defeat with British casualties numbering 210 killed and 728 wounded, and was the second major defeat of Black Week.

Buller's force continued to march to the relief of Ladysmith. His units were repulsed while trying to cross the Tugela River at Colenso on December 15, 1899, at a cost of 1,138 total British casualties. The Battle of Colenso was the third British defeat during Black Week. The British public was shocked by these British failures, which, together with Buller's suggestion that the Ladysmith garrison consider surrendering, resulted in his replacement by Field Marshal Lord (later Earl) Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., on December 18, 1899. Buller did not return to England then; rather, he remained in South Africa and commanded British troops in Natal until October 1900. He was in overall command at the disastrous Spion Kop battle, January 23–24, 1900, at which at least 322 men were killed, 585 wounded, and 300 captured. Moreover, the Boers continued to besiege Ladysmith.

Roberts and his new chief of staff, Lieutenant General (later Field Marshal Earl) Lord Horatio H. Kitchener, arrived at Cape Town on January 10, 1900. Revising Buller's strategy, Roberts implemented a more indirect strategy concerned with seizing the enemy's capitals, believing that enemy resistance would then crumble. The third phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War, also called the Roberts phase, began on February 11, 1900, and consisted of generally successful British counteroffensives. Kimberley was relieved on February 15, 1900, Ladysmith on February 28, and, after a 217-day encirclement, Mafeking on May 17.

Roberts and Kitchener tried to reorganize the supply and transport system in February 1900, but the effort failed. Within weeks, the old supply and transport system, under the control of the Army Service Corps, was largely restored.

Kitchener, in Roberts's absence, commanded British troops at Paardeberg on February 18, 1900. Kitchener committed his troops to numerous futile frontal assaults against the entrenched Boers, failing to understand the lethality of an enemy armed with magazine-fed rifles using smokeless powder. Kitchener's dogmatic use of outdated tactics resulted in the most British casualties—1,270—suffered in a single day during the entire war. However, given that 4,000 Boers surrendered, Paardeberg represented a serious blow to the republican cause. Boer leadership changed after Paardeberg. Among the old commanders, Piet Cronje was captured at Paardeberg and Piet Joubert died of natural causes. Younger and more dynamic leaders emerged, such as Louis Botha who became commandant-general of the Transvaal, and Christian de Wet, who became commandant-general of the Orange Free State.

Roberts's offensive, after the capture of Bloemfontein (March 13), Johannesburg (May 31), and Pretoria (June 5), seemed to lose its momentum. Roberts failed to secure areas behind the British advances, thus making them vulnerable to guerrilla warfare—an unconventional type of fighting that he only belatedly recognized and had difficulties understanding. Although he initiated the policy of farm burning in June 1900, Roberts had convinced himself for many months that the war was basically over. He relinquished command on November 29, 1900 to Kitchener, returned to England, and replaced Field Marshal Viscount Garnet J. Wolseley as commander in chief of the British Army. This concluded the third phase of the war.

The fourth phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War began on March 31, 1900, with the Battle of Sannaspos. Thus the third and fourth phases of the Second Anglo-Boer War overlapped (from March 31 to November 29, 1900) and marked the transition from semiconventional operations to guerrilla warfare. Among the Boers, elite property owners who had lost everything in the war refused to give up and were dubbed "bittereinders," while poorer men who had long resented commando service surrendered or changed sides; these men were called "hendsoppers" (hands uppers) and "joiners." Kitchener resorted to drastic, frequently criticized methods to defeat the continued Boer insurgency. In order to deprive the Boer guerrillas of food, shelter, information, and other support, he increased farm burning, removed Boer families from their homesteads and resettled them in concentration camps, and constructed an increasingly large network of blockhouses. Mobile columns attempted to hunt down and isolate Boer forces. Kitchener's draconian measures ravaged the countryside and finally wore down Boer resistance.

The conflict ended in a British "victory" with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on May 31, 1902. While the Boers gave up their independence, British concessions included the return of all prisoners, general amnesty, protection of property rights, nonpunitive taxation, up to 3 million pounds toward reconstruction, the promise of self-government, assurances that black political rights would not extend north from the Cape, and preservation of the Dutch language. In 1907, the Boers of both the

Transvaal and Orange River Colony were granted responsible government. In 1910, the British colonies of the Cape and Natal and the two former republics combined to form the Union of South Africa, a self-ruling British dominion like Canada and Australia. The first three prime ministers of the Union—Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, and J. B. M. Herzog—were veterans of Boer forces in the war, which informed the popular saying that "the Boers lost the war but won the peace." However, the bitter memory of the war contributed to the rise of Afrikaner (Boer) nationalism during the early 20th century.

A total of 365,695 imperial and 82,742 colonial soldiers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Rhodesia fought for the British during the Second Anglo-Boer War. Of this number, 21,942 were killed in action or died of wounds or disease. Boer combatants totaled 87,365, about 7,000 of whom died. Poor living conditions in the concentration camps claimed the lives of perhaps 15,000 Boers and 20,000 of their African servants. The British rationalized or forgot the reasons for their early defeats by the Boers and failed to appreciate the major tactical lesson of the conflict: "It was that the smokeless, long-range, high-velocity, small-bore magazine bullet from rifle or machine-gun—plus the trench—had decisively tilted the balance against attack and in favour of defence" (Pakenham 1979, p. 610).

The Second Anglo-Boer War was the last great British imperial war. It would take the hecatombs of casualties a generation later in the static and putrid trench warfare of the Western Front and the Dardanelles before the British and other armies learned that the era of colonial warfare was over.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr. and
Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Belmont, Battle of (November 23, 1899); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); Blockhouses, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Buller, Redvers Henry; Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De la Rey, Jacobus; De Wet, Christiaan R.; Gatacre, William F.; Gandhi and the Second Anglo-Boer War; Graspan, Battle of (November 25, 1899); "Hendsoppers" and "Joiners" in the Second Anglo-Boer War; Jameson, Leander Starr; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 18991899); Methuen, Lord; Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Rhodes, Cecil John; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Sannaspos, Battle of (March 31, 1900); Smuts, Jan Christian; Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900); Stormberg, Battle of (December 10, 1899); Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902); Wolseley, Garnet

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Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868)

In the early 1860s, Ethiopian emperor Tewodros II appealed to imperial Britain, as a fellow Christian power, for help against Muslim Egyptians threatening his territory from Sudan and Ottomans blocking his country's trade through the Red Sea. The emperor's request was rejected, though, because due to the American Civil War, the British were dependent on Egypt for cotton and on the Ottoman Empire as a foil to Russian ambitions in India. Tewodros, angry that the Christian British had betrayed their Ethiopian coreligionists, ordered the detention of British diplomats in Ethiopia.

At this point, Tewodros's authority was declining, as Menilik declared himself the independent ruler of Shewa, Tigray had broken away, and there was a rebellion in Gojjam. Confined to a smaller area, Tewodros could raise an army of around 10,000 men, whereas he had once commanded over 100,000. In October 1867, an Anglo-Indian expeditionary force commanded by Sir Robert Napier landed at Zula, about 50 kilometers south of the Ottoman enclave of Massawa on the Red Sea coast, where it built a port and marched inland toward the Maqdala stronghold to liberate the British hostages. Napier's contingent consisted of 16,000 soldiers, one-third British and two-thirds Indian, 26,000 workers and camp followers, and 40,000 pack animals, including some Indian elephants to carry the artillery, consisting of 16 cannon, 16 rocket tubes, and 2 mortars. It took three months for the British to travel the 640 kilometers of mountainous terrain.

The Ethiopians clashed with the Anglo-Indian force on April 10, 1868 (Good Friday), at Aroge near Maqdala. Despite defending a natural mountain fortress, the Ethiopians were outnumbered and outgunned. The Ethiopian troops were armed with obsolete muzzle-loading, smoothbore matchlocks, while the British and Indian soldiers were equipped with modern, breech-loading rifles. Tewodros's locally manufactured artillery was either defective or not fired correctly. The British repelled a massive Ethiopian attack and then dislodged a defending force in just two hours, with 700 Ethiopians killed and 1,400 wounded, while only 2 British men were killed and 18 wounded.

On April 12, the emperor attempted to make peace by sending the British 1,000 cattle and 500 sheep and releasing the captives. Napier refused the livestock, as he did not want to make peace without defeating the Ethiopians on the battlefield, and Tewodros, seeing that he was surrounded, fled to Maqdala. The next day, the British successfully assaulted the mountain stronghold. Instead of surrendering, Tewodros placed his pistol in his mouth and killed himself. The British destroyed Maqdala and the Ethiopian artillery and then withdrew with the dead emperor's son and a large number of religious items and manuscripts.

Returning to the coast, the British rewarded Dajazmach Kasa Mercha, the Tigrayian ruler who had allowed them to pass through his territory and supplied animals and workers, with 6 mortars, 6 howitzers, 900 muskets and rifles, and a great stock of ammunition that greatly increased his military power. John Kirkham, a member of the British expedition, remained to train the Tigray army in European methods of warfare. This enabled Kasa to challenge Wagshum Gobaze, the ruler of Amhara, Wag, and Lasta, who had himself crowned emperor at Gondar.

Gobaze sent an army of 60,000 men to capture Adwa, then capital of Tigray, but Kasa's well-armed force defeated it at the Battle of Assam on July 11, 1871. Subsequently, Kasa was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV, and Menelik remained the autonomous ruler of Shewa. Between 1874 and 1876, Yohannes led Ethiopian armies to victory against the invading Egyptians, who had seized Massawa from the Ottomans and were trying to control the Red Sea coast. In the late 1870s and early 1880s, Yohannes's well-equipped army imposed more control over Ethiopia's other regions, such as Wollo and Shewa. After Yohannes was killed in battle against invading Mahdist forces from Sudan in 1889, Menelik took the imperial throne, with the assistance of firearms provided by the Italians, who had just become interested in the region.

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See also: Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Menelik II; Napier, Robert C.; Tewodros II; Yohannes IV

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Anglo-Ndebele War (1893)

During the late 1880s, British imperialist, mining magnate, and Cape Colony politician Cecil Rhodes planned to seek new sources of gold north of the Transvaal Boer republic, which he perceived as an obstacle to the dream of British rule from Cape to Cairo. In 1888, his agents visited Lobengula, ruler of the Ndebele, who lived north of the Limpopo River in what is now southwestern Zimbabwe, and convinced him to sign the Rudd Concession, which promised the British exclusive access to minerals in his territory in exchange for promises of money, 1,000 Martini-Henry breechloading rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and a gunboat on the Zambezi River. However, the British delivered only 500 rifles with some ammunition and Lobengula stored them at his capital rather than issuing them to his warriors, for fear that rival Ndebele factions would use them to challenge his authority.

Since Rhodes and his associates claimed that the Ndebele ruled the various Shona groups, it was erroneously believed that the concession extended British authority into Shona territory, which represents roughly the eastern half of present-day Zimbabwe. Rhodes received a royal charter and formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC), which sent a column of 200 armed Europeans supported by artillery, Maxim guns, and an electric searchlight into Shona country in 1890 and established a series of small posts, including Fort Victoria (today's Masvingo) and Fort Salisbury (today's Harare). The column was led by Frederick Courtney Selous, who had hunted extensively in the area over the previous two decades. Seeing that this was an invasion and not just mineral prospecting, Lobengula had several of his advisors executed for having supported the Rudd Concession and instructed his warriors to shadow the column, but not attack, as he feared colonial firepower. The Shona did not resist this limited European occupation, which had little impact on them at the time.

When it became apparent that Shona territory did not have the anticipated gold resources, the BSAC used a July 1893 Ndebele raid on Shona around Fort Victoria as an excuse for war. The company organized three fast-moving columns of mounted troops and wagons to converge on the Ndebele capital of Bulawayo. The Salisbury column, commanded by Major Patrick Forbes, had 258 European mounted infantry, 115 African allies, 16 wagons, a field gun, 2 Maxim guns, and 2 obsolete manual machine guns (a Nordenfeldt and a Gardener). The Victoria column, led by Captain Alan Wilson, consisted of 414 European troops, 400 Shona irregulars, 18 wagons, two field guns, and three Maxim guns.

These two columns rendezvoused at Iron Mine Hill in mid-October 1893 and proceeded toward Bulawayo. The Southern Column, originating from Tuli in Bechuanaland (now Botswana), was commanded by Pieter Johannes Raaf and Hamilton Goold-Adams and comprised 450 Europeans, two field guns, five Maxims, and 1,760 African auxiliaries under the Ngwato Tswana ruler Khama, half of whom were armed with Martini-Henry rifles. Previously, Khama had volunteered to come under British rule to counter threats from the Transvaal Boers and Ndebele. BSAC forces combined firepower and mobility by mounting Maxim guns on wagons that also carried large amounts of ammunition, and during the night, they formed defensive laagers.

The conservative Ndebele used some firearms, but their marksmanship was poor and they stuck to using the old “chest and horns” formation, a legacy of their Zulu origins, to directly attack colonial positions. In the early morning darkness of October 25, about 5,000 Ndebele warriors attacked the combined Salisbury and Victoria Columns at the Shangani River. While several mounted colonial patrols were driven back to the laager, BSAC firepower cut down the Ndebele and artillery disrupted their efforts to regroup. The Ndebele lost 500 men, compared to just 1 European and 40 to 50 Africans for the BSAC. The Salisbury and Victoria Columns advanced to the Mbembesi River, where on November 1, their single laager was attacked by a large Ndebele force held at bay by BSAC machine guns and artillery that killed between 800 and 1,000 men. On the same day, as it crossed the Ramokabane River, the strung-out Southern column was saved by its Maxim guns, which repelled an ambush by 600–700 Ndebele under its leader, Gambo.

As Lobengula led the remnants of his army north toward the Zambezi River, on November 4, the Salisbury and Victoria Columns entered Bulawayo, which had been burned by the Ndebele the previous day. The Southern Column arrived 11 days later. During the second half of November, Major Forbes led 270 mostly mounted men, supported by five wagons and four Maxims, in pursuit of Lobengula. Since Forbes’s detachment was slowed by mud and rain, he sent out a mounted patrol of about 40 men under Wilson without Maxim support. On December 4, Wilson’s patrol was trapped on the other side of the swollen Shangani River and annihilated by thousands of Ndebele warriors. One of the few survivors of the Wilson Patrol was Frederick Russell Burnham, an American frontiersman who had joined the invading army’s scouting element. Wilson and his men would be hailed as British imperial heroes and their last stand celebrated as a central event in the white colonization of southern Rhodesia.

Lobengula died of fever in early 1894, and his burial place remains unknown. The BSAC took Ndebele land and cattle, banned the Ndebele monarchy, and turned Bulawayo into a colonial town. Under company administration, the Shona territory (called Mashonaland) and the former Ndebele state (called Matabeleland) were combined as the British colony of southern Rhodesia, which developed a colonial economy based on white settler commercial farming and some mining. Africans were pushed off much of the best agricultural land and into small reserves from where they provided cheap labor.

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See also: British South Africa Company; Burnham, Frederick Russell; Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Firearms Technology; Khama III; Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Rhodes, Cecil John; Selous, Frederick Courtney; Shangani Patrol (December 1893); Technology

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Anglo-Ngoni War (1896–1900)

From 1891 to 1895, a relatively small number of British-led Indian and African troops transported by steamboats on Lake Nyasa (now Lake Malawi) subdued Yao and Swahili-Arab slave traders in what became called the "Slavers' War." The British then turned their attention to the Ngoni in the hills west of the lake in what was now the Central African Protectorate (later named Nyasaland).

Originating in the southeastern part of present-day South Africa, the Ngoni of Zwangendaba crossed north of the Zambezi River in 1835 and eventually split into different groups who raided African communities around Lake Nyasa and Lake Tanganyika. In 1896, Nyasaland's colonial military establishment was formalized by the establishment of the Central Africa Rifles (CAR), renamed the Central Africa Regiment in 1900, consisting of six companies of 120 men, each posted at forts across the territory.

In January 1896, a small British expedition of 24 Sikhs and 80 African soldiers from Nkotakota on Lake Nyasa stormed the mountain villages of the Ngoni leader Tambala in the middle of Nyasaland. Unlike the Swahili-Arabs, the Ngoni did not employ many firearms or fortify villages. Like their Zulu colleagues to the south, they relied on terror, mass encirclement tactics, and short stabbing spears for close combat. Shortly after the attack on Tambala, a Zomba-based British force of 58 Sikhs and 200 Africans took the village under Chikuse, an Ngoni leader south of the lake.

In January 1898, the protectorate's entire military under Captain H. E. J. Brake, 7 European officers, 118 Sikhs, and all 6 CAR companies supported by artillery and Maxim guns, assembled at Fort Jameson in the west and marched into the northeastern part of northern Rhodesia at the request of the North Charterland Exploration Company, which was experiencing resistance from the Ngoni of Mpezeni. On January 20, just east of the colonial fort at Luangweni, Brake's forces used volley fire to disperse at least 600–700 Ngoni, who were bombed by artillery as they fled. Later the same day, the expedition used artillery and Maxim fire, as well as a threatening charge from one of the CAR companies, to repel another group of 500 Ngoni approaching from the west.

During the remainder of January and early February, the British dispatched patrols to destroy Ngoni villages and capture cattle. Mpezeni surrendered and spent a year in prison before being allowed to return as chief, and his son Singu, whom the British blamed for the conflict, was captured and shot. A new colonial post, Fort Manning, was erected in the area, and three new CAR companies created to garrison it. The last British operations against the central Ngoni took place in November and December 1900 with the destruction of over 300 villages and Tambala's capture.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); King's African Rifles (to 1914); North End War/Slavers' War (1887–1895); Technology

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Anglo-Somali Wars (1891–1920)

In 1888, the British established a protectorate called British Somaliland through signing treaties with Somali leaders. Located in the northwest of present-day Somalia, the protectorate supplied beef to the nearby British enclave of Aden, which controlled access to the strategically important Red Sea (and hence the Suez Canal).

Beginning in 1899, Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan, derisively called the "Mad Mullah," established a Muslim Sunni state in the interior of British Somaliland, assembled an army of mounted gunmen from across the Somali region and called on his people to drive out infidels such as the Ethiopians, Italians, French, and British. In March 1900, Hassan led an attack on the Ethiopian garrison at Jijiga and recovered livestock previously seized from Somalis. In May 1901, the British and Ethiopians conducted a joint operation against Hassan's followers. A British colonial expedition of 1,500 Somali soldiers led by Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Swayne and a 15,000-strong Ethiopian force from Harar converged on Hassan's army, which moved into Italian Somaliland. The British and Ethiopians then withdrew from the inhospitable region. The memory of their 1896 defeat at Adowa discouraged the Italians from assisting in the campaign against Hassan.

In 1903, another British offensive led by Brigadier William Manning, which included a landing on the Italian Somaliland coast, failed, resulting in Hassan's followers occupying areas on both sides of the British and Italian Somaliland border up to the coast. In 1904, another British expedition under Major General Charles Egerton, supported by British and Italian warships, inflicted serious casualties on Hassan's forces and pushed them inland. By 1913, they had built a series of stone forts that dominated the interior of the Somali Peninsula. In August 1913, at the Battle of Dul Madoba in northwestern Somalia, some 2,700 of Hassan's men defeated a 110-strong contingent of the British Somali Camel Constabulary, which lost 36 men, including their commander, Colonel Richard Corfield. Hassan's army then attacked and looted the British-ruled port of Berbera. While the British expanded the constabulary into the Somaliland Camel Corps in 1914 to deal with the rebellion, the outbreak of the World War I delayed these plans.

By 1919, the British had established posts in the mountain passes, but Hassan's rebels still conducted raids and ambushes. After the British imperial general staff recommended that it would take two divisions and an enormous cost to pacify the area, the Colonial Office turned to the newly formed Royal Air Force (RAF), which, eager to prove that it should remain a distinct service, promised to complete the operation itself, with support from local colonial forces. By the start of 1920, with transport provided by the British aircraft carrier HMS *Ark Royal*, the RAF in Egypt had assembled a "Z Force" at a number of temporary airfields in British Somaliland. Commanded by Group Captain Robert Gordon, it included 12 biplanes for bombing, 14 motorized support vehicles, and 200 personnel.

In late January and early February, the RAF bombed Hassan's forts, which were then easily taken by the Camel Corps and a King's African Rifles (KAR) battalion on the ground. Terrified by the airplanes, Hassan's men scattered, and he retreated to the Ogaden Desert, where he died of natural causes in December. In what the British called "the cheapest war in history," colonial control over Somaliland was stabilized, and colonial secretary Winston Churchill began to think that air power could represent a cost-effective method to control the entire empire. To this end, he put British forces in the rebellious Iraq under RAF command.

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See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Churchill, Winston; King's African Rifles (to 1914); Muhammed Abdullah Hassan, Sayyid

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Anglo-Zulu War (1879)

The Anglo-Zulu War is remarkable for battles that included perhaps the most humiliating defeat in British military history, the Battle of Isandlwana (January 22, 1879), and one of its most celebrated feats of martial arms, the defense of Rorke's Drift (January 22–23,1879).

In the 1870s, after the discovery of diamonds in the northern Cape, the British embarked on new imperialistic ventures to confederate South Africa and make the region economically self-sufficient. They were also concerned with forestalling the colonization of more territory by other European powers. When the British annexed the Boer republic of Transvaal in 1877, they inherited the Boers' border disputes with the Zulus. The British, who had previously supported the Zulus, reversed their policy and engineered a territorial dispute as a basis for a confrontation. Cetshwayo kaMpande, who had been the Zulu king since 1872, was given an ultimatum on December 11, 1878—dismantle his army and turn over to the British those guilty of recent border violations. He was bewildered by this turn of events.

The British assembled at Fort Pearson on the Tugela River and invaded Zululand on January 11, 1879, after their ultimatum expired. The British forces in South Africa, commanded by Lieutenant General Frederick A. Thesiger, Second Baron Chelmsford, totaled about 16,000 soldiers, which included about 9,000 African levies. Some 977 wagons, 56 carts, 10,023 oxen, 803 horses, and 398 mules, with 2,000 extra locals to drive them, were required to support this force.



British soldiers at Isandlwana during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. On January 22, 1879, a large Zulu force surprised the British at Isandlwana killing 1,329 imperial and colonial troops. (The Illustrated London News Picture Library)

The British force that invaded Zululand was divided into five columns. The center column (No. 3), which Thesiger and his headquarters accompanied, was commanded by Colonel Richard Glyn. This 4,709-man column was to cross the Tugela River at Rorke's Drift and conduct the main attack directly on Cetshwayo's capital at Ulundi. The left column (No. 4) was commanded by Colonel Henry Evelyn M. Wood. V.C. Colonel Charles K. Pearson, commanding the right column (No. 1), was to initially establish an advanced base at Eshowe and then coordinate with Thesiger so that his column and Wood's column would converge on the center column at Ulundi. The No. 2 column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony W. Durnford and consisting mainly of African troops, was broken up, although Durnford and the Natal Native Horse were subsequently ordered to join the No. 3 column. Colonel H. Rowlands's No. 5 column guarded the Zululand frontier.

The center column reached Isandlwana, 16 kilometers from Rorke's Drift, on January 20, 1879. British forces reconnoitering the area found a number of Zulu soldiers the next day, but they did not realize that they were stragglers from the 23,000-man main Zulu army. On January 22, Thesiger took about half the center column (mainly the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, with four guns) to find and engage the Zulu army. He

ANGLO-ZULU WAR, JANUARY–JULY, 1879


NTOMBE
TRANSVAAL
Luneburg
Bivane R.
Phongolo R.
KAMBULA
Utrecht
HLOBANE
Ncome R.
Newcastle
Mzinyathi R.
BEMBA'S KOP
KOPPIE ALLEEN
Cetshwayo captured
Black Mfolozi R.
ZULULAND
Prince Imperial killed
Dundee
White Mfolozi R.
ISANDLWANA
ULUNDI
Helpmekaar
RORKE'S DRIFT
Ladysmith
Msinga
Mhlatuze R.
Eshowe
Port Durnford
MIDDLE DRIFT
NYEZANE
GINGINDLOVU
NATAL
Estcourt
Greytown
Tugela R.
Stangerr
LOWER DRIFT
Pietermaritzburg
N
1st invasion
Eshowe relief expedition
2nd invasion
Border raids
Durban
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left about 1,700 British and African soldiers (the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, with two guns) to guard the base camp at Isandlwana. During Thesiger's absence, the main Zulu army attacked and veritably wiped out the force at Isandlwana. At the Battle of Isandlwana—which was more of a slaughter than a battle—1,329 of the white and African soldiers were killed in what was one of the most shameful defeats in British military history.

On the night of January 22–23, 1879, about 4,000 Zulus under Dabulamanzi kaMpande attacked the center column's small supply base and hospital at Rorke's Drift. The small force at Rorke's Drift (consisting of 8 officers and 131 other soldiers, the nucleus of which was Company B, 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, under the overall command of Lieutenant John R. M. Chard) held off repeated Zulu onslaughts throughout the night. The desperate defense of Rorke's Drift was recognized by an unprecedented award of 11 Victoria Crosses.

Pearson's No. 1 column crossed the Tugela River into Zululand on January 12, 1879. His forces built Fort Tenedos, a mud fortification on the Zululand side of the Tugela across from Fort Pearson, and continued to advance. On January 22, a 6,000-man Zulu force surprised Pearson's column near the Inyezane River. After a fierce skirmish, the British counterattacked and forced the Zulus to retreat, at a cost of 10 of their men killed and 16 wounded. The British reached the abandoned Norwegian Mission Station at Eshowe the following day. These soldiers began to establish a supply station called Fort Eshowe by constructing a mud fort with entrenchment and timber ramparts.

On January 28, 1879, Pearson learned of the Zulu victory at Isandlwana and decided to remain at Eshowe. After sending some mounted troops back to Fort Tenedos, Pearson had 1,700 soldiers with him at Fort Eshowe. This position was then besieged by Zulus.

After the disaster at Isandlwana, Thesiger retreated and reassembled a 6,000-man force at Fort Pearson. This new force, including reinforcements from St. Helena, Ceylon, and the Naval Brigade, departed on March 29, 1879, from Fort Tenedos to relieve Fort Eshowe. On April 1, 1879, Thesiger's relief column encamped 24 kilometers from Eshowe on the south bank of the Inyezane River near the kraal of Gingindlovu, which had been burned by Pearson's column 10 weeks earlier.

Zulus were seen massing in the hills around Gingindlovu that evening. Two large enemy columns, totaling about 12,000 Zulus, attacked out of the thick mist the following morning, April 2, 1879. British Gatling guns opened up first on the attacking enemy, and well-aimed rifle volley fire and rockets prevented the Zulus from coming within stabbing distance of the fortified British camp. As the Zulu attack wavered, Thesiger ordered out his cavalry, which ruthlessly pursued and killed any fleeing Zulus. The entire battle was over in about 90 minutes and resulted in a total Zulu rout. About 500 Zulu dead were counted in front of the British positions, and another 600 were killed during their retreat. British casualties were 13 killed (all ranks) and 46 wounded. Eshowe was relieved on April 3. After the Eshowe fortifications were destroyed, British forces returned to Natal.

Wood's No. 4 column originally entered Zululand on January 10, 1879. It contained one Royal Garrison Artillery battery, two regular infantry battalions, two battalions of allied Zulus, and six troops of Colonial Mounted Volunteers (four Frontier Light Horse troops, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers Buller, and two troops of Baker's Horse). Its mission was to distract a number of Zulu groups in the northwest area of Zululand and prevent them from joining Cetshwayo's main army. There were three flat-topped mountains, named Zunguin, Hlobane, and Ityentika, in the area. After learning of Isandlwana, Wood moved his column to Khambula Hill, from where his force could observe the avenues of approach and the Zulus at Hlobane.

Wood's force received periodic reinforcements, some from Lydenburg in the Transvaal to the north. Heavy rains and flooded rivers occasionally impeded resupply and reinforcements. On March 12, 1879, Captain David Moriarty's Company H, 80th Regiment, which had been escorting convoys across the flooded Ntombe River, was surrounded and attacked at night by 800 Zulus. In the confusing melee that ensued, Moriarty, 62 soldiers, and 17 civilian drivers, out of 106 men, were killed.

Wood took advantage of his relative autonomy, and Buller's horse troops made numerous raids on the Zulus. Wood directed Buller to attack the Zulu camp at Hlobane on March 28, 1879, to drive off the cattle before Zulu reinforcements arrived, and to provoke them to attack Wood's well-fortified encampment at Khambula. Buller's force ascended the plateau in a thunderstorm, and in the subsequent confusion, while rounding up the Zulu cattle, observed the main 26,000-man Zulu army approaching. Many British casualties were sustained and much valor shown, as Buller's force extricated itself and returned to Khambula. Buller and four others received the Victoria Cross for their gallantry at Hlobane, while 94 were killed (all ranks) and 8 wounded.

The Zulu army, as expected, attacked Khambula on March 29, 1879. Wood's 2,086-man, six-gun force was defending the hilltop position. After midday, as Zulu troop deployments were observed, Buller's men rode out to fire on the Zulu right horn and provoke it into a premature attack. This tactic worked, and after about a 35-minute fight, in which a few Zulus broke into the British position, the right horn withdrew. The Zulu center and left horn then attacked from the protection of a ravine, pressuring advanced British riflemen into withdrawing to the main encampment. The right horn returned to action, and as the situation became precarious, Wood ordered two companies of the 90th Light Infantry to fix their bayonets and charge the Zulu left. This well-timed counterattack drove the Zulus back into the ravine, where they came under intense British fire. The Zulus fearlessly and repeatedly charged the British, but well-aimed artillery and rifle fire broke up their assaults. The British shifted forces to make their fire more effective, and at about 5:00 P.M., the Zulus began to withdraw. Buller's cavalry pursued the Zulus for over 11 kilometers. Over 800 Zulus were killed near the British positions, and hundreds more during the pursuit. The British casualties were 18 killed and 65 wounded, of whom 11 later died. At the Battle of Khambula, which was clearly a British victory and the turning point of the war, the Zulus learned the hard way that their weapons were no match against those of the British.

Thesiger had meanwhile been assembling reinforcements, and on May 31, 1879, he began his second invasion of Zululand.

As his force plodded toward Ulundi, he learned that he was to be replaced by General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley. Thesiger pushed his force to Ulundi, wanting to engage and defeat the Zulus before Wolseley arrived to supersede him. Finally, on July 4, 1879, Thesiger's 5,317-man force formed into a large square and was attacked by the Zulus. With their spirit arguably broken at Khambula, the Zulus attacked the British, but they were never able to penetrate the wall of steel made by Gatling gun, artillery, and rifle fire. The Battle of Ulundi was the decisive and last large-scale battle of the war, which ended when Cetshwayo was captured on August 28, 1879.

The power of the Zulu kingdom was destroyed when it was divided into 13 separate, independent chiefdoms, each with a British resident. In 1883, the exiled Cetshwayo returned home, which prompted a disastrous civil war between Zulu royalists and supporters of the chiefs. Great Britain annexed Zululand in 1887.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Buller, Redvers Henry; Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chard, John R. M.; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Dabulamanzi kaMpande; Durnford, Anthony William; Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Pearson, Charles Knight; Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Wolseley, Field Marshal Garnet J.; Wood, Henry Evelyn; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (c. 1575–1648)

The Portuguese Conquest of Angola was a long process of military occupation of the African kingdom of Ndongo between the 16th and 17th centuries. Historians are not unanimous about the dates when this occurred, though it is common to find references for the foundation of Luanda (1575) and the defeat of the Dutch invaders (1648) as the initial and final landmarks for this conquest. The defeat of Ngola-a-Ari and the destruction of his capital in Pungo-a-Ndongo (1671), and the defeat of Matamba (1683) are also widely accepted as end dates for the *conquista.* Nevertheless, these dates do not represent the obliteration of local African authorities or the consolidation of a colonial state in Angola.

As defined by the Portuguese colonial administrator Joaquim José Lopes de Lima (1844), there were three main methods of occupation of new territories:

- *Feitoria,* in which the concern was solely the establishment of commercial relations with indigenous populations, but with little military investment. Bissau and Cacheu were examples of *feitorias*. The verb *feitoriar* also means "to trade" and was largely used in this sense up to the 19th century.

- *Conquista*, in which there was a heavy military investment and long periods of warfare. The word, in fact, carries the figurative meaning of "continuous struggle." Angola is the greatest example of African *conquista.* Although Benguela was formally a *feitoria,* it was subordinate to Luanda and considered part of the conquest of Angola.
- *Colônia*, which refers to settlements (mainly on islands) where Portuguese nobles migrated with their families, serfs, and slaves. Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe were examples of Portuguese colonies in the 16th and 17th centuries, in the strict sense of the word.

In the late 19th century, international disputes between the Portuguese, French, and Belgian traders for the control of the Congo basin and increasing international pressure for the formalization of European colonies in Africa culminated in the Conference of Berlin (1884–1885). During this period, Portugal adopted a renewed colonial ideology, focusing on the effective occupation of Angolan territory while writing a new historiography of the Portuguese presence in Africa, in which historical rights legitimated their colonial authority in places such as Angola and Mozambique. Still, it is possible to find Portuguese writers complaining that Portugal had not yet learned the secrets of colonization by the early 20th century.

Until the dissolution of the colonial state in 1975, the history of Angola could only be written through Portugal. In 1955, the colonial historian Ralph Delgado based his *História de Angola* on a Portuguese historical timeline starting before their arrival in Kongo. He chose the explorations of Fernando Pó (1472) and not the voyages of Diogo Cão (1485) as the starting point for Angolan history. According to Delgado, the history of Angola is divided into five parts:

1. 1472–1575: Discoveries and commercial monopoly
2. 1575–1648: Beginning of conquest and development of the slave trade until the expulsion of the Dutch
3. 1648–1836: Dependency of Brazil and second phase of the conquest with social progress
4. 1836–1918: End of the slave trade, abolition of slavery, and effective occupation of the territory
5. 1918 to the present: Economic and administrative expansion, social transformation, and full development of the colonial state

Angola acquired its current borders only in the 20th century while still a colony. Territorial occupation was a slow process that began with the Portuguese arrival on Luanda Island in 1575 and reached the eastern frontier only at the end of the 19th century. During this period, the so-called *Conquista de Angola* was composed of strips of land between city-ports on the Atlantic coast and some military enclaves (*presídios*) in the interior. There were two main trading routes until the 19th century: one between Luanda and the *presídio* of Pungo-a-Ndongo, and another from

Benguela to the *presídio* of Caconda. These enclaves usually had a fortress and a small contingent of soldiers meant to promote the opening of trading routes and the establishment of vassalage treaties with local chiefs (*sobas*). Since the slave trade became the central economic activity in Angola, these *presídios* were mainly used by traders on their way to slave markets in the interior. In addition, the commanders of these military enclaves were deeply involved in the Atlantic trade and often were accused of engaging in unjust wars against local rulers in order to produce captives.

Although the Portuguese monarchy was responsible for granting royal charters for the exploration of African territories, the conquest was largely a private business. Initially, there was little investment by the Crown for the occupation and development of its overseas territories. In the case of Angola and Benguela, nobles received the title of *conquistadores* and the authorization to organize the military occupation of these territories. The role of *conquistadores* was sponsored by the 1452 Papal Bull, which granted the king of Portugal "full rights to capture the Saracens, pagans, and other infidels" and to subjugate them to "perpetual slavery." The first Portuguese expedition, led by explorer Diogo Cão, arrived at the West Central African coast in 1483. The explorers found the Congo River estuary and disembarked in the Sonyo province of the Kingdom of Kongo. They engaged in diplomatic and commercial relations with the *mani Kongo*, who provided slaves for Portuguese sugar plantations in São Tomé. Many of these slaves were Mbundu who lived along the southern border of Kongo, between the rivers Dande and Kwanza. Soon these slave traders began looking for more affordable sources of slaves beyond the official port of Mpinda. They found a suitable site to develop their trade in a sheltered bay behind Luanda Island and engaged in negotiations with the local ruler, the *ngola* of Ndongo.

In 1520, the Portuguese sent their first official expedition to Ndongo, commanded by Balthasar de Castro. When Castro arrived in Ndongo, he learned that the *ngola* had acquired considerable wealth and power due to commercial relations with Portuguese private merchants representing São Tomé. These merchants viewed the arrival of royal representatives as an attack on their lucrative deal with the *ngola*. Their trade with Ndongo was considered illegal by both Kongo and Portugal. They were now to be taxed and their trade limited by the Portuguese royal presence beyond Kongo. They probably warned the *ngola* about the Portuguese intentions of controlling the local trade. He decided to imprison Castro, who was held in Ndongo for six years. Castro was released only with the intervention of the *mani Kongo*. After this incident, it took decades for new diplomatic attempts between Portugal and Ndongo.

Finally, in 1557, Ngola-Inene sent an ambassador to Lisbon asking the Portuguese king to send representatives to his court in Ndongo. The Jesuits had plans for opening new missions in Africa and strongly advocated for this embassy. In 1560, Lisbon authorized an expedition led by Paulo Dias de Novais to the mouth of the Kwanza River, and from there to Ndongo. He was accompanied by four Jesuit missionaries, who intended to convert the *ngola* and his subjects. But by the time Novais arrived, Ngola-Inene had died, and the new ruler Ndambi-a-Ngola did not seem enthusiastic about the Portuguese. The new *ngola* accepted the gifts brought by the expedition but refused the Jesuit teachings. He was more interested in military and commercial arrangements than in missionary work. It seems that the *ngola* was informed by local advisers, and even by the *mani Kongo* Nzinga Mvemba (Bernardo I of Kongo), that the Portuguese were actually looking for silver and gold. Novais was accused of being a spy, and the Portuguese were held prisoner in Ndongo.

Father Francisco de Gouveia, a Jesuit missionary in Novais's expedition, was never allowed to leave Ndongo. During his years in captivity, he became convinced that the Mbundu could only be converted to Christianity by force, so he began advocating for the political domination of the African kingdom. In 1563, Gouveia wrote to Portugal extolling the riches of Angola, predicting the discovery of silver, copper, and salt mines in Ndongo. He also believed a short way could be found to the gold mines of the Mwene-a-Mutapa and to Mozambique, avoiding thus the dangerous voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The Jesuit argued that a "just war" could be waged against the *ngola* in return for his refusal of the word of God and the insolent way in which he treated the envoy of the king of Portugal. Gouveia remained a prisoner of Ndongo for a total of 15 years; he died on June 19, 1575.

Novais returned to Portugal in 1556 and began supporting Father Gouveia's plea to conquer Ndongo, using his political influence in court to lobby for a charter as *conquistador* of the entity called the "Kingdom of Angola," which was finally granted in 1571. This charter made Novais governor for life of the territory between the southern border of the Kingdom of Kongo and the Kwanza River. The Crown also made him hereditary ruler under royal suzerainty for another conquest south of the Kwanza River, a territory stretching for 194 kilometers along the coast and as far inland as he cared to conquer. His main duty was the creation of a Portuguese settlement with 100 non-Jewish white families, an army of 400 soldiers, and 20 cavalry. He was also to provide the settlement with masons and builders, a barber and a physician, and build a church dedicated to Saint Sebastian. In order to consolidate the Portuguese military presence in the region, he was also to build three stone forts (also called *presídios*), which would become the main tactic in the Portuguese strategy of conquering Angola.

When Novais's new expedition disembarked on Luanda Island in February 1575, they found seven slaving vessels anchored in the bay and at least 40 Portuguese traders already settled there. They were private traders who had sailed south of the Dande River looking for better trading conditions. Some had fled Mbanza Kongo when the Jaga warriors attacked in 1568. By 1575, Ndambi-a-Ngola had died and was succeeded by his son, Ngola-Kiluanji-kia-Ndambi. The new *ngola* sent an embassy to welcome the Portuguese and engaged commercial relations, developing a military alliance as well. Initially, Novais assisted both Kongo and Ndongo to fight local rebels. In fact, Ngola-Kiluanji-kia-Ndambi is remembered in Ndongo's tradition as the king who used the Portuguese to defeat rebellions and expand the kingdom in the region of the Dande, Zenza, and Lukala rivers. This *ngola* died some years after Novais's arrival and was succeeded by Nzinga-Ngola-Kilombo-kia-Kasenda, a fearful and violent ruler famous for his fight against the *soba* of Hari, one of the local titleholders with royal blood who could make a claim for the throne of Ndongo.

By 1576, the Portuguese settlers moved from the island to the mainland, where they built the *presídio* of São Miguel. The commercial relations between Portuguese officials and the ruler of Ndongo came to a tragic end in 1579, after a dispute between Novais's men and some private traders led by Francisco Barbuda d'Aguiar, a Portuguese slaver who had lived in Kongo for more than 25 years and served as confessor in the court of Alvaro I of Kongo. Barbuda warned the *ngola* of Novais's real intensions to conquer his kingdom. It seems that he had done something similar back in Kongo when he advised the *mani Kongo* of the conquering intentions behind the Portuguese supporting them against the Jaga marauders who invaded Mbanza Kongo in 1568. The *ngola* retaliated against this treachery by killing the Portuguese traders found at his capital, Kabasa, seizing their merchandise, and allegedly massacring more than a thousand Christian slaves. He then organized an army of 12,000 Mbundu soldiers and attacked Novais in the small fort of Nzele, built 50 kilometers inland from Luanda. Novais resisted the attack with only 60 European soldiers and 200 African troops.

In 1580, Novais organized a military expedition up the Kwanza valley composed of 300 European soldiers and about 200 African slaves. He used guerilla tactics and avoided open fights against the Ndongo army. The Portuguese expedition did not carry provisions and relied on raiding local villages to meet their needs. They reached the territory of Makunde by the end of the year and built a fortified camp there, but they were defeated by Mbundu forces and by tropical fevers that caused heavy losses. Novais expected reinforcements from Kongo, but they never arrived. These troops, led by European officers, had been intercepted by the Ndongo army. Fearing revenge from the *ngola*, the *sobas* who had been supporting Novais deserted, isolating the Portuguese at their camp in Makunde.

It took three years for Novais and his army to advance a few kilometers inland along the Kwanza River. He was still looking for the legendary silver mines that Father Gouveia had reported. In 1581, Novais made an important alliance with the *soba* Songa, who controlled the mouth of the Kwanza. He also made important allies in the territory of Ilamba, between the Kwanza and Bengo rivers. Between 1582 and 1583, Novais reached the confluence between the Kwanza and Lukala rivers, where he founded one of the main *presídios* of Angola, Massangano. Nzinga-Ngola sent detachments into Kisama in 1581 and Ilamba in 1582, but a combined force organized by Novais with the support of local rebel *sobas* detained them. In 1585, the *ngola* sent the largest army that the Portuguese had faced thus far into Ilamba. The Portuguese had 120 soldiers, backed by 8,000 African warriors (*empacaceiros*) provided by some 40 *sobas*. The following year, Nzinga-Ngola sent a second large army against Massangano, but it was attacked and defeated by the Portuguese while trying to cross the Lukala River. After this sequence of defeats, the *ngola* retreated and sought to build new internal Mbundu alliances with places such as Matamba.

Between 1580 and 1640, the Portuguese crown joined Castile and Aragon under the Iberian Union. Philip of Spain, the Iberian king, sent out three batches of reinforcements for the conquest of Angola. In 1584, João Castanho Velez left for Angola with 2,000 soldiers, treasury officials, and experts on mining. Two years later, Jacome da Cunha sailed with 90 soldiers. In 1587, a mercenary force was dispatched with 350 soldiers, including Castilians, Flemings, and even Germans. Most of these troops died of fevers before seeing any action. Novais died on May 9, 1589, and was replaced by Luis Serrão.

In 1590, Serrão organized an expedition that marched up the Lukala River into Ndongo. He sent his troops to Ngoleme-a-Kitambu, north of Kabasa, where he assembled the most powerful Portuguese force that Ndongo had ever faced, containing 15,000 African archers and more than 120 European arquebus infantrymen. When they arrived at Kabasa, though, they found a deserted capital. Some days later (December 29, 1590), they were surprised by troops from Ndongo and Matamba, who enveloped them and forced Serrão to retreat under heavy attack. He marched for 15 days to reach Massangano, suffering substantial losses. Besides losing many men, he also lost a great amount of merchandise and watched a massive desertion of supporting *sobas*. The response of the Iberian crown to this major defeat was to revoke Novais's private charter and replace the captain with an appointed governor.

By 1591, the Portuguese colony of Angola was just a narrow strip between the Kwanza and Bengo rivers, stretching for about 160 kilometers inland from Luanda to Massangano. The Iberian Union sent the royal inspector Domingos Abreu e Brito to Angola to report on the political, military, and economic situation. In his report, Brito reproduced some of the old myths about silver mines and other minerals. He drafted a plan to conquer the Mbundu, reporting about the areas that could still be occupied. He recommended the use of expatriate soldiers (*degredados*) from São Tomé and Brazil and gave detailed estimates of the cost of guns and uniforms for the new army. He calculated a total of "seventy hundredweight of gunpowder" and "a hundred of lead" necessary for these military campaigns. He also advocated for the construction of a chain of *presídios* connecting Luanda to the supposed silver mines of Cambambe.

Nzinga-Ngola-Kilombo-kia-Kasenda died around 1592 and was succeeded by his son, Mbandi-Ngola-Kiluanji. This year also marked the arrival of the first governor of Angola, Francisco de Almeida. Bearing the title of "captain-major and governor of the conquered territory and other provinces of Angola," he arrived in Luanda with an army of 600 soldiers. He tried to reform an exploitative system that had been established in Angola during the charter period, in which the local African chiefs were allocated to white masters as serfs. Almeida wanted to restore the autonomy of the local Mbundu chiefs and make them owe direct allegiance to the Crown. However, his actions harmed the Jesuits, who had become the overlords of many chiefs. Jesuits and other army captains began to pressure the governor, forcing him to withdraw to Brazil. His brother, Dom Jerónimo de Almeida, took over the government and suspended the decisions of his predecessor, restoring the Mbundu chiefs to their "masters." In 1593, he led an army of 160 soldiers and 18 cavalry into the territory of Kisama to get control of its salt mines. Salt figured as one of the main local currencies, and the governor hoped that he could exercise some economic hegemony in the region by controlling its supply. He built a *presídio* to enforce the Portuguese presence in the region, but it was soon abandoned. Although Almeida managed to subject several local chiefs, he left Kisama without facing its strongest ruler, Kafushe Kambare. Almeida's successor, Balthasar de Almeida de Sousa, led an attack against this African chief in April 1594, but he was crushed and driven out of Kisama. Kafushe Kambare was later accused of eating the Portuguese prisoners of war.

The second governor, João Furtado de Mendonça, arrived in Luanda in 1594 and tried to penetrate the interior along the Bengo River. In 1596, he allegedly defeated 20,000 African bowmen with an army of 15,000 Africans and 400 Portuguese armed with guns. Around the same period, the *ngola*'s army besieged the Portuguese in Massangano and Captain Balthasar Rebello de Aragão was sent to rescue them. On his way back to Luanda, he stopped at Mushima and built an important *presídio* between the Luanda and Massangano that enhanced the Portuguese presence, though again it did not guarantee control of the territory much beyond its walls. Governor Mendonça returned to Portugal in 1601–1602 and was replaced by a slave trader named João Rodrigues Coutinho, who bought the right to export slaves from Angola. This slave contract allowed him to sell licenses to private traders and made him responsible for collecting taxes. He was also held responsible for the construction of three new forts: one in the far interior at Cambambe, one to protect the salt mines of Kisama, and another in the region that the Portuguese called the Kingdom of Benguela. After some relatively successful campaigns in Kisama, Governor Coutinho died of fever and was replaced by an interim governor called Manuel Cerveira Pereira.

Pereira was a harsh military commander, accused of cruelty not only against his enemies, but also his own troops, which supposedly drove many soldiers to desertion. He carried on his predecessor's military objectives in Cambambe, Kisama, and Benguela. In 1603, he marched into Cambambe after the mythical silver mines. He found no silver but greatly increased the slave trade by signing a treaty with the *ngola* and reopening commerce with Kabasa. He also built an important *presídio* in Cambambe in 1604. The absence of silver meant that slaves should become the main wealth to be "mined" from Ndongo. The salt mines of Kisama could provide an alternative economy, but Kafushe Kambare made them inaccessible. Despite one important source affirming that Pereira defeated Kafushe and forced other lesser chiefs to sign treaties with the Portuguese, historians doubt this ever happened based on a later formal accusation that the Portuguese commander freed the African chief in exchange for a bribe of 40 slaves. Nevertheless, Pereira's greatest achievement was the conquest of Benguela, where in 1617 he built a *presídio* and founded the port of São Filipe de

Benguela, opening a new branch for the Portuguese conquest of Angola.

Indeed, 1617 is a very important year in the conquest of Angola, not only because of the foundation of what would become the second-largest port of the Angolan slave trade, but also because of the arrival of Governor Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos. He initially tried to reform the trade, denouncing the dishonesty of slavers and their use of Imbangala "cannibal" warriors to hunt down slaves, which he considered a "disservice for both God and the crown." Soon, Governor Vasconcellos succumbed to the Angolan reality and the Imbangala military superiority. He ended up using Imbangala warriors in military campaigns to capture slaves, which allegedly resulted in the beheading of 94 local chiefs. The year 1617 was also believed to be when *ngola* Mbandi-a-Ngola-Kiluanji died. He was succeeded by his son, Ngola-a-Mbandi, who raised strong resistance against Vasconcellos's advances, especially concerning the *presídio* that the Portuguese built in Mbaka, within Ndongo territory.

In 1621, a new governor arrived in Luanda. The administration of João Correia de Souza was marked by the strengthening of slave markets in Mushima, Massangano, and Cambambe and by the famous embassy of Nzinga-Mbandi (Ngola-a-Mbandi's sister) to the capital in 1622. Nzinga-Mbandi deftly negotiated the peace between Ndongo and Luanda and accepted baptism to consolidate the treaty, being renamed Dona Anna de Souza (after the governor). Ngola-a-Mbandi died sometime around 1624, and Nzinga-Mbandi succeeded him as queen of Ndongo. By that time, Angola was being governed by Fernão de Souza, who supported the rise of the *soba* of Mbaka Ngola-a-Ari as the legitimate ruler of Ndongo. As part of the dispute for the control of Ndongo, Nzinga-Mbandi declared war on Ngola-a-Ari, which the new governor took as just cause to protect the vassal of the Crown and wage war against her. Consequently, Nzinga-Mbandi looked for the support of Imbangala warriors. The growth of different Imbangala bands during this period gave birth to new political units that shifted the balance of commerce and power in Angola to the states of Kasanje and Matamba.

The year 1641 marked another moment of profound political transformation in Angola, as its capital Luanda was invaded and occupied by Dutch forces. The Portuguese were forced to flee their homes, first to a camp in the Bengo River and then to the *presídio* of Massangano, which became the capital of the *conquista* until 1648. The Dutch were welcomed by anti-Portuguese forces such as the Nzinga-Mbandi and the *mani* Kongo. Other local powers, such as the Imbangala bands of Kasanje, renewed their alliance with the Portuguese. In Europe, the Iberian Union had just ended in 1640 and the restored Portuguese crown could not invest in a distant war in Africa; hence, the reestablishment of Portuguese authority in Angola came through Brazil. Mixed troops of Brazilian black and indigenous soldiers led by Salvador Correia de Sá e Benevides arrived in Luanda in August 1648 and drove the Dutch invaders away. The restoration opened a period of greater Angolan dependency on Brazilian commercial networks. In 1650, Governor Sá e Benevides declared the conquest of Angola over; Kongo was subdued, Kasanje was friendly, Nzinga was under control, Ndongo was loyal, Kisama was pacified, and the slave trade flourished from Loango to Benguela.

Estevam Thompson

See also: Afonso I; Imbangala; Jaga; Kongo Empire; Mbwila, Battle of (October 10, 1665); Nzinga, Queen

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Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1880–1907)

While the Portuguese had conquered a large portion of what is now Angola during the 1500s and 1600s, their empire building, particularly in the interior southern region, was renewed during the so-called Scramble for Africa. During the 1840s and 1850s, Portuguese, Brazilian, and German settlers established the port of Moçamedes (now Namibe) on the coast of southern Angola and proceeded to move inland in an attempt to colonize what became the Huila district (now Huila province).

In 1857 and 1860, Ovimbundu warriors from central Angola attacked the small Portuguese garrison at Huila Fort, which, by 1867, was the last Portuguese outpost on the plateau. In 1879, around 300 Boers led by Jacobus Frederik Botha crossed the Cunene River into southern Angola, raided the local Humbe community of chief (or soba) Chaungo and allied with the Portuguese near the coast. In 1880, the governor of Moçamedes dispatched a small detachment of Portuguese troops to reoccupy the previously abandoned Huila Fort, and the Boers were granted Portuguese citizenship and established the nearby settlement of Humpata or St. Januario.

Over the next few years, the Portuguese imported several hundred more settlers, mainly from the island of Madiera. In 1885, reflecting the ambitions of Portugal to unite its territories on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts in light of the Berlin Conference, an expedition led by Roberto Ivens and Hermenegildo Capelo, marched some 4800 kilometers from Moçemedes in Angola to Quelimane in Mozambique.

In early 1885, the Humbe leader Chaungo refused to pay taxes to the Portuguese, imposed tribute on Portuguese traders and forbad his people from interacting with whites. With only 60 troops garrisoning Huila Fort, Colonel S. Nunes de Matta, the governor of Moçamedes, sent a force of 120 African colonial soldiers to suppress the incipient rebellion, but they withdrew. At the end of October, Chaungo directed attacks on the fort, trading posts, and settlers. In November, a colonial patrol of 34 African soldiers and 24 African irregulars destroyed Chaungo's abandoned settlement and was ambushed on the return journey, suffering 52 men killed, including its commander, local Portuguese trader Clemente de Andrade.

In December, a Portuguese column consisting of 93 African troops, 38 Boers, 94 Herero and Khoisan allies, and 150 Ovimbundu allies, supported by 2 cannon and 20 supply wagons, relieved the besieged Huila fort and began burning Humbe villages. Although the column used its firepower to defeat the Humbe at Jamba on December 21, Chaungo escaped and the colonial force was hampered by disease and the departure of the Boers for their farms. The arrival of reinforcements and more ammunition reinvigorated the force, which, with 220 men, resumed the offensive and again defeated the Humbe at Cafuntuca on March 13, 1886. At this time, further colonial operations against this First Humbe Rebellion were impossible, given problems with personnel and expenses.

In 1888, Chaungo was captured by the Portuguese who imposed a new soba called Tchioa on the Humbe. The Second Humbe Rebellion began in March 1891, when Tchioa, given his lack of legitimacy and reputedly poor rainmaking ability, was overthrown by Luhuna. Tchioa sought refuge at Huila Fort. Given their small number of troops in the area, the Portuguese hired local mercenaries to form an offensive column consisting of 60 African troops, 60 mounted settlers (including Boers, 20 men of mixed race, 44 Berg-Damara, 30 Khoisan, and 500 Himba), supported by a Krupp cannon, a machine gun, and seven wagons. During the first half of May, the column, commanded by Major Justiniano Padrel, left its staging area at the town of Gambos (now Chiange), defeated a Humbe attack, burned numerous African settlements, and relieved Huila Fort. During several engagements in late May, the Humbe were defeated by Portuguese artillery, and Luhuna escaped south to Donguena followed by Patrel's force, which killed 200 people and captured over 3,000 cattle. Consequently, Luhuna and his followers crossed south of the Cunene River into the territory of the Kwamato Ovambo, who possessed a significant number of up-to-date rifles.

In late June, Patrel focused on subjugating the Humbe around Huila Fort by seizing women and children who were ransomed for cattle. Without informing the governor, Patrel led his force across the Cunene in July and linked up with some 3,500 Kwanyama Ovambo allies of King Weyulu. With a total of 4,600 men supported by two cannon, this was the largest Portuguese expedition mounted in southern Angola; it marched on the Kwamato capital of King Iquera, where Luhuna had taken shelter. On the night of July 12–13, thousands of Kwamato warriors assaulted the Portuguese camp at Dombeafungue and disabled one of the cannon. Although the Kwamato were repelled and took hundreds of casualties, this surprise shook the resolve of Patrel's African allies. The next day, 2,500 Kwanyama went home. Patrel led the remainder of the expedition back across the Cunene, suffering 11 dead and 31 wounded from constant Kwamato harassment. Since most of Luhuna's subordinate chiefs had been captured, Patrel left the Humbe area at the start of August.

In 1897, the cattle disease rinderpest was spreading across East Africa and southern Africa, including Angola. In October, a Portuguese vaccination team was sent to Humbe territory, escorted by 150 Portuguese soldiers of the Moçamedes Dragoons Company. The Humbe accused the Portuguese of poisoning their already dying cattle and using the crisis as a pretext for moving troops into the area. On December 12, 1897, a 29-man dragoon detachment was attacked after interrupting a Humbe funeral at Tchituba. Of the dragoons, 14 were killed and 7 wounded. Huila Fort, defended by 40 African troops under a Portuguese second lieutenant, was quickly besieged and attacked on four separate days in late January 1898.

A relief force, led by Colonel Artur de Paiva, set out consisting of 16 Portuguese officers, 120 Portuguese dragoons, 280 African soldiers, 140 Boer and other settler volunteers, 650 Khoisan and Himba mercenaries, and five cannon tended by 30 artillerymen from Luanda. The column was supported by 50 wagons and 873 supply carriers. Despite heavy rain, which swelled rivers and created quagmires, the column advanced and inflicted heavy casualties on the Humbe in two engagements in the middle of February 1898. After a slow, grueling march that lasted one month, the expedition arrived at the fort on February 23 and then conducted further punitive actions. The rebellion was over by late June, as almost every Humbe village was destroyed, thousands of cattle and sheep captured, and over 800 people killed and several hundred captured. Of the Portuguese column, 8 soldiers were killed in the fighting and 96 (including 74 Europeans) died from disease. Paiva died in 1900 of an illness contracted during this Third Humbe Rebellion.

Although the Portuguese had founded the slave port of Benguela on the central Angolan coast in the early 1600s, their subsequent efforts to gain control of the Ovimbundu states of the adjacent interior highlands failed. From 1774 to 1776, the Portuguese invaded Ovimbundu territory and defeated the powerful Bailundu (Bailundo) state, but they lacked the military resources for effective occupation. During the late 18th century, the Portuguese paid less attention to the interior and attempted to reinforce their position on the coast, which was threatened by the Dutch, French, and British. The Ovimbundu states supplied slaves to the Portuguese on the coast, who exported them to Brazil. In the middle of the 19th century, Portuguese traders began to establish outposts in the Ovimbundu area, and from the 1870s, the export of rubber became increasingly important to the Ovimbundu economy.

In 1890, a Portuguese military expedition conquered the Ovimbundu state of Bihe and built a fort in its territory, which facilitated increased settlement by Portuguese and Boers. In 1896, the Bailundu king ordered an attack on a Portuguese fort recently built near his residence. In 1902, the Ovimbundu came under pressure from smallpox, famine, a drop in the price of rubber, and the Portuguese labor and rum trade. Following a dispute between a Portuguese trader and Bailundu leaders, the Bailundu ruler Kalendula and four elders visited the Portuguese fort to negotiate in mid-May, but they were detained.

Consequently, a number of other Ovimbundu and non-Ovimbundu states joined with the Bailundu, led mainly by councilor Mutu-ya-Kavela, in war against the Portuguese. It is possible that adherence to the Kandundu cult played a role in uniting the rebels. From May to July, as many as 6,000 Ovimbundu warriors besieged the Portuguese fort, and others attacked Portuguese trading posts and killed 20 Portuguese and 100 of their African supporters. Missionaries were left alone, however. Responding to the rebellion, the Portuguese formed three armed columns in different parts of Angola that converged on Bailundu. Formed at a post on the Cuanza River, the Northern Column consisted of fewer than 100 men and broke the siege of Bailundu on July 10. The Caconda Column, consisting of 215 men (including some Boers), left Benguela on August 1, and after many delays, reached Bailundu on September 23. Originally formed in Luanda, the third and largest column left Benguela on August 9 and arrived at Bailundu fort on September 24. Under Captain Pedro Massano de Amorin, who had led operations against slavers on Angola's border with the Congo Free State the previous year, the column had 458 soldiers, including 142 metropolitan troops sent from Lisbon and 261 African colonial troops supported by 4 mountain guns and over 1,000 supply carriers. The third column had orders to pacify the Ovimbundu.

Since the campaign was fought over three months during the dry season, the invading Portuguese enjoyed great mobility given the hard ground and lower prevalence of tropical disease, while the shriveled bush offered little cover to the Ovimbundu. Additionally, the Portuguese possessed superior firepower, as their modern repeating rifles were superior to the Ovimbundu's obsolete muzzle-loaders, and Portuguese artillery bombarded rebel hilltop strongholds. After numerous engagements in which the rebels showed bravery that earned them much admiration from the Portuguese, Mutu-ya-Kavela was killed in early August, and most rebel leaders began to surrender in late September. Limited resistance continued until March 1904, when a 230-man Portuguese expedition to the mountainous Bimbe area killed or captured the last rebels.

In February 1902, in response to Kwamato raids against the Humbe north of the Cunene River, the Portuguese colonial military reinforced Huila district, the garrison of which grew to around 260 colonial troops (most of whom were Africans supported by an artillery section and around 200 settler and Boer volunteers). Given concerns about German advances from the south, the Portuguese organized a large force to exercise "effective occupation" of the territory between the Cunene and Okavango rivers in southwestern Angola, which was inhabited by the well-armed Ovambo. Commanded by district governor Captain João Maria de Aguiar, it consisted of 40 Portuguese officers and 467 Portuguese metropolitan soldiers, including 100 cavalry, 613 African colonial soldiers, 420 African mercenaries, and 500 Humbe auxiliaries.

In late September 1904, this column crossed the Cunene River and was almost immediately trapped on the south bank by the Kwamato Ovambo, who shot the oxen and horses. On September 25, at the Pembe crossing of the Cunene River, a relief force of 255 Portuguese and 244 African soldiers under Captain Luis Pinto de Almeida was ambushed at close range by the Kwanyama and Kwamato. Some 250 colonial troops were killed, including 22 by their own artillery. In turn, Aguiar then directed Portuguese forces to withdraw north of the Cunene, abandoning two field guns, two ammunition wagons, and several hundred rifles, as well as their dead. Blamed for the so-called Disaster at the Ford of Pembe, which can be compared to the devastating British loss at Isandlwana and the Italian defeats at Dogali and Adowa, Aguiar was recalled to Portugal, where he continued his career in military engineering.

In 1905, Captain José Augusto Alves Roçadas, the new governor of Huila district, began consolidating his position in preparation for a future offensive against the Ovambo. In October 1905, Portuguese forces moved east of Huila, where they bombarded and seized the stronghold of the Mulondo leader Hangalo, who had long rejected colonial authority. Hangalo's decapitated head was displayed as a symbol of Portuguese dominance. In 1906, Portuguese forces crossed the Cunene, where they established Fort Roçadas, which would provide a staging area for subsequent operations conducted primarily by regular soldiers. Beginning in June 1907, a large colonial expedition was assembled at Fort Roçadas comprising 87 Portuguese officers; 1,306 Portuguese soldiers, of whom 200 were mounted infantry; 906 African troops, including 200 from Mozambique; and 115 settlers and African auxiliaries. It was supported by 4 machine guns, 10 cannon, and 67 wagons, and among the supplies were empty sandbags for fortification. The Portuguese believed that the combined strength of the Ovambo states amounted to between 15,000 and 20,000 warriors, with around 7,000 armed with Martini-Henry, Snyder, and Mauser rifles obtained through trade and hunting contacts.

With Roçadas in command, and guided by a disaffected member of the Kwamato royal family, the expedition launched its offensive against the Kwamato on August 26, 1907. The next day, at Mufilo, the Kwamato and Kwanyama Ovambo engaged the Portuguese defensive square with heavy fire but were driven off by several infantry and cavalry charges. The expedition then established a fortified camp at Aucongo, where there was a reliable well (which was important in the arid environment). On September 2, the spear-wielding Kwambi Ovambo attacked Aucongo. While Roçadas dispatched a wagon train to take the sick and wounded to Fort Roçadas, he led the bulk of his forces in a square formation in a feint advance against Macuvi, which distracted the Ovambo. Once the train was safely away, Roçadas' square fought its way back to the Aucongo post.

Throughout the middle of September, the expedition overcame stiff Ovambo resistance and advanced through Kwamato territory, seizing several water sources that were subsequently fortified and the surrounding areas cleared. On September 22, the Portuguese bombarded and then seized the capital of the Kwamato leader Sihetekela, who escaped. On the site, they built a colonial fort called Don Luis de Braganca. On October 4, the Portuguese force seized the capital of the other main Kwamato leader, Oikhula, where artillery captured in the 1904 massacre was recovered. A new Kwamato leader was appointed, and the Portuguese expedition withdrew from the area. During the campaign, the Portuguese saw 66 men killed and 139 wounded, and 346 of the metropolitan troops fell ill. The Ovambo losses are unknown. Throughout 1908, Sihetekela led a limited guerrilla resistance.

World War I led to the final colonial subjugation of the Ovambo. The intrusion of German forces from South West Africa (now Namibia) into southern Angola in late 1914 and their defeat of a Portuguese force under Roçadas at the Battle of Naulila prompted a rebellion among the Ovambo that the Portuguese then brutally suppressed over the next two years. Since the Germans had never really subdued the Ovambo in northern South West Africa, South African occupation forces dispatched an expedition to the area in 1917 that defeated the Kwanyama Ovambo and killed their leader, Mandume Ya Ndemufayo, who had moved south from Angola to escape the Portuguese.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Berlin Conference; Boers; Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Firearms Technology; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Portuguese-Gaza War (1894–1895): Portuguese-Makua Wars (1585–1870)

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Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–1894)

With the Belgian government uninterested in acquiring colonies in the late 19th century, the country's constitutional monarch, Leopold II, engaged in private empire building. In 1876, he founded the International Africa Association (IAA), which, during the early 1880s, conquered the vast Congo River basin, which it euphemistically named the Congo Free State. Although the goals of Leopold's association were supposedly scientific and abolitionist, his regime in the Congo became one of colonial Africa's most brutal ruthlessly extracting rubber and ivory.

Leopold never visited Africa and hired famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley, who had traversed the region in the mid-1870s, to organize the initial occupation, which focused on gaining control of the Congo River itself. In 1881, Stanley organized local people to carry a steamboat in pieces from the river's mouth on the Atlantic coast to Malebo (later Stanley) Pool, the eventual site of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), where it was assembled and taken upriver. (The first 400 kilometers of the river was not navigable given its rocks and rapids.) Between 1886 and 1896, the Congo Free State used half its revenue to develop a fleet of steamers that patrolled from Leopoldville some 1,400 kilometers northeast up the Congo River to Stanley Falls, the eventual site of Stanleyville (now Kisangani), and then another 800 kilometers south up the Lualaba River to what would become Katanga province. That province was conquered in 1891 by an expedition led by Canadian-born British mercenary Captain William Stairs. In 1886, Leopold, wanting to enforce his rule, created a 2,000-strong private army called the Force Publique (FP), which was initially a mercenary force consisting of West African Hausa or East African Zanzibari soldiers and officers from various European countries. To economize, recruitment was shifted to local people in 1891, when chiefs were ordered to produce a quota of young men every year and a militia was created for emergencies.

The main obstacle to Leopold's control of the eastern Congo basin was the Swahili-Arab ivory and slave trading empire of Tippu Tip, who considered himself nominally under the authority of the sultan of Zanzibar. With the British and Germans challenging Zanzibar's influence in East Africa, Tippu Tip switched allegiance to Leopold, who appointed him in 1887 as governor of the eastern Congo Free State, with his capital at Stanley Falls. Tippu Tip promised to stop the slave trade, as mandated by the Berlin Conference. However, the Swahili-Arab merchants resented the fact that their ivory, previously exported to the east coast, was being sent west, where it was subject to Free State tax; that their slave raiding was restricted; and that the FP was recruiting from their subordinate communities.

When Tippu Tip retired to Zanzibar in 1891, war seemed inevitable. Anticipating hostilities with the Swahili-Arabs, the FP built fortified and well-supplied bases at Basoko, down the Congo River from Stanley Falls, and Lusambo, to the south on the Sankuru River. Additionally, in 1890 the Free State administration imposed a ban on the sale of breech-loading rifles and ammunition on the Swahili-Arabs. While subsequent Free State military operations against the Swahili-Arabs were explained by accusations that they continued to trade slaves and were plotting with fellow Muslim Mahdists in Sudan, competition over the ivory trade represented an important motivation. During the so-called Arab War, the FP was expanded from 6,000 in 1892 to 10,000 in 1894, and irregulars were recruited from the previously conquered Tetela and Luba.

In March and April 1892, Sefu, Tippu Tip's son, led attacks on Free State officials who were seizing ivory from Swahili-Arab merchants. Within six months, Sefu mobilized an army of 10,000 mostly local men led by 500 Swahili-Arabs. Open warfare began in November, when Sefu established a fort on the Lomani River, which was taken by the FP. Under Commandant Francis Dhanis, the FP advanced on the main Swahili-Arab towns of Nyangwe and Kasongo on the Lualaba River, which were besieged, bombarded by artillery, and captured during the first half of 1893. To the north, another FP detachment under Commandant Louis Napoleon Chaltin, using the fort at Stanley Falls as a base, proceeded up the Congo and Lomani rivers by steamboat and captured lightly defended Swahili-Arab outposts. At the same time, a Swahili-Arab army attacked and besieged the garrison at Stanley Falls, which was saved from disaster in May 1893 by the timely arrival of a steamer carrying a relief force under Chaltin.

The war ended on October 20, when the FP under Dhanis and Pierre Joseph Ponthier defeated the Swahili-Arabs at the Luama River immediately west of Lake Tanganyika. Although both sides suffered heavy casualties, and Ponthier later died of his wounds, Sefu was killed, which meant that Swahili-Arab resistance collapsed. After a campaign that took the lives of tens of thousands of mostly local people, the Congo Free State took over the region in January 1894. The mobility and ease of supply made possible by control of the river system facilitated the FP victory. In Belgium, the Arab War would be portrayed as European-led forces of civilization and progress liberating an oppressed African people from a violent and exploitative Arab regime.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Berlin Conference; Chaltin, Louis Napoleon; Dhanis, Francis; Force Publique; Leopold II; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Stairs, William Grant; Stanley, Henry Morton; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tippu Tip

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Archinard, Louis (1850–1932)

Louis Archinard was born in La Havre, France on February 11, 1850. His mother and father were teachers. In 1868, he entered the Ecole Polytechnique in Palaiseau, near Paris, which prepared students to join the civil service or military. He joined the Marine artillery just in time to participate in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), and he was present at the siege of Paris.

From 1876 to 1878, Archinard gained his first colonial experience as a captain in charge of the armory in Saigon, South East Asia. After a period directing courses at the Ecole Polytechnique, Archinard was posted to West Africa in 1880 at a time when France was seeking to expand its colonial territory there. Between 1880 and 1883, he became part of the inner circle of officers associated with Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes, a marine artillery colonel who had a mandate to expand French territory. After a posting at the artillery office in France, Archinard returned to West Africa in 1888 as the superior commander of the Upper Niger River on the strong recommendation of his predecessor, Joseph

Galliéni. Under Archinard, the French eroded the power of the Tukolor and Mandinka empires, and in April 1890, they captured the Tukolor capital of Segu.

In 1890, the French governor of Senegal created an entity called French Sudan, which gave Archinard new administrative and financial authority. He tried to create a British-style indirect rule system in West Africa by attempting to reestablish the Bambara kingdom of Segu, which had existed before the emergence of Tukolor in 1860. However, this effort was undermined by rebellion. Archinard became ill and returned to France in 1891; he was replaced in West Africa by Colonel Gustave Humbert. During 1892 and 1893, Archinard, now a colonel, returned to West Africa as both the superior commander and governor of French Sudan. Despite warnings from French officials not to continue military conquests, Archinard led the subjugation of the last Tukolor towns along the Niger. He returned to France in 1893 and made plans for the defeat of Samori Toure's Mandinka Empire. This was delayed by the turn of French policy against further colonial expansion and the appointment of a civilian, Albert Grodet, as governor of French Sudan. Archinard then served on the commission that planned the invasion of Madagascar, which was led by Galliéni, and in 1897, he was promoted to general and sent to Cochinchina (the southern part of French Indochina) as a brigade commander.

In 1904, he became, at age 54, the youngest general in the central command in Paris. At the outbreak of World War I, he was appointed inspector general of finances for colonial troops, and in 1915, he was transferred to the reserves, as he had reached mandatory retirement age. In 1919, he was dispatched to Poland to help found a new army. Archinard's role in French colonial expansion was celebrated at the 1931 Colonial Exhibition in Paris; he died the next year. He was an aggressive leader of French colonial conquest in West Africa who often ignored civilian superiors.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Galliéni, Joseph; Madagascar, French Conquest of (1882–1905); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Samori Toure; Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914)

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Army of Africa, France

French military units formed in Algeria during the mid-19th century conquest quickly became a mainstay of the entire French army. In 1831, the French organized indigenous Algerian light cavalry units under the Ottoman term *Spahi,* as well as several infantry battalions of Zuwawa Berbers called *Zouaves.* The French broadened the recruitment of indigenous light infantry (or *tirailleurs*) in 1841, and there were three such regiments by the mid-1850s.

With the formation of the Arab and Berber tirailleurs, the Zouave units were transformed into elite European infantry with a distinctive Turkish-style uniform. By the 1870s, they were made up of local French settler conscripts. Formed in the 1830s, the *Chasseurs a'Afrique* (Huntsmen of Africa) were European light cavalry that also became dominated by French settler conscripts.

In 1873, the indigenous Spahi and tirailleurs, as well as settler Chasseur and Zouave units in Algeria, and later Tunisia and Morocco, were organized into the new 19th Army Corps, or "Army of Africa," which was separate from colonial forces serving in other parts of Africa or Asia. These North African soldiers participated in all of France's major military campaigns, including the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Franco-Austrian War of 1859, the French intervention in Mexico during the 1860s, the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), many colonial conflicts in Africa and Asia, and World Wars I and II. Following later French colonial conquest, similar Spahi, tirailleur, and Zouave units were formed in Tunisia in the 1880s, and Spahi, tirailleurs, and Goumiers (indigenous mountain troops) in Morocco during the early 20th century.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Zouaves

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Asamoa Nkwanta (d. 1875)

Asamoa Nkwanta was the anantahene (chief of battles) of Kumase, which was the capital of the Asante Empire in West Africa. He is known as the foremost Asante military leader of the 19th century. From 1841 to 1844, he led a force of 30,000–40,000 Asante infantry that fought an arduous campaign to reestablish control over the northern savannah state of Gonja. The victorious military leader and his soldiers were welcomed home at the beginning of June 1844 in one of the largest public ceremonies in 19th-century Asante history.

In 1853, Asamoa Nkwanta commanded a 6,000-strong force that escorted an Asante diplomatic mission to the British. He is credited with introducing the 20-man platoon as a standard unit in the Asante army and inventing a technique for fast loading and firing of breech-loading muskets. Asamoa Nkwanta was greatly respected by Asante fighters, who called him Srafokra or "soldiers' guardian spirit" and believed he possessed some supernatural ability to protect them. By the 1870s, most Asante military commanders had been taught by him. In the late 1860s, he withdrew from court politics, which gave more influence to the war party.

In 1872–1873, Asamoa Nkwanta observed the effectiveness of the new Snider breech-loading rifle, which was used by the British army. As a result, he began to advocate for peaceful negotiations with the British, as opposed to a more radical prowar party within the royal court. When the Asante invaded the coast in 1873, Asamoa Nkwanta planted his cow tail switch, believed to be a war charm that could clear the path for an army, in a river to create a safe crossing. However, the river rose, many men were drowned, and the charm was swept away, which was believed to represent a bad omen for future military campaigns.

During early 1874, Asamoa Nkwanta led Asante forces against the British invasion. In preparation for the Battle of Amoafo on January 31, 1874, some Asante leaders wanted to conduct a surprise frontal attack on the advancing British, but Asamoa Nkwanta advocated for a traditional defensive operation in which they would attempt to encircle the British. The latter plan was approved by the king but did not stop British firepower and the subsequent destruction of Kumase. In late 1875, when neighboring Dwaben invaded Asante, Asamoa Nkwanta and two other field commanders blew themselves up to avoid capture.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War of 1873–1874; Anglo-Asante Wars; Firearms Technology; Kofi Karikari

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Askari

"Askari" was a term applied to local Africans who served in European colonial forces. The entomology of the word comes from the Arabic word *soldier* and, as it was most commonly used in the eastern African context, reflects the mixed Swahili culture of the region. The term also means someone who is "locally recruited," which carries special import in terms of Africans recruited from the colonies to serve European interests. The importance of the askari to the colonial project underscores the true nature of imperialism. Despite the claims of imperialists that European success was due to their cultural, racial, or technological superiority, the reality of most colonial conquest underscores European dependence on Africans to accomplish the aims of imperialism. For example, the famous colonial standoff at Fashoda, in that the French force consisted of seven Frenchmen and around 140 Senegalese, illustrates this reliance. African askari were of critical importance to nearly all of the colonial powers, although the manner in which they were organized and employed was as varied as the colonizers themselves.

What was common to the colonizers, at least initially, was a firm belief in a hierarchy of "martial races" that meant Africans from certain communities were seen as naturally good soldiers for the Europeans. Not only were these races deemed strong and hearty (useful qualities in any soldier), but also they were considered most willing to obey European officers. Often, this led to common recruitment practices as Europeans attempted to maximize their use of



African soldiers under German command in late-nineteenth-century East Africa. European-led colonial armies in Africa relied on a rank-and-file of African troops often called "Askari," which is a Kiswahili word for "soldier." (Sueddeutsche Zeitung Photo/Alamy Stock Photo)

these martial races. Prized for their effectiveness against the forces of the Egyptian Khedive, and later against Europeans under the Mahdi, were Sudanese troops. Sudanese were recruited by both the British and the Germans, for example, to staff their initial forces. Even after such common recruiting practices went away, largely due to the solidification of colonial divisions, this belief in racial or ethnic hierarchy was simply transferred to the specific colony or colonial holdings of the respective powers. Beyond racial categorization, askari often would be recruited on ethnic lines to ensure the connection of one people, group, or region to the colonizers. The very nature of recruitment was designed to divide and conquer the colony.

African soldiers were often utilized in regions not connected to their ethnic background to ensure that there would be no chance of common cause between colonial troops and African civilians. These tactics underscore that the role of the askari was as much about internal security as about defending the colony from foreign threats. Beyond such racial and political justifications were the practical matter that utilizing African troops made colonial conquest and administration far less costly in money and European lives. Every askari in a colonial force lowered the monetary cost of administration, as well as the risk to European troops, who often suffered mightily from the African climate and African diseases.

As Belgium's King Leopold II served as one of the major catalyzing agents for the Scramble for Africa, it is unsurprising that his Force Publique (FP) employed askari. Leopold's force reflected the views of the "martial race," with his force initially recruiting heavily from the Sudan. Of the initial 2,000 askari, for example, only 111 were Congolese. Only in the 1890s were local chiefs required to produce recruits for service to fill out the ranks. During the period of personal rule, the line between soldier and mercenary was thin, with the askari more readily employed as overseers to punish those African civilians who did not meet their rubber quotas. Famously, the Belgians went out of their way to recruit cannibals in order to heighten the potential terror of their troops. The largest action of the FP was during the Congo-Arab War, to repress Arab population centers along the Lualaba River. The war involved a massive number of African troops as the FP absorbed mercenaries and irregulars into their forces to quell the Arab states. After a three-year war, the Belgians were able to defeat the remaining Arab positions and solidify their control over the Free State. After the Belgian government acquired the colony, the askari became a more regularized force, both in weaponry and organization, which enabled the FP to acquit themselves in Africa during World War I.

In the British case, the use of Africans to fight for British interests was originally an ad-hoc affair. Frederick Lugard helped create the Central African Rifles and Uganda Rifles when serving the interests of British companies attempting to solidify their hold over the African interior. Eventually these ad-hoc units, as well as the East African Rifles, combined to form the King's African Rifles (KAR) in 1902. The KAR served with distinction in colonial campaigns in Somalia and the German East Africa campaign of World War I. Lugard was also responsible for the creation of the askari forces in the British possessions in West Africa. He was the founding commander of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF), which was an amalgamation of a number of ad-hoc units in West Africa. This force was organized in order to protect Nigeria's hinterland from French encroachment. Lugard utilized the force, however, to conquer the Sokoto caliphate in what is now northern Nigeria. The WAFF fought in World War I in Africa and was renamed the Royal West African Frontier Force (RWAFF) in 1928.

Despite the common utilization of the term askari, it is most readily associated with the German *Schutztruppe* (Protective Force) of the respective German colonies. Like other colonial forces, these units were created out of necessity to meet the needs of the imperial venture. In 1888, after suffering under the exploitive rule of Carl Peters and his German East Africa Company, Africans led an uprising against the company that took over nearly the entire coast. The German government, in responding to this threat against their interests, sent a force under the command of Hermann von Wissmann to repress the revolt. Originally, this *Wissmann-Truppe* consisted of a polyglot assembly of Africans (600 Sudanese, 100 Zulu from Mozambique, 80 East Africans, and 40 Somali), in line with the common European attitude of the martial races. The Sudanese were deemed the bravest soldiers with some Germans referring to them as "black lansquenets" in homage to the Germanic mercenary soldiers. This force, which was used to crush the rebellion, was then made the official protective force of East Africa by the German government. While initially relying on foreign Africans, the *Schutztruppe* shifted to utilizing locally recruited Africans (in other words, askari), primarily from the Nyamwezi people located in western Tanganyika. This region, heavily connected to the caravan culture of east Africa which required the service of young men as soldiers and porters, served as an attractive area of recruitment. While the forces in East Africa have attracted the most historic attention, largely due to their success in World War I, another primarily African *Schutztruppe* force was formed in German Cameroon, while an entirely white cavalry force was created in German South West Africa. These forces served as the punitive and protective force in the German colonies and then became the main fount of German resistance during World War I. Under Paul von Lettow-Vorbek, the east African *Schutztruppe* proved a thorn in the side of the British, as the Germans were able to conduct a guerilla campaign that tied down British imperial troops throughout the entire war.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); Arab War (1892–1894); Fashoda Incident (1898); Force Publique; Italian colonial troops; King's African Rifles (to 1914); Leopold II; Lugard, Frederick; Mahdi; Peters, Carl; *Schutztruppe*; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); West African Frontier Force (to 1914); Von Wissmann, Hermann

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Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898)

The Anglo-Egyptian Army victory over the dervishes at the hard-fought Battle of Atbara (April 8, 1898) paved the way for the southward advance to Khartoum and the completion of the reconquest of the Sudan.

Major General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener, commanding the Anglo-Egyptian army in the Sudan, assembled his forces in early 1898. He sent one Egyptian army brigade forward to the Atbara Fort, located on the northeastern side of the confluence of the Atbara and Nile rivers about 320 kilometers north of Khartoum, and then assembled his entire force at the same location. The dervish forces were located on March 30, 1898, and after a period of irresolution, Kitchener decided to attack and his army advanced closer to the enemy on April 4, 1898. After cavalry skirmishes, the Anglo-Egyptian force was ready to attack the Khalifa's army. Before sunset on April 7, Kitchener's four-brigade force advanced in large brigade squares on line, with the British brigade leading. The force halted at about 4:00 A.M. less than 1,000 meters before the dervish positions.

At dawn on April 8—Good Friday—the Anglo-Egyptian force attacked south to the heavily defended dervish camp. Kitchener's force was deployed with three infantry brigades on line and one brigade in reserve. From left to right, the Anglo-Egyptian units consisted of eight Egyptian cavalry squadrons on the left flank; the British Brigade (1st Battalions of the Cameron Highlander, Royal Warwickshire, Seaforth Highlander, and Lincolnshire Regiments), commanded by Major-General William F. Gatacre; the 2nd Egyptian Brigade (9th, 10th, and 11th Sudanese and 2nd Egyptian Battalions), under Colonel Hector A. Macdonald; and the 1st Egyptian Brigade (12th, 13th, and 14th Sudanese and 8th Egyptian Battalions), under Colonel John G. Maxwell. The 3rd Egyptian Brigade (3rd, 4th, and 7th Egyptian Battalions), commanded by Colonel D. F. Lewis, was in reserve. Major-General Archibald Hunter was in overall command of the Egyptian forces, organized into the Egyptian Division. Artillery and Maxim guns were positioned along the line. Kitchener's force totaled about 14,000 men, with 24 artillery pieces, 4 Maxim guns, and a rocket detachment.

The artillery and rockets began firing at 6:15 A.M., and their bombardment continued until 7:40 A.M. The Anglo-Egyptian force, led by their commanders on horseback and accompanied by shouts of "Remember Gordon!" (Hunter, 1996, p. 85), then advanced as if on the parade field. The enemy began a heavy fire on Kitchener's troops when they were 300 meters from the dervish zareba. On the second command of "advance," the Anglo-Egyptian units assaulted the dervish fortifications and fought their way with bullets and bayonets through the dense vegetation and maze of trenches. The Sudanese fought especially well, with Kitchener's brother writing that "the Blacks went through the zariba like paper" (Keown-Boyd, 1986, p. 199). They finally pushed through the entire enemy position and soon reached the Atbara River bank.

At 8:25 A.M., the cease-fire was sounded and the battle was over. In spite of the unimaginative tactics used in the engagement, Anglo-Egyptian casualties were 81 killed and 478 wounded, while the dervishes suffered over 3,000 killed. The British Brigade fired over 56,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and the Egyptian Division shot over 193,000 rounds. One war correspondent, however, called the Battle of Atbara "this clean-jointed, well-oiled, smooth-running, clockwork-perfect masterpiece of a battle" (Steevens 1898, p. 151). At the Battle of Atbara, Kitchener's army destroyed the last major dervish force outside Omdurman.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Gatacre, William F.; Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Australians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)

The South African War of 1899–1902, also called the Second Anglo-Boer War, was fought between the British and Boers over the ownership of the two Boer republics, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The Australian colonies sent troops to aid the British army from the outbreak of war and played a significant part in defeating the Boer forces.

British settlers (*uitlanders*) appealed to Australians, as loyal members of the Empire, for aid in increasing their influence within the Boer republics before the war, which provoked debates in the various colonial parliaments on the relevance of the war to Australia, as well as questions regarding its morality. The South African War was the first overseas military venture that Australia as a whole became involved in. Thus, the desire for military experience and prestige, as well as the perceived need for security from Britain and the requirement to display loyalty to the "Mother Country," prompted the colony of Queensland to offer troops in July 1899, shortly followed by New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia.

The Australian public displayed widespread jingoism before the declaration of war on October 11, 1899, and after the British victories in the first half of 1900;

A memorial to Australians who fought in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Around 23,000 Australians fought on the British side of this conflict which is often seen as Australia's first major military engagement. (Rafael Ben-ari/Dreamstime.com) however, there were small, yet significant groups that were opposed to the war. These included antiwar organizations, often labeled "pro-Boer" but rarely were so, such as Melbourne's Peace and Humanity Society, formed in May 1900 by clergymen Dr. Charles Strong and Reverend Laurence Rentoul, as well as Victorian parliamentarian Henry Bournes Higgins. University of Sydney academic George Arnold Wood and William Holman, a local political figure, formed Sydney's Anti-War League in January 1902. Opposition to the war also arose among small groups of Irish-Australians, various religious groups, and trade unions, as well as in the press, with noteworthy opposition coming from feminist journalist Alice Henry and James Edmond, the editor of the decidedly antiwar magazine *The Bulletin*. Germany's support for the Boer forces also created some tension on the Australian home front between British and German settlers.

Despite prevalent debate in political and intellectual circles about the future of Australia's relationship to Britain, the general public still viewed themselves as devoted British subjects. Eagerness for the war among the population saw numerous fundraising groups formed, concerts organized to help the troops, and widespread celebration on the streets of Australian cities when the British army achieved victory. Public displays of loyalty appeared to decline in the final years of the war, a result of both initial expectations of a swift British victory and revelations about the poor treatment of Boer women and children in British concentration camps after the establishment of a scorched-earth policy in June 1900 that saw large numbers of Boer and African farms burned in an effort to cut enemy supply lines.

Numerous Australians offered their services for the war effort, whether by serving as soldiers, supplying equipment to the troops, or serving as nurses for the sick and wounded on the war front. Many who attempted to enlist for military service were rejected due to the surplus in volunteers, and some men traveled independently to South Africa to attempt to join British and allied contingents.

Due to widespread drought in much of Australia in the late 19th century, and subsequent lack of employment, many men living in rural areas enlisted. As a result, the majority of men in the Australian forces were accustomed to harsh rural conditions, which contributed to their skills in fighting the highly mobile Boer forces on the South African veldt. After he replaced Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts as commander in chief of the British army in South Africa on November 29, 1900, Lord Herbert Horatio Kitchener specifically requested additional Australian troops due to their effectiveness on the battlefield—a point that became a source of pride for the fighting Australians. Despite such praise, many Australians were sent to South Africa with very little training, if any.

The first contingents sent to South Africa were raised and funded by the individual Australian colonies and first arrived on the war front in December 1899. From early 1900, it became clear that mounted units were more successful against the Boers than traditional infantry, so prominent Australian civilians began forming independent "bushmen" contingents, some paid for by public philanthropy, and others, labeled "imperial bushmen" contingents, financed by the British government. On January 1, 1901, the federation established

Australia as a constitutional monarchy tied to Britain. After this, the newly labeled Australian states, previously colonies, formed draft contingents until the new federal government of Australia was able to form its own units, named the Australian Commonwealth Horse. These were the last groups of men sent to South Africa before the end of the war and the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on May 31, 1902. Although most Australians fighting in the war were white, aboriginal Australian troops and trackers were also present on the South African war front. The Australian contingents fought alone or alongside British, Scottish, Canadian, or New Zealander troops. African groups loyal to the British cause also joined the Australians as fellow soldiers, trackers, or servants.

Australians were present at the reliefs of Kimberley on February 15, 1900, Ladysmith on February 28, 1900, and Mafeking on May 17, 1900, as well as the British occupation of Pretoria beginning on June 5, 1900. They were also highly successful, when compared with more traditionally trained British troops, in fighting the Boers during the guerrilla phase of the campaign starting in September 1900.

One of the greatest international controversies of the war involving Australian troops was the court-martial and hanging of Lieutenant Harry "The Breaker" Morant of the Bushveldt Carbineers on February 27, 1902. He was executed along with his fellow officer, Lieutenant Peter Handcock, for killing Boer prisoners of war in August 1901. Although Lieutenant George Witton was also involved in the crime, Lord Kitchener commuted his death sentence to lifetime imprisonment, of which he served two years. The story of "Breaker Morant" is one of Australia's enduring tales of the war.

In total, approximately 16,000 Australians fought in South Africa, and over 7,000 fought in British or South African contingents, with approximately 600 casualties in total. Six Australian men received the prestigious Victoria Cross for their services during the war. The South African War is frequently viewed as Australia's first major military venture and provided a precursor for its involvement in World War I.

Effie Karageorgos

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boers; Canadians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899—February 15, 1900); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); New Zealanders in the Second Anglo-Boer War; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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B

Baden-Powell, Robert (1857–1941)

A renowned military hero of the Second Anglo-Boer War, Sir Robert Stephenson Smyth Baden-Powell of Great Britain was the founder of the Boy Scouts, an organization that helped form the character of thousands of young men throughout the world over the course of the 20th century and beyond.

Born on February 22, 1857 in London, Baden-Powell came from a prosperous and well-connected family. His father, a professor of geometry at Oxford University, died when Baden-Powell was only three years old, leaving his mother to raise the family of 10 children. The family, though by no means wealthy, managed to secure a good education for the children. From a young age, Baden-Powell and his 6 brothers enjoyed the outdoor life, spending enormous amounts of time hiking, fishing, and camping.

Unlike his older brothers, who attended Oxford, Baden-Powell joined a cavalry unit of the British army as a sub-lieutenant in 1876. Posted to the 13th Hussars, he sailed with his regiment to India that same year. In India, Baden-Powell quickly distinguished himself as skilled in reconnaissance and scouting. He was promoted to captain in 1883, and shortly thereafter, he published two books on the technical aspects of scouting: *Reconnaissance and Scouting* (1884) and *Cavalry Instruction* (1885). Thus began a lifelong tradition of publishing accounts of his military experiences. All of the books he subsequently published were accompanied by his illustrations, as he was a gifted artist and frequently sketched or painted the scenes that he witnessed.

Over the next 20 years, Baden-Powell moved back and forth between India and Africa. The situation between the British settlers, Africans, and the Dutch-speaking Boers in South Africa became particularly tense during this period, and Baden-Powell was involved in several reconnaissance missions related to this matter. In early 1896, he led a force that occupied the capital of the Asante Empire in West Africa, and in 1896–1897, he participated in the suppression of the Ndebele and Shona rebellions in southern Rhodesia, where he was impressed by the scouting of American frontiersman Frederick Burnham Russell. Back in India by 1899 and commander of his own unit of dragoon guards, Baden-Powell published *Aids to Scouting,* which offered a course of instruction for military scouts. In it, he elaborated on the key to good scouting: acute skills of observation and the division of men into small, mobile units that were free to take the initiative.

Shortly before the Second Anglo-Boer War broke out later that year, Baden-Powell was transferred back to South Africa, where he was stationed in the strategically important railway town of Mafeking. Some 6,000 Boers laid siege to the town, which was defended by about 1,000 troops and volunteers. As the British military leader of Mafeking, Baden-Powell did an amazing job of withstanding the siege. Proving himself an organizational genius, he managed the garrison's limited supplies, kept morale high, and held off the Boers for 217 days until he was relieved by a British force. The siege of Mafeking, and Baden-Powell's role in it, captured the imagination of the British public and made him a national hero.

As the war wound to a close, Baden-Powell was placed in charge of establishing the South African Constabulary, a military force to occupy the conquered Boer republics. Returning to England in 1901, he received a hero's welcome. In 1907, he was promoted to lieutenant general, and the following year, he was entrusted with the task of commanding a division of the British Territorial Army in the north of England. The Territorials had just been established, presenting Baden-Powell with the opportunity to employ his organizational talents once again to this new defensive unit.

Baden-Powell retired from the army in 1910 to pursue a new interest. He had been surprised to learn in 1903 that several teachers around Great Britain were using his book *Aids to Scouting* to instruct boys in wilderness skills. Believing that many boys would enjoy some wilderness training, he founded the Boy Scouts in 1907, establishing a summer camp that same year at Brownsea Island. The boys he admitted to the camp were all over the age of 11 and were from varying social backgrounds, an experiment in class mixing that proved remarkably successful, as did the entire wilderness camp experience. In 1908, he published *Scouting for Boys,* a manual for Scouts that laid out the purpose of the organization (to build character and hone leadership skills) and a strict code of conduct (which mirrored general notions of gentlemanly behavior at the time).

The Boy Scouts proved enormously popular, and within months of the organization's founding, Scout troops had sprung up all over Britain, quickly spreading to the British colonies and the United States. After his retirement from the army, Baden-Powell spent all his time working to administer the Boy Scouts and promote the organization's development. In 1910, he created the Girl Guides as a companion organization with the help of his sister Agnes. He was later assisted in this endeavor by his wife, Olave St. Clair. She became an active organizer and promoter of the Girl Guides in her own right.

During World War I, the Boy Scouts proved valuable additions to Britain's home defense organization, with more than 20,000 of them employed as couriers and lookouts. Even though most of the organization's scoutmasters joined the British army during the war, the organization continued to expand. Critics accused Baden-Powell of training boys for the military, but he countered with the statement that the Boy Scouts formed the character of the nation's youths so that they could lead in times of both war and peace.

After the war, Baden-Powell encouraged the international growth of the organization, believing that it promoted world peace. He received several awards for his work in this area. In 1920, he organized the first international Scout jamboree in London, where he was proclaimed Chief Scout of the world. Similar jamborees were held all over the world during the next several years, including in Denmark (1924), Hungary (1933), and the Netherlands (1937).

Baden-Powell received several honors over the course of his life, for both his military service and his work with the Boy Scouts. Created a baronet in 1922, he was ennobled as a baron in 1929. Always an avid traveler, he was in Egypt when World War II broke out in 1939. He died in Nyeri, Kenya, on January 8, 1941.

Elizabeth Dubrulle

See also: Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Burnham, Frederick Russell; Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897)

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Bai Bureh (c. 1840–1908)

Temne chief and warrior Bai Bureh believed in the territorial sovereignty of traditional leaders in Sierra Leone and refused to succumb to the British. His resistance culminated in the Hut Tax War in 1898, one of the last attempts to rescue Sierra Leone from British imperial rule.

Of Loko descent, Bai Bureh was born around 1840 in the village of Rokthenti on the Mabole River, a tributary of the Small Scarcies, just northwest of present-day Makeni, Sierra Leone. The son of a professional warrior, he was sent to a traditional military school at Pendembu Gwahum, where his military prowess earned him the nickname “Kebalai,” which means “one whose basket is never full”—that is, one who kills so much that his “basket” seems bottomless.

From the 1860s through the 1880s, Bai Bureh built up his reputation as a fierce warrior and leader under the powerful Loko chief Bokhari. In 1859, and again during 1874–1875, he took part in wars between the Temne and the Susu along the Scarcies rivers. In 1887, the Temne elders were in the unfortunate position of not having a suitable hereditary chief when Bokhari died. The elders offered the chieftaincy to Bai Bureh, who was given the title of ruler of the Kasse (Small Scarcies).

As ruler of the Kasse, Bai Bureh received a stipend from the British government (tantamount to a bribe). Following the concept of indirect rule, the British used local rulers to carry out their administrative orders, and they in turn were expected to acknowledge British claims and maintain order among themselves. Bai Bureh, however, was not satisfied with these arrangements. He continued to take part in small skirmishes with local leaders, which tended to disrupt trade and upset the local balance of power.

From 1889 to 1892, Bai Bureh fought against a local chief, Kairimu. He also aided about 1,500 British soldiers in their defeat of another rival chief. During the campaign, he learned British fighting techniques that would later influence his warring strategy. When the colonial government had enough of Bai Bureh's warring, it decided to fine him and ordered him to come to the capital, Freetown, for discussions. Not one to acknowledge British sovereignty, Bai Bureh refused to attend the talks. In 1891, the British tried to arrest him for criticizing the fact that they settled disputes without input from him. In 1895, the French made a claim that a local chief, aided by Bai Bureh, was making incursions into French territory. The British attempted to arrest him for insubordination but were unsuccessful. By all accounts, British endeavors to control the Kasse warrior failed.

While he accepted his stipend, Bai Bureh continued to defy British rule, even after the royal government, which had been running its West African colonies from Freetown, declared a protectorate over the Sierra Leone hinterland in August 1896. Since they believed that they were doing what was best for the interests of the people, the colonial officials established five districts protected by frontier police. The police were in place to protect trade routes, with the idea that they should be financed locally since the British and the African peoples would both benefit from their presence as trade increased. Financing would be in the form of a hut (house) tax to be collected by local chiefs.

Payment of the hut tax in goods other than money was initially allowed. The British believed that the increase in trade and the number of wage-earners working on infrastructure projects would increase the flow of cash, enabling all subjects to pay the tax without any problem. In 1897, Temne chiefs told the Freetown government, "Our own true fear is that paying for our huts naturally means no right to our country." Clearly, they saw the tax as a loss of independence. Many of the new rules instituted by the British—land clauses, special courts, and trading licenses—went against traditional Temne ways. Little of the tax money trickled in, causing the British to appoint regents backed by the frontier police in the Port Loko area to collect the tax, bypassing local authority altogether.

The British dispatched a letter to Bai Bureh ordering him to begin collecting the tax. He refused to accept the letter and sent the government representatives away. The police returned to arrest him but were driven away by taunting crowds. Beginning in February 1898, Bai Bureh led a Temne campaign against the British that lasted for 10 months.

The Hut Tax War consisted of Temne guerrillalike tactics against the British style of fighting, with which Bai Bureh had become familiar. His warriors used stockades made from palm logs that were set into the ground, and behind the stockades were trenches. While they were close to the roads, they were nearly invisible in the bush, giving Bai Bureh and his men the upper hand. His early successes inspired others to take up the cause. The British, however, with their superior weaponry, managed to destroy the stockades, burning villages, rice fields, and crops along the way. By May 1898, some 97 villages were destroyed.

By July, only Bai Bureh and his troops still posed a threat. The colony governor, Frederic Cardew, offered a 100 pound reward for Bai Bureh, who was said to have reciprocated by offering a 500 pound reward for the governor. The warrior chief was finally subdued by the British on November 16, 1898. Two stories exist about the day. One was that Bai Bureh was simply captured by the British. The other was that he emerged from the bush with his hands up, declaring that the war was over. Regardless, he was taken into British custody and held at Karene, where he may have tried to escape. In February 1899, he was moved to Freetown. The hut tax was retained, but the British learned that they would no longer be able to deal this aggressively with the local chiefs.

Determining punishment for Bai Bureh was difficult. There was no evidence that he committed any murder, and because he claimed no loyalty to the queen, he could not be tried for treason. In July 1898, the last indigenous challenger to British rule in 19th-century Sierra Leone, Bai Bureh, was exiled to the Gold Coast. He was allowed to return in 1905 to his former title of Kasse chief. He died in Sierra Leone in 1908.

Cynthia Fife-Townsel

See also: Hut Tax War, Sierra Leone (1898); West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Baker, Valentine (1827–1887)

Valentine Baker was a talented British Army officer who, in 1875, was tried and found guilty of an alleged indiscretion, imprisoned, and dismissed from the service. The case stunned British society at the time.

Baker, a younger brother of famed African explorer Sir Samuel Baker, was born on April 1, 1827, at Enfield. He became an ensign in the Ceylon Rifles in 1848 but transferred to the 12th Lancers in 1852 and fought in the Eighth Cape Xhosa War in South Africa. Baker served in the Crimean War, and upon obtaining his rank of major under the purchase system in 1859, exchanged into the 10th Hussars.

Baker assumed command (again by purchase) of the 10th Hussars in 1860 and commanded the regiment for 13 years. During this period, he developed a new system of squadron drill and, unlike most cavalry commanders, trained his men in scouting and skirmishing tactics. Baker was also the first commander to practice cavalry movement by train. Interested in his profession, he also served as an observer during the 1866 Austro-Prussian War and 1870 Franco-Prussian War.

Relinquishing command in 1873, Baker went on half pay. He traveled to Persia to see for himself the extent of Russian imperialism in Central Asia, and on his return wrote *Clouds in the East* (1876), an account of his journey that warned of Russian encroachment in that area. Baker was assigned as assistant quartermaster-general at Aldershot in 1874.

The following summer, Baker was accused of indecently assaulting a young woman on a train and was subsequently tried and convicted in a civilian court on the uncorroborated testimony of the woman. He was found guilty, sentenced to 12 months imprisonment, and fined. Subsequently, he was dismissed from the army.

Baker joined and was commissioned a major general with the title "Pasha" in the Turkish gendarmerie during the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War. He later commanded a Turkish division in the Balkans and fought at Tashkessan in "one of the most brilliant and successful rearguard actions on record" (Stephen and Lee 1964–1965, p. 109) on December 31, 1877. Baker was promoted to lieutenant general in recognition of his services.

In 1882, after the British occupation of Egypt, he was offered and accepted the post of commander in chief of the Egyptian army. This appointment was not confirmed, however, because of his earlier disgrace, and he was then designated commander of the ill-trained paramilitary Egyptian Gendarmerie. He attempted to relieve the besieged town of Tokar with this force but was soundly defeated by the Mahdists at El Teb on February 4, 1884. After the arrival of reinforcements, Baker was designated intelligence officer of the British force and guided its advance to the successful Battle of El Teb, February 29, 1884, where he was wounded.

Baker remained in command of the Egyptian Gendarmerie and died of heart disease in Egypt on November 17, 1887. In announcing his death, the *Times* observed that Baker's "career might have been among the most brilliant in our military services" (Barthorp 1984a, p. 35).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Egyptian Army; El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Mahdi; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Baldissera, Antonio (1838–1917)

One of Italy's more successful colonial officers, Antonio Baldissera is perhaps best known for his role in recruiting and training the force of indigenous regular troops (*ascaris)* in Eritrea that would render valuable service in campaigns in Ethiopia in the 1890s and in the conquest of Libya in 1911–1912. Baldissera's early career closely resembles that of his contemporary, Carlo Caneva. Both grew up in the province of Friuli north of Venice, then part of the Habsburg Empire, and thus began their military careers in the Austrian army. Like Caneva a distinguished graduate of the Austrian military academy at Wiener Neustadt, Baldissera served with valor in the war against the Kingdom of Piedmont and France in 1859 and against Piedmont and Prussia in 1866. Austria's defeat in the 1866 war cost her Venetia, and, again like Caneva, Baldissera opted to transfer his allegiance to the new kingdom of Italy. Although he faced some hostility from officers in the Italian army because of his Austrian service, he was nonetheless able to retain his earlier rank of captain and was made a colonel in 1879. By 1887, he had been promoted to major-general and was assigned to service in Eritrea in the wake of the massacre of Italian troops at Dogali in January of that year.

Baldissera went out to Eritrea with a force of some 18,000 reinforcements under the command of General Alessandro Asinari di San Marzano. He succeeded the general as governor of the colony when he departed in 1888. His predecessor having been criticized for adopting a basically defensive policy toward Ethiopia, Baldissera quickly took the opposite tack, forming, as we have seen, a large force of native troops (*ascaris)*; building roads and railroads into the interior; and stimulating the local Eritrean economy. With the government of Ethiopia in disarray following the death of the emperor, Yohannes IV, Baldissera went on the offensive, defeating the armies of the local governor, Ras Alula, and occupying his capital, Asmara. His ambition of pushing further into Ethiopian territory, however, was considered too provocative by his civilian masters back in Rome, and in 1890, he gave up his command and returned to Italy. His stock would rise over the succeeding years, however, as Italian governments adopted a more aggressive attitude toward Ethiopia.

Baldissera would be back in Ethiopia once again in the wake of another military setback, this one far more serious than the defeat at Dogali. On March 1, 1896, a large army of Italian troops and Eritrean and Tigrayan *ascaris* under the command of the governor of Eritrea, General Oreste Baratieri, was destroyed at Adowa in northern Ethiopia by an army under the personal command of the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II. This bloodiest of all the battles in the European wars of imperial conquest in Africa not only put paid to Italian efforts to conquer Ethiopia for a generation, but also threatened Italy's hold on Eritrea.

In the weeks prior to Adowa, the government in Rome, finding General Baratieri too cautious, had secretly ordered Baldissera to go out to Ethiopia to replace him. He was at Suez on his way to East Africa when the battle of Adowa took place. Baratieri appears to have gotten wind of the scheme, however, and some observers believe that he decided to do battle at Adowa, against his own inclinations, in order to forestall being replaced. Once on the scene in the wake of the defeat, Baldissera acted with his customary energy, reorganizing what was left of the defeated Italian army and, with the aid of reinforcements from Italy, relieved the beleaguered garrisons, drove back Menelik's army, and secured the frontiers of Eritrea. Once again, however, the general's offensive tendencies outran the inclinations of government policymakers back home. In 1897, he was back in Italy again, as Rome cut its losses in East Africa and turned its imperial attentions to North Africa.

Made a senator in 1906, Baldissera commanded the VII and VIII Army Corps in Italy until his retirement in 1908. He died in Florence on January 8, 1917.

Bruce Vandervort

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Alula Engida, Ras; Baratieri, Oreste; Caneva, Carlo; Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887);

Italian Colonial Troops; Italo-Ethiopian War (1895–96); Libya, Italian Conquest of (1911–1912); Menelik II; Yohannes IV

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Baratieri, Oreste (1841–1901)

Oreste Baratieri was a brave and competent soldier of the Italian unification wars. However, his crushing defeat at the Battle of Adowa signaled the end of Italy's colonial aspirations in Africa for 40 years.

Baratieri was born in Condino, Lombardy, on November 13, 1841, as a subject of the Austrian Empire. The kingdoms and provinces of Italy were then in the throes of mounting resentment against foreign domination, however, and a series of wars commenced in 1848 to achieve national unification. Like many Italians of his generation, Baratieri took up arms in an attempt to expel the Austrians from his native soil. He joined Giuseppe Garibaldi's 1,000-man Redshirts in 1860 and fought throughout the victorious Neapolitan campaign. Finding military life to his liking, Baratieri subsequently joined the Italian army as an officer and was present at the crushing defeat of Custozza on June 24, 1866. Despite this loss, because Austria was decisively defeated by Prussia at the Battle of Koeniggratz the following month, all its Italian possessions were granted unconditional independence.

Oreste Baratieri (1841–1901) was the Italian general who commanded Italian forces defeated by the Ethiopians at the Battle of Adowa in March 1896. He was court-martialed over the disaster but acquitted. (Paul Popper/Popperfoto/Getty Images)

Baratieri remained in the military once Italian unification had become a reality, but he also wrote several military treatises and served in the national Parliament between 1876 and 1896. Throughout this period, the new nation, with its newly consolidated political and military institutions, began looking for new territory to acquire. Because France and England were rapidly expanding their holdings upon the African continent, the Italian government under Premier Francesco Crispi began focusing its attention on the territory of Abyssinia (present-day Ethiopia). As early as 1870, Italy had acquired the port of Assab on the Red Sea for trading purposes and slowly began expanding its influence toward the interior. This move was greatly resented by Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV, and in January 1887, he decimated a 500-man Italian outpost at Dogali. However, Yohannes was killed in battle with the Sudanese Mahdists in 1889, and his success, Menelik II, signed the Treaty of Wichale, in which Ethiopia recognized Italian control of coastal Eritrea and Italy supported Menelik as Ethiopian emperor. A few years later, conflict developed because the Italian version of the treaty stipulated that Ethiopian foreign relations would be controlled by Rome, but the Amharic one disagreed.

Baratieri at this time had risen to the rank of general, and as of 1892, he was appointed as military governor of Eritrea. He tried negotiating with Menelik to avert conflict, but because the wording of the contested treaty differed in the Italian and Ethiopian versions—to Italy's advantage—the emperor finally renounced it. The Italians, meanwhile, were themselves diverted by hostilities with the Mahdist armies, and on December 21, 1893, a force under Colonel Giuseppe Arimondi defeated a large contingent of Sudanese at Agordat. Baratieri himself took to the field in July 1894 and successfully stormed Kassala.

Upon returning to Eritrea, Baratieri discovered that the Ethiopians were concluding an alliance with the Mahdists against the Italians, and he took to the field again. In January 1895, he met and defeated large Ethiopian forces at Coatit and Senate, and he subsequently occupied the city of Adrigat prior to annexing the Tigray province. When these moves failed to awe the Ethiopians, he next pushed two columns of soldiers (many of whom were African) farther south after his initial success. This army, unfortunately, collided head on with a huge force under Menelik himself, who was advancing northward. The Europeans were roughly handled at Amba Alagi in December 1895 and at Mekele in January 1896, and they were forced to retreat in haste to Baratieri's main body. Believing himself to be vastly outnumbered, the beleaguered general fortified his position, hoping that Menelik would exhaust his forces against them. When the expected siege did not transpire, a stalemate of several weeks ensued.

The impasse ended in March 1896, when Crispi angrily telegraphed Baratieri and chided him for not resuming the offensive. The general then made additional overtures to Menelik but was disappointed when the Ethiopian monarch moved his large force to Adowa to outflank him. Under intense pressure from his government to act, Baratieri marshaled his army and prepared to advance. He marshaled a force of three Italian brigades and one African brigade, totaling 15,000 men. The Italians planned to advance upon the enemy in four columns and surprise them in camp, only 30 kilometers distant. Maps provided to the army proved inaccurate, however, and the columns became vastly separated.

On the morning of March 1, 1896, Menelik became aware of Baratieri's scheme and sortied an estimated 90,000 men to meet him. Baratieri's African contingent, which had advanced the farthest, was quickly engulfed by a sea of Ethiopian warriors and annihilated. The remaining three brigades then commenced an uncoordinated defense in the face of very unfavorable odds. Fearful of being overwhelmed, Baratieri commenced a retreat that soon disintegrated into a rout. For an estimated loss of 12,000 dead, Menelik had scored a decisive victory over his technologically superior enemies, killing 6,500 and taking 2,500 prisoners.

The implications of the Battle of Adowa were severe. The disaster for the Italian army not only unraveled the myth of European superiority, but also spelled the end of Italian colonization of Africa for nearly four decades. Italy was also forced to sign the Treaty of Addis Ababa in October 1896, which recognized the independence of Ethiopia. The defeat was so devastating that the Crispi administration resigned in disgrace, and to this day, March 1 is still celebrated as a national Ethiopian holiday. The public's bitter memory of the defeat was a major factor in prompting Benito Mussolini to resume aggressions against Ethiopia during the 1930s.

As a result of Baratieri's mishandling of Adowa, the general was court-martialed, acquitted, and slipped into a quiet retirement. He died at Sterzing, Tyrol, on August 7, 1901, having presided over one of the worst defeats ever suffered by colonial forces in Africa.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Italian Colonial Troops; Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Mahdi; Menelik II; Yohannes IV; Wichale, Treaty of (1889)

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Barbary Wars (1783–1815)

The *Barbary States* was the term applied in Europe to the North African provinces of the Ottoman Empire (modern-day Algieria, Tunisia, and Libya). For centuries, Barbary pirates (corsairs) had captured merchants and raided towns, looting and capturing Christians to sell as slaves. Rejecting a policy of appeasement, the United States defeated the Barbary pirates in two wars, the Tripolitan War of 1801–1805 and the Algerine War of 1815.

The Tripolitan War began February 26, 1801, when Tripoli declared war after the U.S. government refused to meet its demands. The Tripolitan pirates regularly raided merchant ships to demand tribute for the right to sail their seas and to offer for ransom the sailors they took into slavery. Most European countries chose to pay the tribute demanded. The young United States followed suit and, starting in 1796, regularly paid tribute to Algiers. Public opinion went against such policy, however, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney's now-famous statement—"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute"—gained in popularity. In 1801, with the addition of several powerful frigates to its standing naval force, the new administration under President Thomas Jefferson refused to comply with Tripoli's demands for tribute, and on February 26, 1801, the pasha opened hostilities. On July 24, 1802, Commodore Richard Dale, commanding the American squadron, blockaded Tripoli. On June 2, 1803, Captain David Porter raided the Tripoli harbor with an amphibious landing, the first American action on a hostile foreign shore. In August 1804, Tripolitanian ships and Tripoli's harbor defenses were attacked. In 1805, William Eaton marched U.S. forces across the desert from Alexandria to attack Tripoli. Eaton captured Derna on April 28. On June 4, a peace treaty was signed between Tripoli and the United States.

After the American victory in the first Barbary War, the United States became embroiled in a larger struggle for mastery in the Atlantic, which eventually led to the War of 1812. The Barbary pirates exploited this opportunity to resume attacks on U.S. merchant vessels and hold their crews for ransom. The United States initially recommended paying tributes, but after the conclusion of the War of 1812 with Britain, Washington turned its attention to the issue of piracy. The Algerine War began in early March 1815, when the U.S. Congress authorized the deployment of naval squadrons against Algiers. On June 28, Commodore Stephen Decatur, commanding an American squadron, arrived at the port of Algiers, having captured a couple of Algerian warships along the way. He threatened to bombard Algiers if a peace treaty were not signed at once. On June 30, a treaty was signed, its terms dictated at the mouth of a cannon. Decatur then sailed for Tunis and Tripoli, where he forced their rulers to sign a peace treaty as well. This effectively ended the war with the Barbary pirates. A second American squadron visited the ports of the Barbary States a few weeks later to reinforce their will to comply with the treaties.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Decatur, Stephen

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Behanzin (1844–December 10, 1906)

Born in 1844, Behanzin was the son of Glele, ruler of the West African kingdom of Dahomey in what is now Benin. At that time, he was called Kondo. Accounts by European visitors prior to 1870 do not mention him, but they do state that Ahanhanzo was the son and heir of Glele. However, Ahanhanzo died sometime in the middle 1870s, either from smallpox, or he was killed by his brother Behanzin. The elderly Glele went into seclusion from around 1875 until his death in 1889. During this period, there was competition between Sasse Koka, supported by his powerful mother, Visesegan, and Behanzin over who would succeed their father. Within the new context of the rising influence of slave diviners and advisors at the royal court, Behanzin became more popular through his emerging reputation for having supernatural powers.

During the 1880s, European powers began to intervene more aggressively in West Africa. Early in the decade, the French established a protectorate over the port of Porto Novo, which had been dominated by Dahomey in the interior; and in 1884, Germany established a colony in neighboring Togo. France also began to extend its authority over the ports of Whydah and Cotonou. In 1888, Behanzin made an unsuccessful attempt to gain the support of the British in Lagos in his struggle against Sasse Koka, who his emissaries portrayed as cruel. Glele died on December 30, 1889; shortly afterward, Behanzin, despite lack of support from many within the royal family, became ruler and Sasse Koka died.

Around this time, Behanzin refused to meet with French official Jean Bayol, who hoped to persuade the new Dahomian ruler to accept a French customs post at Cotonou. In March 1890, a Dahomey force attacked Cotonou, but it was repelled by French colonial troops. Subsequently, Behanzin withdrew his forces inland to protect the kingdom's homeland, and in October 1890, he signed a treaty that recognized French control over Porto Novo and Cotonou. In Dahomey, Behanzin's authority was

Behanzin (1844–1906) was ruler of the West African state of Dahomey from 1889 to 1894. He led his kingdom during two wars with the invading French who deposed him and exiled him to Martinique in the Caribbean and then Algeria. (adoc-photos/Corbis via Getty Images) bolstered by the lack of French invasion and deals with German trading firms in which he sent several thousand subjects to work in neighboring German and Portuguese territories in exchange for modern rifles and several machine guns.

In 1892, Behanzin, with the best-armed African army in West Africa, tried to reassert his claims to the coast, which prompted a French intervention. In August 1892, a French expeditionary force under Alfred-Amedee Dodds invaded Dahomey, where it faced determined resistance for over a year before seizing the capital of Abomey. In early December 1892, Dodds officially deposed Behanzin as king of Dahomey, as he had paid a small portion of a 15-million-franc fine imposed by the French. As he fled north, Behanzin appeared willing to make an agreement with the French invaders. This frustrated some of his subjects, who wanted to continue fighting.

In January 1894, Behanzin surrendered to the French, who appointed Agoliagbo, another son of the late Glele who had served Behanzin, as the new king of Dahomey. The French exiled Behanzin to Martinique in the Caribbean, where he became sick. Subsequently, he was transferred to Algeria where he died on December 10, 1906. By the mid-twentieth century, African nationalists considered him a hero of anticolonial resistance. In 1900, the French imposed direct rule and deposed Agoliagbo, who was exiled to Gabon until 1910, when he was allowed to return home (but not as king).

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Amazons, Dahomey; Dodds, Alfred-Amedee; Franco-Dahomey Wars (1890–1894); French Colonial Policy in Africa

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Belmont, Battle of (November 23, 1899)

In early November 1899, a few weeks after the start of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), three British forces were poised for a counterattack against the Transvaal and Orange Free State Boers, who had invaded the British territories of the Cape and Natal. In Natal, Redvers Buller led the relief of Ladysmith; in the middle Cape, William Gatacre drove out the Boers; and in the northern Cape, Lord Methuen led his 1st Division up the railway to relieve Kimberley.

Methuen followed the railway, which ran through Kimberley and then passed through Mafeking on the way north to Rhodesia, as there was a lack of draft animals to haul supply wagons and it was the only way to evacuate civilians from Kimberley. On November 21, Methuen led his 10,000 men from Orange River Station, near the western border of the Free State, toward Kimberley via the Modder River. North of the Orange River near Belmont, Jacobus Prinsloo and 2,000 Boers occupied a hill, intending to delay the British until Piet Cronjé could send reinforcements from Mafeking. Although Jacobus De la Rey brought reinforcements from Makeking, many demoralized Boers had deserted, so their total force was still 2,000. While the Boers knew that Methuen was heading straight for Belmont and the exact strength of his force, the British knew that the Boers held Belmont but knew nothing about their forces there. With only 900 mounted troops, Methuen's division lacked sufficient reconnaissance assets.

In the early-morning darkness of November 23, Methuen's three infantry brigades moved around the Boer hilltop positions at Belmont in preparation for an overwhelming dawn attack, and his cavalry positioned themselves to cut off a Boer retreat. However, inaccurate maps resulted in the Guards Brigade going to the wrong location. At dawn, they found themselves not on the flank of the Boers, but in front of them—and at the bottom of a steep slope. Although the Guards suffered heavy casualties from Boer fire, their bayonet charge drove the enemy from Gun Hill. Similarly caught in the open at dawn, the 9th Brigade took serious casualties, but it eventually drove the Boers off Table Mountain.

Methuen tried to minimize casualties by having the infantry adopt an open-order attack formation, but his men were caught in crossfire from different Boer positions. Finally, fire from the Naval Brigade prompted the Boers to mount their horses and abandon the last position of Mount Blanc, and the British lacked enough cavalry to pursue them. The inability of British artillery to move up to captured high ground, where they could support the attack, represented a serious problem. In swarming the hills, the British suffered 300 casualties, which was more than double that of the Boers. De la Rey then established fortified positions on an arc of hills near Graspan, which, on November 25, were bombarded and overwhelmed by the British.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; Cronjé, Pieter; De la Rey, Jacobus; Gatacre, William F.; Graspan, Battle of (November 5, 1899); Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Methuen, Lord

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Benin, British Conquest of (1897)

The British Conquest of Benin, also called the Benin Punitive Expedition, was an 1897 military operation that conquered the Kingdom of Benin; overthrew the kingdom's ruler, Oba Ovonramwen; and annexed the territory, adding it to the increasing number of protectorates that would in 1900 be amalgamated into the Southern Nigeria Protectorate.

The kingdom of Benin controlled extensive trading networks throughout its history, all of which were under the personal control of an oba, who had the power to close markets and ban foreign traders if they did not present him with what he deemed sufficient duties, which he dubbed *gifts.* The oba exercised this power largely through the use of juju fetishes and other magical powers thought to be bestowed upon him through the widespread practice of human sacrifice, mainly of captives and slaves.

The first Europeans documented to have initiated trade with the kingdom were the Portuguese in 1485. However, because of the oba's control over the trading system within the kingdom, most of the trading contacts were relatively small until the 19th century. In the latter half of the 19th century, British industries were increasing their presence in the Niger Delta, and the oba's control of the trade with the coast irked many firms operating in the region. Furthermore, many British consuls in the region viewed Benin's reliance on what they termed "fetish government" as barbaric and opposed to European views of commerce and civilization. In 1862, Richard Burton, the British consul on the nearby island of Fernando Po, visited Benin. In his account of the trip, he noted the kingdom's wealth but also described human sacrifices, claiming that the capital city was littered with corpses and the accompanying stench was unbearable.

In 1888, Ovonramwen was crowned oba in a time of increasing tension between the British and some of the more powerful rulers in the Niger Delta region. After the Berlin conference in 1884–1885, the British, along with the rest of the European powers, began a process of consolidation of their power under the guise of free trade, which became known as the "Scramble for Africa." The year before Ovonramwen's coronation, King Jaja of Opobo was abducted while in Lagos for talks with the British vice consul. After coming to power in 1869, Jaja signed an agreement with the British that allowed him total control of the waterways north of his port city of Opobo. This control included the right to tax British vessels using the Opobo River and seize British vessels that failed to pay. When he refused to stop taxing British merchants, he was asked to go to Lagos for talks, where he was seized, sent to Accra on the Gold Coast, and after a short trial, exiled to St. Vincent in the Caribbean.

Following a series of failed engagements with Benin in 1884, 1885, and 1890, Henry Gallway was appointed vice-consul for the Benin River District in 1891. In efforts to increase exports from the region's interior, he signed several treaties with the local middlemen, placing them under British protectorates. A year later, Gallway successfully signed a treaty with Ovonramwen, effectively opening up the kingdom to free trade and not permitting the oba to close the markets, allowing foreign missionaries into the kingdom, protecting British subjects from local laws, and compelling the oba to accept British control of foreign policy. Ovonramwen largely ignored the treaty provisions, continuing to demand customs duties from his trading partners and, as before the treaty, closing the markets if the duties were unsatisfactory. By 1895, Gallwey surmised that his only option to effectively open the kingdom to trade would be through military means.

In October 1896, James Phillips was appointed as consul-general of the Niger Coast Protectorate and quickly decided to venture to Benin's capital, despite the Foreign Office's instructions and against the advice of the middlemen traders, who warned that he should not attempt to meet the oba because the latter had refused to grant an audience. On January 2, 1897, Phillips left for Benin, taking with him many of his officials and a large contingent of porters. The next day, the party arrived at Ughoton, the kingdom's main trading port. Despite the protestations that they not proceed further, Phillips's entourage left the next day and continued to Benin City. On January 4, they walked into an ambush that killed the entire force except for two British army officers.

This attack gave the British the casus belli to invade the kingdom of Benin and end the oba's rule. On February 9, 1897, an expeditionary force consisting of nine naval ships led by Harry Rawson began a three-pronged assault on the kingdom using naval power as well as artillery, including rockets. By February 19, the assault forces reached the city of Benin, setting it on fire and razing it. During the assault, British forces looted much of the city, including a series of priceless reliefs known as the Benin Bronzes, which now sit in the British Museum in London despite repeated requests for their repatriation.

The oba and his court fled the city during the final assault, having exhausting all options for resistance. He returned in August, was placed on trial, and was forced to abdicate his throne and become a client of the British occupation. A few weeks later, he refused to accompany Phillips's successor as consul-general, Ralph Moor, on a tour of his old kingdom, an act that would have legitimized his abdication. This act of refusal gave Moor the excuse he needed to exile Ovonramwen, with his wives, to Calabar, where he died in 1914.

Roy Doron

See also: Berlin Conference; Rawson, Harry; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Berea, Battle of (December 20, 1852)

In early 1848, newly arrived Cape Colony governor Sir Harry Smith summarily annexed the territory between the Orange and Vaal rivers, called the Orange River Sovereignty, which was home to many Boers who had left the Cape over the previous decade. As such, the British took responsibility for continuous frontier conflict between Boers and Sotho, as well as between various Sotho rulers.

In 1849, Major Henry Warden, British resident in Bloemfontein, attempted to define a boundary (later named the Warden Line for him), between the Boers of the eastern Orange River Sovereignty and the Sotho, which stripped land from the latter. In June 1851, Warden decided to move decisively against the Sotho of Moshoeshoe and Moletsane, who had been blamed for destabilization. Although Warden intended to gather a force of 3,000 men, he only pulled together 1,400, consisting of 160 British troops, 120 settlers, 250 Griqua and Kora, and 800 Rolong. Based at Platberg, Warden sent messengers to Moshoeshoe demanding 6,000 cattle as compensation for theft from surrounding communities.

At the end of June, before the deadline for payment had expired, Warden led his composite force against Moletsane's Taung, who had occupied Viervoet Mountain. With support from a six-pounder gun, Warden's men drove off the Taung and captured around 3,000 cattle. However, a large force of Sotho under Molapo, Moshoeshoe's son, crested the mountain and poured down on Warden's surprised men. Around 200 Rolong, drunk on captured beer, were killed, and the rest of the colonial force fled back to Thaba' Nchu in the Orange River Sovereignty. Further British plans to confront Moshoeshoe and his allies were delayed by the continuation of the Eighth Cape-Xhosa War (1850–1853) to the south. Given their experience with mounted Griqua raiders, the Sotho had adopted widespread use of the horse and acquired obsolete firearms through trade.

In December 1852, Sir George Cathcart, Smith's replacement, led a force of 2,000 men, including cavalry and artillery, into the Sotho Kingdom, where he demanded that Moshoeshoe surrender 10,000 cattle and 1,000 horses as reparation for stock theft from the settlers of the Orange River Sovereignty. Although Moshoeshoe delivered 3,500 cattle, with a promise of more once they were collected, Cathcart launched a sweep of the Berea plateau on December 20 to seize cattle and punish the Sotho, who he thought would not resist. Based at a crossing point on the Caledon River, Cathcart divided his force into three columns that were meant to converge on Moshoeshoe's capital of Thaba Bosiu. Occupied by Moshoeshoe in the 1820s, the mountain fortress of Thaba Bosiu had a spring on top that would enable its defenders to survive a long siege, and it was protected from direct access by the Berea Plateau and backed by the Maluti Mountains, where cattle could be concealed.

Lieutenant Colonel George Napier was instructed to lead 230 cavalrymen, British lancers, and Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) around the northern side of the plateau—which was impossible because, unknown to the British, it extended many kilometers to the east. This mounted detachment climbed the plateau and captured 4,000 cattle, but it was ambushed and pushed back to the colonial camp by 700 Sotho under Molapo and the sons of Moletsane. Just over 10 percent of the column were killed, 25 Lancers and 2 mounted riflemen. The main column, consisting of 500 British infantry supported by several rocket tubes, was led by Colonel William Eyre to the Berea Mission and then straight across the plateau. Eyre's force encountered little initial resistance but, lacking cavalry, they could collect just 1,500 cattle.

During the afternoon, Molapo's 700 Sotho rode south and made several charges against Eyre's column, but they were repelled by the sustained fire of the British infantry. Rounding the southern side of the plateau, Cathcart commanded a column of 300 infantry supported by a small detachment of cavalry and two howitzers. This group advanced to a small hill just five kilometers from Thaba Bosiu, from where it waited for the other columns and watched as a large number of Sotho horsemen gathered around Thaba Bosiu. At around 5 P.M., Eyre's column arrived and reinforced the position just before it was attacked by 5,000 to 6,000 Sotho cavalry. Led by several sons of Moshoeshoe, the Sotho made repeated attempts to outflank the British, including one incident in which they recaptured 400 cattle, but they were repulsed by colonial firepower.

With the sun going down, both Cathcart and Moshoeshoe pulled back their forces. Moshoeshoe sent Cathcart a message, written by a missionary, which requested that hostilities cease and the British keep the 5,000 cattle that they had captured as recompense for the Boers. The mobility and overwhelming numbers of the Sotho had failed to overcome the firepower of the disciplined British infantry. Cathcart, surprised by the tenacity and scale of Sotho opposition, accepted the offer and withdrew his forces from the area.

If victory is measured by obtaining objectives, then Moshoeshoe won the Battle of Berea. Cathcart's two objectives—capturing cattle and punishing the Sotho—were incompatible, as rounding up livestock required splitting the colonial force and gave the Sotho ample warning of their approach. Cathcart's goals were only partly fulfilled; he had taken less than half of the livestock demanded, and from the perspective of the Orange River settlers, the Sotho remained unpunished. Although the Sotho had inflicted serious casualties on the British (with 38 dead and 15 wounded), this was mostly from the ambush on Napier's cavalry, and Sotho losses were probably much higher.

Moshoeshoe's people were so impressed by the British infantry that they called this siege "The Battle of the Soldiers." Moshoeshoe, whose objective was to protect his people and the integrity of his state, had repelled British invaders through a combination of military action and diplomacy. For the British, this battle contributed to a general withdrawal from the South Africa interior with the 1852 Sand River Convention, which recognized the independence of the Boers north of the Vaal River as the South African Republic or Transvaal, and the 1854 Bloemfontein Convention, which did the same for the Boers with the Orange River Sovereignty, which became the Orange Free State.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Cathcart, George; Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869); Moshoeshoe; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn

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Berlin Conference

The Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 resulted in the division of the African continent among European powers. The conference, which was dominated by France,



At the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, representatives of European powers agreed on how they would partition and conquer Africa. This resulted in the subsequent "Scramble for Africa" in which almost all of the continent fell under European rule. (World History Archive/Alamy Stock Photo)

Germany, Britain, and Portugal, remapped the continent without consideration of established indigenous cultural and linguistic borders, or sometimes geography, which created a legacy of interethnic strife and political fragmentation that can still be seen today. In effect, the contemporary international borders of Africa are a result of the Berlin Conference.

By the mid-19th century, the African coast was largely colonized, and competition between the European colonial powers often threatened to turn into violent conflict. At the time, the vast majority of Africa, particularly the interior, was controlled by indigenous societies. German chancellor Otto von Bismarck called the conference in 1884 at the request of Portugal. The meeting was held in Berlin, Germany, from November 15, 1884, to February 26, 1885. In addition to the four dominating nations, Bismarck invited diplomats representing Austria-Hungary, Russia, the United States, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden-Norway (the two nations were joined from 1814 to 1905), Belgium, and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). Africans were not represented.

The purpose of the meeting was to address confusion among colonial powers regarding the borders within Africa. A primary goal was to agree that the Congo and

Niger rivers would remain neutral and freely used to further trade. Since the newly united Germany was a novice in the colonial game, Bismarck sought to negotiate borders and gain control of the uncolonized interior regions of the continent while making his foes struggle for territory. Significantly, the conference granted Belgian king Leopold II's International Africa Association (IAA) private ownership of the vast Congo Basin, which became the Congo Free State and later the Belgian Congo. To gain European public support, the conference resolved to end slavery within Africa. One of the most important principles established at the conference was "effective occupation," which meant that the sometimes vague claims of European powers to "spheres of influence" had to be ratified by agents who established colonial administrations on the ground in parts of Africa. This accelerated an ongoing process of European colonial conquest known as the "Scramble for Africa." Essentially, the conference established a set of rules for the conquest of Africa that, in the short term, prevented conflict between the European colonial powers.

At the end of the Scramble, only two states in Africa remained independent of the European powers: Ethiopia and Liberia. The remainder of the African continent was divided among the French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Turkish, and British governments. Britain lay claim to the Gambia, Sierra Leone, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), and Nigeria in West Africa; Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and the so-called British Somaliland (now northwestern Somalia) in East Africa; the vast majority of southern Africa, including Basutoland (Lesotho), Swaziland, Bechuanaland (Botswana), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe and Zambia), Nyasaland (Malawi), and the territories that later became South Africa; and the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Zanzibar (now part of Tanzania) in the Indian Ocean. It also controlled Egypt, though Egypt technically remained under Turkish sovereignty.

France established itself as the continent's other preeminent colonial power, coming away with a large contiguous area of western and central Africa that included modern Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria; Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso); and Chad, Ubangi-Shari (now the Central African Republic), Gabon, and Middle Congo (now the Republic of Congo). It also claimed the so-called French Somaliland (now Djibouti) in East Africa, and the Comoro Islands, Madagascar, and Réunion in the Indian Ocean. Germany took Tanganyika (now mainland Tanzania), Ruanda-Urundi (Rwanda and Burundi), Cameroon, Togoland (now Togo and eastern Ghana), and South West Africa (Namibia). Portugal took Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Cabinda (now a single state), Mozambique, and Cape Verde, while Italy took Libya, Eritrea, and the so-called Italian Somaliland (now eastern Somalia). The final player, Spain, came away with the least gain, controlling only Río Muni and Fernando Po (now Equatorial Guinea), Western Sahara (now occupied by Morocco), and a number of small territories still under Spanish rule to this day, including the Canary Islands and the North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

Lisa McCallum

See also: British South Africa Company; French Colonial Policy in Africa; German Empire; Goldie, George; Leopold II; Rhodes, Cecil John; Royal Niger Company

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Bhambatha ka Mancinza (1865 or 1866–1906)

Bhambatha ka Mancinza (also spelled Bambata and Bambatha, reflecting earlier Zulu orthographies) is known as the leader of a rebellion against the British colonial government of Natal. His personal rebellion was subsumed in the larger Zulu Rebellion of 1906, which is also called Bhambatha's Rebellion or the Bhambatha Rebellion. He was the son of Mancinza (also called Sobhuza), and in line to succeed his father as chief of the abaseNgome section of the Zondi "tribe" in 1883; and he did so in 1890. The abaseNgome was a relatively small group residing on poor land belonging mainly to Afrikaner (Boer) farmers in the Mpanza district of the Umvoti Division of Natal. Their poverty was exacerbated by the rinderpest, and then by the Second Anglo-Boer War (South African War, 1899–1902), in which Bhambatha sided with the British and subsequently claimed that his people were victimized by Boer landlords. Bhambatha himself was continually in debt. His community was riven by factionalism. He married three times, but his first two wives were estranged.

He had the reputation of being a bad chief, and his participation in a particularly violent faction fight in August 1905 finally prompted the government to decide in February 1906 to remove him. Before this could happen, though, his group was called upon to pay the new and unpopular poll tax. One faction refused and took up arms to resist; Bhambatha dissuaded them, but he also failed to report them to the magistrate (February 22). The governor signed the order for his removal the next day (February 23), and Bhambatha was summoned to give an account of himself.

Bhambatha demurred, and then he fled to Zululand on March 9 to seek help from Dinuzulu, erstwhile king of the Zulu. Dinuzulu, now reduced to a chieftaincy, was secretly trying to regain paramountcy. Bhambatha stayed at his kraal four days, and what passed between them has been much disputed; however, the upshot was that Bhambatha returned home at the end of March, accompanied by two of Dinuzulu's retainers and carrying at least two rifles. He told his people that the two rifles had been given to him with orders to start a rebellion, ostensibly against the poll tax; but when he learned of his dismissal, his rage fixed on that. He rallied a faction, seized his successor (and would have killed him had not one of Dinuzulu's men intervened), attacked the magistrate on April 3 and then the police on April 4, in which fight special medicine allegedly warded off white men's bullets. The government sent militia to fight him, and he fled again with 100–150 men to Zululand (April 6–8), where he received the protection of Chief Sigananda of the large Chube community. Sigananda joined the rebellion and rallied many men of neighboring groups to it; thus, Bhambatha's rebellion became part of the Zulu Rebellion of 1906.

Bhambatha was respected for initiating the rebellion, but as a Natal chief with a small following, he lacked influence, and he differed with the other rebel leaders on strategy and tactics. At the Battle of Bobe (May 5), he failed to attack when the others did and his "medicine" did not repel the bullets this time. He was castigated publicly and apparently suffered a nervous breakdown. He left his men and took refuge with the sympathetic rebel leader Mangathi at Macala. After colonial militia destroyed the bases at Cetshwayo's grave (May 17) and Macala (May 21), Bhambatha emerged from seclusion, and went with Mangathi to Dinuzulu for assistance. What occurred there (May 24–26) is also a matter of dispute, but afterward the two returned to the army, which was now controlled by the chief Mehlokazulu.

Bhambatha was again with his men at the disastrous battle at Mome (June 10). He probably was killed in the battle. A corpse on the battlefield was reported to be his, and the head was cut off, brought to the militia camp, and shown to persons who knew Bhambatha, who confirmed that it was his. Then it was taken back and buried with the body in an unmarked grave. For another 18 months (until Dinuzulu's arrest), reports circulated that Bhambatha had escaped and had been seen at various places; but no one ever claimed to have seen him in person. Stories of his escape and subsequent adventures are legendary.

Despite his iconic status, Bhambatha was not a charismatic leader, nor a romantic hero, but rather a desperado, and the cat's-paw of powerful men.

Paul S. Thompson

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boers; Cetshwayo kaMpande (1826–1884); Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Zulu Rebellion (1906)

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Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)

The term *Bittereinders* comes from Afrikaans; it refers to the burghers of the Boer Republics who were prepared to wage war against Britain to the bitter end. The notion of the bitter end in itself signifies an unyielding moral position with little regard for the consequences. When the Second Anglo-Boer War came to an end on May 31, 1902, roughly 20,000 Bittereinders, some as young as 8 years old, surrendered to the British army in the district they were last active in. These 20,000 resembled a socioeconomic cross section of Boer society to a certain extent, although those who had more to lose, economically speaking, or who had indeed already lost, were more likely to have been Bittereinders.

A bricolage of reasons has been proposed as to why some Boers chose to fight until the bitter end. These reasons varied from person to person, but foremost was a broad sense of nationalism, expressed as a deep love for the respective republics and independence from Britain. This was a national consciousness fueled by events such as the Jameson Raid of 1895 and British imperialist actions, rather than a theoretically understood notion of freedom and independence. Intertwined with a nationalist sense were the deep Christian beliefs of most Bittereinders, who argued that their cause was a religiously just part of God's plan and will, and that they were chosen by God to fulfill that plan by means of the war. Against this background, a spiritual deepening took place among many Boers during the war, which made it easier to persevere and endure the hardships of commando life by a pious, patient, and personal suffering. Within such a frame of mind, the British scorched-earth policy, which left farms and towns destroyed, did not push the commandos to surrender; rather, it had the opposite effect—namely, a determination to fight on, as they did not have farms or property to go back to and wanted to avenge their destruction. Tied to the reaction to the scorched-earth policy was the Bittereinders' view of the plight of the Boer women and children incarcerated in concentration camps. For them, the death and suffering being experienced in these camps provided an impetus to continue with the war, as no price was too big to pay for victory. Ample evidence exists to indicate that frequently Boer women, despite the suffering they and their children were enduring, were the motivational forces driving their husbands to remain on commando.

Boer leaders, both political and military, such as President M. T. Steyn of the Orange Free State and generals Louis Botha, Christiaan de Wet, Koos De la Rey, and others guaranteed that the struggle would continue to the bitter end. This was achieved, not only by leading by example and conviction, but also by delivering rousing motivational speeches and the creative use of war notices issued by the republics. These notices, which were a blend of truth, myth, and propaganda, underplayed British war gains, exaggerated Boer accomplishments, and kept alive the idea of continental European invention on behalf of the republics in the war. Many times, these notices were taken as gospel-like truth that could not be challenged.

As the war dragged on, many Boers became socialized to a life on commando and the associated sense of duty, camaraderie, and cohesion. This lifestyle, with its hardships and adventure, were found to be romantically enticing by burghers; hence, they were reluctant to forsake it. However, not all Boers felt this way, and often forceful pressure needed to be exerted by those with more resilience to ensure that fellow burghers remained on commando to the bitter end. Other Boers continued fighting because they had a deep fear of being captured as prisoners of war and deported overseas.

In the end, the reasons that kept the Bittereinders fighting were overshadowed by the reality of the war. Farms and towns were destroyed, and the commandos had little logistical support and could not readily secure the arms and ammunition (or anything else) needed to continue the war against a far superior and fast-modernizing British army. Realizing that there would be no foreign intervention on the Boer side, the plight of the Boer women and children weighed heavily on the consciences of many, and the threat of more armed Africans entering the war on the British side convinced the majority of Boer leaders to argue that it was actually God's will for the war to end. The situation was poignantly articulated by General Koos De la Rey: "It is argued that we must fight to the bitter end . . . It must be borne in mind that everything—cattle, goods, money, man, woman, and child—has been sacrificed. There are men and women who wear nothing more than plain skins on the naked body. Is this not the bitter end? Therefore, I think that the time for negotiating has now arrived." Two years and eight months after the war had started, the bitter end had arrived, and the Treaty of Vereeniging was concluded between the Boer Republics and Britain.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer "Hendsoppers" and "Joiners" in the Second Anglo-Boer War; Boers; Botha, Louis; Commando System (Boer Republics); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); De la Rey, Jacobus; De Wet, Christiaan; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Steyn, Marthinus; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Black Week (December 10–15, 1899)

Almost two months into the initial conventional phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War, the British suffered serious defeats at Stormberg on the southern front on December 10, 1899, at Magersfontein on the western front on December 11, and at Colenso on the Natal front on December 15. The reaction in Britain was to label this period "Black Week" because of the reverses the professional British Army experienced against the volunteer Boer commandoes. The battles of Black Week happened during the first British offensive, when Lieutenant-General Sir William Gatacre attempted to repulse the Boer invasion of the Cape Colony at Stormberg, Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen marched on the besieged Kimberley via the western railway line, and General Sir Redvers Buller, as commander-in-chief, took it upon himself to lift the siege of Ladysmith.

The first British defeat during Black Week took place at Stormberg in the northeastern section of the Cape Colony. Boer commandoes under Commandant J. H. Olivier had invaded the area in the hope of enticing Cape Afrikaners to rebel and confront the 3,000-strong British force under Gatacre. Olivier and his commandoes entrenched themselves in the foothills of the Stormberg. The operation under Gatacre was problematic from the outset; without intelligence and with little backup, he ordered a night march. In the process, his force got lost and many soldiers broke down physically. When the British force walked into a Boer commando, Gatacre ordered them to charge, with disastrous effect—almost 700 men were killed, captured, or wounded.

In the Battle of Magersfontein the next day, Methuen's orders were to relieve Kimberley, and after some success at Modder River, he had to wait for reinforcements. In the interim, the Boers under General Piet Cronjé had dug trenches in the low foothills of Magersfontein. When the reinforcements arrived, Methuen had the Boer positions bombarded. But this had little impact on the well-entrenched positions. Feeling that the Boers had been softened up, Methuen launched a night attack. Units of the Highlanders marched in unison across the veld toward the assumed Boer positions. The next morning, the British forces were greeted by a blaze of Boer Mausers. The subsequent battle turned into a debacle for the British army, for not only was Major-General A. J. Wauchope killed, but soldiers ran away or cowered where they could in a terrain with little cover, where their colorful kilts were a dead giveaway. The British suffered heavy losses. This was Cronjé's finest hour, and his tactically astute planning repulsed the attack.

The Battle of Colenso, four days later, completed the British humiliation. Buller had 21,000 men at his disposal to take Ladysmith. In his way stood the commandoes under General Louis Botha, who had entrenched themselves well in the hills to the north of the Tugela River. Buller's plan was simple—he ordered his vastly superior force to march in four columns across the river and attack the Boer positions. The attack was preceded with an artillery bombardment that had little effect. The British attack that followed ended in Boer rifle fire mowing down exposed British soldiers. The subsequent retreat ended in chaos with British cannon lost and more than 1,000 British soldiers, killed, wounded, or captured. On the Boer side, 6 were killed and 22 wounded. Buller then ordered Lieutenant-General Sir George White, besieged in Ladysmith, to surrender, but he refused.

The moral and psychological blows of the worst British defeat since the Crimean War were not only felt by the British army, but also by people across the British Empire. At the same time, ideas about the war ending before Christmas disappeared, and the demeaning manner in which the Boer commandoes were portrayed started to change to an appreciation of them as unusually able colonial foes who were tactically astute, good marksmen, determined, familiar with the landscape, and possessing advanced weaponry.

The British army did internalize many of the lessons learned during Black Week. First, the leadership of their military leaders, especially Buller, came under scrutiny, and he was blamed for the defeats. The insistence on staging frontal attacks, based on limited intelligence, against a well-entrenched enemy fighting in the terrain of their choice was severely criticized. As a result, Buller was replaced by Field-Marshal Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts who, accompanied by Lord Horatio Kitchener as chief of staff, assumed command of the British forces. Methuen and Gatacre, however, later had the opportunity to rebuild their military reputations. The change of command went hand in hand with a modernization of the

British army; for example, cavalry lances were replaced with rapid-fire rifles. The humiliating defeats also allowed for the calling up of thousands more troops from Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as the prowar lobby used the national fervor that followed Black Week to drown out all other voices in calling for the defeats to be avenged.

Apart from their victories, the Boers took little else from Black Week, though. The political leadership of the republics, and generals like Christiaan De Wet and Koos De la Rey, were eager to take the opportunity to encircle the British army and cut off the railway-based logistical support to Methuen and Gatacre. However, Cronjé had a different view and favored fighting a defensive war based on accepted Boer military tradition. He thus refused to weaken his commando and their massive wagon train by having smaller ones take the offensive behind the British lines. This meant that the Boers gained little—Kimberley and Ladysmith remained in British hands, the fronts remained static, and the British were allowed time to regroup. Cronjé eventually paid a heavy price at Paardeberg, when he had to surrender with 4,000 burghers. Other Boer military leaders, notably De Wet and De la Rey, fared better and gained experience during Black Week. In a nutshell, the Boers did not use the advantage they gained during Black Week; they only stemmed the British advance temporarily.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Australians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Buller, Redvers; Canadians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Cronjé, Pieter; De la Rey, Jacobus; De Wet, Christian; Gatacre, William; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899—February 15, 1900); Kitchener, Horatio; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Methuen, Paul; New Zealanders in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Stormberg, Battle of (December 10, 1899); Wauchope, Andrew G.; White, George S.

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Blockhouses, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)

The British constructed thousands of blockhouses in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). The blockhouses were built initially to protect the railway, the main British supply route, and their lines of communication. Blockhouses were later built in a series of lines as obstacles that pursuing British columns used to literally fence in the Boers and trap them.

The first blockhouses appear to have been constructed shortly after the fall of Pretoria on June 5, 1900, during the early months of the guerrilla phase of the war. The early structures were masonry built of mortared stonework or concrete, one to three stories in height, with a roof of timber and corrugated iron or concrete. There was usually a platform in one corner on the roof for mounting a machine gun. Entrance was by a ladder through a door on the first floor, about seven or eight feet off the ground.

Rifle ports, windows, and doors were protected by loopholed steel plates. While these blockhouses were virtually indestructible, they were also very expensive (about 800 to 1,000 pounds each) and took about three months to build. The British constructed a total of about 441 masonry blockhouses.

The strategy of General Lord Horatio H. Kitchener, who became commander in chief of South Africa in December 1900, was to integrate the function of fortified blockhouses with that of mobile attacking units on “drives.” The country could be divided into smaller areas by fortified lines, and the Boers would be restricted to operating in shrinking areas that had been cleared previously of all inhabitants and shelter. Mobile British troops could then sweep through an area and drive the Boers into a fortified line of blockhouses.

The high cost and long construction period made further construction of masonry blockhouses impractical. As a result, Major S. R. Rice, 23rd Field Company, Royal Engineers, designed a relatively inexpensive, easily constructed octagonal corrugated iron blockhouse in early 1901. By this time, the Boers had lost most of their artillery, and a double-thick, corrugated iron wall with a shingle-and-rubble filling provided sufficient protection against small arms fire.

Rice developed the circular corrugated blockhouse shortly thereafter. The circular design enhanced all-around observation. In addition, the absence of corners reduced the need for wood, which was subject to rot and splintered when hit by bullets or shrapnel. The circular corrugated blockhouse had an interior diameter of 4 meters, with a standing height of 2 meters. The first blockhouse of this type cost 44 pounds, and when mass-produced, the price dropped to 16 pounds. Reportedly, six men could construct the circular corrugated blockhouse in six hours.

Low walls of stones or sandbags and trenches were frequently placed or dug around, and later between, blockhouses. Soldiers could use this cover and concealment to defend their blockhouse. Barbed wire entanglements were constructed around the blockhouses by twisting rolls and strands together, elevating them to various heights, and staking them into the ground to prevent the passage of Boers or their animals. Frequently, bells and empty tin cans were hung on the wire to serve as alarms. As more blockhouses were built, the distances between them decreased, allowing interlocking fields of fire to be designated between blockhouses. This effect was increased by the blockhouses being built in an intricate wave pattern rather than in a straight line, to prevent soldiers in one blockhouse from firing on an adjacent blockhouse.

One noncommissioned officer and six men normally lived in a single blockhouse. A battalion would normally occupy about 60 blockhouses. A lieutenant was in charge of 3 or 4 blockhouses and a captain 10 to 12.

The first line of blockhouses was built in January 1901 between Kapmurden and Komatipoort in the Eastern Transvaal. After their success was proven, additional blockhouse lines were built in July and August 1901. Gradually, 34 lines of blockhouses were constructed, the longest running for 280 kilometers along the railway line from Komatipoort to Wonderfontein and garrisoned by 3,200 soldiers. From January 1901 to May 1902, an average of 40 blockhouses per month were built.

By the end of the war, over 8,000 blockhouses had been built over 5,900 kilometers, an average of 1 blockhouse every 800 meters. These interconnected blockhouses were manned by 50,000 troops, augmented by about 16,000 Africans who patrolled mainly at night. Blockhouses were an important component of British success during the war.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Tweefontein/Groenkop, Battle of (December 25, 1901)

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Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838)

The Battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838, is called the *Slag van Bloedrivier* in Afrikaans and *iMpi yaseNcome* in isiZulu. The battle, in which the Emigrant Farmers, or Voortrekkers (also called Boers), who were migrating into the interior of southern Africa from the British Cape Colony with their black retainers and livestock, routed a numerically superior Zulu army, was the culmination of a yearlong campaign to force the Zulu to allow them to settle in their kingdom. Subsequently, the battle became the symbol of Afrikaner domination over the African people of the subcontinent.

When the Voortrekkers entered the Zulu kingdom in October 1837 and tried to parlay a land concession from King Dingane kaSenzangakhona, the monarch had reason to fear them. His infantry armies carried spears and shields, but the Voortrekkers possessed firearms, were mounted on horses, and were invulnerable when defending a laager, a formation of wagons drawn up end to end in a circle. Dingane's councillors persuaded him that his only recourse was to make a preemptive strike against the interlopers. On February 6, 1838, Dingane ordered the execution of the party of Voortrekkers (under Piet Retief) negotiating at uMgungundlovu, his chief residence. Another 10 days later, his armies fell on the unsuspecting Voortrekker encampments. Some were overrun, but most survived.

The Voortrekkers then entered into an alliance in April 1838 with the English hunter-traders who had been settled since 1824 at Port Natal (now Durban) for a joint campaign against Dingane. It failed when the Zulu routed a mounted Boer commando



At the Battle of Blood River, fought on December 16, 1838, expansionist Boers decisively defeated a Zulu army. This victory became a symbol of Afrikaner (Boer) domination over the African people of what became South Africa. (Mary Evans Picture Library/Alamy Stock Photo)

at eThaleni on April 10, 1838, and crushed the Port Natal forces at Ndondakusuka on April 17, going on to sack Port Natal. However, when the Zulu counterattacked the consolidated Boer laager at Gatsrand, the Voortrekkers repulsed them at the hard-fought Battle of Veglaer on August 13–15, 1838.

Encouraged, on November 26, 1838 the Voortrekkers elected Andries Pretorius their chief commandant, and he immediately launched a punitive expedition, advancing east into Zululand to force a decisive battle. On December 15, the *Wenkommando* (Victorious Commando), as it came to be known, formed its 64 wagons into a laager positioned on a spit of land between the Ncome River to the east and a dry water-course to the south. This meant that the defenders, who consisted of 472 Boers, 3 white traders from Port Natal, and 120 Port Natal Africans under Alexander Biggar, could concentrate when attacked along the laager's more vulnerable west and north faces. Crammed inside were some 700 oxen, 750 horses, 130 black wagon-drivers, and 200 grooms.

The Zulu army of between 12,000 and 16,000 men under Ndlela kaSompisi Ntuli and Nzobo kaSobadli Ntombela advanced from the southeast before dawn on Sunday, December 16. The left horn of 3,000 younger warriors came on precipitately in advance of the chest and right horn, crossed the Ncome south of the laager, and, at about 6:30 A.M., charged it from the west and north, attempting to perform the normal Zulu tactic of enveloping their foe preparatory to closing in hand-to-hand combat with the stabbing spear. Such tactics, however, could not succeed against a laager defended by muskets and three small cannon shooting in ordered rotation to keep up an uninterrupted rate of impenetrable fire. Repulsed, the left horn broke and fled, with Boer horsemen in pursuit.

At about 8 A.M., the Zulu right horn advanced on the laager, intending to cross the Ncome to the northeast. However, fire from Boer horsemen posted along the river deflected this flanking movement, and the right horn veered to their left. Followed by the chest, they then attacked along the same rout as the already defeated left horn. Despite repeated attempts, they were also unable to break through the Boer zone of fire, and some Zulu units began to withdraw in disarray at about 11 A.M.

Pretorius and about 160 mounted men sallied out in a remorseless pursuit of the demoralized Zulu that lasted over several hours, scattering them in all directions. Their slaughter bloodied the waters of the Ncome, which the Boers renamed the "Bloed," or Blood River.

The Boers admitted to only 3 men wounded in the battle. It is believed that well over 1,000 Zulu were killed; the exact number is unknown, but the Boer tally of 3,000 Zulu dead was likely exaggerated. The battle was not the end of the campaign, however. The Zulu army dispersed after their defeat, and the *Wenkommando* pushed on east as far as the valley of the White Mfolozi River. There, it was worsted on December 27, 1838, in a Zulu ambush and retired. Neither side was prepared to reignite hostilities, so they recommenced negotiations that culminated on March 25, 1839, when Dingane gave the Voortrekkers permission to settle on Zulu territory south of the Thukela River, where they set about establishing their Republic of Natalia.

The Voortrekkers attributed their victory at Blood River to divine intervention. On December 9, 1838, they made a covenant with God, which they repeated every evening until the battle was won, vowing that if they defeated the Zulu, they and their descendants would observe the anniversary as a day of thanksgiving to God ever after, and that they would also build a church in commemoration of the momentous occasion. Consecrated in Pietermaritzburg on March 15, 1840, it now forms part of the Voortrekker/Msunduzi Museum. Toward the end of the 19th century, when Afrikaners were resisting British imperialism, the covenant and battle gained significance as cornerstones of Afrikaner nationalism.

Following the British victory in the South African War of 1899–1902, when there was a determined Afrikaner effort to promote their national identity and reassert their God-given right to rule in South Africa, the battle increased in symbolic importance. December 16 was proclaimed a public holiday, initially called Dingaan's Day and subsequently known as the Day of the Covenant. At the Blood River site, a large stone monument of a wagon was erected on December 16, 1947, to the Voortrekker victory, followed on the same anniversary in 1971 by an impressive laager of 64 bronze, life-size wagons.

For the Zulu people, on the other hand, the battle was the symbol of Afrikaner domination and racial ideology during the apartheid era. In 1994, the new democratic government decided to redress the imbalance. The public holiday was renamed the Day of Reconciliation, and on December 16, 1998, a new monument—shaped like the horns of a Zulu battle formation—opened across the river from the laager of bronze wagons. It is dedicated to the brave Zulu who fell in the battle defending their independence, and the complex incorporates a museum exhibiting Zulu material culture.

John Laband

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Dingane kaSenzangakhona; Pretorius, Andries; Retief, Piet

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Boer Conquest of the Kekana and Langa (1847–1868)

Beginning in the late 1830s, groups of Dutch-speaking white settlers called Boers left the British-ruled Cape Colony, in what later Afrikaner nationalist historiography would call the "Great Trek," and conquered areas in the center of what is now South Africa. During the 1840s, Boers moved into the northwestern Transvaal and began demanding livestock, land, and labor from the local Kekana and Langa, led by Mokopane and Mankopane respectively, around Potgietersrus (present-day Mokopane). This area was important to the Boers as a route through the mountains to the ivory-rich northern Transvaal.

In 1847 and 1848, the Boers, without provocation, attacked these groups and seized children, who were sold as slaves, and livestock. As a result, these African communities began acquiring firearms. The Boers believed that their 1836 defeat and expulsion of Mzilikazi's Ndebele, a group from the Indian Ocean coast that had dominated this area for about a decade, had given them jurisdiction over all the Africans in the region; but Mokopane and Mankopane had never been subjects of Mzilikazi, so they felt this did not apply to their people. Furthermore, the Kekana and Langa did not want to submit to Boer authority because of demands for labor and the Boer prohibition on Africans owning guns and horses.

In September 1852, a Boer war council at Olifantsrivier declared Mokopane and his people enemies of the Transvaal Republic. In September 1854, during several incidents, the Kekana and Langa killed and mutilated 28 Boers, including Field Cornet Hermanus Potgieter, who had stolen their cattle and children and also killed Mokopane's brother. Boers in the Rustenberg and Zoutpansberg areas left their farms and formed their wagons into defensive laagers. Two Boer commandos, 100 men under P. W. Potgieter from Zoutpansberg and 200 under M. W. Pretorius from Pretoria, rendezvoused in Mokopane's territory, joined by some African Kgatla allies.

As they had done previously, the Kekana took shelter in a deep cave, where they fortified the two entrances and interior with stone walls and stockpiled firearms, ammunition, and food. A stream flowing through the cave supplied water. In late October 1854, the Boers assaulted the entrances, blasted the walls with cannon, and pushed the Kekana deeper into the cave. P. W. Potgieter was shot dead while standing near a cave mouth. After unsuccessful attempts to blow up the cave and smoke out the defenders, the Boers diverted the stream and besieged the Kekana by building stone fortifications around the two entrances.

Two weeks later, the Boers, suspecting that the Kekana were sneaking out of the cave, used 300 African laborers to block the entrances with trees and stones. When some Kekana tried to sneak out of the cave at night, a Boer patrol discovered them, killing between 700 and 900 of them. By mid-November, around 800 Kekana women and children had surrendered and were sent to work on Boer farms. The Boers ended the campaign at the end of the month since many horses were sick, gunpowder was running short, many Boers wanted to get back to their farms, there were slim prospects for more loot to be had, and it was the beginning of the rainy season.

Although Mokopane escaped, the Kekana were dispersed, with some survivors taken by the Boers and others seeking refuge with the neighboring Langa. After the siege was lifted, a Boer patrol under Paul Kruger, deputy of the Pretoria commandoes and later president of the Transvaal Republic, went north and seized 1,000 cattle from Maraba's people, who did not resist. The main Boer army then advanced against the Langa but found little loot, as Mankopane and his people had withdrawn. Most of the cattle taken by the Boers were sold to cover the costs of gunpowder, which meant that it became difficult to rally Boers for subsequent and likely unprofitable offensives against Mankopane's Langa.

In April 1858, a commando under Kruger once again attacked the Langa, who fortified themselves on a steep mountain around 100 kilometers northwest of Potgietersrus. Kruger and 100 volunteers attempted to surprise the defenders by scaling the mountain at night, but they were discovered by a sentry, and Mankopane escaped in the ensuing fight. In June 1868, Kruger led 900 Boers in another assault of the Langa stronghold which killed 300 defenders, with a loss of two Boers, but failed to secure the entire mountaintop or capture Mankopane.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Kruger, Paul; Pretorius, Marthinus Wessel

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Boer Expansion in the Eastern and Northern Transvaal (c. 1845–1867)

Starting in the late 1830s, Dutch-speaking white settlers called Boers left the British-ruled Cape Colony and moved into the interior of what is now South Africa, where they eventually formed independent republics and conquered indigenous groups. When Boer trekkers arrived in what became the eastern Transvaal in the mid-1840s, they were initially welcomed by Africans like the Pedi, who cooperated with them in hunting and raiding.

By the late 1840s, Boer demands for ivory, cattle, and captive children had alienated the Kopa of Boleu and the Ndzundza Ndebele of Mabhogo. In 1847, Boer leader A. H. Potgieter and Pedi ruler Sekwati fell out over the division of loot from a joint raid on the Kgatla of the Zoutpansberg, as well as Boer demands for children as slaves. The departure of many Boers for the richer elephant hunting of the northern Transvaal weakened them in the east. As relations with their neighbors deteriorated, the Boers blamed labor desertion and stock theft on local African rulers, and Africans began acquiring firearms by going to work in the British territories to the south. In 1848, a Boer raid on the Kopa captured 24 guns and some cattle.

In 1852, Boers from Zoutpansberg and Lydenburg besieged the Pedi mountain stronghold of Phiring, but they were unwilling to assault it because the defenders had firearms, and African allies had already tried and failed to do so. After 25 days, the Boers left with 5,000 cattle, 6,000 small livestock, and some captured children. Since the siege revealed to Sekwati that his stronghold did not have a reliable water source, the following year, he moved his people to the Tsate Valley, which had better rainfall and soil, and a central hill called Mosego was fortified with stone and pole walls.

While the 1852 Sand River Convention withdrew British claims over the Boers of the Transvaal, who formed a republic, divisions among the Boers during the late 1850s and early 1860s delayed an expected campaign against the Ndzundza and Kopa, who rejected Boer claims to their land. When a commando was finally organized in 1863, the Ndzundza mountain stronghold held out against a blockade by Boers and Pedi allies, while Kopa communities were devastated by a Swazi attack summoned by the Boers. The continued raiding and retaliation meant that by the mid-1860s, many Boers, their farming disrupted by living in laagers, sent cattle to Mabhogo, who permitted them to remain. Between 1859 and the mid-1860s, the Swazi captured slaves and exchanged them with the Boers for livestock.

When the Boers of A. H. Potgieter arrived in the Zoutpansberg area of the northern Transvaal in 1848, eventually founding the town of Schoemansdal, they enlisted local Africans in elephant hunting, which is how the Venda people first gained firearms. When the elephant population declined in the 1850s, the Boers began enslaving local children and exporting them south. The Boers also claimed land for farming and forced African women and children to work their fields. These issues poisoned relations between the Boers and the Venda.

Coming to power in 1864, Makhado reformed the Venda military system by introducing age regiments based on existing circumcision lodges and creating military detachments for specific places. In 1865, Makhado launched raids on settler farms. In May 1867, Paul Kruger led a 500-man Boer commando into the area, but ammunition shortage and mountainous terrain forced them to withdraw. In July, Kruger and his war council ordered the complete evacuation of Schoemansdal, which the Venda destroyed, and the Boers could not muster enough men to recover it.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898); Commando System; Kruger, Paul; Makhado; Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Potgieter, Andries Hendrik

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Boer "Hendsoppers" and "Joiners" in the Second Anglo-Boer War

During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), two broad categories of Boers who had deserted the war effort emerged. The term *Hendsoppers,* literally meaning "hands up" in Afrikaans, referred to those Boers who willingly surrendered to British forces. Most Hendsoppers had little to do with the war effort from then on.

The second grouping was the *Joiners*—Boers who not only surrendered, but who had changed sides and actively joined the British war effort. Neither of these categories was watertight, for the reasons for hendsopping or joining were multifarious, psychologically and morally nuanced, and cut across the class lines prevalent in Boer society. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, Hendsoppers could become Joiners, or even reenlist with the Boer commandos. In so doing, these people embodied different identities during the war.

The large-scale hendsopping by burghers started after the Boer capitals of Bloemfontein and Pretoria fell. By then, the euphoria of the early Boer victories were long forgotten, and many war-weary Boers of all ranks lost their motivation to continue the war, which they came to see as futile. Furthermore, not being professional soldiers that had to adhere to strict discipline, many burghers were prompted to lay down their arms and take the oath of neutrality over concerns about their farms and families, political and economic divisions, and a sense that the war was a lost cause. These included Generals Piet Cronjé and General Marthinus Prinsloo, who surrendered with large commandos at Paardeberg and the Brandwater Basin, respectively. The numerous proclamations issued under British commander Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, which promised the opportunity to reside in peace on their farms with their property intact if they surrendered, seduced many Boers into submission. For the duration of the war, further proclamations, coupled with the scorched-earth policy and the difficulty of life as commandoes, enticed many Boers to become Hendsoppers.

For their part, the British generally found it difficult to protect Hendsoppers as they had promised, for the Boers did not recognize their status and saw them as still being legally under their authority. Hence, Hendsoppers were despised, ostracized, intimidated, charged with treason, flogged, and forcibly reenlisted. Others broke their oath and reenlisted with the commandos because they had a change of heart or felt that they had been duped by the British. All in all, an estimated 15,000 burghers (27 percent of the total) surrendered during the war. Many Boers, however, were not content to merely surrender; rather, they decided to actively join the war against their countrymen in capacities ranging from guides and transport riders to being members of peace committees and scout units.

The reasons for becoming Joiners were as nuanced as for becoming Hendsoppers. They included these people's beliefs that the war was pointless and destructive and that the Boers on commando duty needed to come to their senses, in addition to a desire for personal economic and political gain. Those who believed the war to be pointless joined the British war effort in November 1900 as Burgher Peace Committees, with the support of Lord Horatio Kitchener. The idea was to employ Boers of standing to work toward ending the war by impressing upon the commandoes the hopelessness of continuing the conflict and the wisdom of a general surrender. Under the presidency of Meyer de Kock, pamphlets were prepared and representatives appointed to visit commandos to explain the idea. This initiative ended in disaster, as representatives were arrested, tried for treason, flogged, and sentenced to prison terms; in fact, de Kock himself was executed. These developments ended the Burgher Peace Committees' efforts.

The failure of the Burgher Peace Committees and the numerous proclamations convinced some Hendsoppers that more drastic action of their own was needed. In an effort to bring the war to an end, they proposed the creation of volunteer units from the ranks of surrendered Boers to fight on the British side. The offer was readily accepted by the British army, and from this emerged the National Scouts in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony Volunteers in the Orange Free State—Joiners to their kin in commandos. Leading Boer figures in the Scout Units included former generals Piet de Wet, Andries Cronjé (brother of Piet Cronjé) and J. C. Celliers, and Commandant S. G. Vilonel. The rank-and-file members were invariably drawn from the poorest in Boer society, the bywoners.

The Scouts wore British army uniforms and were organized in units with British officers who were in overall command, but with Boer officers acting under their orders. The Scouts' remuneration initially took the form of loot, in that they could keep half of the cattle captured; in time, though, a salary of 2 shillings and 6 pence per diem was introduced. Loot money was also paid into a fund to support postwar farming operations. Unofficially, many Scouts also hoped for postwar economic and political rewards. On a military level, the Scouts, with their knowledge of their kin and the landscape, acted as the ears and eyes of the British army and provided worthwhile intelligence. On occasion, they also partook in battles, such as at Boschmanskop, on the side of the British. After the war, only 10 percent of the 1,750 Joiners who served in the National Scouts collected their medals.

Hendsoppers and Joiners loom large in the Anglo-Boer War consciousness of South Africans. Regardless of their motives, those who had deserted the Republican cause (Joiners in particular) faced a future punctuated by humiliation, scorn, broken family ties, and marginalization. Their businesses were boycotted, marriages to them were frowned upon, officials appointed from their ranks were not recognized, gains from the war were viewed with contempt, and even Christian forgiveness seemed impossible (in certain districts, they were spiritually humiliated and driven from the church). Hendsoppers and Joiners responded to their treatment by pressing the British government for political and economic support, by creating the Scoutskerk (Scouts Church), and even by leaving South Africa for Kenya. At the forefront of healing the divisions was General Louis Botha, who promoted and worked for reconciliation and unity between the Bittereinders and the Hendsoppers and Joiners. This was a painful undertaking and took generations to achieve.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Cronjé, Pieter; Botha, Louis; Brandwater Basin, Battle of (July 1900): Concentration Camps; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Boer "Pocket Republics" in the West of South Africa (1881–1885)

The entry of Boer migrating groups, armed with early 19th-century muzzle-loading rifles and small field guns, into the interior of South Africa delivered a new era of conflict to southern Africa. The diverse demographics of South Africa's interior made it possible for several language and cultural groups to compete for the same natural resources and land since the early 1800s. Boer commandos (mounted citizen soldiers who were organized into loosely defined military hierarchies) would either fight for their own established Republican state or become mercenaries for local African kingdoms.

The Boers became a decisive factor in several small-scale clashes above the Orange and Vaal rivers for the sake of a profitable offer or for the sake of expanding their own state. This was precisely the case with the demise of Dawid Massouw Riet-Taaibosch, a Koranna leader who had settled next to the Harts River in the western part of the Transvaal Republic (the present-day North-West Province). On December 2, 1885, he met his end at the hands of Boer commandos under General Piet Joubert at Massouw Hill, Mamusa (situated on the western side of the present-day town of Schweizer-Reneke). The Koranna as a community would be eliminated after their defeat at Massouw Hill, all due to their rivalry with the Bathlaping and their misconceptions about the intentions of the British colonial and Boer republican governments.

The escalation of hostilities had two main causes. The first can be attributed to the redrawn border between the South African Republic and Britain's Cape Colony with regard to the Harts River. With the river as the border, the community of the Taaibosch-Koranna was divided, with several of the 5,000 followers of Dawid Massouw finding themselves at the mercy of the pro-British Bathlaping. This led to the second cause, which was the encroachment of Bathlaping communities onto the land belonging to the Koranna. Acknowledging a possible war between the Koranna and the Bathlaping, the London Convention of 1884 tried to soothe the furious Dawid Massouw by redrawing the border with the intention of including all his followers in the Transvaal. A Transvaal commission appointed to make it official received no assistance from Massouw, however. By that time, Massouw and the Bathlaping had already made agreements with other communities and groups of mercenaries to fight on their behalf.

General Joubert could not allow any hostilities to prevail; he ordered 800 Boers and a section of the Transvaal State Artillery to besiege Massouw's capital at Mamusa. The main idea was to cut the Koranna off from their water supply. When the fight started on December 2, 1885, the Koranna stood alone against the Boers; the British refused to intervene on Massouw's behalf. General Joubert gave the order for the Boers under Commandants Piet Cronjé and Koos De la Rey to scale Massouw Hill and defeat the Koranna. By the next day, 3,120 Koranna men, women, and children surrendered to the Boers, but it was believed that Dawid Massouw was shot and killed at Mamusa. The current name of the town, Schweizer-Reneke, was derived from two Boer officers who fell in the battle: Captain C. A. Schweizer and Field-Cornet G. C. N. Reneke. To this day, it remains an open question why an artillery captain was so close to the site of battle.

By 1885, the Koranna were no longer a threat to the Boer Republic of the Transvaal. Yet within the northwestern regions, the Boers still locked horns with the BaRolong and the Bathlaping SeTswana-speaking communities. In the land of the BaRolong-RaTshidi, who reoccupied the land surrounding the Molopo River, Boer farmers had moved to and then settled on large farms since the 1840s. The abundance of water and relatively fertile land attracted Chief Montshiwa and his BaRolong to settle in that area (known today as the Mahikeng district) as well. Tensions between the encroaching Boer farmers (and Boer and British mercenaries) and the BaRolong of Montshiwa resulted in raids launched against the BaRolong, forcing Montshiwa to relocate into present-day Botswana (into the land belonging to the BaNgwaketse). With the BaRolong gone, the Boers and mercenaries claimed the land next to the Molopo as their property.

Informed of the victory, President Thomas F. Burgers of the Transvaal sent a representative to convince the victors to establish a new town in the area. With the first name given as *Vrijwilligersrust* (meaning "resting place for the volunteers"), it was subsequently changed to *Heliopolis* ("city of the sun") by the Burgers administration. Yet this city name was not popular among the people within the Molopo area, and a new name of Rooigrond (Red Soil) was given to the settlement. Rooigrond would become the first capital of the Boer Pocket Republic of Goshen (named after the territory within Egypt where Jacob and his sons stayed after their reunion with Joseph). The Goshenite president, N. C. Gey van Pittius, would continue the conflict with the BaRolong in the nearby settlement of Mahikeng ("place of stones") and even enlisted a rival BaRolong group called the BaRolong-Ratlou to assist the Republic of Goshen with the destruction of any Ratshidi stronghold.

The culmination of hostilities came to a decisive end on July 31, 1884, at the Battle of Tigele, south of Rooigrond. The death of two pro-Montshiwa British mercenaries, Christopher Bethell and Nathan Walker, brought the influence of the British Empire into the "pocket" republic of Goshen. The cause of this battle can be traced to a cattle raid of 3,000 animals, committed by the Goshen Boers on the nearby Batswana settlement of Thlapeng. Alerted to the raid, Montshiwa had called upon his warriors to ambush the returning Boers, who for an unknown reason decided to move the cattle close to Montshiwa's settlement at Sehuba. Led by Bethell, Walker, and Montshiwa's nephew Israel Molema, the forces of Montshiwa found the Goshen raiders only 8 kilometers from Montshiwa's capital. Bethell ordered the attack, but his force was soon overcome by the Goshenite raiders and their 300 Stellaland and Transvaal Boer enforcements.

Upon the retreat, Molema's horse was shot dead underneath him, and Bethell then tried to save Molema. Bethell and Walker, however, were killed by two Goshenite mercenaries, an Englishman called Harrington and a Boer known as Joel van Rooyen. The defeat of Montshiwa's forces at Tigele (known by the Batswana as the place where everything collapsed) heralded the end for the BaRolong-Ratshidi military power, but the death knell was also ringing for the Republic of Goshen. Christopher Bethell was a relative of Sir Charles Warren, commander of Britain's Bechuanaland Expedition, who argued that the death of Bethell was too serious to ignore. With 112 BaRolong, 67 BaNgwaketse, and 50 Goshenites dead, Warren arrived shortly from Kimberley to destroy the Goshenite force. Immediately, the mercenaries recognized that they had no chance against Warren and his men. Warren then allocated the fallen Republic of Goshen's capital to eight new landowners, with the Transvaal remaining aloof.

To the south of Goshen was another republic formed by the consolidation of lands rendered to mercenaries who fought with the different Batswana and Koranna communities. Montshiwa of the BaRolong and Mankurwane of the Bathlaping allied together, with British support, against Dawid Massouw and another Tswana leader called Moshette. Both sides attracted the support of mercenaries, but it was the Bathlaping who lost in the end. During the war against the Bathlaping in 1881, a small group of the mercenaries stated that they observed a shooting star, which inspired them to honor the celestial event in the name of the state that they proclaimed after the war. With Gerrit van Niekerk, a Boer from the Schweizer-Reneke district, as its president, the new Republic of Stellaland tried to lay the foundation of a model state at its capital of Vryburg ("town of freedom"). However, it would not escape the interest of either the Transvaal under Paul Kruger or Kimberley under Cecil Rhodes. In an act to strengthen their defenses, Goshen and Stellaland united in 1883 to become the United States of Stellaland, promising to assist each other with any confrontation. This was the reason why the cattle raiders at Tigele were able to receive enforcements from Stellaland. The United States of Stellaland would not survive until the end of 1885. The Warren expedition was able to make both Stellaland and Goshen part of the British Bechuanaland Frontier Territory, and thus eventually part of Great Britain's Cape Colony.

Emile C. Coetzee

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Commando System; Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De la Rey, Jacobus; Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Kruger, Paul; Rhodes, Cecil John; Warren, Charles

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Boer Trek (1835–1854)

In 1835, about a third of the Dutch-speaking British Cape colonial farmers (called Boers) decided to emigrate from the Cape Colony. Some of the causes for the exodus are debated, but others can be plainly traced to economic and social difficulties that these Eastern Cape frontier farmers experienced due to the inadequate compensation given to them for services and supplies rendered to the British during the Sixth Cape-Xhosa War (1834–1835) and for the emancipation of the Cape slaves. The majority of the men, being veterans of skirmishes with the Xhosa, found it hard to make a living under the inefficient administration of the British colonial government, situated in faraway Cape Town. The challenges arose from the increase in incoming British settlers and freed slaves in the frontier areas (adding competition to the variety of trades).

The first group that left the Cape did so under the leadership of Louis Tregardt. After a short sojourn in the land of the Gcaleka Xhosa, he moved with seven families across the Orange/Gariep River and joined up with another emigrating Boer group of 49 individuals under the command of "Lang Hans" (Tall Hans) van Rensburg. Tregardt and van Rensburg followed a course that took them across the Vaal River and to the northernmost mountain range in present-day South Africa, the Soutpansberg Mountains (*Soutpan* is Afrikaans for "salty pan"). It seems that Tregardt and van Rensburg did not experience any major attacks from the indigenous African communities. It is believed, however, that van Rensburg and his fellow trekkers were killed by the warriors of Manukozi at the Djindi stream in the Limpopo River area. Tregardt wanted to make contact with the Portuguese traders in Mozambique and trekked across the Low veldt, then through the malaria-infected areas of southern Gazaland and arrived in Lourenco Marques (present-day Maputo) in a withered state. After he passed away from malaria, the remainder of his trek party was shipped to Port Natal (present-day Durban) when the Republic of Natalia was established in 1839.

Andries Hendrik Potgieter left the Cape Colony at the end of 1835 with a small group of Boer families and crossed the Orange/Gariep River at Boesmanspoort drift into the Transorangia (Southern Free State). Potgieter was elected by his Voortrekkers as their leader (*Voortrekkers* is a Dutch/Afrikaans noun indicating pioneering ambition—"Voor" for the people migrating and "trek" for the pulling of wagons). When he linked up with another Trekker leader from Graaff-Reinet, Gert Maritz, his leadership was acknowledged for a second time at Thaba Nchu (which the Voortrekkers called Blesberg Mountain). While at Thaba Nchu, the Voortrekkers lived for a short period in harmony with the BaRolong of Moroka at the Wesleyan missionary station of the Reverend James Archbell. They shortly moved to the district between the Vaal and the Vet rivers, where land was bartered with the Taung community under the rule of Makwana. Cattle were exchanged for land, and soon the Voortrekkers under Potgieter expanded to the southern banks of the Vaal River.

It is believed that the Voortrekkers under Potgieter received a warning from King Mzilikazi of the Ndebele that they had no right to cross the Vaal River and enter Ndebele land for any reason. A family by the surname of Liebenberg, however, did cross the river at a point close to present-day Parys, and they were killed by the Ndebele. As the dominant ruler on the western Highveld, Mzilikazi could not ignore the military threat that the Voortrekkers presented. By the time of the Ndebele attacks at the Vaal River (known in posterity as the Battle of Vaal River) on August 23, 1836, Potgieter and a large group of his men were in the Soutpansberg Mountains visiting Tregardt and further exploring the interior. When they arrived back at the site of the Battle of the Vaal River on September 2, 1836, they found 20 Voortrekkers and an unknown number of their Cape Colored (mixed-race) herders dead. The survivors of the battle were hiding at the Renoster River, south of present-day Heilbron in the northern Free State, and soon the whereabouts of the approaching Ndebele warriors were reported to Potgieter.

Mzilikazi appointed his most trusted commander, Mkaliphi, to deliver a final blow to the Voortrekkers in the northern Free State. The two forces met each other on October 20, 1836, at a hill close to the Renoster River. The battle lasted for only about 30 minutes. In that time, the Voortrekkers lost all their herds of cattle and flocks of sheep and only had their steeds at their disposal. Only two men of the Potgieter Commando died while fighting in the laager (a circular defensive structure made by the ox-wagons with spaces covered with cut-up thorn bushes) but 400 Ndebele warriors fell. This was the famous Battle of Vegkop, where a young Paul Kruger helped to load the rifles. Vegkop would be an important lesson for the Zulu king, Dingane.

With the military victory at Vegkop, Potgieter and his men chased the Ndebele and attacked Mzilikazi's settlement at Mosega Hill. In January 1837, the settlement and defensive structures at Mosega were burned down and 7,000 cattle taken as war booty. Mzilikazi was not at Mosega, but with his commander Mkaliphi at eGabeni.

Potgieter and his men were recovering before facing Mzilikazi in the final battle. This came to pass with the arrival of Piet Uys and his reinforcements in November 1837. On November 4, 1837, Mzilikazi and his men were defeated and forced to cross the Limpopo and Shashe rivers, fleeing to where their descendants still live, in present-day Zimbabwe.

Potgieter would not return to a hero's welcome when he arrived at the Voortrekker settlement at the Vet River (the present-day Winburg, in the Free State Province). With his absence, another trekker leader called Piet Retief joined the trekkers, and he was officially elected governor. Maritz remained the leader of judicial affairs, and it was hoped that Potgieter would be happy with being the military leader of the trekkers.

Governor Retief, who moved from Grahamstown in the Cape Colony after being accused of fraud, decided that the area known as Natal represented the best possible location to establish a Boer republic. In the main declaration for the emigration of the Boers, which Retief wrote and got published in the *Grahamstown Journal,* he proposed the idea of establishing a Boer republic on the northern border of the Cape Colony, free from British intervention. This goal resonated with the later Trek leaders.

Retief argued that the best possible method of acquiring land for the envisaged republic was to negotiate with the strongest military power in the Natal area. Dingane was asked to occupy the land between the Umzimvubu and Thukela rivers, the land directly south of the Zulu Kingdom. With the help of the Reverend Francis Owen and the trader Thomas Halstead as translators, he agreed to consider the request if Retief and his men would be able to retrieve the cattle that Sekonyela, leader of the Tlokwa, had taken from him. Historians argue that this was a test from the Zulu king's side, to assess the power of the trekker community. It is believed that Dingane considered Sekonyela to have been a wizard, so he was surprised to see that Retief and his men were able to overcome Sekonyela without any bloodshed. As a result, he believed that they had to be stronger wizards than his previous foe, Sekonyela.

When Retief returned Dingane's cattle in February 1838, the Zulu king allegedly obliged Retief by signing a treaty that allowed the Voortrekkers to occupy the aforementioned territory. Retief then wanted to leave, but Dingane was able to persuade him to stay for an official farewell. During this event, Dingane commanded his warriors to apprehend Retief and his men and took them to a nearby hill, close to the Zulu capital of Umgungundhlovu. There, he killed them with spears and knobkerries (a fighting stick with a crafted bulb on the top). The hill would be known as KwaMatiwane, after the Ngwane leader who was also executed there.

Gert Maritz died of an illness in September 1837, and Piet Uys tried to avenge the death of Retief at the Battle of Italeni on April 11, 1837. Uys and his son Dirkie perished, along with dozens of Voortrekkers, because they were left unprotected at the Bushman and Bloukrans rivers by Potgieter. Leaderless and broken, the Voortrekker men were contemplating returning to the Cape. The arrival of Andries Pretorius in November 1838 changed their minds.

Pretorius soon called upon every willing, arms-bearing Voortrekker man to become part of his punitive commando against Dingane. Arriving in Zululand in December 1838, it is believed that Pretorius, with the help of Sarel Cilliers, drafted a covenant with God for their survival, which was repeated to the commando. On the morning of December 16, 1838, the Zulu army attacked the commandoes of Pretorius at the Ncome River. The trekkers constructed a wagon laager and were armed not only with muzzle-loading rifles, but with three ship cannon, fastened on wagon chassis, especially the 12-pounder cannon, nicknamed Grietjie (Little Greta), which would become infamous for the destruction it caused.

The Zulu warriors received the order to attack from Dambuza and Ndlela, Dingane's trusted commanders, but were completely defeated by the Voortrekkers under Pretorius. No casualties were suffered by the Voortrekkers save for a few injuries, but 3,000 Zulu warriors fell, turning the waters of the Ncome River scarlet. The Voortrekkers, and their descendants, called this "the Battle of Blood River." December 16 became a public holiday in South Africa and was known as the Day of the Vow (and as the Day of Reconciliation today).

Pretorius and his commando arrived at the Zulu capital and saw that it was completely destroyed by Dingane, who fled to Swaziland where he was killed. At Kwa-Matiwane, the remains of Retief and his men and the treaty between Retief and Dingane were found. This meant that the Republic of Natalia could be proclaimed—but it only existed from 1838 to 1843. The British did not consider a Boer republic on their northern border a safe buffer state, especially not after the Voortrekkers in Natalia's southern districts attacked the Bhaca community of Ncapayi. Although the first British force to arrive at Port Natal was defeated by the Boers at the Battle of Congella on May 23, 1842, the arrival of a British relief expedition prompted the Boers to withdraw. In 1843 the British annexed the Boer Republic of Natalia which became the British Colony of Natal. Pretorius and other Voortrekkers then crossed the Drakensberg Mountains and joined Potgieter in the Republic of Potchefstroom-Winburg.

Potgieter was not willing to cooperate with Pretorius, who wanted the British to acknowledge a Boer republic north of the Vaal River. The British annexed the Transorangia area due to the tensions brewing among the Griqua, the Voortrekkers, and the Sotho, and appointed Major Henry Warden to administer the area. Soon Warden confirmed the impossibility to doing this and signed on behalf of the British Empire an agreement with Adam Kok, leader of the Griqua, and the Sotho king Moshoeshoe to ensure the protection and equality for the inhabitants of Transorangia.

This made the Voortrekkers and Pretorius clash once more with the British, at the Battle of Boomplaats in 1848. After his victory at Boomplaats, Cape governor Sir Harry Smith proclaimed all the land between the Orange/Gariep and Vaal rivers a British territory called the Orange River Sovereignty. The end of the Republic of Potchefstroom-Winburg was the immediate result, but Pretorius still believed that the British were not interested in the land above the Vaal River. His feud with Potgieter ended when they reconciled outside present-day Rustenburg. In January 1852, Pretorius sent an invitation to the British in the Cape to negotiate for an acknowledged Boer republic north of the Vaal River. The British agreed and met with Pretorius at the Sand River in the Orange River Sovereignty. On January 17, the two parties agreed on the establishment of the South African Republic above the Vaal River, and two years later, Josias Hoffman accomplished the same with the Bloemfontein convention to create the Republic of the Orange Free State. Thus, by 1854, two Boer republics, as well as the ending of the Boers' Great Trek, became a reality.

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See also: Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boers; Boomplaats, Battle of (August 29, 1848); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Dingane ka-Senzagakhona; Mzilikazi kaMashobane; Potgieter, Andries Hendrik; Pretorius, Andries; Retief, Piet; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn; Vegkop, Battle of (October 16, 1836)

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Boer-Gananwa War (1894)

In the 1890s, the Boer South African Republic (or Transvaal), strengthened by new wealth from gold mining, embarked on a series of campaigns against the remaining independent African groups on its northern frontier. After its successful 1881 rebellion against the British and the formal withdrawal of British authority with the 1884 London Convention, the Transvaal became an independent state under its newly elected president, Paul Kruger. Since the British had eliminated the Pedi threat during the failed confederation process of the late 1870s, the Transvaal Boers could expand elsewhere.

During the 1880s, the Gananwa (also called Hananwa) of the northwest saw increased Boer demands for labor, livestock, land, and taxes, but they were able to resist because many had acquired firearms through wage labor in the diamond mines around Kimberley or the gold mines of the Rand. Christoph Sonntag of the Berlin Missionary Society tried but failed to persuade the Gananwa to avoid war by submitting to the Transvaal.

In 1894, one of the largest commandos in Transvaal history was mobilized under Piet Joubert. Made up of groups from all over the republic, it totaled around 4,000 European and 2,000 African fighters supported by newly imported cannon and Maxim guns. Most of the Europeans were Boers, but some British participated as well, since the Transvaal's 1883 Commando Law had made all white inhabitants of the state liable for military service and enabled the republic to requisition supplies, wagons, and livestock from foreign companies within its borders. *Uitlander* protest and intervention by the British imperial government led to Kruger excusing many of these men from military service in the war. However, a special war tax was imposed on all European residents and institutions. Since foreign whites working in the mining industry (also called *uitlanders*) objected to having to do military service without voting rights, this enflamed tensions between the Transvaal and Britain.

Joubert declared war against the Gananwa after Chief Lebogo (called "Maleboch" by the Boers) refused to comply with a series of ultimatums. The Boer-Gananwa War was fought in four increasingly harsh phases. In the first phase, from May to mid-June 1894, the Boer army isolated peripheral African communities from the Gananwa capital at Blouberg Mountain. During the second phase, in late June, the Transvaal force assaulted the mountain stronghold from all sides, but these efforts failed to dislodge the Gananwa, as they took shelter in deep caves. Subsequently, Joubert ordered large wagonloads of dynamite from Pretoria and offered money rewards to anyone who could blow up the Gananwa in their caves.

During the third phase, from July 1–19, the Boers attempted to bury the Gananwa by dynamiting their caves. But this failed too, because of the area's geology and the oblique angles of the caves, as well as effective Gananwa small-arms fire. The dynamiting operation was criticized by missionaries and a few Boer commanders, who saw it as inhumane and contrary to international law, and by British mine owners, who saw it as a waste of a scarce resource that was vital for their industry (and was likely to scare off African labor to boot). Of course, the use of dynamite was nothing new to the region's colonial wars, as the British had used it against the Pedi a few years earlier. The Boers then resorted to smoking out the Gananwa by spraying the bush and caves with paraffin ignited by artillery fire, but this too was widely condemned as inhumane.

With the Gananwa refusing to surrender, the Boers besieged the mountain, blocked Gananwa access to water sources, destroyed nearby grain stores, and seized the Gananwa's remaining livestock. The Gananwa survived by eating bark, leaves, tree fruit, and other plants. During the siege, the Boers constructed at least 20 small stone fortifications around the area. By the end of July, some of the Gananwa leaders and many elderly women and children had surrendered. Lebogo was held prisoner by the Boers until the British freed him in 1900 during the Second Anglo-Boer War, after which he returned to his home and people until his death in 1939.

After the Boer-Gananwa War, the *uitlanders* became radicalized against the Transvaal Republic, given Kruger's continued refusal to expand the franchise to them and problems with the government's repayment of claims for the material that it had requisitioned during the conflict. This formed part of the context for the 1895 Jameson Raid, in which mining magnate and British imperialist Cecil Rhodes attempted but failed to overthrow the Transvaal state.

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See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Rhodes, Cecil John; Technology

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Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837)

In 1836, groups of Dutch-speaking white settlers called Boers left the British-ruled Cape Colony and moved into the interior of what is now South Africa. By the mid-1830s, the Ndebele kingdom of Mzilikazi, which had originated on the Indian Ocean coast but was now based around the settlements of Mosega and Gabeni on the Marico River, constituted the main power on the western Highveld dominating the neighboring Tswana and Sotho groups. The Ndebele knew about the danger of horse-mounted gunmen, as they had previously been raided by the Griqua.

In August 1836, Mzilikazi sent out a 500-strong raiding party that destroyed several camps of the newly arrived Boers and returned with captured livestock. In early October, he dispatched an army of 3,000 warriors under Mkhaliphi, his senior commander, to drive off the Boers. On October 16, 1836, a group of around 35 Boers, led by Andries Potgieter, rode out to meet the Ndebele about 16 kilometers from the Boer laager at the base of the hill, which later was called Vegkop (Hill of the Fight). Although it appears that the Boers wanted to negotiate, one of them fired into the Ndebele, who then charged. Utilizing fire and movement, the Boers rode back to their laager, pursued by the Ndebele. The laager was tightly formed, with wagons tied together and cut-up thorn bushes placed in the gaps. When the Boers reached the laager, they secured their horses inside and manned the defenses. The Ndebele stopped just out of musket range to prepare for the attack, which gave the Boers additional time to organize.

After a few hours, Mkhaliphi launched a typical envelopment attack on the laager by surrounding it and charging on all sides. After 15 minutes of Boer shooting, in which scattershot from muskets proved particularly effective, Ndebele corpses were piling up. The Ndebele then withdrew with 6,000 cattle and 40,000 sheep that the Boers had kept outside the laager. In this assault, 150 Ndebele died, and 450 may have been killed in the entire engagement. Meanwhile, only 2 Boers were killed and 12 wounded. Boer horsemen then pursued the retreating Ndebele but failed to recover their livestock.

Over the next two months, Potgieter and the recently arrived leader Gert Martiz rallied Boer newcomers and recruited Griqua and Rolong Tswana allies, who had been displaced by Mzilikazi some years before, for an offensive against the Ndebele. In January 1837, Potgieter and Maritz led a raiding party of 107 Boer and 40 Griqua horsemen, and 60 Rolong infantry across the Vaal River. On the morning of January 17, this party attacked Mosega from an unexpected direction, catching the Ndebele by surprise. No coherent defense was mounted, probably because the open ground greatly favored the mounted attackers and Mzilikazi and Mkhaliphi were away at Gabeni. Between 400 and 500 Ndebele were killed, while the other side lost just two Rolong. Potgieter and Martiz captured around 7,000 cattle. Most Ndebele abandoned Mosega and fled north toward Gabeni.

News of Ndebele defeats spread, which encouraged opportunistic attacks against them. In June 1837, the Zulu ruler Dingane sent an army against his old enemy, the Ndebele. The Zulu force split in two, with one section seizing several thousand cattle and the other engaging the Ndebele in an inconclusive battle near the Pilanesberg Mountains. In August, a combined force of Jan Bloem's Griqua and Hurutshe Tswana raided Ndebele cattle posts, meeting little resistance. A total of about 300 Ndebele were killed in both engagements.

In November 1837, Potgieter and Pieter Uys, another newly arrived Boer leader, led a commando of 360 Boers and a few Rolong allies 80 kilometers northwest of Mosega, where they attacked the Ndebele. The result was a nine-day battle in which the Boers and Rolong pursued the fleeing Ndebele north, disrupted attempts to rally groups of warriors, and seized livestock. Mzilikazi's people sustained heavy casualties, although the Boer claim of killing 3,000 Ndebele was probably exaggerated.

Consequently, the Ndebele moved far north over the Limpopo River into what is now Zimbabwe, where they encountered the Rozvi Shona. The Boers, claiming the entire Transvaal by right of conquest, replaced the Ndebele as the main power on the western Highveld and developed tributary relations with many Tswana and Sotho groups.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Commando System (Boer Republics); Dingane kaSenzagakhona; Kruger, Paul; Mzilikazi kaMashobane; Potgieter, Andries Hendrik; Vegkop, Battle of (October 16, 1836)

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Boers

The word *Boer* (from the German word *bauer,* or farmer) was the general name for the people of Dutch descent who left Cape Colony in southern Africa and traveled inland during the "Great Trek" or "Boer Trek" of 1836–1846 to establish their own republics. In the 20th century, the term *Afrikaner* replaced *Boer.*

The Dutch first landed at the Cape of Good Hope in 1652. Dutch settlement increased, with German Protestants and French Huguenots (and other displaced Europeans) also migrating to South Africa. The result was expansion onto the lands of the indigenous Khoikhoi (called "Hottentots" by whites), San (Bushmen), and Xhosa on the Fish River to the east. The Dutch and other immigrants developed the commando system for mobile warfare. The Boers had servants, drawn from the local black population, and also imported slaves from East Africa, Mozambique, and other Dutch colonies.

The British first occupied the Cape from 1795 to 1803 and then returned permanently in 1806. The British abolished slavery without compensation in 1834, bringing Boer discontent to a head. Frustrated with British administration and the return of recently conquered land to the Xhosa, and believing in their own racial superiority, about 14,000 Boers embarked on the Great Trek inland to establish their own independent nations during the late 1830s and 1840s. Called the *Voortrekkers,* they headed north across the Orange and Vaal rivers in the interior of what is now South Africa, and some turned southeast to cross the Drakensberg Mountains, reaching the Indian Ocean coast of present-day Kwa-Zulu/Natal province.

During their exodus, the Boers encountered opposition from the Ndebele in the interior and from the Zulu on the Indian Ocean coast. Some 500 Boers, led by Andries Pretorius, fought and defeated about 11,000 Zulu, killing about 3,000 of them, at the Battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838. The Boers considered this victory a blessing of the Lord and justification for their encroachment on the lands of and dominance over the indigenous black people. It further underscored their later attitudes toward British imperialism.

The Boers, by allying themselves with the new Zulu leader Mpande, declared their own "Republic of Port Natal and adjacent countries." They sought British recognition, but the British were prepared to permit self-government only under overall British control and with a British military presence. In 1842, a 260-man British force encamped near Durban, a British settlement established many years earlier, and skirmishes took place between them and the Boers. The following year, the British government declared Natal a British colony, and in 1844, Natal became a dependency of the Cape Colony.

In early 1848, to try to ease tension between the British and Boers on the Orange River frontier, Lieutenant-General Sir Harry G. W. Smith, the British governor of Cape Colony, annexed the territory between the Orange and Vaal rivers, which was named the Orange River Sovereignty. The Boers resented this action, and another clash, the Battle of Boomplaats, took place on August 29, 1848. At Boomplaats, Smith defeated the Boers, who were unable to withstand the speed of his attack and skillful infantry-artillery coordination. However, the British shortly withdrew from the interior, as there was no reason at the time for them to occupy it and they wished to focus on maintaining control of the coast.

The Sand River Convention of 1852 and the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854 recognized, with limitations, the independence of the Boer republics of Transvaal (South African Republic) and the Orange Free State, respectively. In 1867, diamonds were discovered in an area north of the Cape claimed by the British, Boer republics, and indigenous groups. The Boers became frustrated when, in the early 1870s, a British-appointed arbitrator gave the diamond fields to a Griqua leader, who then agreed to come under Cape authority. The diamonds brought in an influx of immigrants and reawakened British strategic interest in the area.

Friction between the expansionist Boers and indigenous peoples continued during the 1850s and 1860s. In 1868, Sotho ruler Moshoeshoe agreed to come under indirect British rule to prevent what remained of his kingdom from falling to the Boers. In 1876, a strong Boer commando failed to capture the mountain stronghold of the Pedi in Transvaal. It became obvious that the Boers were unable to manage their own finances as the Transvaal neared bankruptcy. The British, who now changed their policy on diamond discovery and wanted to control the interior, annexed the Transvaal in January 1877. British colonial officials believed that the Transvaal would welcome British annexation, protection, and efficient governance, especially as a prelude to confederation with the Cape Colony. This was a tremendous miscalculation, and the Boers bitterly resented this action.

To make the planned confederation work, the British embarked on subjugating the remaining independent African states in the region. The British fought and defeated the Zulus in 1879, and had also vanquished the Pedi by the end of the year. The Boer nationalists were becoming more militant, especially after the 1880 election in Britain, when the prime minister stated that the Transvaal could be independent only as a member of a South African confederation. Finally, the insurgent Boers proclaimed the Transvaal a republic on December 16, 1880.

This led directly to the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). This was a short, sharp conflict in which the Boers defeated and humiliated the British, under the command of Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley. The decisive engagement of the war was the Battle of Majuba Hill (February 27, 1881), in which Colley was mortally wounded and the British soundly defeated. This effectively ended the war, and a truce was signed on March 6, 1881, and ratified by the Convention of Pretoria six months later, which largely restored independence to the Transvaal. Gold was discovered in 1886 on the Witwatersrand, a range of hills west of Johannesburg in the Transvaal. This upset the stability of the area, as large numbers of *uitlanders* (foreigners) migrated to the area. The Transvaal government of President Paul Kruger was averse to giving full political rights to these immigrants, concerned that the Boers would become the

Boer fighters taking cover during the siege of Mafeking during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Boers (now called Afrikaners) are the descendants of the first Dutch settlers in what is now South Africa. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images) minority and could be outvoted by the mainly British foreigners.

The Cape Colony prime minister, Cecil Rhodes, was the driving force behind an unsuccessful raid conducted by Dr. Leander Starr Jameson in 1895–1896 to support a planned uprising of *uitlanders* and overthrow the Transvaal government. This episode led directly to confrontation between the Boer republics and Britain. In light of increasing pressure, and after an ultimatum issued by the Transvaal, war broke out on October 11, 1899. The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) was the result, a conflict prolonged by guerrilla warfare that ravaged South Africa. The British eventually won this war, which ended with the Treaty of Vereeniging on May 31, 1902.

In 1910, the four former colonies—Cape Colony, Natal, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal—were granted independence within the British Empire as the Union of South Africa. The first three prime ministers of the Union, Louis Botha, Jan Smuts, and J. B. M. Hertzog, were Boer veterans of the Second Anglo-Boer War.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boer "Hendsoppers" and "Joiners" in the Second Anglo-Boer War; Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boer Conquest of the Kekana and Langa (1847–1868); Boer Expansion in the Eastern and Northern Transvaal (c.1845–1867); Boer "Pocket Republics" in the West of South Africa (1881–1885); Boer-Gananwa War (1894); Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898); Boomplaats, Battle of (August 29, 1848); Botha, Louis; Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Colley, George Pomeroy; Commando System (Boer Republics); Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795); Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869); Jameson, Leander Starr; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Kruger, Paul; Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881): Mpande kaSenzagakhona; Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Pretorius, Andries; Rhodes, Cecil John; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn; Smuts, Jan Christian; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857)

Beginning in the late 1830s, Dutch-speaking white settlers called Boers left the British-ruled Cape Colony and moved north into the interior of what is now South Africa. Although the Boers saw their defeat of Mzilikazi's Ndebele in 1836 as granting them control over the area north of the Vaal River, many other African groups contested this. In what became the western Transvaal, Boer commandos regularly raided Tswana communities for cattle and slaves.

In 1844, the Kwena leader Sechele fortified his principal town with a stone wall, including loopholes from which his men could fire muskets acquired through the ivory trade. Over the next few years, Sechele rejected Boer demands for submission. Tensions increased as the Boers seized guns from traders doing business with the Kwena and Sechele prevented Boer hunting parties from passing through his territory.

In July 1851, Boer military commander Andries Pretorius convened a war council and authorized spying operations in preparation for war against the Kwena. A Boer commando, in October 1851, rode west, where it accepted the submission of Tswana groups like the Hurutshe, while others withdrew into what is now Botswana. In August 1852, a large commando of 430 Boers and over 400 African allies under Ernst Sholtz and Paul Kruger attacked Mosielele's Kgatla and Sechele's Kwena. The Boers employed cannon to bombard the Kwena mountain stronghold of Dimawe and during the assault used African allies as human shields. After six hours of fighting, while Sechele and his entourage held the top of Dimawe Hill, the nearby town had been burned and other Kwena positions captured. Between 4 and 30 Boers and 60 and 100 Kwena were killed. That night, Sechele and his people fled to another stronghold called Dithubaruba.

Over the next three days, the Boers pursued the Kwena and sacked the residence of missionary David Livingstone, who was away. There, they found firearms, which they saw as evidence that British missionaries were arming Africans. Although the Boers withdrew with around 3,000 cattle and 600 captive women and children, they had failed to conquer Sechele's people. Harassed by the Kwena on its return journey, Scholtz's commando disbanded because its horses and oxen were worn out and the Boers were unwilling to continue the campaign.

The 1852 Sand River Convention withdrew British claims of authority over the Transvaal Boers and prohibited Africans there from obtaining firearms and ammunition in British territory. In December 1852, a commando attacked Montshiwa's Rolong along the Harts River, and after ambushing the Boers to buy time, they withdrew north to live among the Ngwaketse Tswana. In January 1853, retaliatory Tswana attacks caused Boer farmers to abandon the Transvaal's Marico District. Later that month, the Boers and Tswana concluded an uncertain armistice. By 1857, both sides recognized the Limpopo, Madikwe, and Ngotwane rivers as a border between the Boer Transvaal Republic and independent Tswana groups.

In 1856–1857, some of the Tlhaping Tswana tried to replenish their disease-ravaged herds by stealing from the Boers. In 1858, the Boers retaliated by attacking the Thlaping, led by chiefs Gasebonwe and Mahura, seizing 4,000 sheep and goats, 2,800 cattle, 165 horses, 23 wagons, and up to 100 children. Gasebonwe fled but was captured and beheaded by a Boer patrol. Some Tswana groups, such as Kgamanyame's Kgatla, Mgale's Po, Mokgatle's

Fokeng, and Ramokoka's Phalane, developed alliances with the Boers, participated in their raids, and were permitted to keep guns and avoid labor conscription.

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See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Boer-Ndebele War (1836); Commando System (Boer Republics); Kruger, Paul; Mzilikazi kaMashobane; Pretorius, Andries

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Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898)

Conflicts between the Boers and the local Venda communities started in the northern frontier areas of the former Transvaal during the 1860s. It would continue until 1898, with the final demise of Venda military power.

The main reason for the start of the first real confrontation between the Boers and the Venda communities is the fact that the former could not enforce their authority on the latter in the northernmost reaches of the South African Republic (ZAR, derived from the Dutch, *Zuid Afrikaanische Republiek*). The Venda people were also not one united group. Three distinct groups occupied the land surrounding the Soutpansberg Mountains, in the north of what is South Africa today.

By the 1860s, the strongest Venda community was the Western Venda of Ramabulana (known to fellow Vendas as the House of Nzhelele). The lesser counterparts of that group were the Eastern and Southern Venda, consisting of several small communities under the command of their own leaders. Boer settlers had entered the area since the arrival of a trek party led by Louis Trichardt in the late 1830s, but only since the 1850s did a Boer community start to settle permanently. The first confrontation began in September 1863 and ended in June 1865, when the Venda under Rambuda refused to pay any taxes and tolls to the Portuguese trader João Albasini, who had a farm on the northern slopes of the Soutpansberg Mountains. Although small skirmishes with limited casualties on both sides occurred, the conflict forced the other Venda communities to seek agreements for protection against the Boers.

The unity was short-lived, ending with the passing of the Western Venda king, Ramabulana. His two sons, Davhana and Makhado, both laid claim to his throne. Soon each of them made alliances with other Venda communities and with white communities so that he could succeed his father. Albasini made it known that his support lay with Davhana, but on June 3, 1864, Makhado followed advice from Madzhie and Nyakhuhu, his paternal uncle and aunt, to attack his brother. Davhana was not killed, though; he found refuge with Albasini, a safe distance from the new Western Venda king, Makhado, at his new capital, Luatame. However, the refugee prince was not popular among all the Boers. Soon the Boers at Schoemansdal argued that Davhana should be returned. At the same time, a cross-community alliance between the three distinct Venda groups was formed to protect each other if Davhana dared to attack any of them.

That did in fact happen in the Munune fiasco in 1864. Munene was a fugitive from the kingdom of Soshangane (in present-day Mozambique), who was hiding among the Venda. The ZAR government considered it acceptable to hand Munene over to his king, Mzila, and when an action was launched to apprehend Munene, the three Venda communities saw it as a provocation for war. Their argument was that Munene was no longer with them and that the aggressive action by the ZAR was unjustified. Still the Boer commandoes, under Commandant S. M. Venter, attacked the Venda king Maphaha, and it is rumored that Davhana accompanied this specific commando to kill his aunt, Nyankhuhu. Her death increased the tension between the Boers and the Venda, and soon the Boers of Schoemansdal formed laagers for their own protection. In this instance, their farms were left at the mercy of the approaching Venda warriors; but in truth, the Venda warriors only took the rifles the Boers used to hunt elephants, knowing that it would destroy their main source of income. Albasini joined in the fight with his Tsonga mercenaries and plundered the Venda community of Madzivhandila. The ZAR tried to end hostilities with the promise of handing Davhana over to Makhado, but nothing came of this or any of the commissions of enquiry that Pretoria appointed.

By July 1865, the Boer commandos were left with no other option but to attack Makhado and his allies. Their first target was the Venda force under Madzhie, and the battle started right next to the missionary station of Goedgedacht. It ended on July 3, when Madzhie fled to Makhado's stronghold. The next ally to fall was Magoro, a chief who would be executed directly after a truce was agreed to. Albasini, however, could not find any common ground with his Boer counterparts and only decided to be part of campaigns against allies directly connected with Makhado.

By April 1866, the ZAR decided to follow a diplomatic route to end hostilities with the Venda. A three-man diplomatic mission of President M. W. Pretorius, Commandant-General Paul Kruger, and Magistrate P. J. van Staden promised the Venda that they would receive justice for every crime any Boer committed against them. This move might have brought temporary peace to the area, but the Boers reacted with a huge public outcry. By July 1867, the situation in the Soutpansberg Mountains was irreparable and the entire community of Schoemansdal left the town, never to return.

With the self-imposed exodus of the Schoemansdal townfolk, the ZAR appointed a diplomatic agent with the right to form his own posse of men into a military corps for the sake of regional defense against the Venda. From the start, Albasini and the diplomatic agent, Stephanus Schoeman, could not cooperate because Schoeman would attack friendly Venda or Tsonga communities who were in his way. Albasini argued that the ending of Schoeman's raids could only happen in Pretoria, and so he and Schoeman traveled to the capital to settle their differences. In their absence, thousands of Ngoni warriors arrived from

Portuguese East Africa and started to attack the remaining Venda communities in the Soutpansberg Mountains. Makhado and his strongest allies survived the Ngoni onslaught and were also able to fight off another invasion by the Swazis. With the return of Albasini and Schoeman, neither of the men could agree on what had to be done with what was spared by the Ngoni and the Swazi. A diplomatic breakthrough, however, did occur by the end of 1869, when the battle-weary Venda kings, without the support of Makhado and Madzhie, signed an agreement of surrender and subjugation to the ZAR government.

Makhado's day would come posthumously, though. He passed away in 1894, and his son Mphephu took control of the Western Venda. At first, the ZAR of Paul Kruger hoped that with Mphephu, a measure of peace and tranquility could be maintained—but he was mistaken. Mphephu refused to continue to pay taxes to the ZAR and called upon his men to attack Boer farms and the Buysdorp community to the south and west of the Soutpansberg Mountains. The casualties were low on the Boer side, and General Piet Joubert waited patiently for reinforcements to arrive. Yet it was his artillery that would dominate the last three battles against the Venda in November 1898. By the end of that month, the Venda surrendered to the forces of General Joubert, who used iron-clad mobile forts to protect his position. Mphephu fled to present-day Zimbabwe but returned to his ancestral home, reuniting with his brothers, in a reserve that would be approved by the British colonial government. With his defeat in 1898, the final black community fell against the military force of the ZAR, but then the latter surrendered four years later to a much stronger force—Great Britain.

Emile C. Coetzee

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Commando System (Boer Republic); Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Kruger, Paul; Makhado; Pretorius, Marthinus Wessel

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Booma Pass, Battle of (December 24, 1850)

In the wake of the Cape-Xhosa War of 1846–1847, the Rharhabe Xhosa and other western Xhosa groups came under colonial rule within the context of British Kaffraria. The rebellion that broke out in late December 1850 was caused by the weakening of the authority of Xhosa chiefs, who were supervised by white officials, increased activity by Christian missionaries, and loss of land to settlers and African colonial allies. With the Xhosa prophet Mlanjeni calling for the purification of Xhosa society by the slaughter of all yellow or dun-colored cattle (which were often associated with white people), Governor Sir Harry Smith officially deposed Sandile as the Xhosa ruler for failing to show up to a meeting in the territorial capital of King William's Town.

On Christmas Eve morning in 1850, Colonel George MacKinnon led 650 colonial soldiers from Fort Cox into the Amatola Mountains, the historic stronghold of the Rharhabe. Their instructions were to make a show of force to intimidate the Rharhabe and, if possible, capture Sandile or drive him toward another patrol. The colonial force included elements of the British 6th, 45th, and 73rd regiments on foot, along with the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) and local "Kaffir Police." After a two-hour breakfast on the bank of the Keiskamma River, the expedition entered the Amatolas through the narrow and winding Booma Pass, which was flanked by thickly forested hills. A British lieutenant observed some Xhosa men, including one he thought was Sandile, but he could not contact MacKinnon, who appeared oblivious to the danger.

Just as MacKinnon and the lead element emerged onto a small plateau, the rear of the column was ambushed by hundreds of Xhosa warriors, who emerged from the trees, shot their muskets, and then charged down the slopes toward the colonial soldiers. Abandoning the pack horses carrying their ammunition supply (which apparently was the target of the ambush), MacKinnon's force fought their way through the pass and marched 2 kilometers to Keiskamma Hoek, where they spent the night in a defensive square and sent a message to Smith warning him of the rebellion. A total of 12 colonial soldiers were lost in the pass.

With MacKinnon unwilling to risk leaving the Amatolas via the same route, the column spent Christmas Day marching up the Quilli-Quilli Mountain where, upon nearing the summit, the soldiers were once again ambushed by some Xhosa firing on them from the bush. The colonial force took the summit and observed large numbers of Xhosa warriors some distance away on the slopes below, including Sandile, who was wearing the cloak of a recently captured British officer. The column marched along the base of more mountains, and just before making it to the relative safety of Fort White late that afternoon, they discovered the mutilated remains of a dozen British soldiers from the fort, which had been put on display by the Xhosa. While MacKinnon's troops were escaping the Amatolas, Xhosa warriors destroyed the newly constructed colonial military villages of Woburn, Auckland, and Juanasberg, and besieged Smith at Fort Cox. The rebellion quickly spread to the once procolonial Khoisan of the nearby Kat River Settlement and the Thembu of northern British Kaffraria.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Sandile; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn

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Boomplaats, Battle of (August 29, 1848)

Lieutenant-General Sir Harry G. W. Smith, the British governor and commander-in-chief of Cape Colony, annexed the territory between the Orange and Vaal Rivers on February 3, 1848, which then was named the Orange River Sovereignty, to try to ease tensions between the British and Boers on the Orange River frontier. The Orange River Boers acquiesced to this annexation until a number of Boers from the Transvaal, led by Andries Pretorius, incited them to rebel. The Boers then forced Major Henry Warden, the British resident in Bloemfontein, out of the city. They then took up defensive positions south of Bloemfontein at Boomplaats to await the expected British retaliation.

Smith led his force across the Orange River on August 26, 1848, to confront the insurgent Boers. The force consisted of about 800 British soldiers (detachments of the 45th Foot, the 91st Foot, and the Rifle Brigade) and the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), some loyal Boers, and about 250 Griqua horsemen. The approximately 750 Boers were hiding in positions in a stony, brush-covered, horseshoe-shaped ridge astride the road that Smith would have to traverse. There were higher hills behind these positions, and Pretorius put an artillery piece there to give the British the impression that this was the Boers' main defense. The Boers, if necessary, could also withdraw to these secondary positions.

As the British advance guard of CMR approached the Boer positions on August 29, 1848, it came under heavy fire from the Boer left, and then the Boer center. Smith, who had fought in the Peninsula, at Waterloo, and elsewhere, stated, "A more rapid, fierce, and well-directed fire I have never seen maintained" (Berkeley, 1899, p. 3). Smith reacted quickly, bringing his three artillery pieces into action against the Boers while withdrawing his wagons to the rear to be laagered. The CMR regrouped, and the 45th Foot and Rifle Brigade, covered by artillery, attacked to outflank the Boer left.

At about the same time, Boers to the left of the British rode out to capture the British wagons, but they were repulsed by the CMR and heavy British artillery fire. The British infantry on the right advanced so rapidly that the Boers were unable to regain their horses, so they ran to the center of their position. All the Boers tried to withdraw and consolidate in their secondary positions. Withering British artillery fire and assaulting infantry dispersed the Boers, some of whom tried to make a brief last stand in a saddle between two hills before retreating over the plain beyond. The battle ended the Boer uprising.

The Battle of Boomplaats was over in about an hour. Smith's decisive leadership and adroit coordination of his disciplined infantry and well-trained artillery contributed to the British victory. Casualty figures differ, with the British probably losing 16 killed and 40 wounded, with the Boers sustaining 49 killed. Smith considered the Battle of Boomplaats "one of the most severe skirmishes I believe I ever witnessed" (Berkeley, 1899, p. 4).

The British had earlier defeated the Boers in an engagement at Zwartkopjes in 1845, and the relative ease in which the British won the Battle of Bloomplaats reinforced British contempt for the Boers' fighting abilities. However, British lack of interest in the Southern African interior at that time led to the conventions policy of the 1850s, in which London recognized the autonomy of the Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State.

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See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Cape Mounted Rifles; Pretorius, Andries; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn

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Borgnis-Desbordes, Gustave (1839–1900)

Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes was born on October 22, 1839 in Provins, France; his father was a military engineer. In October 1859, he graduated from the elite Ecole Polytechnique near Paris, continued to the Army Artillery School at Metz, and then was posted to a marine unit at Toulon Naval Base, where he became a captain. He fought in French colonial campaigns in Cochinchine, in the southern part of present-day Vietnam, from February 1868 to March 1871.

After the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), Borgnis-Desbordes became a general's adjutant in Paris, and in 1875, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. In 1876, he was posted to Senegal, and in July 1878, in direct violation of orders from civilian authorities in France, he led the conquest of the Kaarta state on the northern side of the Senegal River, which he claimed had been infiltrated by British agents. From 1880 to 1883, Borgnis-Desbordes served as commander of the Military Territory of Upper Senegal, which later, in 1890, was renamed French Soudan.

Commanding African colonial troops of the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, Borgnis-Desbordes initiated campaigns against the Tukolor Empire that involved bombing their forts into submission. To facilitate the construction of a railway from coastal Dakar inland to the Niger River, he established French forts at Kita, in what is now southern Mali, in February 1881, and at Bamako in February 1883. Samori Toure's failed attack on the French at Bamako in April 1883 gave Borgnis-Desbordes the opportunity to push French claims south of the Niger by imposing a protectorate on Beledougou. While his early operations against the Tukolors were done in opposition to directives from France, the successful capture of Bamako make Borgnis-Desbordes a hero at home and an acknowledged expert on the Niger River area.

In 1883, Borgnis-Desbordes was promoted to colonel and returned to Paris as head of the Upper Senegal and Niger division of the colonial ministry. The next year, he joined the Tonkin Expeditionary Corps in what is now northern Vietnam, where he participated in the Sino-French War (1884–1885). Staying in Vietnam, Borgnis-Desbordes was promoted to brigadier general in 1886, became commander of French troops in Indochina in 1889, and was elevated to the rank of divisional general the following year. On July 18, 1900, he died in Hanoi. He was an ardent supporter and hero of French colonialism, and in his honor, several roads in France and another in Dakar were named after him.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Samori Toure; *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Botha, Louis (1862–1919)

A South African soldier and statesman, Louis Botha was born on a farm near the town of Greytown, in what was then the British colony of Natal, on September 27, 1862. In 1869, the Botha family moved to the Boer republic of the Orange Free State, where they farmed near the town of Vrede. Botha's school education, which he received in various farm schools, was limited to just over two years.

In May–June 1884, he took up arms for the first time when he joined a Boer commando unit that assisted in restoring Dinuzulu as king of the Zulus, and subsequently defeated Zibhebhu, who had revolted against Dinuzulu, at the Battle of Tshaneni on June 5, 1884. Dinuzulu rewarded the Boers who had assisted him with a piece of land henceforth known as the independent Nieuwe Republiek (New Republic). Botha was asked to survey the main town, Vryheid (freedom), and soon settled nearby on his own farm, Waterval. That same year, he married Annie Frances Bland Emmett (1864–1937), an English lady of Irish descent. They had three sons and two daughters.

In due course, Botha became a prosperous farmer and businessman. He was elected as a field-cornet in the Boer citizen army, a position that he retained when, in 1888, the New Republic was incorporated into the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR; i.e., South African Republic, as the Transvaal was then known). Botha entered politics when he was elected to the ZAR Volksraad (parliament). Although he favored concessions to the *uitlanders* (foreigners who had settled in the ZAR), Botha strongly opposed British expansionism in southern Africa.

When the Second Anglo-Boer War broke out on October 11, 1899, Botha joined the Vryheid commando as an ordinary burgher and deployed near the Natal border. On October 20, 1899, he saw action at Talana. When Lucas Meyer, who commanded the Boers in this sector, became ill, Botha became acting general in his place. He acquitted himself very well in the Modder Spruit area during the Battle of Ladysmith (October 30, 1899), and was consequently appointed as a general in a permanent capacity. On November 14, having convinced Piet Joubert, the commandant-general of the ZAR forces, to order a reconnaissance in force toward the coast, and to appoint him to lead it, he crossed the Tugela River. The next day, his force captured an armored train near Chieveley. Among the prisoners taken was Winston Churchill, then war correspondent for the *Morning Post*. Together with Piet Joubert, Botha continued the invasion of Natal. He wanted to invade as far as possible, but the hesitant and ill Joubert convinced the Boer war council that they should fall back to a position north of the Tugela River. When Joubert left the Natal front on November 30, 1899, Botha became the commander of all Boer forces on the Tugela front, where he would soon face the enlarged British force commanded by General Sir Redvers Buller, the commander-in-chief of all the British troops in South Africa.

Against Buller's approximately 20,000 men, Botha had only some 3,000 burghers, stretched out along an 11-kilometer front. Buller's full-scale attack on December 15, 1899, failed—he suffered approximately 1,150 casualties (and lost 10 pieces of artillery) as opposed to Botha's 38 casualties. Among the British soliders mortally wounded was Lieutenant Freddy Roberts, the only surviving son of Lord Roberts of Kandahar, who was soon to succeed Buller in overall command in South Africa.

Botha's fame as a dashing military commander was cemented at Colenso, something that would stand him in good stead for the duration of the war and ensure an important postwar political role. In the meantime, Buller moved the bulk of his force to the Upper Tugela, but his attempts to break through to the besieged Ladysmith failed again (and again, and again): at Ntabamnyma (January 20–23, 1900), Spion Kop (January 24), and Vaal Krantz (February 5–7). By skillfully deploying his small army, Botha succeeded again and again and again in beating back the numerically superior forces, but when Buller moved his reinforced army to the Lower Tugela, the exhausted Boer forces could not plug all the gaps. After relentless assaults at various points (February 17–24), Buller broke through Botha's lines at Pieter's Hill on February 27 and relieved Ladysmith the next day.

A disappointed Botha formed a new defensive line farther north, at the Biggarsberg. After Joubert died on March 27, Botha became acting commandant-general of all ZAR forces. He moved to the Orange Free State in an effort to stop Lord Roberts's advance, but the overwhelming British forces left him no option but to fall back in as orderly a way as possible, fighting several rear-guard actions. He took up defensive positons south of Johannesburg, but was—once again—forced to retreat, and Roberts occupied the City of Gold on May 31, 1900. The ZAR government decided not to defend its capital, Pretoria, and consequently Botha left on June 5, fleeing eastward not long before the first British forces arrived. At and near Diamond Hill (Donkerhoek), Botha once again took up defensive positions, but the relentless British assaults, coupled with outflanking movements and artillery bombardments (June 11–12), forced the Boer forces to fall back.

Botha now reorganized the Transvaal forces. One more time, he tried to stem the British advance eastward by taking up defensive positions across the Delagoa Bay railway line, in the vicinity of Bergendal and Dalmanutha, but after protracted fighting (August 21–27), the Boers were forced to retreat once more. Botha now also resorted to guerrilla warfare. The remaining Boer commandos mostly operated in their own districts, where they knew the terrain, with Botha and his commandos launching several attacks against British forces in the Eastern Transvaal, with varying degrees of success.

In February–March 1901, Botha was involved in peace talks with Roberts's successor as commander-in-chief in South Africa, Lord Horatio Kitchener. When these negotiations failed, Botha continued the guerrilla war. In September 1901, he launched an invasion of Natal but was repulsed. Once back in the Eastern Transvaal, Botha achieved one last success as a guerrilla commander when, on October 30, 1901, he defeated Colonel G. E. Benson's column at Bakenlaagte. But the Boer war effort was running out of steam, and on May 31, 1902, after protracted negotiations, the Boers accepted the British peace proposals.

After the cessation of hostilities, Botha played an important role in the reconstruction of the Transvaal. Soon he became the leader of the new party, Het Volk (meaning "the nation" in Afrikaans). Together with Jan Smuts, he endeavored to reconcile all white people in South Africa and to cooperate with Britain. After the Transvaal gained responsible government in 1906, Botha became its first prime minister in 1907. He propagated union in South Africa, played a crucial role at the national convention of 1908–1909, and when unification was achieved on May 31, 1910, he became South Africa's first prime minister. In 1911, he became the founding leader of the South African Party. Under his leadership, the Union Defence Forces (UDF) were established in 1912.

Louis Botha (1862–1919) was the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa serving in that capacity from 1910 until his death in 1919. In terms of his military career, he joined a Boer commando that took part in the Zulu Civil War (1883–1884), commanded Transvaal forces during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), and led South African forces that suppressed a Boer rebellion and invaded German South West Africa during the First World War. (Library of Congress)

When World War I broke out in 1914, Botha—as commandant-general of the UDF—decided that it was in South Africa's interest to actively participate, but before he could invade German South-West Africa (GSWA; today Namibia) he first had to put down a revolt by a minority of Afrikaners who did not favor war with Germany and who wanted to use the opportunity to regain republican independence. After a successful campaign against the rebels in which Botha led the main government forces in the field, he led the invasion of GSWA in February 1915. The UDF far outnumbered the German *Schutztruppe*, and in what can—in later terminology—be characterized as a Blitzkrieg, they captured Windhoek and then drove the remaining German forces northward, until they surrendered on July 9, 1915. It was the first major Allied victory of the war.

Botha triumphantly returned to the Union, and although he did not take command in the field again, he oversaw the deployment of South African forces to German East Africa, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Western Front. In 1919, Botha led the South African delegation at the Paris peace conference. By now, he had gained international prestige, but both he and his colleague, Smuts, were dismayed by the severity of the peace terms forced upon the defeated Germany.

Political dissent in his own ranks, as well as the fact that he had to take up arms to put down a revolt by fellow Afrikaners, combined with the exhaustion suffered when taking the field in GSWA, as well as the stress that accompanied South Africa's war effort in general, undermined Botha's physical and psychological health. On August 27, 1919, a broken man, he suddenly passed away after suffering a heart attack.

Louis Botha, today all but forgotten in South Africa, had a natural ability as a soldier and a keen eye for terrain; he was also an exceptional military commander and a great conciliator. Although he fared better as a conventional leader than as a guerrilla commander, he nevertheless was able to make the transition from conventional to mobile warfare, and in all circumstances was able to get the best out of his men. In both the Second Anglo-Boer War and World War I, he proved to be an excellent strategist and tactician. In the war against Britain, he rose from an ordinary burgher to his country's highest military position in less than six months. In 1911, he was made an Honorary General in the British army. Ironically, it was as a general under the Union Jack that he achieved his most lasting military success—namely, when in less than four months, he conquered the vast GSWA. Botha was able to make the transition from successful military commander to inspirational national leader, and his spontaneous friendliness won him the respect and affection of friend and foe alike. Although he was a farmer at heart, circumstances made him a famous soldier-statesman.

André Wessels

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; Churchill, Winston; Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Commando System (Boer Republics); Dalmanutha, Battle of (August 21–27, 1900); Diamond Hill (Donkerhoek), Battle of (June 11–12, 1900); Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; *Schutztruppe*; Smuts, Jan; Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900); Talana Hill, Battle of (October 20, 1899); Tshaneni, Battle of (June 5, 1884); Vaal Krantz, Battle of (February 5–7, 1900); Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Brandwater Basin, Battle of (July 1900)

During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the successful guerrilla tactics employed by the Boer commandoes since late March 1900 prompted British commander Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts to issue several proclamations urging the burghers to surrender. These, and the punitive burning of farms, had only marginal success. It was decided, therefore, to try to engage General Christiaan de Wet and the Orange Free State commandoes in a fixed battle to defeat them and bring the war to an end. Lieutenant-General Archibald Hunter was placed in charge of the operation. His five-column-strong force occupied Bethlehem in the eastern Orange Free State on July 8, 1900. The Boer commandoes immediately withdrew into the Brandwater Basin, an area surrounded by the Roodeberge to the east and the Witteberge to the west and hemmed in by the Caledon River and Basutoland. The Brandwater Basin was connected to the outside world by six passes: Kommandonek, Witnek, Slagtersnek, Noupoort, Retiefsnek, and Golden Gate.

Hunter’s strategy was simple—his force would deploy a pincer movement, push the Boers into the Brandwater Basin, and then close the pincer. By withdrawing into the basin, the commandoes, as well as the government of the Republic under President M. W. Steyn, walked into the trap. Hunter, however, had to wait two weeks for the necessary logistical support to arrive before he could start the operation. The Boer commandoes in the Brandwater Basin anticipated the nature of the battle and decided to depart the area in three groups. The first to leave was the 2,000-strong commando under de Wet on July 15, 1900. The departure of the unit reduced Steyn and his government to a government in the veld from then on. Two of the remaining three commandoes were to leave the basin in different directions while General Marthinus Prinsloo remained behind to guard the livestock. The escape of de Wet was a blow to the well-laid British plans, and the pursuing columns did little to reel him in. However, in the absence of de Wet, a leadership dispute broke out among the Boer leaders. The dispute centered on the escape routes, how to deal with carts and wagons, and who would be the leader of the commandoes in the basin.

In the interim, Hunter deployed his columns in the planned pincer movement. His deployment was aided by intelligence from African scouts, which revealed which passes the Boers would use as escape routes. Hunter was also convinced that the commandoes would not cross into Basutoland. The columns managed to almost close the pincer; only the Golden Gate pass was open, trapping 6,000 bickering Boers. The subsequent Boer resistance was haphazard, and the two-week operation left 33 British soldiers dead and 242 wounded. With the commandoes trapped and morale low, Prinsloo, who had gained the upper hand in the leadership struggle, sent a message to Hunter offering to surrender. As a result, Prinsloo and 4,314 burghers, half of the Orange Free State commandoes, surrendered. However, Commandant J. H. Olivier and 1,500 of his men escaped via the Golden Gate Pass.

The surrender was a major setback for the Boers and an important, but not decisive, victory for the British. The commandoes that were left were now leaner and possibly more determined.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); De Wet, Christiaan; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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British Anti-Slavery Squadron

The British Anti-Slavery Squadron must be situated within the complex cultural and regional framework of early colonial Sierra Leone. Also called the West Africa Squadron or the Preventative Squadron, this force was established by the British Royal Navy following the 1807 Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade. The upper Guinea coast was not the primary origin for the majority of enslaved Africans entering the trans-Atlantic slave trade, but the region was central to ongoing efforts by abolitionists to establish a colonial project. This settlement of freed slaves was intended not only to offer economic prosperity to its shareholders, but also to provide alternative, so-called legitimate commerce to local Africans. Upon the passing of the 1807 Act, the colony became the seat of a Vice Admiralty Court, which began to adjudicate slave vessels that were seized by vessels acting for the British Royal Navy.

In effect, the beginning of the squadron was a case of honorable intentions combined with English abolitionism. When local Temne youths were captured by an American slave captain, the nearby African elite petitioned the colonists at Freetown for aid. Commander Frederick Parker of the *Derwent* responded, and in November 1807, he liberated the kidnapped Temne. The captain responsible for taking the Temne youths was arrested by volunteers, stood trial, was fined, and his captives freed, and the effort to seize slave vessels began in Freetown in earnest four months later in the beginning of 1808. This placed the governor, Thomas Ludlom, in a difficult position, as he was rapidly forced to respond to an influx of liberated African slaves. Parker was the first naval officer who pursued the slave ships in the waters around Sierra Leone, and his *Derwent* brought in ships under the legal authority of the 1807 Act, which forfeited slaves to the Crown, paid a bounty to the seizing officer, and enlisted or apprenticed freed slaves. Upon the annexation of Sierra Leone by the British Crown in 1808, and the governorship passing to Thomas Perronet Thompson, the system of apprenticeship changed radically, but the ongoing effort to stem the slave trade intensified.

Between 1807 and 1862, the British Anti-Slavery Squadron seized 1,600 vessels, and liberated over 100,000 Africans from their enslavement. In 1808, only two ships belonged to the Squadron, including the *Derwent* and the *Solebay*. By 1811, four ships were counted, including the *Amelia*, *Ganymede*, *Kangaroo*, and *Trinculo*, to which the squadron added the *Protector* in 1812. The ships numbered only two again in 1818 (the *Tartar* and the *Inconstant*), and in 1819 grew once again. The Crown formalized the West Africa Squadron during this year, and it comprised six vessels, including the *Tartar*, *Pheasant*, *Myrmidon*, *Morgiana*, *Snapper,* and *Thistle*. After 1820, the Vice Admiralty Court at Freetown, which adjudicated the captured vessels' human cargo, became the Court of Mixed Commission, and after that point, the squadron's numbers rose and fell, never to less than 5 (1822), but never exceeding 30 (1847).

Seized ships could become vessels of the squadron in turn, such as the ex-slaver *HMS Black Joke* (formerly *Henriquetta*), which between 1828 and 1832 served British abolitionist interests by facilitating the capture of a multitude of its former fellow slave ships. Although she was only lightly armed, she was quickly known as a scourge of slavers, defeating better-armed and considerably larger vessels at sea due to her speed. In one year alone, the *Black Joke* reportedly ran down 22 ships. In 1832, it was condemned by admiralty surveyors, with rotted out timbers, and was burned in that year.

The ships that the Squadron hunted down carried tremendous numbers of enslaved Africans, often in unimaginable conditions. Capturing these vessels cost lives and damaged the ships involved, and adjudication of the prizes thus seized took time. Sometimes months passed with captive ships in Freetown Harbour, their slaves still housed aboard while they were gradually moved through the court system. The *Almirante*, which the HMS *Black Joke* notably took in 1829, was a 14-gun brig flying the Spanish flag. Having purchased its slaves in Lagos, the ship held 466 slaves, 50 of whom had died by the time of its capture.

The actions of the squadron were carried not only against other ships at sea, but also against coastal *barracoons*, or slave pens. In 1840, the squadron destroyed the Gallinhas *barracoons* and bombarded Lagos in 1851. By the second half of the 19th century, its patrols had extended to the eastern coast of Africa. Stretched due to the sheer amount of territory it was forced to cover, the squadron was often evaded by Portuguese and Spanish traders, and only upon Brazil's legislation against slavery in 1890 did the slave trade finally cease.

Katrina Keefer

See also: African Squadron (U.S. Navy); West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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British South Africa Company

The British South Africa Company (BSAC) served as one of Great Britain's most effective instruments of colonization in southern and central Africa. Formed in 1890 under the direction of British mining magnate Cecil Rhodes, the company brought vast territories into the British Empire and made Rhodes one of the wealthiest, most powerful men of the 19th century.

With the discovery of immense gold deposits in south-central Africa in the later part of the century, European interest in the region increased dramatically. Dutch farmers called Boers settled in these lands during the mid-nineteenth century, but the British colonial presence and settlement in the area also had grown steadily. In 1884, a third competitor joined the fray when Germany declared as its colony a region in South West Africa (today's Namibia). Britain responded by annexing the Bechuanaland Protectorate (present-day Botswana).

In the hopes of finding more riches, Rhodes intended to create a private mining company, the BSAC, with the help of several investors. He aimed to conquer Matabeleland and Mashonaland (present-day Zimbabwe), since the dominant African kingdom of the Zimbabwe plateau, the Ndebele, opposed the company's encroachment. In 1888, however, one of Rhodes's agents misled the Ndebele king, Lobengula, into signing a deal that the agent claimed would give land rights to a few prospectors. Instead, the agent obtained from Lobengula leave for the BSAC men to take "whatever action they consider necessary" in the adjacent area of Mashonaland. This agreement is known as the Rudd Concession. The British government approved Rhodes's bid for control and in 1889, chartered the company to administer the Mashonaland for an initial period of 25 years.

The BSAC immediately set out to expand the boundaries of its mandated territory. The company's charter gave it power to make treaties, establish a police force, and establish banking institutions. The armed bands that orchestrated land expeditions invariably met opposition from indigenous African groups, whom Rhodes went to great lengths to defeat. When Harry Johnston became the administrator of British

During the 1890s the chartered British South Africa Company (BSAC) conquered what became Southern Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia). Doctor Leander Starr Jameson (left) and Cecil John Rhodes (center) were leading figures in the BSAC. (North Wind Picture Archives/Alamy Stock Photo)

Nyasaland (present-day Malawi) in 1889, Rhodes paid him 10,000 pounds in a sort of "pacification subsidy" to subjugate the Bemba and Ngoni peoples who opposed BSAC administration in North-Eastern Rhodesia territory (present-day Zambia). It was not until 1895 that the company officially used the name *Rhodesia* for the territories, and not until 1898 did the British government recognize the name.

African groups continued to resist the incursions of the company. In 1893, the BSAC, frustrated by the lack of hoped-for gold in Mashonaland, invaded and conquered the neighboring Ndebele kingdom in Matabeleland, and Lobengula died while retreating north. During 1896–1897, sections of the Ndebele and Shona, frustrated by land alienation and taxation, rebelled against BSAC rule but were suppressed by colonial firepower. Matabeleland and Mashonaland would become the colony of Southern Rhodesia.

The BSAC also attempted to wrest lands from the Boers of the Transvaal. In 1895, under the direction of Rhodes, Dr. Leander Jameson and a band of BSAC armed men attempted to incite white foreigners called *uitlanders,* who were working in the gold mines around Johannesburg, to rebel against the Boer government. The failed plan, known as the Jameson Raid, exacerbated anti-British feeling among the Boers and eventually led to the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Moreover, after investigations revealed that Rhodes was behind the plot, he was forced to resign in 1896 from the position of prime minister of the Cape Colony, a post he had held since 1890.

The company lost a certain degree of credibility after this episode. Rhodes died in 1902, but the BSAC continued to administer the colonies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia. In 1915, the Crown extended the company's charter for another 10 years. The company's rule of Southern Rhodesia ended in 1923, when the British colonial administration turned governance over to the local white settlers.

In 1924, the British colonial office took over from the company the administration of Northern Rhodesia. The BSAC retained such mercantile rights as permission to continue mining and the control of the railroad. In the period between the two world wars, the company profited immensely from the copper mined in Northern Rhodesia. In 1964, the company's royalties from Rhodesian copper amounted to 70 million pounds. When Zambia received its independence in 1964, the company was forced to pay 4 million pounds to the local government and received assistance from the British government to do so. That same year, the BSAC merged with two other companies to form Charter Consolidated, Ltd.

Shobana Shankar

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Anglo-Ngoni War (1896–1900); Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Jameson, Leander Starr; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Lobengula; Makhado; Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Rhodes, Cecil John

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Bromhead, Gonville (1845–1892)

Major Gonville Bromhead served as a lieutenant in the 24th Regiment during the 1879 Anglo-Zulu War. During the Zulu onslaught on Rorke's Drift, January 22–23, 1879, he served as second in command of the post and later received the Victoria Cross for his intrepid leadership during its defense.

Bromhead was born into a well-known British military family in Versailles, France, on August 29, 1845. He purchased an ensign's commission in April 1867 and was promoted to lieutenant in October 1871. He became commander of B Company, 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment. Bromhead was almost entirely deaf, and his superiors, generally taking pity on him, gave his company less demanding tasks, such as guarding supply points.

The senior officer at Rorke's Drift was Lieutenant John R. M. Chard. Bromhead's B Company was on detached duty guarding the station, which served as a hospital and supply point for one of the columns invading Zululand. He served as second in command to Chard and commanded his 81 B Company soldiers. Bromhead helped plan and prepare the hasty defenses, and throughout the numerous overnight Zulu attacks, he helped Chard command the operation and frequently filled gaps in the firing line himself.

Bromhead, along with Chard and nine other Rorke's Drift defenders, were awarded the Victoria Cross. He was also awarded a brevet majority. He seemed to have conveniently overcome his deafness through his gallant actions at Rorke's Drift and subsequent fame, and he was allowed to soldier on. Bromhead was not promoted again; he died of typhoid fever at Allahabad, India, on February 9, 1892.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Chard, John; Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879)

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Bronkhorstspruit, Battle of (December 20, 1880)

On December 16, 1880, the insurgent Boers proclaimed the Transvaal a republic, igniting the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). They immediately invested Potchefstroom and rode on to besiege a number of isolated British garrisons.

The first action of the war took place on December 20, 1880, when Boers intercepted a 34-wagon column of the 94th Foot (Connaught Rangers), commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Philip Anstruther, at Bronkhorstspruit, 60 kilometers east of Pretoria. This British force consisted of the regimental headquarters and A and F Companies, with 6 officers and 230 other ranks; the Commissariat and Transport Company, with 1 officer, 1 warrant officer, and 5 other ranks; and the medical section, with 1 officer, 3 other ranks, and 3 women and 3 children (the wives and children of soldiers); the total was 8 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 238 other ranks (excluding the wives and children).

Around midday on December 20, Anstruther was riding behind his scouts but ahead of the regimental band (playing "Kiss Me, Mother, Kiss Your Darling") and the column main body. A party of about 150 Boers, commanded by Francois Joubert, was sighted to the column's left. This should not have surprised Anstruther since he had been warned on December 17, 1880, that fighting could break out at any moment and he could be ambushed on the road. Anstruther galloped back to the column to give the order to halt, when a Boer messenger, under a flag of truce, handed a message to him. The message requested Anstruther to halt the column and return to Lydenburg, and two minutes were reportedly allowed for an answer. Anstruther purportedly replied, "I have my order to proceed with all possible dispatch to Pretoria, and to Pretoria I am going, but tell the Commandant I have no wish to meet him in a hostile spirit" (Duxbury, 1980a, p. 8).

After the Boer messenger relayed Anstruther's response to Joubert, the Boers closed in on the British column as the soldiers extended in skirmishing order and distributed ammunition. The Boers opened up a murderous fire on the British, hitting all the officers and dominating the battlefield. After about 15 minutes of fighting, the mortally wounded Anstruther, shot five times in the legs, ordered his bugler to sound the cease-fire and surrendered his force.

In this short engagement, about 57 British soldiers were killed and more than 80 wounded out of a total force of 247, with the Boers seeing 2 men killed and 5 wounded. The Boer marksmanship was especially devastating, with each of the wounded British soldiers receiving an average of five wounds. The Boers also treated the British kindly, treating the wounded and paroling prisoners. The British decried this skirmish as a "massacre," although before he died, Anstruther instructed a Boer to go tell his commander that "all he did against me was honest" (Ransford, 1967, p. 28). The Battle of Bronkhorstspruit was the first devastating and humiliating British defeat in the First Anglo-Boer War.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Boers

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Buganda, Civil War and British Intervention. *See* "East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905)"

Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Thomas-Robert (1784–1849)

Thomas-Robert Bugeaud was born on October 15, 1784, into a noble family in Limoges, France. The youngest of 13 children, he ran away from home and for some years worked as an agricultural laborer. He enlisted as a private in the light infantry of the Imperial Guard during the Napoleonic Wars and fought in the Battle of Austerlitz on December 2, 1805. Commissioned the next year, he took part in the Battle of Jena (October 14, 1806) and the Battle of Eylau (February 8, 1807). Sent to Spain, he was in Madrid during the uprising of December 2, 1808. He won promotion to the rank of captain during the Second Siege of Saragossa (December 20, 1808–February 20, 1809). In the course of subsequent fighting in the Peninsular Campaign, he was promoted to major and took command of a regiment. With the first restoration of Louis XVIII, Bugeaud sided with the Bourbons and became a colonel, but he rallied to Napoleon during the Hundred Days and saw service in the Alps region.

With the overthrow of Napoleon and the second restoration, Bugeaud was dismissed from the army. He settled in the Périgueux region and occupied himself with agricultural pursuits. With the July Revolution in 1830, he returned to military service. An unflagging supporter of the new king, Louis Philippe, Bugeaud received command of a regiment, and in 1831, he was commissioned *maréchal de camp*. Elected to the Chamber of Deputies the same year, he was an outspoken opponent of democracy and helped crush the riots in Paris in 1834.

Bugeaud had opposed the French expedition to Algiers in 1830. Initially sent to Algeria in a subordinate capacity, he ultimately played the key role in the French pacification of that vast territory. After a highly successful six-week campaign, which included the defeat of Algerian forces under Abd al-Qadir at Sikkah on July 6, 1836, Bugeaud returned to France a lieutenant-general. The next year, he signed the generous Armistice of Tafna on June 1, 1837, with Algerian nationalist leader al-Qadir. Necessary because of the political and military situation, it nonetheless led to much criticism of Bugeaud in France.

On December 19, 1840, Bugeaud returned to Algeria as its first governor-general. The next year, he instituted his system of light, highly mobile flying columns, which proved highly effective against Abd al-Qadir's forces. Bugeaud also employed local troops. Well respected by his men, he was known as "Père Bugeaud" (Father Bugeaud). In 1842, he undertook the construction of a network of roads to help secure the pacification of the country. In 1843, he was made marshal of France. His great victory over Abd al-Qadir's allied Moroccan forces in the Battle of the Isly River on August 14, 1844, led to his being made a duke.

In 1845, following the French defeat at Sidi Brahim on September 22–25, Bugeaud again took the field. He was almost constantly campaigning until his final departure from Algeria in July 1846, which occurred over differences with the French government's refusal to adopt his program of military colonization. During Bugeaud's years in Algeria, the number of French settlers increased from 17,000 to 100,000.

During the Revolution of 1848, Bugeaud took command of the army but was unable to prevent the overthrow of Louis Philippe. Approached about being a candidate for the presidency to oppose Louis Napoleon, he refused. Following his service as commander of the Army of the Alps, established during 1848–1849 in consequence of events in Italy, he retired and died in Paris of cholera on June 10, 1849. One of France's greatest colonial soldiers and administrators, Bugeaud was a role model for Joseph Galliéni and Hubert Lyautey. Although conservative in his political views, Bugeaud had considerable sympathy for the Algerian peasants and sought to protect them from the excesses of French colonial administration.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Abd al-Qadir; Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Galliéni, Joseph; Lyautey, Hubert; Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

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Buller, Redvers Henry (1839–1908)

Redvers Buller (1839–1908) was one of the most prominent British Army officers of the Victorian era. He took part in the Anglo-Asante War of 1873–1874, the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878, the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, British operations in Sudan in 1884, and commanded British forces during the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. (Library of Congress)

One of the most prominent of Great Britain's officers in the late Victorian age, Redvers Buller reflected the strengths and weaknesses of many of his fellow soldiers. Physically strong and undoubtedly courageous, he accumulated a great deal of experience fighting a variety of peoples in the wars that expanded the British Empire. This experience did not prepare him for high command during the Second Anglo-Boer War, however, when his forces ran up against a well-armed foe. Buller's concern with the welfare of his men, his inexperience in directing large numbers of troops, and his ignorance of modern tactics led him to defeat after defeat in South Africa. His failures prolonged the Second Anglo-Boer

War and lowered the world's esteem of British military might.

Born on December 7, 1839, in Devon, England, Sir Redvers Henry Buller was the son of James Buller, a country gentleman and member of the British Parliament, and Charlotte Howard-Molyneux-Howard, niece of the 12th Duke of Norfolk. Redvers was educated at the prestigious preparatory school Eton, where he did not make much of an impression. After leaving school in 1858, he obtained a commission as an ensign, joining a battalion in India.

In 1860, when the British government sought to enforce its trade rights with China under the Treaty of Tientsin, Buller's unit took part in the occupation of Peking. Two years later, he obtained a promotion to lieutenant and was transferred to a battalion stationed in Quebec. He spent eight years in Canada, with only one brief visit to Britain. In 1870, he helped put down Louis Riel's independent Meti republic (in present-day Manitoba) during Sir Garnet Wolseley's Red River campaign. Buller's toughness impressed Wolseley, and the two formed a friendship that proved highly beneficial to Buller's career prospects.

After returning to Britain, Buller entered the Staff College at Camberley in 1871. Only two years later, he joined Wolseley's Asante expedition as its intelligence officer. After a short campaign, the British succeeded in defeating the forces of Kofi Kakari, asantehene (ruler) of the Asante Empire, at the Battle of Amoafo. Shortly thereafter, British forces captured Kofi's capital at Kumasi. Although the British accomplished these aims at little cost, Buller was lightly wounded and returned to Britain in 1874.

Serving in the adjutant general's department from 1874 to 1878, Buller went on to South Africa, where he was the commander of a light horse corps that fought in the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War (1877–1878). With the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879, Buller's unit formed part of Sir Henry Evelyn Wood's column. The war initially went badly for the British, and a large group of Zulus attacked Buller's troops near Khambula in March 1879. Buller suffered heavy losses, but he behaved in exemplary fashion, rescuing several of his troops from certain death. For his bravery, he was awarded the Victoria Cross. In July, Buller was present at the Battle of Ulundi, where the British finally destroyed the Zulu force. Over the next couple of years, Buller shuttled back and forth between Britain and South Africa.

In 1882, the British government sent an expedition to Egypt under Wolseley to put down the nationalist Urabi Rebellion and keep the country within the British sphere of influence. Buller became chief of the expedition's intelligence staff and took part in the British victory over mutinous Egyptian troops at Tel el-Kebir. After a brief sojourn in Britain, Buller returned to Egypt in 1884 to fight the Mahdists under Osman Digna. At El Teb and Tamai, he successfully halted the Mahdists' advance into southern Egypt. However, at Khartoum, in the Sudan, a Mahdist army had trapped a small Anglo-Egyptian force under General Charles George Gordon. A relief force under Wolseley, who had chosen Buller as his chief of staff, methodically pushed down the Nile to rescue Gordon. Buller took command of a desert column that sought to outflank Mahdist forces. Although he was forced to retreat by superior numbers, he carried out this maneuver with much skill, saving the bulk of his force.

Returning to Britain, Buller was sent to Ireland in 1886 to help preserve public order. After spending about a year in Ireland, he became quartermaster general, and in 1890, he became adjutant general. During his 10 years overseeing army administration, Buller concerned himself with improving soldiers' conditions, along with the state of the army's transport and supply. Promoted to lieutenant-general in 1891, he became a full general in 1896.

When the Second Anglo-Boer War broke out in October 1899, Buller was selected as overall commander of the British forces that would invade both the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State. Originally hoping to use Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, and East London as jumping-off points for an advance on Bloemfontein in the Orange Free State, Buller found his plans derailed by a Boer invasion of Natal and the Cape Colony itself. Boer troops succeeded in trapping British forces in Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking. British public opinion made Buller determined to lift those sieges before proceeding with his invasion. Those attempts ground to a bloody halt after the Boers defeated the British at Stormberg, Magersfontein, and the Battle of Colenso in December 1899, with Buller himself directing the British force at Colenso. In all three battles, collectively known as "Black Week," the British displayed a conspicuous lack of imagination, employing parade-ground tactics to assault the well-positioned and well-entrenched Boers. Buller seemed to feel the weight of responsibility unduly, and his operations were characterized by hesitation. These defeats shocked the British public, and in January 1900, Frederick Sleigh Roberts arrived in South Africa to assume overall command of British forces. Buller became exclusively responsible for operations in Natal.

Buller's attempt to swing around the Boer position at Ladysmith culminated in another defeat at Spion Kop on January 24, 1900. A third attempt to relieve Ladysmith failed again at Vaal Krantz on February 5, 1900. Eventually, after British pressure elsewhere forced the Boers to withdraw some of their forces from Ladysmith, Buller succeeded in fighting his way into town, relieving it on February 28. In May, he captured Dundee from the Boers and headed northward. He eventually reached Volksrust on June 11, thus entering the Transvaal. In cooperation with the British force from the Cape that had just captured Pretoria, Buller headed northward. In late August, he and Roberts defeated the Boers at Bergendal. With this battle came the end of conventional Boer resistance. Two more years of guerrilla warfare were still to come, however.

After some mop-up operations around Lydenburg, Buller's army was broken up into smaller units for use against the Boer commandos. Buller himself returned to Britain in November 1900. He obtained command of a corps at Aldershot in 1901. Because of Buller's performance in South Africa, the press criticized the appointment. Buller sought to defend himself at a public luncheon with what many considered an infelicitous speech. In October 1901, he was deprived of his position and never saw active duty again. After his long service abroad, Buller returned to Devon, where he lived out his life as a prominent country gentleman. His health began to fail, however, and he died at the family home near Crediton on June 2, 1908.

Hubert Dubrulle

See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Gordon, Charles; Gordon Relief Expedition; Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Kofi Karkari; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Mahdi; Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Osman Digna; Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900); Stormberg, Battle of (December 10, 1899); Tamai, Battle of (March 11, 1884); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Vaal Krantz, Battle of (February 5–7, 1900); Wolseley, Field Marshal Garnet J.; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring); Wood, Evelyn

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Burnham, Frederick Russell (1861–1947)

Frederick Russell Burnham was born in 1861 to a missionary family on a Lakota Sioux reservation in Minnesota. In the 1880s, as a young man, he lived in Arizona, where he scouted for the U.S. army in its last wars against the Apache and he became involved in the Pleasant Valley War, which was a violent feud between two families over grazing land. He eventually settled in California.

Disappointed that frontier life seemed to be coming to an end in the American West, Burnham took his wife and young son to Durban, Natal, by ship in 1893 and then traveled 1,600 kilometers north by wagon to join the British South Africa Company (BSAC) of Cecil Rhodes, which had begun the colonization of Mashonaland in what would soon become the colony of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

Burnham's arrival in Mashonaland corresponded with the BSAC invasion of the Ndebele kingdom, and he soon joined BSAC forces as a scout. He was among one of the few survivors of the Wilson Patrol, which, during its pursuit of Ndebele ruler Lobengula, was surrounded and annihilated by Ndebele warriors. Like others who participated in the successful invasion, Burnham was granted a large farm in what became known as Matabeleland. In 1895, Burnham participated in the BSAC exploration and colonization of what became Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia).

During the Ndebele rebellion of 1896, Burnham helped organize the defenses of the besieged colonial settlement of Bulawayo and led patrols into the surrounding countryside. With the arrival of colonial reinforcements, the rebels retreated to the rocky Matopos Hills, where they fought a hit-and-run war against colonial patrols sent against them, including some led by Burnham. It was here that Burnham shot and killed the "Mlimo," who was believed to be an Ndebele religious leader behind the rebellion, though this claim is contested by modern historians. During the Ndebele rebellion, Burnham met British officer Robert Baden-Powell and taught him aspects of field craft and tracking that Baden-Powell would later incorporate into his Boy Scout movement.

After this war, Burnham returned to California and then went to Alaska and the Yukon as part of the Klondike Gold Rush. In 1900, Burnham returned to South Africa at the invitation of British commander General Frederick Sleigh Roberts, who appointed him Chief of Scouts at the rank of captain for British forces fighting the Boers. During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Burnham worked behind the lines collecting intelligence, was twice captured and escaped, and was seriously injured when his horse was shot while he was riding it.

Promoted to major, the wounded Burnham was sent to Britain, where he was celebrated as a national hero despite his American citizenship. In 1901, Burnham was involved in a commercial expedition looking for minerals in the Gold Coast (now Ghana) and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), and from 1902 to 1904, he did the same thing in Kenya. Subsequently, he was involved in guarding American mining operations in Mexico, raising an abortive contingent of American frontiersmen for service in World War I, drilling oil in California and organizing the early American conservationist movement. He died in 1947 in Santa Barbara, California.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War, First (1893); Baden-Powell, Robert; British South Africa Company; Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Rhodes, Cecil John; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Selous, Frederick Courtney

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Burnshill, Battle of (April 16–17, 1846)

In 1844, Governor Peregrine Maitland canceled the treaties that had regulated relations between the British-ruled Cape Colony and neighboring Xhosa groups. In March 1846, Maitland created an excuse for war by demanding that Rharhabe Xhosa leader Sandile surrender a Xhosa fugitive who had stolen an axe from a shop in the frontier colonial town of Fort Beaufort.

On April 11, 1846, three colonial columns, commanded by Colonel Henry Somerset and supported by a 5-kilometer supply train of 125 wagons, crossed the colonial border of the Fish and Keiskamma rivers. Four days later, having encountered no resistance, the columns converged on Sandile's capital, near Burnshill Mission in the Amatola foothills. On April 16, based on reports from his scouts, Somerset led 500 men into the Amatola Valley, where they began to exchange musket fire with Xhosa warriors hiding in the bush.

The supply train was left at Burnshill with some guards, but a Xhosa raiding party managed to get close enough in the surrounding bush to snatch some oxen. On orders from camp commander Major John Gibson of the 7th Dragoon Guards, Waterloo veteran Captain R. Bambrick led a dragoon troop and some Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) in pursuit of the raiders. They were ambushed, and Bambrick was shot dead. Subsequently, as darkness fell, a large body of Xhosa emerged from the bush and attacked the camp but were driven off after a short, intense engagement. Somerset then sent a message to Gibson instructing him to bring the vulnerable wagon train to his position.

The next morning, April 17, Gibson assembled the wagon train and proceeded down a track to try to join the force in the Amatola Valley. Three miles from Burnshill, in a defile leading to a crossing point on the Keiskamma River, the middle of Gibson's wagon train was ambushed by many Xhosa warriors, who jumped out from the surrounding bush and cut the oxen from their wagons to stop the train's movement. Gibson abandoned 65 wagons and focused on getting the ammunition wagons, positioned at the end of the column, back to Burnshill. While the Xhosa had mostly captured the baggage of the Seventh Dragoons, including regimental silver (which was never recovered), this was an obvious setback for the colonial invasion and a boost to Xhosa morale.

The leading wagons made it to Somerset's position, and eventually Gibson forced his way through with the ammunition carriers. Somerset called off his invasion of the Amatolas, and the next morning, as he was about to lead his troops out of the mountains, two large groups of Xhosa attacked his camp from all directions. With sustained musket volleys and some charges from the dragoons, Somerset's force fought its way across the Tyume River, where they lost another wagon and arrived at the colonial post of Block Drift. Despite this early victory in what some call the "War of the Axe," the British adopted scorched-earth tactics that eventually led to the surrender of the Rharhabe Xhosa and other allied Xhosa groups, who became subjects of a new colonial territory called British Kaffraria.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Sandile; Somerset, Sir Henry

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Burundi, German Occupation of. *See* "East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908)"

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Canadians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)

In 1899, Canada was a self-governing dominion of the British Empire. In the months leading up to the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, English-language newspapers in Canada published pro-British and anti-Boer articles that urged the government to dispatch troops to South Africa. French Canadians largely opposed Canadian involvement in the war with Quebec nationalist leader Henri Bourassa, maintaining that Canada should fight only for its own national interests, not that of Britain. The English-speaking labor and farmers' movements also opposed sending Canadian troops. Although Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier was concerned about war opposition in Quebec, he submitted to pressure from the English-speaking majority, who favored the British Empire, and sent troops to South Africa when war broke out. The Canadian federal government would pay for their recruitment and transportation, but once in South Africa, they would be paid for and supported by Britain.

At the end of November 1899, the first Canadian contingent arrived in South Africa. It consisted of the Second Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment of Infantry (2 RCRI) under Lieutenant-Colonel William Dillon Otter, who became the first Canadian-born head of the Canadian military in 1908. The 2 RCRI consisted of eight companies of 125 men each. The companies were recruited from specific regions—three from Ontario, two from Quebec, two from the Maritime Provinces in the east, and one from Western Canada. Although its men had minimal training, 2 RCRI fought at the Battle of Paardeberg in February 1900, which was the first major Boer defeat of the conflict. In this, its first engagement, the unit suffered 34 killed and 100 wounded.

The second Canadian contingent arrived in South Africa between January and March 1900 and mostly comprised the mounted troops of the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) and First Canadian Mounted Rifles, meant to counter the highly mobile Boer commandos, who were now pursuing a guerrilla struggle. The contingent also included three batteries of Royal Canadian Field Artillery (RCFA), with 12-pounder guns. One of the RCFA batteries was involved in the relief of Mafeking in May 1900, and elements of the second contingent participated in Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts's British advance on Pretoria, capital of the Boer Transvaal Republic, in May and June of the same year. In early November 1900, at Leliefontein Farm near the town of Belfast in the eastern Transvaal, Canadian dragoons and artillerymen conducted a rearguard action in which they desperately and successfully prevented the capture of one of their

12-pounders. For this action, Lieutenants R. E. W. Turner and H. Z. C. Cockburn and Sergeant E. J. G. Holland, all of the RCD, were awarded the Victoria Cross; this was the second-largest number of Canadian soldiers to gain this award for a single engagement. Later, as a general, Turner commanded a Canadian division in World War I. More typical of the experience of Canadian troops in South Africa, however, were long patrols in search of elusive Boer commandos and the removal of Boer civilians to concentration camps.

Serving in South Africa from April 1900 to January 1901, Lord Strathcona's Horse had been formed and funded by the wealthy Donald A. Smith, Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, who was the Canadian high commissioner in London. The unit was led by legendary frontier policeman Samuel Benfield Steele, commander of the North-West Mounted Police, and many of its troopers came from that force.

Arriving in January 1902, the last Canadian unit to fight in South Africa was the Second Canadian Mounted Rifles, which participated in the Battle of Harts River at the end of March. Four more battalions of Canadian Mounted Rifles arrived in South Africa, but too late to see any fighting. Around 1,250 Canadians, including Steele, served in the South African Constabulary under R. S. S. Baden-Powell that was formed at the end of 1900 to police the defeated Boer republics and was active in subsequent British counter-guerrilla operations. After the war ended with the Treaty of Vereeniging at the end of May 1902, the South African Constabulary enforced British rule in the former republics until 1908.

The total number of Canadian soldiers to serve in South Africa was 7,368, among whom 89 were killed in battle, 135 died of illness, and 252 were wounded. The war experience in South Africa led to improvements in the training and discipline of Canada's citizen-soldier militia and the establishment of support units of Engineers, Logistics, Ordnance, and Signals. Canada's participation in the Second Anglo-Boer War represented its first major military campaign fought in another part of the world, and it highlighted political differences between the Anglophone and Francophone communities.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Australians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Baden-Powell, Robert; Commando System (Boer Republics); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); New Zealanders in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Caneva, Carlo (1845–1922)

The senior general officer in the Italian army after some 35 years of service, Carlo Caneva was chosen to command Italian troops in the conquest of Libya in the Turco-Italian War of 1911–1912. However, having been made the scapegoat for a badly conceived government strategy for fighting the war, he was dismissed in September 1912, shortly before the conflict sputtered to an end.

Born in 1845 at Udine in the province of Friuli, north of Venice (then part of the Habsburg Empire), Caneva began his military career in the Austrian army. After graduating from the Austrian military academy at Wiener Neustadt, he fought as an artillery lieutenant at the Battle of Sadowa against the Prussians in 1866. But Austrian defeat in the 1866 war cost them their Italian holdings, and Caneva was able to shift his allegiance to the Italian army the following year. He served on the army general staff from 1875 to 1896 before being promoted to colonel and sent to East Africa, where he took part in campaigns against the Ethiopians and the Mahdists in the Sudan.

A successful defense of the Italian fortress of Kassala in northeastern Sudan against a Mahdist attack in 1897 won him a promotion to major general on his return to Italy the following year. Although he served in East Africa for only two years, critics of his later performance in Libya charged that Caneva, like so many other Italian colonial soldiers, was marked by what had become known as the "Adowa syndrome," a reference to the presumed fear of "uncivilized" foes engendered by the Italian army's catastrophic defeat by the Ethiopians in 1896.

Although General Caneva may not have been the best choice to command the Libyan invasion—he was the oldest general officer in the European armies of his day and suffered from poor health—it is unlikely that any Italian general could have done better under the circumstances. Because Italy lacked a purpose-built colonial army, like France's Armée d'Afrique, it was obliged to fight its African wars with conscripts—the only European nation to do so. Caneva's army in Libya thus never showed much enthusiasm for fighting to acquire what many soldiers likened to a "box of sand." Although the Italians showed remarkable ingenuity in military technology, initiating the use of aircraft and dirigibles for bombing, adapting radio communications for battlefield use, and fielding armored cars, their army in Libya had no reliable maps of the interior of the country. This disadvantage, plus their lack of troops with experience in waging desert warfare, virtually ensured that their army would not leave the relative security of its coastal enclaves to engage the enemy. None of this, however, was supposed to matter, according to Caneva's civilian masters, Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti and Foreign Minister Antonino di San Giuliano; they assured him that Libya would fall into Italian hands like ripe fruit. The "Young Turk" revolution in Constantinople the previous year had been a destabilizing force, he was told, and as a consequence, the small Turkish garrison in Libya, consisting of some 5,000 men, was too demoralized to fight. Further, the Arab and Berber populations of Libya would welcome his soldiers as liberators from corrupt and oppressive Ottoman rule. Both of these suppositions, however, proved disastrously false.

As it turned out, the Young Turk seizure of power in Constantinople had actually stiffened Ottoman resistance to European encroachments on the empire and the Turkish forces in Libya, under inspired commanders like Mustapha Kemal (the future Kemal Atatürk) and Enver Pasha, simply withdrew from the coast into the interior to continue the struggle. There, they were joined by large numbers of Arab and Berber fighters who, rather than welcoming the Italians, rallied to the Ottoman sultan as the defender of the Muslim faith against the Christian invaders. On October 23, 1911, less than two weeks after Caneva's army landed at Tripoli, a mixed Turkish and Arab force launched a surprise attack on Italian defenses in the oasis of Sciara Sciat on the eastern edge of the city, killing some 400 Italian soldiers. This pretty much set the pattern for the rest of the war. The Italians hunkered down in the coastal cities—Tripoli, Benghazi, Derna, and Tobruk—protected by the big guns of their fleet, and they only rarely ventured into the desert interior. The Turks and their Arab and Berber allies, meanwhile, were too weak to do more than harass the Italians in their fortified enclaves.

In the wake of the disaster at Sciara Sciat, Caneva proposed the suspension of offensive operations and focusing instead on winning the support of the Libyan population. This "hearts and minds" approach was rejected by the government in Rome, which failed to understand how a large European army could be held at bay by a handful of Turkish soldiers and a rabble of Arab irregulars. In any case, efforts to win over the local population became impossible when Giolitti convinced the king, the titular commander-in-chief of the armed forces, to issue a decree formally annexing Libya in November 1911.

Nonetheless, the lack of progress in the war was blamed on Caneva's excessive caution, and when an increase of Italian troops to some 100,000 failed to produce victories, the general was relieved of his duties on September 2, 1912. His command subsequently was divided between the commander of the Cyrenaica front, General Ottavio Briccola, and his counterpart in Tripolitania, General Ottavio Ragni.

Shortly after his return to Italy, Caneva was promoted to General of the Army, and in 1914, he retired from active service. In 1912, he was made a senator, a post he held until his death in 1922. His swan song as a soldier was an appointment to head the commission of inquiry into the catastrophic defeat of the Italian army at Caporetto in 1917. Carlo Caneva died in Rome on September 15, 1922.

Bruce Vandervort

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Libya, Italian Conquest of (1911–1912); Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896)

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Cape Mounted Rifles

Although settlers were required to participate in regular military drills and could be mobilized to defend the Cape Colony, 18th-century Dutch East India Company officers considered them poorly trained, undisciplined, and rebellious. This led to investment in fortifications and military recruitment of blacks and mixed-race people. In 1722, a militia was created consisting of free blacks, manumitted slaves, convicts, and exiles. By the 1730s, indigenous Khoisan and mixed-race men had been incorporated into settler commandos, and frontier policing was transferred to local settler war councils. In the 1770s, the formation at Stellenbosch of a nonwhite militia called the "Free Corps" signaled the beginning of racially segregated military service in the Cape Colony. Concern about the Cape coming under attack because of Dutch involvement in European conflict led to the enlistment in 1781 of 400 Khoisan and mixed-race men as the "Corps Bastaard Hottentotten," which was disbanded after 14 months when reinforcements arrived from Europe. In 1793, because France had declared war on the Netherlands, the Pandour Corps was formed from Khoisan and mixed-race servants armed by their white masters, as well as recruits from a Moravian mission.

During the first British occupation of the Cape in 1795, several hundred Khoisan and mixed-race soldiers were recruited to cultivate loyalty and discourage Boer rebellion. In 1801, the "Hottentot Corps" was expanded to over 700 men and became a regular unit of the British army based at the Cape. Under the brief period of Batavian rule (1803–1806), the unit became a light infantry battalion and was renamed the "Corps Vrijen Hottentotten." When the British returned in 1806, this unit became known as the Cape Regiment, and in 1817, it was reformed as the Cape Corps with separate infantry and cavalry sections. In turn, those sections were combined during the 1820s as the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), the only permanent military unit formed by the Dutch and British in the Cape Colony. The Cape Regiment, Cape Corps, and then the CMR fought in most of the Cape-Xhosa Wars of the 19th century (1811, 1819, 1834–1835, 1846–1847, and 1850–53) and were present at almost every major engagement. For most of this period, the CMR was commanded by Napoleonic War veteran Henry Somerset, whose father, Lord Charles Somerset, was governor of the Cape from 1814 to 1826.

In early 1851, members of the CMR, inspired by the rebellion of fellow Khoisan in the Kat River Settlement, mutinied and used their military training and firearms to assist Xhosa and Thembu rebels. This event prompted the decline of Khoisan military service in the Cape, where a settler regime was being granted increasing powers of self-government and wanted to establish its own military structures, including volunteer regiments and commandos. In 1855, the Cape formed the full-time and entirely white Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), which began to replace the CMR. In 1870, the CMR, which had always been a British imperial regiment, was disbanded.

In 1878, the FAMP was completely militarized and renamed the Cape Mounted Riflemen. As part of the Cape military force, it fought in the 1881 Gun War in Basutoland (Lesotho), the Anglo-Ndebele War of 1893, and the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902. In 1913, three years after the Union of South Africa, the Cape Mounted Riflemen were incorporated into the South African Mounted Rifles as part of the new Union Defence Force (UDF).

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795); Gun War, Lesotho (1880–1881); Gwangqa, Battle of (June 8, 1846); Holland's Shop, Battle of (December 2, 1877); Ibeka, Battle of (September 29–30, 1877); Settler Volunteer Regiments in South Africa; Somerset, Henry

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Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853)

There were a number of causes behind the Eighth Cape-Xhosa War, the major African rebellion that broke out in British Kaffraria in late December 1850. European magistrates assumed greater powers from the Xhosa chiefs, who were forbidden to fine their subjects cattle or sanction witchcraft accusations, and more European missionaries arrived to establish communities of Christian converts. The Rharhabe Xhosa lost land to white settlers in the Tyume Valley and at the base of the Amatola Mountains, where the villages of Woburn, Auckland, and Juanasberg were founded by white military veterans. These tensions led to the rise in popularity of a Xhosa prophet called Mlanjeni, who ordered the slaughter of yellowish (or dun-colored) cattle, often associated with white people, and the abandonment of contaminating witchcraft.

The emergence of the Xhosa-speaking Fingo as a new colonial ally alienated other African groups that had previously sided with the British, such as the Khoisan and mixed-race people of the Kat River Settlement, created as a buffer between settlers and Xhosa; and the Thembu of northern British Kaffraria, who had agreed to come under colonial rule in 1848. In late 1850, the Rharhabe Xhosa in the Amatolas prepared for war by gathering weapons and storing food, and in October, Governor Sir Harry Smith deposed the leader Sandile for failing to report for a meeting at King William's Town, the capital of British Kaffraria.

On Christmas Eve morning in 1850, Colonel George MacKinnon led 600 colonial soldiers from Fort Cox into the Amatolas under instructions from Smith to capture Sandile. As the British troops moved east through the narrow Booma Pass, hundreds of Rharhabe gunmen fired down on them from rocky precipices. MacKinnon led his men through the ambush and headed south out of the mountains toward Burnshill Mission and Fort White. The Rharhabe counterattacked on Christmas morning by storming out of the Amatolas to destroy Woburn, Auckland, and Juanasberg. Smith was trapped at Fort Cox, and colonial forts and settlements along the frontier were similarly besieged.

Several other developments shocked the British as well. Within a few days, the Kat River Settlement rebelled by attacking recently settled Fingo, and within a few weeks, many Khoisan Cape Mounted Riflemen deserted to the rebels. On January 6, 1851, a combined force of Kat River and Rharhabe rebels approached Fort Beaufort under cover of darkness with the intention of capturing the town and its supply of arms and ammunition. When the Khoisan attacked prematurely and were cut down by colonial firepower, the Rharhabe withdrew. In January 1851, the Thembu attacked the nearby colonial town of Whittlesea. A broad multiethnic rebellion, involving three groups that had previously been rivals (the Khoisan, Rharhabe, and Thembu) broke out in response to colonial oppression. However, several Xhosa groups, such as the Gqunukhwebe of Phato, who did not enjoy the protection of a mountainous homeland and had lost heavily in 1846–1847, sided with the British.

On the morning of January 21, 1851, Sandile led around 2,000 to 3,000 Xhosa warriors, including a large mounted detachment, in an attack on Fort Hare, which was the closest British post to the Amatolas. The assault was repelled by 100 loyal Cape Mounted Riflemen with a cannon, a few armed settlers, and some 800 armed Fingo. On January 24, 1851, a detachment of 120 Cape Mounted Riflemen and 150 Fingo were sent from King William's Town and drove off around 600 Xhosa of the chiefs Anta and Siyolo, who were threatening the town just before British reinforcements arrived. Colonial forces then regrouped and seized the initiative.

At the end of January 1851, Colonel MacKinnon took a wagon train from King William's Town, escorted by 300 British regulars, 150 Cape Mounted Riflemen, 1,500 Khoisan, and 300 Fingo irregulars, and one cannon to deliver supplies to the beleaguered Forts Cox and White. A large body of Xhosa tried to block their march across the Keiskamma River at Debe Nek by attacking the rear and left flank of the column, but they were repelled. In early February, MacKinnon sent two columns of mostly settlers and Fingo volunteers, one led by himself and the other by Lieutenant-Colonel George Napier, from King William's Town to attack the nearby Xhosa of Siyolo. While Napier's 1,100 men tried to block a possible move by Siyolo to reinforce Sandile in the Amatolas, MacKinnon's 1,150 men destroyed Siyolo's settlements and briefly engaged his withdrawing warriors. In mid-February 1851, under instructions from the governor, Colonel MacKinnon led a column of 2,750 men, consisting of five British regular companies, 100 CMR, and settler and Fingo levies, to reinforce Somerset at Fort Hare. At the same time, Governor Smith ordered another force of 300–400 Fingo from Fort Peddie to rendezvous with MacKinnon. Once the Fort Peddie Fingo levy determined that all Siyolo's men had been sent to fight against MacKinnon's column, they crossed over the Keiskamma River and raided undefended homesteads.

On February 13, a group of Siyolo's Xhosa attempted to block the passage of MacKinnon's column through Debe Nek, but artillery and a charge by the Cape Mounted Riflemen and Fingos drove them off. MacKinnon's force then joined up with Somerset at Fort Hare, and both commanders each led a column into the Amatola Mountains to destroy the fields and houses. In late April, MacKinnon once again left King William's Town with an expedition of 200 cavalry, 1,800 British infantry, and 200 Fingo that went into the Amatolas, fought off a number of ambushes, and returned a few days later with 400 cattle. MacKinnon reported that his patrol had killed 250 Xhosa, with a loss of only three British soldiers and one Fingo. Another colonial sweep of the Amatolas took place in June with similar results.

At Whittlesea, a colonial settlement in the north of British Kaffraria named after Governor Smith's birthplace, Royal Engineer Captain Richard Tylden took command of a mixed group of armed volunteers consisting of 70 settlers, 200 Xhosa Christian converts, and 800 Fingo, and the unit fortified four strong buildings. On January 25, 1851, Maphasa's Thembu raided Whittlesea and took many cattle. The next day, the Thembu, joined by some Kat River rebels, occupied the nearby Shiloh Mission. On each of the following two days, 3,000–4,000 Thembu attacked Whittlesea and were repulsed by colonial firepower. On February 1, Tylden led 350 Xhosa Christians and Fingo in an attack on Shiloh, but after six hours of hard fighting, most of the village was burned and around 1,000 Thembu and some Khoisan remained in possession of the barricaded church. Tylden withdrew to Whittlesea with 600 cattle.

On February 3, the Thembu retaliated with another ultimately unsuccessful attack on the four Whittlesea strong points. With his contingent running out of ammunition, Tylden sent a message requesting reinforcements. On February 6, another Thembu assault, which seemed likely to capture the town, was foiled by the timely arrival of mounted settler volunteers from Craddock 200 kilometers to the south. The next day, a wagon train of supplies arrived from Craddock, escorted by 180 Boers. Tylden then led another attack on Shiloh, which again failed to dislodge the rebels because the Boers withdrew to Whittlesea at the last moment. Daily skirmishes ended on February 11, when a confusing order was received from Somerset instructing Tylden to cease operations. By the time the misunderstanding was resolved and Tylden was ready to resume attacks against the Thembu, they had withdrawn north to defend their communities against a Boer commando. Raiding continued, and on July 15, 1851, a patrol of 300 Fingo left Whittlesea, attacked Thembu homesteads along the Black Kei River, and returned with 400 cattle.

In February 1851, Somerset took command of operations against the rebellious Kat River Settlement. Arrangements were made for armed settlers assembled at Post Retief and Somerset's force at Fort Hare to converge on the Kat River and take Fort Armstrong, which had been captured by the rebels. The settlers arrived first and unwisely attacked the insurgent camp on their own. From higher ground, the rebels poured musket fire down upon the settlers, who were caught in the open. Just as it looked like the settlers would have to retreat, Somerset arrived with 1,800 men, and the rebels withdrew to Fort Armstrong. Somerset's force bombarded the fort with several artillery pieces and stormed the walls with overwhelming numbers of Cape Mounted Riflemen and armed settlers. A few rebels tenaciously defended the central tower, but a field gun blew open the door and colonial volunteers streamed in to finish them off. Overall, 500 prisoners were taken, 400 of whom were women and children, and many more women and children perished in the fort. The Kat River rebellion had been crushed, and some of the survivors joined the Rharhabe in the Amatolas.

The Rharhabe leader Maqoma took a few hundred Xhosa and rebel Khoisan into the thickly forested valleys of the Waterkloof Highlands, located within the Cape Colony overlooking Fort Beaufort, from where they would raid settler farms. In trying to dislodge Maqoma's rebels from the Waterkloof, colonial forces were distracted from destroying the main Xhosa reservoir of crops and cattle in the Amatolas. In early September 1851, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Fordyce, commanding officer of the 74th Highlanders, responded to Xhosa cattle raids by taking a punitive expedition of 250 British regulars, 250 Fingo, and about 150 settler and Khoisan volunteers up to the Waterkloof. On the open summit, this force was engaged in a brief skirmish by the rebels, who then withdrew into the forested ravines.

Since his men had little food, Fordyce decided to return to Fort Beaufort and led his force down a particularly narrow forest path, on which they were ambushed by Maqoma's fighters. When Fordyce's Fingo rear guard panicked and ran down the path, causing confusion among the highlanders, the ambushers charged, killing eight soldiers and wounding another nine before running back into the forest. Fordyce led another force into the Waterkloof in mid-October 1851 that included two Fingo levies of several hundred men each. In early November, during another unsuccessful sweep of the Waterkloof, Fordyce was killed by a rebel Khoisan sniper.

In January 1852, the frustrated colonial office replaced Smith with Sir George Cathcart. In June, Cathcart planned to extricate the rebels from the Waterkloof with a large force of 1,200 British regulars and 450 Fingo. As a new strategy, his forces built a series of small fortified posts on the Waterkloof highlands to serve as patrol bases for searching the forested ravines, and to deny the rebels high ground for observation. Colonial sweeps of the Waterkloof continued, with one in September involving 3,000 British soldiers, Cape Mounted Riflemen, and Fingos.

Finding his position untenable, Maqoma began withdrawing his people to the Amatolas, and by the middle of October, Cathcart reported that the Waterkloof was secure. During the dehumanizing Waterkloof campaign, British officers collected human skulls as trophies, colonial troops shot Xhosa women and children, dead insurgents were hung from trees, the Xhosa fed a captured British soldier strips of his own flesh, and piles of bones littered the ground.

Subsequently, the British concentrated on destroying the productive capacity of Rharhabe society in the Amatolas. Throughout October and November 1852, colonial patrols burned crops and seized cattle, and many Rharhabe fled east of the Kei River. Sandile crossed the Kei in January 1853, and Maqoma, who had remained in the Amatolas with only 40 followers, joined him in mid-February, and both chiefs sent a message to colonial officials that they wished to surrender. Their people were evicted from the Amatolas, which became a crown reserve inhabited by settlers and Fingo, and they were given a stretch of open territory between those mountains and the Kei River.

During the conflict, colonial forces mounted several incursions east of the Kei River to seize cattle from the Gcaleka Xhosa of Sarhili, who had declared neutrality but was accused of harboring fugitives and robbing traders. For six weeks in December 1851 and January 1852, Somerset led a 5,000-strong force into Sarhili's territory and returned with 30,000 cattle and 7,000 so-called Fingo (who in reality were probably Gcaleka), who had decided to desert. In August 1852, Cathcart prepared for operations in the Waterkloof and Amatolas by organizing another major raid against the Gcaleka that acquired 10,000 cattle. These raids provided colonial forces with food supplies, loot to reward volunteers, and additional African labor. At the same time, the colonial scorched-earth campaign destroyed Rharhabe food sources and starved them into submission. This "War of Mlanjeni," as some call it, represented the second-longest war fought within South Africa.

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See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Maqoma; Sandile; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn; Somerset, Henry

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Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878)

The catastrophic Xhosa cattle-killing movement of 1856–1857 led to mass starvation in British Kaffraria and the neighboring areas, as well as the removal of thousands of Xhosa into the Cape Colony as labor. The Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), created in 1855, crossed east of the Kei River, the colonial boundary, and occupied an inland strip of land around the Butterworth mission, removing it from the authority of Gcaleka Xhosa ruler Sarhili. In 1865, when British Kaffraria was absorbed into the Cape Colony, armed parties of Fingo (assisted by missionaries and the FAMP) invaded this area. Gcaleka people living there were either evicted to Sarhili's remaining territory along the coast or submitted to the new Fingo leaders in this colonial protected territory known as Fingoland. Stock theft and violence between Fingo leaders and Sarhili's Gcaleka increased in the 1870s. At the same time, the Cape Colony's expansionism was renewed by the advent of diamond mining to its north and British imperial plans to confederate colonial territories in the region.

A clash between Fingo and Gcaleka in August 1877, at the homestead of Fingo leader Ngcayecibi, provided colonial officials with an excuse to demand allegedly stolen cattle from Sarhili's people, which pushed them into war. Within a few months, Rharhabe Xhosa living within the Cape Colony, such as those under Sandile and Tini Maqoma, were bullied into rebellion by settlers and colonial officials who wanted their land. In late September 1877, colonial police and armed Fingo skirmished with Gcaleka who were assembling at Sarhili's capital.

Colonial forces created a laager at Ibeka, manned by 180 FAMP and 2,000 armed Fingo, which was just five miles from Sarhili's great place and thus a major threat to the Gcaleka. On September 29 and 30, an army of 7,000–8,000 Gcaleka warriors repeatedly attacked Ibeka but were repelled by cannon, rockets, and breach-loading rifles. The Gcaleka fled toward Sarhili's great place, pursued for several kilometers by the Fingo and mounted FAMP troopers, who burned homesteads and killed stragglers. Ibeka became a staging area for colonial attacks on the Gcaleka. On October 9, several columns of FAMP troopers, settler volunteers and hundreds of Fingos converged on Sarhili's capital. After they were driven off by cannon fire and pursued by the Fingo, some Gcaleka tried to make a stand on a piece of high ground but were outflanked. The great place and many other homesteads were destroyed, and livestock was looted. In late October and early November, a colonial force of 5,100 men (mostly Fingo) organized into two divisions, advanced along the Mbashe River, and swept through the Dwesa Forest. Patrols were dispatched from the main force to harass the Gcaleka and steel livestock.

By the start of December 1877, colonial authorities believed that the Gcaleka had been evicted east of the Mbashe River, making their former land available for European settlement. It was surprising, therefore, when, on the morning of December 2, a FAMP patrol was ambushed by a large Gcaleka army near a destroyed store called "Holland's Shop," just south of Ibeka. By mid-December, forces from the Cape Colony (mostly settler volunteers) were quickly assembled at Ibeka and resumed operations against the Gcaleka that continued into January 1878.

Since the early 1850s, the Rharhabe Xhosa of Sandile was living in a small colonial reserve between their former home in the Amatola Mountains and the Kei River. News of fighting east of the Kei encouraged colonial officials to disarm the Rharhabe. In turn, Sandile led a faction into rebellion, while others remained loyal to the Cape government. Sandile's men and the Gcaleka force that had ambushed the police at Holland's Shop merged in the Tyityaba Valley just west of the Kei. While British commander General Arthur Cunynghame was rushing his forces west to deal with this new threat, the combined Xhosa army crossed east of the Kei and on January 13, 1878 attacked a small colonial outpost near the Nyumaga Stream. The old muzzle-loading muskets carried by the Xhosa could not match the fire of the newer colonial breach-loading rifles, and they fled. Fingo and mounted police from the post pursued the Xhosa until dusk, killing any that turned to make a stand.

Although colonial patrols swept the Tyityaba Valley, the Rharhabe and Gcaleka remained hidden there, although they were short on food and ammunition. While Sandile wanted to raid Fingo communities around Butterworth for supplies, Sarhili overruled him and sent the combined army to attack a nearby colonial supply base, recently established on Centane Hill near his abandoned capital. This was a surprising decision, considering the problems that previous Xhosa armies had with attacking defended colonial positions. On February 7, the earthen defenses of Centane Hill were defended by 400 settler and British infantry, some FAMP and 560 Fingo auxiliaries supported by two cannon. That morning, 1,500 Gcalaka and Rharhabe attacked the camp, but they withdrew after 20 minutes of heavy firing from the defenders and were then pursued by the Fingo and mounted police. Almost 400 Xhosa were killed, with minimal colonial losses. This crushing defeat ended Gcaleka resistance and Sarhili went into hiding east of the Mbashe River.

With the end of the campaign east of the Kei, colonial forces turned on the Xhosa rebels within the Cape Colony. In January 1878, colonial columns had swept through the Rharhabe reserve, shooting Xhosa (including loyalists), seizing cattle, and destroying homesteads. Motivated by paranoia and greed for land, colonial police surrounded the farm of Tini Maqoma, son of the famous Xhosa leader Maqoma (who had died imprisoned on Robben Island in 1873), near Fort Beaufort, and tried to arrest him. Tini Maqoma fled and was instantly cast as a rebel. With the withdrawal of the Gcaleka east of the Mbashe, Sandile and his Rharhabe rebels returned to colonial territory and took refuge in the overgrown ravines of the eastern part of the Amatola Mountains known as the Pirie Bush.

Throughout March, Lieutenant General F. A. Thesiger (soon to be Lord Chelmsford), the recently arrived British commander, led several columns in a sweep of the Pirie Bush that was meant to push the Rharhabe south into a line of fortified colonial positions. Thesiger's force quickly fell into confusion as the Xhosa drew colonial units into thick undergrowth, where they were ambushed and the colonial artillery bombarded empty parts of the forest. Hundreds of starving Xhosa women and children flocked to the colonial camps, where they were fed from military supplies.

During fighting in the Pirie Bush in March, the British first sent in Fingo levies to determine the location of the Xhosa rebels and then dispatched British soldiers to attack them. The roughly 1,000 Fingo recruited from places like Fort Peddie and Fort Beaufort were not enough to dislodge Sandile's people, so Thesiger imported another 1,000 hastily assembled Fingo reinforcements from east of the Kei. These new recruits were not eager to fight, though, as they had already seized cattle from the Gcaleka. Siyolo, another Rharhabe chief who had fought the British decades before and had been released from Robben Island, led 2,000 Xhosa north toward the Amatolas to reinforce Sandile. Attempting to prevent the amalgamation of rebel forces, Thesiger ordered an attack upon Siyolo's group at Ntaba ka Ndoda, a prominent hill, but the Transkei Fingo proved to be disappointing as fighters, and the Xhosa escaped. Thesiger sent these Fingo back home, and many of the settler volunteers left when their term of service expired.

Thesiger spent several weeks in April 1878 reassembling his forces at King William's Town. In late April, he took 4,000 men into the western Amatolas to root out Siyolo's Xhosa. Cannons were positioned on high ground, from where they fired down into the forested ravines, which were swept by large numbers of infantry. Suffering many casualties, Siyola and a few other rebel leaders fled east to join Sandile. In early May, Thesiger moved his force east to the Pirie Bush, which he surrounded with 3,000 men. Sandile was trapped. Thesiger abandoned the idea of coordinated operations and assigned separate colonial columns to specific areas where they would hunt the Xhosa and seize food and cattle. In these actions, Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers Buller proved a particularly aggressive leader. By the end of the month, the hungry and harassed Xhosa were fleeing. Siyolo, Sandile, and Dukwana, son of the Xhosa Christian prophet Ntsikana, were killed, and Tini Maqoma was captured. Sometimes called the "War of Ngcayecibi," this conflict is usually considered the last of the century's long series of Cape-Xhosa Wars.

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See also: Buller, Redvers Henry; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Centane, Battle of (February 7, 1878); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Cunynghame, Arthur Augustus Thurlow; Holland's Shop, Battle of (December 2, 1877); Ibeka, Battle of (September 29–30, 1877); Sandile

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Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847)

Although the land between the Keiskamma and Fish rivers had been conquered by the British-led Cape forces in 1835 and dubbed Queen Adelaide Province, the imperial government had ordered a retrocession to the Xhosa the next year. The subsequent treaty system, which placed border relations in the hands of colonial officials who negotiated with Xhosa chiefs, was despised by Cape settlers, who wanted more land and labor and worked to discredit the new arrangement by exaggerating Xhosa stock theft. By 1844, these complaints led to a change of policy in London, and Sir Peregrine Maitland, who had commanded a division at Waterloo, was sent to the Cape to cancel the treaties, which quickly led to renewed violence. When a Xhosa man accused of having stolen an axe from a Fort Beaufort store escaped colonial custody in March 1846, Maitland used the incident as a pretext for war.

In early April 1846, three colonial columns, commanded by Colonel Henry Somerset and supported by a supply train of 125 wagons, crossed the Fish and Keiskamma rivers and encountered no resistance as they converged on the capital of Sandile, the Rharhabe leader, near Burnshill Mission in the Amatola foothills. Leaving his wagons at Burnshill, Somerset led 500 men into the Amatola Valley, where they came under musket fire from Rharhabe lurking in the forest. That afternoon, Somerset called for the supply train, which had been harassed by Xhosa fire from the bush, to move forward to his position. As it passed through a mountain defile, the unit was ambushed by a large Rharhabe force. Abandoning 65 wagons, some of which carried muskets and ammunition, the train pulled back to Burnshill, and Somerset withdrew his entire force to Block Drift on the Tyume River.

Encouraged by Sandile's victory, most of the Xhosa leaders between the Keiskamma and Kei dispatched their men to raid settler farms on the colonial frontier. Even Phato's Gqunukhwebe, who had allied with the British in 1835, joined Sandile because they had lost land to a Fingo settlement near Fort Peddie. In early May, they ambushed a colonial supply train passing through the Fish River Bush on its way to Fort Peddie and captured 43 wagons. At the end of May, a combined Xhosa army of 8,000 attacked Fort Peddie but was repelled by colonial artillery and muskets that killed 92 warriors. The Xhosa withdrew, with 4,000 cattle captured from the Fingo. Somerset then led a supply train of 82 wagons, escorted by 1,200 troops, through the Fish River Bush and pushed straight through a Xhosa ambush—with the oxen pulling the wagons being shot, but then replaced—to relieve beleaguered Fort Peddie. In early June, Somerset led a cavalry patrol out of Peddie to destroy nearby Xhosa homesteads, which inadvertently encountered 500 Xhosa warriors led by Siyolo in the open near the Gwangqa River. British dragoons and Cape Mounted Riflemen charged the Xhosa, who responded with ineffective musket fire and then broke. Pursued for 8 kilometers, 300 Xhosa were cut down. News of this disaster prompted Xhosa raiding parties to leave the colony.

At the end of June 1846, Maitland arrived from Cape Town with reinforcements and took command of a colonial army of 3,200 regulars, 5,500 armed settlers, 800 Khoisan levies, and 4,000 Fingo and Khoisan laborers. The army was organized into two divisions. In mid-July, the division under Somerset in the south advanced on the Gqunukhwebe, who withdrew east of the Kei River with their cattle. Somerset pursued them, seizing a few thousand cattle but losing most of them to Xhosa ambushes and harassment on the way back to Fort Peddie. In the north, in late July, the division under Colonel John Hare launched a 10-day sweep of the Amatolas, which the Rharhabe avoided.

By the end of August, Maitland had moved most of his force, badly demoralized and half-starved, to the mouth of the Fish River, where they were supplied by ship. Some minor Xhosa chiefs, who also had problems feeding their people because of drought, surrendered. Sudden, heavy rains in September meant that it was difficult for colonial forces to resume the offensive, and the Xhosa planted their crops. In



Sandile kaNgqika (c. 1820–1878) was king of the Rharhabe branch of the Xhosa nation. He led Xhosa forces during the Cape-Xhosa Wars of 1846–1847, 1850–1853 and 1877–1878, and was killed in the last of these conflicts. (SOTK2011/Alamy Stock Photo)

mid-September, most major Xhosa chiefs, including Maqoma and Sandile, attempted to negotiate but rejected Maitland's demand to abandon land west of the Kei River. At the end of December, Maitland led an expedition across the Kei that seized cattle from the Gcaleka with little resistance. With the conflict dragging on, Maitland was recalled to London.

Sir Henry Pottinger, the new governor, renewed the colonial campaign to drive the Xhosa east of the Kei. The only Xhosa group actively opposing the British were Phato's Gqunukhwebe along the coast. In September 1847, Pottinger mounted an invasion of the Amatolas, and the Rharhabe responded by avoiding the colonial forces, which seized livestock and destroyed settlements. While attempting to parley with the British, Sandile was detained and imprisoned in late October.

During the last three months of the year, Somerset directed operations against the Gqunukhwebe, who were ensconced on difficult ground on the Kei's west bank. In mid-December, Phato was the last Xhosa chief to surrender to avoid starvation imposed by colonial raiding. In December, Sir Harry Smith, who had commanded Cape colonial forces during the 1835 war and subsequently distinguished himself fighting Sikhs in India, became the new governor of the Cape Colony. Late that month, he gathered the captive Xhosa chiefs at King William's Town and declared that the land between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers would become a colonial possession named "British Kaffraria." The Xhosa were assigned areas called *reserves* that roughly corresponded to their existing territories. Technically separate from the Cape Colony, the administration of British Kaffraria was conducted by the chiefs who were supervised by European magistrates reporting to a chief commissioner. For internal security, 2,000 colonial soldiers occupied seven forts in the area and the commissioners controlled 400 African police. In what some call the "War of the Axe," after the incident that gave Maitland his casus belli, Xhosa groups west of the Kei fell under British rule.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Burnshill, Battle of (April 16–17, 1846); Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Gwangqa, Battle of (June 8, 1846); Maqoma; Sandile; Somerset, Henry

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Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835)

By the early 1830s, Cape colonial aggression against the Xhosa had intensified under the patrol system, which sanctioned settlers and soldiers to pursue allegedly stolen livestock across the Keiskamma River border. This often became an excuse for livestock raids that constantly harassed Xhosa communities. The last straw came in December 1834, when Xhoxho, son of the late Ngqika and brother to high-ranking Rharhabe Xhosa leaders such as Maqoma and Tyali, was wounded by a colonial patrol. Late that month, some Xhosa launched retaliatory raids into the colony, and the surprised settlers took refuge at frontier towns like Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, Bathurst, and Salem, where they built barricades and fortified stone churches. Farther west, Boers formed wagon laagers, one of which was attacked by Xhosa on eight successive nights.

The Xhosa raids were quickly portrayed by British colonial officials and the settler press as a massive and unprovoked invasion of the colony. Based at Cape Town, Governor Benjamin D'Urban sent Colonel Harry Smith to take command of military operations in the eastern districts. By the time that Smith arrived in Grahamstown in early January 1835, the Xhosa were retiring east of the Fish and Keiskamma rivers. Smith declared martial law and immediately organized an offensive. In early January, a column of 400 armed volunteers moved east from Grahamstown and burned the homes of the Xhosa leaders Nqeno and Tyhali. Smith directed Colonel Henry Somerset, commander of the local Cape

Mounted Rifles (CMR), to lead a force to clear the road to Algoa Bay, the main colonial supply route, and patrols were sent to secure other strategic points along the frontier. D'Urban arrived in the area in late January and spent the next eight weeks mustering a large invasion force. In early February, Smith led 900 armed Khoisan and settlers against the Xhosa occupying the Fish River bush; three days of many small desperate engagements resulted, in which 12 colonial troops and 75 Xhosa were killed and colonial forces captured 2,000 cattle.

D'Urban planned to invade Rharhabe territory and cross the Kei River to attack the Gcaleka Xhosa, ruled by Hintsa. With 358 regular cavalry, 1,639 mounted Boers, and 1,570 regular infantry now at his disposal, the governor organized four divisions of roughly 800 men each. In late March, Smith led a strong patrol into the Amatola Mountains, the Rharhabe Xhosa stronghold, and returned with 1,200 cattle. Five days later, on March 31, the governor's invasion commenced.

Leaving Fort Willshire, the first division, under D'Urban and Smith, marched northeast toward the Amatolas. Camped between Fort Willshire and the coast, Somerset's second division also swept toward the mountains. Led by Major William Cox, the third division left Fort Beaufort and traveled east over the Tyume River. Finally, the fourth division, consisting entirely of mounted Boers and led by Field Commandant Stephanus Van Wyk, entered the Amatolas from the north. Facing the most serious colonial intrusion to date, Maqoma delayed the converging columns and withdrew his followers deeper into the mountains. Harassed by small groups of Rharhabe, some armed with muskets, D'Urban's forces destroyed settlements and seized women and children for service in the colony. In mid-April, the governor left the third and fourth divisions to continue ravaging the Amatolas and led the first and second east of the Kei to confront Hintsa.

Although Hintsa's people had not participated in the Xhosa raids on the colony, as senior Xhosa ruler he was guilty by association, and the British were looking for an excuse to seize cattle. Smith led 300 horsemen in a series of raids against Gcaleka communities, and some 5,000 Thembu, led by Major Henry Warden, attacked the Gcaleka and captured 4,000 cattle. These actions prompted Hintsa to visit the colonial camp and agree to D'Urban's demand for 50,000 cattle and 1,000 horses as compensation for the December raids. Hintsa then accompanied a 500-man colonial patrol, commanded by Smith, as it collected cattle from various Gcalaka settlements.

On May 12, Hintsa allegedly attempted to escape by riding away, but he was pursued and knocked off his horse by Smith. The chief ran into some bush, where he was shot to death by colonial soldiers who cut off his ears as trophies. At that time, D'Urban's camp began attracting African people, including Gcaleka Christian converts from the nearby Butterworth mission, Gcaleka seeking food and protection, and opportunistic mercenaries who wanted to side with the British. D'Urban reported to his superiors in London that these people, known as Fingo, had been refugees from the wars of the Zulu ruler Shaka farther up the coast, which had subsequently been enslaved by Hintsa and were now seeking emancipation by the British. Thousands of Fingos were settled between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers, particularly around Fort Peddie, and provided the Cape with labor and military allies. D'Urban's force also returned to the colony with 10,000 Gcaleka cattle. The governor declared that the territory between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers was annexed by Britain as Queen Adelaide Province.

While D'Urban's force was operating east of the Kei, the divisions under Cox and Van Wyk continued to pursue the Rharhabe into the Amatola Mountains but were hampered by rough terrain and heavy rain. In mid-May 1835, Maqoma rejected a colonial offer to suspend hostilities if his people moved east of the Kei. Throughout June, D'Urban and Smith, by now west of the Kei, launched an offensive aimed at engaging the Rharhabe in a decisive battle. Hoping to maintain British goodwill, the Gqunukhwebe Xhosa leader Phato sent 1,200 warriors to assist colonial forces. The mountains made it possible for Maqoma and his people to elude the cumbersome colonial columns. Toward the end of June, the British changed their approach and began sending numerous small patrols of 30–100 men, mostly Gqunukhwebe, Fingos, and Khoihoi, into the Amatolas to destroy crops and capture cattle to starve the Rharhabe into submission. The Rharhabe responded by further developing their ambush tactics and using more captured firearms. By the beginning of September, the Rharhabe had to plant crops and D'Urban was under pressure from London to end the expensive war. Several weeks of negotiations, in which Maqoma rejected initial British demands for him to abandon the Amatolas and surrender firearms, produced a treaty in which the Rharhabe accepted nominal British authority but retained their land and chiefs within the newly declared Queen Adelaide Province.

British rule in Queen Adelaide Province did not last. In 1836, Lord Glenelg, the humanitarian colonial secretary in London, ordered the retrocession of the territory and withdrawal of colonial forces. At this point, British imperial policy did not favor expanding the Cape Colony, as the primary purpose of holding it was to control shipping between Europe and Asia. Relations between the Cape settlers and neighboring Xhosa groups became governed by a treaty system in which stock theft accusations or other grievances were arbitrated by border agents who negotiated with Xhosa chiefs. This left Cape frontier settlers, hungry for land and labor, profoundly frustrated.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Hintsa; Maqoma; Somerset, Henry

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Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880)

In the late 1700s, European settlers called Boers, moving east from the Dutch Cape Colony, and westward-traveling Xhosa entered the rich grazing land between the Sundays and Fish rivers known as the Zuurveld, subjugating the Khoisan autochthons. Although the Boers possessed the mobility of horses and the firepower of guns, the Xhosa offered effective resistance, as their mixed herding and cultivating economy supported a larger population than the Khoisan, and the Xhosa possessed iron weapons. In 1778, Cape governor Baron Van Plettenberg visited the eastern frontier and asked several Xhosa leaders to keep their people east of the upper Fish and Bushman's rivers, but later the same year, frontier Boers blamed the Xhosa for stock theft and attempted to drive them east of the Zuurveld. In 1780, Plettenberg declared the entire Fish River as the eastern border of the Cape Colony, and the next year, a Boer commando attempted to enforce the decision, which proved impossible because the Xhosa simply returned when the force had been disbanded.

In 1793, after being raided by a short-lived alliance of Boers and Rharhabe Xhosa, Mbalu and Gqunukhwebe Xhosa attacked Boer farms on the Zuurveld. Another Boer commando once again attempted to drive the Xhosa east of the Fish, but once again they returned. When the British seized the Cape Colony in 1795, most of the Zuurveld was inhabited by Xhosa, with the frontier Boers controlling the western portion near the Sundays River. In March 1799, a British military force under Brigadier General Thomas Vandeleur was shipped from Cape Town to Algoa Bay. It first suppressed a Boer rebellion in Graaff Reinet and then attempted to drive the Xhosa east of the Fish. Determined Xhosa bush fighting prompted the withdrawal of most of this British expedition.

Around that time, Khoisan servants rebelled against their Boer masters and joined forces with Zuurveld Xhosa in attacks on the colonial presence. This led to the arrival of a second British force under Acting Governor Major General Francis Dundas, who negotiated a settlement in which the Khoisan returned to work and the Xhosa were permitted to remain on the Zuurveld. Warfare resumed in 1801, when Graaff Reinet Boers who resented Khoisan education by missionaries rebelled against the British and the Khoisan again rebelled against the Boers. In 1802, after a Boer commando tried and failed to drive them east of the Fish, the Khoisan and Xhosa launched a concerted westward offensive, destroying Boer farms as far into the Cape Colony as Knysna and Plettenberg Bay. In March 1803, the British abandoned the Cape Colony to the Dutch Batavian Republic and, given the republic's lack of military strength, the eastern frontier conflict was ended through negotiation. Khoisan rebels were placated with land and promises of better treatment by the Boers, who slowly returned to the Zuurveld.

In 1806, the British occupied the Cape Colony for its strategic location on the sea route to India, but for the next few years, they did not have the military resources to address the unstable eastern frontier, where the Boers had been recently pushed off the Zuurveld by the Xhosa. In September 1811, Cape governor Sir John Cradock instructed Colonel John Graham to expel the Xhosa east of the Fish River, which was to constitute the colony's eastern border. Although the Xhosa offered determined resistance in the Addo Bush, they faced the largest colonial army yet sent into the area and were shocked by the indiscriminate killing of women, children, and elderly, as well as the destruction of shelters and fields. By the end of February 1812, some 20,000 Xhosa had been expelled from the Zuurveld, and the Boers began to return.

To prevent a Xhosa return, Governor Cradock arranged the construction of a network of 22 military posts along the Fish River at the center of what was a military camp, which became the colonial regional capital of Grahamstown. In 1817, the Rharhabe ruler Ngqika gained British support by agreeing to the Spoor Law, which sanctioned colonial raids east of the Fish in pursuit of allegedly stolen livestock, the main target of which was the Rharhabe faction of his rival, Ndlambe. The rival Rharhabe leaders each adopted a spiritual advisor who reflected their broader positions. Ngqika patroniz;ed Ntsikana, the first Xhosa Christian convert, who preached peaceful coexistence with Europeans; and Ndlambe embraced Makana (Nxele), who, though influenced by Christianity, prophesized that the Xhosa would expel the Europeans. When his army was decisively defeated by Ndlambe at the Battle of Amalinde in 1818, Ngqika called upon the British, who sent an expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brereton that seized 23,000 cattle from Ndlambe's people.

On April 21, 1819, some 10,000 Xhosa warriors attacked Grahamstown in broad daylight and were gunned down by a relatively small number of British soldiers and Khoisan allies. In late July, Colonel Thomas Willshire led a counterattack into Xhosa territory that was hampered by rain and Xhosa hit-and-run attacks. In mid-August, the war ended with the surrender of Makana, who later drowned trying to escape from imprisonment on Robben Island. Willshire then took another 13,000 cattle from Ndlambe's subjects. While Ngqika had become the dominant Rharhabe ruler, Governor Charles Somerset forced him to accept the advance of the colonial boundary from the Fish to the Keiskamma/Tyume rivers, with the strip in between being named the "Ceded Territory" and serving as a buffer between the settlers and the Xhosa. In 1820, the Cape's eastern frontier was strengthened with the arrival of settlers from Britain.

During the 1820s and early 1830s, colonial patrols raided Xhosa communities east of the Ceded Territory and evicted many who tried to return to their old lands. The last straw came in December 1834, when Xhoxho, son of the late Ngqika and brother to the important Rharhabe Xhosa leader Maqoma, was wounded by a colonial patrol. Late that month, some Xhosa launched retaliatory raids into the colony, and the surprised settlers took refuge at frontier towns like Fort Beaufort, Grahamstown, Bathurst, and Salem, where they built barricades and fortified stone churches. The Xhosa raids were quickly portrayed by British colonial officials and the settler press as a massive and unprovoked invasion of the colony. When Colonel Harry Smith arrived in the eastern districts in early January 1835, he declared martial law and began preparing some preliminary operations to clear the already retiring Xhosa out of the Fish River bush.

Governor Benjamin D'Urban arrived in the region at the end of the month and began mobilizing a large colonial invasion of Xhosa territory that began at the end of March. Crossing east of the colonial border, four strong colonial columns entered the Amatola Mountains, the stronghold of the Rharhabe Xhosa, where they destroyed villages and crops, and seized prisoners and livestock. Maqoma led his people deeper into the mountains. In April and May, the governor led two of these divisions east of the Kei River to extort thousands of cattle from the Gcaleka Xhosa, who had not participated in the war, and whose King Hintsa was murdered and mutilated by some colonial soldiers (including Smith).

At that time, D'Urban's camp began attracting African people, including Gcaleka Christian converts from the nearby Butterworth mission, Gcaleka seeking food and protection, and opportunistic mercenaries who wanted to side with the British. Reporting to London that these people were refugees from the wars of the Zulu ruler Shaka farther up the coast, who had been enslaved by the Xhosa, D'Urban took them into the Cape Colony, where they became known as Fingo (Mfengu) and became an important source of colonial labor and military allies. Throughout June, D'Urban returned to the Amatolas, where he first tried unsuccessfully to engage the elusive Rharhabe in a decisive battle and then sent small patrols to destroy their food resources. By the beginning of September, the Rharhabe had to plant crops, and D'Urban was under pressure from London to end the expensive war. Several weeks of negotiations, in which Maqoma rejected initial British demands for him to abandon the Amatolas and surrender firearms, produced a treaty in which the Rharhabe accepted nominal British authority but retained their land and chiefs. British rule in this new Queen Adelaide Province did not last; in 1836, Lord Glenelg, the humanitarian colonial secretary in London, ordered the retrocession of the territory and withdrawal of colonial forces west of the Fish.

During the late 1830s and early 1840s, relations between settlers and Xhosa were governed by a treaty system involving negotiations between colonial border agents and Xhosa chiefs. Hungry for more land and African labor, the Cape's eastern frontier settlers worked to undermine this system in the local press by portraying it as encouraging Xhosa stock theft. By 1844, these complaints led to a change of policy in London, and Sir Peregrine Maitland was sent to the Cape to cancel the treaties, which quickly led to renewed violence. When a Xhosa man accused of having stolen an axe from a Fort Beaufort store escaped colonial custody in March 1846, Maitland used the incident as a pretext for war. In April, colonial columns under Colonel Henry Somerset, using the Burnhill mission as a base, tried to penetrate the Amatola Mountains but were ambushed by the Rharhabe Xhosa and driven back. To the south, the Gqunukhwebe Xhosa, who had assisted the British in the 1835 war, attacked procolonial Fingo communities around Fort Peddie that had taken some of their land. During operations around Fort Peddie in June, a colonial cavalry force under Somerset caught 500 Xhosa in the open near the Gwangqa River and rode down 300 of them.

During July and August, Maitland launched an offensive against the Xhosa with a force of 3,200 British soldiers, 5,500 armed settlers, 800 Khoisan levies, and 4,000 Fingo and Khoisan laborers. Since the Gqunukhwebe retired east of the Kei River and the Rharhabe hid in the Amatolas, Maitland withdrew his exhausted army to the mouth of the Fish River, where it could be supplied by ship. Although Maitland tried to resuscitate his campaign by leading a major cattle raid east of the Kei in December, he was soon replaced by Sir Henry Pottinger.

In September 1847, Pottinger mounted an invasion of the Amatolas, and the Rharhabe responded by avoiding colonial forces that seized livestock and destroyed settlements. During the last few months of the year, he directed attacks against the Gqunukhwebe on the west bank of the Kei. In late October, Rharhabe leader Sandile was arrested while attending a negotiation, and in December, Gqunukhwebe chief Phato became the last Xhosa leader to surrender to avoid starvation. The settlers called this conflict the "War of the Axe," while the Xhosa called it the "War of the Border."

In December 1847, Sir Harry Smith, who had distinguished himself fighting Sikhs in India, became the new governor of the Cape Colony. He immediately gathered the Xhosa chiefs at King William's Town and declared that the land between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers would become a colonial possession named "British Kaffraria," in which they would be assigned reserves and white commissioners to supervise their rule. Over the next several years, tensions rose in this territory as the authority of the Xhosa chiefs was undermined and land was lost to white settlers and black colonial allies like the Fingo. This led to the rise in popularity of a Xhosa prophet called Mlanjeni, who ordering the slaughter of yellowish or dun-colored cattle, often associated with white people, and the abandonment of contaminating witchcraft.

On Christmas Eve morning of 1850, Colonel George MacKinnon led 600 colonial soldiers into the Amatolas under instructions from Smith to capture Sandile, who had just been deposed as the Rharhabe ruler. After this column was ambushed at Booma Pass and fled the mountains, the Rharhabe counterattacked by destroying nearby settler villages and besieging colonial forts. Within a few days, the Khoisan of the nearby Kat River Settlement, which was established by the British in the late 1820s but now was being settled by whites and Fingo, rebelled and were joined by many of their fellows, who mutinied from the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR). In January 1851, the Thembu, who lived in the north of British Kaffraria and had accepted British rule voluntarily, also rebelled, given the loss of their land. A broad multiethnic rebellion began at that point.

Throughout January and early February, the Thembu repeatedly attacked the nearby colonial settlement of Whittlesea but they could not overcome its hastily constructed fortifications and withdrew northward. In February, a colonial force under Somerset descended upon the Kat River Settlement and used artillery to recapture Fort Armstrong from the Khoisan rebels, many of whom fled to join the Rharhabe Xhosa. In April, after relieving colonial outposts and securing supply lines, colonial forces began to penetrate the Amatolas to destroy settlements and food sources.

In an effort to distract the colonial army from the main Rharhabe productive center of the Amatolas, Maqoma took a few hundred Xhosa and Khoisan into the thickly forested valleys of the Waterkloof Highlands, located within the Cape Colony overlooking Fort Beaufort, from where they would raid settler farms. Large sweeps of the Waterkloof by colonial forces proved ineffective, as Maqoma's fighters would remain elusive until presented with an opportunity for ambush. In November, Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Fordyce, commanding officer of the 74th Highlanders, was killed by a Khoisan sniper during one of these sweeps.

In January 1852, London replaced Smith with Sir George Cathcart, who made continued incursions into the Waterkloof but also ordered the construction of small forts there that kept the rebels off balance and denied them key observation points. By October, the Xhosa and Khoisan had abandoned the Waterkloof, which allowed colonial forces to focus on conducting a scorched-earth campaign in the Amatolas and raid cattle east of the Kei. In mid-February 1853, Sandile and Maqoma surrendered. Their people were evicted from the Amatolas and given an open piece of land between those mountains and the Kei. The "War of Mlanjeni," as some call it, represents the second-longest war in South African history.

The catastrophic Xhosa cattle-killing movement of 1856–1857 led to mass starvation in British Kaffraria and neighboring areas and the removal of thousands of Xhosa into the Cape Colony as labor. The Cape's Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), newly created in 1855, crossed east of the Kei River and occupied an inland strip of land around the Butterworth mission, removing it from the authority of the Gcaleka Xhosa ruler Sarhili. In 1865, when British Kaffraria was absorbed into the Cape Colony, armed parties of Fingo, assisted by missionaries and the FAMP, invaded this area, which became known as Fingoland and enjoyed colonial protection.

In the 1870s, stock theft and violence increased between Fingo and Gcaleka, and the Cape Colony's expansionism was renewed by the advent of diamond mining to its north and British imperial plans to confederate colonial territories in the region. In August 1877, a clash between Fingo and Gcaleka at the homestead of Fingo leader Ngcayecibi provided colonial officials with an excuse to demand allegedly stolen cattle from Sarhili's people, which pushed them into war.

Within a few months, Rharhabe Xhosa living within the Cape Colony, such as those under Sandile and Tini Maqoma, were bullied into rebellion by settlers and colonial officials who wanted their land. At the end of September, Sarhili's warriors attacked a colonial camp at Ibeka but were repelled by superior firepower, and early the next month, colonial forces based at Ibeka destroyed Sarhili's nearby capital. Since colonial authorities believed that the Gcaleka had been pushed east of the Mbashe River, they were surprised when at the start of December, Sarhili's fighters ambushed a FAMP patrol at Holland's Shop and colonial operations in the area were renewed.

In mid-January 1878, Sandile's faction of the Rharhabe crossed east of the Kei and joined with Sarhili's fighters for a joint but unsuccessful attack on a colonial outpost near Nyumaga Stream. While Sandile wanted to raid Fingo communities for supplies, Sarhili overruled him and sent the combined army to attack a nearby colonial supply base recently established on Centane Hill near his abandoned capital, where many were gunned down in another failed assault. Sarhili and his followers then withdrew east of the Mbashe and Sandile, and his Rharhabe rebels returned to colonial territory and took refuge in the Pirie Bush on the eastern side of the Amatolas, where they eluded colonial columns under Lieutenant General F. A. Thesiger (soon to be Lord Chelmsford).

In April and May, Thesiger, with a reorganized force, renewed operations in the Pirie Bush, but instead of attempting coordinated operations, he assigned separate colonial columns specific areas where they would hunt the Xhosa and seize food and cattle. By the end of May, the hungry and harassed Xhosa were fleeing. Siyolo, Sandile, and Dukwana, son of the Xhosa Christian prophet Ntsikana, were killed, and Tini Maqoma was captured. Although this "War of Ngcayecibi" is usually considered the last of the centurylong series of Cape-Xhosa Wars, there would be a final instance of armed African resistance to colonial rule in the Eastern Cape.

In 1878, the Cape's eastern border officially advanced across the Kei River to the Mbashe River, given the conquest of the Gcaleka Xhosa and the absorption of Fingoland in the Transkei Territory. At that time, Mpondomise and Thembu, located in the central-west part of Transkei, were bullied by Cape officials into accepting Cape authority, but erosion of chiefly power, loss of land to Fingo colonial allies, and the opportunity presented by a rebellion in nearby Basutoland (the Gun War of 1880–1881) convinced them to take up arms. In late October 1880, Hamilton Hope, colonial magistrate at Qumbu, met with Mpondomise leader Mhlonhlo and around 800 of his men, who agreed to fight against the rebels in Basutoland if given firearms. While Hope had arranged for the delivery of 265 Snider breach-loading rifles and 15,000 rounds of ammunition, Mhlonhlo had the magistrate killed and the Mpondomise seized the weapons, cut telegraph wives, and looted European stores. Within days, Mhlonhlo was joined by some Thembu people and Mditshwa, the other major Mpondomise leader, who later claimed that he had been pressured by his hot-headed sons.

Since the Fingo in Transkei had just been stripped of their firearms by new Cape legislation that sought to disarm all Africans, they could hardly defend themselves, let alone stop the rebellion. Wagons full of firearms and ammunition and parties of Cape settler volunteers were rushed into Transkei, where Fingo and other African loyalists were quickly rearmed and organized into military units. In late November, the armies of Mhlonhlo and Mditshwa massed near the colonial settlement of Umtata, but a colonial force ventured forth and drove them away. Subsequently, colonial raiders began to destroy Mpondomise and Thembu communities, and many of these people fled or surrendered. The defeated Mhlonhlo and Mditshwa withdrew their remaining forces into the rugged Tsitsa Gorge where, in mid-December, they were trapped by two converging colonial columns. The rebellion ended with the flight



Mounted colonial volunteers from the town of Oudtshoorn leaving for service in the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878. Throughout the Cape-Xhosa wars, Cape colonial forces relied heavily on ad hoc military units formed by white settlers and indigenous Khoisan and Mfengu (Fingo). (SOTK2011/Alamy Stock Photo)

of Mhlonhlo to Basutoland and the surrender of Mditshwa. Around Qumbu, rebel chiefs were replaced by loyalists and land was given to colonial allies like the Fingo. In 1894, Pondoland (home of the Mpondo people), in the northeast, became the last part of Transkei incorporated into the Cape and the last independent part of southern Africa to fall under colonial rule.

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See also: Booma Pass, Battle of (December 24, 1850); Burnshill, Battle of (April 16–17, 1846); Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars, First, Second, and Third (1778–1803); Cape-Xhosa Wars, Fourth and Fifth (1811–1819); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Cathcart, George; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Grahamstown, Battle of (April 21, 1819); Gwangqa, Battle of (June 8, 1846); Hintsa; Holland's Shop, Battle of (December 2, 1877); Ibeka, Battle of (September 29–30, 1877); Maqoma; Mbolompo, Battle of (August 27, 1828); Sandile; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn; Somerset, Henry; Transkei Rebellion (1880)

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Cape-Xhosa Wars, First, Second, and Third (1778–1803)

In the late 1700s, Dutch-speaking European settlers called Boers, moving east from the Cape Colony, and westward-traveling Xhosa entered the rich grazing land between the Sundays and Fish rivers known as the Zuurveld, subjugating the Khoisan autochthones. Although the Boers possessed the mobility of horses and the firepower of guns, the Xhosa offered effective resistance, as their mixed herding and cultivating economy supported a larger population than the Khoisan, and the Xhosa possessed iron weapons. In Xhosa society, boys developed martial skills by stick fighting, and upon ritual circumcision at around 18 years old, they were considered warriors. Wars were usually short and involved capturing cattle and occasionally burning huts. Before a campaign, messengers gathered men at the chief's capital, where they were told about the conflict and spiritualists administered charms. Men who ignored a call to arms had their cattle confiscated by the chiefs. On the march, armies were accompanied by slaughter cattle and women who handled logistics. In battle, chiefs directed their armies from the rear, where they were protected by a reserve of experienced warriors, and sons of chiefs led younger men from the front and usually attempted to encircle an enemy. Military organization was loosely based on age, but there were no formal age delineations. Each Xhosa man went to war with a long, cowhide shield, a bundle of long throwing spears and perhaps one shorter spear for close combat, and they sometimes threw broken off spearheads at the enemy.

Warfare between Boers and Xhosa began shortly after Cape governor Baron Van Plettenberg visited the eastern frontier in 1778 and negotiated an agreement with several small Xhosa chiefdoms that they remain east of the upper Fish and Bushman's rivers. That same year, frontier Boers accused the Xhosa of stock theft and attacked them in an effort to force them east of the Zuurveld. In 1780, Plettenberg claimed the entire Zuurveld by declaring that the entire length of the Fish River represented the eastern colonial border. However, by this time many Xhosa groups, including the Gwali, Dange, Ntinde, Mbalu, and Gqunukhwebe, had moved west of the Fish. The governor ordered Adriaan van Jaarsveld, commandant of the eastern country, to form a large Boer commando and expel the Xhosa east of the new border. In late May and early June 1781, van Jaarsveld and his men toured the area, directing Xhosa rulers to lead their people back east. When they did not comply, he launched a series of attacks on the Xhosa, forcefully driving them across the Fish. At the beginning of this campaign, van Jaarsveld, while seeming to negotiate with the Gwali Xhosa, scattered tobacco on the ground. When the Xhosa rushed to pick it up, van Jaarsveld's men opened fire, killing around 200 Xhosa. By the time van Jaarsveld dissolved the unit in mid-July, it had seized 5,330 cattle and killed a large but unknown number of Xhosa. Thus ended what has become known as the First Cape-Xhosa War.

After van Jaarsveld's demobilization, many Xhosa returned west of the Fish, as there was little to stop them. In May 1793, a party of Boers under Barend Lindeque, who wanted to evict the Xhosa from the Zuurveld, allied with the Rharhabe Xhosa of Ndlambe, who lived east of the Fish and wanted to bring the western Xhosa under his authority. The combined force raided Mbalu and Gqunukhwebe Xhosa communities, seizing about 2,000 cattle; but for unknown reasons, the alliance fell apart and Ndlambe's warriors returned home. The Mbalu and Gqunukhwebe retaliated against Boer farms, capturing 50,000 cattle, 11,000 sheep, and 200 horses, and the Boers fled west of the Zuurveld. Christiaan David Maynier, landdrost of the newly created district of Graaff Reinet, organized a commando, and in late August, it drove the Gqunukhwebe and other Xhosa east of the Fish River and seized 8,000 cattle. Maynier's unit, reinforced from Swellendam to the west, tried to keep the Xhosa from returning to the Zuurveld, but by November, it was clear that this was impossible, and the group disbanded, ending the Second Cape-Xhosa War.

The British seized the Cape in 1795 to prevent the French from blocking the sea route to India. By the late 1790s, most of the Zuurveld was controlled by the Gqunukhwebe and other Xhosa, with the Boers occupying the western portion near the Sundays River. More Xhosa had moved west onto the Zuurveld in the mid-1790s because of conflict between the rival Rharhabe Xhosa leaders Ndlambe and Ngqika. In March 1799, a British military force under Brigadier General Thomas Vandeleur was shipped from Cape Town to Algoa Bay and marched inland to suppress a Boer rebellion in Graaff Reinet. In April, Vandeleur received instructions from the British acting governor Major General Francis Dundas to expel the Xhosa east of the Fish River. In the subsequent fighting, the Gqunukhwebe, under Chungwa, conducted several tenacious attacks against the British and were eventually driven back by concentrated musket and artillery fire. This was the first time that British soldiers fought the Xhosa. Flustered by the determined Xhosa bush warfare, Vandeleur took his force back to Algoa Bay, from where he posted most of his men to Cape Town.

Around the same time, Khoisan and mixed-race people staged a rebellion against the frontier Boers, who used many of them as indentured labor. Led by Klaas Stuurman, Hans Trompetter and Boesak, this uprising differed considerably from previous Khoisan resistance, as the rebels did not seek to prevent colonial expansion; rather, they were colonized people who aimed to overturn settler dominance from within. Although they initially sought British protection, the rebels knew that

Vandeleur was withdrawing his soldiers and therefore allied with the Gqunukhwebe Xhosa.

This alliance between rebel Khoisan and Zuurveld Xhosa was also a new development. During June and July, 700 Khoisan rebels, about half on horseback and 150 with guns, and Chungwa's warriors attacked Boers on the Zuurveld and farther west. Vandeleur raised a commando of 300 Boers that was defeated by 150 Khoi and Xhosa near the Sundays River. In August, Governor Dundas arrived on the frontier with 500 soldiers and negotiated a cease fire with the Khoisan, many of whom returned to working for the Boers and the Gqunukhwebe, who were permitted to live on the Zuurveld.

In July 1801, Boers around Graaff Reinet briefly rebelled against British colonial authority because they objected to Khoisan servants attending Christian church and being taught to read and write by missionaries. Boer attacks on Khoisan reignited the Khoisan rebellion and armed groups raided Boer farms. In January 1802, Tjaart van der Walt, landdrost of Swellendam, led a commando of 88 Boers against a Khoisan rebel stronghold, but on the return journey, they were ambushed and forced to surrender captured livestock. In May, he returned with a force of 700 men and spent several months trying to push the Khoisan and Xhosa east of the Zuurveld. In early August, van der Walt was killed in a predawn attack on a band of Khoisan, and lacking leadership, the Boer commando dispersed.

During September and October 1802, the Khoisan and Zuurveld Xhosa launched a concerted westward offensive, destroying Boer farms as far into the Cape Colony as Knysna and Plettenberg Bay. Defended by a few Boers, the only colonial outpost remaining on the eastern frontier was besieged Fort Frederick at Algoa Bay. In March 1803, the British abandoned the Cape Colony to the Dutch Batavian Republic, which given the republic's lack of military strength, ended the eastern frontier conflict through negotiation. Khoisan rebels were placated with land and promises of better treatment by the Boers, who slowly returned to the Zuurveld. The Batavians did not enforce the Fish River border and held a conference with western Xhosa leaders, who were allowed to remain on the Zuurveld. At the conclusion of the Third Cape-Xhosa War, Boers, Khoisan and Xhosa inhabited the Zuurveld with no clear boundary between them.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795); Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Commando System (Boer Republics)

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Cape-Xhosa Wars, Fourth and Fifth (1811–1819)

During the late 18th century, Dutch-speaking settlers called Boers, moving east from the Cape Colony, clashed with indigenous Xhosa over control of the grassland known as the Zuurveld, in what is now South Africa's Eastern Cape Province. In 1806, the British occupied the Cape Colony for its strategic location on the sea route to India, but for the next few years, they did not have the military resources to address the unstable eastern frontier, where the Boers had been recently pushed off the Zuurveld by the Xhosa.

In September 1811, Cape governor Sir John Cradock instructed Colonel John Graham to expel the Xhosa east of the Fish River, which was to constitute the colony's eastern border. By December, Graham had assembled around 900 regular troops—167 British cavalry, 221 British infantry, 431 Khoisan infantry, and an artillery detachment—as well as 500 mounted Boers. Up to that time, this was the largest colonial army assembled in the Eastern Cape. Graham deployed his force in three divisions along the Sundays River and instructed them to advance east, pushing the Xhosa over the Fish. The southern column under Landdrost Jacob Cuyler advanced east from the Sundays River mouth to the great place of Chungwa, leader of the Gqunukhwebe. There, Cuyler discovered that Rharhabe chief Ndlambe had assembled many warriors from various Xhosa groups to defend the nearby Addo Bush. Since Cuyler lacked the manpower to assault the overgrown terrain, Graham decided that the center and northern columns would converge on Cuyler's position. Since Anders Stockenstrom, the Graaff-Reinet landdrost commanding the northern column, felt that moving south would leave his Boer community vulnerable, he and 25 Boers rode toward Graham to discuss his concerns, but he and most of his men were killed when they stopped to negotiate with some Xhosa. Andries Stockenstrom, the landdrost's young son, then led the northern column south to join Graham.

On New Year's Day 1812, Graham sent 500 men into the Addo Bush to root out Ndlambe's warriors. Colonial forces could not concentrate their firepower or use horses in the dense vegetation where the Xhosa tried to isolate small colonial units and engage them in hand-to-hand combat. After five days of intense fighting, during which colonial forces killed Xhosa men, women, and children, including the elderly and infirm Chungwa, the Xhosa fled east of the Fish River. The Xhosa were traumatized by the indiscriminate slaughter, as the focus of their warfare was the capture of productive resources like women and livestock. Graham's men then seized cattle, destroyed crops and villages, and killed any remaining Xhosa. By the end of February, 20,000 Xhosa had been expelled from the Zuurveld and the Boers began to return. To prevent the Xhosa from coming back, Governor Cradock arranged the construction of a network of 22 military posts along the Fish River, at the center of which was a military camp that became the colonial regional capital of Grahamstown.

The eviction of Ndlambe and his subjects east of the Fish reignited conflict with his rival, Ngqika, over control of the Rharhabe Xhosa. In 1817, Ngqika gained British support by agreeing to the Spoor Law, which sanctioned colonial raids east of the Fish in pursuit of allegedly stolen livestock. The main target of these attacks became Ndlambe's people. The rival Rharhabe leaders each adopted a spiritual advisor that reflected their broader positions. Ngqika patronized Ntsikana, the first Xhosa

Christian convert, who preached peaceful coexistence with Europeans; and Ndlambe embraced Makana (Nxele) who, though influenced by Christianity, prophesized that the Xhosa would expel the Europeans. In October 1818, the forces of Ngqika (led by his son Maqoma) were decisively defeated by those of Ndlambe at the Battle of Amalinde, which took place near present-day King William's Town. Consequently, Ngqika called on the British for assistance, and in December, a colonial expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brereton ravaged communities under Ndlambe and captured 23,000 cattle.

In January 1819, Ndlambe dispatched his warriors west of the Fish to raid settler farms. While colonial forces were mobilizing for a counteroffensive, Ndlambe's Rharhabe and allied Gqunukhwebe warriors massed in secret for the most ambitious operation in Xhosa military history. At midday on April 21, 1819, Grahamstown was suddenly attacked by some 10,000 Xhosa fighters accompanied by Makana and led by Mdushane, Ndlambe's son. Although surprised and vastly outnumbered, the 350 British and Khoisan defenders, supplemented by the arrival of 130 Christian Khoisan hunters, used superior firepower (including several cannon) to drive off the Xhosa.

In late July, Colonel Thomas Willshire led three converging columns, with a total of 500 men, across the Fish and into Ndlambe's territory, where they were beset by Xhosa hit-and-run night attacks and unexpected winter rain. When Ndlambe attempted to concentrate his people in the dense Fish River bush, Boer volunteers under Stockenstrom drove them into the open, where they were driven east by British cavalry. Once again, the Xhosa were shocked that colonial forces killed women and children, and the colonial destruction of crops and livestock seizure led to famine threatening Ndlambe's people. In mid-August, the war ended with the surrender of Makana, who later drowned trying to escape from imprisonment on Robben Island. Willshire then took another 13,000 cattle from Ndlambe's subjects.

While Ngqika had become the dominant Rharhabe ruler, Governor Charles Somerset forced him to accept the advance of the colonial boundary to the Keiskamma and Tyume rivers, with all Xhosa having to move farther east. Known as the "Ceded Territory," this strip of land between the Fish and Keiskamma/Tyume was meant to remain mostly uninhabited, with the exception of some colonial military posts, and form a buffer between the settlers and the Xhosa. In 1820, the Cape's eastern frontier was strengthened with the arrival of settlers from Britain. Throughout the 1820s, colonial patrols continued to cross into Xhosa territory in pursuit of supposedly stolen livestock.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Grahamstown, Battle of (April 21, 1819); Maqoma

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Carrington, Frederick (1844–1913)

Born in Cheltenham, England, and not very successful at school, Frederick Carrington purchased a commission as a lieutenant in the British army's 24th Regiment of Foot (now the South Wales Borderers) in 1864. In 1874, after a decade of uneventful military service in Britain in which he remained a lieutenant, Carrington accompanied his unit to the Cape Colony.

Given his skill with horses, Carrington was soon directed to form an irregular cavalry unit from among local settlers called Carrington's Horse, which participated in the suppression of a white miners' uprising in Griqualand West. During the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878, he reformed his irregular mounted force, renamed it the Frontier Light Horse, and fought in the decisive Battle of Centane. Subsequently, this unit was taken over by Major Redvers Buller.

Promoted to captain, Carrington missed the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, as he was sent to patrol the Transvaal borderlands with another new irregular unit called the Transvaal Mounted Horse. In late November 1878, during the British conquest of the Pedi Kingdom in the Transvaal, he led eight squadrons of colonial troops during the final assault on the Pedi mountain stronghold known as the Fighting Kopje. Carrington performed well in this engagement and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel. During the "Gun War" of 1880–1881, in which the Basotho rebelled against Cape administration, Carrington commanded the Cape Mounted Riflemen and led a breakout of the besieged town of Mafeteng and a subsequent attack on the village of the rebel leader Lerothodi. With the departure of Cape colonial force commander General Mansfield Clarke, Carrington was left in charge of the remaining 2,000 troops confronting the Basotho in what turned into a stalemate.

In 1885, after leave in Britain, Carrington commanded the 2nd Mounted Infantry (popularly known as Carrington's Horse) as part of General Sir Charles Warren's expedition that brought the northern Tswana under British colonial authority within the context of Bechuanaland. Subsequently, Carrington became commander of the Bechuanaland Border Police (BPP), which, given the high quality of its recruits, was popularly known as the "Blue-Blooded Police" or "Top Hat Brigade." During the Zulu Rebellion of 1888, Carrington, still BPP commander, was briefly assigned the job of organizing colonial African levies. In 1890, Carrington assisted an expedition led by Cecil Rhodes that passed through Bechuanaland on its way north to occupy Mashonaland. Carrington stationed a BPP detachment on the Bechuanaland border to discourage the Ndebele ruler Lobengula from attacking the column.

After a brief term commanding British troops in Gibraltar, Major-General Carrington was sent back to southern Africa in 1896 to command imperial and colonial troops in the suppression of the Ndebele and Shona rebellions in Southern Rhodesia. He then briefly commanded the Belfast district in Ireland. In 1900, Carrington was given command of the 5,000-strong Rhodesian Field Force that fought in the Second Anglo-Boer War. However, given its problems relieving Brakfontein, British commander Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts broke up the force, and a humiliated Carrington was sent home. In 1904, he retired to Gloucestershire, where he died almost a decade later.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Buller, Redvers Henry; Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Centane, Battle of (February 7, 1878); Gun War, Lesotho (1880–1881); Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902), Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Cartography and Conquest

Maps have served a critical role in achieving military success from the earliest periods of time. In the Early Modern period, accurate maps were prized as closely guarded state secrets. The Dutch Republic, for example, would execute any captain in their employ who provided maps to a foreign power. In the case of the European conquest of Africa in the 19th and 20th centuries, however, maps played a far greater role than is generally believed. In the context of imperialism, maps served a multitude of purposes that not only enabled but legitimized the project of building empire.

The first use of cartography, significant for the Scramble for Africa, was the seemingly benign efforts of European explorers to unlock the mysteries of the continent. Explorers such as John Hanning Speke, Gustav Nachtigal, and David Livingstone excited European audiences with their tales of exploration into heretofore unexplored regions. Their exploits transformed these explorers into celebrities, as their journeys were spread well outside the meeting-rooms of exploratory societies and into public consciousness. A good example would be the search for the source of the Nile, which not only led to the infamous clash between Richard Burton and Speke, but also the famed expedition by Henry Morton Stanley to find Livingstone. The maps produced by the explorers do not appear threatening at first, but that judgment fails to appreciate what these maps contained.

Conceptually, these maps transformed Africa from an unknown continent into a legible land mass. In charting African topography along the neat grids of longitude and latitude, the continent was transformed from a place in which, as Jonathan Swift remarked, cartographers “placed elephants for want of towns” (Jacob, p. 14) into a territory readily understood by European audiences. Fundamentally, these maps changed Africa from an unknown entity into a land that could be occupied, competed for, and (most dangerous for colonial enthusiasts) lost. The blanks on the map, which had formerly motivated explorers to move into the unknown, now motivated colonizers to compete with one another as part of a race to possess part of the continent.

Beyond this conceptual power, the work of the explorers was critical to facilitating the conquest of the African interior. Explorers did not simply catalog the topographic features of the continent, but also relayed information useful for future military campaigns. They would fill their maps with details on flora and fauna and the locations of water and wells, and even make observations on the nature of indigenous peoples. For military strategists attempting to campaign across an environment that was nearly as hostile as their African opponents, these details would prove extremely useful. Any number of military campaigns depended on the observations and maps provided by many of these seemingly neutral observers. The 1873 British campaign against the Asante, for example, was greatly aided by observations provided by captive missionaries that helped them chart the best route to the Asante capital of Kumasi. The efforts of the German East Africa Company and Imperial British East Africa Company were also heavily dependent on explorer maps, as they highlighted the most effective routes into the interior.

Maps were also understood to be critical to the stability of colonial rule, as underscored by the heavy involvement of colonial officers in cartographic efforts after the initial conquest. Many post-conquest maps were not made by explorers or scientists, but by military officers acutely aware that accurate maps would be useful in any future campaigns against African uprisings. In the case of Kenya, for example, there were continued cartographic efforts in the unpacified Northern Frontier District. This region, forming the border with southern Ethiopia, suffered due to raids by Ethiopian tribesmen into Kenya. In response, the region was actively mapped by the British military in order to provide the necessary information to protect and pacify the district.

Maps to aid in this effort, created as late as 1905, highlighted many of the same features that had filled the maps of early explorers and early military campaigns. Rather than documenting development schemes or modern roads, these maps indicated the most useful paths for marches and the locations of wells. It was hoped that this information would prove beneficial to the hoped-for arrival in 1914 of British reinforcements, in the form of a flying column, to help subdue a region that remained unstable even until the beginning of World War I.

As much as maps helped engender European excitement for colonies and enabled colonial conquest, they also legitimized the conquests themselves. Maps, through the key, title, and use of color, made the colonial conquests appear legitimate, if not natural, as Europeans divvied up the African continent. These maps also solidified in the minds of the public the connection between national greatness and these colonies. Otto von Bismarck's successor, Georg Leo von Caprivi, poked fun at this view, suggesting that colonial enthusiasts believed "if we had colonies, and bought ourselves an atlas, and colored Africa blue all over,

AFRICA, 1914


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RIO DE ORO
FRENCH WEST AFRICA
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THE GAMBIA
SENEGAL
PORTUGUESE GUINEA
GUINEA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
(Ally of the U.S.)
IVORY COAST
GOLD COAST
TOGO-LAND
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
KAMERUN
UBANGI-SHARI
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
ERITREA
FRENCH SOMALILAND
BRITISH SOMALILAND
ABYSSINIA
(Neutral)
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
BRITISH EAST AFRICA
UGANDA
SPANISH GUINEA
SAO TOMÉ (PORTUGUESE)
GABON
BELGIAN CONGO
CABINDA
GERMAN EAST AFRICA
KATANGA
ANGOLA
NORTHERN RHODESIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique Channel
MADAGASCAR
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
GERMAN SOUTHWEST AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND
INDIAN OCEAN
German colony
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then we would be respectable people" (Wesseling, p. 45). Regardless, the map helped solidify the creation and legitimacy, in the public consciousness, of territories that would be known as "French West Africa" and "German East Africa."

Placing too much trust in maps, however, carried risks. The faulty maps provided to Italian forces ahead of the Battle of Adowa, for example, may have played a role in the misalignment of Italian forces and their defeat. In campaigning against the Boers, the British general Redvers Buller was soundly defeated at the Battle of Colenso. This third and final defeat, as part of the "Black Week" of the British army, led to public chastisement and the end of Buller's career. Later research has shown that the maps that Buller was given, and that he built his strategy around, were faulty. Maps, therefore, were often a double-edged sword. While they proved an aid in conquest and a tool of legitimizing European imperialism, the very trust placed in them to depict the truth, such as the truth of European imperialism, could lead to disaster if that trust was misplaced.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Anglo-Asante War 1873–1874; Berlin Conference; Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); Buller, Redvers Henry; Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Stanley, Henry Morton

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Cathcart, George (1794–1854)

Lieutenant General Sir George Cathcart was a competent, conscientious officer who distinguished himself commanding British troops during the Eighth Cape-Xhosa War (1850–1853) and the 4th Division during the Crimean War.

The third son of the Earl Cathcart, George Cathcart was born on May 12, 1794, and commissioned as a cornet in the 2nd Life Guards. He served as private secretary to his father, who was British ambassador to Russia, and was present at many of the Napoleonic battles in 1813. Cathcart entered Paris with the allied armies in 1814, and from 1815 to 1818, he was aide-de-camp to Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley, the first Duke of Wellington, at Waterloo and in Paris.

Cathcart's career was rather uneventful, as he transferred into numerous regiments during the 1820s and 1830s and served as deputy-lieutenant of the Tower of London from 1847 until his promotion to major general in 1851. He was then appointed governor and commander in chief of Cape Colony, replacing Sir Harry Smith, who had been recalled. Arriving in South Africa in

1852, Cathcart was responsible for concluding a campaign of attrition that wore down the Xhosa. Hostilities ended in March 1853, and the separate territory British Kaffraria was later incorporated into the Cape. In December 1852, he led an unsuccessful punitive expedition against the Sotho, culminating in the Battle of Berea. For his services in South Africa, Cathcart was knighted in July 1853 and appointed adjutant-general at the Horse Guards.

Cathcart commanded the 4th Division in the British expeditionary force that arrived in the Crimea on September 14, 1854. Even though he was not the senior division commander or senior to all the staff officers, Cathcart held the "dormant commission," which authorized him to succeed to the command of the force in the event of the death or incapacitation of Field Marshal Fitzroy J. H. Somerset, 1st Baron Raglan, the commander. This was a secret piece of paper, signed by Queen Victoria and known to only three people in the Crimea: Field Marshal H. R. H. Prince George F., 2nd Duke of Cambridge (then commanding the 1st Division); Raglan; and Cathcart, who carried the document in his pocket. This was a frequent source of friction, as Cathcart then seemed to consider himself the force's second-in-command and expected Raglan to consult him.

At the Battle of the Alma (September 20, 1854), Cathcart's 4th Division, along with the 3rd and the Cavalry Divisions, were in reserve. After the British victory, the force continued the march toward Sevastopol, which seemed undefended. Cathcart urged an immediate assault on Sevastopol, a suggestion brushed aside by the dogmatic Raglan.

On the morning of the Battle of Balaclava (October 25, 1854) an aide-de-camp brought Cathcart the order to deploy his division to a supporting position. Cathcart complained that his men had spent the previous night in the trenches, and he initially refused to move his formation. He eventually relented, and when the 4th Division finally arrived on the battlefield, he was ordered to seize a series of redoubts. The 4th Division occupied the first vacant redoubt, and Cathcart refused to advance farther, believing that he would have to vacate the redoubts again anyway and return to the siege trenches before Sevastopol. While Cathcart refused to execute an order that he deemed futile, another commander—Brigadier General James T. Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan—had no such scruples, leading the Charge of the Light Brigade that afternoon. On the following day, and not related to the previous day's battle, Cathcart was informed by Raglan that the secretary of state for war had rescinded the dormant commission.

On November 5, 1854, the Russians attacked the British, and the 4th Division was ordered to support two divisions already fighting the Battle of Inkerman. In the rain and fog, Cathcart and a small element had moved too far to the east and were cut off by the Russians. A number of frantic assaults up the rugged hills were made to regain contact with the British. In one of these charges, Cathcart was shot in the chest and killed. His last words were, "I fear we are in a mess."

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Berea, Battle of (December 20, 1852); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Smith, Henry George Wakelyn

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Centane, Battle of (February 7, 1878)

Given fighting between Cape colonial forces and the Gcaleka Xhosa east of the Kei River in late 1877, colonial officials attempted to disarm the Rharhabe, who lived just inside colonial territory on the west side of the Kei. While some Rharhabe remained loyal to the colonial government, the Rharhabe ruler Sandile led others in rebellion. Sandile's men and the Gcaleka force that had ambushed a colonial patrol at Holland's Shop at the start of December joined in the Tyityaba Valley just west of the Kei.

While British commander General Arthur Cunynghame was rushing his forces west to deal with this new threat, the combined Xhosa army crossed east of the Kei, and on January 13, 1878, attacked a colonial post near the Nyumaga Stream. Commanded by Colonel Richard Glyn, who had just ridden west from Ibeka that day to take charge, the colonial position was defended by two small detachments of British infantry, a few Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP) troopers, some Fingo auxiliaries, Royal Marine rocket launchers, and two cannon that repelled the Xhosa assault. Although colonial patrols swept the Tyityaba Valley, the Rharhabe and Gcaleka warriors remained hidden there, though they were short on food and ammunition.

While Sandile wanted to raid Fingo communities to the north around Butterworth for supplies, the Gcaleka king Sarhili overruled him and sent the combined army to attack a nearby colonial supply base recently established on Centane Hill near his abandoned capital. This was a surprising decision, considering the problems that previous Xhosa armies had with attacking defended colonial positions. Some 1,500 Gcaleka and Rharhabe warriors began gathering in the Mnyameni bush near Centane. Commanded by Captain Russell Upcher of the British 24th Regiment, the Centane position consisted of a wagon laager with earthwork defenses, including a ditch and rifle pits. On February 7, it was defended by 400 settler infantry and cavalry, British regular infantry and FAMP, two cannon, a rocket tube, and 560 Fingo auxiliaries initially deployed outside the position.

On that damp and misty morning, the Gcaleka contingent under the war-leader Khiva and Sigcawu, Sarhili's son, approached from the south, and some settler cavalry under Lieutenant Frederick Carrington ventured out of the Centane position, fired at the attackers, and then withdrew to the defenses. As the Gcaleka continued the assault, the Fingo pulled back to the post, where British infantry emerged from the rifle pits and fired a deadly, close-range volley that prompted the Xhosa to retreat.

Led by the experienced Sandile, the Rharhabe contingent approached the western flank of Centane. Some colonial police and infantry left the Centane position to try to lure the Rharhabe closer, but Sandile's men withdrew and were then pursued by the colonial troops, who were themselves caught in an ambush and almost surrounded.

Hearing news that a detachment of police and settler cavalry from another nearby post was on its way to the battle, Sandile ordered a withdrawal that saved the encircled colonial troops. The short engagement ended around 10:30 A.M. Almost 400 Xhosa men were killed, with minimal colonial losses.

This decisive defeat ended Gcaleka resistance, and Sarhili went into hiding east of the Mbashe River. Khiva was killed in a skirmish with colonial forces in March. In late April and early May, colonial forces pursued Sarhili and the Gcaleka but found only a few cattle. Sandile and his Rharhabe rebels returned to colonial territory and took refuge in the overgrown ravines, known as the Pirie Bush, on the eastern side of the Amatola Mountains.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Cunynghame, Arthur Augustus Thurlow; Holland's Shop, Battle of (December 2, 1877); Ibeka, Battle of (September 29–30, 1877); Sandile

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Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904)

During the late 19th century, the British conquered the area between the Limpopo River and the Congo Basin, which might be described as the southern portion of Central Africa, consisting of today's Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. British imperialist dreamer and Cape-based mining magnate Cecil Rhodes played a central role in this process.

In the late 1880s, Rhodes wanted to seek new sources of gold north of the Boer-controlled Witwatersrand in the Transvaal Republic and more broadly sought the extension of British power in Africa from the Cape in the south to Cairo in the north. This put Rhodes in competition with the Portuguese, who wanted to link their territories of Angola and Mozambique; and Leopold II of Belgium, who wanted to expand the Congo Free State south into Katanga. In 1888, Rhodes's agents fraudulently secured the so-called Rudd Concession from Lobengula, the ruler of the Ndebele in the southwest of what is now Zimbabwe, which gave the British access to the area's minerals in exchange for promises of money, 1,000 Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles, 100,000 rounds of ammunition, and a gunboat on the Zambezi River. Only 500 rifles were delivered, which Lobengula stored away due to fears that they would be used against him by local rivals. Rhodes claimed that the concession extended into Mashonaland, the area inhabited by the Shona people in today's eastern Zimbabwe, which he erroneously represented as under Ndebele domination.



Cecil John Rhodes (1853–1902) was a mining magnate and politician based in the Cape Colony. He was also an ardent British imperialist who organized the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which conquered the territories that became Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). (Library of Congress)

With a royal charter obtained on the strength of the concession, Rhodes formed the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and organized a column of white settlers led by hunter Frederick Courtney Selous which, in 1890, occupied Mashonaland and established the colonial towns of Fort Victoria and Salisbury. Although Lobengula realized that this column was not a simple prospecting expedition, concerns about colonial firepower prevented him from ordering an attack. At this time, the Shona did not resist colonial occupation, as the initial BSAC presence in their area was limited. Ultimately, Rhodes and his associates were disappointed by the lack of gold resources in Mashonaland. As a result, in 1893, the BSAC mounted an invasion of the Ndebele kingdom (or Matabeleland), in which three fast-moving colonial columns, with Maxim guns mounted on wagons, converged on Lobengula's capital and defeated conventional Ndebele attacks. Lobengula fled north and died of an unspecified illness somewhere near the Zambezi River. In 1896, with the absence of BSAC forces that had participated in the ill-fated Jameson Raid in the Transvaal, some Ndebele rebelled due to the loss of their land and cattle, the abolition of their monarchy, and colonial oppression and taxation. They were eventually joined by some Shona groups, who also saw an opportunity to escape colonial subjugation, which they were just beginning to experience with the introduction of hut taxes meant to propel them into the colonial economy.

While the Ndebele rebels fought a hit-and-run war in the rocky Matopos Hills and used guns much more effectively than in the previous war, their chiefs eventually negotiated a separate peace with Rhodes. Reinforced by British imperial and Cape colonial military units, BSAC forces concentrated on overpowering Shona hilltop strongholds and dynamiting rebel-held caves. Shona rebel leaders, such as the spirit mediums Nehanda and Kaguvi, were hanged. In turn, Matabeleland and Mashonaland were combined into the BSAC-administered territory of Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe). Resistance continued in the northeast, where the Shona leader Mapondera conducted an insurgency against the BSAC and the Portuguese in Mozambique until his capture and death in 1904.

North of the Zambezi River, where the large Lozi and Bemba states were plagued by internal conflicts, the BSAC extended its authority by treaty and thereby eventually amalgamated the colonial territory of Northern Rhodesia (today's Zambia). In 1890, the Lozi Kingdom in the western region accepted a British protectorate to counter Ndebele raids from the south, and in 1898, the Bemba in the east allowed a French missionary to declare himself king and invite British rule. The Stairs Expedition of 1891–1892, which killed the Yeke leader Msiri, claimed mineral-rich Katanga for Leopold II's Congo Free State, thus establishing the colonial border between what ultimately became BSAC-administered Northern Rhodesia and the Belgian Congo.

The British conquest of the area around Lake Nyasa (today's Lake Malawi) consisted of many small campaigns against local groups in which transportation by steamboat, as well as superior firepower, were essential. By the late 1880s, the British African Lakes Company vied for control of the lake trade with Swahili-Arabs and Yao slavers and Ngoni raiders. The British allied with local people such as the Nkonde and Tonga, who had been victims of attacks by these groups. During 1888 and 1889, company forces led by Captain Frederick Lugard and transported by steamboat attacked Swahili-Arab strongholds at the north end of the lake. Given Portuguese expansion toward the lake's eastern shore, the British government, in 1889, claimed the west and south sides of the lake and eventually called this territory the Central African Protectorate and later Nyasaland (today's Malawi).

Harry Johnson, an associate of Rhodes, was dispatched to establish British authority there, which he did by making peace with the Swahili-Arabs in the north so that he could focus on the south, where a colonial capital was founded. Between 1891 and 1895, British forces consisting of Sikh soldiers from India and local African troops fought numerous engagements to subdue various Yao groups around the southern end of the lake. In late 1895, the growing British colonial forces returned to the lake's north end, where they destroyed the settlements of Swahili-Arab leaders who had repudiated their treaty, such as Mlozi. While British military operations against the Yao and Swahili-Arabs were justified on the ground of eliminating the slave trade, they also established colonial rule.

In 1896, the protectorate's military establishment was formalized with the creation of the Central African Rifles (CAR), later incorporated into the King's African Rifles (KAR) in 1902 and based at forts across the territory. The next targets for subjugation were the Ngoni groups who lived in the hills west of the lake and who had moved into the area from the south during the mid-19th century. Although they were often seen as a warriorlike people because of historic connections with the Zulu, the Ngoni were particularly vulnerable to colonial attack, as they did not fortify their villages as the Swahili-Arabs and Yao had, and lacked firearms. During 1896, several Ngoni communities in the protectorate were conquered by elements of the CAR.

In early 1898, the entire CAR, with artillery and Maxim guns, was concentrated for an offensive that defeated the Ngoni of Mpeseni across the colonial border in the northeastern part of the BSAC-administered Northern Rhodesia. In August 1899, protectorate forces cooperated with the Portuguese, who had abandoned their ambitions in Central Africa in 1890, in a campaign to subdue a Yao group along the eastern border with Mozambique. In September of that year, a CAR expedition again marched into Northern Rhodesia and drove the last active Swahili-Arab slavers into the Congo Free State. The last British operations against the Ngoni took place in November and December 1900, bringing about the destruction of some 300 villages in the central part of the protectorate and the capture of the Ngoni leader Tambala.

The BSAC-administered Southern Rhodesia until 1923, when the territory's white settler minority was granted responsible government (a type of internal self-government), and Northern Rhodesia until 1924, when it became a protectorate ruled by the British government. In terms of the regional colonial economy, Southern Rhodesia's white minority gained control of the territory's best agricultural land and established commercial farming, Northern Rhodesia developed industrial copper mining, and the densely populated but impoverished Nyasaland exported African migrant labor to as far away as the gold mines of South Africa.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Anglo-Ngoni War (1896–1900); Boers; British South Africa Company; Firearms Technology; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); King's African Rifles (to 1904); Leopold II; Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Lugard, Frederick; Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Nehanda; North End War/Slavers' War (1887–1896); Portuguese-Gaza War (1894–1895); Rhodes, Cecil John; Selous, Frederick Courtney; Technology and Conquest (Transportation, Communications, and Medical); Stairs, William Grant

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Cerveira Pereira, Manuel (d. 1626)

Manuel Cerveira Pereira, son of Gaspar Cerveira Pereira, was a Portuguese noble (*fidalgo*) and military captain who led several successful campaigns in the conquest of Angola during the first quarter of the 17th century. He served two terms as governor and captain-general of Angola (1603–1606 and 1615–1617), and was named conquistador of the Kingdom of Benguela by the Iberian ruler Philip II. In 1617, he founded the port town of São Filipe de Benguela, which became the second-most-important embarkation region in the history of the south Atlantic slave trade, after Luanda.

Cerveira Pereira became captain-general of Angola in 1603, after the death of João Rodrigues Coutinho amidst a military campaign up the Kwanza River, close to the *presídio* of Massangano. He defeated the powerful *soba* Kafushe Kambare with the assistance of another local chief, *soba* Langere. Following this victory, he invaded the Cambambe region, building a *presídio* within this territory in 1604, which helped the development of the slave trade in the region. The ruler of Ndongo, Mbandi-Ngola-Kiluanji, sent emissaries to Cambambe and allegedly tried to establish peaceful relations with the conquistador, who accepted the offer and did not attack the *ngola*. This decision spurred negative reactions from his soldiers, who considered the peace treaty with the African ruler a waste of a very promising raid. These good relations between the captain-general of Angola and the *ngola* of Ndongo did not last long; soon Cerveira Pereira resumed his attacks, leading to the subjugation of several African chiefs.

The arrogant and hostile way Cerveira Pereira treated both foes and allies made him many enemies. His adversaries sent the Iberian king complaints and reports on his misconduct as governor of Angola, and the Crown appointed Manuel Pereira Forjaz to replace him. The new governor arrested Cerveira Pereira as soon as he arrived in Luanda. He was suspect of corruption because he retreated from waging war against Kafushe Kambare in exchange for 40 slaves. He was also accused of deliberately shielding Mbandi-Ngola-Kiluanji after the invasion of Cambambe rather than destroying him when he had the chance, and of bribing the other captains not to oppose his decisions. Paradoxically, Cerveira Pereira was also accused of waging unjust war against other African potentates, having even betrayed and attacked formal Portuguese allies such as *soba* Langere.

The conquistador was notorious for overturning the decisions of other Portuguese officials serving in Angola. He freed supporters accused of crimes and imprisoned merchants who did not trade with him. He sent the justice official Filipe Butaca, to jail in Lisbon for arresting one of his associates, and reportedly threatened to feed a local clerk to crocodiles if he did not give him privileged information about accusations made against him by his opponents.

Cerveira Pereira was even accused of coveting local married women, having defamed dozens of them by using artifices such as evening parties with music.

Cerveira Pereira was sent to Lisbon to answer for his crimes, but once in Portugal, he convinced the Crown that he was wrongly accused by his opponents, and all he did was to defend the Portuguese interests in the *conquista*. As the Benguelan historian Ralph Delgado has argued, apart from the accusation of defaming married women, Captain Pereira's behavior did not differ from that of other governors of Angola. Even his successor, Pereira Forjaz, was later accused of misconduct and illegal usufruct of the spoils left by their predecessor, João Rodrigues Coutinho.

Captain Forjaz suffered a sudden death on the night of April 15, 1611. On that same night, a local council organized by Bishop Manuel Baptista gathered and elected Captain Bento Banha Cardoso as temporary governor. The crown chose Francisco Correia da Silva as new governor of Angola, but he died before assuming the post. The new choice was Gonçalo Coutinho, brother of the deceased governor João Rodrigues Coutinho, but before he embarked to Angola, the decision was revoked by Philip II himself, and Manuel Cerveira Pereira, who by then had been cleared of all charges, once again became governor and captain-general of Angola from 1615 to 1617. He was also chosen to carry on the exploration of the territory south of the Cuanza River and to look for copper mines in the region known as the Kingdom of Benguela.

Captain Cerveira Pereira left Luanda for Benguela in April 1617, accompanied by 130 soldiers on board five ships to face his greatest challenge, the establishment of a new Portuguese outpost (*feitoria*) in São Filipe de Benguela. Soon after settling close to the Marimbombo River, he engaged in conflicts with local jagas—namely, Kangombe from Catumbela and the Moquimbes from Quilumata. He also faced internal conflicts with other officials, and especially with his own soldiers, who regularly complained about harsh treatment and heavy labor, which led to revolts and attempts of escape.

Cerveira Pereira also had conflicts with the new governor of Angola, Luis Mendes de Vasconcellos (1617–1621), and complained to Philip II about the lack of support from Vasconcellos to his royal mission to conquer Benguela and discover its copper mines. The king determined that the new governor, João Correia de Sousa (1621–1623), should support the conquest of Benguela. Nevertheless, Sousa showed the same animosity toward Cerveira Pereira as his predecessor. Once the samples of copper ore sent to Lisbon by the conquistador proved to be of poor quality, he lost the remaining support necessary to carry on the exploration of the territory. Manuel Cerveira Pereira died on April 9, 1626, and was probably buried in the church of the Jesuits in Luanda.

Estevam Thompson

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest (1575–1648); Jaga

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Cetshwayo kaMpande (c. 1826–1884)

Cetshwayo kaMpande was the last independent king of the Zulu nation in what is now South Africa and strove to maintain his kingdom in the face of white encroachment. Although brave and intelligent, he seriously underestimated what war with the British Empire would entail.

Cetshwayo was born sometime in 1826 the son of Chief Mpande and his first wife, Mgquumbhazi. King Shaka, Cetshwayo's uncle, had reorganized the Zulu people along strict military lines, equipped them with sharp stabbing spears, and conquered many of the surrounding groups. When Shaka was assassinated in 1828, he was succeeded by his half-brother, King Dingane. After a rule of several years, Dingane was deposed by another half-brother, Mpande, who succeeded by forging an alliance with the white settlers of nearby Natal. During his long reign, Mpande had two sons, Cetshwayo and Mbulazi, both of whom were heirs-apparent to the throne.

For many years, the two rivals formed political alliances against each other, and their father did little to dissuade them. When civil war broke out in 1856, Cetshwayo enjoyed larger numbers of warriors, and he crushed Mbulazi's army at the Battle of Ndondakusuka on December 2, slaughtering him and most of his followers. Mpande was allowed to remain on the throne, but Cetshwayo became de facto ruler of the Zulu people. Following his father's death in October 1872, he was formally elevated to king. One of his first acts was to overhaul and revitalize the famed Zulu military system—a move that instilled fear in his white neighbors.

Cetshwayo proved himself an able leader and managed to maintain Zulu unity in the face of white encroachment. Like his father, he wisely retained good relations with the British colony of Natal, which served as a counterweight to the Afrikaners in neighboring Transvaal. The Afrikaners were white colonials of Dutch descent who were dissatisfied with British authority along the coastal regions and had pushed farther inland to escape them.

By 1878, the Afrikaners were determined to seize parts of Zululand, and Cetshwayo appealed to the British authorities to arbitrate the dispute. The British settled in favor of the Zulus, but a new high commissioner, Sir Henry Bartle Frere, had other plans. Eager to promote a confederation of white colonies in South Africa with trade arrangements favorable to Great Britain, Frere suppressed the report supporting Cetshwayo and threw his support behind the Afrikaners. Moreover, on his own authority, he issued an ultimatum to the Zulu king, demanding that he disband his army within 30 days and accept a white regent or face war. This move would have constituted the immediate end of Zulu national sovereignty. When Cetshwayo, the proud ruler of a proud people, predictably ignored such unreasonable conditions, the British prepared for an immediate invasion.

In January 1879, British general Frederick Chelmsford led five columns of British troops and African auxiliaries into the Zulu heartland. Despite the fact that Zulus enjoyed a sterling reputation as the finest and most disciplined warriors in Africa, the British anticipated an easy conquest, and Chelmsford carelessly divided his force. Part of the center column, consisting of 800 white and 1,000 black troops, encountered a large Zulu army of between 10,000 and 20,000 warriors at the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, and were nearly wiped out.

This Zulu victory represented the largest defeat ever handed to European forces by Africans and forced Chelmsford to fall back and regroup. Zulu losses had also been heavy, however, inspiring Cetshwayo to comment that "a spear has been plunged into the belly of the Zulu nation." At length, Chelmsford resumed his offensive more carefully and defeated the Zulus in a number of pitched battles. The climax came when the British stormed the Zulu capital at Ulundi on July 4, 1879. Following the Battle of Ulundi, Cetshwayo fled as a fugitive in his own land and was taken prisoner the following month.

The Zulu king remained confined at Cape Town for several months, refusing to take responsibility for the war. He insisted that he had acted in self-defense, and only for the protection of his homeland. It was decided to allow Cetshwayo to plead his case directly before Queen Victoria, and he was sent to London. His intelligence and integrity favorably impressed the British court, and eventually, he was allowed to return to Zululand as king. In his absence, however, the British had totally reorganized the conquered nation along lines that best suited their interests. The kingdom was now broken up into 13 petty fiefdoms, each with its own British-appointed chieftain.

Cetshwayo kaMpande (c. 1826–1884) was ruler of the Zulu Kingdom from 1872 until he was deposed by the British at the conclusion of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. The British took him to Cape Town and London, and eventually returned him to Zululand which enflamed the Zulu Civil War of 1883–1884. He died suddenly and mysteriously in February 1884 at Eshowe in the British colony of Natal. (C.F. Crewes/George Eastman House/Getty Images)

With his army disbanded, Cetshwayo could no longer maintain order, and in July 1883, civil war broke out. A rival chief captured the capital, forcing Cetshwayo to flee. He spent his last few months in exile in Eshowe, Natal, as a guest of the British, before dying there on February 8, 1884. Cetshwayo was succeeded by his son Dinuzulu, but within three years of his passing, Zululand was annexed to British-controlled Natal and ceased to be an independent nation.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Isandlwana, Battle of (1879); Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Mpande kaSenzangakhona; Ndondakusuka, Battle of (December 2, 1856); Ulundi, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Chad, French Conquest of (1895–1900)

Rabih ibn Fadl Allah had served in Egypt's Sudanese cavalry during the war against Ethiopia in the 1860s and became the military commander of a Sudanese slaver in the Bahr el Ghazal region of southern Sudan during the 1870s. In 1879, following the suppression of slave traders by the Egyptian-appointed governor General Charles Gordon, Rabih led 700 to 800 slave soldiers south to raid the country between the Nile and Ubangi basins. In 1887, after the Mahdi had overturned Egyptian rule in Sudan, Rabih's forces invaded Darfur, where they recruited more soldiers but were defeated by the sultan of Wadai. Then they subjugated a small sultanate just north of what is now the Central African Republic.

Claiming to be a follower of the Mahdi, Rabih's expansion clashed with growing French ambitions in the region. His army relied on a core of fast cavalry armed with imported rifles. In 1892, Rabih led an invasion of the Bagirmi sultanate southeast of Lake Chad and destroyed its capital in March 1893, which prompted the exiled ruler to eventually accept French protection in 1897. Later that year, Rabih led 2,000 horsemen into Borno, southwest of Lake Chad, and defeated its 15,000-strong army in May and September.

After the new Borno ruler Kyari inflicted a defeat on the invaders and occupied their camp, Rabih launched a vicious counteroffensive that sacked the capital, Kukuwa, in what is now northeastern Nigeria. Kyari was killed, and Rabih established a new, fortified capital at nearby Dikwa. As military dictator, Rabih reformed Borno taxation and used its revenue to rebuild the army commanded by his fellow Sudanese, which seized food from villages and captured slaves.

In 1895, Rabih tried unsuccessfully to obtain guns and ammunition from the British Royal Niger Company, and a French expedition under Emile Gentil, meant to block British and German expansion, traveled by steamboat up the Congo and Ubangi rivers to establish Fort Archambault (present-day Sarh) in what is now southern Chad. The French greatly underestimated Rabih's military strength, and in late 1898 and early 1899, a small French expedition led by naval lieutenant Henri Bretonnet with five French officers, 50 Senegalese tirailleurs, and three cannon was dispatched up the Congo River to support the Baguirmi kingdom, which lent it

400 fighters, and established a defensive position on the Togbao Hills overlooking the town of Kouno. On July 17, 1899, Rabih's army, consisting of 2,700 gunmen and 10,000 auxiliaries with spears and bows, overwhelmed the position after three attacks and massacred the defenders.

Subsequently, the French set out to unify their African territories by having three columns converge on Lake Chad; one of them, led by Gentil, traveled by steamboat up the Congo River; another, under Major Amedee-Francois Lamy, marched south from Algiers across the Sahara; and a third, commanded by the psychopathic Captain Paul Voulet, originated from Dakar in Senegal and marched across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Since it wantonly destroyed villages and massacred people in its path, the Senegal expedition was pursued for over 2,000 kilometers by 70 Senegalese tirailleurs under Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Francois Klob, the French commander at Timbuktu ordered by Paris to stop the slaughter. But Klob was killed in a confrontation with Voulet. The Senegal expedition then degenerated into mutiny and infighting, during which Voulet and other officers were killed.

After capturing the town of Zinder in what is now Niger, the combined force of the late Voulet and Klob, numbering 600 tirailleurs, was divided, with 170 under Lieutenant Paul Joalland continuing east until they linked up with Lamy's column and proceeded to Lake Chad. On October 28, Gentil led an attack on Rabih's fort at Kouno, with his gunboat providing artillery fire from the Chari River and 340 tirailleurs with several cannon approaching overland. With the three cannon captured at Togbao, Rabih and his men repelled repeated French assaults, and after half his force was killed or wounded, Gentil ordered a withdrawal to Fort Archambault to await the other columns. On April 21, 1900, Gentil's and Lamy's expeditions joined on the east bank of the Chari across from the town of Kousseri in today's northern Cameroon. The next day, 700 tirailleurs, along with 600 Bagirmi infantry and 200 cavalry, attacked Rabih's camp, where his 10,000 men were routed. Lamy and Rabih were both killed, and the French displayed the latter's decapitated head as proof of their conquest. French control of what is now Chad, administered from Fort Lamy (now Ndjamena) linked their Central, West, and North African territories.

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See also: Gordon, Charles George; Kouno, Battle of (October 28, 1899); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Kousseri, Battle of (April 22, 1900); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Rabih ibn Fadl Allah; Royal Niger Company; *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Voulet-Chanoine Mission (1898–1900)

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Chaltin, Louis-Napoleon (1857–1933)

Louis-Napoleon Chaltin was born at Ixelles, Brussels, on April 27, 1857, and his father was an officer in the Belgian army. In 1873, when he was 16 years old, he entered the Belgian army and worked his way through the ranks until being promoted to lieutenant in 1878. During the 1880s, he was seconded to the Ministry of War and served on a military court, and in 1890, he was posted to a military cartographic institute.

In January 1891, Lieutenant Chaltin joined the Force Publique (FP) and was shipped to Boma, the capital of Leopold II's Congo Free State. Later that year, in June, he became commander of the FP outpost at Basoko, on the Congo River in the northern part of the territory. A year later, in the opening engagements of the so-called Arab War, Chaltin received a spear wound in the leg. Promoted to captain in March 1893, Chaltin led an FP detachment based in a fort at Stanley Falls and proceeded up the Congo and Lomani rivers by steamboat to capture Swahili-Arab strongholds. In May 1893, the garrison at Stanley Falls was besieged by the Swahili-Arabs and narrowly saved by the arrival of a river-borne relief force under Chaltin.

In March 1894, at the end of his first term of service in the FP, Chaltin returned to Europe but in May 1895, he returned to the Congo for a second tour of duty. Given Leopold's desire to extend the Congo Free State to the upper Nile River, Chaltin was immediately dispatched to the northeast of the territory, where he led forces that defeated several Azande rulers. In these bloody battles, Chaltin lost two fingers from his left hand. The pacified northeast then served as a staging area for two FP columns that headed for the upper Nile in what is now South Sudan. A large force under Francis Dhanis left Stanley Falls in September 1896 but was disrupted by a mutiny that led to several years of guerrilla warfare in the area.

A smaller expedition, consisting of 800 FP soldiers and 550 Azande irregulars under Chaltin, left Dungu in December 1896 and arrived at the Nile on February 14, 1897. On February 17, 1897, Chaltin's force defeated the Mahdist defenders of Rejjaf, the southernmost port on the Nile, and took control of the surrounding area, known as the Lado Enclave. At the same time, a large Anglo-Egyptian army was moving south along the lower Nile toward Khartoum and a small French expedition that had started at the Atlantic coast was marching toward Fashoda in southern Sudan. In June 1898, at the end of his second term of service, Chaltin again returned to Belgium.

From March 1899 to 1902, Chaltin returned to the Congo for a third term and served as the administrative and military head of Uele District in the northeast and the Lado Enclave. Subsequently, he returned to the Belgian army, where he was promoted to major in 1903, but his career was hampered by a riding accident injury, which led to his early retirement in 1908. Chaltin's colonial contacts resulted in his taking over the operations of a concessionary company in the Kasai region of Congo. When World War I broke out in 1914, Chaltin returned to military service as a reserve colonel and commanded a volunteer unit of 330 former colonial soldiers who had served in the Congo. In late August 1914, during the defense of Namur, Chaltin and many of his men were captured by the Germans. He remained a prisoner of war in Germany until 1917, when he was transferred to neutral Switzerland because of illness. He eventually was sent to France and returned to the Belgian army before the end of the war.

In March 1920, Chaltin finally retired from the military after undertaking some recruiting in Belgium. He then worked for various companies involved in the Belgian Congo such as Belcoma Cafegas, the Kasai Company, and Unatra, which operated steamers on the Congo River, and became active in the Belgian Colonial Society of Eastern Congo. He died in Uccle, Belgium, on March 14, 1933. A town in the northern Belgian Congo was named Port Chaltin, but the name was changed to Aketi in 1971.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–1894); Dhanis, Francis; Force Publique (to 1914); Leopold II; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Rejjaf, Battle of (January 16, 1897); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Chard, John R. M. (1847–1897)

Colonel John R. M. Chard is best remembered for his service as a lieutenant and commander of the post of Rorke's Drift during its gallant defense against repeated Zulu attacks, January 22–23, 1879, during the Anglo-Zulu War.

Chard was born on December 21, 1847, in Devonshire, England. He was commissioned a lieutenant in the Royal Engineers upon graduation from the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in 1868. Assignments in Bermuda and Malta followed before he returned to England in 1875. He left England with the 5th Engineer Company on December 2, 1878, for service in the Zulu War. Arriving at Durban on January 4, 1879, Chard was sent in advance to Helpmakaar to prepare for the arrival of his company. He arrived at Rorke's Drift on January 19, and after Major Henry Spalding's departure on January 22, Chard was left in command of the post.

On January 22, 1879, the Zulu devastated a British force at Isandlwana and that night attacked the small post of Rorke's Drift. Chard, assisted by Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead of the 24th Regiment, hastily planned, organized, and led the defense of the post through numerous desperate and intense Zulu attacks until the following morning. Remarkably, the British garrison of eight officers and 131 other ranks (including 35 who had to go to the hospital) held off the repeated assaults of about 3,000 to 4,000 Zulu. For his gallantry and leadership, Chard was awarded the Victoria Cross, along with 10 others. Chard was also given a supernumerary captaincy in the Royal Engineers and a brevet majority dated January 23, 1879. He thus became the first British army officer to be promoted from lieutenant to major in a single day.

Chard was a somewhat unimpressive fellow, and many senior officers were amazed that he had been able to orchestrate and lead the stubborn defense of Rorke's Drift. Lieutenant General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, for example, who presented the Victoria Cross to Chard, reportedly found him "a hopelessly dull and stupid fellow, and Bromhead not much better" (Best and Greaves 2001, p. 123).

After the Anglo-Zulu War, Chard served at Devonport, Cyprus, and other locations in England before sailing for Singapore in 1892, where he served for three years. Returning to Britain in 1896, he was promoted to colonel on January 8, 1897. Chard died of tongue cancer on November 1, 1897.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Bromhead, Gonville; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879); Wolseley, Field Marshal Garnet J.

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Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus) (1827–1905)

Throughout his military career, Frederick Augustus Thesiger, the second Baron Chelmsford, enjoyed a series of staff positions and rapid promotion. Unfortunately, by the time he led British forces in the Zulu War of 1879, he had obtained little experience in field command, nor did he have the necessary knowledge of South Africa. Although he ultimately succeeded in destroying the Zulu as a military power, Lord Chelmsford's terrible reverse at the Battle of Isandlwana proved one of the greatest defeats suffered by a European force at the hands of an African one.



Lord Chelmsford (F.A. Thesiger, 1827–1905) commanded British forces during the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878 and the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Given the Zulu defeat of the British at the Battle of Isandlwana, Chelmsford was replaced by Garnet Wolseley. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

Born on May 31, 1827, Frederick was the eldest son of Frederick Thesiger, the first Baron of Chelmsford, and Anna

Tinling. After attending the famous public school at Eton, he entered the army as a second lieutenant in 1844. Starting with the rifle brigade, he transferred to the grenadier guards. Over the next several years, he obtained rapid promotion and served in a number of staff posts. A captain by 1850, he became the aide-de-camp to the lord lieutenant of Ireland two years later. From 1853 to 1854, he served as aide-de-camp to Sir Edward Blakeney, commander of British troops in Ireland.

During the Crimean War in 1855, Chelmsford was aide-de-camp to Lieutenant-General Frederick Markham, commander of the British second division, before assuming the post of deputy assistant quartermaster general during 1855–1856. Promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 1857, he saw the closing actions of the Indian Rebellion. He remained in India for several years as the adjutant general of British troops in the Bombay presidency. In 1868, he joined an expedition led by General Robert Napier, which sought to free a number of European hostages taken by Emperor Tewodros II of Ethiopia. As deputy adjutant general, Chelmsford impressed Napier as a conscientious officer. The next year found Chelmsford in the East Indies, where he served as adjutant general for British forces in the area until 1874. Returning to Britain, he held several staff positions and achieved the rank of major general in 1877. In 1878, after his father's death, he became the second Baron Chelmsford.

During the same year, the British government sent Chelmsford to South Africa with orders to suppress unrest among various indigenous peoples in the area. After defeating the Griquas in the Cape Colony, Chelmsford moved his base of operations to the Transvaal, where he attempted to quell an uprising by Sekhukhune, leader of the Pedi. The situation in South Africa became increasingly volatile as Sir Henry Bartle Frere, the new governor of the Cape Colony, along with Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the Colonial Office's representative in the area, planned to unite the British colonies in the region with the Boer republics. An integral part of their scheme consisted of disarming local African powers. These activities antagonized the Sotho, Gcaleka Xhosa, and Rharhabe Xhosa, who all began to occupy Chelmsford's attention. Unfortunately, Frere and Shepstone also picked this moment to neutralize the most powerful African people in the region—the Zulu under King Cetshwayo.

In 1879, after presenting Cetshwayo with an ultimatum that the Zulu leader could not accept, Frere sent Chelmsford into Zululand with 5,000 British troops and 8,000 African auxiliaries. Dividing his force into three widely dispersed columns, he planned to have them converge on Cetshwayo's village at Ulundi. This division of his forces proved a mistake, since the columns were too far from one another to offer mutual support. Chelmsford accompanied the center column and compounded his original mistake by splitting this group in half.

On January 22, 1879, while Chelmsford was off with half of this force, the other half, encamped at Isandlwana, was annihilated by a portion of the Zulu force. More than 800 British troops were killed, and only a handful of survivors escaped. Until the Italians were defeated by the Ethiopians at Adowa in 1896, Isandlwana was the worst defeat suffered by a European force at the hands of black Africans. Chelmsford's offensive ground to a halt. At the Battle of Rorke's Drift, a company of British troops belonging to the center column narrowly avoided further annihilation when a force of several thousand Zulus attacked its encampment on the border of Natal and the Zulu Kingdom. Just over 100 British troops held the Zulu off for about 24 hours. More British soldiers won the Victoria Cross for their heroism at Rorke's Drift (11 being awarded) than in any other action in the history of the British army. Nevertheless, the remnants of the center column had to retreat, while Chelmsford's two flank columns halted and entrenched themselves before large Zulu forces. Ominously, Chelmsford's African troops deserted in large numbers.

Having received reinforcements from Britain, Chelmsford tried his luck again. Sending one force along the coast, he led another directly on Ulundi. Reaching Ulundi with about 5,000 men on July 4, 1879, Chelmsford sought battle with Cetshwayo. Forming his troops into a hollow rectangle, he took advantage of his force's superior firepower to halt Cetshwayo's attacks and destroy the Zulu force. Ironically, Chelmsford achieved victory at the Battle of Ulundi after he had already been relieved of his command. Stung by the defeat at Isandlwana, the British government had sent General Sir Garnet Wolseley to replace Chelmsford. Wolseley, however, did not reach Chelmsford's forces in the field until July 15. With Wolseley continuing mop-up operations, Chelmsford returned to Britain.

In 1882, Chelmsford was promoted to lieutenant general, and he remained in service until 1893. On April 9, 1905, Chelmsford died suddenly while playing billiards at the United Service Club in London.

Hubert Dubrulle

See also: Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Napier, Robert C.; Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879); Sekhukhune woaSekwati; Tewodros II; Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Wolseley, Field Marshal Garnet J.

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Churchill, Winston (1874–1965)

Sir Winston L. S. Churchill, best known as the dynamic and pugnacious prime minister of Britain during World War II, lived during the final decades of Queen Victoria's long reign. His early life was dominated by British army service and by journalism, and he was arguably the most famous soldier–war correspondent of the late Victorian era.

Born on November 30, 1874, Churchill was the son of Lord Randolph Churchill (who was the third son of the seventh Duke of Marlborough) and an American-born mother. After being educated at Harrow

Winston Churchill (1874–1965) was one of the most well-known British soldier-journalists of the Victorian period. He participated in and wrote about the British invasion of Sudan in the late 1890s and the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). (Library of Congress)

and at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Churchill was commissioned into the 4th Hussars in 1895. He was highly ambitious, and his "plan was to round out his [military] training with direct experience of warfare and, simultaneously, to report to the world on what he saw" (Weidhorn, 1974, p. 15). Churchill also intended to use his newspaper articles and books as a platform from which to launch a political career.

In 1895, taking advantage of family connections, Churchill was able to travel to Cuba, where an insurgency against Spanish rule had been in progress since the previous year. He sent letters back to England for publication in the *Daily Graphic*.

In September 1896, Churchill was posted to his regiment in India. The following year, while on leave, he learned of a punitive expedition being formed for action on the North-West Frontier. Because all staff positions were filled, Churchill became a war correspondent to accompany the Malakand Field Force. He was resented by the professional officers, who did not like his self-serving, journalistic motives. Churchill's *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War* was published in 1898.

The Anglo-Egyptian reconquest of the Sudan had begun in 1896, and Churchill was also eager to participate in the concluding phase of this campaign. He had already made a number of enemies within the British army, and his "energetic pursuit of adventure had gained him the reputation of a medal-hunter and self-advertiser and his association with the newspapers was also a cause of suspicion" (Dyas, 2002, p. 1). The commander of the Anglo-Egyptian force in the Sudan, Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener, was opposed to Churchill accompanying the force, but he was overruled by the adjutant-general at the War Office. Churchill was appointed a supernumerary lieutenant in the 21st Lancers and arrived in Cairo in August 1898 with an arrangement to provide news for the *Morning Post.* He was present at the Battle of Omdurman (September 2, 1898) and participated in the charge of the 21st Lancers, in which 21 officers and men were killed and 71 wounded. Churchill wrote the two-volume *The River War* (1899), based on his reports from the Sudan.

In September 1899, with war clouds looming over South Africa, Churchill was asked to be the *Daily Mail* correspondent in South Africa. He landed at Durban on November 4, 1899, and attempted to pay any soldier 200 pounds to take him to the besieged Ladysmith. He was later captured by the Boers, perhaps intentionally, and he escaped, thus becoming a national figure. Based on his Second Anglo-Boer War reports, with which Churchill "reached both the climax and the end of his brief but incandescent career as a correspondent" (Woods 1992, p. xxvi), he wrote two more books: *London to Ladysmith via Pretoria* (1900) and *Ian Hamilton's March* (1900).

The notoriety and fame that Churchill achieved as a soldier and war correspondent helped him win election to Parliament in 1900. Churchill later served as prime minister (1940–1945; 1951–1955). He was knighted and received the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953. Churchill, the soldier–war correspondent of the late Victorian era, died on January 25, 1965.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Film Depictions of African Colonial Warfare; Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Coatit, Battle of (January 13–14, 1895)

The Italian victory over the army of the ruler of the Ethiopian province of Tigray in the Battle of Coatit convinced the Italian army high command that it could achieve its goal of conquering Ethiopia by manipulating two factors: loyal indigenous troops and firepower (especially artillery fire). This belief would be sorely tested a year later in the epic Battle of Adowa, the bloodiest defeat suffered by a European army in colonial warfare in Africa.

The Battle of Coatit was an episode in the struggle between the Italians and the Ethiopian emperor, Menelik II, over control of Eritrea and, ultimately, of Ethiopia as a whole. The Italians had felt that their hold on Eritrea was secure when Menelik agreed to recognize its boundaries in the Treaty of Wuchale in May 1889. But Menelik, rightly suspecting that the Italians thought that the treaty granted them a protectorate over the whole of Ethiopia, repudiated it and began laying plans to recover Eritrea. His first move was to win over the local rulers of Tigray, the Ethiopian province next to Eritrea, which enjoyed virtual autonomy, and of the southernmost parts of Eritrea, Ras Mengesha, Ras Alula, Bahta Hagos, and Welde Mikael Mekonnen, who had been aligned with the Italians. The emperor forgave the warlords for their indiscretions and promised Ras Mengesha the throne of Tigray if he joined an impending campaign to evict the Italians from Eritrea.

In December 1894, the warlord Bahta Hagos launched an uprising in Akele Ouzai, the region under his rule in Eritrea. Hoping that Ras Mengesha would march to his aid, Bahta attacked an Italian garrison at Hatay, but his force was taken in the rear by a relief column led by Major Pietro Toselli. His army was driven off, and Bahta was killed.

The Italians in Eritrea, seeing the hand of Ras Mengesha in the revolt led by Bahta Hagos, now took the field with a force comprised largely of "native" regulars or *ascaris* under the command of the colonial governor, General Oreste Baratieri. The general took with him three battalions (led by Italian officers) of *ascari* infantry with 1,100 men each, 28 *ascari* lancers, around 400 local irregulars, and four mountain guns. The opposing force, led by Ras Mengesha, included some 12,000 riflemen and 7,000 soldiers equipped with swords and spears.

Baratieri's scouts located Ras Mengesha's camp near the town of Coatit on January 12, and at dawn the next morning, the Italian force attacked following an artillery bombardment. The Tigrayans recovered quickly from the surprise attack, however, and fighting was frequently hand to hand. Ras Mengesha's force next moved to turn the Italian left flank, and it very nearly succeeded. But the Italians managed to execute a change of front under fire and took up a new defensive position, protected by artillery, from which the Tigrayans were unable to dislodge them. Ras Mengesha finally ordered a retreat on January 16, and Batatieri's troops set out in hot pursuit, coming up on the Tigrayans' camp the next day and driving them off in headlong retreat. On January 18, Baratieri turned north once again and Eritrea was deemed secure.

The Battle of Coatit and the pursuit that followed appear to have convinced the Italians that they could prevail against Ethiopian troops even when heavily outnumbered, given the steady performance of their *ascaris* under Italian officers and their advantage in firepower. Indeed, according to historian Nicola Labanca, they believed in the "myth of the cannon" (Labanca, *In marcia verso Adua* [Turin: Einaudi, 1993], pp. 191–192). In a little over a year, an Italian army, again under the command of General Baratieri, would pay a heavy price for its reliance on firepower and its belief that Italian soldiers—descendants of the Romans, after all—could not be beaten by the so-called barbaric hordes of Ethiopia.

Bruce Vandervort

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Alula Engida, Ras; Baratieri, Orestre; Italo-Ethiopian War (1895–1896); Mekonnen, Welde Mikael; Menelik II

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Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899)

The Battle of Colenso, on December 15, 1899, was the third of three demoralizing defeats suffered by the British during "Black Week" in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), after the Battles of Stormberg (December 10) and Magersfontein (December 11). It took place during operations to relieve Ladysmith in the British colony of Natal.

The Boers began to besiege Ladysmith on November 2, 1899. General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., commander-in-chief of the South African Field Force, assembled a 21,000-man force—the largest commanded by a British general since the Crimean War—by December 10, 1899, at Frere for the purpose of relieving Ladysmith. The force consisted of four infantry brigades, a mounted infantry brigade, five field batteries and two naval guns, and a naval contingent. To get to Ladysmith, Buller's force would have to advance 16 kilometers across open country to the fast-flowing Tugela River—a major obstacle. High ground, with a number of easily defensible peaks, stretched from the bank of the Tugela northward for 8 kilometers. Ladysmith was 20 kilometers north of the Tugela. The town of Colenso was on the south bank of a loop in the Tugela, where a railroad bridge crossed the river. A wagon bridge crossed the Tugela less than a mile west of the railroad bridge.

Buller had originally planned to try to outflank Colenso by crossing the Tugela farther upstream, but when he learned on December 12, 1899, of the British defeat at Magersfontein the previous day, he decided on immediate action and a frontal assault across the Tugela River. The British artillery bombarded the hills north of the Tugela for two days, revealing the British intentions.

The 4,500-man Boer force, consisting of nine commandos (with one in reserve) with artillery under Commandant-General Louis Botha, was entrenched along an 11-kilometer front north of the Tugela, in a manner similar to their defenses at the Battles of Modder River (November 28, 1899) and Magersfontein. It concentrated on the Colenso bridges and other fording sites. Once the British attacked and tried to cross the Tugela, the Boers planned to enfilade the attackers by fire from a tenth commando, located on Hlangwane Hill, south of the Tugela, on the British right flank. Moreover, the Boers would counterattack on their right flank.

Buller's plan was to attack with two brigades abreast in the daylight and force a passage of the Tugela by sheer weight of numbers and seize the high ground north of Colenso. At 4:00 A.M. on December 15, 1899, the British force left its camp 5 kilometers south of the Tugela and marched northward. Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard's 2nd Brigade, on the right, was to conduct the main attack by crossing the Tugela at Old Wagon Drift, near the rail bridge. Major-General Fitzroy Hart's 5th (Irish) Brigade was to the left, with orders to cross the Tugela at Bridle Drift, about 1.5 kilometers west of a second river loop. Meanwhile, Colonel the Earl of Dundonald's mounted brigade guarded the right flank and was to seize Hlangwane Hill if possible. Major-General G. Barton's 6th (Fusiliers) Brigade was in reserve to the right, and Major-General Neville G. Lyttelton's 4th (Light) Brigade was in reserve to the left. The artillery, under Colonel C. J. Long, who had commanded the artillery at the Battle of Omdurman (September 2, 1898), was to support the infantry assault.

Hart's brigade got lost and marched into a salient in the Tugela and, when it was 200 meters from the river, the Boers opened fire. The roar of the Mausers sounded like "the sound of rain beating on a tin roof" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 228). The Irish Brigade tried to deploy from close order, but Hart urged his men forward, and by 7:15 A.M., his disorganized brigade was receiving enemy fire from three directions and had suffered over 400 casualties. Buller ordered Hart to withdraw his brigade.

The aggressive Long, eager to support Hildyard's 2nd Brigade attack and to compensate for any inferior range of his artillery, galloped his 12 field and 6 naval guns forward, far ahead of his infantry escort and even the 2nd Brigade. He began firing at the Boers about 900 meters across the Tugela. Boer riflemen and artillery soon engaged the British in a tremendous firefight. After Long's artillery ran out of ammunition and about one-third of the artillerymen had become casualties, the remaining soldiers abandoned their guns.

When Buller was informed of this situation at about 8:00 A.M., and after only one of his brigades had attacked, he called off the entire operation. He then attempted to rescue Long and his guns, personally directing units and serving as an example of courageous leadership. He called for volunteers to save the guns, and a number of corporals and soldiers responded, followed by three officers of his staff. One of these officers was Lieutenant Frederick Roberts, son of Field Marshal Lord (later Earl) Frederick S. Roberts, V.C. Numerous attempts were made to save the guns, and two of them were recovered.

Realizing the weariness of his troops in the hot sun, fighting against an unseen foe, coupled with the repulse of Dundonald's brigade, Buller realized the best course of action was to withdraw the entire force. By 3:00 P.M., most troops had retreated out of danger, and the transport of wounded to the rear began.

That evening, the tired and wounded Buller reported his "serious reverse" at Colenso and suggested that the besieged garrison of Ladysmith surrender if it could not hold out for another month. These actions led to Buller's supersession by Roberts, whose son had died of the wounds he received trying to rescue Long's guns (he would receive the Victoria Cross posthumously). Five others also received the Victoria Cross.

The failure at Colenso cost the British 1,138 casualties: 143 killed, 755 wounded, and 240 missing, most of whom were captured. This operation, a disaster due largely to Long's improper forward deployment and abandonment of his guns, followed a great British army tradition: "courage matched only by stupidity" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 240).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); Botha, Louis; Buller, Redvers Henry; Foreign Volunteers in Boer Forces, Second Anglo-Boer War; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Stormberg, Battle of (December 10, 1899)

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Colley, George Pomeroy (1835–1881)

Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley was considered a brilliant British army officer, and his outstanding abilities and promise had been recognized early by his inclusion in Major-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley's Ashanti Ring of young, competent, and progressive officers. While a superb staff officer and instructor, Pomeroy Colley had little command experience.

Pomeroy Colley (his original surname was "Colley," but he added Pomeroy later in life) was born into an Anglo-Irish family in 1835. At 13, he entered the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, passed out at the top of his class, and in 1852, he was commissioned without purchase as an ensign in the 2nd Foot. Promoted without purchase to lieutenant to 1854, he was posted to his regiment in Cape Colony, South Africa, where he served as a border magistrate.

In 1860, Pomeroy Colley served as a company commander in the Second China War and then returned to Britain to attend the Staff College. His intellect was readily apparent when he completed the normal two-year course in less than 10 months, earning the highest score on the examination then on record. His exceptional theoretical knowledge soon led to his appointment as professor of military administration at the Staff College.

Wolseley selected Pomeroy Colley to serve as director of transport during the Second Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874). This operation, in a disease-ridden jungle environment, heavily depended on logistics and transportation. Pomeroy Colley's superb achievements in West Africa earned him a secure place in Wolseley's fledgling Ashanti Ring and promotion to colonel. Wolseley believed that Pomeroy Colley "was a man in a thousand, with an iron will and of inflexible determination" (Farwell, 1972, p. 243).

In 1875, when Wolseley was appointed governor of Natal, Pomeroy Colley accompanied him as a staff officer, which gave him a good opportunity to reconnoiter the terrain of the area and gain an appreciation for Boer attitudes. He then became military secretary to the viceroy of India, but when Wolseley was appointed to command the forces in 1879, during the later phases of the Zulu War, he rejoined Wolseley as chief of staff. The conclusion of the war in Natal, coupled with renewed fighting in Afghanistan, required Pomeroy Colley's return to India.

Pomeroy Colley was promoted to major-general in April 1880 and succeeded Wolseley as governor and commander-in-chief of Natal and the Transvaal and high commissioner for South-East Africa. There was considerable Boer discontent in the Transvaal, which had been annexed by Britain in 1877, and friction increased over taxation and other issues.

The First Anglo-Boer War broke out on December 16, 1880. The initial action of the war took place four days later, when the Boers intercepted a British column at Bronkhorstspruit, east of Pretoria. In the short engagement that followed, the British suffered heavy casualties and the survivors surrendered. This was a humiliating defeat for the British.

At this time, Pomeroy Colley commanded about 3,500 British troops in the Transvaal and Natal. While he was considered a brilliant staff officer and administrator, this was his first independent field command. His 1,400-man composite Natal Field Force departed Pietermaritzburg on January 10, 1881, to quell the Boer unrest and relieve the British garrisons in the Transvaal. On January 28, 1881, his force conducted a frontal attack uphill, intending to turn the Boer position at Laing's Nek, a key pass in the Drakensberg Mountains on the route to the Transvaal. Accurate Boer marksmanship halted the British, who again sustained a large number of casualties. The attack was an abject failure. Pomeroy Colley seemed to have found it unimaginable that a bunch of Boer farmers had defeated well-trained and disciplined British soldiers.

The British withdrew to Mount Prospect, 5 kilometers south of Laing's Nek. On February 7, 1881, however, the Boers started a flanking movement to isolate the British force. The next day, Pomeroy Colley, under Colonial Office pressure to defeat the Boers quickly, personally led a five-company force to ensure that the route was still open—an act that should have been conducted by a subordinate officer. Some 13 kilometers south of Mount Prospect, near the Ingogo River, the British fought a large Boer force and suffered many casualties.

Back at the base camp, Pomeroy Colley, eager to redeem his tainted reputation before a peace settlement was reached, learned that the Boer positions at Laing's Nek had been strengthened considerably. He decided to seize the undefended mountain of Majuba that dominated Laing's Nek. To accomplish this plan, Pomeroy Colley led his force in a night march, February 26–27, 1881, over steep and winding paths. The last British soldier reached Majuba's unoccupied summit by 5 A.M. on February 27. Pomeroy Colley, arguably overconfident, did not order his soldiers (who had not received any information as to the situation and plans) to dig defensive fighting positions. At the same time, listlessness is said to have overwhelmed Pomeroy Colley, and as a result, there was no coordinated assault on the Nek.

In conclusion, the Boers advanced stealthily up the hill to the British positions. After about five hours, during which time heavy rifle fire was exchanged, about 400 Boers reached positions within striking distance of the summit. By using skillful fire and movement and infiltration techniques, the Boers occupied Majuba. They poured heavy fire into the confused and demoralized mass of British soldiers, many of whom panicked and stampeded to the rear.

Pomeroy Colley seems to have been dazed by the rapidity of events and sudden reversal of fortune. It is unclear whether he was trying to rally his men or surrender, but he was shot in the forehead and died instantly. He was one of the 285 British soldiers, out of a force of about 365 on the summit, killed or wounded at the ignominious Battle of Majuba Hill. In his quest to redeem his reputation, Pomeroy Colley may have become unbalanced and achieved a different sort of immortality from that which he had sought.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Bronkhorstspruit, Battle of (December 20, 1880); Ingogo, Battle of (February 8, 1881); Laing's Nek, Battle of (January 28, 1881); Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Wolseley, Field Marshal Garnet J.; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

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Commando System (Boer Republics)

As they expanded east from the Cape Colony during the 18th century, frontier Dutch settlers called Trekboers organized voluntary local militias called commandos to mobilize for raids and defense against the indigenous Khoisan. Organized between 1700 and 1715, the first commandos consisted of Dutch East India Company employees and some settler volunteers. While the first entirely civilian commando was formed in 1715, these groups remained dependent upon the company for ammunition. In 1739, commando service became compulsory for all frontier settlers, who often brought along armed Khoisan servants (or sent them as substitutes), and they collected a share of captured livestock. Commando leaders were not required to get permission before raising a force; rather, they had to submit a report upon disbandment. Despite their temporary nature, commandos could be very destructive—for instance, in 1774, a grand commando of

100 Boers and 150 Khoisan swept the Sneeuberg area, killing 503 Bushmen and capturing 241.

When the British seized the Cape in 1806, they retained the Boer commando system. During the late 1830s and 1840s, the Boers who left the Cape Colony on what would be called the "Great Trek" brought the commando concept inland, making it the military system of their new republics. Commandos were mustered when required, there was no training, and members provided their own firearms and horses.

Since a commando came from a specific district, most of its members were relations or neighbors, and skills were passed down over generations. The election of officers created an egalitarian myth, but as votes were not secret, elite landowners were usually appointed by their dependents. Councils of war were held before operations, officers voted on plans, and anyone who disagreed could ride away with any men they brought with them. Although the commando was an inexpensive way for frontier republics to quickly organize a defense, it was notoriously unreliable, with no method of punishing deserters, and its logistics consisted of Boer women and African servants bringing food in wagons that were also used to create defensive laagers.

Given the small Boer population, commandos did not favor last stands, avoided close combat that resulted in high casualties, and withdrew when things went wrong. The Boers of the 1830s and 1840s perfected a tactic of dismounting to fire volleys, riding a short distance, dismounting and firing again, and repeating the process. This was successful in goading the spear-wielding African infantry into attacking prepared laagers, where they would be cut down by concentrated firepower. It was famously used with great success against the Ndebele and Zulu during the late 1830s.

From the 1850s to 1870s, Boer commandos included mounted infantry who rode to battle and dismounted to fight using "fire and movement" in assaults, sometimes supported by a few field guns. Although the Boers besieged many African mountain strongholds, such as those of the Sotho and Pedi during their conquest of the interior, this practice did not favor them, as hungry Boers eventually returned to their farms, which they were anxious to protect. However, when there was a perceived threat to their homes and way of life, the Boers could become well motivated, as happened during the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881.

The primary advantages of the commando system was its mobility, as every member had a horse, as well as the individual shooting, riding, and field craft skills of the frontier Boers. However, these factors began to wane during the 1890s with the development of a gold mining industry and subsequent urbanization. By the 1880s, Boer commandos would ride toward their enemy in loose formation, use dead ground to conceal their approach, and then dismount to fire from an advantageous position. Another problem with the commandos was that they possessed little or no artillery, nor did they have anyone trained in its use.

In the republics, the Orange Free State and Transvaal, each district had a few military-administrative officials called field cornets, who reported to an elected commandant, who led a commando, and who ultimately reported to a commandant-general. In the 1850s, the Orange Free State passed a commando law compelling all white males between 16 and 60 to register for armed service, and by the 1890s, they were required to attend annual training camps. During the 1870s, white males in the Transvaal had to complete at least three months military service every year. In 1883, the Transvaal enacted a Commando Law that obliged all white male residents to provide military service and allowed the republic to requisition supplies from foreign companies operating within its territory. This ultimately provoked resentment among foreigners working in the Transvaal's gold mines, as they objected to performing military service without voting rights, and the gold mining industry also disliked having to surrender its resources.

Although motivated by powerful ideas of manhood, Calvinist Christianity, and national freedom, Boer absenteeism from commando service became a serious problem. Since the Orange Free State and Transvaal prohibited blacks from carrying guns, the 19th-century republican commandos were significantly whiter than their 18th-century Cape predecessors. However, black servants called *agterryers* (which means "riders" in Afrikaans) came along to drive wagons, tend horses, load weapons, handle livestock, gather firewood, dig trenches, help wounded, and stand guard. During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), there was around one *agterryer* for every four or five Boer commando members. In 1899, both republics had a system of calling up age-based waves of commandos, starting with those aged 18 to 34.

During the Second Anglo-Boer War, some 70,000 Boers served in the commandos. Despite some dramatic initial success, the conventional warfare of the first phase of the conflict did not suit the commando system, as highly mobile forces became bogged down in a series of sieges. The commando came into its own during the final guerrilla phase of the war, when small elusive groups fought a hit-and-run campaign against large British occupation forces. The commando system was then outlawed by the British, who were concerned about potential Boer resistance. However, it was revived as a military reserve system after the 1910 Union of South Africa. During World War II, the British, inspired by their earlier experience in South Africa, popularized the term *commando* as shorthand for small, fast-moving, and highly skilled units conducting lightning raids.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795)

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Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)

The British took increasingly harsh measures beginning in 1900 to try to defeat Boer guerrilla fighters in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). In June, the British warned the Boers that farms near sabotaged railroad lines or from which British troops were fired on would be burned. A few months later, it was announced that farms hiding and protecting combatant Boers would also be razed. Shortly thereafter, selected farms were designated for destruction, and the so-called land clearance policy was implemented near the end of the year. These actions were intended to punish the Boers, individually and collectively, and to deprive the fighting Boers of food and shelter. Within weeks, numerous Boer families were homeless, and many other refugees sought British protection from possible Boer reprisals. The British solution was to concentrate the displaced Boers in protected camps near the railways.

The British establishment of concentration camps for the Boer refugees was well intentioned, although there was an initial lack of command interest in the issue. Moreover, the British did not anticipate the large numbers of homeless Boers, nor did they allocate adequate resources for the camps.

Conditions in the camps varied considerably. A superintendent, assisted by a storekeeper, clerks, a medical officer, a dispenser, a matron, and nurses, ran each one. At first, the refugees were housed in prefabricated wooden huts, but the supply of those was soon exhausted. Large tents, and later bell tents, were then used to house the internees. Extra medical care was frequently provided by camp inmates, who were paid for their assistance. Food was rationed, based on guidelines issued by medical authorities for the maintenance of health, and generally consisted of a pound of meal and about a half pound of meat per day, plus coffee and sugar. Additional food, clothing, and supplies were sold in camp shops at regulated prices. Attempts were made to find employment for as many of the refugees as possible, with many families being paid up to 20 pounds a month for their work. Boers who surrendered voluntarily were generally allowed to keep their livestock. Schools were set up in the camps for children.

Administrative difficulties soon arose, and conditions in some of the camps became very bad. Health issues were a primary concern. While the living conditions and food in the camps were supervised carefully, medical authorities were still unaware of a number of issues, including the possible vitamin deficiency of the diet due to lack of fresh vegetables. Moreover, the Boers had normally lived on isolated farms or in widely separated villages and were unfamiliar with the hygiene requirements of community living. The crowded conditions of the camps facilitated the exposure to and spread of contagious diseases to such a degree that simple illnesses became fatal. In addition, the winter of 1901–1902 was extremely severe, which exacerbated the situation.

Critical accounts of the conditions in the camps began to reach Britain early in 1901. Emily Hobhouse, a British social worker who had established the South African

Women and Children Distress Fund, arrived in South Africa on December 27, 1900, to deliver supplies to the camps. She was shocked by the living conditions she saw, and on her return to London, she produced a report that exposed the worst aspects of the refugee camps. Newspapers and public officials demanded inquiries, which helped lead to improvements.

Separate concentration camps were established for white and black refugees. There were reportedly 27,927 deaths in the white camps during the war, of which 26,251 were women and children. Of the 115,700 people who were interned in black camps (which numbered at least 66, with perhaps as many as 80), there were 14,154 deaths recorded, of which about 8 percent were children.

The concentration camps of the Second Anglo-Boer War must not be confused or equated with the German camps of World War II, although the former tainted the reputation of the British. For the most part, given the level of knowledge at the time and availability of resources, many British camp administrators had performed their duty the best they could. Many South Africans considered the operations of the camps a crime—although Boer commandant-general Louis Botha admitted during the war that “one is only too thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English protection” (Pakenham, 1979, p. 603)—and this has left an indelible impression on their memory.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Blockhouses, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Boers; Botha, Louis; Hobhouse, Emily; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Crealock, Henry Hope (1831–1891)

Crealock was an army officer and artist who saw service in the Crimea, China, India, and Zululand, where he was a divisional commander. Born into the English landed gentry on March 31, 1831, he was educated at Rugby School. He was commissioned through purchase as an ensign in the 90th Light Infantry on October 13, 1848, was made lieutenant on December 24, 1852, and captain on December 29, 1854.

Crealock saw distinguished action in the Crimean War (1854–1855). He was promoted to major on December 26, 1856, and in March 1857, he was appointed deputy adjutant quartermaster-general to the China Expeditionary Force in the first stage of the 2nd Sino-British (Opium) War (1857–1858). On July 20, 1858, he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and then served in the final campaigns of the Indian Rebellion (1858–1859). He returned to China in March 1860 as a staff officer during the second stage of the 2nd Sino-British War. On July 6, 1864, he was made colonel, created a Commander of the Bath in 1869, and on January 2, 1870, promoted to major-general. During the Austro-Prussian War (1866), he served as a military attaché in Vienna. From 1874 to 1877, he was quartermaster-general in Ireland.

Crealock was one of the four major-generals sent out with reinforcements during the second stage of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. On April 13, 1879, he took command of the 7,500 men of the 1st Division, South African Field Force, concentrated in southeastern Zululand. Before advancing up the coastal plain toward oNdini, King Cetshwayo kaMpande's great palace, in support of the simultaneous advance from the northwest by Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, Crealock overmethodically brought up supplies by ox-wagon, bridged rivers, and constructed advanced posts. The 1st Division finally moved forward in June, and by July 1, it was encamped at Port Durnford, where supplies came by sea. From there, Crealock sent out patrols to raid the countryside and induce Zulu submissions. There was little resistance because the cumbersome progress of "Crealock's Crawlers" (as his force became known) allowed the Zulu to ignore its presence and concentrate all their forces to resist Chelmsford's far more threatening advance. On July 4, 1879, Chelmsford routed the Zulu army at the Battle of Ulundi. The following day, most of the coastal chiefs surrendered to Crealock. The 1st Division had been essentially irrelevant to the success of the campaign, and was broken up on July 23, 1879.

Despite his lackluster record in Zululand, Crealock was created a Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George and retired from the army on September 4, 1884, with the rank of honorary lieutenant-general. The dandified and snobbish Crealock possessed an acerbic tongue, which made him unpopular with his fellow officers. He also was an accomplished artist who left a valuable visual record of many of his campaigns. He died on May 31, 1891.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879)

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Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus (1836–1911)

Pieter Arnoldus Cronjé was an Afrikaner general who attained fame after he thwarted an invasion of the Transvaal by agents of Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company in 1895. Though he also distinguished himself in South Africa's Second Anglo-Boer War, his surrender at Paardeberg in



Boer general Pieter Cronjé (1836–1911) surrenders to British forces at the end of the Battle of Paardeberg in February 1900 during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Previously, in 1895, he had led Boer forces that foiled the Jameson Raid which represented an attempt by the British South Africa Company (BSAC) to overthrow the Transvaal government. (Library of Congress)

1900 dealt a severe blow to the Afrikaner cause.

Cronjé was born in Colesberg, Cape Colony on October, 1836, the second son of Andries and Johanna Cronjé. The Cronjés were farmers, and in 1844, like other Boers who were trekking north, Andries moved the family to Groenvlei in the Orange River area, and then again to Winburg, in search of fertile land. The family ultimately ended up living in the independent Afrikaner Republic of Potchefstroom, which would later become a part of the Transvaal Republic. In 1857, Cronjé married Hester Visser. They subsequently had nine children together before Hester died in 1903. The couple settled down to farm in the Transvaal, where Cronjé served as a field coronet in the local militia and took part in raids against neighboring African kingdoms.

By the late 1870s, the British authorities in Cape Colony were becoming increasingly desirous of bringing the Afrikaner republics under British rule. In 1877, the British took the first step in this plan by annexing the Transvaal. Up until then, Cronjé had remained aloof from politics. However, in 1879, he was chosen as a delegate for Potchefstroom, and the following year, he joined with many other Transvaal leaders in declaring the republic's independence from Britain. War then broke out between the British and the Afrikaners. Although Cronjé took the field against the British, he played little part in the war, which ended very shortly as a victory for the Afrikaners.

After the war, Cronjé was elected to the *volksrad* (assembly) as a member for Potchefstroom. While serving in the assembly, he remained on active service with the Transvaal militia, participating in campaigns against the African states on the republic's borders. In 1883, he stood for election as the commandant-general of the Transvaal but was handily defeated by Piet Joubert. When Joubert resigned in 1884, Cronjé replaced him, only to have Joubert reclaim the position after another election in 1885. Over the next several years, Cronjé served periodically in the *volksrad* and as commandant for his home region of Potchefstroom.

In the late 1880s, the British revived their plans to bring the Transvaal into a South African federation. Their renewed interest was inspired by the discovery in 1886 of vast gold deposits in the Witwatersrand of the Transvaal. British officials in the Cape Colony feared that the enormous wealth of the gold fields would shift the center of power in the region from the British Cape to the Afrikaner interior. At the end of 1895 and beginning of 1896, a private army in the pay of the British financier Cecil Rhodes invaded the Transvaal in the hopes of fomenting a rebellion among British miners against Afrikaner rule. Cronjé was the commander of the Transvaal force that intercepted the invading army, and in a brief skirmish, forced their capitulation. Cronjé also captured the leader of the army, Leander Starr Jameson, who was a close associate of Rhodes. The apprehension of the invaders was heralded as a major victory for the Transvaal, and Cronjé became a celebrity both within the republic and in Europe.

Tensions between the British and Afrikaners led to the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899. Cronjé was initially opposed to war, fearing that the Transvaal would stand little chance against the British army. When war broke out, his first command was to capture the city of Mafeking. Instead of assaulting the city, he settled his troops in for a prolonged siege. The British garrison held out, and Cronjé's campaign tied up valuable troops that were desperately needed elsewhere. Cronjé was then placed in charge of the Transvaal forces at Modder River. In this engagement, he distinguished himself by repelling a British attack in November 1899. The following month, he won a similar engagement at Magersfontein. By February 1900, however, his troops were facing a renewed assault from the British. At Paardeberg in that month, the British surrounded his army and forced him to surrender along with 4,000 troops. This defeat was a devastating blow to the Afrikaner cause, and Cronjé's reputation never recovered from the humiliation.

The British deported Cronjé and several members of his family to the island of St. Helena. After the war, he traveled to the United States, where he earned money performing in Boer War reenactments. He became disillusioned with life there and returned to South Africa in 1905. He lived his final years alienated from his neighbors, many of whom still blamed him for the surrender at Paardeberg and resented his activities in the United States. Cronjé died on February 4, 1911.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; British South Africa Company; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Jameson, Leander Starr; Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899); Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Rhodes, Cecil John

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Cunynghame, Arthur Augustus Thurlow (1812–1884)

Sir Arthur Augustus Thurlow Cunynghame was the General Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Forces at the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, and St. Helena from November 5, 1873 to March 2, 1878. The Ninth Cape-Xhosa War (1877–1878) sorely tested his organizational, military, and political skills.

Cunynghame was born on August 12, 1812, into a Scottish landed family, the fifth and youngest son of Colonel Sir David Cunynghame, fifth baronet of Milnecraig, County Ayr, and Maria, illegitimate daughter of Edward, Baron Thurlow, the Lord Chancellor. After being educated at Eton, Cunynghame entered the army and was commissioned as second lieutenant on November 20, 1830. His steady course of promotion up to full general on August 13, 1877, through purchase, exchange, patronage, staff appointments, and seniority was conventional for a man of his connections and means, and he became closely associated with the antireformist military circle of his patron, HRH the Duke of Cambridge, Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief (1856–1895). Cunynghame also had his unconventional and adventurous side, and he relished his extensive travels and exotic postings in Asia, North America, and South Africa and wrote four rambling books about his experiences. On September 13, 1845, he advantageously married the Honorable Frances Elizabeth Hardinge, the elder daughter of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge, the governor-general of India (1844–1848).

Cunynghame served in the First Opium War of 1839–1842 and in the Crimean War of 1853–1856, where he distinguished himself at the Battle of Inkerman on November 5, 1854, for his leadership and gallantry. In May 1855, Cunynghame was made second in command of a division of the Turkish Contingent, which garrisoned Kerch in the eastern Crimea. Between 1856 and 1860, Cunynghame commanded a brigade in Ireland, and between March 1860 and February 1865, he held a series of commands in India and took part in the Ambela campaign of 1863. He was promoted to major-general on May 10, 1862. Between October 1865 and July 1870, he commanded the Dublin district in Ireland. On June 2, 1869, Cunynghame was advanced to Knight Commander of the Bath and promoted to lieutenant-general on October 22, 1870.

Cunynghame's command at the Cape in 1873 was considered suitable for a well-connected (if relatively indistinguished) senior officer who lacked experience in conducting independent operations. However, Cunynghame's supposedly safe command, at a time when British policymakers were sparring on the confederation of

South Africa, and when white settlers were in fear of an African conspiracy to overthrow white rule, proved far more testing than anticipated. After two tours of inspection in 1874 and 1877, Cunynghame was aware that the British garrison in South Africa was unequal to dealing with a major conflagration, and that it was stretched to the breaking point by the annexation of the Transvaal Territory in April 1877.

Cunynghame's first campaign in South Africa was the easy suppression of the minor Diamond Field Revolt of 1875 in the colony of Griqualand West. The second was a full-blown colonial war. Between 1779 and 1853, eight increasingly destructive wars had been fought along the fluctuating Cape east frontier which pitted white settlers, along with British troops and their African allies, against the Xhosa people. The Ninth Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878 would secure the final subjugation of the Xhosa. Cunynghame, who took formal command on October 2, 1877 of all the troops, imperial and colonial, saw no combat. All the fighting that involved imperial troops was undertaken by his field commander, Colonel Richard Glyn. As General Officer Commanding, Cunynghame was obsessively thorough in planning logistical support and ploddingly conventional in formulating strategy.

Placed on December 8, 1877, in active command of the imperial troops operating in the Transkei, Cunynghame never contemplated the option of irregular operations against an elusive foe. Instead, he fell back on the classic procedure of mounting cumbersome sweeps through enemy territory, seeking decisive pitched battles, and building lines of fortifications to contain the Xhosa. He was fortunate that the disastrous decision by the Xhosa commanders to force a resolution through pitched battle played into Glyn's hands, ensuring his victory at Centane on February 7, 1878, which drove the Gcaleka Xhosa of the Transkei out of the war. That left the Ngqika Xhosa in the field in the Ciskei, but before Cunynghame could proceed against them, he was tripped up by the politics of command.

Dealing with the parochial politicians of the Cape Colony, self-governing since 1872, required tact, but Cunynghame could not hide his disdain. He adhered wholeheartedly to the confederating mission of Sir Henry Bartle Frere, who arrived as High Commissioner in March 1877, joining him in the call for military reinforcements to make it feasible and dismissing the military capabilities of the Cape government as amateur and inadequate. He joined Frere in vigorously opposing the Cape ministry's push for a division in command between colonial and imperial troops. It speaks to his political naïveté that he did not see, once Frere had gained his point, how his strongly expressed views would make him an embarrassment to the government in London, which was anxious to appease ruffled colonial opinion. He was superseded on March 2, 1878, by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederic Thesiger and was left devastated by this act of perceived unfairness that terminated his career. Being made Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath in June 1878 was scant consolation. Cunynghame continued to travel, and he died at sea on March 10, 1884.

John Laband

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Centane, Battle of (February 7, 1877); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus)

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D

Dabulamanzi kaMpande (c. 1839–1886)

A Zulu prince, military commander, and politician at the time of the destruction of the Zulu kingdom by the forces of colonialism, Dabulamanzi was King Cetshwayo kaMpande's half-brother and was enrolled with him in the uThulwana *ibutho* (age-grade regiment). During the Zulu civil war of 1856, which was fought to decide the royal succession, he supported the victorious Cetshwayo. When Cetshwayo became king in 1872, he appointed Dinuzulu commander of the eSiqwakeni *ikhanda* (royal military center) near the prince's eZuluwini homestead in southeastern Zululand. There, the confident and handsome Dabulamanzi developed close contacts with white hunters and traders from the neighboring British colony of Natal and indulged his taste for firearms, European clothing, and horses.

During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Dabulamanzi was with the uncommitted Zulu reserve at the victorious battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879. When the reserve joined the pursuit, Dabulamanzi asserted his royal status to lead it into Natal despite Cetshwayo's express orders not to invade British territory. On the late afternoon and night of January 22–23, 1879, Dabulamanzi's force was repulsed when it assaulted the British base at Rorke's Drift.

Retiring in disgrace to eZuluwini, Dabulamanzi coordinated the Zulu blockade of Fort Eshowe garrisoned by the British No. 1 column between January 23 and April 3, 1879. During the Battle of Gingindlovu on April 2, 1879, he led the Zulu right horn against the British Eshowe Relief column and suffered a serious defeat. The British evacuated the Eshowe garrison on April 4, 1879, and burned Dinuzulu's eZuluwini homestead. Dabulamanzi surrendered to the British 1st Division operating along the coast on July 12, 1879.

On September 1, 1879, the British suppressed the monarchy and divided Zululand into 13 territories under appointed chiefs, and Dabulamanzi found himself in John Dunn's chiefdom. He became active in agitating for the exiled Cetshwayo's restoration. When Cetshwayo was restored to the central portion of his former kingdom in January 1883, and civil war broke out between the royalist uSuthu faction and their Zulu foes led by Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, Dabulamanzi served as a prominent uSuthu commander. He was defeated by Zibhebhu at the Battle of Msebe on March 30, 1883, and again at the Battle of oNdini on July 21, 1883. Undeterred, Dinuzulu fell back to the Nkandla Forest, where he vigorously resisted both Zibhebhu and the forces of the Resident Commissioner of the Reserve Territory, Melmoth Osborn. On May 10, 1884, he repulsed Osborn's offensive, but his forces were then defeated on June 1, 1884.

Meanwhile, as one of the guardians of Cetshwayo's teenaged heir, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, Dabulamanzi was instrumental in forging the alliance on May 21, 1884, between Dinuzulu and Boer freebooters from the South African Republic, which culminated in Zibhebhu's defeat at the Battle of Tshaneni on June 5, 1884. Dabulamanzi fell out with the Boers when they occupied northwestern Zululand as the price of their assistance. On September 22, 1886, a party of Boers arrested him on a trumped-up charge and then shot him down in cold blood. Dabulamanzi is buried at the site of his eZuluwini homestead.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Dunn, John Robert; Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); oNdini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879); Tshaneni, Battle of (June 5, 1884); Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Da Gama, Vasco (1460–1524)

The Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama was the first to sail from Portugal to India, opening up major trading routes for spices and gems.

The son of the governor of the Portuguese state of Sines, da Gama was born in Sines in 1460. He was probably well educated and went into the service of King Joao II. In 1492, da Gama seized French ships as payment for piratical raids on Portuguese ships.

By 1494, the Portuguese navigator Bartolomeu Dias had already traveled around the Cape of Good Hope, and Christopher Columbus had sailed to the New World. King Manuel I of Portugal entered into a treaty with Ferdinand V and Isabella I of Spain to divide up this world that the two nations were discovering. Portugal would take Africa and points east; Spain would be free to take the Americas.

Manuel I hoped to send an expedition to India in order to wrest control of the spice trade from Muslim traders and launch a crusade against Islam. He turned to da Gama to lead the first voyage to India. After several months of planning, da Gama set sail on July 8, 1497, with a fleet of four ships: *Sao Gabriel, Sao Rafael, the Berrio,* and a storeship.

The fleet rounded the Cape of Good Hope on November 22 and began to sail up the eastern coast of Africa. At Mossel Bay on November 25, they bartered with the indigenous Khoikhoi for cattle. Although their relations with the Khoikhoi began in a friendly manner, they had turned sour by the time da Gama's fleet left. The fleet divided the storeship's supplies and crew among the other ships, broke up the storeship, and sailed on.

Farther north on the African coast, da Gama's fleet met and bartered for supplies with friendly natives at the mouth of what they named the Copper River. On

January 25, 1498, da Gama's fleet sailed into Mozambique, which was controlled by Muslims. The sultan of Mozambique came on board the ship amicably enough, but he soon realized that his new friends were not Muslims, but rather were the hated Christians. He gave da Gama two pilots in order to get rid of him. When one of the pilots escaped, relations between the sultan and da Gama soured, and da Gama ordered a bombardment of the city. News of this turn of events traveled north, and when da Gama's fleet reached Malindi, the sultan there cooperated with da Gama in order to avoid a similar incident. He provided the Portuguese with an Indian pilot who helped guide them to Calicut, India's most important trading center.

Da Gama and his crew believed that Indians were Christians, and King Manuel I had hoped to make them allies in a future crusade against Islam. When they were taken to a temple to worship Devaki, mother of the god Krishna, da Gama's men realized that they were not dealing with Christians—not ordinary Christians, anyway. The relationship took another hit when the zamorin ruler of Calicut saw the gifts that his Portuguese friends had brought. They were cheap trinkets compared with the wealth he knew. The products that the Portuguese had brought with them met with an equally chilly reception in the market. After a chilly standoff and negotiations that included da Gama taking several hostages, he finally sailed from India with ships laden with precious jewels and spices and a letter promising to trade spices and gems for gold, silver, coral, and scarlet cloth. Da Gama's fleet sailed from India in August 1498, enduring a difficult passage, during which many sailors died. Da Gama finally made it back to Lisbon on September 9, 1499.

Upon his return, da Gama was hailed as a hero. King Manuel granted him titles and estates and a healthy pension. Another voyage to exploit the commercial possibilities of India left Portugal in 1500.

Two years later, da Gama returned to Calicut with a fleet of 20 ships. This time, he bombarded Calicut to force the zamorin to sign a treaty with Portugal. The Portuguese fleet easily defeated the Muslim navy, and da Gama continued on to sack and force treaties on other Indian trading centers. In February 1524, King Joao III, son of Manuel, named da Gama viceroy of Portuguese India, and he made one last voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. Just a few months after his arrival, da Gama died, on December 24, 1524. His remains were returned to Portugal.

Katherine Gould

See also: Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795); Indian Ocean, Portuguese Conquest of (1498–1698)

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Dalmanutha (Bergendal), Battle of (August 21–27, 1900)

Bergendal (or Berg-en-Dal, which means "mountain and dale") and Dalmanutha are two small railway stations, some 230 kilometers east of Pretoria on the main railway line from the Witwatersrand to Maputo (previously Lourenco Marques; Delagoa Bay); and about 16 kilometers east of the town of Belfast. After Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, the British commander-in-chief in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), occupied Pretoria (June 5, 1900) and secured a victory at Diamond Hill/Donkerhoek (June 11–12, 1900), the Boer forces, led by Commandant-General Louis Botha, retreated farther eastward along the Delagoa Bay railway line. Meanwhile, General Sir Redvers Buller, after relieving Ladysmith (February 28, 1900), in due course advanced northward, linking up with Roberts's forces on August 15. By taking up a defensive position along a 48-kilometer front, stretching across the railway line and including positions at Dalmanutha and Bergendal, Botha made a final attempt to check the British advance. The battle that followed is referred to as "Dalmanutha" in most British sources, but in light of the fact that most of the decisive events took place on the Bergendal farm, it should, strictly speaking, be named as such (as most Afrikaans and Dutch sources indeed do).

To stem the advance, Botha had some 6,000 men, mainly from the Germiston, Heidelberg, and Bethal commandos, the Transvaal Police (Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Politie, or ZARP), and a number of Austrian volunteers (commanded by Baron Anton von Goldegg), and the force was supported by several artillery pieces. (In the subsequent battle, the four Boer 155-mm Creusot siege guns, known as "Long Toms," came together on the same battlefield for the first and last time.) They took up positions some 7 kilometers and beyond from the town of Belfast—at and in the vicinity of Bergendal, northwest of Dalmanutha Station, but with defensive lines also stretching much farther north and south.

Beginning on August 21, the British attacked these Boer positions (mostly the Boer left flank at first), but from August 24, onward, also in the center. On August 26, Buller, who commanded some 19,000 men with 30,000 in reserve and 42 guns, advanced from Geluk, near Belfast, but soon came under fire from the Heidelberg and Bethal commandos, while the British right flank also came under fire from the Boer artillery. In the meantime, the British artillery bombarded the positions of the Germiston commando, which lay right in the path of the British advance. The British infantry advanced slowly but were driven back by the Boers. Eventually, the British forces reached Waaikraal.

At dawn on August 27, Major-General J. F. Brocklehurst's cavalry and infantry advanced, while Buller ordered his artillery to let loose a heavy and sustained bombardment on the Boer trenches—one of the heaviest bombardments of the war. When the British forces eventually advanced en masse over broken ground, they were met with intense and accurate fire from the Boer trenches. In due course, the outgunned Boer defenders yielded under the pressure of superior British numbers and evacuated their positions. The ZARP fought stubbornly almost to annihilation in the key position they held at Bergendal. The total British casualties for the period of August 21–27 amounted to about 385, while on the side of the Boers, there were at least 78 casualties.

Lord Roberts arrived at the battlefield on August 27 from his headquarters at Belfast (where he had been since August 25). Five days later, on September 1, 1900, convinced that the Boer resistance was now definitely broken, he annexed the ZAR (which henceforth was known as the Transvaal Colony).

With Bergendal and Dalmanutha in British hands, the road to Machadodorp (which became the Transvaal seat of government after the British occupation of Pretoria on June 5, 1900) was clear. The British would occupy Machadodorp on August 28 and continue their advance eastward. Dalmanutha/Bergendal was the last major set-piece battle of the war, and although the Boer commandos were defeated, they were not destroyed, and the conflict was far from over.

André Wessels

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Buller, Redvers Henry; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Darfur, British Conquest of (1916)

During the late 19th century, the sultanate of Darfur, located in the west of what is now the Sudan, had resisted Egyptian and then Mahdist domination. After the British reconquered the Sudan in 1898, Darfur recovered its autonomy. However, Sir Reginald Wingate, British commander of the Egyptian army, pressured London in 1915 to approve a British offensive against Darfur, falsely claiming that German/Ottoman agents, within the context of the ongoing world war, were encouraging an attack on the British in the neighboring Sudan. Wingate also realized that the French wanted to expand east from Chad into Darfur, and with the conclusion of the German Cameroon campaign, they would soon have the forces to do so.

With permission from his old Sudan colleague Lord Kitchener, who was now London's secretary of state for war, Wingate organized the 2,000-strong Western Frontier Force (WFF), which was British-led but composed entirely of Egyptian army units, some of which were Sudanese. The WFF was under the command of Colonel Philip Kelly and supported by 18 machine guns and a battery of six mountain guns. Approaching the border at Jabal al-Hilla, the column formed a square when attacked by Fur warriors, who were traumatized and repelled by automatic and artillery fire with which they had no experience.

Although Ali Dinar, sultan of Darfur, had initially planned to flee his capital of al-Fashir to lead guerrilla resistance in the nearby mountains, his wife and advisors convinced him to confront the invaders. Consequently, Ali Dinar ordered the construction of a 1,800-meter-long crescent of trenches around the capital to ambush the advancing WFF and overwhelm it with vastly superior numbers before machine guns and artillery took their toll. On May 25, 1916, near the village of Berinjia, a British-led Egyptian Camel Corps unit, scouting ahead of the main WFF force, prematurely triggered the Fur ambush. The first shots were misunderstood by the Fur as a signal to attack, and they climbed out of their trenches and charged over open ground toward the distant WFF square. Some 1,000 out of 3,600 Fur warriors were killed.

The next day, after fending off several Fur cavalry attacks, the WFF looted al-Fashir. The sultan led a group of fugitives too weakened by disease to march north across the desert to the Sanussi Brotherhood, which was fighting Anglo-Egyptian forces in western Egypt; a westward retreat had been blocked by the French. A patrol of 100 Egyptian mounted infantry, led by British major Herbert Huddleston, tracked Ali Dinar to the village of Jiuba, where he was killed by machine gun fire and his remaining followers scattered. Rather than a campaign of World War I, the British conquest of Darfur seemed more like a completion of the colonial conquest of the Sudan. Darfur was then incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Chad, French Conquest of (1895–1900); Egyptian Army; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Wingate, Reginald

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Decatur, Stephen (1779–1820)

Stephen Decatur, the youngest man to hold the rank of captain in U.S. navy history, was an ardent patriot and a national hero. Despite his daring actions in the Tripolitan War with the Barbary pirates and the War of 1812, he is best remembered for a celebrated toast: "Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but our country, right or wrong!"

Decatur was born in Sinepuxent, Maryland, on January 5, 1779, the son of a French naval officer and an American mother. His father was a privateer captain during the American Revolution and also captured the first prize of the Quasi-War with France in 1798. Decatur briefly attended the University of Pennsylvania but quit to obtain a midshipman's commission in April 1798. He accompanied Captain John Barry through several sweeps of the West Indies, acquitted himself well, and rose to lieutenant in 1799. In 1801, he joined Commander Richard Dale's squadron on a cruise of the Mediterranean aboard the frigate *Essex*.

After a brief tour with the frigate *New York* in 1803, Decatur secured his first command, the 16-gun schooner *Enterprise,* and sailed with Commander Edward Preble against the Tripolitan pirates. In October 1803, the American frigate *Philadelphia* under Captain William Bainbridge ran aground in Tripoli Harbor and was taken. Five months later, Preble resolved to strike back, authorizing Decatur to deliver the blow. On February 16, 1804, he sailed the captured ketch *Mastico,* renamed *Intrepid,* alongside the unsuspecting *Philadelphia,* boarded it with only 81 men, and set it afire. For performing what Admiral Horatio Nelson characterized as "the most bold and daring act of the age," he was promoted as the youngest captain in the navy, at age 25. Decatur still had plenty of fight left in him, and in August 1804, he conducted one of the last actions of the Barbary War by capturing two enemy gunboats in hand-to-hand fighting.

After the war, Decatur returned home to command the Norfolk Navy Yard and in 1808, he took charge of the 44-gun frigate *United States.* However, his most notable service that year was sitting on the court-martial of Captain James Barron, on trial for his alleged misbehavior during the notorious *Chesapeake-Leopard* affair of 1807. Although charges of cowardice were dismissed, Decatur voted to find him guilty of unpreparedness and sentenced him to a five-year suspension. This verdict poisoned relations between the two men and had serious consequences later.

Following the onset of hostilities with Britain in June 1812, Decatur sailed the *United States* from Boston in search of enemy shipping. On October 25, he encountered the 38-gun frigate HMS *Macedonian* near the island of Madeira and launched into battle. The British warship sailed better than his own vessel, but Decatur directed his broadsides so accurately that the *Macedonian* was dismasted and captured in only 90 minutes. British losses amounted to 105 casualties, while the American sustained 7 killed and 5 wounded. He sailed home with his prize, to national applause.

Decatur returned in triumph to New London, and there he remained, blockaded by a powerful enemy squadron, for two years. He then transferred to the 44-gun frigate *President* at New York, and on the evening of January 15, 1815, he attempted to run the blockade under the cover of a squall. Unfortunately, the *President* was buffeted by a sandbar, damaged, and then set upon by four British warships. Decatur engaged and disabled the 38-gun frigate HMS *Endymion* but could not outsail the pursuing *Tenedos* and *Pomone,* so he surrendered. It was an especially bitter loss, considering that the war had ended the previous December. Decatur was then briefly detained at Bermuda and paroled in New London. When a court of inquiry absolved him for the loss of his ship, his stature as a national idol remained unscathed.

After the war, Decatur led a nine-ship expedition against the bey of Algiers, who was preying on American shipping in the Mediterranean, in violation of an earlier treaty. His ships quickly captured two Algerian vessels, and the commodore appeared off Algiers, determined to dictate peace "at the cannon's mouth." The bey submitted to his terms, and Decatur then sailed on to Tripoli and Tunis, imposing similar conditions. For having effectively ended Mediterranean piracy, he received the thanks of the U.S. Congress and several other European countries. Again, Decatur was hailed as a national hero.

Back home, Decatur was appointed by President James Madison to serve on the newly created Board of Naval Commissioners. Assisted by John Rodgers and David Porter, he helped lay the administrative groundwork for a more efficient navy. However, he adamantly opposed reinstating Barron to active duty for spending the War of 1812 in England. Barron became convinced that Decatur headed a cabal against him and challenged him to a duel. They met on March 22, 1820, and while Barron sustained a thigh wound, Decatur was mortally injured. He died the following day and was buried with honors befitting the idol of American sea power.

John C. Fredriksen

See also: Barbary Wars (1783–1815)

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De Cristoforis, Tommaso (1841–1887)

Death at the head of his command at the massacre of Dogali in Eritrea in 1887 made Lieutenant-Colonel Tommaso De Cristoforis one of Italy's most famous colonial soldiers. There is a Piazza Tommaso De Cristoforis in Rome, and streets in several Italian cities bear his name.

De Cristoforis was born in Casale Monferrato in the Kingdom of Piedmont, known as "Italy's Prussia" for the number of soldiers that it has produced. A graduate of the military academy at Turin in 1859, he learned his trade in the Italian wars of independence, serving in campaigns to integrate the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies into the new Italy in 1860 and to repress a separatist rising in Sicily in 1866. His service in the 1860 campaign won De Cristoforis the Silver Medal for Bravery. Following several years as an officer with the garrison at Turin, De Cristoforis was promoted to lieutenant-colonel and given command of the Third Battalion of the Infantry of Africa at Massawa in Eritrea, then in the process of becoming an Italian colony (in the teeth of opposition from the neighboring kingdom of Ethiopia). On the eve of the battle of Dogali, in which he would lose his life, De Cristoforis was the commander of an Italian fort at Monkullo, inland from Massawa.

On January 26, 1887, De Cristoforis led a force of 548 Italian soldiers and Eritrean irregulars south from Monkullo to relieve a garrison besieged by troops loyal to the Ethiopian ruler, Emperor Yohannes IV. En route, his column was ambushed by an army of some 7,000 men commanded by the local Ethiopian governor, Ras Alula.

Heavily outnumbered and out of ammunition after several hours of fighting, all but 80 soldiers of the Italian command were killed in hand-to-hand combat, including Lieutenant-Colonel De Cristoforis.

Lionized by the Italian public, De Cristoforis nonetheless came under criticism from some Italian military leaders, including the Minister of War, General Cesare Ricotti Magnani, for failing to properly reconnoiter his line of march and accepting battle when so heavily outnumbered. He would not be the last Italian colonial soldier to underestimate Ethiopian military capabilities or to trust in firepower to carry the day against superior numbers.

De Cristoforis was posthumously awarded Italy's Gold Medal for Bravery. He is buried in the Italian cemetery in Massawa, Eritrea.

Bruce Vandervort

See also: Alula Engida, Ras; Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Yohannes IV

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De la Rey, Jacobus (1847–1914)



Jacobus "Koos" De la Rey (1847–1914) was one of the most dynamic and effective Boer leaders during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). His innovative tactics resulted in a Boer victory at the Battle of Magersfontein in November 1899 and he proved a skilled guerrilla leader during the last phase of the war. (Wilson, H.W. *After Pretoria: The Guerilla War,* 1902)

Jacobus "Koos" De la Rey was one of the most dynamic and effective Boer leaders during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). He was an innovative, flexible tactician, responsible for the first and last Boer successes of the war—the capture of an armored train at Kraaipan on October 12, 1899, and the defeat and capture of Lieutenant General Lord Paul S. Methuen at Tweebosch on March 7, 1902. He completely lacked pretension and both the Boers and the Britons greatly admired him.

De la Rey was born on October 22, 1847, in Winburg in what later became the Orange Free State. He had his first combat experience during the 1865 conflict with the Sotho, and at age 19, De la Rey became a field cornet, the youngest man known to hold this responsible appointment. In 1879, he participated in an expedition against the Pedi and fought in the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). Elected a commandant in 1885, De la Rey became a member of the Transvaal *Volksraad*. He came into prominence as a member of Piet Cronjé's force that captured Dr. Leander Starr Jameson's raiding force in 1896.

De la Rey expressed his reservations about provoking war with Britain in 1899, but when war broke out, he went along with the majority and acted as an adviser to the older Cronjé in the Western Transvaal. He believed in swift attacks and thought that sieges wasted time and resources. He distinguished himself at Graspan (November 25, 1899), where he observed that establishing vulnerable positions on hilltops was unwise when fighting an enemy with superior artillery. He also realized that to maximize the effectiveness, flat trajectory, and range of their high-velocity Mausers, it was best to engage the enemy from concealed positions at ground level. The Boers employed De la Rey's innovative tactics at the Battle of the Modder River (November 28, 1899), where the British suffered heavy casualties but achieved tactical success. It was a bitter occasion for De la Rey, whose son was mortally wounded that day. He was responsible for selecting and preparing the defensive positions at Magersfontein, where the Boers crushed the assaulting British two weeks later.

Guerrilla warfare dominated the conflict by the end of 1900, with De la Rey commanding Boer operations in the Western Transvaal. De la Rey, unlike most of the other senior Boer commanders, trained his subordinate commando leaders to conduct autonomous operations. He also developed and used the tactic of charging on horseback. At Tweebosch on March 7, 1902, De la Ray captured the wounded British general Lord Methuen. He treated Methuen kindly and even sent a message to Methuen's wife. De la Rey participated in the negotiations at Vereeniging and signed the peace treaty. Afterward, he met a group of dejected Boer leaders and stated in halting English, "We are a bloody cheerful-looking lot of British subjects!" (Lee, 1985, p. 206).

After the war, De la Rey became a senator in the first parliament of the Union of South Africa. He supported the nationalist movement and wanted to restore the Boer republics. Which side he would have taken during the 1914 Afrikaner Rebellion in South Africa was never known, as he was accidentally shot and killed at a police roadblock before it began.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bitter Enders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869); Graspan, Battle of (November 25, 1899); Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Methuen, Lord; Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899); Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Tweebosch, Battle of (March 7, 1902); Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Dervishes

The original name for the followers of the Mahdi in the Sudan was *dervishes* (from the Persian term *darawish,* meaning "beggar"), a term later discarded in favor of *ansar* ("helpers"). *Dervish,* however, has become the most common appellation for those followers of the Mahdi and his successor, the Khalifa, in the Sudan (1885–1899).

The rapidly forming dervish army consisted of people from throughout the Sudan. The largest groups were the cattle-raising Baggara people, from the desert area north of Kordofan, and the Beja of the eastern Sudan. The Beja, mainly because of the way they dressed their hair with mutton fat or butter to resemble a mop, were known as "fuzzy-wuzzies."

Many of the dervishes were religious fanatics, believing in Islamic fundamentalism, expansionism, and emancipation from foreign rule. They were also disciplined, courageous, and ferocious in battle.

The Mahdi's army was organized into three divisions, each under the command of one of his three caliphs and named after the color of its flag. The Black Flag, consisting of men from the western Sudan and the Baggara, was commanded by Khalifa Abdullahi ibn Mohammed, who succeeded the Mahdi in 1885. Khalifa Ali wad Hilku commanded the Green Flag, whose soldiers came from the area between the Blue and White Nile rivers, and the Red Flag, led by Khalifa Mohammed esh Sherif, came from the northern Sudan. There were no formal subordinate units, although the flags frequently became so large that they were divided into *rubs,* similar to battalions and having 800–1,200 men. *Rubs,* in turn, were frequently subdivided into four elements: an administrative unit and one element each of riflemen, swordsmen, and spearmen, and cavalrymen.

The dervish army was mobilized only in time of war, but attempts were made to establish a standing army to garrison important towns. These soldiers, called *jihidiyya,* many of whom had worked for slave traders, were armed with rifles. They were organized into companies of 100 men and smaller platoons.

Initially, the dervishes used sticks, stones, double-edged swords, and spears as weapons, but as they defeated and massacred various Egyptian and British forces that had come to suppress them, they captured firearms and other equipment. The dervishes wore a white *jibbeh* (tunic) with colored patches sewn on it, representing poverty (considered a virtue), turban, skullcap, trousers, plaited straw belt, sandals, and beads.

The dervishes made excellent use of terrain, cover, and concealment. Generally, the swordsmen and spearmen, with another group of dervishes providing covering or suppressive fire, would sneak up as close as possible to the enemy. At the last minute, they would charge, oblivious to incoming rifle fire, and then engage in ferocious, hand-to-hand combat.

Dervishes armed with sticks, stones, and spears killed a group of Egyptian soldiers sent in the summer of 1881 to seize the Mahdi. He declared a jihad (holy war) on August 12, 1881, and the dervishes annihilated an Egyptian force sent from Fashoda in June 1882.

They fought many other battles with the forces that were sent to the Sudan to eliminate them. When the forces were composed entirely of British troops, the dervishes started to lose battles, although they gained tremendous notoriety for breaking the British square at the Battle of Tamai on March 13, 1884. The British defeated the dervishes at the Battle of Ginnis (December 30, 1885), and British-led Egyptian soldiers soundly defeated the dervishes at the Battle of Toski (August 3, 1889), shattering the myth of their invincibility. At the Battle of Omdurman (September 2, 1898), the Khalifa army numbered over 40,000 against about 26,000 Anglo-Egyptian troops, and the dervishes suffered over 10,000 killed, about an equal number wounded, and about 5,000 captured. The British finally killed the Khalifa and defeated the dervishes at the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat (November 24, 1899).

The British soldiers generally respected the courage and discipline of the dervishes. This sentiment was expressed by poet Rudyard Kipling in "Fuzzy-Wuzzy": "We've fought with many men acrost the seas, / an' some of 'em was brave an' some was not: / The Paythan an' the Zulu an' Burmese; / But the Fuzzy was the finest o' the lot" (De Cosson, 1886, p. xiii).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Ginnis, Battle of (December 30, 1885); Gordon, Charles George; Khalifa; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Rejjaf, Battle of (January 16, 1897); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tamai, Battle of (March 11, 1884); Toski, Battle of (August 3, 1889)

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De Wet, Christiaan R. (1854–1922)

Chief commandant Christiaan R. De Wet was an outstanding Boer guerrilla leader of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

De Wet was born on a farm in the Orange Free State on October 7, 1854. He had little formal education, worked as a transport driver and butcher, and was one of the few Boers from the Orange Free State to fight in the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881). He later farmed, but he also served in the parliaments of both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

On October 2, 1899, nine days before the start of the Second Anglo-Boer War, he and his three sons were summoned to military service. He was soon elected commandant of his commando. He demonstrated his leadership abilities at the Battle of Nicholson's Nek (October 30, 1899), where his 300 men drove the British troops from their positions and took 800 prisoners.

He was appointed field general under Assistant Commandant-General Piet Cronjé in December 1899 and tried to persuade him to invade the Cape Colony. Cronjé refused and later surrendered his force at Paardeberg on February 27, 1900.

De Wet reorganized the commandos in the spring of 1900 and instilled a new spirit of discipline into his men. With an uncanny sense of timing and location, De Wet conducted many hit-and-run raids on the British to disrupt their lines of communication and destroy their supplies. A notable example of this success occurred at Roodewal Station, where De Wet captured 500,000 pounds' worth of British supplies on June 7, 1900. The British reacted to the Boer tactics by burning down Boer homesteads.

In July 1900, De Wet, with Orange Free State president Marthinus T. Steyn, was entrapped by the British in the Brandwater Basin area. De Wet and Steyn, with about 2,000 Boers, escaped, and the British initiated the unsuccessful large-scale operation called the "first De Wet hunt" to capture the elusive commando leader. Later in 1900, De Wet's forces invaded Cape Colony, and the British conducted other operations to try to capture him. His excellent intelligence system and mobility permitted him to continue to evade the British even after they established their blockhouse system.

Realizing the inevitability of Boer defeat, De Wet, as acting president of the Orange Free State, reluctantly signed the Treaty of Veereniging on May 31, 1902, ending the Second Anglo-Boer War. He then accompanied other Boer leaders to Europe, during which time he wrote *Three Years War,* his account of service and operations in the Second Anglo-Boer War.

De Wet served in government positions until the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, when he retired from politics. He was a leader of the rebellion that broke out in the Orange Free State at the beginning of World War I, was captured, and was found guilty of treason. He was fined and sentenced to six years of imprisonment, but he was released after six months, an old man broken physically and spiritually. De Wet, one of the most able and charismatic Boer guerrilla leaders, died on February 3, 1922.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Brandwater Basin, Battle of (July 1900); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Steyn, Marthinus T.; Veereniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Dhanis, Francis (1862–1909)

Born in London in 1862, Francis Dhanis was the son of a Belgian consul father and an Irish mother. Educated in Britain, Dhanis attended the Belgian Royal Military Academy and became an officer in the Belgian army. In 1887, he joined Leopold II's Force Publique (FP) and went to the Congo Free State as a lieutenant. His first years in Congo were taken up with missions of exploration and establishing colonial outposts and other infrastructure. In 1892, he replaced Captain Paul le Marinel as commander of the FP.

In early 1893, during the "Arab War" in the eastern Congo, Dhanis led one of the main river expeditions that attacked and captured the Swahili-Arab towns of Nyangwe and Kasongo on the Lualaba River. On October 20, 1893, an FP army under Dhanis and Pierre Joseph Ponthier defeated the Swahili-Arabs at the Luama River immediately west of Lake Tanganyika in a battle that resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. Swahili-Arab resistance collapsed as their leader Sefu was killed in the battle. During the campaign, Dhanis established the foundation of Congo Free State authority in the east by extracting labor and provisions from local communities and building more outposts and bridges. After the war, he arranged for freed slaves to form farming communities under appointed chiefs and recruited some into the FP. Dhanis was awarded the title of baron and became vice-governor of the territory.

In 1896, Dhanis led 30,000 men, the largest FP army to date (which included many irregulars and members of the recently conquered Tetela group) northeast toward southern Sudan, as Leopold had decided to expand the Congo Free State to the headwaters of the Nile. Shortage of food, mistreatment by officers, and forced marches through swamps provoked a mutiny that ended the expedition before it achieved its objective. In early 1897, Dhanis led a 500-strong battalion against the mutineers, but his own men rebelled and the commander narrowly escaped. Subsequently, he was involved in fighting a long campaign against the mutineers, which ended in 1900 when some 2,000 of them crossed into German-ruled Rwanda and Burundi and were disarmed.

In 1899, before the mutiny had been suppressed, Dhanis returned to Belgium with the honorary rank of vice-governor general. In 1902, he joined the board of directors of one of the concessionary companies that Leopold had created to extract resources from the Congo Free State. He died on November 13, 1909, and was honored as a Belgian national hero.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–1894); Chaltin, Louis-Napoleon; Force Publique (to 1914); Leopold II; Tippu Tip

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Diamond Hill (Donkerhoek), Battle of (June 11–12, 1900)

By the time the British occupied Pretoria, the Transvaal seat of government, on June 5, 1900, during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the Boer forces had fallen back eastward. Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, the British commander-in-chief in South Africa, believed that with their capital captured, the Boers would surrender, but that did not happen. Consequently, Roberts decided to launch an offensive eastward to drive the Boer forces to a safe distance from Pretoria, but also to open the way for an advance to the border with Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique).

Some 29 kilometers east of Pretoria, General Louis Botha, the Transvaal commandant-general, with not more than 6,000 men and 30 guns, drew up a line of defense stretching some 40 kilometers from north to south. At its center, some 26 kilometers east of Pretoria, a railway line ran eastward from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay (Lourenço Marques, which today is known as Maputo) in Portuguese East Africa. Just south of where the railway cut through the hills at Pienaarspoort, members of the Transvaal police force known as the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Politie (ZARP) were in position at Donkerpoort, with other Boer forces deployed at Donkerhoek and Diamond Hill. North of the railway line, General Jacobus De la Rey (of Magersfontein fame), commanded the defenders; to the south, Botha was in charge of the Boers' central positions and left flank.

The British flank attacks commenced in the early hours of June 11, 1900, when the British forces (with about 20,000 men and perhaps as many as 83 guns) commanded by Lieutenants-General John French and Ian Hamilton advanced toward the Boer positions north and south of Pienaarspoort. French's force soon became bogged down north of the railway line in the Kameelfontein Valley. From Eerstefabrieken, Roberts viewed Hamilton's advance on the Boer left flank, south of the railway line. Brigadier-General R. G. Broadwood drove the Bethal commando from their positions, but he failed in attempts to outflank them. At Diamond Hill, Major-General Bruce Hamilton dislodged the Boer defenders in the foothills (in positions that suited defense), but they regrouped, and the British could not take Diamond Hill itself. Thus, the first day's fighting ended in a stalemate in all sectors.

The next day, in the southern sector, the British army advanced en masse toward Diamond Hill, but stubborn Boer resistance hampered their progress. In the meantime, north of the railway line, French renewed his efforts to break through the Boer line of defense, but he also met with dogged resistance. By afternoon, French's troops were all but surrounded by De la Rey's men, but before the Boers could pounce on the British forces, news arrived of a British breakthrough at Diamond Hill, south of the railway line. Here, the southern crest of Diamond Hill had been occupied by British forces. By now, the outnumbered Boers along the whole defensive line were exhausted, and Botha feared that his southern forces would be cut off. Consequently, Botha ordered his commanders to withdraw their respective commandos. In the course of the night of June 12–13, all Boer forces quietly withdrew eastward, to Bronkhorstspruit.

For a hard-fought battle, the casualties suffered at Diamond Hill (as most British sources refer to the battle—Afrikaans sources call it Donkerhoek) were surprisingly low, but it must be kept in mind that the British commanders shrank from sacrificing troops, which would have happened if persistent open assaults had taken place. In the course of the June 11–12, 1900, battle north and south of the railway line, the British suffered at least 28 killed and 145 wounded, while Boer casualties amounted to approximately 30 killed or wounded, plus a few taken prisoner. The British won a tactical victory, mainly thanks to their artillery, but the Boers withdrew to fight another day. The inability of the British to crush the Boer forces in a decisive battle led to a protracted, exhaustive, and costly guerrilla war.

André Wessels

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; De la Rey, Jacobus; French, John D. P.; Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Dias, Bartolomeu (1450–1500)

Bartolomeu Dias was one of the most important Portuguese sea explorers of the 15th century and the first European to round the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of Africa. After more than 50 years of unsuccessful expeditions to cross the difficult waters around the cape, the Portuguese were finally able to open a sea route to India, initiating a period of tremendous economic and military expansion along the coasts of Africa and India, as a result of Dias's efforts.

Not much is known about Dias. He was born around 1450, probably near Lisbon. He became an esquire at the court of King Manuel. He may have been related to Dinis Dias, another sea captain who had tried to find a sea route to the Indies in 1445. Dias had at least one brother, who accompanied him on the voyage around the cape. (One of the reasons for the lack of information on the lives of many of these explorers is the secrecy that surrounded their expeditions. With Portugal and Spain actively competing for sea routes and new lands, any advantages gained in the field were carefully guarded, as were maps and any information pertaining to navigation.)

The main issue behind the need to establish a sea route to India was economic. Starting in the early 1400s, the Portuguese began pushing south along the coast of Africa. King John I's son, Prince Henry the

Bartolomeu Dias was one of the most important Portuguese sea explorers of the fifteenth century and the first European to round the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of Africa. (Saphire Ovadia/Dreamstime.com)

Navigator, played a crucial role in the development of the economic, political, and technical conditions necessary for the effective exploration of the African coast. When Gil Eanes crossed Cape Bojador, off southern Morocco, in 1434, the Portuguese were on their way to exploring the remaining coast. For the next 50 years, the Portuguese established fortresses and outposts along the coast, carrying out the lucrative business of slavery.

By 1481, Dias was one of several sea captains in charge of helping in the construction of a new fortress at Mina, on the coast of present-day Ghana. The main exploration effort south continued, mainly under the direction of Diogo Cão. The Portuguese marked their new territories by erecting 7-foot limestone columns called *padrões,* which claimed the new lands for the Portuguese crown. In 1487, King John put Dias in charge of an important expedition comprising two caravels and a supply ship. Pedro de Alenquer, one of the best mariners in the service of the Portuguese crown, was the chief pilot for Dias's ship, the *São Cristovão.* The second ship was captained by João Infante, a knight, while Dias's brother Pedro served as captain on the supply ship the *São Pantaleão.* Bartolomeu Columbus, the brother of Christopher Columbus, was also on board. The crew of 60 men carried six African slaves, who were to be used as traders and interpreters along the coast. The Portuguese were intent on finding the mythical kingdom of Prester John, the Christian king who according to legend dwelled somewhere in the midst of a powerful and wealthy land. Dias also had with him three *padrões* with which to mark his progress along the coast and claim any new lands for the king of Portugal.

The expedition sailed first to Mina, the fortress that Dias had helped to establish some years earlier. There, they took on supplies and then proceeded to the southern Angolan coast. On December 1, they passed the southernmost *padrão* left behind by Diogo Cão. Dias and his men were now in uncharted waters. They proceeded another 480 kilometers south but were assailed by foul weather and huge swells. Dias ordered the ships to sail away from the coast toward deeper waters in an effort to escape the tremendous swells that had battered his ships for weeks. Unable to find land, the ships turned north. When the crew finally spotted land, they realized the coast was now running east instead of south. Hardly believing what he was witnessing, Dias realized that while the ships were away from the coast for the last 13 days, they had achieved what many had tried and failed: he had crossed the southernmost tip of Africa. The route to India was now open.

Dias was intent on continuing the expedition, but his men were at the point of mutiny and refused to go any farther. Several had died during the storms, and the remaining crew only wanted to return home. João Infante, the knight, was jealous of the tremendous achievement that Dias had just accomplished and supported the rebellious crew. To avoid dishonor, Dias made his officers sign a document explaining that it was them who wanted to return. On the shore, he left a *padrão* to mark his remarkable discovery.

On June 6, on their way home, Dias and his men sighted the great cape that they had unknowingly crossed during the storms in February. Dias called it Cabo das Tormentas (Cape of Storms), but King John later renamed it Cape of Good Hope, for it was the gateway to India. Dias arrived in Lisbon in December 1488 after some 15 months at sea. The king was extremely pleased with the expedition results but kept them a secret for the next eight years. Christopher Columbus, waiting for his younger brother's return, was one of the few who knew about the expedition and one who would greatly benefit from it later.

Dias later had a key role in designing the ships that took Vasco da Gama to India in 1498. He was also one of the captains sailing with Pedro Cabral in 1500 when the armada inadvertently got within sight of the Brazilian coast. When the expedition left for the African coast, it was met by a tremendous storm in late May while rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Four ships were lost, with all their crews. Dias was among those who perished in the treacherous waters.

James Burns

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest (1575–1648); Da Gama, Vasco; Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795); Kongo Empire

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Dingane kaSenzagakhona (c. 1798–1840)

Dingane kaSenzagakhona was a Zulu statesman and warrior who assassinated his half-brother King Shaka to become the Zulu nation's second king in 1828. In the larger warfare of South Africa, however, Dingane led his soldiers in a disastrous attack on European settlers in 1838, which cost him his throne and ultimately his life and sank the Zulu state into a period of decline.

Dingane was one of three brothers to rule the Zulu state after his birth in around 1798. His half-brother Shaka seized the throne in 1815 and transformed the Zulu state into a powerful force in the region. Shaka's success stemmed in part from his utilization of novel military tactics and the creation of a professional standing army. Dingane had been an early supporter of Shaka and was involved in the administration of the new military empire. Though details of his role in the early years of the state remain obscure, he is known to have taken part in all of Shaka's campaigns. By 1828, however, Shaka's constant warring had exhausted his followers, and his rule had become increasingly arbitrary. In that year, Dingane and two conspirators assassinated the king. Although they ruled briefly as a triumvirate, Dingane soon consolidated his position as Shaka's heir and eliminated his rivals.

As king, Dingane tried to win the support of his people by slowing the military expansion. The large Zulu army thwarted his efforts, however, forcing Dingane to resume Shaka's aggressive policy. He led a series of campaigns against his neighbors in Natal and the Transvaal, as well as raiding expeditions against the Portuguese settlements on the Indian Ocean coast.

Dingane assumed power during a period of growing European interest in, and expansion into, the Zulu homeland in the Natal region of southern Africa. Shaka had allowed a handful of British traders admission into Natal. Dingane continued this policy and permitted European missionaries to enter his kingdom. In 1837, a group of European settlers led by Piet Retief petitioned Dingane for permission to settle in Natal. These pioneers were Boers, farmers who spoke Afrikaans (a language related to Dutch). Their ancestors had arrived in Cape Colony, South Africa, from Holland during the 17th century.

Retief and his followers had left the British-controlled Cape Colony to find new pastures for their livestock and to free themselves from British colonial administration. Dingane agreed to provide them with land if Retief's party would reclaim cattle captured from the Zulu by the neighboring Tlokwa. When Retief and his men appeared the following year with the cattle, Dingane massacred their entire party. He then ordered his army to attack the other Boer settlers in the region. Soon the missionaries and traders in Natal fled the country.

The Afrikaners regrouped and led by Andries Pretorius, returned to Zululand in 1838, where they established their camp next to the Blood River. Dingane's troops attacked on December 16, 1838. The Boers, protected by their circled wagons and enjoying superior firepower, inflicted a devastating defeat on the Zulu troops, suffering only three wounded men while killing 3,000 of Dingane's soldiers. The Battle of

Blood River marked the beginning of Boer penetration into the lands of the Zulu. The date of the battle came to be celebrated by Afrikaners in South Africa as Dingane's Day to commemorate their great victory. In 1994, given the advent of democracy in South Africa, the holiday was officially renamed Reconciliation Day.

British officials from the Cape Colony intervened in the conflict and brokered a peace between the warring parties, but the defeat left Dingane in a precarious position among his people. He attempted to escape the Boer influence by shifting his empire northward. There, he met resistance from the Swazi who thwarted his attempts to expand at their expense.

In 1840, Dingane's half-brother, Mpande, joined forces with the Boers and marched an army against the Zulu king. Mpande's troops triumphed, and the new Zulu king drove Dingane into exile, where he died as a refugee that same year.

James Burns

See also: Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Mpande kaSenzangakhona; Pretorius, Andries; Retief, Piet

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Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo (1868–1913)

A Zulu king in the aftermath of the Anglo-Zulu of 1879 caught up in civil war, the colonial partition and annexation of Zululand, loss of royal status, failed rebellion, and ultimate exile, Dinuzulu was born in 1868 to King Cetshwayo kaMpande's first wife, Nomvimbi kaMsweli, and was his heir designate. Cetshwayo, a fugitive at the end of the Anglo-Zulu War, appointed Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, chief of the Mandlakazi in northeastern Zululand, as Dinuzulu's guardian. However, when in the settlement of September 1, 1879, the British abolished the Zulu monarchy and appointed Zibhebhu chief of one of the 13 territories into which they partitioned Zululand, it became in Zibhebhu's interest to suppress the aspiration of the royal house rather than support them. Dinuzulu therefore escaped to his uncle, Prince Ndabuko kaMpande, who assumed his guardianship.

The British restored Cetshwayo to the central portion of his former kingdom on December 11, 1882, and Dinuzulu joined him at oNdini, his great place. Simultaneously, and as a counterweight to Cetshwayo, the British apportioned Zibhebhu an enlarged chiefdom in the northeast. He and the uSuthu, or royalist faction, were soon at war, and Zibhebhu decisively routed them at the battle of oNdini on July 21, 1883. Dinuzulu escaped on horseback and joined his father in the Nkandla Forest in the British Reserve Territory in southern Zululand. Upon Cetshwayo's sudden death on February 8, 1884, Dinuzulu's uncles, Ndabuko, Dabulamanzi kaMpande, and Shingana kaMpande, rallied around him to prevent a disputed succession. Driven to desperation by the continuing and unsuccessful war against Zibhebhu and his allies, Dinuzulu decided to ally the uSuthu with Boers freebooters who were infiltrating northwestern Zululand. On May 21, 1884, the Boers of the Committee of Dinuzulu's Volunteers proclaimed Dinuzulu king of the Zulu and agreed to aid him militarily against Zibhebhu in return for land. (On the previous day, Dinuzulu's uncles had installed him as king with traditional Zulu ritual.)

Dinuzulu led the uSuthu forces at the Battle of Tshaneni on June 5, 1884, where his Boer allies were vital in routing Zibhebhu. On August 16, 1884, the Boers exacted their price. He ceded them nearly 3 million acres for the establishment of their New Republic and accepted the extension of a Boer protectorate over his remaining territory. From oSuthu, his chief homestead in the valley of the Vuna River where the uSuthu were concentrated, Dinuzulu was helpless to protect his nominal subjects as the Boers occupied their new farms and pursued their land claims eastward to St Lucia Bay. To contain this threat to its regional interests, Britain recognized the New Republic on October 22, 1886, in return for the Boers abandoning their protectorate over Dinuzulu. On May 19, 1887, Britain annexed the rest of Zululand as a colony.

Dinuzulu initially welcomed British annexation as saving him from the Boers, but he soon came to resent the nature of the colonial administration that they imposed. He was outraged when the colonial authorities decided to return Zibhebhu to his old territory in northeastern Zululand in November 1887 to help intimidate the increasingly recalcitrant uSuthu. The volatile situation was made worse in January 1888, when the local magistrate demarcated an overly large location for Zibhebhu and permitted the expulsion of uSuthu living within its confines.

By April 1888, the uSuthu were in open rebellion, and Dinuzulu assumed a prominent part in the planning of military operations. He also commanded and fought on the front lines when on June 2, 1888, the uSuthu repulsed a British force on Ceza Mountain that had been dispatched to arrest him; and on June 23, 1888, Dinuzulu again personally led the uSuthu forces that routed Zibhebhu at the Battle of Ivuna. These local successes notwithstanding, the uSuthu were unable to maintain the struggle once the British rushed in reinforcements, and the uSuthu Rebellion petered out in pacification operations between July and August 1888.

On August 7, 1888, Dinuzulu disbanded his remaining followers on Ceza Mountain and fled to the South African Republic before making his way to Bishopstowe, Harriette Colenso's house outside Pietermaritzburg in Natal. She was the eldest daughter of John Colenso, the Bishop of Natal (1814–1883), who had strenuously promoted the exiled Cetshwayo's cause, and she was equally assiduous in defending that of Dinuzulu and the uSuthu. Consequently, she was both feared and abhorred by the Zululand officials.

Dinuzulu followed her advice and surrendered to the British authorities on November 15, 1888. With other uSuthu leaders, he stood trial in Eshowe before the Court of the Special Commissioners for

Zululand between February 13 and April 27, 1889. Despite the strong legal defense organized by Harriette Colenso, he was found guilty, along with his uncles Ndabuko and Shingana, of high treason and public violence. He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, to be served on the island of St. Helena. During his incarceration, Harriette Colenso was unremitting in her efforts to secure his pardon.

As part of a general settlement to restore stability to Zululand, on December 30, 1897, the colony of Zululand was incorporated into Natal, and in January 1898, Dinuzulu and his uncles, along with Zibhebhu, were returned to their former homes. Dinuzulu was deprived of his royal status and was recognized merely as a Government Induna, which was a junior official Nevertheless, many Zulu persisted in regarding him as their legitimate ruler. During the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, the British were reluctantly compelled to exploit Dinuzulu's continuing standing among his people to raise Zulu levies to help defend Zululand against Boer incursions.

In 1906, the widespread Zulu Uprising (or Bhambatha Rebellion) broke out in Natal against colonial rule and was ruthlessly suppressed. Because so many Zulu still looked up to him on account of his royal heritage, Dinuzulu found it impossible to avoid all involvement in the uprising. On December 10, 1907, the Natal authorities controversially arraigned him in Nongoma. Harriette Colenso again rallied a skillful legal defense, and although Dinuzulu was acquitted of the main charges, he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment and stripped of all his remaining authority.

In 1910, Louis Botha, the prime minister of the newly formed Union of South Africa, commuted Dinuzulu's sentence to exile on the Rietfontein farm in the Transvaal Province. There, overweight, depressed, and given over to drink, Dinuzulu died on October 18, 1913. His body was carried to emaKhosini (the Valley of the Kings) in the heart of the old Zulu kingdom, to lie among his royal ancestors. He was succeeded by his son, Solomon Nkayishana kaDinuzulu, born on St. Helena on January 2, 1893, to Silomo kaNtuzwa Mdlalose, who had accompanied his father into exile.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Botha, Louis; Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dabulamanzi kaMpande; Ivuna, Battle of (June 23, 1888); Ndabuko kaMpande; oDini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Tshaneni, Battle of (June 5, 1884); Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884); Zulu Rebellion (1888); Zulu Rebellion of 1906

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Dithakong, Battle of (1823 and 1878)

Dithakong (meaning "place of ruins" in Setswana) is located in what is today the Northern Cape province of South Africa and is the location of ancient stone walls. During the very early 19th century, Dithakong was the site of a large Tlhaping Tswana town that was visited by several British expeditions of exploration. By the same time, a collection of trans-frontier peoples generally called Griqua (also Kora, Koranna, and other names) had used possession of horses and guns from the Cape Colony to dominate much of the surrounding area, where they raided livestock and slaves from local Sotho and Tswana groups. The Griqua expelled many Rolong and Tlhaping Tswana from their lands, and some Sotho and Tswana lived around Griqua settlements in a quasi-feudal arrangement.

In the 1810s, British missionaries began to establish themselves among the Griqua, who had picked up Christianity and Afrikaans language from the Boers, and turned a blind eye to their raids for the sake of spreading their religion. An 1823 drought prompted Sotho and Tswana living on the grasslands around the Vaal River to move southwest in search of food. When they were driven off by the Ngwaketse, Rolong, and Hurutshe Tswana, this refugee group headed south toward the Kuruman River where there was food and water. They were mistakenly called "Mantatees," as they had been attacked by the Tlokwa Sotho under Queen Mantatisi. A combined force of 200 Griqua and many more Tlhaping, accompanied by missionary Robert Moffat and British agent John Melville, confronted these refugees on June 24, 1823, near Dithakong. Having never fought against horses and guns, the so-called Mantatees were easily scattered, leaving behind around 500 dead. The Griqua returned home with 1,100 cattle and some captives.

For many years, historians portrayed this engagement as a defensive action by the Griqua and their allies against a violent group set in motion by the upheaval of Mfecane (or crushing) that had been initiated by the expansion of the Zulu kingdom. However, a more recent view sees the "battle" as a calculated cattle and slave raid by the Griqua, and there have been controversial accusations that Moffat and Melville were involved in planning it.

In 1878, the Griqua and Tlhaping of Griqualand West, a diamond mining area recently taken over by the British, rebelled against colonial rule and were driven north of the Molopo River border into the territory of the independent southern Tswana. In mid-July, a force of 300 colonial soldiers commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William Owen Lanyon pursued the rebels across the border and drove them from stone fortifications at Gamopedi. On July 24, the colonial army bombarded the stone walled Tlhaping stronghold of Dithakong for three hours and then launched a two-pronged cavalry and infantry attack. As professional hunters, the Tlhaping had firearms and knew how to use them. Despite a determined stand, they were compelled to flee by the attackers' firepower. In what Lanyon called "the most decisive victory of the war," his men captured 3,600 cattle, 6,000 sheep, 63 wagons, some rifles, and a considerable amount of trade goods such as ivory, ostrich feathers, and hides. Five colonial troops and 39 Tlhaping were killed.

During the last months of 1878, Major Charles Warren led patrols though the independent area between Griqualand West and the Molopo River, where he apprehended rebels and obtained the submission of all rulers to British authority. Africans in Griqualand West were disarmed and taxed, and in 1881, the territory was absorbed by the Cape Colony. In 1885, the southern Tswana, located between the former Griqualand West and the Molopo River, became residents of British Bechuanaland, which was also eventually incorporated into the Cape Colony and became part of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Griqualand West Rebellion (1878); Warren, Charles

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Dodds, Alfred-Amedee (1842–1922)

In 1842, Alfred-Amedee Dodds was born in Saint-Louis, Senegal. Part of the metis community, his grandfather had been an English merchant who married a woman of partly African origin. The young Dodds was sent to France for his education, and in 1862, he graduated from the military college at Saint-Cyr and became a lieutenant in the marine infantry, France's colonial troops, serving in the Indian Ocean island colony of Reunion during riots in the late 1860s.

Born in the French enclave of Saint Louis in Senegal, Alfred-Amedee Dodds (1842–1922) became a French military officer and fought in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. During the late 1880s he returned to Senegal and directed French colonial expansion into the interior of West Africa and in 1892 he led the French invasion of Dahomey. (Collection Christophel/Alamy Stock Photo)

Dodds served as a captain in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71, where he was captured and escaped, and was decorated as Knight of the Legion of Honour. From 1871 to 1878, he served in Senegal and in 1878–1879, he posted to French Cochinchina in Southeast Asia. Returning to Senegal in

1879, he participated in fighting in the Casamance region until 1883, when he was sent back to Southeast Asia. There, he became a lieutenant-colonel and fought in the Sino-French War (1884–1885) which gave France control of Tonkin.

In 1887, Dodds became a colonel and was appointed superior commandant of Senegal. Overer the next few years, he was involved in a series of military expeditions that extended French rule inland, including into Futa Jallon, in what is now Guinea. In 1891, Dodds was decorated Commander of the Legion of Honour and placed in command of the 8th Colonial Army in Toulon, southern France. From 1892 to 1894, he commanded the French colonial expedition sent to conquer the kingdom of Dahomey (in what is now Benin). Success in this war earned him promotion to brigadier general and decoration as Grand Officer of the Legion of Honour.

In 1900, Dodds became high commander of French colonial troops in Indochina and between 1903 and 1907, he was high commander of French marine infantry and a member of the French Superior War Council. Given his age, he did not participate in military activities during World War I and died in 1922.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Behanzin; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Franco-Dahomey Wars (1890–1894)

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Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887)

Fought inland from the port city of Massawa in present-day Eritrea, the Battle of Dogali, an ambush and massacre of Italian soldiers by an Ethiopian force, quickly acquired a place in Italian memory similar to that of the Little Big Horn in the American consciousness, with the Italian commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Tommaso De Cristoforis, who died at the head of his troops, occupying a role very much like that of George Armstrong Custer.

The Battle of Dogali has to be viewed in the context of dogged Italian imperial ambitions, which followed quickly on the country's unification in 1870 and were seen as a necessary continuation of that process, and of Britain's evolving policy with respect to the Horn of Africa. Frustrated by the 1882 French takeover of Tunisia, where Italy had a large economic stake, the Italian government turned its attention to Eritrea on the Red Sea coast of East Africa. The Italians' efforts were encouraged by the British, who viewed Italy as a proxy in the competition for control of the region with the French and a bulwark against expansion by the Mahdist state in the Sudan.

This was an abrupt shift in British policy toward the region. Eritrea had been under the rule of Britain's regional protégé, Egypt, until its defeat in an 1874–1876 war with Ethiopia. In the Hewett Treaty of 1884, the British had recognized the victorious Ethiopia as the dominant power in Eritrea. The Ethiopian ruler, Emperor Yohannes IV, had duly moved to incorporate Eritrea into his realm, only to find that his claim was now contested by Italy, with

British support. The Italians had profited from local opposition to Ethiopian rule to secure a foothold in the province and were now moving aggressively away from the coast and toward the temperate highlands around the city of Asmara. Since the bulk of the population of Eritrea was Muslim, there was little local enthusiasm for amalgamation with the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia, and the Italians were reasonably successful throughout the years of their East African empire in raising local levies to fight the Ethiopians.

The Battle of Dogali stemmed from Ethiopian efforts to thwart Italian expansion inland from a lodgment carved out on the Eritrean coast five years earlier with the acquisition by Rome of the coaling station of Assab in southern Eritrea from an Italian shipping firm that had bought it from a local ruler at the time of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Subsequent Italian expansion, beginning with the occupation of Massawa in 1885, was considered a threat to Ethiopian interests, and the veteran soldier Ras Alula Engida, who had been made governor of Eritrea by Yohannes IV with headquarters in Asmara, was ordered to drive the invaders back. His army attacked an Italian garrison in the town of Sahati, halfway between Massawa and Asmara, on January 25, 1887, but it was driven off and suffered heavy losses. The garrison, however, found itself short of ammunition and other supplies and wired for reinforcements.

The next day, Lieutenant-Colonel De Cristoforis's 548-strong relief column, mostly Italians but including a few Eritrean irregulars, was ambushed near the town of Dogali by Ras Alula's army of around 7,000 men. Out of ammunition and their Gatling gun inoperative, De Cristoforis and his entire command perished in hand-to-hand combat, except for 80 wounded soldiers who played dead and were eventually rescued. The Ethiopians were said to have lost 1,000 dead.

The massacre at Dogali had a much more symbolic than actual impact on Italy's imperial fortunes. The account from survivors of how the Italian troops had stood and presented arms before the last wave of attackers swept over them inspired countless poems, songs, and instant books, as the catalog of any large Italian library will reveal. The large square in front of Rome's central railway station was renamed the Piazza dei Cinquecento ("square of the 500") in honor of the dead of Dogali.

But the defeat also sparked a desire for revenge in Italy, and a relief force of some 18,000 men was quickly sent out to Eritrea. The pullback to the coast that followed Dogali was reversed and the drive toward Asmara resumed, accompanied by construction of a railroad. In 1890, a royal decree made Eritrea Italy's first colony. It became the base for an Italian bid to take over Ethiopia itself in the succeeding decade. But the defeat of an Italian army at Adowa in 1896—a far bloodier setback than Dogali—stalled Italian ambitions in Ethiopia for a generation. It was only with the coming to power in Italy of the fascists in the 1920s that the effort to conquer Ethiopia would be revived. The legend of Dogali would play a part in that effort. In 1925, a large obelisk from the era of Rameses II of Egypt, brought back by its Roman conquerors, was relocated to the Piazza dei

Cinquencento and dedicated to the martyrs of Dogali.

Bruce Vandervort

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Alula Engida, Ras; De Cristoforis, Tommaso; Eritrea; Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italian-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Sudan, British Conquest of (1811–1899); Yohannes IV

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Dongola, Capture of (September 23, 1896)

The British reconquest of the Sudan began in March 1896, and its first objective was to recapture the province of Dongola. The 9,000-man Egyptian army, under the command of Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener, advanced south from Akasha and fought and defeated the dervishes at Firket on June 7, 1896. Egyptian losses were 113 killed or wounded, while the dervishes suffered over 1,000 killed. Although a small engagement, it instilled confidence into the leaders and soldiers of the Egyptian army.

The military railway that had been built to Wadi Halfa was then extended to about 16 kilometers south of Firket. Over the summer of 1896, cholera broke out in the camps along the Nile, killing over 600 men. Severe weather hindered preparations for the advance. A gunboat flotilla was assembled to support the advance.

As the town of Dongola, the capital of Dongola province, was the obvious objective of Kitchener's force, the dervish governor established defensive positions at Kerma, on the east bank of the Nile, and at Hafir, 800 meters upstream on the Nile's west bank. On September 18, 1896, the dervish governor learned that the Egyptian army was advancing on Kerma, and that night, he transported his force across the Nile to the defensive positions at Hafir.

Kitchener's force attacked Kerma at dawn on September 19 and found it deserted. The British gunboats discovered the dervishes on the opposite bank and opened fire on them, and after a heated artillery and small arms duel, Kitchener ordered the gunboats to proceed to Dongola, 56 kilometers upstream. That night, the dervishes slipped away from the Hafir positions, and the following day, Kitchener used the dervish boats to transfer his troops across the Nile.

On September 22, 1896, and throughout the evening, the Egyptian army began its approach march to Dongola, anticipating action the next morning. When the Egyptian troops prepared for combat at dawn on September 23, dervish cavalry were spotted in the distance, but they withdrew. The Egyptian army advanced to Dongola and found that the dervishes were gone. The capture of Dongola was an anticlimax to the campaign. Kitchener pushed on, and his forces occupied Debba and Merowe by the end of September, capturing all of Dongola Province and establishing positions near the dervish stronghold at Abu Hamed. The capture of Dongola province, the first phase in the reconquest of the Sudan, met with enthusiastic approval in Britain. Anglo-Egyptian combat casualties were 47 killed and 122 wounded, but over 1,000 other lives were lost to disease.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Egyptian Army; Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Sudan, British Conquest of (1811–1899)

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Doornkop, Battle of (May 28–29, 1900)

After the Second Anglo-Boer War disasters of “Black Week” in December 1899, British general Frederick Sleigh Roberts and massive numbers of British reinforcements arrived in South Africa and launched a counteroffensive to lift the sieges of Kimberley, Mafeking, and Ladysmith and invade the Boer republics. In March 1900, Bloemfontein, capital of the Orange Free State, was occupied, and at the end of May, British forces invaded the Transvaal.

Although he had 6,000 men at his disposal, Transvaal commander Louis Botha realized that this was not enough to face Roberts’s massive force, and he decided to abandon the mining center of Johannesburg and move farther north. Botha rejected the pleas from Boer radicals and Irish volunteers to blow up the gold mines, as they would be needed after the war. The defense of the Rand was left to a few hundred Boers under Ben Viljoen and Jacobus De la Rey, who dug in on the high ground of Doornkop, 4 kilometers north of the Klip River.

On May 28, one of John French’s cavalry brigades, including the Royal Canadian Dragoons and Canadian Mounted Rifles, crossed the Klip River, established a foothold on the other side, and spent the entire day and night under Boer fire. The next day, Roberts reconsidered the developing frontal attack, which would have to cross difficult ground, and ordered the withdrawal of most of the mounted brigade. Instead, he sent them to seize another river crossing to the west from where infantry could outflank the Boers on Doornkop. However, when Ian Hamilton’s infantry crossed the river at that point, he directed them to conduct a frontal attack on the overlooking Boer position. There was little cover, as the Boers had set fire to the grass, which meant that the British khaki uniforms contrasted with the blackened hillside.

Led by Major-General Horace Smith-Dorrien, two British infantry brigades (including the Gordon Highlanders, the City Imperial Volunteers (London), and 2nd Battalion Royal Canadian Regiment) advanced uphill and under fire to eventually take the position, which the Boers abandoned given fears of encirclement by British cavalry. The British suffered 28 dead and 134 wounded. The bravery of the Gordon Highlanders, who sustained heavy casualties, prompted war correspondent Winston Churchill to describe them as "the finest regiment in the world." Hamilton's brash frontal attack may have been inspired by the fact that Doornkop was where Leander Staff Jameson's raiders had surrendered to the Boers in 1895. This was the only engagement of the war in which units from the first and second Canadian contingents fought together. Most Boers who wanted to continue the fight headed north.

The British and Boers agreed to a peaceful handover of Johannesburg at the end of May because of their common need to dominate African workers. Roberts's failure to press the fight against the fleeing Boers may have represented his greatest mistake of the campaign, as he had annexed the Transvaal without a military conquest. Although they had been expecting a climactic battle that would defeat the Boers, British forces under Roberts entered Pretoria on June 5, 1900, without a fight. Ultimately, the Boers who remained in the field embarked on a guerrilla campaign that would gradually bleed the larger British forces.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Black Week (December 10–15); Canadians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Churchill, Winston; De la Rey, Jacobus; Jameson, Leander Starr; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Dunn, John Robert (1833–1895)

A white "transfrontiersman" in Zululand, John Robert Dunn was initially a Zulu chief, and then an ally of the British in their military operations in Zululand. Born in the Cape Colony in 1833 as the son of a Scottish immigrant from Inverness, Dunn entered Zululand in 1853 as a trader and hunter. Even though he fought the victorious Prince Cetshwayo kaMpande in the civil war of 1856 to decide the Zulu royal succession, he succeeded in gaining Cetshwayo's confidence and moved to the Zulu kingdom in 1858 as his secretary and adviser. Cetshwayo rewarded Dunn with a large chiefdom in southeastern Zululand, where he supplied migrant labor to Natal and ran firearms into Zululand. Dunn exploited his status in the Zulu kingdom, building up large herds of cattle and—to the scandal of colonial Natal—taking 48 Zulu wives in addition to his white wife.

In 1878, Dunn strongly advised Cetshwayo against risking war with Britain. When accused of treachery by the royal council, he fled to Natal in December 1878 with his adherents and cattle. During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, Dunn fought for the British. He accompanied the Eshowe Relief Column in March 1879 to organize reconnaissance and to advise on laagering procedures, and he fought at the Battle of Gingindlovu on April 2, 1879. He then joined the 1st Division, the South African field force in command of the Native Foot Scouts, and in June and July 1879, he played an important part in negotiating the submission of the costal Zulu chiefs. He advised General Sir Garnet Wolseley in devising his partition of Zululand into 13 fragments on September 1, 1879, and was rewarded with a large chiefdom in southeastern Zululand, which he ruled effectively.

When Britain restored the deposed King Cetshwayo to the central portion of his formal kingdom on December 11, 1882, Dunn's chiefdom was incorporated into the British Reserve Territory in the southern third of Zululand. Dunn much resented the loss of his chiefdom, but continued nevertheless to cooperate loyally with the British. During the Zulu civil war of 1883–1884, he raised African levies in 1884 to defend the Reserve Territory against attacks by the royalist uSuthu faction. During the final stages of the uSuthu Rebellion of 1888 in the colony of Zululand against British rule, he raised Dunn's Native Levy in July 1888 to assist in pacification operations.

Until his death on August 5, 1895, Dunn continued to live as a "white chief" at his Mangethe and Moyeni homesteads in southeastern Zululand. He was survived by 23 Zulu wives and 79 children. The John Dunn Land Distribution Acts of 1902 and 1935 confirmed his descendants' ownership of his lands, reaffirmed by a South African High Court decision in August 2004.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879); Ndondakusuka, Battle of (December 2, 1856); Wolseley, Field Marshal Garnet J.; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884); Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Durnford, Anthony William (1830–1879)

An army officer who played a controversial role in the British defeat at the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, Anthony William Durnford was born in Ireland on May 24, 1830, into a military family. In 1846, he entered the Royal Military

Academy, Woolwich, and on June 27, 1848, he was commissioned as second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. He was promoted to first lieutenant on February 17, 1854. He was stationed in England from then until 1871, except for a posting to Ceylon from 1851 to 1856 and to Gibraltar between 1860 and 1864. In 1860, he and his wife separated. Energetic, charming and high-principled, Durnford was also impetuous and a compulsive gambler. He was exasperated by his failure to see active service.

Durnford was posted to the Cape Colony in January 1872 and promoted to major in July 1872. In May 1873, he was posted to Natal. He served during the Langalibalele Rebellion of 1873, when his small force was routed on November 4, 1873, at the Bushman's River Pass and his left arm suffered a crippling injury. A court of enquiry in October 1874 was critical of his leadership while acknowledging his personal courage. Promoted to lieutenant-colonel on December 11, 1873, he acted as colonial engineer for Natal between 1873 and 1875 and erected a stone blockhouse of his own design in Estcourt.

He antagonized many colonists by championing the cause of Africans being punished for their part in the recent rebellion. In August 1876, he was posted to Ireland, but he returned to Natal in March 1877. In February 1878, he was appointed to the Zululand Boundary Commission adjudicating the border dispute between the British Transvaal Territory and the Zulu Kingdom. During August and September 1878, he was involved in raising, organizing, and training African levies for the coming invasion of Zululand and in preparing a military map of Zululand.

Durnford was promoted to army colonel on December 11, 1878, and given command of the No. 2 column of the British army, which invaded Zululand in January 1879. Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford ordered him on January 22, 1879, to reinforce the garrison of the camp of the No. 3 column at Isandlwana with part of his force. Durnford, as the senior officer present, disregarded Chelmsford's orders to the camp's commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine, to act strictly on the defensive. His imprudent advance against the attacking Zulu army compelled Pulleine to overextend his dispositions in support. Engaged far out on the British right and fighting courageously, Durnford was killed when the Zulu outflanked his position.

Subsequently, Chelmsford and his staff made Durnford their scapegoat, attributing the disaster to his rash conduct. Durnford's brother, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Durnford, and Frances Colenso, the second daughter of the humanitarian Anglican bishop of Natal, John Colenso, with whom he had enjoyed a close, sentimental friendship, endeavored with limited success to rehabilitate his tarnished reputation through their writings and public lobbying.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Langalibalele Rebellion (October–December 1873); Pulleine, Henry Burmester

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Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795)

In 1652, the Dutch East India Company founded a permanent post at the Cape of Good Hope to secure this strategic point on the sea route between Europe and Asia and create a reliable source of fresh water and food for their passing ships. Since the primarily pastoral Khoisan around Table Bay were hesitant to trade a large number of cattle, the Dutch imported settlers in 1657 to produce vegetables and meat. Competition over grazing land between Europeans and Khoisan led to the First Dutch-Khoi War of 1659–1660, in which the Khoisan groups united briefly and trapped the settlers within their fort. However, the Khoisan alliance deteriorated, and they ultimately negotiated with the Dutch. After the conflict, the Dutch erected a series of fences and hedges between themselves and the Khoisan, who were pushed off their land.

The Second Dutch-Khoi War of 1673–1677 comprised a series of cattle raids by Dutch settlers, assisted by impoverished Khoisan allies, which broke the power of the large Cochoqua group in the Saldanha Bay and Boland areas. European settlers expanded, and many Khoisan, their cattle seized and game hunted out, began to work for the Dutch alongside slaves imported from other parts of Africa and Asia.

Frontier Dutch settlers called Trekboers organized voluntary local militias called commandos to mobilize for raids and defense. Then they disbanded, which allowed the Khoisan to renew their attacks. Between 1700 and 1715, the first commandos consisted of company employees and some settler volunteers. While the first entirely civilian commando was formed in 1715, these groups remained dependent upon the company for ammunition.

In 1739, commando service became compulsory for all frontier settlers, who often brought along armed Khoisan servants or sent them as substitutes, and they collected a share of captured livestock. Commando leaders were not required to get permission before raising a force but were obliged to submit a report to colonial authorities upon disbandment. The loose structure of the commando made it flexible and fast in response to sudden Khoisan attacks or stock theft.

As Dutch settlement expanded north beyond the Piketberg Mountains during the 1730s, the Khoisan mounted intense guerrilla attacks, and violence there continued for the rest of the century. Eastward Dutch expansion across the arid Karoo and into the rich grazing land between the Gamtoos and Fish rivers led to warfare from the 1770s to the 1790s. A major factor in these conflicts was that since the Trekboers lacked the capital to employ wage labor, they captured Khoisan women and children for indentured service. In the northeast, particularly in the Sneeuwberg area, violence between Bushmen hunters and Trekboer herders in the early 1770s caused many of the latter to abandon their farms. In 1774, a so-called grand commando of 100 Europeans and 150 Khoisan swept through the area, killing 503 Bushmen and capturing 241. Between 1786 and 1795, there was near-constant warfare in the northeast and commandos killed 2,480 Bushmen and captured 654, and the Bushmen killed 276 of the Boers' Khoisan herders.

The Khoisans' resistance failed because they did not produce iron weapons or tools, which the Dutch quickly refused to provide them through trade, and the scale of their political organization was small, facilitating colonial divide and rule tactics. Although there has been some debate over these issues, factors such as a major smallpox epidemic among the Khoisan in 1713 and expanding Dutch control of water sources also contributed to the Khoisan decline. The Dutch had greater mobility provided by their horses, and their firearms were lethal and terrifying.

The Khoisan learned to counter Dutch firepower by adopting hit-and-run and ambush tactics and attacking when it rained, as the firearms of the period did not work properly when wet. Although Khoisan reliance on livestock left them vulnerable to fast-moving Trekboer raiders, groups that had lost their cattle and resorted to hunting and gathering proved more adept at guerrilla tactics. By the 1670s, the Khoisan had acquired a few guns through trade and capture, and this led to a series of frequently ignored Dutch prohibitions on trading firearms with them. Eventually, many Khoisan fled east to live near or among the more numerous Xhosa people; others moved north, where they formed the nucleus of new transfrontier communities such as the Kora and Griqua, which employed horses and guns acquired from the Dutch to seize livestock and slaves from African groups farther inland. Ultimately, most Khoisan accepted a subordinate position within Dutch colonial society and merged into the culturally mixed Cape Coloured community.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boers; Commando System (Boer Republics); Firearms Technology

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East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905)

In Buganda, a compact but powerful state on the north shore of Lake Victoria, three new religious-political factions aligned with external forces emerged during the second half of the 19th century. Muslim converts associated with Arab traders, Catholic converts with French missionaries, and Protestant converts with British missionaries. Around the same time, Bunyoro, located to the northwest and under Kabarega, the king of Buganda, created a professional corps of musketeers made up of deserters from the Egyptian army in Sudan and other displaced men. Within a few years, Bunyoro fielded 1,000 gunmen armed with breech and muzzle-loading rifles who, given the decentralized nature of Bunyoro's government, were dispersed in small units across the country.

Since no other state in the area had a similar force, Kabarega launched a series of campaigns in the late 1880s and early 1890s to recover land taken from Bunyoro years earlier. The young Mwanga, who took over as Buganda's ruler after the death of his father, Mutesa, in 1884, feared that his kingdom's Christian converts supported European encroachment from the east coast. In 1886, Mwanga ordered the killing of the new British Anglican bishop, James Hannington, while on his way to Buganda, as well as 50 Baganda Christians. Furthermore, a Buganda army raiding Bunyoro was defeated by superior firepower. These developments prompted Buganda's Muslims, Catholics, and Protestants to acquire firearms and organize military units.

Lacking military support, Mwanga promoted Muslim and Christian converts to head four new special chieftaincies of young unmarried men located close to the capital. Among the new military elite were Apolo Kagwa, a Protestant, who controlled the royal armory; Henry Nyonyintono, a Catholic, who headed a large armed group; and Kapalaga, a Muslim, who was the army's chief of staff. However, in 1888, the three armed convert factions converged on the capital of Mengo and overthrew Mwanga, who fled south by boat. Since the Muslims made up the entire palace guard and had over 2,000 gunmen (compared to 1,000 for the Christians), they controlled the new ruler, Kiwewa Mutebi II. The religious alliance dissolved, fighting broke out at the capital, and the combined Christian forces fled south to Ankole. The Muslims then overthrew Kiwewa Mutebi II, who was a traditionalist; installed Kalema, who became the first Muslim ruler of Buganda; persecuted Christians; burned Christian missions; and expelled European missionaries.

Kalema sent a punitive expedition south, which was routed, and then the confident

Christians attacked Kalema's force. At the subsequent Battle of Mawuki, one of the Christian divisions defeated a major wing of the Muslim army, but the other Christian division was ambushed and overwhelmed. Since Kalema had killed many of the Baganda royals, the Christians had no alternative but to support the exiled Mwanga and his traditionalist followers. After Mwanga's combined army of Christians and traditionalists were defeated by the Muslims, the former Protestant missionary Charles Stokes began using his Lake Victoria steamer to supply the Christians with arms and ammunition. Also on the lake, Mwanga sent a canoe force under Gabriel Kintu to intercept a Muslim Zanzibari arms shipment on its way to Kalema, and after an intense naval engagement, the Arab boat was blown up. Attempting to regain control of the vital lake supply route, Kalema ordered the construction of war canoes, but Mwanga's forces attacked and destroyed them.

After a series of land battles, the Muslims were eventually encircled and began withdrawing toward the capital. At the Battle of Bunkabira, in early October 1889, a Christian army under the emerging military leader Semei Kakungulu inflicted heavy losses on the Muslims. The next day, at the Battle of Kitebi fought near modern Kampala, the Muslims were again defeated, and Kalema fled the capital, which was reoccupied by Mwanga. With the help of neighboring Bunyoro, the Muslim army was reorganized and quickly went on the offensive, defeating a Christian force with 2,600 gunmen under Apolo Kagwa. Mwanga once again abandoned the capital. At the ensuing Battle of Bulwanyi, Christian forces under Kintu and Kakungulu—the most successful Christian military leaders of the Buganda civil war—decisively defeated the Muslims. Kalema fled and later died of disease, and Mwanga was restored.

In December 1890, an Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) expedition with 100 Swahili and Sudanese soldiers and one machine gun under British officer Frederick Lugard arrived in Buganda with instructions to stop Mwanga from making agreements with other powers. Mwanga had recently signed a treaty with German agent Karl Peters that had been voided by an 1890 Anglo-German agreement on colonial borders in East Africa. After Lugard threatened to use his machine gun, a hesitant Mwanga marked a "treaty of friendship" that surrendered Buganda's sovereignty to Britain. Reinforced with 175 African soldiers and another machine gun in January 1891, Lugard began to fortify his post on Kampala Hill overlooking Mengo. In May, Lugard led a British detachment that accompanied a Buganda army to attack exiled Baganda Muslims in Bunyoro, where his machine gun inflicted 300 fatalities. This was likely the first time the machine gun was employed in combat.

Lugard then led his expedition to southern Sudan, where he found 600 Sudanese soldiers and thousands of dependents left behind after the Egyptian evacuation and brought them back to Buganda. He positioned most of these Sudanese along the Bunyoro-Buganda border and brought 100 of them back to Mengo. With British support, Baganda Protestants became aggressive toward their more numerous Catholic countrymen backed by Mwanga, who sought to assert Buganda's independence. On January 24, 1892, just after Lugard issued a few Snider breech-loading rifles and 500 muzzle loaders and ammunition that he had obtained from Stokes to the Baganda Protestants, civil war broke out. With the support of Lugard's machine gun, the Protestants drove the Catholics and Mwanga out of Mengo to islands in Lake Victoria. Violence continued over the next few days, with the British contingent using a machine gun to sink 30 boats of refugees and Sudanese troops under Captain W. H. Williams, Lugard's second in command, and to drive the Catholics off nearby islands. The Protestant minority became Buganda's ruling elite, and Mwanga returned and converted to Protestantism. Lugard went to Britain to respond to criticism of his intervention, and in 1893, the British government assumed administration of Buganda from the financially failing IBEAC.

In mid-1893, the colonial administration discovered that Baganda were plotting with some Muslim Sudanese troops to rebel, and the mutineers were disarmed and arrested. Near the capital, a Baganda Christian army of 2,200 gunmen and 4,000 spearmen, led by Kakungulu, defeated a smaller Muslim force with just 1,300 gunmen. Protestant Baganda forces under Kakungulu embarked on an offensive against the Muslim Baganda, who were slaughtered by superior firepower. The Muslims were then disarmed, excluded from Buganda's government, and restricted to a small western section of the country.

In December 1893 and January 1894, the British and Buganda launched a grand offensive consisting of 400 Sudanese troops with several machine guns under Henry Colville and thousands of Baganda, including 2,500 musketeers under Kakungulu, against Bunyoro. Faced with an overwhelming adversary, Kabarega withdrew from his capital and fought a series of delaying actions. Suffering from smallpox, the British-Baganda army returned with captives, vast amounts of livestock and ammunition, and control over much of southern Bunyoro, which was given to chiefs from both Christian factions. In April and May 1895, two British-Baganda forces, an overland one with machine guns under Major George Cunningham and Kagwa, and an amphibious force of 123 canoes under William Grant and Kakungulu, converged on Kabarega's new capital on the Nile. After pursuing the fleeing Banyoro for several days, the expedition returned with captured cattle, which were argued over by the rivals Kagwa and Kakungulu. The resurgence of Bunyoro had been checked, and further raids were mounted. Later the same year, Kakungulu led 1,000 Baganda warriors as part of a British punitive expedition against the pastoral Nandi in what is now western Kenya.

Resentful of attempts by the British and Protestant Baganda leaders to limit his authority, Mwanga and his 150 bodyguards left the capital in early July 1897 and went to the Buddu province to rally Catholic and Muslim forces. A British and Protestant Baganda force pursued Mwanga; and after the Battle of Kabuwoko, another occasion where the Protestant forces succeeded because of machine guns, the exiled king and his men fled south to German East Africa. In August, the British regime in Buganda officially deposed Mwanga and appointed his one-year-old son, Daudi Chwa, as king, supported by three regents: two Protestant and one Catholic.

Around this time, Baganda forces under Kagwa (one of the regents) and Kakungulu suppressed a rebellion by Sudanese colonial troops. After a three-month siege, the Baganda overcame the Sudanese mutineers holding out at Bukaleba in Busoga. Since the Sudanese were trained soldiers equipped with breech-loading rifles and machine guns, the Baganda suffered terrible casualties and succeeded because of overwhelming numbers. Escaping from German custody, Mwanga returned to Buddu, where he and Kintu, who had been convicted of murder by the Protestant rulers, led a guerrilla campaign against the superior firepower of colonial forces for the next two years. Mwanga's messages made it clear that he was not fighting for religion, but against British domination. He was joined by Kabarega and other exiles from Bunyoro, and they moved north to Langi country.

In April 1899, the British sent the Wakeddi Field Force (which included 100 Baganda gunmen led by Kakungulu) to find the fugitive kings, whose location was revealed by Langi, who was eager to avoid colonial retribution. Mwanga and Kabarega, who lost part of his arm in the subsequent skirmish, were captured and exiled to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean. Given his rivalry with Kagwa, who was now Buganda's prime minister, Kakungulu was assigned the northeastern frontier territory of Bugerere that had been taken from Bunyoro. Extending his influence eastward beyond Lake Kyoga into Iteso territory, he established a network of forts with Baganda garrisons, built roads to link them, and appointed loyal Baganda as local rulers.

This pattern was soon replicated by the British. In 1900, the British and Buganda regents signed the Uganda Agreement, which made Buganda a province within a larger protectorate, granted Buganda land taken from Bunyoro, reduced the power of the Buganda king, and turned the Baganda Protestant leaders into wealthy landowners. From that point, Buganda became the center of British expansion and rule in the larger colony of Uganda.

The British government was mostly interested in using the East African Protectorate, which it took over from the failed IBEAC in 1895 and referred to as "Kenya" after 1920, as a corridor for a railway to extract resources from the agriculturally rich southern Uganda to the Indian Ocean coast. In 1895, British officials intervened in a succession dispute among the Swahili Mazrui clan that sparked a rebellion led by Mbarak bin Rashid that quickly spread along the coast. After the Royal Navy stormed his stronghold at Mweli, some 24 kilometers from the coast, the Mazrui leader embarked on a guerrilla campaign and attracted numerous supporters, including the Giriama, who were ivory and slave traders in the Mombasa hinterland.

The rebels attacked Malindi and set fire to the coastal town before being repelled. With the arrival of reinforcements from India in March 1896, the British launched an offensive that drove the rebels into German East Africa, where they were disarmed and detained. Some rebel leaders eventually returned under an amnesty. Although the Mazrui Rebellion delayed the establishment of colonial administration, it resulted in the subjugation of coastal Swahili leaders and marked a transition from Zanzibari Arab to British dominance of coastal Kenya.

The most serious obstacle to British colonial rule in Kenya came from the decentralized and pastoral Nandi, who lived in



The most serious obstacle to British colonial rule in Kenya came from the decentralized and pastoral Nandi who lived in the forested hills around Mount Elgon on the route to Uganda. The Nandi fought against a series of British punitive expeditions sent into their area between 1895 and 1905. (Library of Congress)

the forested hills around Mount Elgon on the route to Uganda. During the mid-1800s, the Nandi had earned a fierce reputation by ambushing Swahili-Arab caravans, and European explorers of the 1870s and 1880s avoided them. In 1895, Nandi raiders began attacking British merchant and missionary caravans along the developing Uganda road. With just 1,200 Sudanese troops in the protectorate, the IBEAC could not deal with the Nandi threat. When the British government took over, it created the Uganda Rifles with 800 men and brought in the 27th Bombay Light Infantry from India.

In late 1895, a British column under Cunningham consisting of 400 Uganda Rifles, a machine gun, 23 Baganda irregulars, and 600 porters left Kampala and invaded Nandi territory. Destroying Nandi communities and seizing livestock, the British initially faced limited opposition. However, on November 13, 500 Nandi warriors attacked Cunningham's force on the Kimonde River and made it to within 30 meters of the colonial firing line before retreating. More than 100 Nandi had been cut down, while the British lost 14 African troops. While the British learned about Nandi discipline and élan, the Nandi learned that their usual tactics could not overcome colonial firepower. Subsequently, the Nandi began to use archers to harass the British force as it passed through forests and ravines where deploying firepower was limited. Exhausted and demoralized, Cunningham's men withdrew in late December, still pursued by Nandi warriors.

In 1896, the British built a road through Nandi territory and a fort to protect it. In May and June 1897, Colonel Trevor Ternan, acting commissioner of the Uganda Protectorate, dispatched two columns to converge on the suspected location of Koitalel Arap Samoei, the Nandi spiritual and war leader (called the *Orkoiyot*). Each column consisted of 220 African soldiers, 200 Maasai irregulars, 150 carriers, and a machine gun. The Nandi ambushed colonial patrols sent to seize livestock, and the British, unable to capture the Orkoiyot, eventually withdrew with some livestock. In 1900, the Nandi resumed attacks on colonial caravans and messengers. A British punitive expedition of Indian and African troops, assisted by Luo allies from western Kenya, was sent against the Nandi, who refused to be lured into a battle. The expedition withdrew, and the British negotiated with the Nandi, who gave permission for the Uganda railway to pass through their area. Nandi raiding along the railway and theft of copper telegraph wire led to further hostilities. In late 1905, a large military expedition of African troops from the recently formed King's African Rifles (KAR) and Maasai and Somali irregulars finally subdued the Nandi.

In October, Koitalel was invited to negotiations, where he was shot dead by British officer Captain Richard Meinertzhagen. In this last and costly campaign, 1,117 Nandi were killed, almost 5,000 huts and grain stores were burned, and 16,000 cattle and 36,000 goats and sheep were seized. During the next year, colonial troops drove the Nandi into a reserve in the arid northern part of their territory while their fertile land in the south was given to white settlers.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Kabarega; King's African Rifles (to 1904); Lugard, Frederick; Mazrui Rebellion (1895–1896); Mwanga II; Peters, Karl

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East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908)

In February 1885, Germany, a recent entry in the race for colonies in Africa, declared a protectorate over the mainland of present-day Tanzania, which became German East Africa. The arrival of the Germans prompted the British to drop their support for Zanzibar as the dominant force on the East African coast and impose direct control from the Kenyan coast inland to what is now Uganda.

In 1888, the German East Africa Company of explorer Karl Peters leased the coastal strip opposite Zanzibar from the sultan for 50 years. Attempting to extend German authority inland, Peters led an expedition that used breech-loading rifles to inflict heavy casualties on the Maasai during late December 1889. German attempts to control coastal towns sparked resistance from local Swahili-Arab ivory and slave traders.

A rebellion broke out in August 1888 when German administrator Emil von Zelewski attempted to raise a German flag over Pangani. Led by Arab-African planter Abushiri ibn Salim al-Harthi, the revolt spread along the coast from Tanga in the north to Lindi and Mikindani in the south. With the exception of the larger centers of Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, the Germans were either killed or expelled. In

For much of the nineteenth century the fearsome reputation of the Maasai had kept Swahili-Arab slavers out of their territory. However, in December 1889, a German colonial expedition led by Carl Peters inflicted heavy casualties on them at the Battle of Elbejet. (Library of Congress)

February 1889, Berlin sent Captain Hermann von Wissman, a German army officer and explorer who had been employed by Leopold II in the Congo, to the East African coast with a detachment of Sudanese mercenaries recruited from demobilized units of the Anglo-Egyptian army, as well as Zulu from South Africa. With the assistance of the British navy, Wissman fortified Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam and recaptured Tanga and Pangani. The Germans fortified the interior center of Mpwapwa, opened trade routes to the interior and used superior firepower to crush the rebellion.

Abushiri attempted to flee but was betrayed and captured in December 1889 and publicly hanged in Pangani. The imperial German government then took control of German East Africa from the German East Africa Company. Wissman was criticized by some German diplomats and military observers for needlessly executing people, burning villages, and destroying fields. From March 1891, Wissman's African mercenaries formed the nucleus of the East African *Schutztruppe* (protection force), a German colonial army with white leaders and black soldiers called askari. From 1896, this force fell under the command of the German colonial office.

In the mountainous area of what is now central Tanzania, Mkwawa emerged from an 1881 civil war as leader of the powerful Hehe state. During the mid- to late-1880s, he embarked on a series of military campaigns that expanded Hehe territory and raided Swahili-Arab trade caravans. Around this time, the Hehe staged several unsuccessful attacks on a stone fort at Utengule Usongwe that had been built by the Sangu, perhaps inspired by Arabs, who had moved west of the Ruaha River because of Hehe raids. This influenced Mkwawa to rebuild the wooden stockade at his capital of Kalenga with stone, which he believed impregnable.

Since the Hehe were expanding toward the coast and the Germans moving inland, each represented a major obstacle for the other. Around 1890, the Hehe attacked African communities that had submitted to the Germans, who had built forts at Mpwapwa and Kilosa on the trade route inland from Bagamoyo. The Germans began to fear that the Hehe might attack the coast.

Lacking the military resources to defeat the Hehe, the Germans initially negotiated. After a German expedition of 150 men visited the Hehe in the Usagara area, a Hehe delegation visited the coast and departed with an understanding that they could acquire guns and ammunition from the Germans. In June 1891, reports of Ngoni and Hehe raids in the interior prompted the Germans to send a patrol under Emil von Zelewski, nicknamed "The Hammer" during the Abushiri rebellion, to Usagara, where it destroyed abandoned Hehe villages, entered the core of Hehe territory where more villages were sacked, and marched toward the main Hehe fort at Kalenga. The German column consisted of 13 Europeans, 320 Askari, 170 porters supported by two machine guns, and three light cannon.

On the morning of August 16, when the German column paused to regroup at a place called Lugalo, some 3,000 Hehe warriors unexpectedly attacked from a clump of dense bush and rocks just 30 meters away. Although the Hehe had few guns and were armed mainly with spears and shields, the colonial soldiers managed to fire only one or two shots before they were overwhelmed and the donkeys carrying the support weapons bolted. The Germans lost 10 European officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), including von Zelewski, who had been riding a donkey at the head of the column, 256 African soldiers and their firearms, 96 porters, three cannon, and most of their baggage. Lieutenant Maximilian von Tettenborn rallied the German rearguard on a hill and held there for two days waiting for survivors before withdrawing toward the coast. The Hehe set fire to the dry grass to burn any wounded trying to crawl away, and then they pulled back. Although Tettenborn estimated that around 700 Hehe had been killed, the ambush represented a major German defeat.

While French missionaries visited the Hehe to assure them that the Germans wanted peace, German garrisons were established at Kilosa and Kisaki. In early October 1892, a Hehe force attacked and almost annihilated a large caravan at Mukondoa, which led to the evacuation of the missionaries. The Germans were unable to quickly mobilize a large expedition against the Hehe because a number of other African rulers took the opportunity to rebel, including Mkwawa's father-in-law, Isike in Unyamwezi, the Arab Mwinyi Mtwana, and several Sangu rulers living around Lake Rukwa. One by one, the Germans stormed the forts of these rulers, and Isike was killed while trying to blow himself up.

During the dry season of 1894, the new German governor Freiherr von Schele led a large expedition with 600 African troops, three machine guns, and some field guns from the coast into Hehe territory. Taking a different route from von Zelewski, the Germans approached Mkwawa's stone fort at Kalenga on the Little Ruaha River and built their own thorn stockade just 400 meters away. The stone wall that encircled Kalenga, which was 2.5 meters tall and up to 1.2 meters thick and 3.2 kilometers in circumference, could not be defended properly by the existing 3,000-man garrison and was vulnerable to artillery fire. On October 30, after two days of German bombardment, Captain Tom von Prince led a dawn assault that penetrated the Hehe fort.

After four hours of intense hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans were in control and Mkwawa had escaped. One German officer, eight African colonial soldiers, and 150 Hehe had been killed. The Germans were surprised to discover that Mkwawa had issued just 100 of the 300 guns in his possession, and that the Hehe had not attacked them en route to the fort. Years later, some Hehe sources suggested that Mkwawa had instructed his men to load their guns with blank charges, as he claimed that magical charms would stop the Germans. The Germans blew up 30,000 pounds of gunpowder at Kalenga and seized some ivory and guns. On its march back to the coast, the German column was ambushed by 1,500 Hehe warriors who disrupted the porters but were repelled by superior firepower.

Although the Germans attempted to negotiate with Mkwawa, the Hehe continued to attack other African groups that had accepted German rule. In 1896, a substantial German expedition under Prince, accompanied by his wife, Magdalene, returned to Hehe territory and built a garrison town at Iringa, about 11 kilometers from Kalenga. Within a few weeks, four of Mkwawa's subordinate rulers surrendered to the Germans, who made Mpangile, Mkwawa's brother, the puppet "Sultan of Uhehe." However, Prince blamed these men for continued Hehe attacks on German patrols, and in February 1897, he had them executed.

Hunger, disease, and protracted fighting took a toll on the Hehe, and their resistance began to wane. The German-Hehe War ended on July 19, 1898, when Mkwawa shot himself to avoid capture by a German patrol that had been tracking him, and his head was sent to Berlin as a trophy. As a result of this conflict, the German and subsequent British colonial administrations developed respect for the Hehe as a warrior people, and in postindependence Tanzania, Mkwawa is remembered as an anticolonial hero.

In July 1905, peasant communities in the Matumbi Hills, northwest of Kilwa, rebelled against German authorities, and this action quickly spread to the rest of the southern part of German East Africa. Causes of the uprising included the German imposition of cotton growing, which undermined food production, taxation, restrictions on hunting, and abuse by colonial troops. Since local spirit medium and prophet Kinjikitile Ngwale told people that a magical water (called *Maji* in Kiswahili) would render German bullets harmless, this event was dubbed the "Maji-Maji" Rebellion. While Ngwale was captured and hanged by the Germans early in the war, other prophets seem to have been involved in organizing the rebels. German officials, soldiers, traders, and missionaries were attacked and killed, including the Catholic bishop of Dar es Salaam, who was travelling in the interior. In the entire south, the Germans had just 588 African soldiers and 558 African police.

In mid-August, the Mbunga people overwhelmed a German post at Ifakara, killed all 13 colonial soldiers, and placed the imperial German eagle on a flagpole next to the decapitated head of a German NCO. The Germans at Mahenge, the main colonial post in the southern highlands, were warned of an impending attack and built fortifications, including a wooden machine gun tower, and hanged suspected rebels. On August 30, 1905, several thousand Pogoro, Ngindo, and Mbunga rebels assaulted Mahenge but were cut down by shooting from Captain Theodore von Hassel's garrison of 60 African troops and several hundred Bena loyalists. Some of the rebels fell within 30 meters of the fort's two machine guns. Mahenge was then besieged until a German relief force under Captain Ernst Nigmann from nearby Iringa drove off the rebels in late September.

The rebellion spread farther south to the Ngoni who, frustrated by colonial taxation and restrictions on raiding, planned to attack the Germans at Songea. In late October, Nigmann led a German detachment, including two machine guns, from Mahenge and dispersed a camp of 5,000 Ngoni rebels. Although Governor Graaf Gustav Adolf von Gotzen requested reinforcements, the Herero and Nama rebellion in German South West Africa meant that Berlin could dispatch only two cruisers to East Africa with 200 marines that arrived in October. Three German columns then moved into the south, where they destroyed food resources to starve the rebels into submission, pardoned rank-in-file rebels, and hanged their leaders.

The Hehe, who had fought the Germans during the 1890s, sided with the colonizers against the rebels. The rebellion ended in June 1906 after months of guerrilla fighting. Although the Germans claimed to have killed 26,000 rebels, it appears that somewhere between 250,000 and 300,000 people perished in the ensuing famine. Half of the Vidunda, over half of the Matumbi, and three-quarters of the Pangwa people died during the rebellion, and most of the southern highlands, once well settled and cultivated, had been turned into wilderness. Indeed, the hills of the Ngindo subsequently became the world's largest game park. Although Tanzanian nationalist historians of the 1960s claimed that Maji Maji represented the emergence of proto-nationalism among the country's diverse peoples, more recent scholars suggest that it was a series of rebellions provoked by different reasons and was part of a long series of wars that had begun before the arrival of the Germans.

After the 1895 death of Rwanda's ruler Rwabugiri, his son and co-ruler, Rutarindwa, was installed as king, and his rival, Kanjogera, one of the late ruler's wives (but not the new ruler's mother), became queen mother. Rwanda had little experience with external forces, having successfully kept out Swahili-Arab slavers during the mid- to late-19th century. Indeed, the arrival of a German exploratory expedition under von Gotzen in 1894 represented the first European visit to Rwanda's royal court. In July 1896, the Belgian Force Publique (FP) established two posts at Shangi at the south end of Lake Kivu and looted the area. After a debate about the supposed invincibility of Europeans, Kanjogera's brothers convinced Rwanda's royal court to send an army against the Belgians. Four elite companies totaling around 600 men assaulted the Belgians, were quickly decimated by gunfire, and withdrew. Kanjogera then arranged for the deaths of several of the king's supporters. This led to a battle at the royal residence of Rucunshu in

December 1896 between forces loyal to Rutarindwa and Kanjogera, in which hundreds were killed and the king committed suicide.

In February 1897, Kanjogera arranged for her teenage son, Musinga, to become king, followed by a purge of military commanders suspected of disloyalty. In late March, a German expedition consisting of 300 soldiers commanded by Captain Hans von Ramsay, who had just established a German military district in Ujiji on the east shore of Lake Tanganyika, arrived in Rwanda and allied with Kanjogera and Musinga in return for the kingdom becoming a German protectorate. After the Belgians had been driven out of Shangi by FP mutineers, the Germans occupied the area in November 1898 and founded the military district of Bujumbura that oversaw Rwanda and Burundi. A Belgian attempt to retake Shangi led to a skirmish with the Germans that encouraged both countries to sign a treaty in 1899 recognizing German authority in Rwanda.

As Musinga came of age, he relied increasingly on German colonial troops to suppress rebellions and extend his rule northward. In the recently conquered Ndorwa, resentment of Rwanda's rulers led to the emergence of a prophetic movement believing that Nyabingi, the daughter of the last independent ruler, would return one day. In 1897, Muhumuza, one of the late Rwabugiri's wives who had been on the losing side of the power struggle after his death, fled to Ndorwa with her young son, where she was celebrated as the returned Nyabingi. During the early 1900s, Muhumuza led guerrilla resistance to Musinga's Rwanda, as well as the Germans, Belgians, and British in this border area. In 1908, she was jailed for two years by the Germans, and in 1911, a British expedition attacked her stronghold on Ihanga Hill. Muhumuza was captured and exiled to Kampala, where she died in 1944.

Coming to power during the late 1860s, Burundi's ruler, Mwezi Gisabo, used his powerful royal guard to repel numerous Swahili-Arab incursions from the south and west, and Nyamwezi raiders from the east in 1884. Burundi remained less centralized than its neighbor Rwanda, and during the late 1800s, there was internal conflict between rival royal sons and the king. The Germans, in 1896, established a military post at the trading town of Bujumbura on the north end of Lake Tanganyika and assumed that nearby Burundi would become part of their East African colony. In 1899, a German military expedition under Captain Heinrich von Bethe marched into Burundi and attacked communities under a local chief who had burned a new Catholic mission. At that time, Mwezi Gisabo, perhaps intimidated by colonial firepower with which Burundi had no experience, accepted German authority.

In 1902, continued violence in Burundi between territorial rulers and the king, who now seemed to reject German supremacy, prompted Captain Friedrich Robert von Beringe, the German commander at Bujumbura, to organize a punitive expedition of 8 European officers and NCOs, 115 African troops, 234 local auxiliaries, and 60 Rwandan warriors supported by a machine gun and a light cannon. The German force was divided into four sections that converged on Mwezi Gisabo's capital, killing 200 men and suffering only three dead and two wounded. Mwezi Gisabo surrendered, recognized German sovereignty, promised to refrain from attacking trade caravans and missionaries, granted independence to rebellious subordinates who had assisted von Beringe, and provided 424 cattle as reparations.

Since Beringe had disobeyed explicit instructions from Governor von Gotzen to avoid conflict, he was replaced by Captain Werner von Grawert. Gotzen then reversed Beringe's policy of divide and rule with strong support for Mwezi Gisabo as king. Assisted by a 1905–1906 German expedition under Grawert, Mwezi Gisabo reasserted his authority over the rebellious chiefs, including those who had supported Beringe and extended his influence over new territory. Symbolizing the importance of superior firepower in the German conquest, Burundians gave Grawert the nickname "Digidigi" in imitation of a machine gun's retort.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889)**;** Force Publique (to 1914); German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898): Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891); Maji Maji Revolt (1905); Peters, Karl; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); Shangi, Battle of (July 1896); von Prince, Tom; von Wissman, Hermann; von Zelewski, Emil

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Egypt, British Occupation of (1882)

The defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Russia in 1877–1878 encouraged European powers to intervene directly in parts of North Africa under the nominal authority of Istanbul. In 1877, an 8,000-strong Egyptian expeditionary force was sent to Bulgaria to join Ottoman forces but suffered from incompetent Egyptian and Ottoman leadership and lack of warm clothing, and many of its soldiers injured themselves to avoid the pointless fighting. This was the last time Egyptians fought under the Ottoman sultan. In the Egyptian army, which had been modernized by American Civil War veterans during the 1870s, men of local peasant origin had gained access to junior officer ranks, where they became nationalistic and resented the continued dominance of their Turko-Circassian superiors.

The 1869 opening of the Suez Canal, linking the Red and Mediterranean seas, dramatically increased the strategic importance of Egypt for naval powers Britain and France, to which Cairo was indebted financially. In May 1882, prompted by a coup attempt by 4,000 nationalist Egyptian soldiers, France and Britain dispatched a combined naval squadron to Alexandria. American, Greek, Italian, German, and Russian naval ships were also sent but did not participate in subsequent fighting. The weakened Ottoman Empire rejected a request for the Egyptian ruler (or khedive) Tawfiq Pasha to send a relief force. On July 11, responding to the outbreak of riots in Alexandria, British warships bombarded the port's ineffective gun emplacements, killing 100 crewmen and injuring 400. At the last minute, the French chose not to intervene. Two days later, at the request of the embattled khedive, Royal Marines landed and quickly occupied the city.

By late August, the British were in control of both ends of the Suez Canal, vital for shipping to and from India, with forces based in Crete and Malta landing in the north and others from India landing in the south. British commander Sir Garnet Wolseley assembled an army of 25,000 British and Indian troops at Ismailiya at the middle of the canal. Opposing them was a larger Egyptian army under nationalist leader Urabi Pasha, who did not make any effort to defend the Suez Canal, as he believed the British would not risk damaging it. On September 10, Urabi's forces tried to recapture the canal by attacking the British at Kassassin, but they were repelled. On September 13, after a silent night march, the British surprised the Egyptian camp at Tel el-Kebir. The Highland Brigade stormed the Egyptian trenches with a bayonet charge, allowing the rest of Wolseley's force into Urabi's unprotected camp. British horse artillery galloped forward and cut down the retreating Egyptians with grapeshot. Several other British charges were supported by fire from artillery and Gatling guns. Urabi fled, and he surrendered Cairo to the British the next day.

The American chief of staff of the Egyptian general Charles Pomeroy Stone returned home to supervise the installation of the Statue of Liberty in New York, and many of the nationalist leaders, including Urabi, were exiled to Ceylon. Britain then took over command of the Egyptian army. Since Egypt remained technically part of the Ottoman Empire, the British occupation established a de facto protectorate until 1914, when Istanbul's entry into World War I on the side of Germany prompted London to unilaterally declare a protectorate over Egypt. Although Egypt became formally independent in 1922, British troops remained until 1956.

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See also: Alexandria, Bombardment of (July 11, 1882); Urabi Pasha, Ahmed; Urabi Rebellion (1882); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Wolseley, Garnet

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Egyptian Army

The Egyptian army, under Mohammed Ali until the mid-19th century, fought campaigns on behalf of the Ottoman sultan in the Arabian Peninsula, Sudan, and Greece. When attempting to gain independence from the Ottomans, Mohammed Ali's army, reportedly numbering 250,000 soldiers, invaded Syria in 1831 and marched close to Constantinople before being pressured to withdraw by Western powers. From Muhammed Ali's conquest of Sudan in the 1820s, the Egyptian army employed Sudanese slave soldiers.

After 1850, Egypt's military strength declined. Ismail, who became khedive in 1863, sought the assistance of American military officers to train and modernize the Egyptian army. Between 1868 and 1883, over 50 Americans, many former U.S. army or Confederate officers during the Civil War (1861–1865), served in the Egyptian army. Many served in senior positions, such as Lieutenant General Charles P. Stone, who served as chief of the general staff of the Egyptian army from 1870 to 1883. Others served as inspectors-general of cavalry and coastal defense, and some explored unknown regions. Stone tried to improve Egyptian efficiency by establishing a general staff and battalion training schools. Egypt's failure in its 1875–1876 campaign against Ethiopia and its indebtedness forced the departure of 9 of the 10 remaining Americans in 1878, as well as an 80 percent reduction of the Egyptian army.

The downsizing of the Egyptian army and the large number of officers and soldiers who were thrown out of work factored into the Urabi Rebellion in 1882. The remnants of the Egyptian army were shattered by the British at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882).

The British then occupied Egypt and raised and trained an entirely new Egyptian army, under the overall command of Major-General Sir (Henry) Evelyn M. Wood, V.C., the first sirdar (commander), in 1883. Wood selected 26 British officers, many of whom later achieved high rank, to assist him. These British officers frequently held ranks two levels higher than their British army ranks.

The new Egyptian army raised formally in 1883 consisted of 6,000 men who served four years in the army, four in the police, then four in the reserves. They were organized into eight battalions, with four battalions in each of the two brigades. Although no longer slaves, Sudanese soldiers continued to serve in the British-led Egyptian army.

The Egyptian army, by the end of 1885, consisted of 9 infantry battalions (totaling 25 British officers, 181 indigenous officers, and 4,646 men), 8 cavalry troops (1 British and 27 indigenous officers and 540 men), 4 artillery batteries (1 British and 18 indigenous officers and 403 men), and 3 Camel Corps companies (2 British and 7 indigenous officers and 203 men). The infantry and Camel Corps soldiers were armed with Martini-Henry rifles and triangular socket bayonets, and the cavalry was armed with the Martini-Henry carbine and swords. The artillery consisted mainly of 7-pounder mountain guns.

The Egyptian army grew as circumstances dictated. When the reconquest of the Sudan began in 1896, the Egyptian army totaled 18,000 men and included Sudanese battalions. It ultimately comprised 18 infantry battalions.

The new Egyptian army had its first real test of battle in late 1885, at Kosheh and Ginnis. At that time, one Egyptian or Sudanese infantry battalion, one Camel Corps company, and one field battery were attached to each British brigade. The British were very surprised by the proficiency and discipline of their Egyptian army counterparts, especially the Sudanese.

The Egyptian army, led by Horatio H. Kitchener as sirdar, bore the brunt of battle and campaigning during the 1896–1898 reconquest of the Sudan. In fact, of the 25,000 "British" soldiers at the Battle of Omdurman (September 2, 1898), more than 17,000 were Egyptians and Sudanese.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Baker, Valentine; Ginnis, Battle of (December 30, 1885); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Urabi Pasha, Ahmed; Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wingate, Reginald; Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Elands River, Battle of (August 4–16, 1900)

While the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) began with conventional warfare, the Boers turned to hit-and-run attacks after the British occupation of Pretoria, capital of the Transvaal Republic, in June 1900. After the British garrison at Mafeking was relieved in May 1900, the British established a large supply base near Brakfontein Drift on the Elands River, which was meant to serve their forces in the western Transvaal.

On August 3, 1900, an 80-wagon supply column arrived at the supply base, where it was to await escort. Desperate for supplies, a force of 2,000–3,000 Boers under Jacobus De la Rey and Hermanus Lemmer, supported by six field guns and three automatic light guns, surrounded the garrison that night and attacked the next morning as the defenders were eating breakfast. The Brakfontein Drift base was defended by 297 Australians, 201 Rhodesians, and a few Canadian and British soldiers, supported by one machine gun and an obsolete field gun, under the British lieutenant-colonel Charles Hore. Given some warning of the Boer attack, the garrison had prepared limited defenses but could not dig in very well, as the ground was hard and there was a shortage of digging tools.

During the first two days of the battle, the Boers intensely shelled the British position but then reduced their rate of fire, as it became obvious they were destroying the supplies they hoped to capture. In turn, the Australians and Rhodesians used their bayonets to dig deeper trenches, piled up stones to create walls, and dismantled wagons to use the wooden planks for overhead cover. Early in the siege, De la Rey called on Hore to surrender, but he refused. On August 5, a weak relief column of 650 colonial volunteers under Frederick Carrington was turned away when it was ambushed by some of Lemmer's Boers a few kilometers from the base. Since it was short of water and the weather was extremely hot, Rhodesian troops under Captain Sandy Butters made repeated night forays to the river 800 meters away and often had to fight their way back. On two successive nights, August 6 and 7, the Boers tried to cut off the British water supply by capturing Butter's position, the southernmost part of the garrison known as Butter's Kopje, but were repulsed by heavy fire, including from another supporting position called Zouch's Kopje.

A week into the siege, De la Rey again called on the garrison to abandon the position and offered them safe passage to British lines and the right of officers to retain their sidearms. However, Hore refused, reputedly stating that the Australians would cut his throat if he accepted, and on Butter's Kopje, there were yells of "Rhodesians Never Surrender!" In fact, by this time Hore was suffering from malaria, and command had effectively passed to Australian najor Walter Tunbridge. On August 6, Robert Baden-Powell left Rustenburg with a 2,000-man relief force but prematurely turned back one-third of the way to Brakfontein Drift as the distant sound of gunfire made him believe that the siege had been lifted by another force under Carrington. Based on information from Carrington, overall British commander Frederick Sleigh Roberts erroneously thought that the garrison had surrendered, so he ordered Baden-Powell's force to return to Pretoria.

Although the siege continued, many Boers began to abandon the post, leaving to protect Boer farms raided by local Kgatla people, which prompted the garrison to stage more night forays, even though they believed that the reduction in Boer forces was a ploy to draw them into a trap. On August 13, the British captured a Boer messenger and learned that the garrison was still holding out. Two days later, some 10,000 troops under Horatio Kitchener set out for the Elands River, and De la Rey withdrew the siege force, which now amounted to only 200 Boers. Kitchener's column arrived at the post on August 16. Among the garrison, 12 soldiers and 4 African porters had been killed, and 36 soldiers and 14 African porters had been wounded.

For their actions during the siege, Butters and Australian medical officer Captain Albert Duka received the Distinguished Service Order, and three soldiers (including former miner Trooper Thomas Borlaise, who helped improve the post's defenses) were decorated with the Distinguished Service Medal. Kitchener remarked that only colonial troops had the toughness to endure such conditions, and later, Boer commander Jan Smuts and British author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle praised the bravery of the garrison. British delays in relieving the garrison raised Boer morale, and the deployment of Kitchener's column allowed another Boer force led by the elusive Christiaan De Wet to escape capture by moving into the Magaliesberg Mountains.

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See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Australians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Baden-Powell, Robert; Canadians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Carrington, Frederick; De la Rey, Jacobus; De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899)

At the start of the Second Anglo-Boer War, Boer forces invaded the British colony of Natal, hoping to occupy it to prevent British reinforcements being landed on the coast. On October 19, 1899, a Boer force consisting of the Johannesburg commando and detachments of German, French, Dutch, Irish, and American volunteers took the railway station at Elandslaagte to cut off communication between the British garrisons at Ladysmith and Dundee.

British lieutenant-general Sir George White, who had recently taken over from the mortally wounded William Penn Symons, dispatched Major-General John French with a cavalry force and some artillery to recover the station. Arriving just prior to dawn on October 21, French discovered that the station was held by around 1,000 Boers supported by three field guns. Consequently, French telegraphed for reinforcements—mostly infantry and more artillery and cavalry—that arrived the same day by rail from Ladysmith, bringing British strength up to 3,500 men and 18 field guns. Supported by fire from the British guns, the 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment attacked the front of the Boer position, while Colonel Ian Hamilton led the main attack on the left flank by the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, 2nd Battalion Gordon Highlanders, and dismounted Imperial Light Horse. As the attack commenced, thunderstorms darkened the day and the British soldiers were slowed by a barbed-wire farm fence in which several men became tangled and were shot as a result.

Although some Boers were beginning to display white flags of surrender, Boer commander Meyer de Kock led a counterattack that drove back the British troops in confusion. Hamilton, assisted by his buglers and pipers, rallied his men and resumed the advance, killing Kock and some of his men. As many Boers mounted their horses and attempted to ride away, they were cut off by two squadrons of British cavalry from the 5th Lancers and 5th Dragoon Guards. Lacking swords to engage the British, many Boers were cut down or speared. The British suffered 55 dead and 205 wounded, while the Boers sustained 46 dead, 105 wounded, and 181 missing or captured.

The British then squandered their costly victory. Concerned that a large Boer force from the Orange Free State was set to attack Ladysmith, White ordered the British garrison at Dundee and French's force to withdraw, and two days later, the Boers once again occupied Elandslaagte. Subsequently, although the Boers did not make it to the Natal coast, they besieged Ladysmith from November 2, 1899 to March 1, 1900, when the garrison was relieved by British forces under Redvers Buller. For their actions at the Battle of Elandslaagte, Sergeant-Major William Robertson and Captain Matthew Meiklejohn of the Gordon Highlanders and Captains Robert Johnson and Charles Mullins of the Imperial Light Horse were awarded the Victoria Cross.

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See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; Foreign Volunteers in Boer Forces, Second Anglo-Boer War; French, John D. P.; Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Penn Symons, William; White, George S.

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Elbejet, Battle of (December 22, 1889)

In 1889, Carl Peters, the driving force behind the German East Africa Company, led an expedition inland from the East African coast with the stated intention of rescuing Emin Pasha, the Egyptian governor of Sudan's province of Equitoria, who had been isolated by the Mahdist revolt. In reality, Peters wished to use the expedition to extend German territorial claims further into East Africa, including Buganda.

By mid-December 1889, Peters's 60-strong expedition reached the Laikipia Plateau in what is now Kenya and encountered Maasai pastoralists. Peters provoked hostilities by shooting a Maasai bull and refusing to pay customary tribute to travel through the territory. The German explorer seemed intent on exploding the Maasai martial reputation that had kept Swahili-Arab slaving caravans out of their area for many years. On the morning of December 22, after some Maasai had stolen supplies from his camp the previous night, Peters led 35 gunmen, divided into three wings, against the Maasai settlement of Elbejet, where they shot seven people and withdrew with 2,000 cattle. Subsequently, as Peters's expedition withdrew from its camp, a large number of Maasai warriors attacked from a nearby forest. In the ensuring battle, Peters's men fired 900 rounds that killed around 120 Maasai, compared to just 7 expedition members who were lost. As the surviving Maasai retreated down a hill, Peters's men threw decapitated Maasai heads after them. The expedition then returned to Elbejet and burned the settlement. It continued on its westward journey but was followed by a large group of Maasai, who were discouraged from another attack by a solar eclipse that happened the next day.

On December 24, a Maasai attack was repulsed by the expedition's firearms, though this dangerously depleted Peters's ammunition supply. Given their number of high casualties, the Maasai then agreed to guide the expedition through their territory, but they led it into an area with no water. Peters then forced local people to lead his expedition to a river and then Lake Baringo, which it reached on January 12, 1890. Although the area was clearly within British territory as defined by an 1886 agreement between London and Berlin, Peters convinced local leaders to sign a treaty that brought them under German authority. A few weeks later, in February 1890, Peters reached Buganda and signed a treaty with its ruler, Mwanga, although this was nullified by an Anglo-German agreement of the same year. In December, a British expedition under Frederick Lugard arrived to claim the area that eventually became Uganda.

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See also: East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore); German Empire; Lugard, Frederick; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Mwanga II; Peters, Carl

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El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884)

Britain occupied Egypt and became responsible for its security in 1882 after defeating the Urabi Rebellion. The British also reorganized and provided leadership for the Egyptian army. As the situation in Egypt-controlled Sudan became more chaotic with the rise of the Mahdi in 1881, the British realized that they would have to eliminate this threat in their southern territory. A poorly trained and inadequately equipped Egyptian force under the command of Major-General William Hicks Pasha was sent to defeat dervishes south of Khartoum. This force was annihilated by dervishes at Kashgil on November 3–5, 1883.

In late 1883, dervishes under the command of Osman Digna attacked Egyptian garrisons at Sinkat and Tokar and besieged Suakin, a key port on the Red Sea. A relief force, consisting of 1,000 men of the Egyptian gendarmarie, 1,500 assorted black troops, and 450 Egyptian and Turkish cavalrymen, with two guns, under the command of Lieutenant-General Valentine Baker Pasha, was sent to Suakin in mid-December 1883. Baker, possibly wanting to restore his martial reputation after being disgraced and discharged from the British army in 1876, had his motley force shipped to Trinkitat to conduct offensive operations.

Early on February 4, 1884, Baker Pasha's force, which included Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick G. Burnaby, began its desert march to Tokar. The force formed a large square, with the cavalry screening the advance. As the force neared the village of El Teb, Baker, who was riding in front of the square with his staff, observed to his rear a few Arabs on horses and camels threatening the square's flanks. It seems that he ordered one cavalry troop to investigate the situation, but the entire cavalry force galloped out, fleeing the area.

Before Baker could enter the square, his soldiers began to panic, shooting wildly at the charging dervish cavalry that was followed by thousands of armed dervish foot soldiers. The square disintegrated as the horrified Egyptians tried to run away from the dervish onslaught. "The sight," wrote Burnaby, "was one never to be forgotten, with some four thousand men running pell-mell for their lives, with a few hundred Arabs behind them, spearing everyone within reach" (Baker, 1996, p. 140). By early afternoon, fewer than 500 men from Baker's force had escaped the massacre at El Teb and returned the 8 kilometers to Trinkitat.

The British response to this severe reverse was to send a force of two infantry brigades, a cavalry regiment, and other units under the command of Major-General Sir Gerald Graham, V.C., from Egypt to Suakin. Graham's force fought a ferocious battle and defeated the dervishes at El Teb on February 29, 1884. British casualties were 35 killed and 155 wounded, with dervish losses estimated at over 2,000 killed in this second battle.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Baker, Valentine; Dervishes; Egyptian Army; Graham, Gerald; Hicks, William; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Osman Digna; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Urabi Rebellion (1882)

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Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore) (1840–1892)

Born in what is now southern Poland, Eduard Schnitzer studied medicine in Berlin where he became a doctor in 1864. Shortly thereafter, he was disqualified from practicing medicine and spent a decade traveling through the Ottoman Empire, where he learned a number of languages. At the end of 1875, he settled in Khartoum in Egyptian-ruled Sudan, where he took the Muslim name Mehemet Emin, though it is not clear if he converted to Islam. He established a medical practice and began selling samples of local flora and fauna to European museums.

In May 1876, Emin was appointed chief medical officer for the province of Equitoria, located in what is now South Sudan, which was under the governorship of Charles Gordon, who sent him on a mission of exploration to Buganda and Bunyoro in what is now Uganda. In 1878, Emin succeeded Gordon as governor of Equitoria and was based at Lado, near present-day Juba, with several thousand soldiers. By 1883, given the Mahdi's rebellion, Emin was cut off from Khartoum and Cairo, and when Mahdist forces invaded Equitoria, he was compelled to withdraw south to Wadelai on the north end of Lake Albert.

The death of Gordon and the fall of Khartoum in early 1885 prompted public calls in Europe for the rescue of Emin, who sent messages via Russian explorer Wilhelm Junker, who traveled through Buganda to Zanzibar on the east coast.

As a result, famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley organized the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition that, beginning in March 1887, undertook a difficult and violent journey up the Congo River by steamer and through the Ituri Forest on foot. They met Emin at the south end of Lake Albert in April 1888 but spent another year convincing him to abandon Equitoria and dealing with a mutiny among his African soldiers who were recruited by British officer Frederick Lugard during his intervention in Buganda, later, in 1890. Stanley and Emin left Lake Albert in April 1889, traveled around the southern side of Lake Victoria and arrived at the German-ruled East African port of Bagamoyo in December.

The relief of Emin Pasha became an excuse for the launching of several other expeditions that were primarily interested in colonial expansion. In 1889, Carl Peters and Frederick Jackson led separate German and British, respectively, Emin Pasha expeditions that attempted to claim Buganda. Stanley left East Africa to write a book about his expedition but Emin, who broke his leg at the welcome celebration in Bagamoyo, remained to work for the German colonial administration. Together with German explorer Franz Stuhlmann, Emin embarked on an expedition to the Great Lakes in 1892 but was killed by Swahili-Arab slavers near Nyangwe in the Congo Free State.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Gordon, Charles George; Firearms Technology; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Peters, Carl; Stanley, Henry Morton; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890)

The conquest of Eritrea was driven by Italian dreams of establishing an empire that would legitimize their newly established country. It was hoped that the conquest of Eritrea, along with their possessions in Somalia, would provide the necessary jumping-off points for a conquest of Ethiopia and dominance of the Horn of Africa. While successful, the Italian colonization of Eritrea exposed Italian weaknesses, as their "conquest" was more a product of foreign weakness and political maneuverings than Italian strength, which would only be fully brought to light by their defeat in the First Italo-Ethiopian War.

Italian influence in Eritrea began, following the pattern of many European colonizing powers at that time, through the auspices of a private company. The Rubattino Shipping Company established a position on the Bay of Assab, leasing the port from the sultan of Raheita for a sum of $9,440 in 1870. The company hoped to make money by controlling the interior traffic of arms, while also capitalizing on the increasing importance of eastern Africa due to the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Even at this early point, however, the company did have colonial designs. The Rubattino Company, in conjunction with the Filonardi Company, which had made inroads into Somalia, helped establish the *Societa di Navigazione Generale* and donated 16 steamships to the Italian government to be used for colonization.

Even if the Rubattino concessions helped ensure Italian influence in the region, further Italian advances would depend on political changes in eastern Africa. What would become the colony of Eritrea was, during the 1870s, an area of diplomatic and military conflict between Ethiopia and Egypt. Ismail Pasha, the khedive of Egypt, sought to expand his holdings southward along the Red Sea coast toward Ethiopia. Ethiopia had little ability to resist initially as it was still recovering from the British invasion of its territory under Sir Robert Napier in 1868. The invasion had led to a power struggle for the throne, which was only settled in 1872 with the crowning of Emperor Yohannes IV.

In June 1872, the Egyptians occupied from Massawa to Keren in Eritrea, and by 1875, they had advanced southward to Harrar in Ethiopia. Yohannes IV summoned his forces and met an advancing Egyptian column at the Battle of Gura. With Yohannes portraying the war as religious crusade against Islam, he was able to assemble a large force that inflicted devastating defeats on the Egyptians. The region was further thrown into flux with the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan as a threat to both European and Ethiopian interests. The Mahdi achieved great success not only establishing a firm base of support in the Sudan, but also destroying the forces of Charles “Chinese” Gordon at Khartoum. Such was the fear of the Mahdi that the British sent an envoy, Sir William Hewitt, in 1884 to arrange Ethiopian support against the Mahdi in exchange for British protection for the free transit of Ethiopian goods to Massawa.

The defeat of the Egyptians did not go unnoticed by the Italians, who saw in this power vacuum an opportunity to stake their own claims to a position on the Red Sea. In 1882, the Italian government purchased the port of Assab from Rubattino and established their first colony. After consulting with the British, who felt the question of ownership devolved to the Ottomans after the retreat of the Egyptians, the Italians felt comfortable sending a detachment of 1,000 troops to Massawa where, on February 5, 1885, they occupied the port. From their initial possession of a mere 4 square miles, the Italians quickly began investing in and expanding their holdings.

This construction was paralleled by Italian forces that pushed southward to occupy Sa’ati and Wa. These efforts were met by Ethiopian forces under the command of Ras Alula Engida, who acted either at the behest of Emperor Yohannes IV or, at least, with his tacit approval. His initial assault on the fortified Italian position at Sa’ati suffered heavy casualties, but did cause the

Italians to fear for the position. A force of 500 men, under the command of Colonel Tommaso de Cristoforis, was sent to resupply and reinforce the position at Sa'ati. Ras Alula was able to catch this reinforcement detachment and overwhelm it with a force of 7,000 men. The destruction of this force at the Battle of Dogali (January 26, 1887) led to another relief force being sent to Massawa, which dug in to face the arrival of Emperor Yohannes IV at the head of his army. A standoff ensued, which ended when Yohannes was forced to pivot to deal with a Mahdi invasion of his western provinces.

In the aftermath of the Battle of Dogali, the Italians began searching for a political victory and began intriguing with Menelik, the King of Showa, a region in southern Ethiopia, to see Yohannes as a common enemy. Rather than a costly colonial campaign, they hoped that Menelik could be enticed to support the Italian cause for political recognition and shipments of arms and ammunition. This relationship bore fruit when Yohannes was killed in action against the Mahdists at Gallabat on March 10, 1889. With his death, Menelik II quickly proclaimed himself *negusa negest* or king of kings, and was able to solidify his claim due to his southern base of support as well as his northern ties through his wife, Empress Taytu. The formalization of the Italian-Ethiopian friendship would come in the form of the Treaty of Wichale, signed on May 2, 1889, which would recognize Menelik's sovereignty, as well as provide funds for his kingdom, in return for a recognition of Italian occupation of the lands they had taken in their conflict with Yohannes. On January 1, 1890, the colony of Eritrea, getting its name from the Roman name (*Mare Erythraeum*) for the Red Sea, was created.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Alula Engida, Ras; Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); De Cristoforis, Tommaso; Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Gordon, Charles George; Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Menelik II; Napier, Robert C.; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Wichale, Treaty of (1889); Yohannes IV

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Ethiopia, Portuguese Involvement in (1541–1633)

By around 1500, there had been several centuries of conflict between the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia and the Muslim kingdom of Adal, both located in the interior of the horn of Africa. In 1526, Ahmad ibn Ibrahim, who the Ethiopians called Gragn, or "the left-handed," became ruler of Adal and declared jihad against Christian Ethiopia. Ahmad encouraged Adal border towns to stop sending tribute to Ethiopia and invaded the Ethiopian highlands, taking slaves who were then exported to Arabia in return for firearms.

In the Battle of Shimbra-Kure, fought 80 kilometers south of present day Addis Ababa in March 1529, Ahmad's army defeated a larger Ethiopian force, though both sides sustained heavy casualties. Ahmad's victory has been attributed to his deployment of a unit armed with matchlocks, which represented the first time that Ethiopians faced firearms in battle. To placate his anxious men, Ahmad withdrew from the Ethiopian highlands, only to launch a new invasion in 1530–1531. In October 1531, with Turkish cannon that panicked the Ethiopian army, Ahmad won the Battle of Amba Cela (also called Antukyah). This allowed the Adal army to march north, where they looted churches, including one where the Ethiopian rulers were traditionally crowned. Subsequently, Ethiopian leader Lebna Dengal directed his army to retreat and desperately tried to rally support against the invading Muslims, who occupied the area from the Shewa Plateau in the south to present-day Eritrea in the north. Only a quarter of Ethiopia remained unoccupied.

When Ahmad's forces captured Amhara and Lasta in 1533 and Tigray in 1535, the Ethiopian ruler became a fugitive, fleeing from one mountain stronghold to another. A desperate Lebna Dengal then appealed to the Portuguese, who had made contact with Ethiopia in 1508 and were vying with the Ottomans over control of the nearby Red Sea, for assistance against a common Muslim enemy. Adal forces were becoming overstretched and failed to consolidate their conquests, and allied Somali nomads returned home with their loot.

In February 1541, 400 Portuguese musketeers led by Christovao da Gama, son of the famous explorer Vasco da Gama, landed on the Red Sea coast at Massawa and marched inland to link up with Christian Ethiopian forces. News of the Portuguese arrival prompted some Ethiopians who had supported Ahmad to desert him in favor of Empress Sebla Wangel, the widow of the recently deceased ruler. The Portuguese contingent clashed with Ahmad's army in April 1542 at Jarta. The Portuguese formed a square, advanced, and used concentrated firepower to repel repeated Muslim attacks. When Ahmad was wounded in the leg, his forces retreated, and many were killed by pursuing Portuguese and Ethiopians.

Two weeks later, the Portuguese again advanced in square formation against the now-reinforced Muslims. At the moment when the Adal cavalry was about to break through the Portuguese lines, an accidental explosion of gunpowder spooked the horses and caused a general Muslim retreat. During the winter rains, Ahmad called for additional firepower from other Muslim powers and received 10 cannon and 700 musketeers from the Ottomans. By this time, casualties had reduced the Portuguese force to 300 men. In August 1542, Ahmad's vastly superior numbers attacked the Portuguese camp, killed half the defenders, and captured a badly wounded da Gama, who was executed after refusing conversion to Islam. This victory gave Ahmad false confidence, and he allowed the Ottoman gunmen to return home. The Portuguese survivors then joined the army of the new Ethiopian emperor, Galawdewos.

On February 21, 1543, 9,000 Ethiopian troops defeated 15,000 Muslims at the Battle of Wayna Daga. During this engagement, Ahmad was killed by a Portuguese musketeer and the Adal forces subsequently withdrew east. While Galawdewos reoccupied the Shewa Plateau during the rest of the 1540s and early 1550s, the recent power vacuum allowed Oromo pastoralists from around Lake Turkana to move into the southern highlands. Adopting settled agriculture and horses that gave them mobility, the Oromo separated the historical enemies of Christian Ethiopia and Muslim Adal. In 1557 the Ottomans, given the increasing Portuguese involvement, landed 2,000 troops at the Red Sea port of Massawa, which they held for the next three centuries. Galawdewos was shot dead in 1559 while leading a badly planned campaign to capture Harar, the capital of Adal.

Under the brief reign of Emperor Minas, Galawdewos's brother and successor, Ethiopia abandoned efforts to control eastern trade routes to the Gulf of Aden, which ended the long conflict with Adal. During the early 1560s, Minas led two campaigns—one against the Falasha, or Jewish Ethiopians, to the northwest; and another against the Ottomans, who were supporting Bahr Nagash rebels in the north. The next Ethiopian emperor, Sarsa Dengal, ruled for 30 years and directed numerous campaigns such as ones against Gambo in the west, Enarya and Hadeya in the southwest, the Oromo in the south, the Falasha in the northwest, and the Ottoman-supported Bahr Nagash in the north.

Despite Ethiopian resistance, the Oromo continued to expand. The threat of Oromo expansion prompted a series of Ethiopian rulers to attempt to replace Orthodox Ethiopian Christianity with Roman Catholicism to attract Portuguese military support during the early 17th century. This prompted numerous rebellions by Ethiopian traditionalists and the Portuguese firearms, promised by Jesuit missionaries, never arrived. Emperor Susneyos, after defeating a rebellion in Gojjam where 8,000 Ethiopian peasants were killed in a single day, realized the self-destructiveness of this policy and returned to the Orthodox Church. His successor, Fasiladas, expelled the Jesuits in 1633, cut relations with the Portuguese, and signed treaties with the Ottomans to prevent Europeans from entering the area by sea.

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See also: Firearms Technology; Indian Ocean, Portuguese Conquest of (1498–1698)

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Faidherbe, Louis (1818–1889)

One of the most important figures in France's colonial history, Louis Faidherbe was an architect of the French Empire in Africa. Founder of Dakar and governor of Senegal, Faidherbe devoted his life to the expansion of French power and also made a name for himself in national politics.

Louis-Léon-César Faidherbe was born on June 3, 1818, in Lille, France. As a child, he was fascinated by the military and was soon recognized as a bright child by his family. Faidherbe eventually moved to Paris for his education, graduating from the Ecole Polytechnique, where he focused on military engineering. In 1840, Faidherbe joined the military engineers corps and spent the next three years serving with them. Meanwhile, France was solidifying its conquest of Algeria in North Africa, and Faidherbe was one of the engineers sent to the country. He spent the years 1843–1846 as part of the French military force there.

While in Algeria, Faidherbe began to develop a reputation as a fervent republican, as well as a strong worker for the French imperial cause. In 1847, he was transferred to Guadeloupe in the French West Indies. During his two years in the Caribbean, Faidherbe was unpopular due to his political commitment to republican values within an imperial setting. The army sent him back to Algeria in 1849, and he remained there until 1852. While he was in Algeria for that second tour of duty, Faidherbe commanded his own group of soldiers for the first time. His unit was very successful, particularly in subduing rebellions in Kabylie, and Faidherbe was granted the title Chevalier of the Legion of Honor.

Because of his success in Algeria, Faidherbe was transferred to Senegal in 1852 to serve as the deputy director of the army's engineering corps. Within two years, his popularity among local French residents and his success commanding underlings led the military to promote him to the rank of major, and in 1854, he became the governor of Senegal. It was in that position that Faidherbe became most famous. He was responsible for subduing many factions within Senegal opposed to French rule and for unifying the country's administrative and commercial sectors. In that sense, he was exactly what France was looking for in an imperialist leader, and under his rule, Senegal became the most important of France's West African colonies.

The most ardent opponents of Faidherbe were the followers of Umar ibn Said Tall, an Islamic leader whose forces along the Senegal River fought to drive the French from the territory and established the Tukolor Empire. Previous French governors had been reluctant to challenge Umar's army head on, but Faidherbe was determined to crush all resistance. By 1858, he had removed the Islamic armies from Senegal. He pushed the rebellious Tukulor Empire east of upper Senegal by 1863 and conquered much more territory than the French government had thought possible at the time when he annexed Cayor and Wolof. He founded the new capital city of Dakar in 1857 and ruled over a unified French colony that came to dominate French West Africa in trade and political power. That same year, Faidherbe established a local colonial military force consisting of African soldiers called the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, which would exist until decolonization in 1960.

While in Senegal, Faidherbe argued for the complete abolition of slavery, the creation of new farming techniques, and the greater expansion of French control into Senegal's neighbors along the Niger River and Western Sahara. Part of his success lay in his ability to train young Senegalese notables to be loyal to French rule while their parents continued to maintain their local authority, so long as they did not challenge the French as Umar had. Despite his great success in Senegal, however, the French government withdrew Faidherbe from West Africa in 1865 and returned him to Algeria, where he remained until 1870.

In that year, the Franco-Prussian War forced France to recall many of its best military leaders from the empire, and Faidherbe was made commander-in-chief of the Northern Army. Although the Prussians won the war, Faidherbe remained a popular figure among the French public, and in 1871, the citizens of Somme, Nord, and Pas-de-Calais elected him to the French National Assembly. However, Faidherbe did not remain in the Assembly for long because the government's antirepublican stance offended Faidherbe's political devotion to the republic. In 1876, he ran for the position of senator, but he was defeated. However, in 1879, he was elected as the republican senator for the northern departments (administrative regions), a position he held until 1888. While he was a senator, Faidherbe was an active opponent of the aggressively nationalist Boulangist movement, which supported Georges Boulanger, and also wrote many books focused on West Africa ethnography and geography. By 1880, the government honored Faidherbe with the title of Chancellor of the Legion of Honor.

As his health faded, Faidherbe could no longer serve as a senator, and he resigned his post in 1888. Partially blind and paralyzed, he died in Paris on September 29, 1889. With his military and political foresight, Faidherbe laid the foundation for France's mighty West African empire, hoping that his nation would be able to check British imperial influence in the world.

Nancy Stockdale

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); French Colony Policy in Africa (1750–1900); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Fashoda Incident (1898)

The "Scramble for Africa" and the British and French imperial rivalry culminated in a confrontation between military forces in a desolate swamp at Fashoda, about 800 kilometers south of Khartoum on the Upper Nile River of southern Sudan. This episode, involving national prestige and colonial encroachment, brought Britain and France to the brink of war.

Fashoda was a significant location because both the British and the French believed that whoever occupied the area could build a dam there that would control the Nile River waters and thus hold the key to controlling Egypt and the strategically important Suez Canal. The French also wanted to control Fashoda to unite their colonies from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea and to drive a wedge between the British colonies of Egypt and Uganda. To accomplish their goal, the French sent three



Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand (standing second from right) commanded a French colonial expedition during the Fashoda Incident of 1898. While this Anglo-French confrontation in southern Sudan represented the closest European powers came to going to war over part of Africa during the "Scramble," the French backed down and withdrew from the area. (Time Life Pictures/Getty Images) expeditions from various locations to converge from east and west at Fashoda.

The column of Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand, consisting of seven French officers and about 120 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, had started on the Atlantic coast and struggled through all types of terrain over 6,400 kilometers during a two-year journey before arriving at Fashoda on July 10, 1898. Marchand raised the French flag over the old fort at Fashoda and claimed the region for the French.

A large Anglo-Egyptian force under the command of Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener had been advancing from the Egyptian frontier southward up the Nile since 1896. The British campaign basically ended with the decisive defeat of the dervishes at the Battle of Omdurman (September 2, 1898). Kitchener received instructions from Britain to immediately sail to Fashoda. He departed Omdurman on September 10, 1898, taking with him in five gunboats a 1,500-man force consisting of E Company, 1st Battalion, Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders; the 11th and 13th Sudanese infantry battalions; one battery of Egyptian artillery; and one section of four Maxim guns.

Kitchener arrived at Fashoda on September 18, 1898. The British greatly outnumbered the French, and the situation was tense. Kitchener and Marchand met on a British gunboat at about 10 A.M. After a frosty introduction, both agreed that the ultimate decisions pertaining to the Fashoda situation would be made in London and Paris. Kitchener protested that the French presence at Fashoda violated Egyptian and British rights. Marchand replied that he could receive his orders only from Paris and was willing to fight to the death if necessary. Kitchener advised Marchand that he would not force him to lower the French flag or retire from Fashoda. In return, Marchand stated that he would not object to Kitchener, the sirdar of the Egyptian army, raising the Egyptian flag—but not the British flag—on the tree next to the fort.

The two senior officers celebrated after reaching this compromise. From another British gunboat, it was observed that "the two great men were slapping each other on the back, swapping anecdotes about beating the Dervishes and clinking glasses of whisky and soda" (Pakenham, 1991, p. 548). In the afternoon, the French repaid Kitchener's hospitality with sweet champagne. Kitchener left the 11th Sudanese Battalion at Fashoda, and then steamed the same day about 80 kilometers to the south, where the Sobat River joined the White Nile. Kitchener posted another detachment there to observe any French activities. The following day, Kitchener and his force sailed back past Fashoda, without stopping, to Omdurman.

Kitchener and Marchand's adroit diplomacy had retrieved a potentially volatile situation. The French, embroiled at home in the scandalous Dreyfus Affair, in which a Jewish army officer was falsely convicted of giving secrets to the Germans, attempted to negotiate with the British, but they realized they were in an untenable situation. Marchand was ordered to evacuate Fashoda and marched out of the fort there on December 11, 1898.

The Fashoda Incident was a moral victory for the British and a humiliating defeat for the French. While this colonial confrontation almost led to war, the resentment and anger soon faded. France yielded its claim to the Upper Nile region in March 1899 and was given part of the Sahara area as compensation. More important, this clash paved the way for Britain and France to become allies in the 1904 Entente Cordiale.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Egyptian Army; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Marchand, Jean-Baptiste; Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Rejjaf, Battle of (January 16, 1897); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Wingate, Reginald

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Film Depictions of African Colonial Warfare

Africa has presented a fitting background to cinematic stories ranging from the fantastical (*Congo*), to the romantic *(Out of Africa*), to the sadly true to life (*Hotel Rwanda*). Despite the prevalence of movies concerning Africa, however, there have not been as many covering the period of colonial conflict. Beyond the scant number of films on this topic, an additional issue is one of focus—many of these movies center on conflicts that featured predominantly white units fighting African armies, which therefore provides a historically anachronistic view of colonial conflict as a whole, given the reliance of European states on non-European troops in most campaigns and pacification efforts. Despite this flaw, which is not a constant and does vary from film to film, filmmakers from the United States, Europe, and Africa have continued to develop stories centering on this period and are unlikely to stop in the near future. The films cataloged here are grouped by thematic elements rather than chronology, to better illustrate the similarities across time.

One early thematic focus—which is not surprising given the romantic aura surrounding these soldiers—is that of the French Foreign Legion. One particular film, *Beau Geste,* was made three separate times, in 1926, 1939, and 1966, respectively, underscoring this common fascination. These movies were based on the eponymous novel by P. C. Wren written in 1924, with each of these films presenting the same general storyline (indeed, the 1939 version is a nearly shot-by-shot remake of the silent 1926 film, but with sound). The general narrative consists of the main characters turning to the legion as a way to escape their problems, struggling under the command of a brutal officer, and the climax of the film, including the settling of scores with said officer, occurring in the background of a Tuareg attack against a weakened Legion fort.

These films were part of a "Foreign Legion" genre that also included *Fort Algiers* (1953) and *Outpost in Morocco* (1949). This was not merely an American phenomenon, as French filmmakers produced a similarly focused big-budget film called *Fort Saganne* in 1984, starring Gérard Depardieu. The film, which received four César award nominations, including one for best actor, documented Depardieu's rise from a lowly soldier to a national hero through service in the legion. While the genre faded in importance, some fascination with the theme remains today, as evidenced by the aptly titled *Legionnaire* 1998 movie, starring Jean Claude von Damme. The trope of the legionary adventurer even kicked off the recent *Mummy* trilogy of movies, with the first film introducing Brendon Fraser's character defending a position, along with other legionnaires, in Egypt. Given that the location of the legion and their enemies, usually also described as Tuaregs, is ahistorical, it is telling that the character arc is so familiar that it can still be used. With the legion's reputation as a place for those without hope or running from their problems, it is unsurprising these films echo, or perhaps promote, this common understanding. What typifies these films is a reliance on African conflict to aid in furthering character development, rather than a focus on African warfare itself.

Another thematic focus is on the British conflict in the Sudan against the Mahdists in the 1880s. The movie *Four Feathers,* based on a novel written by A. E. W. Mason in 1902, was made into a silent film in 1915 and was remade five other times (in 1921, 1929, 1939, 1977, and 2002). The story centers around the effort of the movie's protagonist, Harry Faversham, to reclaim his honor by aiding (and hopefully rescuing) his comrades engaged in battle against the Mahdist forces. In 1966, the film *Khartoum* was released, which focused on the siege of that city; the role of Charles "Chinese" Gordon was played by Charlton Heston and Muhammad Ahmed was played by Laurence Olivier. Also, the famed Battle of Omdurman was depicted in the 1972 biopic *Young Winston,* which covers Winston Churchill's early life as a military officer and war correspondent.

By far, the most well known colonial conflict depicted on film is the 1879 British campaign against the Zulu, largely due to a film entitled *Zulu,* released in 1964. It was an extremely well received movie, although its very popularity led to critiques of historical inaccuracy, which depicts the survival of a British detachment at Rorke's Drift against a Zulu attack. The huge success of *Zulu,* grossing roughly $8 million in 1964 on a $3.5 million budget, led to a number of other films and TV movies related to the Zulu kingdom. In 1986, for example, a 10-part miniseries called *Shaka Zulu* was released on the life of the famed Zulu king. Critics panned it as a piece of South African apartheid propaganda meant to depict Africans as inherently violent. A prequel of sorts to the film *Zulu* was released in 1979 entitled *Zulu Dawn*. Written by Cy Endfield, the same screenwriter as the original *Zulu*, this new movie depicted the British defeat at Isandlwana. Despite a noteworthy cast, including Peter O'Toole as Lord Chelmsford and Burt Lancaster as

Colonial wars in Africa became a popular subject for the film industry. In the 1966 film *Khartoum*, Charlton Heston plays British general Charles Gordon and Laurence Olivier plays Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah, also known as the Mahdi. (United Artists/Photofest)

Colonel Anthony Durnford, the film did not do well at the box office, nor was it well received by critics.

Surprisingly, European victory is not depicted that often in these films, with the Legion genre of films often ending with a lone survivor or few survivors. What is common, however, is the depiction of warfare as consisting of white Europeans against indigenous people. To varying degrees, the image of Africans that audiences get from these movies is as a savage, nomadic horde fighting outnumbered but well-drilled and well-equipped Europeans. The only shades of gray in this presentation are via outsized personalities, such as the mutual respect established between Gordon and the Mahdi in *Khartoum*, which most likely has more to do with the actors involved and the conventions of storytelling than a desire to depict indigenous resistance to colonialism realistically.

The South African film industry employed similar themes when dealing with its own history of colonial wars. In the context of rising Afrikaner nationalism and a recent Afrikaner rebellion, the 1916 film *Die Voortrekkers* heroically depicts 19th-century Boer expansion and defeat of the Zulu at the 1838 Battle of Blood River. An apartheid-era version of *Die Voortrekkers* was released in 1973. These films have been compared to the racist American epic *Birth of a Nation*. The 1918 *Symbol of Sacrifice* reminded white South African audiences, divided over World War I, of the unity of Britons and Boers against the Zulu in 1879. Indeed, the centenary of the celebrated Battle of Blood River in 1938 inspired a South African government–sponsored film entitled *Die Bou van'n Nasie/They Built a Nation,* with Afrikaans and English versions that told the story of the advance of white civilization over African so-called barbarity.

The Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) has also been the subject of filmmaking. A 1941 German Nazi propaganda piece entitled *Ohm Kruger* (Uncle Kruger) depicted British aggression against the Boers in a predictably slanted way. As part of the broader revival of Australian cinema, the successful 1980 film *Breaker Morant* showed an Australian nationalist version of the British execution of Australian soldiers. The 1984 apartheid-era South African film *Sanna/Torn Allegiance* depicts the British destruction of Boer farms and confinement of Boer women and children in concentration camps.

A turn away from the Eurocentric presentations of much of the films of colonial warfare comes in the movie *Sarraounia.* The film is a 1986 drama directed by Med Hondo, a Mauritanian director, and based on a Nigerian novel of the same name written by Abdoulaye Mamani. It dramatizes the resistance of Queen Sarraunia against the advance of French troops in 1899. While the resistance was ultimately unsuccessful, the film depicts French atrocities and portrays Queen Sarraunia as a brave and resourceful leader against the French.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Churchill, Winston; Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Gordon, Charles George; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Firearms Technology

The employment of different kinds of firearms was a central feature of European colonial campaigns fought in Africa from the early 1500s to the late 1800s. Until roughly the mid-19th century, European firearms were muzzle-loading, which made them slow to reload, and generally used a smoothbore barrel, which was inaccurate and had an effective range of less than 100 meters. This meant that to maximize their firepower on the battlefield, such weapons were employed by tightly formed units and fired in volleys. Of course, the smoke and blast of these firearms also had an impact on enemy morale, especially against people who had no experience of these weapons.

During the 1500s and 1600s, the Portuguese and Dutch who invaded parts of Africa used matchlock arquebuses. These early firearms employed a simple firing mechanism that lowered a slow-burning fuse into a small pan of gunpowder to ignite a propellant charge that shot a metal ball out a smoothbore barrel. There are many examples of matchlocks enabling small European forces to defeat much larger African armies. In 1542, a 400-strong Portuguese expedition with firearms intervened on behalf of Christian Ethiopia in its struggle with Muslim Adal and won several dramatic victories until the arrival of Ottoman gunmen who assisted Adal. In 1571, some 600 Portuguese gunmen restored the Christian king of Kongo by defeating the invading Jaga from the interior, who were afraid of the blast and smoke of firearms. In 1572, in the Zambezi Valley, a 650-strong Portuguese expedition used firepower to twice defeat a Tonga army of well over 10,000. During the first of these engagements, the Portuguese inflicted a psychological blow on the Tonga by shooting a female diviner who was spraying water in the air and proclaiming it would blind the Portuguese. However, while detachments of Portuguese arquebusiers supported by thousands of African allies could win battles, their small numbers meant that they struggled to hold the conquered territory.

Of course, like the Khoikhoi who fought the Dutch in the Cape during the late 1600s, Africans facing these matchlocks in battle soon realized that they did not work when it was raining, so they shifted to fighting only in storms. Africans developed other strategies to avoid European firepower as well. In 1684, at the Battle of Maungwe fought on the Zimbabwe Plateau, a Rozvi Shona army with bows and arrows took heavy casualties from Portuguese shooting. That night, Rozvi women lit fires around the Portuguese camp, which prompted the Portuguese to abandon the area, erroneously believing that they were surrounded.

During the late 1600s, European and American slave traders began providing West African states with large numbers of flintlock muskets. Although it still relied on a muzzle-loaded smoothbore barrel, this weapon employed a much more reliable firing mechanism that used a piece of flint to generate a spark that would ignite a small amount of powder in a covered pan. As a result, it could be safely carried while loaded and would operate in somewhat wet conditions. The flintlock dominated European warfare throughout the 18th and early 19th centuries. West African states readily adopted flintlocks into their military systems in what some historians have called a "Gun Revolution." For example, in the late 1600s, the Akan states in what is now Ghana began to field armies consisting of mobile groups of gunmen who fired from the hip at very short range and preferred to fight forest ambushes. This led directly to the rise of the Asante Empire among the Akan at the beginning of the 18th century, and similar processes contributed to the expansion of other West African states such as Dahomey and Benin.

Content to await the delivery of slaves at coastal enclaves or ships anchored off the coast, European powers of this slave trade era were generally not eager to conquer large territories in West Africa. Indeed, from around 1700 to the early 1800s, European and West African armies were both equipped with similar infantry weapons: flintlocks. However, Europeans still held an advantage in terms of better-quality ammunition and artillery. While the Asante defeated a small British expedition that attempted to penetrate their forest homeland at the Battle of Nsamankow in 1824, a large Asante force that unwisely conducted a daylight attack on Cape Coast castle in 1826 was defeated by British cannon and rockets at the Battle of Katamanso.

In southern Africa during the early 1800s, colonial forces with flintlocks and sometimes cannon inflicted terrible casualties on African armies with little experience of concentrated firepower. At the Battle of Grahamstown in 1819, some 10,000 Xhosa warriors, the largest Xhosa army ever assembled, attacked a British garrison of around 350 and were repelled by volley fire and artillery. Some Xhosa were reported to have held their hands or cloaks over their eyes so that they would not see the blast of the guns. In 1838, at the Battle of Blood River, perhaps 3,000 Zulu were killed when they attacked a wagon laager defended by 464 Boers with flintlocks and three cannon. While the Xhosa learned from the Grahamstown disaster and began to minimize British firepower by conducting unexpected hit-and-run attacks from bush hideouts, the Zulu stuck to their historic system of mobilizing a large army to confront an enemy in open terrain.

Africans in southern Africa also began acquiring large numbers of flintlocks, such as the Xhosa, who increasingly used them throughout the 19th-century Cape-Xhosa Wars, and the mountain-based Sotho, who combined firearms with the mobility of horses. In East Africa, where muzzle-loaders arrived in the mid-19th century through the developing Swahili-Arab slave and ivory caravan trade, the pastoral Maasai began using a simple but effective tactic to counter firearms that involved diving for cover to avoid the first volley, and then charging before the enemy could reload.

The Second Industrial Revolution of the mid-19th century resulted in the extremely rapid development of firearms technology in Europe and North America. Consequently, these new weapons, which African powers generally had not had time to acquire, were employed by European-led armies that invaded Africa during the "Scramble" period of the late 1800s. Earlier in the century, the rifled barrel had increased range and accuracy, while the percussion cap firing mechanism increased reliability. By the 1860s, the advent of breech-loading, single-shot rifles and manufactured cartridges, which combined propellant change and projectile into a single item, greatly enhanced the speed of loading and firing. It also made it possible for soldiers to reload when lying down to avoid enemy fire. These weapons became standard issue in European armies such as the French, who embraced the Chassepot in 1866, and the British, who adopted the Martini-Henry in 1871. Soldiers with these single-shot breech-loaders could effectively engage targets at around 400 meters and their maximum range was over a kilometer.

Although the Zulus massacred 779 poorly positioned British soldiers armed with Martini-Henry rifles at the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879, the other battles of this war, such as Rorke's Drift and Khambula, displayed the lethality of this weapon. Similar innovations were also applied to artillery, dramatically improving their range and firing speed. The last two decades of the 19th century saw the popularization of magazine-fed rifles, which further accelerated loading and firing, and the development of smokeless powder, which meant that a firer's position was not instantly noticeable.

The first military rifle to employ smokeless ammunition, the French-designed Lebel used an 8-round tube-magazine combined with a bolt-action loading system. This weapon was used by the French military from 1887 until World War I. In 1888, the British army adopted the bolt-action Lee-Metford rifle, which featured a 10-round box magazine; and in 1895, it was replaced by the very similar but slightly improved Lee-Enfield, which would remain in service until the 1950s. Although these were precision weapons, many European colonial forces ignored individual shooting skills and continued to train their soldiers to shoot in volleys. It was in South Africa from 1899 to 1902 that the Boers showed the British the deadliness of such rifles in the hands of skilled marksmen.

The late-19th-century weapon most associated with European colonial wars in Africa is the machine gun, which used an automatic (or machine) loading system to fire rifle ammunition at a devastatingly high speed. Developed during the 1860s, the first of these weapons employed a hand-driven machine-loading system and multiple barrels to facilitate cooling. The most famous of these was the Gatling gun, which was designed in the United States, first used in combat during the American Civil War (1861–1865), and introduced to Africa by the British army during the 1879 invasion of the Zulu Kingdom. In theory, it could fire over 1,000 rounds per minute, but in practice, this was reduced to around 400.

Similar weapons included the Nordenfelt and Gardner guns, used by the British in Sudan in the 1880s, and the Belgian and French Mitrailleuse series, which was used in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, but not much after. In 1884, the same year as the Berlin Conference that planned the European partition of Africa, American-born and British-based Hiram Maxim designed and produced the first machine gun to employ a fully automatic loading system based on the backward movement of gas produced by firing rounds and the forward movement of springs. It also utilized a water-cooled barrel and belt-fed ammunition. This was considerably more efficient than manually driven systems such as the Gatling. From its early days, the Maxim gun became a popular symbol of European colonial conquest in Africa. The first Maxim gun brought to Africa was donated by Hiram Maxim, as a form of advertising, to Henry Morton Stanley's Emin Pasha Relief Expedition of 1886 to 1889. British chartered companies operating in Africa were eager to buy the new weapon.

The Maxim was first used in warfare in 1890 when an Imperial British East Africa Company (IPEAC) force under Frederick Lugard intervened in the Buganda Civil War, and again in 1893 during the British South Africa Company (BSAC) invasion of



A patent drawing of R.J. Gatling's "Revolving Battery" dated November 1862. Gatling also designed the "Gatling gun" which was a forerunner of the machine gun and greatly facilitated the European conquest of Africa during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. (National Archives)

the Ndebele kingdom. The conquest of the Ndebele inspired a satirical rhyme that included the lines "Take the glorious tidings where trade can be done. Spread the peaceful gospel—with a Maxim gun." Reflecting the importance of the weapon in granting European military supremacy over colonized people, Anglo-French poet Hilaire Belloc wrote, "Whatever happens, we have got—The Maxim Gun, and they have not." Eventually, all European powers in Africa used versions of the Maxim gun, which became a standard feature of colonial wars in the 1890s and early 1900s.

In considering the importance of firearm technology in facilitating the European subjugation of Africa, it is important to remember that in the 1896 Battle of Adowa in Ethiopia, the one major engagement where Africans possessed significant numbers of breech-loading rifles (and even artillery and some machine guns), the invading Europeans were decisively defeated.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Anglo-Asante Wars (1823–1826); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Angola, Portuguese Conquest (1575–1648); Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); British South Africa Company; East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard

Carl Oscar Theodore); Ethiopia, Portuguese Involvement in (1541–1633); Grahamstown, Battle of (April 21, 1819); Lugard, Frederick; Stanley, Henry Morton; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Zimbabwe Plateau, Portuguese Invasion of (1572–1696)

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Force Publique (to 1914)

During the 1880s, the International Africa Association (IAA), founded by the imperialist Leopold II, whose own country of Belgium was uninterested in acquiring colonies, conquered the vast Congo River basin in Central Africa, which was then euphemistically named the Congo Free State. Despite Leopold's rhetoric of suppressing the slave trade in the region, his regime in the Congo brutally extracted rubber and ivory.

Leopold never visited Africa; rather, he hired the famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley to organize the initial occupation, which focused on gaining control of the Congo River itself. Since navigating the first 400 kilometers of the Congo River was hampered by rapids and falls, Stanley organized local people in 1881 to carry a steamboat in pieces from the river's mouth on the Atlantic coast to Malebo (later Stanley) Pool, the eventual site of Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), where it was assembled and proceeded to travel upriver. Between 1886 and 1896, the Congo Free State developed a fleet of steamers that patrolled from Leopoldville, some 1,400 kilometers northeast up the Congo River, to Stanley Falls, eventual site of Stanleyville (now Kisangani), and then another 800 kilometers south up the Lualaba River to what would become Katanga Province.

In 1895, the Congo Free State built a railway from the Atlantic coast to Stanley Pool to better transport steamboat parts around the rapids of the first stretch of the Congo River. From the beginning of these activities, Stanley had organized a mercenary force largely recruited from West Africa. In 1885, Leopold formally created a 2,000-strong private army called the Force Publique (FP), which initially consisted of West African Hausa and East African Zanzibari soldiers and officers from various European countries. To economize, recruitment was shifted to local people in 1891, when chiefs were ordered to produce a quota of young men every year and a militia was created for emergencies. In 1900, the term of service in the FP was extended from five to seven years.

During operations, the FP employed local auxiliaries such as the Azande in the north and the Tetela in the south central area, who were paid with booty. Through enforcing Leopold's regime, the FP gained a reputation for cruelty, looting, and cannibalism. When communities failed to produce a set quota of rubber, FP soldiers flogged people and cut off hands or heads to prove to their officers that bullets had not been wasted. Functioning as an occupation army and labor police, small FP posts of several dozen black soldiers under one or two white officers were maintained in every district, with their number growing from 183 in 1900 to 313 in 1908. Larger bases and training camps were established near the colonial capital of Boma on the coast, at Irebu near the confluence of the Ubangi and Congo rivers, and Lisala in the north.

Although men from many ethnic backgrounds joined the FP, Lingala became the soldiers' lingua franca, as many early recruits had come from the northwest where this language was spoken, and soldiers from there did not participate in a series of mutinies in the 1890s. Soldiers and their families were prohibited from speaking other languages on or off duty. At the same time, the all-white officers adopted French as the language of command. From 1892 to 1994, during the "Arab War," the FP was expanded from 6,000 to 10,000 troops and irregulars recruited from the previously conquered Tetela and Luba. Under commandants Francis Dhanis and Louis Napoleon Chaltin, FP expeditions used control of the river system to conquer the Swahili-Arab ivory and slave traders of the eastern Congo Basin. In July 1896, the FP established a post at Shangi at the south end of Lake Kivu, which was attacked by a 600-strong force from nearby Rwanda that was gunned down in minutes.

During the 1890s, the FP experienced several serious mutinies. In 1895, at Luluabourg (today's Kananga) in the south-central area, Sergeant Kandolo led a rebellion by soldiers who were tired of oppression by their commander, Mathieu Pelzer, who routinely punished men with 125 lashes and ordered his African concubine killed for sleeping with another man. Pelzer fled into the bush but was followed and killed. Donning a white officer's uniform and riding a bull, Kandolo led the mutineers to other military posts, where they killed loyalist soldiers and white officers, rallied recruits, and allied with local chiefs. For about a year, the rebels controlled most of the Kasai region and split into small groups to fight hit-and-run campaigns against several heavily armed FP expeditions that suffered several hundred casualties. In early 1897, Kandolo, leading about 400–500 rebels, was mortally wounded and replaced by his two corporals, Yamba-Yamba and Kimpuki, who continued the guerrilla war until they were killed in 1908.

After the Arab War, Leopold embarked on an ambitious plan to extend his rule to the headwaters of the Nile. In 1896, Dhanis led 30,000 men (the largest FP army to date), which included many irregulars, northeast toward southern Sudan. However, food shortage, mistreatment by officers, and forced marches through swamps provoked a mutiny that ended the expedition before it reached its objective. The mutineers killed most of their officers, rallied under their own red-and-white flag, and fought a three-year war against several FP expeditions arrayed against them. In 1900, shortly after a large attack on a heavily defended Free State position, some 2,000 of these rebels crossed into German ruled Rwanda and Burundi, where they were allowed to settle after yielding their arms. When another smaller expedition led by Chaltin occupied a small sliver of southern Sudan called the Lado Enclave and defeated a Mahdist army at the Battle of Rejjaf in 1897, Britain and France discouraged Leopold from further expansion toward the Nile. Another mutiny occurred at Fort Shikakasa in Boma because soldiers who had completed their contracts were forced to remain in service as labourers.

In 1908, after an international outcry about the severe viciousness of the Congo Free State regime, Leopold was compelled to relinquish the territory to the Belgian government. On the eve of World War I, the FP numbered 15,000 troops in 26 districts and had the lowest ratio of European leaders to African soldiers of any colonial army in the region. The FP continued to serve as both the military and police for the Belgian Congo until independence was achieved in 1960.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Arab War (1892–1894); Chaltin, Louis-Napoleon; Dhanis, Francis; Leopold II; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Rejjaf, Battle of (January 16, 1897); Stairs, William Grant; Stanley, Henry Morton

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Foreign Volunteers in Boer Forces, Second Anglo-Boer War

The unequal struggle between two small Boer republics (the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek, ZAR, also known as the South African Republic or the Transvaal; and the Oranje-Vrijstaat, OVS, also known as the Orange Free State, OFS) and the mighty British Empire captured the imagination of many people across the globe. On the European continent, there were strong anti-British (and consequently, sometimes also strong pro-Boer) feelings at the cusp of the 19th and 20th centuries.

In most instances, pro-Boer sentiments in due course led to the donation of money to alleviate the plight of those Boer civilians who had suffered from the collateral damage caused by the conflict—with particular reference to the British scorched-earth policy and the concomitant camp system (which, of course, not only had an extremely negative impact on the Boer civilians, but also on the black inhabitants of the ZAR and OFS). However, there were also men who left their respective countries and went to South Africa to join the Boer forces. Although it is not possible to ascertain exactly how many foreign volunteers fought on the side of the Boers, the names of at least 2,616 have been identified; perhaps as many as 3,000 joined the Boer forces, at least 138 of which died in active service.

The foreign volunteers came from 21 countries. A total of at least 194 Irishmen (some of them from the United States) joined the Boer forces with 15 of them dying in the course of the war. They were formed into two Irish brigades. At the Battle of Colenso (December 15, 1899), Colonel John Y. Filmore Blake's First Irish Transvaal Brigade faced the British army's Second Royal Dublin Fusiliers. The latter suffered serious losses. (It is estimated that as many as 47,000 Irishmen served in the

British army in South Africa; of note, Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts was of Anglo-Irish parentage, and Lord Horatio Kitchener, who in November 1900 succeeded him as overall commander of the British forces in South Africa, was born in Ireland.) Perhaps the most famous Irishman to serve on the Boer side was Sean (John) MacBride, who on May 5, 1916, was executed for his role in the Easter Rising in Dublin. Over and above the Irish-Americans already referred to, approximately 64 other Americans (of whom 3 died) also fought on the side of the Boers.

In light of the fact that the Dutch were the first to establish a halfway (replenishment) station at the Cape, and that the Boers were mainly descendants of the Dutch colonists, it is not surprising that there were strong cultural and emotional ties between the Boers/Afrikaners and the Dutch. Consequently, no fewer than 687 Dutch volunteers, including some 15 Belgians, served on the Boer side. Many of them already lived in the Transvaal when the war broke out. A total of 50 Dutch volunteers died during the conflict, with their most serious losses occurring at the Battle of Elandslaagte (October 21, 1899). Many other foreign volunteers also became casualties in this battle. There was also a Dutch Red Cross ambulance and a Belgian-German ambulance on the side of the Boers.

At least 884 Germans (of whom 22 died in the course of the conflict) served as volunteers in the Boer forces, with the most well known probably being Count Heinrich Eugen von Zeppelin, who was mortally wounded at Elandslaagte on October 21, 1899. At least 28 Austrians and 6 Hungarians from the Austro-Hungarian Empire joined the Boer forces, and 1 Austrian died. A total of at least 274 Frenchmen fought on the Boer side, of whom 4 died, including the most famous volunteer, Colonel Georges Henri Anne-Marie Victor de Villebois-Mareuil, who was killed in action near the town of Boshof on April 5, 1900. Most foreign volunteers left the war zone around the time the guerrilla phase of the conflict started in March–September 1900, but a colorful Frenchman who fought until the end of hostilities on May 31, 1900, was Robert Marie de Kersauson de Pennendreff.

By 1899, at least 3,000 persons of Russian origin (mainly Jews) lived in the two Boer republics. As many as 225 Russians served on the Boer side of the war. There was also a Russian ambulance, as well as a Russian-Dutch ambulance. The Boer forces also had at their service a Scandinavian Corps (commanded by Johannes Flygare, from Sweden), consisting of at least 109 Swedes (of whom 18 died), 31 Norwegians (4 died; Sweden and Norway of course, were one country from 1814 until 1905), 39 Danes (4 died) and 25 Finns (4 died). The Scandinavian Corps suffered severe casualties at the Battle of Magersfontein (December 11, 1899). From Switzerland, 26 persons joined the Boer forces: at least 7 from Portugal (1 died), 119 from Italy (6 died), 2 from Bulgaria, 2 from England, 3 from Scotland, 14 from Greece, and at least 1 each from Spain, Bosnia, Brazil, and Chile. And then there was the sole Arabian Boer volunteer: Amard Naceur, from Batua in Algeria, who was captured by the British on July 23, 1900, and, like so many other Boer prisoners, was sent to a prisoner-of-war camp in Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka).

The volunteers' contribution to the Boer war effort was small, but the fact that perhaps as many as 3,000 foreigners were prepared to take up arms in the interest of the republican cause is a reflection of the sympathy that was shown toward the Boer republics. The Second Anglo-Boer War indeed captured the imaginations of millions of people across the globe, and events in the war zone were followed closely by many in the countries from which the volunteers came to join forces with the Boers.

André Wessels

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Franco-Dahomey Wars (1890–1894)

In 1851, the kingdom of Dahomey, located near the West African coast in what is now the Republic of Benin, allowed French traders to enter its territory. However, during the 1860s and 1870s, Dahomey and France competed for control of the coastal trading enclaves of Porto Novo and Cotonou. Dahomey had long tried to dominate the coastal trade, and in the early 1860s, its campaign to expand east into Yoruba territory had failed. Dahomey's army was based on firearm-equipped infantry, including an elite corps of female warriors that Europeans romanticized as "Amazons."

After Porto Novo was attacked by British antislavery warships in 1861, the local ruler requested French protection, but this was opposed by Dahomey, which saw the ports as tributaries. During the 1880s, Dahomey raided Porto Novo and surrounding villages. In March 1889, Dahomian warriors decapitated a coastal chief who had told them that the French flag would protect him and wrapped his severed head in it. The French fortified Cotonou and built up a 360-man garrison there, of which 300 were Tirailleurs from Senegal and Gabon.

On the morning of March 4, 1890, a Dahomey army attacked the French fort at Cotonou. Some Dahomian warriors pried open the stockade's wooden stakes, through which they shot their muskets, and others climbed the wall and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting. French firepower, including from a gunboat, eventually repelled the Dahomey force, which suffered several hundred killed. French losses, on the other hand, were minimal. Dahomey's ruler, Behanzin, sent another army to attack Porto Novo, but it was intercepted by a contingent of 400 colonial soldiers with three field guns and 500 local allies who served as a screening force. While the Porto Novo contingent was routed, the French-led Tirailleurs formed a defensive square and slowly withdrew to the coast while fending off repeated Dahomian attacks. The First Franco-Dahomey War ended in early October 1890, when Behanzin signed a treaty recognizing Porto Novo and Cotonou as a French protectorate.

When Dahomey reasserted its claims to the coast in 1892, a French gunboat was sent up the Oueme River, where it was attacked and forced to withdraw. Under Colonel Alfred-Amedee Dodds, a 2,164-man expeditionary force was sent from Senegal that consisted of French Foreign Legionnaires, marines, artillery, Senegalese auxiliary cavalry, and Tirailleurs. Porto Novo provided the expedition with 2,600 supply carriers. After the previous war, Behanzin had acquired 4,000–6,000 rifles, including many repeating models and some machine guns and Krupp artillery pieces from Togo-based German merchants through the port of Whydah. It is unlikely that the machine guns and artillery were ever used by Dahomey forces, as they lacked the appropriate training. The French then blockaded the coast to prevent further firearm imports to Dahomey. Justifying their planned campaign, French officials vilified Dahomey by highlighting its ritual human sacrifice and slavery.

After French gunboats bombarded villages up the Oueve River in early July, Dodd's expeditionary force began marching upriver toward the Dahomian capital of Abomey in mid-August. On September 19, at Dogba, some 80 kilometers from the coast on the border of Porto Novo and Dahomey territory, the French colonial force was attacked by a Dahomian army that tried repeatedly to get into close combat but was repelled after three or four hours. Hundreds of Dahomey warriors were killed. On October 4, after the French column turned west to approach Abomey, it was attacked at Poguessa by a Dahomey force led by Behanzin. After several unsuccessful charges against lines of 50-centimeter-long French bayonets, the Dahomians were repelled, having lost 200 troops. The French suffered only 42 casualties. It then took the French a month to advance 40 kilometers to Abomey, as they had to overcome entrenched Dahomey positions.

At the village of Adegon, on October 6, a major engagement took place in which a French charge inflicted 419 fatalities on Dahomey's famous Amazon corps. The French lost just 6 dead and 32 wounded. After this stunning defeat, the royal court at Abomey realized that they could not win. The French reached the village of Akpa, 16 kilometers from Abomey, in mid-October, where they were repeatedly attacked by Dahomey forces, including remnants of the Amazon unit, until the end of the month, when they resumed the advance. In late October, the French used bayonet charges to overcome Dahomey trenches near the capital. Although the Dahomey warriors favored hand-to-hand fighting, they were disadvantaged, as their swords and machetes did not reach as far as the French bayonets. In early November, the French defeated a 1,500-strong Dahomey force, led by Behanzin but consisting of many slaves and convicts called up to replace losses, at Cana, just outside Abomey. While the Amazons specifically targeted French officers to disrupt command and control, colonial bayonet charges once again overpowered the Dahomey army.

The French occupied Abomey in mid-November while the king, his offer to negotiate ignored, and his remaining supporters fled north. The French appointed another member of the royal family as king of Dahomey, and Behanzin, who tried but failed to rebuild the Dahomey army, eventually surrendered in January 1894 and was exiled to Martinique and then Algeria, where he died in 1906. The French extended colonial rule farther inland over the Ewe-speaking people; and in 1904, Dahomey, where French merchants took over palm oil exports, became part of French West Africa.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Amazons, Dahomey; Behanzin; Dodds, Alfred-Amedee; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914)

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Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869)

In 1849, when the Boer settlers of the Orange River Sovereignty were under British rule, Major Henry Warden attempted to establish a border between them and the neighboring Sotho called the "Warden Line." Subsequent British attempts to enforce this boundary failed, culminating in the Sotho victory over a British force at the Battle of Berea in December 1852. In 1854, the Bloemfontein Convention, which signaled a British withdrawal from the interior of what is now South Africa, made it possible for the Orange Free State Republic to be established on February 23 of that year. What would be seen in later years as a "model republic" under the administration of President Johannes Brand was first a fledgling Boer republic that had to solve major military issues on its southeastern border with the Sotho mountain kingdom (Lesotho) under King Moshoeshoe (also spelled Moshweshwe).

President J. P. Hoffman, the first president of the Orange Free State, argued that the best way to solve the republic's dispute with the Sotho would be to send their king a gift. Hoffman's gift consisted of a barrel of gunpowder. His countrymen were upset about giving the ruler of their enemy ammunition as a gift, and Hoffman was soon relieved of his responsibilities as head of state. When President J. N. Boshoff took over from Hoffman, the removal of the border dispute with the Sotho was at the top of his agenda. On March 11, 1858, Boshoff sent an ultimatum to Moshoeshoe demanding that he withdrew all his subjects under chiefs Posholi and Lebenya from the western side of the Warden Line, pay compensation for damages caused by the latter to Boer families, and officially accept the border as decided upon before. Boshoff gave Moshoeshoe eight days to respond, but no reply came from his capital, Thaba Bosiu.

Next, 1,000 Free State Boers from the Smithfield and Winburg districts were ordered to report for commando service and move across the Caledon River to take on Moshoeshoe's 10,000 warriors. The first battle took place at the same spot where former British governor George Cathcart had crossed the Caledon six years prior. It is believed that up to 8,000 Sotho warriors waited for the Winburg commandos, under Frederick Senekal, to arrive. The Sotho warriors attacked first but were repulsed and forced to flee. Senekal and his men continued to their rendezvous point at Jammerberg Drift and waited for the Smithfield commando, which arrived on April 25.

Their next target was Morija, and not even the missionaries there were spared the brunt of the Boer attacks. Thaba Bosiu was the final target, and by May 8, Senekal's men formed a laager around the foot of the mountain. Moshoeshoe by this time ordered several of his raiding parties to attack Boer farms inside the Free State; luckily for him, Griqua and Batswana raiders were attacking Boer farms at the same time. With this news reaching the Boer commando, a rapid artillery barrage was ordered, but the Boers then retreated to save what was left of their farms. This was noted by the Free State Boers as the "First Basotho War," while the Sotho called it "Senekal's War." In October 1858, the British brokered the Treaty of Aliwal North between the Free State and Lesotho, which set a boundary between the two similar to the disputed Warden Line, and authorized the Boers to pursue alleged stock thieves across the border.

Tensions between the Orange Free State and the Sotho increased again during the mid- 1860s. In May 1865, President Brand called on a 5,000-strong commando to force Sotho out of the northern parts of the republic. He warned Moshoeshoe not to interfere with the unit's duties, but Moshweshwe did not have full control over his kingdom. Supported by the Rolong and Fingo, the Free State commando under General Johannes Fick reported for duty in the ill-administrated northern regions of the Free State. Moshoeshoe's own sons would fight the Boers, with Molapo focusing his force on Kroonstad and Masopha invading the Bloemfontein district (and raiding Transvaal traders in Natal). The Sotho refer to this second war with the Free State as the "War of Cannon's Boom" due to the variety of artillery pieces that were used (mostly by the Boers).

The Boers would remember other legends generated by the conflict. For instance, the demise of the Cape farmer Louw Wepener became a legend of the siege of Thaba Bosiu. It is believed that General Fick might have condemned the young Commandant Wepener by not supporting him fully in the planned charge up the mountain. On August 18, 1865, Wepener and 600 armed Boers volunteered to charge Thaba Bosiu. Their strategy was simple. While the Free State's artillery would bombard the top of the mountain, the Boers would attack by climbing and scurrying behind large sandstone boulders that were marking their path to the top.

As the fighting grew grim, only 100 Boers were still with Wepener by 5 P.M.; the others had retreated to the Boer lines. It is believed that Wepener tried to rally his men when he stood up to shout to them: "Follow me!" but instead he got shot in the head by a Sotho sniper. The siege continued until January 1866, when Fick and his men returned to the Free State to reorganize. In fact, the Free State forces learned from their first war with the Sotho and were able to curb any further attacks on Free State farmers and starve the Sotho nation through destroying their crops and isolating them from their grazing lands. It is perhaps for this reason that the Sotho, who had to stop fighting to attend to food production, refer to the April 1866 settlement of this second conflict (the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu) as the "Peace of the Millet," in which they agreed to surrender 3,000 cattle and some land to the Boers.



Moshoeshoe I (c. 1786–1870) was the founding ruler of the Kingdom of Lesotho in Southern Africa during the early nineteenth century. While his armies fought several wars against the Boers of the expanding Orange Free State, he preserved the remnant of his kingdom by accepting a British protectorate in 1868. (Fotosearch/Getty Images)

An ailing Moshoeshoe was concerned about the future of his kingdom when his son Molapo, in March 1866, signed a separate treaty with the Boers in which his subjects came under the authority of the Free State. In 1867, following Boer raids, a number of Sotho chiefs agreed to become Free State subjects in exchange for being allowed to retain some of their lands. Further tensions over land led to a Third Free State–Lesotho War. Prompted by the advance of two Boer commandos in September 1867, Moshoeshoe requested British protection, which was granted in March 1868 when Lesotho, on the eve of a Boer assault on Thaba Bosiu, became the British territory of Basutoland.

Unwilling to risk confrontation with the British, President Brand withdrew his forces from the area. In February 1869, the British and Free State negotiated a new border for Basutoland, in which it gained arable land in the west that it had lost three years earlier but lost all its territory north of the Caledon and a section between the Caledon and Orange. These borders would be inherited by the modern state of Lesotho when it became independent in 1966. The elderly Mosheshoe died in 1870.

Emile C. Coetzee

See also: Berea, Battle of (December 20, 1852); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Cathcart, George; Commando System (Boer Republics); Moshoeshoe I

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French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900)

Initially limited to trading posts in Senegal, the French colonial presence grew in the 19th century to include Algeria and then much of northern, western, and central Africa.

France first obtained trading posts on the Senegal River (1638) and in St. Louis (1659) and Gorée (1679). These were captured by Britain during the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763) and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815) and were then restored to France under the 1815 Treaty of Paris. The French had little presence in the interior and limited themselves to exports of gum, ivory, and slaves. The latter grew in importance with the development of France’s Caribbean colonies in the 18th century.

Colonial rule changed dramatically with the advent of France’s Second Republic (1848). Slavery was abolished permanently, and inhabitants of Gorée and St. Louis (and later Rufisque and Dakar) were allowed to vote in French parliamentary elections. Louis Faidherbe (governor, 1854–1861, 1863–1865) fought Muslim warlords and expanded the French presence into the interior.

In northern Africa in 1798, French forces landed in Egypt to block British access to India. Despite initial successes, the expedition was hampered by epidemics, military setbacks in the Levant, and Britain’s naval victory at the Battle of the Nile (1798). The French left in 1801, and Egypt became a British protectorate much later (1882). France’s main remaining asset was the Suez Canal, built by Ferdinand de Lesseps during 1859–1869 and owned by a majority French company until 1956.

Algeria (nominally a province of the Ottoman Empire) was one of the infamous Barbary States that preyed on Mediterranean shipping, but the French invasion of Algeria was initially motivated by more prosaic events. A financial dispute led to a diplomatic incident with the *dey* (governor) of Algiers, leading to a French blockade of the city (1827). French king Charles X, afraid of the political repercussions of the ineffective standoff, sent French troops to occupy Algiers in 1830. His successor, Louis-Philippe, fought the Abd al-Qadir rebellion and occupied all of Algeria (1830–1847).

Settlers (the *pieds noirs*) came from France, Italy, Malta, and Spain and acquired vast estates where they produced tobacco, wine, and grain. Military rule was phased out as the European population increased, and three *départements* (administrative units under civilian rule) were created in 1848. Jews, along with a few Muslims who had forsaken some tenets of Islam (known as *évolués*), were granted full French citizenship, but most Muslims complained of losing their lands and being denied equal rights.

France battled rival Italian, Spanish, and German ambitions to establish a protectorate over Tunisia (1881) and most of Morocco (1911). Morocco was pacified under the governorship of Louis Lyautey (1912–1916, 1917–1925).

In sub-Saharan Africa, French colonies were long limited to the coast and the Indian Ocean islands of Réunion (1664), Mauritius (1718), and Comoro (1841). The French presence grew considerably, however, when the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) granted France vast tracts of Africa.

The Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF; French West Africa) was created in 1895 and headquartered in St. Louis and then Dakar. The federation included Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Dahomey (Benin), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), in addition to Senegal. In central Africa, Savorgnan de Brazza (1852–1905) explored Gabon and the Congo (1874–1875) and founded Brazzaville (1880). Thanks to his efforts, the Afrique Equatoriale Française (AEF; French Equatorial Africa) was created in 1910 and headquartered in Brazzaville. It included Chad, the French Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Gabon, and Ubangi-Shari (Central African Republic).

France established a protectorate in Djibouti (1885), conquered Madagascar (1895–1896), and gave up its ambitions in the Sudan after the Fashoda Incident (1898). France ceded part of Cameroon to Germany in 1911 in exchange for Morocco, and then regained most of the colony at the Treaty of Versailles (1919), along with most of Togo.

Appraisals of the French presence in Africa vary considerably. Critics view French colonial rule as an example of naked greed, marked by land appropriations, racial discrimination, theft of local resources, forced labor, and disregard for local customs. Others point to France's civilizing mission (*mission civilisatrice*), the creation of infrastructure, the eradication of slavery, health and education projects, and the work of philanthropists such as Albert Schweitzer in Gabon (1875–1965).

Philippe R. Girard

See also: Abd al-Qadir; Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Barbary Wars (1783–1815); Fashoda Incident (1898); Lyautey, Louis Hubert; Madagascar, French Conquest of (1882–1905); Faidherbe, Louis; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934); Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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French, John D. P. (1852–1925)

Field Marshal John D. P. French, first Earl of Ypres, was an outstanding cavalry commander who led the Cavalry Division with distinction during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). He also served as chief of the imperial general staff immediately before World War I.

French was born on September 28, 1852, in Kent. His father was a retired naval officer, and the younger French joined the Royal Navy in 1866, although he resigned in 1870 and joined the militia. After tutoring, French passed the army entrance examination, was gazetted to the 8th Hussars in 1874, and shortly thereafter transferred to the 19th Hussars. He spent a number of years on regimental assignments, including secondment to a yeomanry regiment, and rejoined the 19th Hussars in Cairo in October 1884. French's baptism of fire came during the Gordon Relief Expedition, when his detachment, as part of the Desert Column, fought at the Battle of Abu Klea (January 17, 1885) and covered its retreat from the Sudan.

The 19th Hussars returned to England in 1886. French commanded the regiment in England and in India from 1888 to 1893 and gained a reputation as an innovative cavalry leader and trainer. From 1893 to 1895, French was on half pay and was assigned to the War Office as a colonel in 1895. In May 1897, French assumed command of the newly organized 2nd Cavalry Brigade and, the following year, the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

French, as a local lieutenant general, was assigned to command the cavalry in Natal and arrived in South Africa shortly before the outbreak of war on October 11, 1899. His cavalry helped achieve victory at the Battle of Elandslaagte (October 21, 1899) and avoided being besieged in Ladysmith. He was an indefatigable cavalry commander, driving his horsemen in the relief of Kimberley, the capture of Bloemfontein and of Pretoria, and later in drives to capture the insurgent Boers. French returned to England in July 1902. Whereas the unorthodox warfare of the Second Anglo-Boer War ruined the reputations of many British officers, French emerged from the conflict with two knighthoods and an assignment as the 1st Army Corps commander at Aldershot.

French commanded the 1st Army Corps from 1902 to 1907, and it was apparent that he was being groomed to command the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in the event of a European war. He was appointed inspector-general of the forces and tried hard to instill drill and discipline into unit training and field maneuvers. In 1912, French became chief of the imperial general staff and was promoted to field marshal in 1913. As a result of the Curragh Incident, in which French informed the government that the army might split over events in Ireland, he resigned in March 1914, and his career seemed to be over.

French was appointed commander-in-chief of the BEF when World War I began in August 1914, but he was relieved from command in December 1915. He served as commander-in-chief of the home forces (1916–1918), then as lord lieutenant of Ireland (1918–1921). French was ennobled as a viscount in 1916 and as an earl after his final retirement. He died on May 22, 1925.

French was a good, but not a great, general, and in spite of a scandalous divorce, he achieved the highest military rank and position. As a cavalry leader, however, French was "the most distinguished Englishman since Cromwell" (Holmes, 1981, p. 366).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Abu Klea, Battle of (January 16–18, 1885); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Doornkop, Battle of (May 28–29, 1900); Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899); Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1889–February 28, 1900); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Galliéni, Joseph (1849–1916)

By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, General Joseph Simon Galliéni had already attained a reputation as one of France's foremost military figures for his military achievements in the French colonies. His performance in the First Battle of the Marne in September 1914, which dramatically saved France from an early defeat at the hands of the Germans, elevated him to the status of national hero.

Galliéni was born on April 24, 1849, at Saint-Réat in the Haute Garonne department of France. In August 1870, in the midst of his studies at the prestigious military academy St. Cyr, the Franco-Prussian War broke out. He left school to join in the fighting, taking part as a second lieutenant in the Battle of Sedan on September 1. The battle was a disaster for the French, and Emperor Napoleon III was captured by Prussian forces, as was Galliéni, who was also wounded in the engagement.

Upon his release from a German prisoner-of-war camp, Galliéni immediately left for service in the French colonies. He was serving in West Africa in 1878 when he was promoted to the rank of captain. By 1881, he had taken part in several important expeditions throughout the region of the upper Niger River basin, expanding French control over the area and negotiating a commercial treaty with the powerful Tukolor Empire of Ahmadu in March 1881. For his role in negotiating that agreement, Galliéni was awarded the Gold Medal of the Société de Géographie. From 1882 to 1885, he served in Martinique and then was made a lieutenant-colonel and the governor-general of Upper Senegal in 1886. In that capacity, he had several notable military successes against native resistance, including that led by the Mandinka leader Samori Toure.

In 1888, Galliéni was made an officer in the Legion of Honor and returned to Paris to receive staff training at the École Supérieur de la Guerre. Having been promoted to full colonel in 1891, he commanded the second division of Tonkin in Vietnam and used both military and diplomatic tactics to strengthen French control over the area. He returned to Paris in January 1896 and was immediately promoted to major-general and dispatched to Madagascar as governor-general and commander-in-chief. Galliéni was an energetic military governor and was highly successful in administering that new colony, suppressing revolts, pacifying the local populations, and promoting peace, stability, and economic growth. When he resigned his position in 1905, Madagascar was fully integrated into the French imperial system, and Galliéni had gained a reputation as one of the foremost military-political figures in the building of the French Empire—a reputation that was only enhanced by his numerous published accounts of his colonial adventures.

Upon his return to France, Galliéni became commander of the XIV Corps at Lyon. In 1911, he was offered the position of commander-in-chief of the entire French army. He refused, citing ill health, and recommended instead his colleague in the colonial army, General Joseph Joffre, for the position. In April 1914, Galliéni retired from active command but was retained on the army list. Upon the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, he was recalled to duty, told he would assume supreme command of the army in the event that Joffre vacated that position for any reason, and was appointed military governor of Paris. Perceiving that the situation was likely to grow very desperate in the face of the relentless German advance toward the capital (the government had already left and set up operations in Bordeaux), Galliéni immediately began to build up the city's defenses, organize a defensive force, and reassure the Parisian populace.

As the Germans approached the city in the first days of September, Galliéni determined that their line of marching would expose them to a flank attack originating from the direction of the capital. He convinced Joffre to order such an initiative and sent his forces out from Paris to participate in a general counteroffensive. The result was the "Miracle of the Marne." In five days of dramatic fighting during September 5–10, the French stopped and then reversed the German advance, saving Paris from capture and keeping France in the war. Although many leaders, not to mention common soldiers, shared credit for the victory, Galliéni's role was recognized as decisive, and he enjoyed a reputation as the savior of Paris. Despite his desire to assume command over an active army group at the front, he remained military governor of Paris for the next year.

On October 29, 1915, Galliéni became minister of war in Prime Minister Aristide Briand's cabinet. In that office, Galliéni once again demonstrated his administrative skill and undertook important reforms. He defended his old friend Joffre from increasing criticism for the failure to break the stalemate on the western front, but he could not hide the army commander-in-chief's evident failure to prepare for the massive German attack at the Battle of Verdun at the beginning of 1916. In response, Galliéni recommended a thorough reorganization of the war effort, retaining Joffre as commander-in-chief in Paris but inserting General Édouard de Castelnau as direct battle commander of the forces on the western front. The rest of the cabinet feared the political risks of such a maneuver, however, and Galliéni resigned his position as minister of war on March 16, 1916.

Galliéni cited medical problems as the public reason for his resignation, and it was true that his health had deteriorated markedly as a result of overwork. After undergoing two risky and ultimately unsuccessful operations to relieve his condition, Galliéni died at Versailles on May 27, 1916. He was given a state funeral and interred for a time in the national military shrine at *Les Invalides* before being buried at Saint-Raphael. After the war, on April 21, 1921, Galliéni was posthumously elevated to the rank of marshal of France, the nation's highest military honor.

Richard Fogarty

See also: Joffre, Joseph; Lamine, Mamadu; Madagascar, French Conquest of (1882–1905); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Samori Toure

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Gandhi and the Second Anglo-Boer War

In 1893, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (Mahatma) arrived in the colony of Natal from India to provide legal services to local Indian traders. However, his legal work was soon superseded by his engagement in other politically oriented activities. One such engagement was the organization of the Indian Ambulance Corps in support of the British army. The motivation of Gandhi was ostensibly for Indians to show their loyalty to the British Empire during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), and in so doing, improve their political situation in Natal. This could be done only by means of an ambulance corps, for as a devout Hindu, Gandhi believed that he could not physically partake in the war.

Gandhi worked tirelessly to bring the Indian Ambulance Corps to fruition, and he held meetings with the local Indian community, canvassed white colonial politicians, drew in local Indian leaders, and had Dr. L. P. Booth train prospective Indian volunteers in medical work. The volunteers generally comprised Indian men working on the large coastal sugar estates and clerks, artisans, and shop owners. The indentured laborers from the sugar estates, volunteered and paid for by the estate owners, would be the stretcher bearers, while those that were more urbane became the leaders—a class distinction that would typify the corps during its existence. A case in point is the provision of uniforms and familial support to the roughly 25 leaders—a courtesy not extended to the approximately 600 stretcher bearers.

As the military activities along the Natal front increased and the casualties rose, the Indian Ambulance Corps was called to duty in mid-December 1899. The corps arrived in time to be given Red Cross badges and rudimentary supplies and be thrown into the Battle of Colenso. In the aftermath of this battle, the stretcher bearers did yeoman's work carrying, under the direction of Booth and the leaders, several hundred British wounded for many kilometers over rough terrain to the nearest field hospital. Four days after the battle, the corps was temporarily disbanded, and its members returned home. However, within weeks the corps was revived and reorganized, partially due to the efforts of Gandhi. The corps, now consisting of more than 1,000 volunteers and 30 leaders, arrived at the Natal front in early January 1900 after receiving some rudimentary training. The stretcher bearers distinguished themselves at the battles of Spionkop and Vaalkrantz, transporting large numbers of wounded soldiers to safety. After the relief of Ladysmith, the Indian Ambulance Corps was finally disbanded and replaced by Red Cross units from Britain.

In the aftermath of the abandonment of the corps, Gandhi agitated for some recognition for the duties performed by the leaders. His request for the "Queens Chocolates" (a tin of chocolates sent to noncommissioned officers and soldiers by Queen Victoria) to be awarded was rejected, as did his request for official certificates of discharge. Honors eventually arrived, though, and the leaders of the corps were awarded the Queen's South African campaign medal, while praise was bestowed on them from all quarters of Natal society. In the process, the work done by the ordinary Indian stretcher bearers and the treatment they had to endure were relegated to the background, and Gandhi did very little to have the honors spread evenly.

The hopes of Gandhi and the other leaders that their loyal war service to the empire would result in an improvement in the political plight of Indians in Natal were dashed when anti-Indian legislation in Natal was retained after the war ended. This did not dampened Gandhi's spirit, and in the Zulu Rebellion of 1906, he again organized the Indian Ambulance Corps to support the Natal colonial military. Any hope that this act would lead to real political gain for Indians in general and for Gandhi specifically were again quashed. One of the most tangible advantages gained by Gandhi from his involvement in the Indian Ambulance Corps was the discipline gained from the long marches. This stood him and his followers in good stead during the passive resistance campaigns, which started in 1907. The emergence of the Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence and passive resistance is also attributed to his wartime endeavors.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24,1900); Vaal Krantz, Battle of (February 5–7, 1900); Zulu Rebellion of 1906

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Gatacre, William F. (1843–1906)

Lieutenant-General Sir William F. Gatacre was a senior general who saw considerable active service during the final decade of Queen Victoria's reign, culminating in command of the 3rd Division during the Second Anglo-Boer War.

Gatacre was born in 1843 and commissioned in the army in 1862. He served in India for many years, was an instructor at Sandhurst from 1875 to 1879, and participated in an expedition to Burma in 1889.

Gatacre commanded a brigade in the 1895 Chitral Relief Expedition on the North-West Frontier. On one occasion, an attack was to be conducted on a rebel leader's fort. He thought the mission too risky, so he argued with the force's chief of staff over seniority. By the time the force commander arrived, the rebels had slipped away.

As a major-general, Gatacre was sent to the Sudan in early 1898 and commanded a British brigade at the Battle of Atbara (April 8, 1898) and a division at Omdurman

(September 2, 1898). While his soldiers fought well, he was considered an abrasive officer, “totally unable to delegate, he interfered constantly with his battalion commanders and insisted on being consulted on the slightest measure, right down to platoon level” (Neillands, 1996, p. 191).

Gatacre arrived in South Africa in November 1899 and took command of the 3rd Division. He was tasked with a small ad hoc force (as most of his division had been sent to Natal), to try to control as much of the northeastern section of Cape Colony as he could and prevent Boer advances from Stormberg. Even though instructed to remain on the defensive until reinforced, Gatacre was determined to seize Stormberg in a dawn attack after a night march. He failed to conduct a reconnaissance, changed the route and direction of attack at the last minute (or got lost en route), and then led tired troops in rugged terrain in an attempt to surprise the Boers. In superb physical condition, Gatacre—nicknamed “Backacher” by his soldiers—expected his troops to also be in excellent shape and marched them as if they were impervious to fatigue. At daylight on December 10, 1899, his column was caught unprotected in a pass with Boers on the high ground. The Boers opened fire on the British; some of them were able to occupy the nearby high ground, but most were exhausted and withdrew hastily. British casualties at Stormberg—one of the three significant British defeats constituting the so-called Black Week—were 28 killed, 51 wounded, and 634 captured.

On April 10, 1900, however, after Gatacre had failed to send his force to assist during an attack near Dewetsdorp, he was fired and unnecessarily humiliated by Field Marshal Lord Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., commander-in-chief. Gatacre returned to England and commanded the Eastern District until he retired in 1904.

Gatacre, who “was as brave as a lion . . . No day was too hot for him, no hours too long, no work too hard” (Belfield, 1975, p. 49), later worked for a rubber company. He died of fever in the jungles of Abyssinia in 1906.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898); Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); Omdurman, Battle of (Septemer 2, 1898); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Stormberg, Battle of (December 10, 1899); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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German Empire

In the history of colonialism, Germany’s empire has received far less attention than the overseas empires of Britain and France. There are several reasons for this, including the relative brevity of Germany’s colonial project, the comparatively small amount of territory involved, the marginal economic importance of the German colonies, and Germany's early loss of its colonies following defeat in World War I. Yet Germany's colonial empire is significant to both modern European history and the colonial histories of Africa and Asia. Indeed, it is impossible to understand the histories of modern Germany and its former colonies without also understanding the German colonial period.

German liberals began discussing the acquisition of colonies as early as 1848, and the idea of colonialism reemerged in the 1860s as a subject of interest to certain German constituencies, such as industrialists and the Prussian military establishment. It was not until after German unification in 1871, however, that colonialist agitation reached a higher pitch in domestic politics. The development of the colonialist movement after 1871 was due to the convergent interests of several groups, including commercial and industrial representatives, tropical trading interests, and German emigrationists.

In the 1860s and 1870s, several organizations were founded to promote German colonial interests. These early examples became models for the later *Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft,* formed in 1887 by the members of two existing colonial organizations. This organization, which remained the most vocal and steadfast advocate of colonialism throughout the imperial period, lasted until the Third Reich, when it was subsumed under the national socialist organizational apparatus. Carl Peters, one of the group's initial leaders and perhaps the most notorious figure in German colonial history, played a formative role in the ideological development of the German colonialist movement as a propagandist, but he also played an active role in the actual territorial acquisition of Germany's East Africa colonies. He and several like-minded associates undertook a series of treaty-signing expeditions in 1884 that led directly to the German possession of Tanganyika in East Africa. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had staunchly opposed colonial expansion until 1884, but for a combination of domestic and foreign policy reasons that have been much debated by historians, he changed his mind in 1884, setting Germany on its path to formal colonialism.

Chancellor Bismarck officially declared a protectorate over portions of southwest Africa in 1884. The establishment of protectorates over the West African areas that later became known as Togo and Cameroon followed later that year. In February 1885, Bismarck also declared a protectorate over mainland East Africa, and he later placed its administration under the newly created German East Africa Company. In each case, the establishment of protectorates over these territories followed the signing of individual "treaties" with local African leaders. These treaties were of dubious character, since the African leaders who signed them generally had no authority to grant land concessions to the Germans and certainly could not have known what the German legal concepts in the treaties involved. Nevertheless, these pieces of paper served as the foundation for German colonial rule over these four disparate regions of Africa.

In the Pacific, Germany acquired northeastern New Guinea in 1884 and added the Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands, and

Although the first German chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898), had initially opposed acquiring overseas colonies, he reversed this position in 1884 and Germany quickly seized territory in Asia, the Pacific and Africa. The German colonies in Africa comprised Togoland (today's Togo and part of Ghana), Kamerun (today's Cameroon and part of Nigeria), South West Africa (today's Namibia) and East Africa (the mainland part of today's Tanzania plus Rwanda and Burundi). (Chaiba Media)

Palau Islands to German New Guinea in 1899. It also occupied and leased the Chinese city of Qingdao and its hinterland in 1897 and annexed the islands of Savaii and Upolu as German Samoa in 1900. This annexation rounded out Germany's possessions for the remainder of its tenure as a colonial power. The Pacific islands remained the most economically unimportant in the German colonial constellation, although they did feature in political debates in the Reichstag over the citizenship rights of the so-called mixed-race offspring of German men and Asian women.

In November 1884, Bismarck hosted the Berlin Conference, at which the great powers of Europe decided how best to proceed with the colonial occupation of Africa, while at the same time avoiding potentially disastrous conflicts among themselves. Although Bismarck achieved his goal of preventing a major European conflagration over the colonies, the doctrine of "effective occupation" that emerged from the conference committed Germany to a more expensive colonial project than he had planned for.

Between 1884 and 1907, Germany attempted to fulfill its effective occupation requirements in its various African colonies by fighting a series of wars of "pacification" and launching "punitive expeditions" against numerous peoples who opposed the German presence and the economic, social, and political changes the colonial regime demanded. German colonialists also attempted to set up the fundamental economic and political elements necessary to effectively administer the colonies and to encourage more settlers. German military commitments to securing colonial territories culminated in two major rebellions in two separate colonies—German South West Africa (GSWA) and German East Africa—that began in 1904 and 1905, respectively.

In GSWA, first the Hereros and then the Namas rose in open and coordinated rebellion against the Germans, and they had some initial successes. However, after German reinforcements arrived in the summer of 1904, they defeated the Hereros at Waterberg Mountain, surrounded them there, and drove the remaining force into the Omaheke Desert, where most of them died of thirst and starvation. In October 1904, General Lothar von Trotha, the German commander, issued his infamous "extermination order," in which he ordered that all Hereros were to be shot, regardless of combatant status. In the end, about 80 percent of the Hereros and 50 percent of the Namas died either in the war itself or in its aftermath, when those who survived were confined in disease-ridden concentration camps on the coast or used as forced laborers.

In East Africa, the Maji Maji Rebellion, which mainly involved the southern portion of the colony, broke out in 1905. As in GSWA, the military suppression of this rebellion required the use of reinforcements. The main part of the uprising was put down by April 1906. Up to 100,000 Africans died in the conflict, and the famine and disease that followed it unleashed massive starvation in the southern region. Although relatively few Germans died in these conflicts, the expenses incurred and the publicity surrounding the alleged atrocities committed by German troops provoked much domestic discussion about the nation's colonial project.

These military activities, the brutal treatment of the subject African populations involved, and a series of colonial scandals caused by official misconduct on the part of colonial military officers and administrators provoked substantial debate and crisis in the Reichstag, raising questions about colonial policy and parliamentary oversight. The turmoil eventually resulted in Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow's dissolution of the Reichstag and the election of the "Bulow bloc," which included all political parties except the Catholic center and the Social Democrats, based on a patriotic, procolonialist platform. Between 1907 and 1914, German colonial administrators and governors sought to develop the colonies so that they would be self-sufficient and economically productive for Germany. By 1913, however, the colonies still required subsidies in order to function, and profits from trade in the colonies were negligible.

In 1914, World War I erupted, and the German colonies came under attack by Allied forces almost immediately after war was declared in Europe in August 1914. Togo and the Pacific possessions fell to Allied occupation in late 1914, but GSWA and Cameroon were not conquered until 1915 and 1916, respectively. In German East Africa, a legendary force led by General Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck held out against a harried multinational Allied force until after the European armistice in 1918.

At Versailles, Germany petitioned to have its colonies returned to it, but the Allies argued that Germany was not fit to continue to administer colonies. Accordingly, its colonies were taken and divided among the Allies as mandates of the League of Nations. For Germany's former colonies, the mandate period entailed learning how to live under new colonial administrations and the different practices of a new set of colonial practitioners.

Although Germany's formal period of colonialism had now come to an ignoble end, the colonies remained a prominent feature in German politics during the Weimar and Nazi eras, when they became symbols of the perceived wrongs done to Germany during World War I and at Versailles.

Michelle R. Moyd

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); Elbejet, Battle of (December 22, 1889); German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); German-Nama War (1893–1894); Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Leutwein, Theodore; Maharero, Samuel; Maji-Maji Revolt (1905); Peters, Carl; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); von Trotha, Lothar

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German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898)

The Hehe Wars were a series of military engagements fought by the Hehe people of central Tanganyika and their allies against the German *Schutztruppe* and their local partners. These conflicts are especially notable due to the initial devastating German loss at Lula-Rugaro (Lugalo), the lengthy guerrilla resistance by the Hehe following the German counterattack, and the inspired leadership and eventual death of Mkwawa, ruler of the Hehe.

The seeds of the eventual conflict between the German colonial forces and the Hehe were planted in the events of the previous decade. In 1883, Chief Mkwawa of the Hehe defeated the last of his serious rivals and assumed sole leadership of the Hehe. Already a formidable military leader, Mkwawa quickly adopted an aggressive foreign policy to deal with his regional competitors, the Ngoni and Sangu. Since his realm was bracketed between these rivals, Mkwawa engaged in diplomacy with his neighbors who were farther afield. In addition, he continued expanding his realm to gain greater influence along the major trade routes that led inland from the coast. By 1890, Mkwawa had built a strong and aggressive regional power with several subject peoples and a formidable reputation.

Conversely, the German colonial forces were now pursuing the pacification of the interior following their suppression of the Abushiri Rebellion in 1888–1889. Initially driven out of their coastal holdings (aside from Dar es Salaam and Bagamoyo), the Germans recruited a mercenary force of Sudanese and Shangaan troops that won a string of victories against the followers of Abushiri Salim al-Harthi and Bana Heri. Later in the rebellion, Abushiri had called on the Mafiti, allies of the Hehe, for help. Mkwawa sent along several small detachments of Hehe warriors along with his allies, drawing the ire of the Germans. With the ending of the Abushiri Rebellion, the Mafiti and Hehe became the next objective for the German campaign of pacification and a new expedition under Captain Emil von Zelewski was organized to force their submission. This expedition would mark the formal start of the Hehe Wars.

The Zelewski expedition initially consisted of three companies of *Schutztruppe* askari (African soldiers), including 362 African troops, eight noncommissioned officers, and five officers. The expedition also brought along one cannon and two machine guns to increase the firepower of the small force. It left Kilwa on July 22, 1891, and headed west toward the land of the Mafiti. They encountered little resistance and, with supplies being scarce along the route, continued quickly into territory claimed by Mkwawa. Because von Zelewski was disdainful of the Hehe, he took few security measures along the way. However, Mkwawa had remained apprised of the German movements through agents along the caravan route and had dispatched a strong force of 3,000–5,000 warriors under the command of his brother, Mpangile. On August 17, 1891, the Hehe forces ambushed the *Schutztruppe* column at Lula-Rugaro (Lugalo) and wiped out the vast majority of it. The few survivors of the German forces hastily retreated to the coast, and the building perception of German invincibility was shattered. While the Hehe suffered heavy casualties of their own, they had handed the German forces a critical defeat—one that would make the Germans reassess their strategies of conquest over the next several years.

The immediate aftermath of Lula-Rugaro forced the remaining German troops to go on the defensive. Mkwawa's forces launched raids into Sagara and defeated a small *Schutztruppe* detachment from Kilossa. However, a Hehe assault on Kilossa itself was repelled, gaining the Germans some breathing room. The Germans, for their part, began the process of rebuilding their military forces and supply stockpiles in preparation for a renewed offensive against Mkwawa. They also began a long-term strategy of attacking Hehe allies while courting their rivals to weaken the Hehe overall position. It was not until 1894 that the Germans were prepared for further hostilities.

By October 1894, the Germans had finally gathered a significant force of 600 askari, 33 officers, two machine guns, and an artillery piece, and set off along a circuitous route to attack Mkwawa's headquarters, his fortified settlement at Iringa. While the artillery piece had no effect on the fortifications, the German soldiers managed to successfully launch an assault over the walls and engaged the 2,500 warriors of the garrison. After heavy fighting, the town fell.

Despite the German failure to capture the Hehe chief, who slipped away in the confusion, the fall of Iringa crippled the war efforts of the Hehe themselves. They lost hundreds of rifles and powder, along with thousands of cattle along with other wealth. Following Iringa and further smaller defeats at Mage and Konko, Mkwawa would not be able to call on a large army and the Germans intensified their attempts to peel away the allies of the Hehe.

Notwithstanding the loss of his capital and main army, Mkwawa continued to fight German domination. Using his still-significant popularity, the chief launched a guerrilla war against the Germans and those Hehe leaders who began collaborating with them. These attacks were such a concern that Captain Tom von Prince was dispatched to the region to deal with them in 1896. He built a series of fortifications throughout Mkwawa's former domain, including a new fort and garrison at Iringa. Beyond this, he declared Mkwawa's brother, Mpangile, as leader of the Hehe in an attempt to undermine Mkwawa's credibility.

These measures, combined with constant patrols hunting Mkwawa, eventually eroded what support there still was for the Hehe chief, and by the end of 1897, his situation had become dire. Although Mkwawa was still able to launch occasional raids throughout January 1898, he was entirely isolated by July of that year. On July 19, 1898, having been abandoned by his followers and being tracked by German soldiers, Mkwawa committed suicide, and his body was shortly found by his pursuers. His skull was taken as a trophy by the Germans, and with his death, the Hehe Wars effectively ended.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891); Mkwawa; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); von Prince, Tom; von Zelewski, Emil

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German-Nama War (1893–1894)

Near southern Africa's Atlantic coast, the grassland between the Kalahari and Namib deserts had been dominated by various Khoisan-speaking Nama groups that had moved north from the Cape of Good Hope with horses and guns acquired from the Dutch. The Nama raided cattle (mostly from the Bantu-speaking Herero) around present-day Windhoek and the Ovambo farther north. During the 1860s, the Herero obtained firearms from European traders from the diamond fields and used them to increasingly challenge the Nama. In 1878, the British, encouraged by Herero requests for protection from the Nama, annexed the trading outlet of Walvis Bay, which was placed under Cape administration. During the 1880s and 1890s, Hendrik Witbooi, encouraged by Christian prophecies, attempted to unite the Nama groups and lead them north, which resulted in years of guerrilla warfare with the now-stronger Herero.

In 1884, Germany declared a protectorate over the Atlantic coast and its hinterland from the Orange River in the south to the Cunene River in the north, except for Walvis Bay. Herero leader Maherero initially accepted German protection, but he renounced this in 1888, as they proved unable to stop Nama attacks. In January 1889, a small German military detachment under Captain Curt von Francois landed at the port of Swakopmund and built a fort inland at Tsaobis. The next year, with reinforcements, the Germans constructed another fort farther east at Windhoek, which became the colonial capital. Faced with gradual colonial encroachment, Maherero renewed his agreement with the Germans just before his death in 1890, but Witbooi stubbornly refused to submit.

In April 1893, Francois led a raid by 200 German troops on Witbooi's camp at Hoornkranz, where 150 Nama were killed, including many women and children. Witbooi and about 250 armed and mounted Nama fled the camp. Based in the Naukluft Mountains, Witbooi's force swelled to 600, 400 of whom possessed guns and 300 were mounted. They waged a guerrilla war against the Germans by storming horse posts and ambushing supply wagon trains. With 100 reinforcements from Germany, Francois tried to surround the elusive Nama who attacked his lines of communication. On February 1–2, 1894, at the Onab Valley, the Germans engaged the Nama with artillery, but once again, they disappeared into the nearby hills. In early 1894, Major Theodor Leutwein took over as German commander, and while waiting for 250 more reinforcements, he isolated Witbooi by turning other African groups against him. In late August, Leutwein's force scoured the Naukluft Mountains, capturing waterholes and observation points and surrounding Witbooi's Nama, who surrendered in early September and accepted a protection treaty.

Civil war broke out among the Herero between the followers of the late ruler's sons, Nikodemus and Samuel. In 1896, Leutwein directed German forces to intervene against the supporters of Nikodemus, some of whom were hanged and had their land and cattle confiscated. Consequently, Samuel became the primary Herero leader and accepted German settlement in the southern part of Herero territory. In mid-1896, the arrival of 400 German troops consolidated colonial control of German South West Africa (GSWA), south of Ovamboland, which is Namibia today.

Given its dry environment and lack of tropical disease, Berlin saw GSWA as a place for European settlement similar to the neighboring British colonies and Boer republics, where Africans provided labor for cattle ranches and mines. German military veterans were granted land, and by 1897, there were 2,600 Europeans living in the colony. By 1897, the German *Schutztruppe* (protection force) in GSWA consisted of 700 mostly European mounted infantry, which reflected the colony's settler orientation and open geography. Many Herero and Nama, their cattle destroyed by the 1896–1897 Rinderpest, gave away more land to a growing number of settlers and became indebted to European merchants. This set the stage for future conflict.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Dutch-Khoisan Wars (1659–1795); Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); German Empire; Leutwein, Theodore; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); Witbooi, Hendrik

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Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879)

On April 2, 1879, during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the British Eshowe Relief Column routed a Zulu army blockading the British No. 1 Column in Fort Eshowe and relieved the garrison.

At the outset of the war, the No. 1 Column had advanced up the east coast of Zululand to the abandoned mission station at Eshowe. Upon learning of the British defeat at Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, the column fortified the post, which the Zulu loosely invested. Having been reinforced, the British commander, Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford, planned a major new offensive against Zululand, but first he had to relieve the beleaguered Eshowe garrison. On March 29, the Eshowe Relief Column of 3,390 white soldiers and 2,280 black troops advanced into Zululand. In response, the Zulu concentrated 10,000 men in the vicinity of Fort Eshowe under the overall command of Somopho kaZikhala. On April 1, the Eshowe Relief Column formed a square, entrenched wagon laager on a knoll close to the burned kwaGingindlovu *ikhanda* (military homestead) just south of the Nyezane River. It corners were strengthened by 9-pounder guns, Gatling guns, and rocket tubes.

At 5:45 A.M. on April 2, one Zulu column advanced rapidly south across the Nyezane and another came from Misi Hill to the west, enveloping all except the eastern side of the laager in a large crescent. The British troops manned the laager's shelter trench two deep, while the African troops and livestock remained inside the laager. Their concentrated fire, which opened up at a range of about 400 meters, prevented repeated Zulu charges from coming closer than 18 meters of the shelter trench. A British mounted sortie out of the north side of the laager at 6:40 A.M. proved premature and had to be recalled. At 7 A.M., the Zulu right horn, led by Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande, determinedly attacked the laager's southern face. When this assault faltered, Chelmsford ordered a fresh mounted sortie from the laager's unengaged eastern side. The horsemen transformed the Zulus' withdrawal into a rout and kept up the pursuit for nearly 3 kilometers. At 7:15 A.M., the African troops advanced out of the laager in support of the horsemen, killing all the wounded Zulu. Uncommitted Zulu reserves on the hills beyond the Nyezane retreated, and the 9-pounders dispersed those who attempted to rally on Misi Hill. The British lost nine white soldiers and five black. The Zulu probably lost close to 1,200 men.

The following day, Chelmsford advanced to relieve the Eshowe garrison and evacuated it on April 4, clearing the way for a major advance into Zululand.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Dabulamanzi kaMpande; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879)

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Ginnis, Battle of (December 30, 1885)

The Battle of Ginnis, fought between Anglo-Egyptian and Mahdist forces on December 30, 1885, was the last engagement in the Sudan campaign involving British troops, which had begun with the Battle of El Teb (February 29, 1884). In addition, it was the first significant battle fought by the Egyptian army after being reorganized and retrained by the British and was the last battle in which British soldiers wore scarlet serge uniforms.

The failure of its mission and other factors caused the Gordon Relief Expedition to be disbanded in the summer of 1885 and replaced by the two-brigade, 3,200-man Anglo-Egyptian Frontier Field Force. The Frontier Field Force manned forts and outposts in southern Egypt along the Nile River and the railroad from Aswan to Aksaha to prevent a dervish invasion of Egypt. The southernmost outpost was at Kosha. The overall commander of the Egyptian army was Brigadier General Francis W. Grenfell, who had become sirdar (commander-in-chief) in April 1885. The 1st Brigade, Frontier Field Force, was commanded by Colonel William F. Butler and headquartered at Wadi Halfa, and the 2nd Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General A. G. Huyshe.

In late November 1885, scouts reported a buildup of dervish forces near the village of Ginnis, a few miles upriver from Kosha. The garrison at Kosha, consisting of the 79th Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders and the 9th Sudanese Battalion, was invested shortly thereafter. There were numerous skirmishes between the Anglo-Egyptian and dervish forces, and troops from the British Army of Occupation in Egypt, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick C. A. Stephenson, were sent to reinforce the frontier region and relieve Kosha. Stephenson arrived on December 19, 1885, and assumed overall command of the operation, with Grenfell serving as division commander and Butler and Huyshe as brigade commanders.

Stephenson's 5,000-man force bivouacked the night of December 29–30, 1885, about 5 kilometers northeast of Kosha on the Nile River. At 5:00 A.M. on December 30, the entire force began its advance. In the lead was the 1st Brigade, which took up a position on the ridge overlooking Ginnis, while the 2nd Brigade positioned itself to the east, overlooking Kosha. After a 15-minute artillery barrage that began at 6:10 A.M. and surprised the dervishes, the 2nd Brigade assaulted Kosha, while its garrison attacked along the riverbank, supported by the gunboat *Lotus*. Kosha was cleared in less than a half hour, and the Kosha garrison troops and 2nd Brigade continued their advance toward Ginnis.

As the 1st Brigade attacked the Mahdist camp at Ginnis, dervishes counterattacked the Egyptian Camel Corps on the British left flank, but the Egyptians closed ranks and held their ground until the assault dissipated. The 1st Brigade charged into the village of Ginnis and into the main dervish camp. They were soon joined by the 2nd Brigade; a bayonet charge broke the dervishes' will to fight, and they withdrew. British and Egyptian cavalry conducted a weak pursuit. By 10:00 A.M., the Battle of Ginnis was over.

Anglo-Egyptian casualties at Ginnis were 10 all ranks killed and 41 wounded. The 6,000-man dervish force lost an estimated 400 killed and hundreds wounded. The new Egyptian army had proved itself in battle. "The Soudanese troops had acted with dash and gallantry," Grenfell (1925) recalled, "and the Egyptians had done all that they were asked to do" (p. 88). After the Battle of Ginnis, distant outposts were withdrawn and the Egyptian-Sudanese border fixed at Wadi Halfa.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Egyptian Army; El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Grenfell, Francis; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Gold Coast Regiment. *See* "West African Frontier Force"

Goldie, George (1846–1925)

George Dashwood Goldie Taubman was a British businessman and founder of the Royal Niger Company, a trade monopoly on the River Niger. Goldie was born on the Isle of Man on 20 May 1846, the son of John Taubman Goldie Taubman, one of the wealthiest traders on the Isle of Man. Little is known about his childhood, except that at the age of eight, he discovered that he had a gift for mathematics. He finished his schooling at the Royal Military Academy in Woolwich, and he claimed to have passed his final engineering exam while drunk.

After graduation, he served for two years in the Royal Engineers before coming into a large inheritance and using it to travel to Egypt and the Sudan. While in Egypt, he fell in love with a young Arab woman, from whom he learned to speak fluent Arabic, and became involved with many Hausa scholars on the pilgrimage route to Mecca. After three years in Egypt, he returned



George Goldie (1846–1925) was a British businessman and founder of the Royal Niger Company which established British rule over southeastern Nigeria in the 1880s and 1890s. The company was liquidated in January 1900 and power transferred to the newly created British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. (mooziic/Alamy Stock Photo)

home to the Isle of Man, where he met the family governess, Mathilda Catherine Elliot. He fled with her to Paris, where they remained during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870–1871, and then returned to London and married in July 1871; they remained married until Mathilda's death in 1898.

In 1875, Goldie became head of one of the smaller trading firms operating in the Niger Delta, Holland Jacques and Company, owned by Goldie's brother's father-in-law, Joseph Grove-Ross. Goldie arrived in the Niger Delta with his brother the following year in the hopes of traversing the continent from Niger to Nile. The plan was aborted when his brother became severely ill in Nupe.

Before Goldie's arrival, trade on the Niger Delta was a chaotic mix of economic competition, political dealings, and open warfare. Several British firms courted the interior trade, often thwarting each other's efforts by creating competing trading warehouses in close proximity. In addition, the firms were collectively attempting to bypass the coastal peoples' traditional roles as middlemen by using steamers to navigate the River Niger. King Ockiah of Brass retaliated by attacking steamers belonging to any company not allied to the Liverpool traders, his main trading partners (which included Holland Jacques, the smallest of the firms operating in the delta). In 1871, a Holland Jacques steamer was sunk after being impaled on a spike set up for that purpose. The violence prompted the Royal Navy to afford protection to the various trading companies on the river. British ships could navigate the Niger only during the rainy season, and at that time they attacked sites hostile to British commercial interests. During the dry season, when the waters were too low for the warships to enter the waterways, the attacks on the steamers resumed.

In 1875, Grove-Ross offered Goldie a position in Holland Jacques, which was suffering severe financial hardships due to the instability in the region. Goldie quickly took control of the company, in 1876 renaming it the Central African Trading Company, with a view toward creating a monopoly on the Niger Delta's trade. Goldie determined that creating a monopoly was the only way to end the turmoil of trade in the region. On November 20, 1879, Goldie successfully consolidated the various trading companies, including Miller Brothers, into a new company, the United African Company. Although the company was chaired by Lord Aberdare, the former Home Secretary, Goldie held the real power over the company's affairs in his role as vice chair. This monopoly united the various British commercial interests in the Niger trade but did not alter the political fragmentation in the region. Even more troubling for the British, the new company attracted the attention of German and French commercial interests.

Goldie had stated several times that his ultimate goal was to establish British political hegemony over the Niger Delta region. In 1881, local ruler, King Ja Ja of the coastal town of Opobo, who had come to power in 1869 with the support of one of the British trading companies, took control of significant parts of the interior and barred all British from direct trade with his newly acquired territories. In 1884, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck established a protectorate over the region to the east of the delta in Cameroon. Goldie reacted to the new threats to British interests by signing more than 200 treaties with local rulers. He also applied for a royal charter, which was granted in 1886, after initially being denied in 1881. The new charter created the Royal Niger Company and was used to argue for British "effective occupation" of the Niger Delta, a term coined the year before at the Berlin Conference and used to confer European sovereignty over African territories.

Although the Berlin Conference guaranteed all European powers free navigation of the Niger, along with all other major African waterways, Goldie used his charter to secure the company's position, often in direct contravention of the international treaties that the charter required he uphold. Goldie interpreted the treaties to mean that other European powers had the right to navigate the rivers, not to trade on them. He effectively blocked German, French, and even other British traders from using the company's facilities along the river. This move sparked several crises, with both Germany and France objecting to Goldie's policies. When Goldie turned his attentions to solving these crises, the new ruler of Brass, King Koko, on January 1895 attacked the company's Akassa headquarters at the mouth of the delta's most important tributary.

The conflicting aims of managing the company as both a commercial enterprise and a colonial administration proved untenable. In 1896, French forces took control of the kingdom of Bussa, sparking a crisis that ended in 1898 with the signing of the Anglo-French Niger Convention, which necessitated the transfer of power from the company to the British Government. The company was liquidated on January 1, 1900, and power transferred to the newly created protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria.

After his charter was revoked, Goldie turned his attentions to establishing a new company in China, abandoning his plans in the wake of the Boxer rebellion. In 1901, he was offered a governorship in Australia, but he declined after learning that he would have no real power. After Cecil Rhodes's death in 1902, Goldie attempted to join the British South Africa Company; however, this too proved fruitless. He retired soon thereafter to his family home. He died on August 20, 1925, after a long battle with emphysema.

Roy Doron

See also: British South Africa Company; Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (1897–1903); Royal Niger Company; Royal Niger Constabulary; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Gordon, Charles George (1833–1885)

Renowned for his military exploits as well as his Christian beliefs, the British general Charles George Gordon enjoyed a popularity that few soldiers could match in the Victorian age. A capable and resourceful soldier who enjoyed a great deal of success commanding foreign soldiers, Gordon often made do with very little. Meeting a heroic death at Khartoum, he became a martyr and national hero who inspired a generation of Britons.

Born on January 28, 1833, in Woolwich, England, Charles was the son of Henry Gordon, a lieutenant general in the Royal Artillery, and Elizabeth Enderby. In 1848, he entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich and after four years, he left as a second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. During the Crimean War, he saw service in the trenches before the Siege of Sebastopol, getting wounded in an attack on Russian lines in June 1855. Throughout the siege, he impressed his superiors not only with his bravery and ability, but his piety as well. After the war ended in 1856, he served as an assistant on a surveying expedition that sought to determine the frontiers of Bessarabia. The next year, he served on a boundary commission that delineated the Russo-Turkish border around Erzurum.

After fighting broke out between the Chinese government on the one hand and Britain and France on the other over rights conferred by the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), Gordon was ordered to the Far East. Joining allied forces under Sir James Hope Grant, Gordon participated in the successful assault on the Taku forts that guarded the way to Beijing in August 1860. Afterward, he took part in the allied campaign against Beijing that culminated in the capture and sack of the Qing summer palace in October that same year. That Anglo-French invasion occurred against the backdrop of the Taiping Rebellion. To preserve order and protect trade, the British government threw its support behind the Qing government. Consequently, British forces remained in many of the most important Chinese coastal towns.

Stationed in Tianjin for the next several years, Gordon placed fortifications around the city to protect it from Taiping incursions. In 1862, he participated in operations that pushed the Taiping away from Shanghai. A year later, at the request of Chinese authorities, he became commander of the "Ever Victorious Army," a Chinese force led by European officers that sought to defend Shanghai. Gordon imposed discipline on that small army of some 4,000 soldiers and used it successfully against the Taiping. In a short, sharp campaign, Gordon fought his way eastward and eventually helped capture the important city of Suzhou in December 1863. Continuing eastward toward Nanjing—held by the Taiping but besieged by the Qing—Gordon sought to neutralize Taiping efforts to relieve the city. Capturing Yixing and Liyang in February 1864, he was wounded in an assault on Jintan. In April 1864, he participated in the successful assault on Changzhou, ending the possibility that the Taiping could rescue their garrison in Nanjing. Gordon's exploits in China made him a popular hero in Britain and earned him the nickname "Chinese" Gordon.

Returning to Britain in 1865, Gordon found himself stationed at Gravesend, where he helped supervise the construction of forts along the Thames. During that relatively quiet period in his life, he displayed a special interest in Christian philanthropy, devoting much of his time and what little money he had to a variety of charitable projects, especially the education of poor children. In 1871, Gordon served as a member of an international commission meeting at Galati, Romania, that sought to improve the navigation of the Sulina branch of the Danube. As Gordon returned to Britain, the Turkish government asked him to become governor of southern Sudan. He accepted and assumed his new post in 1874.

During his tenure, Gordon concerned himself with maintaining order, suppressing the slave trade, and mapping the upper reaches of the Nile. Frustrated in some of his plans, he resigned in 1876, only to return in 1877 as governor-general of the entire Sudan. For the next two years, he found himself fighting against a number of uprisings. He put down unrest on the Ethiopian border. He suppressed an uprising in the province of Darfur. He overawed a rebellion of slavers in Dara and succeeded in disrupting the slave trade. Throughout that period, Gordon displayed enormous energy and willpower, repeatedly crisscrossing the great territory of the Sudan.

Resigning his post in 1880, Gordon briefly served as private secretary to Lord Ripon, viceroy of India. Finding himself unsuited to the task, he resigned. Soon after, British authorities in China asked him to serve as a military adviser to the Chinese government. Gordon accepted and played a leading role in convincing the Chinese not to declare war on Russia during the Ili River crisis of June–July 1880. Over the next several years, Gordon traveled throughout the world: as an engineer officer in Mauritius (1881–1882), commander of colonial forces in the Cape Colony (1882), and a tourist in Palestine (1883).

In the meantime, the emergence of the Mahdist state in Sudan had imperiled Anglo-Egyptian control of the region. The British government sent Gordon to the region as the governor-general of the Sudan, with orders to withdraw Egyptian troops and civilians from the area. Directing that operation from Khartoum, Gordon and his Egyptian troops found themselves besieged by Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi in March 1884. For 10 months, Gordon conducted a resourceful defense of the city against overwhelming odds. The British government belatedly sent a relief expedition to rescue him under Sir Garnet Wolseley. Determined to take the city before British forces could relieve it, the Mahdists launched an assault on Khartoum on the morning of January 26, 1885. Gordon was killed at some point during the battle and subsequent massacre. The Mahdists cut off his head and presented it to their leader as a war trophy. Wolseley's forces reached Khartoum only two days later.

Hubert Dubrulle

See also: Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Wolsely, Field Marshal Garnet J.

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Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885)

The Gordon Relief Expedition was the ill-fated British operation in 1884–1885 to rescue Major-General Charles G. Gordon, who was besieged in Khartoum by dervish forces. This was one of the most dramatic and legendary events in British imperial history, and its failure contributed to the downfall of the Liberal government of William E. Gladstone in 1885.

Gordon, an eccentric British Royal Engineer officer, had served as governor of the province of Equatoria (the southern part of Egyptian-ruled Sudan) and governor-general of the Sudan in the 1870s. A deeply religious man, Gordon was eager to suppress the Sudanese slave trade. In 1881, an Islamic revolt led by the Mahdi that threatened Egypt had begun in the Sudan. Various forces sent from Egypt to prevent Mahdist expansion were defeated. Given the 1882 British occupation of Egypt to secure the Suez Canal, London was drawn into events in the Sudan.

It became clear to the British government that all British and Egyptian citizens in the Sudan would have to be evacuated. Gordon, who was planning to resign his British army commission to serve in Leopold II's Congo Free State, was charged with traveling to the Sudan to investigate the possibility of evacuation and making a recommendation to London.

Gordon departed for Cairo on January 18, 1884, and, after arriving, received supplemental instructions to establish organized governments in the various Sudanese provinces. He was also reappointed governor-general of the Sudan and reached

Khartoum without incident in early February 1884. On February 4, an Egyptian *gendarmarie* force under the command of Major-General Valentine Baker Pasha was annihilated by dervishes at El Teb. The British reacted by sending a force under the command of Major-General Sir Gerald Graham, V.C., to the eastern Sudan. This British force defeated the Mahdists at El Teb on February 29 and was withdrawn in the following months.

Gordon requested from Khartoum that British troops be sent to Berber, but the British government refused. On March 12, 1884, dervish forces began the siege of Khartoum. The British government overestimated the influence of Egypt in the Sudan, underestimated the Mahdi's power, and failed to appreciate that British prestige was connected to Gordon's fate.

The British public, thinking that Gordon was being abandoned, pressured the government to debate sending a force to save him. While the government procrastinated, tentative plans were being made at the War Office under the direction of the adjutant-general, General Lord Garnet J. Wolseley, to send an expedition to rescue Gordon. A key planning factor was route selection. Wolseley preferred the 2,300-kilometer Nile River route from Cairo to Berber, while senior officers in Egypt recommended the 400-kilometer desert route from the Red Sea port of Suakin to Berber. As the government delayed, the dervishes captured Berber in late May 1884.

Throughout the summer, Wolseley urged the government to act. In June 1884, he wrote to the Marquis of Hartington, the secretary of state for war, "Time is the most important element in the question, and indeed it will be an indelible disgrace if we allow the most generous, patriotic, and gallant of our public servants to die of want or fall into the hands of a cruel enemy because we would not hold out our hands to save him" (Farwell, 1972, p. 280). Finally, on August 23, 1884, Gladstone informed the queen that he was sending Wolseley to Egypt to assume temporary command of the British troops and oversee the preparations for any possible expedition.

Wolseley arrived in Cairo on September 9, 1884, and predicted to his wife that he would rescue Gordon in Khartoum on about January 31, 1885. He finally received the order to proceed to Gordon's rescue on September 19, although he did not receive formal instructions until October 8: "The primary object of the expedition up the valley of the Nile is to bring away General Gordon . . . from Khartoum. When that object has been secured, no further offensive operations of any kind are to be undertaken" (Cromer, 1908, 1:581).

Wolseley had not been idle during the government's delays. Based on his successful Red River Expedition in 1870, he had developed a flotilla, under the command of Colonel William F. Butler, of specially built whale boats manned by Canadian voyagers for passage up the Nile. Butler arrived at Aswan, 1,000 kilometers from Khartoum, with his boats on October 7, 1884. All boats were at the foot of the Second Cataract by October 18 and reached the Third Cataract on November 27, 1884. From his headquarters at Wadi Halfa, Wolseley ordered Butler on November 27, 1884, not to advance farther south, as other units would dash across the desert to defeat the Mahdi and save Gordon.

By December 16, 1884, Wolseley and his chief of intelligence, Colonel Sir Charles W. Wilson, had reached Korti, 640 kilometers downriver from Khartoum. Because Gordon could not hold out much longer, Wolseley divided his force (which eventually totaled about 11,000 troops) into two elements to attempt to accelerate the relief. The first element was the Desert Column, commanded by Brigadier General Sir Herbert Stewart, with Wilson accompanying it. Its task was to travel overland from Korti and reach Metemmeh on the Nile by January 7, 1885. Major-General William Earle commanded the second element, the River Column (four battalions in boats), which was to follow the Nile and reach Shendi, opposite Metemmeh, on February 1, 1885. The River Column would then establish a supply base to be used in the final advance on Khartoum.

The River Column was delayed in its advance, largely because of the Nile cataracts. Earle was informed of the fall of Khartoum on February 5, 1885, and told to halt his force, but he resumed the advance to Abu Hamed on February 8. The British fought and defeated the dervishes at Kirbekan on February 10, although Earle was killed in action.

The Desert Column fought the dervishes at the fierce Battle of Abu Klea on January 17, 1885. Wilson, a staff officer, seemed uncertain of what to do next. The Desert Column made a feeble attack on Metemmeh on January 21, when four steamers from Khartoum appeared on the Nile. Wilson spent the next day reconnoitering the area rather than taking the two steamers the 150 kilometers to Khartoum. Finally, early on January 24, Wilson took two of the steamers and headed to Khartoum, which was sighted at midday on January 28. Khartoum had fallen after a 317-day siege, and Gordon had been killed 2 days earlier.



The Gordon Relief Expedition was the ill-fated British operation in 1884–1885 to rescue Major General Charles G. Gordon, who was besieged in Khartoum by Mahdist forces. Gordon was killed in February 1885 and the relief expedition withdrew to Egypt. (Library of Congress)

On February 20, 1885, all British troops were ordered to return to Korti. Graham's Suakin Field Force returned to Suakin on March 12, 1885, and the dervishes attacked and broke the British square, but they were repulsed at the Battle of Tofrek (March 22, 1885). Concerns for imperial defense, especially with Russia on the northern border of India after the Penjdeh Incident (March 30, 1885), provided a convenient excuse for the withdrawal of British forces from the Sudan in May 1885.

The news of the fall of Khartoum and death of Gordon was received in Britain with horror and indignation. Many people considered Gladstone, the "Grand Old Man" (G.O.M.), to be the "Murderer of Gordon" (the M.O.G.), and this contributed to the fall of his government later that year. Wolseley attempted to blame Wilson for the failure of the force, but the accusation was an effort to shift blame, and the 51-year-old Wolseley never received another field command.

The Gordon Relief Expedition, in light of government procrastination and other difficulties, "was a campaign less against man than against time. Had British soldiers and camels been able to subsist on sand and occasional water, or had the desert produced beef and biscuit, the army might, in spite of its late start, have reached Khartoum in November" (Cromer, 1908, 2:4). The Gordon Relief Expedition was indeed too late and failed in its mission.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Abu Klea, Battle of (January 16–18, 1885); Baker, Valentine; Dervishes; El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Gordon, Charles George; Graham, Gerald; Hicks, William; Leopold II; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Penjdeh Incident; Stewart, Herbert; Sudan, Reconquest; Wilson, Charles W.; Wolseley, Garnet

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Graham, Gerald (1831–1899)

Lieutenant-General Sir Gerald Graham was a courageous, professional British army officer who made his reputation as a dynamic commander in Egypt and in the Sudan. He was 6 feet, 4 inches tall, and "his appearance at once impressed one with a sense of physical grandeur and power" (Farwell, 1972, p. 276).

Graham was born in London on June 27, 1831, and after attending the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, was commissioned in the Royal Engineers in 1850. He served throughout the Crimean War, at the Battles of the Alma and Inkerman, and many times in the trenches before Sevastopol. On June 18, 1855, when he led a ladder party during the assault on the Redan, Graham distinguished himself by his gallantry and was later awarded the Victoria Cross for this act and other heroic actions. Graham, who was wounded twice during the Crimean War, also served in the Second China War and was severely wounded at the storming of the Taku Forts.

After a number of routine assignments, Graham was promoted to colonel in 1869. In 1877, he was assigned to the War Office, serving there until his promotion to major general in 1881.

Graham commanded the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, throughout the British campaign in 1882 to suppress the Urabi Rebellion in Egypt, including actions at Magfar (August 28, 1882) and Kassassin (September 9, 1882), and at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882). Graham emerged as one of the most experienced and trusted subordinates of the force commander, General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, and was knighted for his service.

After the Urabi Rebellion was over, Graham remained in Egypt with the British Army of Occupation. On January 23, 1884, Graham and others met the British representative, Major-General Charles G. Gordon, who was going to Khartoum to assess the situation there in light of the Mahdist uprising. Graham and Gordon had known each other since they were both cadets at Woolwich. A few days later, Graham and others escorted Gordon part of the way on his train trip to Khartoum.

After dervish forces defeated the Egyptian *gendarmerie* at El Teb (February 4, 1884), Graham was ordered to lead a force consisting of three British infantry battalions, elements of two cavalry regiments, and Indian units, to the eastern Sudan. Graham's force fought fierce battles with Osman Digna's dervishes at El Teb (February 29, 1884) and Tamai (March 13, 1884), the latter infamous because the British square was broken. Graham was then promoted to lieutenant general. His force was withdrawn in April and May 1884 but left behind a small garrison at Suakin. In 1885, Graham commanded the Suakin Field Force in a short campaign. The only notable battle during this period was at Hashin, on March 20, 1885.

Graham retired from the army in 1890 and died on December 17, 1899.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Tamai, Battle of (March 11, 1884); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet

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Grahamstown, Battle of (April 21, 1819)

During the late 18th century, Dutch-speaking settlers called Boers, moving east from the Cape Colony, clashed with indigenous Xhosa communities over control of the grassland known as the Zuurveld, in what is now South Africa's Eastern Cape Province. With the British seizure of the Cape Colony in 1806 and the arrival of professional British army units with artillery, the balance of these early Cape-Xhosa wars shifted dramatically to the colonial side.

In late 1811 and early 1812, in what was the first Xhosa experience of total war, British soldiers and Boers under Colonel John Graham evicted elements of the Rharhabe and Gqunukhwebe Xhosa east of the Fish River and off the Zuurveld. This movement reignited the conflict between rival Rharhabe Xhosa leaders Ndlambe and Ngqika, whose followers now had to live closer together. In 1817, to gain British support, Ngqika agreed to the "Spoor Law," which authorized colonial patrols to trace allegedly stolen livestock east of the Fish River border and recover them from Xhosa communities. The subsequent colonial cattle raids were directed mostly against Ndlambe's people. These Xhosa leaders were advised by prophets with different views on how to respond to colonial intrusion, with the fiercely anticolonial Makana (or Nxele) counselling Ndlambe and the conciliatory Christian convert Ntsikana guiding Ngqika. With Ndlambe's victory of Ngqika at the October 1818 Battle of Amalinde, the latter called for direct British intervention. In December 1818, a colonial expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Brereton attacked Ndlambe's communities, who retaliated by staging raids against settler farms west of the Fish.

While colonial forces were mobilizing for an offensive, Ndlambe's Rharhabe and allied Gqunukhwebe warriors massed in secret for the most ambitious operation of

Xhosa military history. At midday on April 21, 1819, some 10,000 Xhosa warriors, accompanied by Makana, attacked the local colonial capital of Grahamstown, which had developed from a military camp in 1812 into a small town. A few days earlier, a Xhosa interpreter working for the British army, who was actually a spy for Ndlambe, had warned that the Xhosa were crossing the Fish near the coast, and local commander Colonel Thomas Willshire dispatched a British infantry company south, which weakened Grahamstown's defenses. Grahamstown had around 350 defenders, mostly British and Khoisan infantry, five cannon, and a few armed settlers.

A total of 60 British soldiers were sent to defend the military barracks on the town's east side, while the rest of the colonial force lined up on a slope in front of a stream, infantry in front and artillery on higher ground in back, to confront the main Xhosa attack. The Xhosa divided their large force into four divisions. Two of these, under Mdushane, Ndlambe's son, attacked the main colonial line. A third group, under Makana (who allegedly promised that colonial bullets would turn to water) assaulted the military barracks, and a fourth, the smallest division, moved around to the south to intercept anyone fleeing the settlement.

Mdushane's men, who broke off the long shafts of their spears for close combat, made repeated attacks but took heavy casualties from colonial muskets and artillery firing grapeshot. Many Xhosa were terrified by the smoke and flash of the firearms, and some held their hands or hide cloaks to their eyes so they would not see it. The most intense fighting happened when Makana's men penetrated the barrack's external walls, with some getting inside the hospital. It has been claimed that Elizabeth Salt, the wife of one of the British soldiers, walked through the Xhosa, who did not molest women during war—carrying what looked like a baby, but was in fact a sack of gunpowder she was bringing to the beleaguered defenders.

Willshire sent some men from the Cape Corps to reinforce the barracks. At this critical moment, a party of 130 Khoisan hunters from a Christian mission arrived, and their marksmanship helped to repel Makana's division. After two-and-a-half hours of fighting, the Xhosa retreated toward the Fish River, but the British did not pursue for fear of leaving Grahamstown defenseless. On the colonial side, two men were killed and five wounded. Estimates of Xhosa losses vary, from 150 corpses reported by Willshire three days later to 2,000 estimated by Charles Stretch, a veteran of the battle, in 1876. The largest Xhosa army ever assembled had suffered a grave defeat at what became known as "the Battle of Grahamstown." While historians have observed that the Xhosa might have overwhelmed the town had they attacked at night, they would have been aware of the potential problems of coordinating such a large force in darkness.

In July, Willshire led a colonial offensive east of the Fish that targeted communities under Ndlambe, whose capitulation was signaled by the surrender of Makana, who later drowned while trying to escape the colonial prison on Robben Island. Xhosa expectations of his return would ultimately turn bitter and inspire the Xhosa using the phrase "When Nxele returns" to refer to something that is promised but will never happen. Although Ngqika was now the dominant Rharhabe Xhosa ruler, the price for British support was the granting of a strip of land between the Fish and Keiskamma/Tyume rivers known as the "Ceded Territory" to the Cape Colony, which meant Xhosa people once again were pushed east, and they continued to be harassed by colonial raids throughout the next decade.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa Wars, Fourth and Fifth (1811–1819); Firearms Technology

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Graspan, Battle of (November 25, 1899)

In late November 1899, as part of the first British offensive during the Second Anglo-Boer War, a British division under Lord Methuen pushed up the Cape to Rhodesia railway to relieve the garrison at Kimberley. At dawn on November 23, Methuen's three infantry brigades, although caught in a Boer crossfire that inflicted serious casualties, conducted a frontal attack that drove the Boers from their positions on hills around Belmont. Under Jacobus De la Rey, some 2,000 Boers then withdrew to hills around Graspan, where they dug in and waited to once again confront the British advance.

In the early morning darkness of November 25, Methuen moved his artillery close to the Boer positions, but the subsequent bombardment failed to dislodge them. Although Methuen deployed his infantry brigades with the intention of attacking the Boer flank, the quick-moving Boers shifted their positions, and soon the British were engaged in another frontal attack. While it was supported by artillery and volley fire from the 2nd Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (KOYLI), the Naval Brigade maneuvered too close together and suffered terrible casualties from Boer fire.

With the Boers concentrating mostly on the sailors and marines of the Naval Brigade, British infantry from the KOYLI and 1st Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment advanced to within 25 meters of the enemy position. In turn, the Boers mounted their horses and retreated so hastily that the British artillery could not target them even on open ground, and Methuen's division still lacked sufficient cavalry for an effective pursuit. The engagements at Belmont and Graspan reinforced the Boer belief that they could face superior British numbers and use their mobility to avoid disasters. For Methuen, these battles showed the limited utility of artillery and the ultimate success of costly frontal attacks. Among the British, 23 soldiers were killed and 165 wounded. Boer casualties are unknown but thought to be minimal.

On November 27, Methuen's division, not wanting to give the Boers a chance to regroup and requiring water, resumed the advance but left the railway and headed toward the Modder River. Methuen was unaware that between 6,000 to 8,000 Boers under Piet Cronjé had gathered around the Modder River Bridge, where the British were to rejoin the railway. In planning the Boer defense, De la Rey abandoned hilltop positions that were vulnerable to artillery bombardment and entrenched 3,000 Boers in a concealed reverse slope position on both sides of the Modder River.

Believing that the Boers were retreating toward Magersfontein, the last settlement en route to Kimberley, Methuen led his division toward the Modder River on November 28, fell into the ambush, and was pinned down the entire day. Of 10,000 British soldiers, 500 were wounded or killed. Instead of exploiting their success, however, the Boer war council voted for an orderly night withdrawal. Methuen organized 13,000 men for what he believed would be the final push on Kimberley, which on December 11 was halted during the Battle of Magersfontein.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Belmont, Battle of (November 23, 1899); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De la Rey, Jacobus; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Methuen, Lord; Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899)

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Grenfell, Francis (1841–1925)

Field Marshal Lord Grenfell of Kilvey was a highly versatile British army officer best known for his staff and administrative abilities.

Grenfell was born in London on April 29, 1841, and commissioned into the army in 1859. For the following dozen years, he served in garrisons in Britain and overseas, including Malta (1866–1867), Canada (1867–1869), and India (1869–1871). Due to a perceived lack of promotion and active service opportunities, he submitted his resignation paperwork in 1873. Before it was approved, however, Grenfell was offered the position of aide-de-camp to General Sir Arthur Cunynghame, general officer commanding Cape Colony.

His duties were routine until the outbreak of the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War (1877–1878), where he participated in the Battle of Centane (February 9, 1878) and the Anglo-Zulu War (1879), where he was present at the Battle of Ulundi (July 4, 1879). He served as a brigade major both in Britain, as of 1879, and South Africa, as of April 1881. During the Urabi Rebellion in Egypt, he fought at the Battle of Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882). Later the same year, he was promoted to colonel (after having been a captain just four years earlier) and became aide-de-camp to Queen Victoria. His rise was nothing less than meteoric, but perhaps even more important, his service had caught the attention of General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley.

When the British began raising and training a new Egyptian army in early 1883, Grenfell was appointed second in command to Major-General Sir (Henry) Evelyn M. Wood, V.C., the first sirdar. During the 1884–1885 Gordon Relief Expedition, the Egyptian army secured the Nile line of communications. Grenfell, ranking as a brigadier general in the British army, replaced Wood as sirdar in April 1885 and became a full general in the Egyptian army. The Egyptian army then established a frontier force, headquartered at Aswan, to prevent a Mahdist invasion of Egypt. Grenfell commanded a division under General Sir Frederick C. A. Stephenson at the Battle of Ginnis (December 30, 1885). Grenfell later commanded the Egyptian army against the dervishes at the Battle of Toski (August 3, 1889), a victory that showed the high level of discipline and training of the Egyptian soldiers.

Grenfell returned to England in 1892 and served as deputy adjutant-general of reserve forces at the War Office. In 1897, he was asked to return to Egypt and command the British troops to facilitate the reconquest of the Sudan, then taking place under Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener. Two years later, Grenfell became governor of Malta, was ennobled in 1902, and returned to England in 1903 to command the IV Army Corps.

Promoted to general in April 1904, Grenfell was appointed to the Irish Command the following month. He retired in 1908 and was promoted to field marshal the same year. He died in 1925, and his *Memoirs* were published later that year.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Centane, Battle of (February 7, 1878); Cunynghame, Arthur Augustus Thurlow; Egyptian Army; Ginnis, Battle of (December 30, 1885); Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Toski, Battle of (August 3, 1889); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet; Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Griqualand West Rebellion (1878)

In 1873, the British took over the new diamond mining area north of the Cape, which became the colony of Griqualand West. Two years later, white diamond diggers attempted to exclude blacks from mining and rebelled against British officials, but they backed down upon the arrival of 300 British and colonial troops.

In 1878, the Griqua and Tlhaping Tswana of Griqualand West rebelled against colonial rule, given the loss of their land to white settlers, impoverishment, and deterioration of chiefly authority. In early May, Lieutenant-Colonel William Owen Lanyon, the territory's administrator, led a patrol of 100 armed settlers and police to the rebel mountain stronghold of Koegas west of Griquatown, which he realized could only be taken with artillery from the Cape. On May 22, Lanyon and 34 horsemen attacked Jackal's Vlei, three miles south of Griquatown, killing 25 rebels, including some leaders. With colonial reinforcements approaching, 600–1,000 rebels attacked the colonial camp at Koegas at the end of May but were repelled.

In early June, 113 colonial cavalry supported by a cannon seized the rebel stronghold at Koegas, killing between 40 and 50 rebels and capturing 1,700 sheep with just one casualty. When the main body of the Diamond Fields Horse, a colonial unit under Major Charles Warren that had been fighting in the Eastern Cape, arrived on June 7, the total colonial force amounted to 700 men. During mid-June, Lanyon and Warren led a series of attacks on rebel mountain positions, killing 66 enemy and capturing 2,200 cattle, 3,000 small stock, and 200 horses. Colonial casualties were small. Many rebels began to flee north, and on June 25, they were caught by a colonial force at Boetsap, where 80 surrendered, along with 500 women and children. Three rebel leaders were shot. On June 28, Griqua and Tlhaping unsuccessfully attacked Campbell, a colonial post east of Griquatown.

The flight of rebels north of the Griqualand West border extended the conflict to independent southern Tswana country. In early July, 90 colonial volunteers marching to occupy Kuruman mission were ambushed by 240 Tlhaping, who were driven off. In mid-July, 300 colonial soldiers under Lanyon and Owen, supported by artillery, drove the rebel Tlhaping from stone fortifications at Gamopedi. Some 50 Tlhaping and 9 colonial soldiers were killed. The colonial force captured 600 cattle, 2,000 sheep, and 20 wagons. On July 24, the colonial army bombarded the stone-walled Tlhaping stronghold of Dithakong for three hours and then launched a two-pronged cavalry and infantry attack. Although the determined Tlhaping defenders were professional hunters who possessed firearms and marksmanship skills, they were compelled to retreat by the attackers' superior firepower. In what Lanyon considered the most decisive victory of the campaign, his men captured 3,600 cattle, 6,000 sheep, 63 wagons, some rifles, and a large quantity of trade goods such as ivory, ostrich feathers, and hides. A total of 5 colonial troops and 39 Tlhaping were killed.

During the last months of 1878, Warren led patrols though the independent area between Griqualand West and the Molopo River, where he apprehended rebels and obtained the submission of all African rulers to British authority. Africans in Griqualand West were disarmed and taxed, and in 1881, the territory was absorbed by the

Cape Colony. In 1885, the land between the former Griqualand West and the Molopo River, inhabited by the Rolong and Tlhaping Tswana, became British Bechuanaland and was eventually incorporated into the Cape Colony. As such, both areas would eventually become part of the Union of South Africa in 1910. In 1885, the British, worried about German encroachment from South West Africa (present-day Namibia) entered into treaties with the Tswana leaders north of the Molopo, who were concerned about Boer expansion, with their territory becoming the Bechuanaland Protectorate and later the independent state of Botswana.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Boer "Pocket Republics" in the West of South Africa (1881–1885); Boers; Dithakong, Battles of (1823 and 1878); Warren, Charles

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Gun War, Lesotho (1880–1881)

To prevent their conquest by Boer forces from the Orange Free State, the rulers of Lesotho had volunteered in 1868 to come under British protection, with their territory becoming British Basutoland. The Sotho monarchy and chiefs continued to govern their people under nominal British supervision. In 1872, administration of Basutoland passed to the settler-dominated and self-governing Cape Colony and eventually colonial magistrates were brought in and challenged the chiefs' authority. Cape disarmament policy represented a direct threat to Sotho independence, which relied on men acquiring horses and guns through migrant labor on the diamond fields, and Sotho land rights were jeopardized when the Quthing District was opened for white settlement.

In September 1880, the colonial garrison of Mafeteng, 171 members of the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) and 120 Native Police, along with a few volunteers, were besieged by a large Sotho force under Lerothodi. Commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Fred Carrington, the defenders fortified the town, including the construction of three strong points and cleared fields of fire. On the morning of September 21, 7,000 Sotho, mostly mounted, attacked the town. Despite intense colonial shooting, the Sotho made off with all the town's cattle and captured a small African village some 400 meters away that had some strong buildings and walls that provided cover from which they returned fire on Mafeteng.

During the next six hours, Sotho from nearby hills fired continuously on the colonial defenses, while large groups of Sotho cavalry made a series of determined charges but were repulsed by small arms fire. In one instance, over 1,500 Sotho cavalry charged down the main road of town but were driven back within 180 meters of colonial fortifications. Some of these Sotho dismounted and set fire to a house, and the smoke from the conflagration allowed around 400 others to crawl up to within 45 meters of one of the strong points, where they piled up rocks for cover and loopholed garden walls. These were eventually repelled by a sortie of 25 CMR men, who withdrew under tremendous fire from the surrounding hills. Later, Carrington remarked that just one cannon would have dispersed the Sotho reserves and firing positions farther from Mafeteng.

By the end of the day, the Sotho had withdrawn but kept up harassing fire against Mafeteng all night. Since the Sotho carried away most of their casualties, it is impossible to determine how many were killed or wounded. None of the defenders were killed, and only five were wounded. Cartridge cases found after the battle suggested that most of the Sotho were armed with up-to-date Martini-Henry and Snider rifles.

On October 4, the dismounted Sotho used low ground to attack an outlying section of Mafeteng's defenses known as "Frazer's Store," and although they managed to breach its walls, were eventually driven off by repeated colonial counterattacks. On the night of October 14, Carrington dispatched a patrol that destroyed one of the Sotho positions overlooking Mafeteng. The next day, he sent out dismounted skirmishers who lured 1,500 Sotho into an attack on the town in which several were killed and the rest repulsed.

In early October 1880, rebel Sotho began to gather around Maseru, the colonial capital that was defended by a fort, and seized cattle from Sotho communities that had not joined the uprising. On October 12, the rebels began shooting down on Maseru from nearby hills, but return fire from colonial cannon prevented a daylight attack. The Sotho attacked at dusk. Before retiring into the fort, colonial troops set the town's hospital on fire, which provided enough light for them to shoot accurately. Following an unsuccessful assault on the fort, the Sotho burned and looted some buildings, captured firearms, and withdrew around midnight. Sotho losses are not known, although colonial sources considered them heavy, and just one of Maseru's defenders was killed and four wounded.

After the attack, the rebels abandoned their settlements near Maseru and took refuge in mountain caves. On the morning of October 25, Sotho cavalry charged into Maseru from the south and southwest, followed by around 400–500 Sotho infantry who took up firing positions on nearby rocky ground from where they supported the attack. The Sotho cavalry withdrew after capturing some cattle and horses. When all was over, 20 Sotho lay dead and some had been seen carrying away their wounded comrades.

From early October, Brigadier-General C. M. Clarke, commander of Cape military forces, had been gathering reinforcements near Wepener in the Orange Free State for the relief of Mafeteng. On October 19, he led a column of 1,600 European and 75 African troops, together with a supply train, across the Basutoland border. As the relief force advanced through the mountain pass near Kalabani Hill, the 1st Cape Mounted Yeomanry, volunteers from the Eastern Cape, were ambushed by many Sotho cavalry, who charged down a slope brandishing lances. In the attack, 32 colonial troops were killed and 10 wounded. The loss was blamed on the yeomen's lack of swords, which disadvantaged them in hand-to-hand combat. Between 7,000 and 8,000 Sotho then appeared on the heights above the column and were repelled by colonial artillery.

Clarke's force made it to Mafeteng, although the ambush proved that he did not have enough men to undertake further operations, and he requested an additional 1,000 settler volunteers. On October 22, he led a strong patrol from Mafeteng into the mountains to attack Lerothodi's village, which was occupied briefly before stiff resistance and news of an impending attack on Mafeteng forced them to withdraw. Clarke then warned his superiors that a second corps of 1,000 volunteers might be needed. At the end of October, Clarke once again took a force, this time numbering 1,450 men, to seize Lerothodi's village, but he was again compelled to retire by an unexpectedly reinforced enemy tenaciously clinging to their mountainous positions.

In early November, Clarke, facing a new rebellion in Transkei, suspended colonial offensive operations in Basutoland until sufficient reinforcements arrived. The conflict stalemated, with colonial patrols occasionally raiding the Sotho, who defended their mountain strongholds. Negotiations began in February 1881, and a cease-fire was declared. Heavy rains flooded rivers, making military activity almost impossible, and the Sotho used the respite to reap crops and strengthen fortifications.

Making it clear that their problems were with the Cape and not the imperial government, Sotho rebel leaders refused demands for unconditional surrender. An agreement was reached in April 1881 in which the Sotho accepted colonial rule and turned over 5,000 cattle as compensation for war damages. However, they were allowed to retain firearms under license, and rebel leaders received amnesty. In 1884, Basutoland was removed from Cape administration and became a British crown colony with a large degree of internal autonomy. It would eventually become the independent country of Lesotho.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Carrington, Frederick; Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869); Transkei Rebellion (1880)

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Gungunhana (1850–1906)

Gungunhana was the last independent ruler of the Gaza state in southeastern Africa, in the area of present-day Mozambique. His rule coincided with the height of European imperialism in the region, and he led the resistance to the Portuguese as he worked for unity among the peoples of the Gaza empire.

Gungunhana was probably born in 1850, but little is known about his youth. His father, Mzila, was chief of the Gaza people, but when he died in 1884, the succession was unclear. Gungunhana seized the throne with Portuguese support and attempted to eliminate all potential rivals, several of whom escaped and found refuge among his neighbors. They would continue to plot against him from exile.

Gungunhana thus faced two main challenges. The first was to keep his kingdom from disintegrating. He ruled over a multiethnic empire that included many Nguni linguistic groups and other conquered peoples. He frequently had to pressure member communities to keep them from splitting off. The second challenge was staving off the encroachment of the Portuguese. With their far-flung trading empire in Asia, the Portuguese greatly valued this African territory on the coast of the Indian Ocean as an important base of naval supply and trade.

Throughout his career, Gungunhana had an ambivalent relationship with the Portuguese. Although they had aided him in his bid to seize the throne of his father, he had angered them by sheltering several chiefs who had opposed their role within Gaza. Gungunhana decided that his best chance for keeping the Portuguese out of Gazaland was by making an agreement with Britain. Yet the British ignored his repeated entreaties for protection.

During the late 1880s, Gungunhana faced simultaneous pressure from Portuguese settlers to the north and the rebellion of the Chope, subjects of the Gaza, in the south. In 1889, he decided that he could exert more complete control over his wayward subjects if he moved his capital out of the highlands and down to the mouth of the Limpopo River. He undertook what proved to be an arduous journey, accompanied by 60,000 of his followers. Although he was able to reassert his authority over the Chope, the trip ultimately weakened his kingdom.

In 1890, representatives of the British mining magnate Cecil Rhodes arrived in Gazaland seeking permission to mine in the area. Gungunhana wrongly assumed them to be representatives of the British government and gladly granted them permission. Although nothing came of these meetings, his negotiations with Rhodes's company antagonized the Portuguese. The following year, the British and Portuguese governments came to an agreement regarding their respective spheres of influence in East Africa. The Gaza Empire fell into the Portuguese region, and the British agreed to stay clear of the area and not interfere in the Portuguese dealings with Africans.

Gungunhana was left with little alternative but to attempt negotiations with the Portuguese. By this time, however, the Portuguese were committed to destroying the power of the African states throughout southern Mozambique. In 1895, they attacked the Gaza. Using machine guns and other modern weapons of war, they shattered the Gaza army and captured Gungunhana. He was sent into exile with his 10 wives in the Azores, where he died in 1906. In 1985, his remains were returned to Mozambique, where they were buried with a hero's honors.

James Burns

See also: Firearms Technology; Portuguese-Gaza War (1894–1895); Rhodes, Cecil John

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Gwangqa, Battle of (June 8, 1846)

In 1844, the British governor of the Cape Colony canceled the treaties with neighboring Xhosa groups and relaunched an expansionist policy. This led to the Cape-Xhosa War of 1846–1847 (also known as the "War of the Axe"), in which colonial forces invaded and conquered independent Xhosa territory between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers.

On June 8, 1846, a force composed of elements of the British 7th Dragoon Guards and Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) under Colonel Henry Somerset ventured out from Fort Peddie to attack nearby Xhosa communities, which was meant to distract the Xhosa from a train of empty supply wagons that had started its journey back to the regional capital of Grahamstown. Somerset's patrol found and followed the tracks of a large group of Xhosa. Subsequently, they found several hundred Xhosa warriors, led by Mhala or "the wildcat," gathered around camp fires that scattered into nearby forests. While searching for their enemies, Somerset's cavalry happened upon another larger force of 500 Xhosa, led by Siyolo, that was marching along open ground beside the small Gwangqa River, a tributary of the Keiskamma River, toward the returning supply train. They had ignored Mhala's prior advice to only travel at night.

Supported by fire from several cannon, Somerset led the dragoons, followed by the CMR in a charge toward the Xhosa, who gathered together. After the Xhosa fired a mostly ineffectual musket volley, the horsemen broke through their ranks and then wheeled around to charge again from the other direction. Xhosa warriors attempted to grab the bridles of the horsemen, who responded with saber cuts and carbine fire. The Xhosa then broke and ran and were pursued by the cavalry for eight kilometers. Furthermore, some Fingo colonial allies arrived from Peddie to finish off the wounded Xhosa and loot their bodies. Some 300 or more Xhosa were cut down, and their remains lay along the river for some time, with British soldiers taking bones as souvenirs. A British participant later observed that the Xhosa might have repelled the cavalry if they had relied on their spears instead of old muskets. Somerset's men suffered 2 killed and 16 wounded. Cape governor Sir Peregrine Maitland called this colonial victory a "brilliant affair."

News of their decisive defeat at Gwangqa prompted Xhosa raiding parties to leave the Cape Colony, and from that point on, the course of the war shifted toward the British, who led a concerted invasion of Xhosa territory that eventually became British Kaffraria. Such a massed cavalry change was unusual in the Cape-Xhosa Wars, as the Xhosa adopted elusive bush warfare tactics meant to reduce the colonial advantages of firepower and mobility.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Somerset, Henry

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Hamilton, Ian S. M. (1853–1847)

General Sir Ian S. M. Hamilton, who participated in many campaigns and wars, was considered one of the brightest generals of the late Victorian and Edwardian eras. His dutiful service, significant accomplishments, and military reputation, however, have been overshadowed by his command of the disastrous Gallipoli campaign against the Turks in 1915.

Hamilton was born on Corfu, where his British army officer father was stationed, on January 16, 1853. He was educated at Wellington College and attended a special course at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, from which he graduated in 1872. Then he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 12th Foot in Ireland. After 18 months of service, he transferred to the 92nd Highlanders, his father's old regiment, in India. Hamilton was ambitious, but he was also a good sportsman and took an interest in improving unit marksmanship.

Hamilton's regiment was attached to the force commanded by Major-General Sir Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., during the Second Afghan War (1878–1880) and his courage in action brought him to Roberts's attention. He served as Hamilton's mentor for many years. Returning to Britain, Hamilton's regiment was diverted to South Africa, where Hamilton fought and was severely wounded at the ignominious Battle of Majuba Hill (February 27, 1881). Recommended for the Victoria Cross, Hamilton was considered "too young" (Lee, 2000, p. 17) to receive the award. He was selected to be aide-de-camp to Roberts, then commander-in-chief of the Madras army.

In 1884, while returning to England for leave, Hamilton participated in the Gordon Relief Expedition in the Sudan, and then returned to India and service on Roberts's staff in 1886. Showing talent at staff work and with troops, he was promoted to colonel in 1891, reportedly the youngest in the British army at the time. Hamilton held increasingly responsible positions in India, participated in the 1895 Chitral Relief Expedition, and commanded the 1st Brigade of the Tirah Field Force in 1897. He fell off his horse and broke his leg, missing the Battle of Dargai. He was given command of the 3rd Brigade shortly before the expedition ended.

Hamilton returned to Britain in 1898 and the following year, he was appointed assistant adjutant-general to General Sir George White, quartermaster-general at the War Office. Both officers were assigned to South Africa in the fall of 1899 in anticipation of war against the Boers. As a local major general, Hamilton commanded the 7th Brigade at the Battle of Elandslaagte on October 21, 1899, and was again recommended for the Victoria Cross. This time, he was considered too senior to receive the award. He served in besieged Ladysmith, and then was promoted to lieutenant-general and commanded a division under Roberts, then commander-in-chief, in field operations. When Roberts returned to Britain to serve as British army commander-in-chief, Hamilton accompanied him as military secretary. Hamilton returned to South Africa in November 1901 to serve as chief of staff to General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener in the concluding phases of the guerrilla war. Hamilton, as a substantive lieutenant-general, returned with Kitchener to England in July 1902.

In 1903, Hamilton was appointed quartermaster-general at the War Office. The following year, he was attached as an observer to the First Japanese Army in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War and wrote about his experiences in *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book During the Russo-Japanese War*. Recalled to England in 1905, Hamilton then headed the Southern Command until 1909 and was promoted to general in 1907. He became adjutant-general in 1909 and in 1910, he was elevated to the general officer commanding Mediterranean Command and the inspector-general of overseas forces.

When World War I broke out in 1914, Hamilton was appointed to command the Central Force for Home Defense. The following year, he became commander of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, with vague instructions to assemble a force in support of a naval assault on the Dardanelles. Hamilton had a premonition that the campaign would be ill fated. With inadequate reinforcements, resupply, guidance, and political support, the Gallipoli campaign turned into a debacle, and Hamilton was relieved of command on October 15, 1915. Subsequently, British forces were evacuated.

Hamilton never held another command after Gallipoli. He became the lieutenant of the Tower of London in 1919 and immersed himself in regimental, veterans', literary, and other activities until his death in London on October 12, 1947.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899); Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 3, 1899–February 28, 1900); Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; White, George S.

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Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907)

After the Holocaust of World War II, international law defined the term *genocide* as an attempt to exterminate, in whole or in part, a racial, ethnic, national, or religious group by killing or causing physical or psychological harm, imposing conditions intended to bring about destruction, preventing births, and transferring children to another group. Although the German campaign against the Herero and Nama in South West Africa (current-day Namibia) between 1904 and 1907 took place before the term *genocide* was coined, it corresponds to this definition and happened within the context of the European conquest in Africa.

In 1884, Germany, a newly united European power that suddenly entered the race for colonies in Africa and Asia, declared a protectorate over what is now Namibia. The Herero leader Maherero accepted German authority just before his death in 1890, but the Nama leader Hendrik Witbooi stubbornly refused to submit. From April 1893 to September 1894, Witbooi's Nama fought a guerrilla war against the Germans and surrendered after they lost key waterholes. In 1896, Samuel Maherero, son of the late Herero leader, emerged as the victor of a Herero civil war and repaid German assistance by allowing settlement in his southern territory. Unlike Germany's other African colonies, South West Africa had a dry climate and lacked tropical disease, which encouraged the German government to see it as a place for European settlement like the neighboring British colonies and the Boer republics in which Africans provided labor for European farms and mines. By 1897, there were some 2,600 Europeans living in the colony, and the local German military consisted almost entirely of Europeans.

The Herero and Nama came under pressure at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. European settlement grew as Boers displaced by the South African War of 1899–1902 entered South West Africa, and in 1903, the Germans announced plans to expand settlement by building a railway though Herero territory and placing the Herero in reserves. Rendered destitute by the Rinderpest cattle epidemic of 1896–1897, many Herero and Nama gave away more land to settlers and became indebted to European merchants. When the colonial administration announced in 1903 that it would cancel the debts, European traders hired off-duty soldiers to collect them all at once, which led to mass seizures of livestock and violence against the Herero. This sparked the Herero Rebellion, which began in mid-January 1904 with a surprise attack on Europeans that claimed the lives of 150 men but spared the women and children.

There were about 7,000–8,000 Herero combatants, half of which possessed firearms and limited ammunition. The German force consisted of 800 regulars, the same number of reservists, 400 armed settlers, and 250 African scouts supported by a few cannon and machine guns. To make matters worse, at the outbreak of the Herero Rebellion, Governor Theodor Leutwein and most regular soldiers were in the south suppressing a rebellion by the Bondelswarts. In late January and early February, the Germans relieved the besieged posts at Okahandja and Windhoek, and several companies of marines were landed. During February and March, reinforcements and heavy weapons arrived from Germany. Leutwein organized two columns with 2,500 men that attempted to encircle the Herero during March and April, but they withdrew because of Herero attacks and disease within German ranks.


Fighting between German colonial troops and Herero in German South West Africa (today's Namibia) during 1904. In the twentieth century's first genocide, the Germans exterminated around 60 percent of the Herero population. (Art Media/Print Collector/Getty Images)

In June 1904, Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha, one of Germany's few generals experienced in colonial warfare who had fought in East Africa and China, arrived in South West Africa with more reinforcements and replaced Leutwein. He answered directly to Kaiser Wilhelm II, who had given him a free hand to crush the rebellion. With a colonial force that was now 10,000 strong, supported by over 30 artillery pieces, von Trotha launched an offensive against the Herero, who took refuge in the northeast on the Waterberg Plateau on the western edge of the Omaheke area of the Kalahari Desert. Since the railway did not yet extend farther inland than Windhoek, German forces took three months to reach the Waterberg.

In mid-August, six German columns, with a total of 1,500 soldiers equipped with machine guns and cannon, converged on the Herero, who had 4,000–6,000 men armed with rifles and thousands more noncombatants. The main German column under von Trotha advancing from the south overcame stiff Herero resistance to capture the important waterholes at Hamakari and bombarded Herero positions. The next day, Samuel Maherero led his people east through a gap in German lines and into the Omaheke Desert. Historians disagree over whether the gap was purposely created by von Trotha to force the Herero into the desert, or inadvertently opened by the late movement of a German column. Nevertheless, the Herero were driven into the desert

GENOCIDE OF THE HERERO AND NAMA, NAMIBIA, 1904–1907


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ZAMBIA
Katima Mulilo
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CAPRIVI STRIP
Grootfontein
Otjiwarongo
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BOTSWANA
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SOUTH AFRICA
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and attempted to march 320 kilometers to seek safety in British Bechuanaland (now Botswana). German soldiers prevented the Herero from using wells, and many died of thirst in the desert.

On October 2, 1904, von Trotha, who saw the conflict as a race war, issued an "extermination order," in which he declared that all Herero, including women and children, in German territory would be shot. The next day, Witbooi's Nama rebelled due to German brutality against the Herero, rumors that they would be disarmed, the threatening movement of German soldiers into Nama territory, and Christian millenarian prophecies. In this campaign, von Trotha disarmed the Nama scouts working for the German army and in April extended his extermination order to Witbooi's people.

Avoiding the sort of pitched battle that had gone badly for the Herero, some 1,000–2,000 Nama horsemen fought a guerrilla war of over 200 small engagements against 15,000 German troops, who resorted to scorched-earth tactics. Although Nama resistance began to wither after the 80-year-old Witbooi was killed in late October 1905, the Germans continued operations until March 1907, and some fighting continued for another year. Colonial concerns about eliminating the labor supply caused the German imperial government to rescind von Trotha's extermination order at the end of 1904, but the military cordon that confined the Herero to the desert and kept them away from water sources was not lifted until the end of 1905.

Herero and Nama prisoners were herded into concentration camps, where they became slave workers on the railway or unwilling subjects of medical experiments. By March 1907, some 7,600 out of 17,000 camp inmates had died. At Shark Island in Luderitz Bay, perhaps the world's first extermination camp, 3,000 Herero and Nama died from cold, hunger, disease, violence, and exhaustion, and their decapitated heads were studied by German scientists fascinated by racial theories. Some Nama prisoners were deported to the West African German colonies of Togo and Cameroon, where most died of tropical disease. Although the numbers have been debated, it is likely that around 60,000 Herero and 10,000 Nama died during the conflict, which represented a majority of each population. The postrebellion labor shortage in South West Africa, described as "the peace of the graveyard," incited the Germans to extend their rule north over the Ovambo. In 2004, the German government officially apologized for the genocide committed in Namibia a century earlier.

The German response to the Herero and Nama rebellions was the first genocide of the 20th century and foreshadowed the Holocaust four decades later. In addition, von Trotha's extermination order clearly signifies the intent to eliminate the Herero people, and the German tactic of driving them from water sources and into the desert were conditions meant to cause destruction. While African rebellions were common in this early period of colonial rule, it was rare for European officials to order the extermination of Africans, who constituted the main source of labor or cash crops for the developing colonial economy. There were many reasons why the German response to the Herero and Nama rebellion turned genocidal, including Germany's colonial inexperience, the dominance of the German military, the policy of South West Africa as a settler colony, and the desire to remove Africans from their land.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: German Empire; German-Nama War (1893–1894); Leutwein, Theodor; Maharero, Samuel; Shark Island Extermination Camp; von

Trotha, Lothar; Waterberg, Battle of (August 11, 1904); Witbooi, Hendrik

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Hicks, William (1830–1883)

Williams Hicks was an officer from Britain who served in the Egyptian army in the 1880s. He is best known as the leader of an ill-fated column that was massacred by the forces of the Sudanese leader Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi at the Battle of Kashgil (also called Shaykan or El Obeid) in 1883.

Little is known of Hicks's early life, other than that he was born in 1830. He entered the Bombay Army of the British East India Company in 1849. In 1857, he served with distinction in the Indian Rebellion. He was promoted to the rank of captain in 1861. In 1867, he took part in a British expeditionary force against the emperor of Ethiopia and was again mentioned in dispatches for his bravery. He resigned from the British Indian Army in 1880 and enlisted as an officer in the Egyptian army in 1883.

Hicks joined the Egyptian army at an important turning point in that country's history. In the 1870s, European bankers and politicians had become concerned with the massive debt accumulated by the khedive (ruler) of Egypt. European pressure on the regime inspired the Urabi Rebellion in 1882, in which several Europeans were injured. In order to protect European civilians and safeguard their control of the newly constructed Suez Canal, the British army invaded Egypt and took control of the government of the khedive Tewfik in 1882. The following year, the British appointed Sir Evelyn Baring as their consul-general in Egypt. Through Baring, the British government exercised almost complete control over the Egyptian state. By occupying the country, however, the British also inherited the regime's problems. Baring began reforming the finances of the Egyptian government and encouraged Tewfik to hire British officers to reorganize and modernize the army. Hicks was one of several British officers who volunteered to help reform the khedive's military.

One of the challenges facing Tewfik and the British was establishing control over the Sudan, the vast region to the south of Egypt. While the Egyptians claimed sovereignty over the Sudan, their hold on the region was weak. In 1882, Muhammad

Ahmad, a Sudanese traveling preacher, had declared himself the Mahdi (final prophet of God) and launched a jihad (holy war) against the Egyptians. Hatred of the Egyptians and the Mahdi's tremendous personal charisma brought thousands of followers into his movement. He quickly built his following into an army that began attacking Egyptian positions throughout the Sudan.

Hicks entered the Egyptian army as a colonel and was given the title of pasha. He was sent to Khartoum, in the northern Sudan, to serve as the chief-of-staff to an Egyptian force led by Suliman Niazi Pasha. The army consisted of 8,000 conscripted Egyptian peasants suffering from extremely low morale. Many of the soldiers had participated in the resistance to the British invasion in 1882 and now resented British influence in Egyptian affairs. Conditions were so bad among the troops that many of the unwilling recruits were chained to keep them from deserting.

Hicks trained the troops for a month before leading them in their first engagement, against Mahdist forces in Sennar. The campaign proved a success, and Hicks's army drove the Mahdist troops out of Sennar and Khartoum. Hicks soon fell out with Suliman Niazi Pasha, however, and threatened to resign unless he was appointed commander-in-chief of the army. The Egyptian government transferred Suliman Niazi Pasha to the Red Sea Province and placed Hicks in command of the troops.

Once in charge, Hicks received instructions to march on the main Mahdist army at El Obeid. Hicks warned the Egyptian government that his army was not up to this task. The government disparaged the Mahdist threat, however, and ordered him to attack. On September 9, 1883, Hicks led an army of 1,000 cavalry, 7,000 infantry, and 2,000 camp followers toward El Obeid. It was an arduous march through the Sudanese desert, compounded by the fact that the column's guides deliberately misled the force. On November 3, the thirsty and weary army encamped in an area of tall grass, where the Mahdist forces lay in ambush. Hicks and all but 300 of his troops were annihilated at this Battle of Kashgil. According to some sources, Hicks was the last soldier to die fighting. After the battle, his severed head was brought to the Mahdi.

The astounding defeat of the British-led expedition added immensely to the Mahdi's growing prestige. By 1885, he had established a vast empire in the Sudan, which was eventually conquered by a British force led by General Horatio Kitchener in 1898, but Hicks's ill-fated campaign and subsequent death did much to popularize the British-Egyptian cause in Britain.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Egyptian Army; Kashgil (Shaykan or El Obeid), Battle of (November 3–5, 1883); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Urabi Rebellion (1882)

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Hintsa (c. 1790–1835)

Born around 1790, Hintsa was the second-eldest but highest-ranking son of Khawuta, ruler of the Gcaleka Xhosa, who lived on the east side of the Kei River in what is now South Africa's Eastern Cape Province. At this point, the Rharhabe Xhosa, who had separated from the Gcaleka about a generation earlier, lay between Hintsa's people and the expanding British-ruled Cape Colony to the west.

Shortly after coming to power around 1818, Hintsa allied with Ndlambe in his struggle with fellow Rharhabe Xhosa ruler Ngqika. Hinta's men participated in the Battle of Amalinde, fought near present-day King William's Town, in which Ndlambe's forces defeated those of Ngqika. However, the Gcaleka withdrew from this area once Ndlambe's forces engaged the Cape Colony, which had sided with Ngqika.

In 1828, Hintsa allied with the neighboring Thembu and Mpondo and a colonial expeditionary force to attack and destroy Matiwane's Ngwane at the Battle of Mbolompo. Hintsa maintained neutrality during the Cape-Xhosa War of 1834–1835. However, as he was the senior Xhosa ruler, the British blamed him for Xhosa attacks on the colony in 1834, and in May 1835, a colonial expedition entered his territory. Governor Benjamin D'Urban demanded that he surrender 50,000 cattle and 1,000 horses as compensation. Hintsa presented himself to the colonial camp and agreed to accompany a colonial patrol led by Colonel Harry Smith, which was to gather the livestock from Gcaleka communities.

On May 12, 1835, during this patrol, Hintsa allegedly attempted to escape by riding away, but he was pursued and knocked off his horse by Smith and then shot several times as he ran away. The wounded Hintsa fled into some bush, where colonial scout George Southey killed him with a shot to the head, and then colonial soldiers cut off his ears as trophies. For the Xhosa, the murder of their king under conditions of a truce represented a national disaster that would never be forgotten and demonstrated the ruthlessness of colonial forces.

D'Urban considered the easy surrender and elimination of Hintsa as a fortunate event. Upon orders from London, D'Urban, at the end of August 1836, convened a one-week-long court of inquiry into Hintsa's death that did not find anyone responsible but criticized the mutilation of his corpse. Hintsa's death, among other acts of colonial aggression condemned by some humanitarians in the Cape and Britain, influenced British colonial secretary Lord Glenelg (Charles Grant) to order the retrocession of conquered Xhosa land between the Fish and Kei rivers later that year and the establishment of treaty relations with the Xhosa rulers.

In 1996, Xhosa traditional healer and Hintsa descendant Nicholas Gcaleka, supposedly guided by dreams, traveled to Scotland, where he obtained a skull with a hole in it that he claimed to be that of Hintsa. However, the Gcaleka royal family rejected the authenticity of the skull and refused to bury it.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Mbolompo, Battle of (August 27, 1828); Smith, Henry; Somerset, Henry

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Hlophekhulu Mountain, Battle of (July 2, 1888)

The British defeat of uSuthu forces at the Battle of Hlophekhulu Mountain in central Zululand on July 2, 1888 was the last major engagement of the uSuthu Rebellion of 1888 against British rule in the colony of Zululand.

In June 1888, Prince Shingana kaMpande assembled an uSuthu force of about 1,100 men on Hlophekhulu Mountain, on the northern bank of the White Mfolozi River, in support of his nephew and the uSuthu leader, King Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, who was ensconced on Ceza Mountain 56 kilometers to the northwest in defiance of the British authorities. From Hlophekhulu, Shingana raided Zulu loyal to the British and threatened the British lines of communications to their military camp at Nkonjeni, halfway between Hlophekhulu and Ceza. Lieutenant-General Henry Augustus Smyth, who assumed command of the British forces in Zululand on June 28, immediately decided to clear Hlophekhulu of the uSuthu.

Since the uSuthu were technically rebels, local magistrate Richard Hallowes Addison, as the representative of the civil authorities, set out at dawn on July 2 to arrest Shingana on Hlophekhulu, escorted by 87 Zululand Police (ZP) under Commandant George Mansel. Anticipating armed resistance, Addison counted on the British troops marching with him to help disperse the uSuthu. These troops, which were commanded by Colonel Henry Sparke Stabb, consisted of 198 British dragoons and mounted infantry, 141 Mounted Basutos and about 1,400 Africans of the Eshowe Levy and Mnyamana's Auxiliaries. A supporting British force under Lieutenant-Colonel A. Froom, consisting of 205 British regulars, some 500 African levies, and two mountain guns, was posted on Lumbe Mountain 5 kilometers south of the river to intercept any fleeing uSuthu.

At about midday, Stabb sent the African auxiliaries and levies in flanking movements to the west and east of Hlophekhulu, respectively. Once they were in position, the ZP advanced from the north in skirmishing order, supported by the British troops. They stormed the bushy mountain crest held by the uSuthu and finally carried it at bayonet point. The uSuthu, dislodged from the crest, dispersed down the mountain, but their flight was blocked by the auxiliaries and levies positioned below, and they were forced down to a narrow strip of land between the mountain and river where their families were encamped with their cattle. In the hand-to-hand fighting and final rout, the uSuthu lost 1,000 cattle to their pursuers and suffered between 200 and 300 killed. The British lost 2 white officers, 3 ZP, 2 Mounted Basutos, and 55 African levies.

The capture of Hlophekhulu and the dispersal of Shingana's forces restored British control in central Zululand, secured their line of supply to Nkonjeni, and opened the way to pacification operations that brought the rebellion to an end by September 1888.

John Laband

See also: Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Hobhouse, Emily (1860–1926)

Emily Hobhouse was a British liberal, pacifist, and self-appointed social worker who was one of the first to visit and report on the deficiencies of the refugee concentration camps in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Her complaints after her return to England prompted the government to establish the Fawcett Commission, which further investigated camp conditions and helped improve the sanitary and living conditions in them.

Born in 1860 in Cornwall, England, Hobhouse lived with her parents and took care of her invalid father until he died in 1895. She then traveled to the United States, where she reportedly became a social worker. Hobhouse returned to England after an unsuccessful marriage engagement.

Hobhouse became active in numerous social work and political reform movements, including the Adult Suffrage Society. Belonging to the radical wing of the Liberal Party, she opposed the Second Anglo-Boer War that broke out in October 1899. Hobhouse spoke at several public meetings, denouncing the policies and activities of the British government.

In late 1900, after the institution of British farm burning and land clearance policies in South Africa and the establishment of camps to house and protect displaced Boer refugees, Hobhouse began to learn details of poor treatment and unsatisfactory conditions in the camps. At about the same time, she established the South African Women and Children Distress (or Relief) Fund, to provide food and clothing to those interned in the camps. Few people or groups, however, contributed to her fund.

Hobhouse traveled to South Africa to deliver supplies from her fund to the camps, arriving in South Africa on December 27, 1900. Sir Alfred Milner, high commissioner for South Africa, approved her visits. She visited several camps for white inmates, including those south of Bloemfontein, at Norvalspont, Aliwal North, Springfontein, Kimberley, and Orange River. Hobhouse complained to authorities at these camps about inadequate sanitary conditions and alleged insufficient rations.

Hobhouse, considered "pro-Boer" and a "screamer," returned to England in May 1901. She wrote a lengthy report exposing the worst aspects of the South African concentration camps and the harsh military methods employed by the British to end the war. She tried to return to South Africa in

October 1901 but was prevented from landing. Whether Hobhouse was motivated by social welfare concerns or was using the camps to advance her liberal pacifist political agenda cannot be ascertained. Parliament appointed the all-female Fawcett Commission (which did not include Hobhouse) to travel to South Africa and report on the conditions in the camps. The commission confirmed Hobhouse's main points and made a number of common-sense recommendations for camp improvement that were implemented shortly thereafter.

Hobhouse remained active in pacifist and social welfare organizations for the rest of her life. She died in Cornwall on June 8, 1926, and her ashes were buried in 1927 at the foot of the Women's Memorial in Bloemfontein, South Africa.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Hoe Handle, War of the (1927–1932)

The most widespread colonial pacification campaign in sub-Saharan Africa between World Wars I and II took place in French Equatorial Africa in what is now western Central African Republic and eastern Cameroon, close to the border with Congo-Brazzaville. During the 1800s, the area became a haven for people fleeing slave raids connected with the Atlantic and trans-Saharan trades, and in 1896, Gbaya communities led by French adventurer Alphonse Goujou defeated Muslim Fulbe pastoralists ruling on behalf of the Germans.

After World War I, the entire area came under the French, who contracted portions of it to exploitative concessionary companies, which demanded rubber and ivory from locals. In 1924, the French imposed heavy forced labor to build the Congo-Ocean railway, and in 1927, they increased taxes. As a result, local prophet Barka Ngainoumbey, called Karnu or "roller up of earth," urged his Gbaya people to refuse to pay taxes and perform labor, predicted that the French would turn into gorillas, and issued magical hoe handles as protection from bullets. After an altercation between a colonial official and the people of Karnu's village of Nahing, three detachments of African guards (each led by a Frenchman) converged on the prophet's home but suddenly withdrew on orders from the governor-general, who believed that military action would inflame the situation.

Since it appeared that Karnu had caused the French to back down, local people with spears and arrows attacked the colonial officials and traders. Consequently, in October, the colonial state mounted a full-scale war against the people of this region, with a column of 300 soldiers marching northwest from the administrative center of Bangui, picking up reinforcements and military commander Major General Albert-Theodore Thiry and Governor-General Raphael Antonetti at the village of Ireman, and inflicting a scorched-earth campaign on the Gbaya, in which they were forcibly relocated into so-called protected villages.

On December 11, a company of 132 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* under Lieutenant Boutin attacked Nahing, where Karnu was killed by machine gun fire and his body displayed as proof that he did not possess magic. A total colonial force of 1,000 men mopped up islands of resistance, and by October 1929, the Lobaye and Haute Sangha areas had been brought under control. Responding to abuse by African colonial guards, the Pana and Karre people around Bocarango, south of Bangui, hid in caves and conducted guerrilla warfare against the French as they had done against the Fulbe. French colonial forces used pepper-laden fires to smoke the rebels out of caves and then cut them down with machine guns. The fighting ended by late 1931 and early 1932.

French colonial authorities, concerned over anticolonial critics at home, kept reports about the rebellion out of the French press. Similar to earlier rebellions against colonial rule in the 1890s and 1900s, Central African nationalists would later see the Kongo Wara War (War of the Hoe Handle) as a widespread attempt by a new prophetic leadership to oust the French, while others view it as a series of separate disturbances prompted by French military overreaction.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914)

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Holkrantz, Battle of (May 5–6, 1902)

The Battle of Holkrantz ("Ntatshana" in Zulu) took place during the night of May 5–6, 1902, 17 kilometers north of the town of Vryheid in the southeastern Transvaal. The roots of the battle can be traced to the geopolitical history of the region. The Qulusi, a local Zulu community, lost their land when the New Republic, which existed from 1884–1888 with Vryheid as the capital, was created as part of a military pact between local Boers and the Dinizulu in his military struggle for the Zulu crown.

By the time of the Second Anglo-Boer War, less than two decades later, the Transvaal had incorporated the New Republic, and tensions arose between the Vryheid commando and the Qulusi. The latter saw themselves as subjects of Dinizulu rather than the Transvaal. These tensions were heightened when, early in the war, the local Boer commandos requisitioned grain and livestock without receipts and forced Qulusi men to work as auxiliaries to the Boer forces. For their part, the Qulusi, as instructed by Dinizulu, generally supported the British army with intelligence and by rustling Boer cattle, occupying abandoned Boer farms, and harassing smaller Boer commandos. Such actions were invariably followed by Boer reprisals, both officially sanctioned and part of a certain lawlessness, which included raids on Qulusi livestock, intimidation of community members, and the summary executions for spying or carrying weapons in support of the British war effort.

In March 1902, British commander Lord Horatio Kitchener decided to root out the remaining Boer commandos from the woody and hilly Vryheid district. General Bruce Hamilton was placed in command of the operation. He asked King Dinizulu for auxiliary support to round up Boer cattle, capture commandos, and provide intelligence. In response, an Impi (army) of 700 Qulusi under Sikhobobo joined Hamilton's force. The operations were largely unsuccessful, and the Zulu Impis were disbanded and ordered home. But the participation of the Qulusi in these military maneuvers led to a complete breakdown with the Boers of the Vryheid district. Consequently, General Louis Botha, himself a resident of the Vryheid district, in late April 1902 ordered punitive measures against the Qulusi. In the process, the homesteads of those who supported the British were burned and thousands of head of livestock seized. Sikhobobo and his followers had to seek refuge in the station building in Vryheid.

Bent on revenge, Sikhobobo and a 300-strong Qulusi Impi armed, with spears and knobkerries, left Vryheid in the evening of May 5, 1902, telling Magistrate A. J. Shepstone that they wanted to retrieve some of their lost cattle. At Holkrantz, they attacked the 126-strong Boer commando under Field-Cornet J. A. Potgieter, who, with rumors of peace talks making the rounds, was lax in terms of security. In the onslaught, 56 of the 70 local commando members were killed, while 52 members of the Impi were killed and 48 wounded.

This military victory by a Zulu Impi operating independent of British forces had a profound impact on the Boer leadership, and fears were expressed for the plight of women and children and the guerilla tactics employed by the commandos should armed Africans continue to operate in this manner. The Battle of Holkrantz thus became a powerful argument to persuade the Boers to consider peace, which led to the Treaty of Vereeniging.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Commando System (Boer Republics); Dinizulu kaCetshwayo; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902); Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Holland's Shop, Battle of (December 2, 1877)

After the Gcaleka Xhosa were defeated at the Battle of Ibeka in late September 1877, during the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War, their ruler Sarhili directed an eastward withdrawal across the Mbashe River. Subsequently, the former Gcaleka territory between the Kei and Mbashe rivers was earmarked by Cape colonial authorities for white settlement. However, sometime around the end of November, the Gcaleka war leader Khiva led a 1,000-man force, including many horsemen, back into their homeland.

On the Sunday morning of December 2, a routine colonial patrol of Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP) and settler militia with some horse artillery encountered Khiva's force on a ridge near the abandoned trading post of Holland's Shop, which was located between the colonial post at Ibeka and the Kei River. Experiencing withering gunfire from the Gcaleka, the patrol withdrew to Holland's Shop, where it formed a defensive square. The Gcaleka infantry and cavalry began their attack at sunset, around 6 P.M., using the cover of rocks and anthills to get within 50 meters of the colonial guns. With the battlefield illuminated by a bright moon, the defenders were able to continue effective fire until around 9 P.M., when they began to run short of ammunition. At this point, the Gcaleka made one last charge that stalled just short of the colonial line, and then they withdrew.

It was now obvious that Sarhili had taken his noncombatants and livestock east of the Mbashe and had now launched a counterattack in attempt to recover his lost territory, which was now patrolled by only 500 FAMP, as most of the auxiliary troops had been demobilized. As a result, British high commissioner Sir Henry Bartle Frere relieved FAMP officer Charles Duncan Griffith of command in the area and replaced him with British general Sir Arthur Cunynghame, who was instructed to use imperial troops to subdue the Gcaleka. Since only several hundred British troops were available, Cunynghame assembled a unit of settler militia infantry from railway workers and diamond diggers under Colonel Henry Pulleine and some settler cavalry under Lieutenant Frederick Carrington.

By the mid-December, Cunynghame's force had assembled at Ibeka and was ready to commence operations against the Gcaleka. Along with reassembled Fingo allies, they conducted raids and sweeps in December 1877 and January 1878. However, within a few weeks, they were distracted by a rebellion that broke out among the Rharhabe Xhosa on the west side of the Kei River.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Cunynghame, Arthur Augustus Thurlow; Ibeka, Battle of (September 29–30, 1877); Pulleine, Henry Burmester

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Hut Tax War, Sierra Leone (1898)

During the 1790s, the British settled freed black slaves from North America on the coast of Sierra Leone, which became a British colony in 1808. Control over the region was a challenge that the British Crown struggled to overcome throughout the 19th century. At various points, the Temne, Mende, Loko, Sherbro, and Bullom peoples were engaged in internecine conflicts or hostilities with the authorities at Freetown in Sierra Leone.

By the 1880s, Britain had extended its imperial authority over Sierra Leone's various peoples, establishing a Frontier Police force in 1890 to actively oversee villages and serve as official representatives. Wars of pacification and treaties were concluded with the peoples of the coast and of the interior. On August 31, 1896, after negotiations with France that delineated the borders between Guinea and Sierra Leone, the British formally proclaimed a protectorate over the region. The majority of chiefs in the region were not consulted, nor were they aware that the terms of their preexisting treaties had radically changed. Colonial authority that was previously legally limited to Freetown was now extended to cover the whole region, and the Frontier Police provided enforcement of newly imposed laws.

However, the Frontier Police remained a heavy financial burden upon the new protectorate, costing an estimated 19,927 pounds in 1896, which was more than a fifth of the total revenue available. Colonel Frederic Cardew, the governor whose hard work had finally established the protectorate, decided to apply a method that he had seen in Gambia and South Africa to raise the necessary funds: he would levy a tax on dwelling-houses. He therefore provided for an annual tax within the protectorate of 10 shillings on houses with four rooms, and 5 shillings for houses with fewer than four rooms, beginning on January 1, 1898. Chiefs would be made responsible for collecting these taxes, with a commission of 3 pence per house—payment in produce was allowed, but Cardew expressed hope that with the rise in wage labor, cash would rapidly supersede alternative revenue. Unoccupied houses were also taxed, and chiefs were further expected to organize the residents of their districts to build and maintain roads, despite the requirement of peoples of the region to devote considerable time to subsistence farming in order to survive.

Cardew's scheme was opposed by some members of the protectorate's government, with some like J. C. E. Parkes, the secretary for native affairs, recommending a poll tax instead, which would have reduced the burden of taxation on chiefs. Importantly, throughout this time, the British authorities were conducting hunts for so-called human leopards, presumed to be cannibals. However, these accused in fact belonged to the quasi-governmental Poro male initiatory society of the upper Guinea coast and represented highly ranked members. By singling them out and hanging them, the colonial authorities were in effect attacking their direct rivals for power among the various peoples who followed Poro regionally, which included the Temne, Mende, Vai, Bullom, and Sherbro among many others.

This British persecution of African figures of authority included the Temne chief Bai Bureh, who was arrested in 1894 despite having provided troops to fight on behalf of the colony in 1892. Cardew in particular manifestly disliked Bai Bureh, and he offered only disrespect and dismissal when Bai Bureh and 24 other chiefs brought signed petitions protesting that the new Hut Tax was too burdensome, and often the money paid far exceeded the value of the homes being taxed. Cardew reportedly indicated his firm belief that the chiefs lacked cohesion and could be quickly put down with force using the Frontier Police if any rebellion arose. Misunderstandings between chiefs, local traders, and district commissioners became commonplace, with chiefs generally being arrested or removed from office by the colonial authorities for failing to speedily brings the levied money.

Based on rumors, Captain W. S. Sharpe, the district commissioner of Karene, concluded that not only was the whole country from Karene to Port Loko under Bai Bureh's sway, but also that an attack was imminent. Government troops, therefore, opened fire on a group of people at Romani whom they believed to be Bai Bureh's soldiers, and the victims of the attack responded with gunfire in return. By March 2, a state of war existed. Martial law was declared in Karene, but the leadership of the protectorate underestimated Bai Bureh's strength, and a bloody series of skirmishes unfolded throughout the year.

Bai Bureh's forces offered to make peace in April but were rejected by Cardew, who insisted that the surrender and arrest of Bai Bureh was the only avenue to peace. Bai Bureh voluntarily surrendered on November 11, 1891, after repeatedly expressing his desire to treat with the British. The war that arose was largely blamed on Bai Bureh's supposed refusal to pay the Hut Tax, although his own account asserted that his engagement had come about as a result of the British firing upon his people and the threat that Captain Sharpe intended to kill him.

In truth, the war had raged not only between the British and Bai Bureh's Temne, but also between the Mende to the south and the colonial forces. The Mende had risen on April 27, 1898, and struck in a variety of places, explicitly in response to the imposition of British imperial rule. They attempted to expunge any and all symbols of British culture or authority, striking traders and mission stations, as well as colonial officials. For the Poro-practicing Mende, the war that they were fighting was necessary to preserve their autonomy, and the spark that lit the simmering hostilities was the crippling financial burden of the Hut Tax. The so-called war-boys of the Mende killed approximately 1,000 people during their rising.

After the cessation of hostilities on both fronts, government members in Britain decried the Hut Tax as being tantamount to a scattering of a profitable and century-old relationship with local African traders. The colonial narrative was that those involved in resistance were rebels or slavers or both. All records note Poro as central to the two connected uprisings, but few address the systematic assault of the protectorate's leadership on the much older, indigenous, and decentralized government, or how that suppression set the stage for the 1898 uprising. While the British effectively crushed large-scale resistance to colonial rule, the Sierra Leonean peoples continued to resist through riots and chaotic labor disturbances throughout the 20th century.

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See also: Bai Bureh; British Anti-Slavery Squadron; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Ibeka, Battle of (September 29–30, 1877)

In 1865, groups of armed Fingo (colonial allies for the past 30 years) crossed the Cape colonial border of the Kei River and seized a strip of territory from the independent Gcaleka Xhosa, which was then named "Fingoland" and placed under colonial protection. In August 1877, a violent clash between some Fingo and Gcaleka at a wedding celebration provided Cape colonial officials with an excuse to demand supposedly stolen cattle from the Gcaleka under King Sarhili, which led to the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War (1877–1878).

In late September 1877, the Cape's Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP) established a laager at an Ibeka trading post that was just eight kilometers from Sarhili's great place, and thus a major threat to the Gcaleka. Commanded by Charles Duncan Griffith, a veteran of the Cape-Xhosa Wars who had just arrived, the Ibeka defenses consisted of several brick buildings encircled by a low sod wall and ditch. On September 26, a mounted FAMP patrol from Ibeka skirmished with some Gcaleka, and a nearby group of Fingo under James Ayliff, a colonial resident in Fingoland, was forced to flee a Gcaleka force at Gwadana. At the end of the day, Ayliff's Fingo withdrew to Ibeka, which meant that the post was now defended by 180 FAMP and 2,000 Fingo.

On September 29, some 8,000 Gcaleka warriors led by the accomplished Khiva attacked Ibeka on three of its four sides. With their Schneider rifles, Congreve rockets, and one cannon, the defenders cut down the Gcaleka, who advanced in close order on the insistence of a traditional diviner and then withdrew. Key to the defense was a nearby stone kraal held by 400 Fingo under Captain Veldtman Bikitsha, a veteran of two previous Cape-Xhosa conflicts and the largest landholder in Fingoland, the firing from which accounted for many Gcaleka casualties. The next morning, concealed by a thick mist, the Gcaleka again attacked just one side of the post but were repelled by colonial firepower and then pursued by Fingo at the post, who burned some nearby Gcaleka homesteads and killed stragglers.

Given the events at Ibeka, on October 5, British high commissioner for South Africa Sir Henry Bartle Frere declared that he had deposed Sarhili as the Gcaleka ruler and announced that imperial and colonial forces would invade Gcaleka territory. On October 9, Griffith, with his Ibeka post reinforced by settler and Fingo volunteers, led several converging columns that destroyed Sarhili's nearby capital. Some Gcaleka tried to take a stand on a piece of high ground but were outflanked. In the middle of October, Griffiths swept the area with 500 FAMP, 1,000 settler volunteers, and 6,000 Fingo and Thembu allies. Sarhili and the Gcaleka refused to be drawn into an engagement and withdrew east of the Mbashe River.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878)

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Imbangala

Located in what is now Angola, the Imbangala were a society of warriors famous for strict military organization, and cohesion and discipline in battle. In the 16th century, Imbangala was not an ethnicity, and certainly not a single group. They were frequently mistaken for the Jaga, another band of fierce warriors who invaded the city of Mbanza Kongo in 1568. The origin of the Imbangala is still debated by scholars. While some believe that they migrated westward from the Lunda states under a ruler named Kinguri at the end of the 15th century and arrived in Angola by the mid-16th century, others state that the Imbangala oral tradition concerning Kinguri is an appropriation from the 19th century and that, in fact, the Imbangala originated in the interior of Benguela, either in the highlands or around the region of Kilengues. The traditions connecting the Imbangala and the Lunda thus would be a fabrication of the 19th century to facilitate trade within the Lunda commonwealth.

The Imgangala began as a group of marauders who roamed the interior of what is now Angola, structured by a warrior-based political system called *kilombo*, a word also used to describe their fortified war camps. The *kilombo* was not a lineage-based society like others commonly found among the Mbundu people of the area. There was no kinship organization; rather, they were divided into army units headed by captains under the command of a strong single leader. This absence of lineage, which had historically retarded the political and social expansion of other local groups, was a 16th-century Imbangala innovation that gave them overwhelming military superiority. Their economy was predatory, and they consumed all available local resources with no regard for the future, destroying palm trees to make wine, stealing crops produced by others, and consuming herds that they acquired rather than managing them. They only produced slaves, which they traded to the Portuguese in exchange for luxury goods.

The Imbangala are notorious for the severity and violence of their society. They killed their babies at birth since they were constantly at war and always on the move. There were explicit laws in the *kilombo* that denied the procreative function of women, aimed at avoiding the creation of kinship links between mother and child. Women were specifically prohibited to give birth within the sacred encampments and were killed (along with their baby) when that happened. Although in practice some children did survive, they were considered illegitimate and denied social status within the *kilombo*. The Imbangala strengthened their numbers by incorporating some of the teenagers kidnapped during wars and raids, first as slaves and then, after a series of initiation rites, as full Imbangala warriors. This conscription of new members into the *kilombo* through initiation ceremonies not connected to kinship gave the Imbangala leaders a monopoly on power unknown to their Mbundu counterparts and allowed their armies an unprecedented capacity to quickly assimilate large numbers of new warriors. The only requirement was that a young initiate not be circumcised, a demand connected to the denial of kinship.

The strict social and political structure of the *kilombo* gave the Imbangala tactical advantages over their enemies, which in military terms translated into well-organized troops capable of executing coordinated maneuvers during major battles. While their Mbundu enemies tended to organize their armies into a loose amalgam of small groups of warriors drawn from different lineages, each under the control of its own hereditary leaders, the Imbangala troops fought together under the leadership of one man. The military training that members received during their initiation in the *kilombo* prepared them to respond to their leader with a degree of coordination that other local armies could not attain. Although the Imbangala troops are widely known for their use of bow and arrow, they also used weapons common to other Mbundu armies, such as spears, knives and hatchets. They also applied poison to their arrowheads, making their missiles especially deadly.

Although the Imbangala are also recognized as bloodthirsty cannibals, many of the stories told by both their European and African enemies are clearly exaggerated. The consumption of human flesh happened in a limited number of rituals, and never for necessity or pleasure. For the Imbangala, physical combat was just part of a much larger war strategy based on supernatural powers. Sometimes they devoured enemies slain in battle to tame the spirits of the opponents that they had killed. Cannibalism also could be used to strengthen the discipline in the *kilombo* or as a reaction against violation of the laws. In these cases, the accused was killed and eaten as part of the cleansing of the *kilombo*. This was also the fate of cowards, who could be eaten after a battle. These cannibalistic practices thus purified the *kilombo* by completely obliterating unworthy comrades and offenders, without even their remains existing.

The Imbangala relationship with the Portuguese started at the beginning of the 17th century. According to accounts of travelers, the Portuguese helped the Imbangala cross the Kuvo River in 1601, and later the Kwanza River in 1611. The Imbangala began mounting slave raids against the Mbundu and Kongo and by 1613 the *mani Kongo Mpangu a Nimi* (Álvaro II of Kongo) was complaining that the Portuguese governors in Luanda sent Jaga mercenaries into his territory to capture his subjects.

The Imbangala enabled Portuguese armies to operate effectively against the Mbundu for the first time, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it was largely due to Imbangala support that the Portuguese managed to defeat Ndongo by 1620. Soon after this victory, the Imbangala began to create polities and gradually lost their mobility and distinct ideology, becoming another sedentary variant of an Mbundu kingdom. In 1629–1630, they founded the kingdom of Kasanje in the upper-middle Kwango Valley and later became part of the trading networks connecting the Portuguese and the Lunda commonwealth.

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See also: Afonso I; Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Jaga; Kongo Empire; Mbwila, Battle of (October 10, 1665)

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Imperial British East Africa Company. *See* "East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905)"

Indian Ocean, Portuguese Conquest of (1498–1698)

From the 10th to 14th centuries, a number of towns developed along the East African coast where the Swahili served as middlemen in trade between the people of the interior, who exported ivory, gold, and some slaves, and Arab sailors, who brought goods like glass beads, porcelain, and silks from Asia. At this time, the main Asian, African, and Middle Eastern powers involved in the Indian Ocean trade lacked effective navies. Speaking a Bantu language with Arabic elements, the Swahili converted to Islam due to their trade connections to the Middle East. Militarily weak, Swahili towns were independent, and there was intense economic competition between them. Since they had occasionally been attacked by inland groups, Swahili coastal fortifications usually faced the land, which made them vulnerable to naval attack. By the end of the 1400s, some Swahili had acquired simple firearms but were not skilled in their use.

Moving down the Atlantic west and southwestern African coast, Portuguese mariners searching for a route to the rich trading available in India first rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Indian Ocean in 1498. Portuguese ships were larger, more maneuverable, and more heavily armed with cannon than Indian Ocean vessels. Led by Vasco da Gama, the initial expedition bombed the Swahili towns of Mogadishu and Mozambique. Countering competition from Mombasa to the south and Pate to the north, the Swahili at Malindi made a lasting alliance with the Portuguese. Da Gama's subsequent 1502 expedition established the pattern of Portuguese naval activity on Africa's east coast. Swahili towns were forced to pay tribute to Portuguese fleets or face bombardment. In 1503, Portuguese captain Ruy Lourenco Ravasco bombed Zanzibar until the ruler agreed to make annual payments. Ravasco then sailed up and down the coast, seizing trade vessels for ransom. In 1505, a Portuguese flotilla of 11 ships under Francisco de Almeida, as well as two other expeditions the next year, attacked Swahili towns and seized Mozambique, Sofala, and Kilwa, where they built forts.

The Portuguese were the first to use state-sponsored violence to control the Indian Ocean trade. Although the Egyptians, Indians, and Persians assembled a large combined fleet to try to regain the Indian Ocean, it was defeated by 18 Portuguese vessels at the Battle of Diu, off the coast of western India, in 1509. Subsequently, the Portuguese established a chain of fortified coastal enclaves along the Indian Ocean rim. Because the east coast of Africa was a commercial low priority, the Portuguese withdrew from Kilwa in 1512, leaving a local vassal in charge. Towns along the northern section of the coast, such as Mogadishu, remained independent. In the 1530s, the Portuguese began to penetrate the interior along the Zambezi River, seizing the Swahili trading posts of Sena and Tete in the hope of securing sources of gold and ivory to pay for spices and other goods in India. Subsequently, the Portuguese attempted to control the gold mines of the Mutapa kingdom on the Zimbabwe Plateau, south of the Zambezi.

Starting in the 1540s, the new Ottoman rulers of Egypt, with a better navy than their Mamluk predecessors, expanded down the Red Sea and into the Indian Ocean, where they presented themselves as liberators to the Swahili and challenged the Portuguese. However, Ottoman ambitions in the Indian Ocean were delayed in 1571, when they were defeated by a Christian coalition naval force at the Battle of Lepanto, off the coast of Greece.

The appearance of a single Ottoman ship off the East African coast in 1585 prompted a general Swahili rebellion that was quickly suppressed by the Portuguese. Several years later, a small Ottoman naval force under Amir Ali Bey encouraged another Swahili revolt. The entire Portuguese garrison on Pemba Island was annihilated, and the rebels attacked the Portuguese ally of Malindi. Subsequently, a Portuguese fleet from India restored control. As punishment for their rebellion, the entire population of Faza was killed, all its plantations and ships destroyed, and the decapitated head of its ruler sent to Goa, the Portuguese colony in India.

Two years later, Ali Bey returned with a slightly larger naval force and occupied Mombasa, where his men were besieged by a mainland group called the Zimba, which had recently sacked Kilwa. Yet another two years later, in 1589, a Portuguese relief fleet attacked Mombasa and then withdrew to let the Zimba finish off the city.

The Ottoman incursions showed the Portuguese that they needed a strong naval base along the northern East African coast, and between 1593 and 1596, they built the imposing Fort Jesus at Mombasa. A member of the compliant Malindi royal family was installed as ruler; he taxed the local population and traders and sent tribute to the Portuguese. Portuguese relations with the Mombasa rulers were not always cordial, though. In 1631, Dom Jeronimo, the Christian ruler of Mombasa, had the Portuguese garrison slaughtered and repelled a Portuguese relief force. Since Jeronimo abandoned Mombasa and became a pirate, the Portuguese recaptured the town in 1632 without resistance and imposed direct rule and taxation.

During the late 1600s, the Arab sultanate of Oman, which had expelled the Portuguese from its capital of Muscat in 1650, began to push them out of the northern section of the East African coast as well. Omani naval expeditions raided the Portuguese at Zanzibar in 1652, Mombasa in 1661, and Mozambique in 1669. In 1696, seven Omani ships carrying 3,000 men arrived at Mombasa; after a 30-month siege, they took control in 1698, as a Portuguese relief force from India arrived too late. The Omanis seized Zanzibar the same year. The East African coast was now controlled by the Omanis in the north and the Portuguese in the south. During the 1700s and 1800s, the Portuguese along the coast of Mozambique gradually pushed inland at the expense of the Makua states, which had previously controlled the export of ivory and slaves.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Da Gama, Vasco; Ethiopia, Portuguese Involvement in (1541–1633); Portuguese-Makua Wars (1585–1870); Zimbabwe Plateau, Portuguese Invasion of (1532–1696)

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Ingogo, Battle of (February 8, 1881)

The Natal Field Force, commanded by Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley during the First Anglo-Boer War or Transvaal Rebellion, returned to its camp at Mount Prospect to await reinforcements after being defeated by the Boers at Laing's Nek on January 28, 1881.

On February 7, 1881, the Boers started a flanking movement to sever the main road bringing reinforcements and supplies from Newcastle and ambushed an escort accompanying the mail. The Colonial Office was also pressuring Colley to defeat the Boers quickly or end hostilities before they spread further. The next day, Colley, in an operation that should have been conducted by a subordinate officer, personally led a five-company force (five understrength companies from the 3rd Battalion, 60th Rifles, including 273 all ranks, two 9-pounder and two 7-pounder guns, and a detachment of 38 mounted troops) escorting the mail wagon back to Newcastle to ensure the route was still open. He apparently also wanted to frighten the Boers in the area.

After an 8-kilometer march southwest, the column came to a double drift just to the west of the confluence of the Ingogo and Harte rivers. Colley detached the F Company and two mountain guns and had them positioned on a spur overlooking the two fords.

About 3 kilometers farther, as the force entered a plateau, Boer horsemen were spotted in the distance. The British artillery fired a few rounds at the Boers, hoping to frighten them. The Boers, however, charged at the British, and when they reached a ravine, they dismounted and began firing at their opponent. Other Boers, skillfully using the cover of the terrain and concealment of the high tambookie grass, began to encircle the British force on the plateau.

Colley realized that he was in a precarious position and requested reinforcements from Mount Prospect. The Boers concentrated their initial fire on the artillery horses to immobilize the guns. At about 3:00 P.M., the reserve I Company was sent across open ground to reinforce an area where a Boer attack was expected. Boer sharpshooting reduced the company from 66 to 13 men within minutes, but the Boer firing then seemed to taper off because they were not strong enough to assault the British.

The Boers did receive some reinforcements, and at about 5:00 P.M., a torrential downpour began. In the ensuing confusion, both sides purportedly used white flags of truce to their advantage, but each ignored the other. The Boers tried to collect their wounded and withdrew in the storm. The British, without food and water and almost out of ammunition, took advantage of the noise and chaos caused by the storm to retreat to Mount Prospect. The rainstorm swelled the Ingogo River, and it was only with great difficulty, and losing eight men and a number of horses in the process, that the flooded river was crossed and the British were finally able to return to their camp.

The Battle of Ingogo was considered a Boer victory, even though the British were able to withdraw. In this fiasco, the British suffered 76 men killed and another 67 wounded out of a total force of about 300. The Boers had about 8 men killed and 6 wounded.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Colley, George Pomeroy; Laing's Nek, Battle of (January 28, 1881)

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Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879)

The Battle of Isandlwana was one of the most humiliating defeats ever suffered by the British army.

The British invaded Zululand on January 11, 1879, with three widely dispersed columns under the overall command of Lieutenant-General Frederick A. Thesiger, the second Baron Chelmsford. The center column (No. 3), consisting of about 4,709 soldiers, was to cross the Tulega River at Rorke's Drift and conduct the main thrust directly toward the Zulu king Cetshwayo kaMpande's royal homestead at Ulundi. Chelmsford located his force headquarters with the center column. The left (No. 4) and right (No. 1) columns were to converge on Ulundi in support of the center column. Two smaller columns (Nos. 2 and 5) guarded the Zululand border.

On January 20, 1879, the center column reached Isandlwana, a distinctive, rocky outcrop rising about 90 meters above the plain and about 16 kilometers from Rorke's Drift. The British established a camp at its base. Intelligence reports suggested that Zulu forces were on their way to attack the British. The next day, Chelmsford sent out scouts who encountered Zulu solders near Mangeni, about 20 kilometers away. The scouts did not recognize that these were stragglers from the 23,000-man main Zulu army.

Early on January 22, 1879, Chelmsford led a 1,600-man element (most of 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment plus four guns) to find and engage the Zulu army, leaving behind at Isandlwana about 1,700 British and African soldiers (1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, Natal Native Contingent and two guns) to guard the camp. Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine was left in charge at the camp. He also ordered the No. 2 Column, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Anthony W. Durnford, to advance to Isandlwana. Chelmsford, who had recently defeated the Xhosa during the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War, believed the Zulu would also avoid confrontation and conduct guerrilla warfare.

Durnford's column arrived at Isandlwana at about 10:30 A.M. He had seen Zulu in the area, and about an hour later, he took his 500-man force to reconnoiter and stumbled on the main Zulu army. The Zulu, taking advantage of concealment and the undulating terrain, reacted immediately and configured into the traditional chest-and-horns attack formation.

Durnford's column, about 7 kilometers from Isandlwana, began a fighting retreat toward the camp. Pulleine assembled his soldiers into a long line, extended in open order with about 1 meter between each man and two light 7-pounder guns at the center. African auxiliaries also served in the line. Durnford's column rejoined Pulleine's right flank, by which time the British line consisted of about 1,300 men.

Fire from the British Martini-Henry .45-caliber breech-loading rifles slowed down, but did not stop, the Zulu onslaught. After about 30 minutes, Durnford's soldiers ran out of ammunition and the right flank collapsed, permitting the Zulu left horn to outflank the British line and regain the initiative. The British line withdrew in disorder, and the Zulu rushed forward, stabbing and killing indiscriminately. The British resisted for a while in the saddle of the hill, running low on ammunition and holding off the Zulu with fixed bayonets. The British, with the Zulu right horn to their rear, were eventually overwhelmed and killed. The Zulu disemboweled the enemy dead, supposedly to release their spirits.

It was dusk by the time Chelmsford realized that the Zulu were attacking Isandlwana in strength, and he reassembled his force and returned to the camp. Of the 1,700 soldiers that Chelmsford had left to guard the camp, 1,329 (858 white and 471 African soldiers) were killed. Very few white officers or men escaped the massacre. Perhaps as many as 3,000 Zulu were also killed. The battlefield defied description, although one Zulu warrior recalled that "the green grass was red with the running blood and the veld was slippery, for it was covered with the brains and entrails of the killed" (Knight, 1990, p. 1).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Durnford, Anthony William; Natal Native Contingent; Pulleine, Henry Burmester

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Italian Colonial Troops

Following the example of other European powers, Italy attempted to seize colonies in Africa in order to showcase its martial prowess and arrival as a "Great Power." In a similar manner, the Italians followed the same pattern as other colonial powers, in forming colonial units built around locally recruited African soldiers. Beyond responding to the prototypical incentives to create these units, including lowered military and administrative costs and the threat of disease and climate to European soldiers, the Italians also focused on African recruitment due to the weakness of their own European arms.

The weakness of the Italian military in Africa was due to the makeup of its forces. Unlike other European powers, the Italians relied on European conscripts to fight their colonial wars. This dependence meant that the Italian troops were inexperienced and unprepared for the multiple demands that a colonial conflict would place on them. Given that other, more seasoned European units often struggled with the climate, logistics, and tactics of the opposing forces in Africa, it is unsurprising that the conscripted forces of the Italians tended to perform poorly. These problems were only exacerbated by an Italian leadership that, rather than correcting these deficiencies, chose to rely on racial beliefs in European superiority or visions of Italians imbued with the martial spirit of ancient Rome. The Italians were also hindered by poor planning. When the Italians had the opportunity to occupy the Red Sea port of Massawa, for example, they did not draw up a new operational plan, but rather used the exact same plan they had for the occupation of Libya, only giving it a new name. The utilitzation of these poor-quality Italian conscripts meant that the Italians had an even greater incentive to develop, and rely on, a force of indigenous African troops.

The primary recruitment area for the Italian colonial forces was their initial colony of Eritrea, which began when the Italians purchased the port of Assab from the Rubattinno Company and then occupied the port of Massawa. From a small beginning (a mere six and a half square kilometers), the Italians expanded and came into conflict with the Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV. After Ethiopian forces threatened an Italian detachment, a force of 500 Italian troops was sent to reinforce the position. These troops were trapped by a 7,000-man force of Ethiopians and annihilated at the Battle of Dogali in 1887.

The aftermath of this debacle carried great import, as it led the Italians to begin to intrigue against Emperor Yohannes with the future Emperor Menelik and to restructure Italian colonial forces. Although Dogali led to the creation of 500 Italian "martyrs," with the square outside the Roman Termini station being christened the Piazza del Cinqucento in their honor, the battle signaled to Italian leaders the need to recruit Africans to serve in their colonial units.

One could trace the importance and reliance on Eritrean askari (African soldiers) through cataloging the main colonial battles that followed the Battle of Dogali. The Italian victory over the Mahdists in 1890 at Agordat was accomplished with a force of under 100 Italian officers and over 2,000 askari. The Italian victory over the uprising of Ras Mengesha's force at Coatit in 1895 was similarly performed by a force of under 200 Italian officers and NCOs and nearly 3,800 Eritrean askari. Finally, when the Italians faced defeat at the famous Battle of Adowa in 1896, nearly half the Italian force consisted of Eritrean askari and Tigrayan irregulars.

The Eritrean askari grew from a band of irregular mercenaries into some of the best units of the Italian colonial forces. Initially, the Italians employed existing Eritrean mercenaries who served local Eritrean communities but which were, in 1885, absorbed into the Italian military as auxiliaries. By 1889, however, the Italians began standardizing and professionalizing their African troops. That year, the Italians created four battalions of Eritrean soldiers, each recognizable by a different colored sash that soldiers wore around their waists. Eritreans were attracted to service due to the cultural respect shown to soldiers, as well as the pay which was substantial relative to other African professions.

The Italians were so desperate for men that they freely recruited without a religious test and often ended up with units of Christians and Muslims serving side by side. These soldiers quickly proved their worth by serving with distinction at the Battle of Agordat. Eritreans served the colonial regime ably; however, unfortunately for later developments at Adowa, this convinced the Italian leadership that they could conquer large swaths of African territory quite cheaply. The low costs of these early campaigns were due in no small measure to their heavy reliance on African troops. The Italian dependence on the Eritrean soldiers, however, was probably best exemplified at their defeat at Adowa. The initial clash between Ethiopian units and General Matteo Albertone's forward position featured roughly 4,000 soldiers on both sides, with only 100 white troops within the colonial element. Underscoring the importance of these Eritrean troops to Italian colonial expansion was the treatment of the 1,200–1,500 captive Italian askari in the aftermath of the battle. Deemed traitors to the Ethiopian kingdom, they were punished with the loss of their right hand and left foot. Only 300 of these askari prisoners would return to Eritrea to be fitted with prosthetics.

The Italians would build around these Eritrean units, eventually forming the *Regio Corpo Truppe Coloniali* (Royal Corps of Colonial Troops). These troops were drawn from all of the Italian lands, but the Eritreans remained the most important. As a study commissioned by the colonial state noted in 1913, "Eritrea had become the colony of [askaris]." Until 1907, there were 5,000 stationed in readiness to resist an expected Ethiopian invasion, but then they became the chief units sent to other colonies to stabilize Italian rule. For example, two Eritrean battalions, of 600 men each, were stationed in Somalia from 1907–1910.

Eritrean units also figured heavily in the occupation of Libya. Rather than a quick campaign bringing easy victory, as was expected, the Italians found themselves enmeshed in a long, taxing struggle of pacification. In these efforts, the Italians leaned heavily on Eritrean units to supplement the massive force of Italian conscripts. The first Eritrean battalion was sent to Libya in 1912, and by July, over 3,500 Eritrean soldiers were stationed in the problematic theater. To underscore the importance of the Eritrean forces, these 3,500 soldiers were coming from an entire colonial army made up of only 5,990 men.

The prevalence of the Eritrean troops continued, although the Italians eventually raised units in Libya and Somalia as well. Ultimately, these forces underscore the fact that despite the late entry of the Italians into the so-called Scramble for Africa, they, like the other colonizing powers, recognized the importance of indigenous African units to their overall success.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Askari; Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Menelik II; Yohannes IV

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Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896)

The First Italo-Ethiopian War was the result of diplomatic disagreement over the previously signed Treaty of Wichale between Ethiopia and the kingdom of Italy. The war saw the Italian expedition, led by General Oreste Baratieri, defeated by the forces of Emperor Menelik II at the Battle of Adowa. This defeat, which was one of the most significant checks on European efforts during the Scramble for Africa, ensured that Ethiopia remained one of two independent African countries on the continent (the other was Liberia). The larger significance of the battle, however, was that it became of symbol of African and Pan-African resistance, as well as later Italian designs on revenge under Benito Mussolini.

Italian influence in the Horn of Africa was the result of opportunism mixed with shrewd diplomacy. After acquiring a position on the Red Sea, purchasing a port from the Rubattino shipping company, the Italians utilized the chaos of the region to acquire the colony of Eritrea. Given fighting between Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia and Ismail Pasha, the khedive of Egypt, which was only exacerbated by the rise of the Mahdi in the Sudan, Britain was more than willing to see Italian influence grow in the region to provide a stabilizing force. To ensure their dominance in the region, the Italians established a relationship with Menelik II, then king of Showa, so that when Emperor Yohannes IV fell in battle against the Mahdi, they were ready to forge a diplomatic agreement with the new leader of Ethiopia. This relationship was crystallized in the Treaty of Wichale, signed in 1889.

Despite Italian beliefs that Wichale would enshrine a new period of friendship, the disagreements over the nature of this treaty would serve as the cause for future conflict. It granted Italy certain trade privileges and formalized their territorial gains in Eritrea, while Ethiopia gained diplomatic recognition and access to Italian credit. The main disagreement of the treaty involved Article 17, which the Italians interpreted as making Ethiopia a protectorate, but the Ethiopians did not. Disagreement over this article was the result of the differing wording for that article in the Italian and Amharic (Ethopian) versions. Although diplomatic rumblings indicated a clear disagreement, hostilities did not break out until Menelik II formally repudiated the treaty in 1893. The Italian response was to wage small campaigns against outlying areas of Ethiopia in the hope of either pressuring Menelik to accept the terms or to cultivate, as they had against Yohannes IV, a sufficient indigenous ruler to supplant him.

The first serious engagement of the war was the Battle of Coatit (January 1895), where Italian forces were able to check Ra Mangesha Yohannes, which they then followed up with an active pursuit that led to Mangesha's complete defeat. While this was a victory, it set a dangerous precedent for Italian decision making in this campaign. The Italians factored this Ethiopian defeat in with the long litany of Ethiopian failures, going back to their reverses at the hands of the British in their 1868 expedition against Emperor Tewodoros II. The Italians failed to appreciate that Menelik II not only possessed a stronger political base of support—made only stronger by the Italian defeat of his chief rival, Ra Mangesha Yohannes—but also had used the monies allotted in the Treaty of Wichale to strengthen his military with foreign arms. The fact that Baratieri was able to defeat Mangesha so quickly, and at so low a cost in men, material, and money, made the Italians believe that all future efforts against the Ethiopians would be won as easily. Thus, the Italians continued their campaign under a veil of overconfidence and a faulty vision of their opponent.

A sign of Ethiopian strength was Menelik, in response to Mangesha's defeat, calling the nation to arms in late 1895, which demonstrated his firm political basis for rule. In addition, following the Battle of Coatit, the Ethiopians enjoyed a series of military successes. First, they decimated an unsupported detachment of roughly 2,000 Italian soldiers at Amba Alage, and followed that up with forcing the surrender of an Italian detachment at Meqele. These losses galvanized the Italian government, under Francesco Crispi, to mobilize reinforcements to seek revenge. Despite pleas from Baratieri that the forces were inexperienced and overstretched, and that Menelik's forces would collapse due to their own logistical constraints, he was pressured to attack.

Italian forces, numbering roughly 11,000 men, advanced during a night march on February 29, 1896, in an attempt to take commanding and mutually supporting positions along three hilltops. As the brigades were unable to communicate adequately during the night march, one detachment, under General Matteo Albertone, ended up 6.5 kilometers beyond its intended position. Either due to poor communication or hubris—Albertone potentially pushing his advance guard forward to defeat what he believed was a weakened enemy—his unit's placement jeopardized the entire Italian strategy. Rather than three mutually reinforcing positions, the Italian units could now be cut off and defeated. This precarious position was only made worse when another Italian brigade under General Vittorio Dabormida attempted to advance to support Albertone's force, only to get lost in the passes and further separate the Italian forces. Menelik, who had planned on dispersing his army the very next day, rallied his force of 80,000–100,000 men to attack the Italian positions in turn. Utilizing European rifles and artillery pieces, the Ethiopians were able to overwhelm the Italian positions through firepower and force of numbers.

The Italians suffered 7,000 dead and over 3,000 captured, while the Ethiopians lost roughly 5,000 dead. The defeat was crippling for Italian forces, which fled the field, leaving comrades and equipment behind. The grave defeat only served to crystallize public discontent against the war, as riots broke out in several Italian cities, and Menelik craftily used the Italian prisoners of war as a diplomatic bargaining chip as the Crispi government collapsed. A new Italian government was installed that began negotiations with Menelik II and signed the Treaty of Addis Ababa in 1896, which established Ethiopia as a legitimate, sovereign, and independent nation.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Treaty of Addis Ababa (1896); Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Baratieri, Oreste; Coatit, Battle of (January 13–14, 1895); Eritrea, Italian Conquest (1870–1890); Italo-Ethiopian War, Second (1935); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Menelik II; Tewodoros II; Wichale, Treaty of (1889); Yohannes IV

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Italo-Ethiopian War, Second (1935–1936)

The Italo-Ethiopian War of 1935–1936 was a major colonial conflict leading to World War II, which demonstrated the impotence of the League of Nations when trying to preserve international security. It was also known as the Second Italo-Ethiopian War and the Second Italo-Abyssinian War.

Italy had a long-standing interest in colonizing Ethiopia (Abyssinia), and in 1896, the Ethiopians defeated a sizable Italian army at Adowa. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini took advantage of this humiliating event in his country's history to stir nationalist sentiment against Ethiopia and endeavor to make Ethiopia part of a greatly expanded Italian-African empire.

On December 5, 1934, Italian and Ethiopian border patrols clashed at Walwal (Ualual), an oasis in a disputed area between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Ethiopia immediately filed a protest with Italy and requested that the affair be arbitrated under the terms of an Italo-Ethiopian treaty from 1928. Italy refused and demanded a formal apology, an indemnity, and the arrest and punishment of the Ethiopians involved.

On January 3, 1935, Ethiopia formally appealed to the League of Nations under Article 11 of its covenant. This action probably sealed Mussolini's intention to invade. In its January meeting, the League Council postponed consideration of the incident (in the hope that in the meantime, the dispute might be settled by an arbitration commission) and urged direct negotiation between the two governments. The arbitration commission's unanimous decision, announced on September 3, 1935, was that neither side was to blame for the Walwal clash because each believed that it was fighting on its own soil. Meanwhile, the British and French governments began negotiations with Italy to reach a solution, but Mussolini rejected the Anglo-French proposal that would have secured for Italy an economic mandate under the league for the financial and administrative organization of Ethiopia.

Italy instead proceeded to build up its troops and supplies in Africa, and on

October 3, 1935, the Italians invaded Ethiopia. Adowa fell to them on October 6. The next day, the League Council declared Italy an aggressor state in violation of Article 12 of the covenant, marking the first time that the league had applied this provision to a European "Great Power." The council's decision was then referred to the League of Nations Assembly for action. That body concurred in the verdict and appointed a committee to consider appropriate measures under Article 16, which covered sanctions.

The sanctions selected, which were adopted by most states, included an immediate arms embargo against Italy, financial sanctions, a ban on the importation of Italian goods, a ban on the exportation to Italy of key war materials, and a call on member-states to try to replace imports from Italy by imports from states that normally had profitable markets in Italy. The assembly committee eventually decided that all sanctions against Italy would go into effect by November 18, 1935.

These sanctions were never applied with full force, and a ban on oil imports—the one export commodity that might have halted Italy—was approved but held in abeyance. Indeed, French foreign minister Pierre Laval and British foreign secretary Sir Samuel Hoare agreed to limit the sanctions even before they were applied. The two were, in fact, playing a double game, hoping not to drive Mussolini into the arms of Adolf Hitler. Publicly, the diplomats

Italian soldiers during the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. In 1935 fascist Italy invaded and occupied Ethiopia, ignoring protests from the League of Nations. (Library of Congress) argued that sanctions on oil, which probably would have brought the Italian war machine to a halt, would not be effective because Germany and the United States were not bound by them. Most Italians did not comprehend their new status as an outlaw nation, and they instead rallied behind Mussolini.

While incomplete sanctions were being applied to Italy, the French and British governments tried to appease Mussolini. The result was the notorious December 1935 Hoare-Laval Proposals, which planned the ceding to Italy of areas in Ethiopia in the vicinity of Eritrea and Somaliland, as well as the establishment of an extensive zone of expansion and colonization in southern Ethiopia in which Italy should have a monopoly of economic rights. In effect, Hoare and Laval were prepared to cede most of Ethiopia to Italy. Public condemnation of the plan was so widespread and vigorous in Britain and France, however, that both men were forced to resign.

With the League Council again considering the adoption of oil sanctions, Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland in March 1936. His decision to violate the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts further complicated the situation and definitely ended the possibility that France would support an oil embargo.

While the diplomats talked, Italian forces had been carrying on military operations in Ethiopia. Before the war, Emperor Haile Selassie had done what he could with limited resources to improve his army, but his air force consisted of only 12 aircraft on the outbreak of the war. Belgian military advisers worked to train the army, and Swedes ran an Ethiopian officer cadet school, but time was too short for them to accomplish much. What few radios the Ethiopians had worked to their disadvantage, in that the Italians intercepted their communications and were thus aware of all their tactical moves. More than any other single factor, this helped win the war for the Italians.

Complete Italian command of the air was another decisive factor. The Italians also employed mustard gas, which, because it was absorbed through the skin, severely affected the Ethiopian soldiers, most of whom went barefoot. Italian military engineering was another key, overcoming considerable natural obstacles in advancing the Italian war machine. The Italians also exploited the factionalism of Ethiopia. Neither side was eager to take prisoners.

General Emilio De Bono commanded Italian troops in East Africa. But he refused to advance beyond Makele to Amba Alagi as Mussolini had demanded, and as a result, on November 17, Marshal Pietro Badoglio took over for De Bono and reorganized the Italian forces. General Rodolfo Graziani commanded the southern prong of the Italian offensive from Italian Somaliland. His motorized column, including tanks, took Ethiopia's second city, Harar. He was made a marshal for his actions, and he replaced Badoglio as viceroy of Ethiopia in late May 1936.

Following a lull, fighting renewed on a more intense scale, and in April 1936, the comparatively primitive Ethiopian resistance collapsed before the modern Italian military. Emperor Haile Selassie, his armies demoralized and his retreat to the west cut off by disaffected regional chiefs, fled on May 2 to French Somaliland, where he boarded a British warship.

Meanwhile, 30,000 Italian troops, in what was perhaps the greatest motorized column yet organized, moved by two main routes toward the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa, which they entered on May 5. In Rome that same day, Mussolini announced, "Ethiopia is Italian." On May 9, *Il Duce* decreed that all of Ethiopia was under Italian sovereignty and that King Victor Emmanuel III was now the emperor of Ethiopia. On June 1, 1936, Italian East Africa was reorganized as Africa Orientale Italiana (AOI), an area of over 1 million square kilometers and with a population estimated at some 12 million people in 1939.

The one-sided nature of the conflict was shown in the casualty totals. In the war, Ethiopia lost 760,000 dead, both military and civilian, whereas the Italian government claimed losses of some 2,000 dead, with another 1,600 lost from among its Eritrean allies. In postwar fighting and the Italian pacification effort, an additional several hundred thousand Ethiopians were killed.

In June 1936, Britain took the lead in dismantling the sanctions, despite the fact that the small neutral states wished to continue them. British prime minister Neville Chamberlain described the continuance of a policy of sanctions as the "very midsummer of madness." This pronouncement was followed on June 18 by a statement from Foreign Minister Anthony Eden confirming the cabinet's decision to propose to the League of Nations that sanctions should be abandoned. Other nations followed suit, and after a polished and moving address on June 30 by Haile Selassie, pleading his cause in person before the league, the assembly adopted a resolution on July 4, 1936, recommending the ending of sanctions.

Italy had won: None of the big powers was prepared to use force to preserve Ethiopian independence, and another crushing blow had been dealt to the belief in the efficacy of collective action to halt aggression. The war also served to give Mussolini an exaggerated sense of Italy's military effectiveness. Colonial Africa's emerging Westernized African middle class was outraged at the invasion and this contributed to an increasing frustration with European rule.

Ethiopian resistance to Italy continued nonetheless, and, in July 1936, Ethiopian patriots attacked Addis Ababa. Their attempt to seize power failed, and most of them were executed. Intermittent Ethiopian resistance continued, and in 1941, British Commonwealth troops liberated the country.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italian Colonial Troops; Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Mekonnen, Welde Mikael

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Ivuna, Battle of (June 23, 1888)

At the Battle of Ivuna on June 23, 1888, King Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo—the leader of the royalist Zulu faction, the uSuthu, who were rebelling against the British, who had annexed the colony of Zululand in 1887—routed Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the principal Zulu ally of the British administration and committed foe of the Zulu royal house.

Following the failure on June 2, 1888, of the black Zululand Police (ZP), supported by British troops, to dislodge Dinuzulu and the uSuthu rebels from their fastness on Ceza Mountain, British authority in the northern parts of the colony of Zululand collapsed. Dinuzulu took the opportunity to raid Zulu who were still loyal to the British and threatened Ivuna, the post of the resident magistrate of Ndwandwe district, Richard Hallowes Addison, where the circular, earthwork fort was held by only 50 ZP. Encamped 900 yards south of the fort, next to the Mbile stream, were the adherents and cattle herds of Prince Ziwedu kaMpande, who had taken shelter there from uSuthu raids. Feeling menaced, on May 31, 1888, Addison ordered up Zibhebhu, who bivouacked with about 800 of his Mandlakazi fighting men (along with numbers of their wives and children) on Ndunu Hill, 800 kilometers to the east of the fort. Zibhebhu proceeded to raid nearby uSuthu adherents, and Dinuzulu decided to launch a surprise attack against him.

On the night of June 22, 1888, about 4,000 uSuthu, along with a few Boer freebooters, marched from Ceza, reaching Ivuna 32 kilometers away, just before daybreak on June 23. The uSuthu advanced against the unprepared Mandlakazi in a traditional formation, with skirmishers to the front of the chest and curving horns, with reserves in support. Dinuzulu led some 40 mounted riflemen supported by uSuthu infantry at the Mandlakazi center, while the horns outflanked the outnumbered Mandlakazi. The uSuthu deliberately did not risk attacking the fort on their right flank. Instead, they veered past it to intercept the disintegrating Mandlakazi fleeing westward toward it under covering fire from the ZP. With their retreat in that direction cut off, Zibhebhu and the Mandlakazi survivors escaped southeastward, pursued by the uSuthu as far as the Mona River, 8 kilometers away. The uSuthu rounded up 1,000 of Ziwedu's cattle and retired toward Ceza with their booty. The ZP sallied out to despatch the uSuthu wounded, while a small mounted patrol of ZP succeeded in recapturing several hundred cattle. Nearly 300 Mandlakazi and 7 of Ziwedu's adherents were killed, along with between 25 and 30 uSuthu.

Believing the Ivuna post now to be untenable, on June 24 the British evacuated the magistrate, garrison, and Mandlakazi survivors to their military camp at Nkonjeni, 48 kilometers to the south, and abandoned all the country north of the Black Mfolozi River to the uSuthu.

John Laband

See also: Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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J

Jaga

The Jaga (also *Yaka*, *Agagi*, *Jiaga,* or *Yaga*) were a band of fierce warriors who invaded the kingdom of Kongo in 1568. They came from the east through the province of Mbata, burning villages and churches and killing indiscriminately. The *mani Kongo Mpangu-a-Nimi* (Álvaro I of Kongo) was forced to flee the capital, Mbanza Kongo (São Salvador), followed by his court. He asked for the help of his fellow Christians and was rescued by the Portuguese, who sent a large body of soldiers under the command of Francisco Gouveia. A combined Kongo-Portuguese military force eventually succeeded in driving the Jaga out of the capital after several years of fighting. The victory over the Jaga was largely credited to the Portuguese use of firearms, for the African warriors were reported to panic and run at the sound of gunfire.

The Jaga probably originated in the region of Yaka, in the Kwango Valley, though some historians believe that they could have originated locally from social unrest experienced in regions such as Makoko (Tyo) or Matamba as a reaction to the pressures created by the increase in the slave trade and the centralization of power in the kingdom of Kongo. Others identify them as the ancestors of the Muyakas, from the lower-middle Kwango River. The Jaga were depicted as bloodthirsty cannibals, which associated them with the *Imbangala*, another band of warriors from Angola. Despite explicit association in the Portuguese sources between these two bands of marauders, it is clear that they were unrelated. While the Jaga invaded Kongo from the east, the Imbangala were "Jagas from the south" and probably originated within the region that the Portuguese called the kingdom of Benguela. Eventually they began applying the term Jaga to any rebellious African leader.

In 1973, historian Joseph Miller theorized that the Jaga had in fact never existed, that there was no invasion of Mbanza Kongo in 1568, and that all stories about them were fabrications of European missionaries, slave traders, and government officials. These foreigners supposedly created these mythical cannibal warriors to justify and conceal their own intentions and activities in Africa. He pointed out that no eyewitness had ever left a written account of the conquest of Mbanza Kongo, and that despite the traumatic outcome of the 1568 invasion, he found no oral record of it among the Bakongo peoples. He went on to affirm that the legend of the Jaga was based on a Portuguese belief in the existence of a single nation of so-called savages within the African continent from where primitive marauder bands originated, some of whom they had encountered not only in Kongo and Ndongo, but also in

Ethiopia and Sierra Leone. Other historians have since written against the "mythical Jaga theory," affirming their existence, as well as reinforcing their origin in the territory of Yaka, basing their arguments not only on linguistic evidence, but also on the trajectory chosen by the invaders through the province of Mbata.

Estevam Thompson

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648): Imbangala; Kongo Empire

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Jameson, Leander Starr (1853–1917)

Dr. Leander Starr Jameson was a colonial administrator in South Africa best known as the leader of the ill-fated Jameson Raid (December 29, 1895–January 2, 1896).

Born in 1853 in Scotland, Jameson trained as a physician and first traveled to Kimberley, Cape Colony, in 1878. He became associated with diamond and later gold mining magnate Cecil J. Rhodes and shared his imperialistic visions. After Rhodes received a charter from the British government on October 29, 1889, for the British South Africa Company (BSAC, also called "the Chartered Company"), Jameson became a company administrator.

Jameson served as administrator of Mashonaland (the eastern region of what is now Zimbabwe). In 1893, he led a force into adjoining Matabeleland, ostensibly to suppress the Ndebele and stop their raiding and incursions into Mashonaland, but in reality to extend the influence of the BSAC. Subsequently, Mashonaland and Matabeleland were combined into the BSAC-ruled territory of Southern Rhodesia.

In 1890, Rhodes became prime minister of the Cape Colony and envisioned British imperial holdings stretching "from the Cape to Cairo," with a federated South Africa. The Boer Transvaal government of President Paul Kruger opposed these plans. Rhodes conceived a plan that would be executed by Jameson to support an *uitlander* (foreigner) rebellion to force Transvaal compliance with this and other proposals.

Jameson, with a force of about 600 mounted troopers with machine guns and artillery, assembled near the Transvaal border. The revolt of disgruntled immigrants in Johannesburg that Jameson was supposed to support never materialized. On December 29, 1895, Jameson decided to dash to Johannesburg to instigate the rebellion. In sum, on January 2, 1896, Jameson's force was surrounded and, after a pitched battle, surrendered to the Boers, led by Piet Cronjé.

Jameson and five of the raiders were returned to England, tried, and imprisoned; Rhodes was forced to resign as prime minister of Cape Colony. After serving a 15-month prison sentence, Jameson returned to South Africa. He served in the Cape Colony Parliament from 1900 to 1902, was besieged in Ladysmith during the Second Anglo-Boer War, and was premier from 1904 to 1908. Jameson played a significant role in the 1908–1909 South African National Convention, which paved the way for the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910. He was made a baronet in 1911 and died in 1917.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Boers; British South Africa Company; Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Kruger, Paul; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28,1900); Rhodes, Cecil John

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Jameson Raid (1895–1896)

The Jameson Raid (December 29, 1895–January 2, 1896) was an ill-fated attempt to support an uprising that would topple the Boer government of the Transvaal (South African Republic) to ensure that foreign (mainly British) immigrants (known as *uitlanders*) were given full political rights. The raid was also intended to eliminate Transvaal resistance to British plans to federate all of South Africa.

Uitlander grievances were subject to exploitation by British imperialists, such as

Cecil J. Rhodes, the diamond- and gold-mining magnate. Rhodes stated that the *uitlanders,* "possessing more than half the land, nine-tenths of the wealth, and paying nineteen-twentieths of the taxes" (Hensman, 1900, p. 1), should be allowed some voice in the government. He had earlier secured Bechuanaland (modern-day Botswana) as a British protectorate and created the charter for the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in 1889. In the following year, Rhodes became prime minister of the Cape Colony and envisioned British imperial holdings stretching from the Cape to Cairo, with a federated South Africa.

The Transvaal government of President Paul Kruger opposed this strategy. Rhodes conceived a plan, apparently with the tacit approval of the colonial secretary, Joseph Chamberlain, and assisted by his colleague Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, to force Transvaal compliance. The plan was for an *uitlander* rebellion that would force the Transvaal to grant full political rights to them; then, in the next election, the *uitlanders* would vote for a government that would support Rhodes's scheme.

Jameson, with a force of about 600 mounted troopers, six Maxim guns, two 7-pounder mountain guns, and a 12.5-pounder artillery piece, assembled within the Cape Colony border. The *uitlander* revolt in Johannesburg was scheduled to take place near the end of December 1895, but it soon became apparent that the uprising "had fizzled out like a damp squib" (Hensman 1900, p. 5). On December 29, 1895, Jameson decided to dash to Johannesburg to instigate the *uitlander* rebellion.

When the raiders crossed into the Transvaal, they cut a number of telegraph wires to prevent early warning of their approach, but in the confusion, they apparently did not cut the wire to Pretoria. On January 1, 1896, Jameson and his men met Boer opposition, led by Piet Cronjé, at Krugersdorp, and on the following day, they were surrounded at Doornkop. The Jameson Raiders attempted to fight their way out of Boer encirclement and suffered 16 men killed and 49 wounded before surrendering to the Boers, who saw only 1 man killed.

The fiasco of Jameson's unsuccessful raid had far-reaching repercussions. Jameson and five of the raiders were returned to England, tried, and imprisoned, and Rhodes was forced to resign as prime minister of Cape Colony. On the other hand, Kruger's prestige was enhanced in South Africa, as well as in Europe. A treaty of mutual assistance between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State was concluded in 1897, and both republics modernized the capabilities of their military forces. Finally, the trust between Britain and the Boers was shattered, with some people believing that war was inevitable.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); British South Africa Company; Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; Jameson, Leander Starr; Kruger, Paul; Rhodes, Cecil John

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Jantjie, Luka (c. 1835–1897)

Luka Jantjie is a 19th-century resistance hero against British colonialism in South Africa. Born in 1835 in today's Northern Cape Province of South Africa, Jantjie was raised by a Christian convert father and educated in a missionary school. He was a *kgosi* (leader) of the Phuduhutswana branch of the Batlhaping, which are one of the Setswana-speaking peoples of southern Africa. The majority of the Tswana live in modern-day Botswana and northern South Africa.

Afrikaners, otherwise known as Boers, were white colonists of Dutch heritage that had started settling the Cape in 1652. By the 1830s, due to British annexation, Afrikaners were fleeing the Cape for the interior. This movement is known as the "Great Trek." By 1858, Afrikaner farmers had started to settle the river valleys around Jantjie's ancestral home. Such close proximity between Africans and Afrikaners resulted in the first violent colonial conflict that Jantjie and his people faced. In 1867, the discovery of diamonds near modern-day Kimberley brought colonial conflict to the region.

Through a series of questionable deals, the British annexed most of the Batlhaping land by 1871, causing Jantjie to lose control of much of his ancestral home. During this process, Jantjie insisted that the British respect the individual and collective rights of the Batlhaping. He submitted many written petitions appealing for British justice in recognizing Batlhaping land claims. Despite this, the British honored colonial land claims and limited the land holdings of Jantjie's people to the extent that they could no longer support their cattle-grazing culture. After an extended struggle with British colonial officials, Jantjie decided to move his people to the Langeberg Mountains in 1895. This dry region, west of his ancestral home, had not yet come under British control. Despite hopes of freedom from colonial infiltration, raiding and looting by both white colonists and Africans increased tensions within the region.

Despite these incursions, Jantjie was determined to protect his people's rights to land and their cattle-raising culture. He refused to be treated as a second-class citizen in his own land, thus becoming a symbol of rebellion to the British. As a result, Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund H. Dalgety and a military force of over 2,000 men began a siege of the Langeberg Mountains in January 1897. Unfortunately, a few days into the siege, a deadly cattle disease called rinderpest struck the few cattle left to Jantjie's people. The ground was too hard to bury them, so they rotted in the open, polluting the water supply. As a result, after approximately six months, Jantjie and his people succumbed to the siege. He was killed on July 30, 1897, in the final days of the battle.

South African history has largely forgotten Jantjie's story, despite his role as one of the first African leaders to confront British colonialism in the wake of the diamond rush. He struggled to maintain his own dignity, and he died trying to protect the rights and freedom of his people. His refusal to accept second-class status under a colonial regime served to inspire his people in the years to come.

Cacee Hoyer

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857)

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Joffre, Joseph (1852–1931)

Joseph Joffre was the French army general and commander-in-chief of French forces. Born on January 12, 1852, at Rivesaltes, Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre interrupted his studies at the École Polytechnique to fight in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871. After the war, he reentered the École Polytechnique, graduated, and was commissioned in the engineers. For several years, Joffre was assigned to the task of restoring French fortresses.

In 1885, Joffre volunteered for Far Eastern service, where as a captain, he was assigned to the staff of Vice Admiral Amédée Courbet, commanding the French China Squadron. Courbet entrusted him with organizing the defenses of Kelung (Chilung) in Formosa, which France had just seized. In 1892, Joffre was sent to Africa to complete a railway in French Sudan from Kayes to Bamako that would join the Senegal and Niger rivers. In February 1894, he commanded a force that seized Timbuktu—an exploit that secured his promotion to lieutenant-colonel. General Joseph Galliéni, governor of Madagascar, then entrusted him with organizing the French base of Diego-Suarez. In less than three years, Joffre undertook the construction of barracks, shops, docks, and installations for 11 coastal defense batteries.

Promoted to general of brigade in 1902, Joffre assumed the post of director of engineers at Paris in 1904. Promoted to general of division in 1905, he was named vice president of the Supreme War Council in 1910. In 1911, he was appointed chief of the General Staff, which meant that in the event of war, he would be commander-in-chief of the French armies. As chief of staff, Joffre carried out a major reorganization of the army, including the removal of many older leaders, the institution of three years of service for conscripts, and detailed mobilization planning that would use the French railroad network.

War Plan XVII, the French military plan developed under Joffre's direction, stressed the doctrine of the offensive and completely ignored the German war plan. Joffre assumed that there would be insufficient German troops available for a wide sweep through Belgium (he did not anticipate the Germans using reserves on the front lines). He expected the German attack to issue from Lorraine, and his own plan called for five divisions to be situated facing east and northeast that would attack between Belfort and Mézières.

Upon the German declaration of war, the French completed their mobilization swiftly and efficiently, in sharp contrast to 1870. Joffre then initiated his offensive plan. But on August 20, the German left-wing armies rebuffed the two advancing French right-wing armies at Sarreborough and Morhange. Three days later, the two French armies in the center were also forced to withdraw, followed by the remaining French army and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the left wing. Joffre refused to panic; instead, he ordered a steady, methodical withdrawal back to Paris. Perhaps his greatest service to France was in simply holding the army together in this perilous time.

The Germans then modified their strategic plan, allowing additional French forces in a new army, the Sixth, to issue from Paris and begin the First Battle of the Marne. Joffre ordered the French army to stand and fight and the men to die where they stood rather than retreat farther. Faulty German dispositions opened a break in their lines, enabling the French to win the most important battle of the war and save Paris. Although General Joseph Galliéni, military governor of Paris, had played an instrumental role in developing the battle plan, Joffre received most of the public credit for the "Miracle of the Marne."

The Battle of the Marne was the high point of Joffre's career. Following the so-called Race to the Sea, in which both armies tried to outflank the other, fighting on the Western Front settled into the stalemate of trench warfare. Joffre persisted in launching a series of offensives to dislodge the Germans from their positions in France. All his major offensives of 1915 and 1916, including Champagne, Artois, and the Somme, were costly failures, with higher casualties for the French than the defending Germans. Joffre maintained that such nibbling tactics were draining German resources and that they convinced Italy to join the Entente in 1915, easing the pressure on both the Russians on the eastern front and the French defenders at the Battle of Verdun in 1916.

By 1916, Joffre was under heavy attack for the high casualties that accompanied his offensive strategy. In addition, he was caught by surprise by the German offensive at Verdun, despite warnings from a number of sources. He was also blamed for the Romanian debacle that same year. On December 13, 1916, Joffre was removed from his post and promoted to military advisor to the government, his disgrace mollified by his elevation to marshal of France. Joffre toured the United States in April and May 1917 just as the United States entered the war. He also made official visits to Britain in 1918, Romania in 1920, and Japan in 1921. Elected to the French Academy in 1920, Joffre spent the last years of his life drafting his memoirs, which were published posthumously. Joffre died in Paris on January 3, 1931, and the government accorded him a state funeral.

Philippe Haudrère and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Galliéni, Joseph; Madagascar, French Conquest of (1882–1905); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898)

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Joubert, Petrus Jacobus (1831–1900)

Petrus Jacobus Joubert served as vice president and commandant-general of the Republic of the Transvaal during the late 19th century. His ineffective leadership during the Second Anglo-Boer War contributed to the defeat of his nation and its annexation to South Africa.

Joubert was born on January 21, 1831, in Groot Swartberg, in the British-ruled Cape Colony in South Africa. His parents, Jozua and Esther Joubert, were poor Afrikaner farmers. By the mid-1830s, many of the Boers in the region were chafing under British rule. They decided to emigrate across the Orange River and place themselves outside the Cape Colony's jurisdiction. This movement became known as the "Great Trek" or "Boer Trek."

When Joubert was six years old, his parents joined a Trek party led by Piet Retief. The family eventually settled in Natal. Joubert's father was unable to make his new farm prosper, however, and when he died in 1843, he left the family in desperate poverty. Esther Joubert took the family to the Afrikaner Republic of the Transvaal in 1847, and in 1848, she married Daniel Riekert. Joubert's mother and stepfather both died in 1853.

Joubert's impoverished pioneer upbringing offered him little opportunity for formal education. However, his mother and grandparents gave him a basic education and inspired in him a great love of learning. He educated himself about a variety of subjects, particularly the law. In 1851, Joubert married Hendrina Botha. They had eight children and remained married until Joubert's death in 1900.

The couple settled down to a life of farming at Rustfontein in the Transvaal. Joubert proved a very capable farmer and soon established himself as an important landowner in the region. He also made a name for himself as a trader and a property manager. Eventually, he became one of the most important businessmen in the Transvaal, with interests in a variety of enterprises.

In 1860, Joubert was elected to the Transvaal assembly, or *volksrad.* However, he was not yet 30, and therefore was too young to serve. He was elected again in 1865, and this time he was old enough to take his seat. In 1873, he was made chairman of the assembly, and when the Transvaal's president, T. F. Burgers, went abroad in 1875, Joubert served in his place. When Burgers returned in 1876, Joubert resigned from the *volksrad,* possibly because he was unwilling to return to the assembly after having served as president. In 1876, he led a failed Boer assault on the mountain stronghold of the Pedi.

By the late 1870s, the British authorities in Cape Colony were becoming increasingly desirous to bring the Afrikaner republics under British rule. In 1877, the British took the first step in this plan by annexing the Transvaal. The republic was by this time debt-ridden and under threat of attack from powerful neighboring African kingdoms. However, most of the citizens of the republic were hostile to the annexation. The British action inspired Joubert to return to politics. In 1878, he joined a delegation that traveled to London to negotiate with the British government. The delegation failed to gain anything for the Afrikaners, and it returned to the Transvaal in 1879. At a subsequent meeting held in Wonderfontein, many *volksrad* members supported a rebellion against British rule. However, Joubert and others counseled caution.

Joubert again embarked on a series of diplomatic missions with British leaders throughout South Africa. Faced with their intransigence, he returned to the *volksrad* in September 1879 and announced that the time for negotiations had passed. When British prime minister William Gladstone rejected the demands of the Transvaalers in August 1880, Joubert determined that his state's independence could be won only by force. In December 1880, the *volksrad* declared the return of republican government to the Transvaal and chose Joubert, Paul Kruger, and Martinus Pretorius to rule the nation as a triumvirate. Joubert was also appointed commandant-general of the army. His government won a brief campaign against the British, and in 1881, Joubert helped negotiate a treaty recognizing the Transvaal's independence. Joubert remained one of the three rulers of the state until he lost a presidential election against Kruger in 1883. He then became the vice president of the Transvaal and served as acting president when Kruger went to London in September 1883.

Over the next several years, Joubert lost several presidential elections to Kruger. However, he retained an active role in Transvaal politics. He also continued to serve as commandant general and led several campaigns against African states on the republic's borders. These included the Boer-Gananwa War of 1894, when he led the largest commando ever assembled in the Transvaal up to that time, and the 1898 conquest of the Venda.

His greatest challenge as the military leader of the Transvaal was in preparing the nation for the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899. He has been criticized for failing to arm and train the Afrikaner troops adequately in the years preceding the war. Once war broke out, he decided to lead the Transvaal's armies in the field, leaving others to organize and implement strategy. Joubert proved to be a dilatory commander, unwilling to aggressively follow up victories and unable to maintain discipline among his troops. His strategy of besieging British forces ultimately accomplished little and acted as a tremendous drain on his army's resources.

In September 1899, he left the front to attend a meeting of the republic's military commanders in Pretoria. After the conference, Joubert became sick and died suddenly in Pretoria on March 27, 1900. He was replaced as commander of Transvaal forces by the younger, charismatic, and dynamic Louis Botha.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Gananwa War (1894); Boers; Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898); Botha, Louis; Commando System (Boer Republics); Kruger, Paul; Makhado; The Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Pretorius, Marthinus Wessel; Retief, Piet

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K

Kabarega (c. 1850–1923)

Chwa Il Kabarega was the last independent mukama (king) of the East African state of Bunyoro, one of the four traditional kingdoms of Uganda. His resistance to British imperialism made him a national hero in Uganda.

Kabarega was born around 1850 in Bunyoro, one of the sons of the current mukama, Kamurasi. When Kamurasi died in 1869, Kabarega fought a civil war against one of his brothers over the right to succeed their father. With the aid of King Mutesa I, the leader of the neighboring state of Buganda, Kabarega emerged victorious in 1870. However, the war left Bunyoro devastated.

Once established on the throne, Kabarega embarked on a campaign to consolidate his hold on power and reclaim neighboring land that Bunyoro had lost during the previous century. He strengthened his government by replacing many of the Nyoro aristocrats who dominated his administration with commoners responsible to himself alone. He also created one of the first standing armies in the region and armed them with guns purchased from Arab traders from the coast. In 1876, he scored a major victory when he brought the Toro kingdom back under Bunyoro rule.

Bunyoro's independence was threatened by the neighboring Buganda kingdom of Mutesa I, as well as by representatives of the Egyptian government who sought to bring Kabarega's kingdom under Egyptian administration. Kabarega remained at war with Buganda for most of the 1880s and repulsed an attempted invasion mounted in 1886 by King Mwanga II, the successor of Mutesa I.

In 1872, English adventurer Samuel Baker arrived in Bunyoro as a representative of the Egyptian government. Baker came with a force of Sudanese infantry and intended to claim Bunyoro on behalf of the Egyptian khedive. Baker formed an unfavorable impression of Kabarega and encouraged Runyonga, one of the Kabarega's chiefs, to rebel against him. Kabarega put down Runyonga's rebellion, however, and drove Baker out of Bunyoro.

Baker's poor opinion of Kabarega nevertheless influenced future British dealings with the king. In 1876, General Charles Gordon became the new governor of the Egyptian Sudan and began planning the annexation of Bunyoro. He sent his representative, Emin Pasha, to negotiate with Kabarega. The two men developed a good relationship, and Egyptian efforts to annex the kingdom stalled. In 1881, the threat from the north of Bunyoro subsided as the Mahdi's Muslim resistance movement in Sudan swept the Egyptian administration back into Egypt. By 1890, Bunyoro's territory appeared secure, and Kabarega had emerged from a turbulent decade as a powerful monarch.

By the end of 1890, however, a new threat appeared that would ultimately drive Kabarega from power. Frederick Lugard arrived in neighboring Buganda as a representative of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). As he entered negotiations with the leader of Buganda, he adopted the Bugandan mistrust of Kabarega. Despite Kabarega's attempts to negotiate, Lugard appeared intent on destroying the state of Bunyoro. In 1891, his army helped the Toro kingdom free itself from Bunyoro. When Lugard's troops left Toro in 1893, Kabarega reconquered the kingdom. By this time, however, the British had declared a protectorate over all of Uganda. With Buganda's help, a British force invaded Bunyoro in 1894. Kabarega initially held the attackers off, but he was eventually forced to retreat and resort to guerrilla warfare. Even after the Bugandan leader Mwanga II became disillusioned with British rule and switched to Kabarega's side, they could not defeat the British. The two African leaders nevertheless waged a guerrilla war of resistance against the British until they were finally captured in 1899. Kabarega lost part of his arm in the final skirmish.

The British sent them into exile on the Seychelle Islands. During his 24 years of exile, Kabarega learned to read and converted to Christianity. He returned to Uganda in 1923 but died shortly after his arrival.

James Burns

See also: East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore); Gordon, Charles George; Lugard, Frederick; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Mwanga II

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Kashgil (Shaykan or El Obeid), Battle of (November 3–5, 1883)

The Egyptian government sent a large force under the command of Major-General William Hicks Pasha to the Sudan in 1883 to suppress the uprising caused by the Mahdi and his dervish army. Many of the members of Hicks's Sudan Force were members of the Egyptian army who had been dismissed after the 1882 Urabi Rebellion and later imprisoned. As part of their punishment, they had been marched in chains to the Sudan, and they were demoralized and relatively ineffective.

After a month of drilling and training, Hicks led his force out of Khartoum on April 29, 1883, and defeated a dervish force a few days later at Jebel Ard. Hicks's force killed over 500 dervishes at a cost of 7 of his soldiers killed. This surprising victory showed that the dervishes could be defeated and gave the Sudan Force considerable confidence. Hicks led his force back to Khartoum to continue training and plan the next phase of his campaign.

On September 9, 1883, Hicks's 10,000-man force, which consisted of regular and irregular infantry and cavalry, 16 guns, 6 Nordenfeldt machine guns, and about 5,000 camels with 2,000 camp followers, advanced into the Kordofan Desert toward the Mahdi's headquarters at El Obeid. "Here, we have nine thousand infantry," wrote an observer, commenting on the poor quality of the force, "that fifty good men could rout in ten minutes, [and] one thousand cavalry and bashi-bazooks [irregulars] that have never learned to ride" (Neillands, 1996, p. 71), to face a Mahdist army estimated at 70,000.

Hicks's force established a supply base at El Duam on the Nile. His plan was to march 320 kilometers west to El Obeid, where the Mahdists were besieging the Egyptian garrison. Although the Mahdists captured El Obeid before Hicks's column set out, the mission launched with the new objective of rescuing the Austrian-born Egyptian governor of Darfur, Rudolf Carl von Slatin. Departing from this location on September 27, 1883, the Sudan Force took the longer of two proposed routes, believing it to have a better water supply. The force, led by guides who may have been Mahdist sympathizers, plodded clumsily in a large, hollow square formation through the desert for over a month, harassed constantly by dervish patrols.

Discipline and cohesion broke down, and on November 3, 1883, the Sudan Force arrived at Kashgil, about 65 kilometers south of El Obeid. Dervishes, armed with thousands of rifles captured earlier, were waiting at Kashgil and poured a continual fire into the Egyptian square. Hicks's force continued to try to advance on November 4, and either late that day or on November 5, the dervishes launched a main assault that shattered the square. The Egyptian soldiers made little effort to resist and were slaughtered. Fewer than 300 soldiers out of the 10,000-man force survived the massacre. Hicks, reportedly fighting courageously, was one of the last men killed. As was the Sudanese custom, Hicks and other leaders were decapitated and their heads given to the Mahdi.

The defeat of Hicks's force at Kashgil, also called the Battle of Shaykan or the Battle of El Obeid, prompted Osman Digna to join the Mahdist movement and lead a rebellion against Egyptian rule in the eastern Sudan near the Red Sea coast. In turn, the British decided that the Egyptians should abandon the Sudan and in early 1884 sent Charles Gordon, who had governed part of the southern Sudan, to organize the withdrawal.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Egyptian Army; Gordon, Charles George; Hicks, William; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Osman Digna; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Urabi Rebellion (1882)

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Khalifa (1846–1899)

The Khalifa, meaning "successor" or "steward" in Arabic, was Abdullahi ibn

Mohammed, the handpicked successor to the Mahdi. When the Madhi died in 1885, the Khalifa continued his predecessor's policy of uniting the Sudan and transforming it into an Islamic state called the Mahdiya.

Abdullahi ibn Mohammed, from the cattle-grazing Baggara people of the Sudan's western Darfur province, was older than the Mahdi, whom he first met in about 1880. While he was a capable administrator, the Khalifa was also cruel and cunning. Even though he was the Mahdi's designated successor, he was only one of three caliphs chosen by the Mahdi, emulating the Prophet Mohammed. As a result, the Khalifa also had to overcome the opposition of the others and purged the Mahdiya of members of the Mahdi's family. He was not able to effectively consolidate power until 1891.

In the meantime, the Khalifa wanted to achieve the Mahdi's goal of conquering Egypt but was defeated by the British at the Battle of Ginnis on December 30, 1885. The Khalifa's fundamentalist rule was oppressive, with internal unrest and tense regional relations. In 1887, a 60,000-man dervish army invaded Ethiopia, and the Ethiopians invaded the Sudan two years later. The Khalifa's best general invaded Egypt, but his force was soundly defeated by British-led Egyptian troops at the Battle of Toski (August 3, 1889), ending the belief in dervish invincibility. The Belgians and the Italians also repulsed dervish invasions of their territories.

The British began their reconquest of the Sudan in earnest in 1896. A number of engagements were fought, culminating in the Battle of Omdurman, near Khartoum, on September 2, 1898. The 26,000-man Anglo-Egyptian force, commanded by Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener and fully utilizing its superior firepower, killed about 11,000 dervishes in the five-hour battle while losing 48 dead and about 400 wounded.

The Khalifa escaped, and operations continued to subdue the dervishes. The British finally defeated the dervishes and killed the Khalifa and many of his key subordinates at the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat on November 24, 1899. The Mahdiya died with the Khalifa.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Ginnis, Battle of (December 30, 1885); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Toski, Battle of (August 3, 1889)

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Khama III (1837–1923)

Khama was a champion of British rule in the area that is now South Africa. He was an early convert to Christianity and a leading supporter of Christian missionaries throughout the region. With his cooperation, the British declared a protectorate over his Tswana kingdom in 1885.

Khama was born in 1837 in Mushu, a village in the area of the current-day Botswana. He was the son of Sekgoma I, the ruler of the Ngwato, a Tswana-speaking community. His father's rule as chief was punctuated by several periods of exile. During one of these times, in 1858, Sekgoma and Khama went to live among the neighboring Kwena people. There, they met a German priest who introduced them to Christianity. When they returned to the Ngwato in 1859, Khama brought the priest with him, and in 1860, the priest baptized Khama and his brother.

A few years later, members of the London Missionary Society arrived among the Ngwato, where they received a warm welcome from Khama. From then on, he became one of the leading advocates of the Protestant missionary cause in southern Africa. With Khama's support, the London Missionary Society became the preeminent mission organization in the region.

Khama rose to prominence through his skills as a military leader. When he was a young man, the Ngwato faced the threat of Ndebele warriors based in the southwest of modern Zimbabwe. In 1863, Khama organized resistance to the raiding of the Ndebele led by King Lobengula and became a very popular figure among the Ngwato. By developing a light cavalry force and operating from the safety of the natural defense of the Shoshong Mountains, Khama kept the Ndebele attacks from threatening the independence of his father's kingdom.

Sekgoma faced other challenges to his authority as chief of the Ngwato, however. Among his opponents was his brother Macheng. Sekgoma also feared the growing popularity of his son Khama, and believed that Khama's adoption of Christianity was a betrayal of ancient customs. When Khama refused, as a Christian, to participate in a traditional initiation ceremony, Sekgoma had him removed as heir to the throne. Initially, Khama allied with his uncle against his father, but in 1872, he tried to seize power for himself. This attempt failed, and Khama spent the next three years in exile. In 1875, he returned and finally forced his father from power. Except for one brief period in 1882, Khama remained the unquestioned ruler of the Ngwato for the rest of his life.

As ruler, Khama recognized the threat posed by Europeans to the independence of the Ngwato. In particular, he feared the white farmers (Boers) from the Transvaal Republic that lay southeast of his kingdom. Khama determined that the Ngwato could be saved from Boer encroachment only through the help of the British. In 1876, he announced his desire to have British protection, though it took nine years before he was able to welcome the British official Charles Warren, who declared a protectorate in 1885 largely to prevent the Boers from linking up with the Germans who had recently arrived in South West Africa (today's Namibia). Khama's Ngwato and other Tswana kingdoms became part of the British protectorate of Bechuanaland.

With British protection, Khama was able to fend off the advances of both the Boer settlers and, to a lesser extent, the agents of Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company (BSAC). As an ardent supporter of British interests in the region, Khama allied with the BSAC during the invasion of the Ndebele kingdom in 1893. Khama provided Rhodes with around 1,800 fighters, about half of whom were armed with Martini-Henry breech-loading rifles. Yet Khama resisted in 1895, when representatives of Rhodes's company attempted to acquire control of Bechuanaland. He vigorously opposed this proposal and traveled to London with two other Tswana chiefs to present his objection in person. His personal diplomacy rescued the protectorate from Rhodes's agents and maintained the autonomy of the kingdom.

In the meantime, Khama ruled his own people in an autocratic way, demanding and receiving their respect but creating divisions as well. He alienated many of his subjects by opposing traditional religious and social customs that he believed to be incompatible with Christianity. Abolishing initiation ceremonies and circumcision, he made Christianity the official religion and instituted observance of the Sunday sabbath. Khama partially did away with bride payments and polygamy. He also restricted the consumption of alcohol, which gave him greater control over the white traders in the region.

With the support of the British and the London Missionary Society, Khama built schools and organized a police corps. He also introduced the ideas of scientific cattle breeding. Over the years, he expanded his kingdom by absorbing other peoples and integrating them, although he did not tolerate slavery.

Khama quarreled with his son, Sekgoma II, and drove him into exile between 1898 and 1910. The two eventually reconciled, and Sekgoma II became chief of the Ngwato when Khama died on February 21, 1923.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); British South Africa Company; Lobengula kaMilikazi; Rhodes, Cecil John; Warren, Charles

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Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879)

The Battle of Khambula on March 29, 1879, was the most decisive battle of the Anglo-Zulu War and marked the turning point of the conflict. The overconfident Zulu veterans of the victorious Battle of Isandlwana (January 22, 1879) were routed by the British No. 4 Column, and the morale of the Zulu army was irreparably damaged.

Colonel Evelyn Wood's No. 4 (Left) Column of some 2,200 men had invaded northwestern Zululand in early January 1879. The defeat of the No. 3 Column at

Isandlwana threw the No. 4 Column on the defensive, and Wood withdrew to Khambula Hill, where on January 31, he formed an entrenched camp. From this base, Wood conducted a vigorous campaign, sending out many mounted patrols and fighting a number of successful skirmishes against local irregular Zulu forces. When the Zulu king, Cetshwayo kaMpande, decided in mid-March to resume the offensive against the invading British, he directed his reassembled army of 17,000 men against Wood because the No. 4 Column seemed to pose the most immediate threat. He entrusted supreme command to Chief Mnyamana kaNgqengelele, his chief *induna* (councillor). Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole, one of the two senior Zulu generals at Isandlwana, was to be the battlefield commander.

Having been ritually prepared for war, the Zulu army advanced northwest from oNdini, Cetshwayo's great place, on March 24. A further 3,000 abaQulusi and other local irregulars were detailed to reinforce it while on the march. Unaware that the Zulu army was approaching, on March 28, Wood mounted a strong raid on Hlobane, a great flat-topped mountain 24 kilometers east of Khambula, which the abaQulusi and other irregulars were using as their base and refuge for their livestock. The abaQulusi, supported by elements of the Zulu army advancing across the plain to the south, surrounded and nearly cut off Wood's force of mounted men and African auxiliaries on top of Hlobane.

Pursued by the Zulu, the badly mauled survivors retreated to Khambula and prepared to defend their camp. Wood stationed the bulk of his British infantry in a strongly fortified wagon laager and placed smaller detachments in an earthwork redoubt to the east along the ridge connected to a stone-walled cattle laager to its south. Six 7-pounder guns were deployed in the redoubt and the open space between the three fortified positions. The garrison numbered 2,086 officers and men, of whom 132 were African mounted infantry.

About 11 A.M., the Zulu army began its advance in five columns from its bivouac on the banks of the White Mfolozi River 19 kilometers from Khambula, halting at midday on the low hills about 6.5 kilometers southeast of the camp. Cetshwayo, who himself had planned the campaign, instructed his commanders not to assault the fortified camp, but rather to draw the British into the open by threatening their line of supply westward to the British Transvaal Territory. But Mnyamana was overruled by the vainglorious younger warriors, who insisted on a direct assault on Khambula.

Shortly before midday, the Zulu army began deploying on a front extending over 16 kilometers and the British struck their tents and took up their battle stations. An hour later, the Zulu's left horn halted when about 5 kilometers away, but at 1:30 P.M., the right horn began an unsupported attack on the northern side of the camp. It seems that the iNgobamakhosi *ibutho* (age-grade regiment) intended thereby to upstage their rivals, the uKhandempemvu (or uMcijo) of the left horn. In any event, these uncoordinated movements disrupted the Zulu plan for enveloping the camp and attacking it simultaneously on all sides. When the right horn was about 800 meters away, two squadrons of mounted troops sallied out to sting it into a committed attack.

The British artillery opened fire at 1:45 P.M. Caught in an enfilading fire from the redoubt and laager, the right horn fell back to rocky outcrops northeast of the camp, where it took cover. At about 2:15 p.m.,the Zulu left and center began their belated assault from the south, coming on in a series of great waves and taking advantage of the dead ground. They dislodged the garrison from the cattle kraal and seriously threatened the main laager.

Several companies of the 13th and 90th Regiments sortied at about 3 p.m. and drove the Zulu back from the laager at bayonet point before being forced to retire in turn under enfilading fire from Zulu marksmen. For two more hours, the Zulu continued to attack, coming at one stage up to the trenches of the redoubt. Thwarted, at 4:30 p.m., the Zulu center switched its assault to the eastern face of the British position when the previously repulsed right horn supported it with a fresh advance. The British held the Zulu at about 300 yards and, in a counterattack at 5:30 p.m. retook the cattle kraal and advanced to fire on the Zulu sheltering in the dead ground.

Daunted at last, the Zulu began to retire in orderly fashion, but three columns of mounted troops sallied out and transformed their withdrawal into a rout. The Zulu commanders failed to rally their exhausted and demoralized men and the horsemen harried them until nightfall as far as Zungwini Mountain, 16 kilometers east. Over the next days, the British and their African auxiliaries scoured the neighborhood of the camp and killed the wounded or those who were hiding. Three British officers and 25 of their men died in the battle. Zulu casualties certainly exceed 1,000.

With the dispersal of their defeated army, the Zulu were thrown entirely on the defensive for the remainder of the war, and Cetshwayo found it difficult to reassemble his dispirited men for the final battle at Ulundi on July 4.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Mnyamana kaNgqengelele; Ntshingwayo kaMahole; Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900)

Located close to the borders of the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, the town of Kimberley was situated in the northern part of the British Cape Colony and was home to the world's largest diamond mining operation, conducted by Cecil Rhodes's De Beers Company. At the start of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Boer plans hinged on taking control of the northern Cape to prevent the British from bringing forces north by rail. This led to Boer sieges of British garrisons at Mafeking and Kimberley.

Given tensions between the British and Boers, De Beers began planning the defense of Kimberley in 1896 and established an arms depot and volunteer defense force. In early October 1899, Colonel Robert Kekewich, with four companies of the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment supported by some engineers and six mountain guns and two machine guns, were sent to defend Kimberley. The town was also defended by 120 Cape Police, 2,000 irregulars (including the Kimberley Light Horse), a battery of obsolete 7-pounder guns, and eight more machine guns. Since Rhodes had been behind the 1895 Jameson Raid, which had inflamed tensions with the Boers, his associates and some residents of Kimberley warned him to stay away, as his presence might antagonize the Boers. However, Rhodes moved to Kimberley just days before the siege, thinking that his presence would prompt the British military to devote more resources to the relief of the town.

On October 15, 4,800 Boers commanded by the Free State general Christian Wessels began what would turn into a four-month siege of Kimberley. The Boers blocked the railway and cut the telegraph lines that linked Kimberley to the outside world and shut off the town's water supply. The Boers believed that their shelling, which they began on November 7 and conducted regularly except for Sundays, and hunger would compel the defenders to surrender. In January 1900, Ignatius Ferreira took command of the Boer siege forces. The British commander Kekewich declared martial law in the town. The British twice tried to send out African migrant workers, but the Boers drove them back, putting more pressure on Kimberley's food supplies. At the end of November, the British launched two raids on Boer positions to try to distract them from the approach of an ultimately unsuccessful relief force from Magersfontein. The first raid was a success, with the capture of 33 Boers, but the second failed, and the raid commander, Major Scott Turner of the Black Watch, was killed.

Since Kimberley was the headquarters of the De Beers Company, the personnel, engineering skill, and resources of the mining industry were diverted to protect the town. Tunnels were dug as bombardment shelters, 21-meter tall mine dumps became fortified observation posts, and barbed wire obstacles fronted trenches. American George Labram, the chief mechanical engineer at De Beers, installed a water supply system using water stored in the mines, built a large refrigeration unit to preserve meat from cattle that had to be slaughtered rather than let them be captured by the Boers, fabricated an armored train used for armed reconnaissance missions, manufactured artillery ammunition, and constructed a unique 28-pounder cannon called "Long Cecil," which had a range of 6,000 meters and fired 225 shells at the Boer lines. The Boers responded by deploying a French-made 155-mm Creusot field gun called "Long Tom," which could hit anywhere in Kimberley and forced people to take shelter underground.

Labram was killed on February 9, 1900, when a Boer shell hit his hotel room. Trapped in Kimberley, Rhodes meddled constantly in military issues, clashed with Kekewich, and set up his own heliograph to send personal messages to higher authorities. As with other sieges in this conflict, the whites largely survived because the rations for blacks were cut, and almost all the 1,500 people who died in Kimberley were Africans.

Although the British general Sir Redvers Buller planned to advance directly on the Boer capitals of Bloemfontein and Pretoria, public opinion in Britain that had partly been shaped by Rhodes's personal efforts meant that the sieges of Kimberley, Mafeking, and Ladysmith had to be lifted first. This caused Buller to divide his forces between the Cape and Natal. A 10,000-strong British force under Lord Methuen, intending to relieve Kimberley and then Mafeking, was defeated by the Boers at the Battle of the Modder River on November 28, 1899, and the Battle of Magersfontein on December 11, 1899. Methuen's men were halted just 20 kilometers from Kimberley.

In January 1900, Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts assumed command from Buller and assembled a force of 30,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 3,600 mounted infantry around the Orange and Modder rivers. The cavalry were formed into a single large division and placed under Major-General John French. In February 1900, Roberts initiated his offensive in the Cape by moving a huge force west along the railway toward Kimberley and then suddenly diverting east, to a point just south of Bloemfontein. Although the Boers concentrated 8,000 men around Magersfontein to deflect an anticipated British push on Kimberley, the British moved east to outflank them and then constantly changed directions to create confusion. Between February 11 and 15, the Boers deployed a thin crescent defense to the south, and simultaneously French's cavalry secured crossing points on the Orange River. The British then advanced on Kimberley, causing the Boers to abandon both that town and Magersfontein.

Successfully charging a force of 900 Boers sent to block them, French's cavalry entered Kimberley on the evening of February 15. French ignored Kekewich and presented himself to Rhodes. On February 17, French's cavalry caught up with the retreating Boers on the Modder River near Paardeberg, where 10 days later, after the arrival of British infantry and artillery, some 4,000 surrendered, with another 4,000 killed or wounded. To honor those who had died during the siege, Rhodes commissioned the construction of a memorial in Kimberley featuring Long Cecil and shells from Long Tom.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; French, John D. P.; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Methuen, Lord; Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899); Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Rhodes, Cecil John; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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King's African Rifles (to 1914)

During the mid-1890s, the British government took over the administration of Uganda and the East Africa Protectorate (later named Kenya) from the struggling

Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC). This prompted the creation of formal colonial military units in these territories. In September 1895, the new British administration in Uganda created the Uganda Rifles with 800 men and brought in the 27th Bombay Light Infantry from India. Between 1895 and 1900, the Uganda Rifles participated in operations against the pastoral Nandi in neighboring Kenya, who were raiding the colonial road from the coast into Uganda. In 1897–1898, several hundred of the new regiment's Sudanese soldiers, frustrated by low pay and indifferent officers, mutinied and joined the rebels from Buganda and Bunyoro. By 1900, the Uganda Rifles consisted of 36 British officers, 21 British sergeants, and 1,952 African soldiers organized into 16 companies.

In September 1895, the 866 African troops of the IBEAC spread across the East Africa Protectorate were formed into the East Africa Rifles, headquartered at Mombasa. As in Uganda, it was supported by a contingent of several hundred Indian troops. In 1898, the regiment was reorganized with a total of 20 British officers and 1,000 African soldiers organized into five companies of Sudanese and four of Swahili. In 1895–1896, the new unit took part in operations against Swahili rebels on the coast, in the late 1890s, it fought against mutineers and rebels in Uganda, and between 1898 and 1901, it participated in several punitive expeditions against Somali groups in Jubaland on the border of Italian Somaliland.

In 1889, the British claimed the territory south and west of Lake Nyasa that was eventually dubbed the Central African Protectorate and later renamed Nyasaland. The first unit of British-led African soldiers there had been formed by Frederick Lugard, under the authority of the African Lakes Company, during the initial campaign against the Swahili-Arab slavers in 1888. In 1891, a contingent of Indian soldiers was imported to protect the new administrative center of Zomba, and conflict escalated with Yao and Swahili-Arab slavers around the lake. By 1893, the British military presence consisted of three British officers, 200 Indian Sikhs, 150 African regular soldiers, and a fluctuating number of African auxiliaries.

In 1896, Nyasaland's colonial military establishment was formalized by the creation of the Central Africa Rifles (CAR—renamed the Central Africa Regiment in 1900), consisting of six companies of 120 men each. Located at forts spread out across the territory, the companies with ethnically oriented, with three of Tonga, two of Yao, and one of Marimba. As Indian troops and African mercenaries from the neighboring Portuguese territory were phased out, the British in Nyasaland began to see the Yao (and eventually Ngoni) as particularly martial people and focused military recruitment on them. During the late 1890s, the CAR mounted successful expeditions that subdued the Ngoni, Yao, and Swahili-Arabs.

In January 1899, a second battalion of CAR consisting of 7 British officers, 32 Sikhs, and 878 African soldiers was formed. In June, to relieve pressure on imperial forces needed in South Africa, it was sent to garrison the Indian Ocean island of Mauritius, an important coaling station, where the African troops clashed with racist Creoles who objected to their presence. The second battalion, including several hundred soldiers' wives and some children from Nyasaland, left Mauritius in February 1900; over the next two years, it fought in British campaigns in Somaliland, the Gold Coast, and Gambia.

In January 1902, the hitherto-separate Uganda Rifles, East African Rifles, and Central Africa Regiment were amalgamated into the new King's African Rifles (KAR). The British government had wanted to make the East African territories militarily independent as a whole, and dispatching units there from India was expensive. Appointed in 1901, the first inspector-general of the KAR was Brigadier W. H. Manning, who had been seconded to Nyasaland forces since 1893. Upon its formation, the KAR consisted of 104 British officers and 4,579 African soldiers. 1 CAR became 1 (Central Africa) KAR, 2 CAR became 2 (Central Africa) KAR, the East Africa Rifles became 3 (East Africa) KAR, the African companies of the Uganda Rifles became 4 (Uganda) KAR, the Indian contingent of the Uganda Rifles became 5 (Uganda) KAR, and it was planned to turn the camel corps in British Somaliland into 6 (Somaliland) KAR, which came into existence in 1908.

In Uganda, given the history of mutiny, the Indian 5 KAR was concentrated in Buganda, while the mostly Sudanese 4 KAR was dispersed throughout the rest of the territory. However, in 1904, the Indian 5 KAR was disbanded and its remaining two companies, stationed at Entebbe and Kampala, incorporated into 4 KAR. Initially, the Nyasaland-based 2 KAR constituted a mobile reserve that could be sent overseas, and in 1904, both Nyasaland battalions (1 KAR and 2 KAR) adopted that role and alternated tours of duty in Nairobi that served as a staging area. The Indian contingent in Nyasaland was to be attached to whatever unit was stationed in that territory.

The first KAR regulations were published in 1905, though they did not apply to the Indian soldiers who remained under Indian army regulations. In 1902, six soldiers from each battalion were sent to London for the coronation of Edward VII. During 1909 and 1910, some portion or all of the five KAR battalions (except for 2 KAR, which remained in the East Africa Protectorate) were concentrated in British Somaliland, where there were serious concerns about renewed local resistance.

With the British decision to abandon the Somaliland interior, the KAR troops returned to their home territories and 6 KAR was disbanded. British efforts to economize, the end of the conquest period, and local settler anxieties about armed Africans prompted the elimination of 2 KAR in 1911 and the abandonment of the mobile reserve concept. At this point, the entire KAR consisted of three battalions (1 KAR in Nyasaland, 3 KAR in East Africa, and 4 KAR in Uganda), with a total of 17 companies. Over the next several years, all Indian soldiers in the region were sent home, and this was compensated for by launching a reserve consisting of African ex-soldiers. Although its officers were seconded from the British army, the KAR fell under the authority of the British Colonial Office, not the War Office.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Somali Wars (1901–1920); Askari; East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Lugard, Frederick; North End

War/Slavers' War (1887–1896); West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Kitchener, Horatio Herbert (1850–1916)

Perhaps the United Kingdom's most famous living soldier at the outbreak of World War I, Horatio Herbert Kitchener had accumulated a wealth of experience in service throughout the British Empire. A methodical soldier who successfully managed a number of imperial campaigns, Kitchener found himself out of his depth when he became secretary of state for war after World War I started. Although he realized earlier than most the enormity of Britain's task, his administration of the British war effort proved in many ways inadequate.

Born on June 24, 1850, near Listowel, County Kerry, Ireland, Kitchener was the son of Lt. Col. Henry Horatio Kitchener, an army officer, and Anne Chevallier. His father was something of an eccentric who possessed bizarre notions regarding discipline and health. His childhood undoubtedly played a role in making him somewhat ill at ease and asocial. In 1863, he moved with his family to Switzerland. Five years later, he entered the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He left in 1870 and a year later, obtained his commission in the Royal Engineers.

Perhaps Britain's most famous living soldier on the outbreak of World War I, Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850–1916) had served in many campaigns throughout the British Empire. He commanded British forces in Sudan from 1896 to 1898 and in South Africa from 1900 to 1902. (Library of Congress)

In 1874, Kitchener departed for Palestine to work as a surveyor. Until the outbreak of World War I, he would see Britain only infrequently. After Britain acquired Cyprus in 1878, Kitchener traveled to that Mediterranean island to do more surveying work. Serving briefly in the British campaign to subdue a rebellion in the Egypt in 1882, he returned to Cyprus to complete his task. Invited back to Egypt by Sir Henry

Evelyn Wood, who had become British head of the Egyptian army, Kitchener served in the Egyptian cavalry. When the Mahdists threatened southern Egypt, he performed intelligence work for Anglo-Egyptian forces. In 1884, when a British force under General Sir Garnet Wolseley attempted to rescue General Charles George Gordon at Khartoum, he served Wolseley as an intelligence officer. Kitchener returned to Britain in 1885, recognized by many as the British army's leading expert on the Middle East. That same year, he served on an international boundary commission that sought to determine the borders of the sultanate of Zanzibar.

In 1886, Kitchener became governor-general of eastern Sudan. For the next two years, he fought the Mahdists, particularly Osman Digna. Wounded severely in 1888, he returned to Egypt to take up the position of adjutant general of the Egyptian army. Over the course of the next year, he assumed command of the Egyptian cavalry and helped halt a Mahdist advance into southern Egypt. Having impressed both British military and civilian authorities in Egypt with his effectiveness, Kitchener became *sidar* (head) of the Egyptian army in 1892.

Believing that only the total defeat of the Mahdists would ensure peace in southern Egypt, Kitchener prepared the Egyptian army—as well as British politicians at home—for an invasion of the Sudan. In 1896, he advanced on Dongola, below the third cataract of the Nile, and captured the town, driving the Mahdists into the Bayudha Desert. The next year, Kitchener's forces drove farther down the Nile and in August, captured Abu Hamad. In September, they seized Barbar, south of the fifth cataract. Kitchener then ordered a railway built across the Nubian Desert from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamad. Instead of traveling down a great loop of the Nile, Anglo-Egyptian troops and supplies could rush southward by a far shorter route.

In April 1898, having concentrated a large force in Atbara after much painstaking effort, Kitchener defeated the Mahdists in the area and continued to advance southward. By late August, he had reached the outskirts of Omdurman with 25,000 Anglo-Egyptian troops. On September 2, Kitchener met a Mahdist army of some 50,000 men and demolished it at the Battle of Omdurman. Driving southward, Kitchener encountered at Fashoda (on the White Nile) a small French force under Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand that claimed the southern Sudan for France. After negotiations with Kitchener, Marchand backed down, and the upper Nile Valley fell into British hands.

Although an angry French public threatened war with Britain, the bargain struck at Fashoda held. Kitchener became governor-general of the Sudan, attempting to impose a Western-style administration on the region while hunting down the remnants of the Mahdists' forces, which finally met their doom at Umm Diwaykarat in November 1899. Although his defeat of the Mahdists did not require great tactical skill, Kitchener showed himself a superb administrator, overcoming tremendous logistical problems with meticulous planning. For his efforts, he became Baron Kitchener of Khartoum.

In the meantime, Britain had suffered a number of defeats in the Boer War. Kitchener became chief of staff to Frederick

Sleigh Roberts, the new British commander in South Africa. In that capacity, Kitchener had wide-ranging powers since Roberts gave him free rein. Although he generally concerned himself with supplying British troops, Kitchener did direct the battle and siege of Paardeberg in person in February 1900. In that setting, he did not show himself to best advantage, losing a large number of troops in an ill-conceived, badly executed attack. However, Paardeberg represented a total disaster for the Boers, with 4,000 of them surrendering. Kitchener proved most successful at tasks that required method and application rather than genius.

After the final defeat of conventional Boer resistance, Roberts went home, and Kitchener became commander-in-chief in South Africa. Facing a guerrilla war, Kitchener reacted in his methodical way. Seeking to protect the railways that served as his lines of communication, he built blockhouses intermittently along the tracks. Eventually, he erected blockhouses throughout the country, tied them together with wire fences to create large enclosed spaces, and conducted sweeps of those areas. While searching for Boer guerrillas, British forces cleared those enclosed areas of both food stocks and people, sending the latter to concentration camps. Although the British army did not intend to kill the Boers placed in those camps, many of them died as a result of negligence. In Britain, the concentration camps became a great scandal that blackened Kitchener's name to some extent. Kitchener's methods told, however, and wore down Boer resistance. By May 1902, the last Boer forces surrendered. As a reward, he was made Viscount Kitchener of Khartoum, of the Vaal, and of Aspall.

In 1903, Kitchener became commander-in-chief of the British Indian Army. Remaining on the subcontinent for six years, he sought to redistribute Indian forces and reform army administration. While attempting to achieve those ends, he encountered a formidable opponent in Indian viceroy Lord Curzon, who jealously sought to preserve his prerogatives. In the end, Kitchener managed to carry through his reforms, enhancing the Indian Army's ability not only to defend the region, but to lend military assistance to Britain. Leaving India in 1909, Kitchener held a number of assignments before returning to Egypt in 1911 as proconsul. Ruling in an autocratic fashion, he sought to encourage the development of the cotton industry in Egypt.

After the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, most Britons saw Kitchener as Britain's greatest soldier still on active duty. Seeking to use his abilities and his popularity, the Liberal government appointed him secretary of state for war and promoted him to field marshal. Kitchener shocked his cabinet colleagues by asserting that the war would last for at least three years and that Britain would have to field an army of 70 divisions to win it. Most of them thought that the war could be won with a minimum of effort, and in a matter of months.

To raise that force, Kitchener called on voluntary enlistments to create what was known as the "New Army" or "Kitchener Army." More than 2 million Britons volunteered for those units, which became known for their enthusiasm. On occasion, Kitchener proved useful in the conduct of operations. When John French, commander of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), panicked after his initial encounter with the German army and began retreating toward the French coast in September 1914, Kitchener appeared on the scene and browbeat French into rejoining the front line. He also served as a useful liaison with France, since he had an excellent command of the French language.

Although he correctly foresaw the requirements of a great war, Kitchener's administration of the British war effort suffered from many shortcomings. His refusal to delegate authority meant that much of the War Office's business did not get completed in a timely manner. His previous experience had not prepared him to act as a team player, and he alienated his cabinet colleagues with his aloof, laconic, and authoritarian manner. While French's accusation that Kitchener had not provided the BEF with sufficient quantities of shells was unjustified, the production of munitions had not increased as rapidly as many thought it could have. In the cabinet discussions that led to the ill-conceived and poorly executed Gallipoli campaign, Kitchener, who should have known better, did not inject much common sense into the proceedings.

The cabinet's increasing dissatisfaction with Kitchener's performance led to a diminution of his responsibilities. The cabinet relieved Kitchener of responsibility for the production of munitions (which went to the Ministry of Munitions), as well as the formation of strategy (which went to the chief of the Imperial General Staff). Nevertheless, the government felt compelled to keep him in office as a symbol of the national will to win. Sent by the government on a mission to Russia, Kitchener boarded the cruiser HMS *Hampshire* at Scapa Flow on June 5, 1916. Not long after leaving port, the *Hampshire* encountered foul weather and apparently struck a German mine. Kitchener and most of the crew perished in the cold waters of the North Sea. His body was never found.

Hubert Dubrulle

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898); Blockhouses, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Dongola, Capture of (September 23, 1896); Egyptian Army; Fashoda Incident (1898); French, John D. P.; Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Marchand, Jean-Baptiste; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Osman Digna; Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902); Wolseley, Garnet; Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Kofi Karikari (1837–1884)

Kofi Karikari was the 10th asantehene (king of the Asante nation), and he reigned from 1867 to 1874. Under his leadership, the Asante attacked the Gold Coast in late 1872. This hostile incursion sparked the Second Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874). The Asante lost this conflict, and Kofi Karikari was deposed in 1874.

Kofi Karikari, known to the British as "King Coffee," was born in 1837. In the mid-1860s, the Gold Coast was in turmoil. The Asante had been losing considerable income due to the British suppression of the slave trade and their blockades of other trading centers. In April 1867, the 70-year-old Asante king, Kwaku Dua I, died unexpectedly in his sleep. His death ignited an internal struggle over his succession. After three months of bitter infighting, sacrifices, and assassinations, Kofi Karikari, Kwaku Dua I's grandnephew, was chosen asantehene by an electoral majority.

Kofi was 30 years old when he was elected king. He was of medium height, had a full beard, and was said to have been handsome except for smallpox scars on his face. Kofi made a number of enemies through his debauched lifestyle, which included making sexual advances to the wives of powerful men, and his profligacy with the kingdom's gold. Moreover, he was very inexperienced militarily and naïve about royal intrigue. When Kofi was crowned, he is said to have promised, "My business shall be war" (Edgerton, 1995, p. 95).

Kofi was confronted immediately by military crises; the first concerned the Fante blockade of the people living near the Dutch fort of Elmina. In 1868, the asantehene sent two large armies to relieve Elmina, commanding one himself. Sporadic fighting continued until 1869.

The continuous warfare around Elmina disrupted trade so much that the Dutch ceded their fort at Elmina and other possessions on the Gold Coast to the British in 1872. Because the British refused to pay the Asante an annual tribute as the Dutch had done for many years, the Asante were incensed and eager for retribution. Although the legendary Asante military commander Asamoa Nkwanta advised against conflict with the well-armed British, the "hawks" at court prevailed, and Kofi Karikari went to war. As a result, in December 1872, the Asante crossed the Pra River (the southern boundary of their territory), defeating other groups in their march to the sea, and were within a day's march of Elmina on June 13, 1873. A small Royal Marine detachment held off the attacking Asante. The British government decided to send reinforcements, and then an expeditionary force, under the command of Major-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley.

Wolseley arrived at Cape Coast Castle on October 2, 1873. Irregular regiments of allied locals were raised, and logistical preparations were made to receive British battalions. During this preparatory phase, confused correspondence passed between Wolseley and Kofi, and the Asante forces began to withdraw north slowly. Wolseley's plan was to use the British troops, starting in January 1874 at the beginning of the dry season, to march to Kumasi and destroy it as a sign of British strength and victory.

Wolseley's force began to advance toward Kumasi in January 1874. On January 24, 1874, Wolseley informed Kofi of his intention to march on Kumasi and issued an ultimatum to halt the conflict. Kofi then seemingly decided to lure the British farther into the jungle to surround and destroy them. Skirmishing took place between the British and the Asante many times. The British were ambushed by an Asante force under Asamoa Nkwanta at Amoafo on January 31, but pushed on through their determined adversary and entered a largely empty Kumasi on February 4, 1874. Kofi had fled north, and Wolseley razed Kumasi.

Wolseley threatened to hunt down Kofi, whose messengers finally caught up with Wolseley at Fomena on February 13, 1874. The asantehene stated that he was anxious for peace and would agree to all the British demands in what became known as the Treaty of Fomena: payment of an indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold, renunciation of suzerainty over a number of other groups, cessation of rent payments on forts, free passage on all roads, and the cessation of human sacrifice. These conditions undermined the stability of the Asante kingdom and the authority of the asantehene. As a result, Kofi was dethroned in September 1874 and died in Kumasi 10 years later.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Asamoa Nkwanta; British Anti-Slavery Squadron; Wolseley, Garnet

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Kongo Empire

The Kongo Empire was one of the most powerful states encountered by European explorers, as well as the first Catholicized sub-Saharan African state. The king of Kongo embraced Christianity, although the religion underwent a transformation to fit local needs and beliefs. The Kongolese became dependent on European trade, as they supplied ivory, hides, and slaves in exchange for luxury goods and firearms. The Portuguese gradually extended their control over the Kongo and eventually made it a colony in all but name.

The ancestors of the Kongo settled in farming villages in western Africa during the 12th century. By the 14th century, a loosely organized federation was formed. A king, or *mani Kongo,* was selected by the elite of different regions, but the kings gradually consolidated power into their own hands. Governors of the six provinces were appointed by the king, who usually selected family members. By 1500, the Kongo was a strongly centralized state; its population was about 350,000, and it covered 75,000 square kilometers.

In 1483, Europeans first encountered the Kongo Empire. The Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão anchored at the mouth of the Kongo River. He visited the *mani Kongo,* Nzinga Nkuwu, and his capital. The Portuguese returned in 1491 with missionaries, soldiers, and artisans. They received a warm welcome. Nzinga Nkuwu was baptized as a Catholic and took the name João I. Portuguese soldiers, armed with firearms, helped him defeat an internal rebellion. When João died, he was succeeded by his son, Afonso I, in 1506. The devout Afonso proclaimed Catholicism as the official religion of the Kongo.

The Portuguese soon increased their trade and influence with the Kongo. They rebuilt the Kongo capital in stone, and the grateful king renamed it São Salvador. To finance his growing trade with Portugal, Afonso supplied ivory, hides, and slaves. Slaves were especially valuable to the Portuguese, who needed workers to produce sugar at their plantations in Brazil. Soon, around 15,000 slaves were exported annually from the Kongo. Some slaves were obtained by raids on neighboring states, which responded with attacks on the Kongo. Afonso and the kings who followed him became more and more dependent on Portuguese mercenaries, armed with firearms to maintain their position.

The Portuguese eventually shifted their attention southward, to the rival kingdom of Ndongo. In 1556, Portuguese soldiers helped Ndongo defeat a Kongo invasion. A Portuguese colony was established between Ndongo and Kongo at Luanda. The Portuguese expanded their holdings until they virtually controlled Ndongo. The new colony became known as Angola.

Central power in Kongo declined. Civil wars among factions of the royal family followed each king's death. In 1641, Garcia II allied himself with the Dutch in an attempt to break away from Portugal's control. Fighting along the border between Kongo and Angola followed. The Portuguese decisively defeated the Kongo at the Battle of Mbwila on October 29, 1665. The Portuguese attempt to solidify their victory led to defeat at the Battle of Kitombo on October 17, 1670, but the Kongolese royal family remained split into three factions. Civil wars and the slave trade depopulated the country.

Kongo had a brief revival at the beginning of the 18th century. Dona Beatriz Kimpa Vita, a young Kongolese woman born into a noble family, claimed to be possessed by St. Anthony in 1704. Beatriz rallied support for the idea of a united Kongo, independent of European interference. Pedro IV, one of the claimants to the throne, proclaimed her a false prophet and executed her in 1706. He reunited the country under his control, but the Portuguese continued to dominate Kongo.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Afonso I; Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Jaga; Imbangala; Mbwila, Battle of (October 10, 1665); Nzinga, Queen

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Kouno, Battle of (October 28, 1899)

In 1895, a French expedition led by explorer Emile Gentil, intending to block British and German expansion into Central Africa, traveled by steamboat up the Congo and Ubangi rivers to establish Fort Archambault (today's Sahr), in what is now southern

Chad. In this area, the French decided to support the Bagirmi state, which was being invaded by the army of Sudanese slaver and warlord Rabih ibn Fadl Allah.

In late 1898 and early 1899, a small French expedition led by naval lieutenant Henri Bretonnet with 5 French officers, 50 Senegalese Tirailleurs, and three cannon was dispatched up the Congo River to support Bagirmi, which lent it 400 fighters, and established a defensive position on the Togbao Hills overlooking the town of Kouno. On July 17, 1899, Rabih's army, consisting of 2,700 gunmen and 10,000 auxiliaries with spears and bows, overwhelmed the position after three attacks and massacred the defenders. In turn, the French set out to unify their African territories by having three columns converge on Lake Chad; one, led by Gentil, traveled by steamboat up the Congo River; another, under Major Amedee-Francois Lamy, marched south from Algiers across the Sahara; and a third, commanded by Captain Paul Voulet, originated from Dakar and cut a path of destruction across present-day Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

On October 23, Gentil led his forces out of Fort Achambault and up the Chari River with a steamboat and barge, and an infantry column marching along the bank. Three days later, his force encamped near the Togbao Hills, within 20 kilometers of Rabih's army. On the morning of October 28, Gentil's steamboat and barge moved farther upriver and used their two guns to shell the town of Kouno, where Rabih's army was waiting. Since Rabih was only aware of the steamboat, he was surprised when Gentil's overland column arrived and began firing its three cannon. However, Rabih's force responded with effective fire from their rifles, and the three cannon were captured at Togbao. The French tirailleurs then used their bayonets to drive Rabih's men through the town and made repeated assaults on the nearby fort.

Although many of Rabih's troops deserted, Rabih and several hundred dedicated followers clung to the defenses and continued to engage the French with rifle and cannon fire. By the late afternoon, 46 French colonial troops had been killed and 106 wounded, which represented nearly half of the 344-strong attack force, and Gentil ordered a withdrawal. The next day, Gentil led a return to Fort Archambault, where his expedition would await the arrival of the two other French missions. Rabih also suffered serious losses, including some of his most loyal assistants.

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See also: Chad, French Conquest of (1895–1900); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Kousseri, Battle of (April 22, 1900); Rabih ibn Fadl Allah; *Tirailleur Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Voulet-Chanoine Mission (1898–1900)

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Kousseri, Battle of (April 22, 1900)

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, three French expeditions converged on Lake Chad to impose French authority on the Sudanese warlord Rabih ibn Fadl Allah. The Voulet-Chanoine mission marched from Dakar east along the southern fringe of the Sahara, Amedee-Francois Lamy led an expedition from Algiers south across the Sahara, and Emil Gentil's group left Brazzaville and proceeded by steamer up the Congo and Ubangi rivers.

Beset with madness and mutiny, the Voulet-Chanoine mission eventually morphed into the Joalland-Meynier mission, which was joined by the Lamy expedition at Lake Chad in February 1900. With Lamy taking command, the combined force bombarded the mud-walled town of Goulfey at the end of the month, compelling Rabih's small garrison to retreat. On March 2, Lamy's force arrived at the town of Kousseri, and the following day, it used artillery to blast gaps in its mud walls through which the Algerian and Senegalese colonial troops waged their assault. Rabih's garrison retreated to the nearby Logone River, where they were shot down as they tried to board canoes or swim.

Since French colonial troops continued to skirmish with Rabih's forces in the surrounding countryside, Kousseri filled with refugees, creating a food shortage in the town. By the beginning of April, Rabih had moved his army to a position near Kousseri, where he built an earthen and log fort and lay siege to the French, who were waiting for the arrival of Gentil's expedition. After Gentil unsuccessfully attacked Rabih's camp near Kouno in late October 1899, the explorer returned to French Congo for reinforcements.

With Lamy's arrival at the lake, Rabih had to redirect his forces northward, which allowed Gentil's group to move up and rendezvous with the other French expedition at Kousseri on April 21, 1900. The next morning, Lamy, with 700 Tirailleurs and 600 allied Bagirmi infantry and 200 cavalry, attacked Rabih's fort on three of its four sides. Supported by fire from four cannon, the colonial infantry moved slowly toward the fort, causing its defenders to waste much of their ammunition on poorly aimed, long-range shots. Lamy signaled the charge around mid-morning, and the Tirailleurs, without ladders, rushed the fort's small doorways, which they penetrated, as most of the defenders had abandoned the wall. Inside the fort, there was terrible hand-to-hand fighting, and in one corner, some 200 defenders who were trying to escape over the wall were shot at point-blank range. The Tirailleurs shot men who tried to flee across the river, while the Bagirmi allies looted the camp.

Rabih rallied some of his men for a counterattack in which Lamy was mortally wounded, but this was opposed by the Tirailleurs, who pursued them into the nearby bush. The now-wounded Rabih was abandoned by his men and shot in the head by a Tirailleur. Since Gentil had put a bounty on Rabih's head, the Tirailleur who fired the fatal shot decapitated the warlord, and the severed head was presented to the dying Lamy and then displayed as proof of conquest.

The French established a post across the river and dubbed it Fort Lamy, which much later became N'Djamena, the capital of independent Chad. The final subjugation of Rabih's forces took another year, with the French eventually destroying his capital of Dikwa, which was in British territory (now northeastern Nigeria). Rabih's successor, Fadalallah, was killed in August 1901.

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See also: Chad, French Conquest of (1895–1900); French Colonial Policy in Africa

(1750–1900); Kouno, Battle of (October 28, 1899); Rabih ibn Fadl Allah; *Tirailleur Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Voulet-Chanoine Mission (1898–1900)

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Kruger, Paul (1825–1904)

President of the Transvaal Republic (in present-day South Africa) for four terms, Stephanus Johannes Paulus Kruger was an important architect of that country, playing a prominent role in the Afrikaner resistance to British domination, as well as the conquest of African peoples in neighboring states.

Kruger was born on October 10, 1825, in the British-ruled Cape Colony (present-day South Africa). Much of the Cape Colony was inhabited by Boers, settlers of Dutch descent whose arrival had preceded that of the British. Most Boers lived as farmers in the interior parts of the colony; the word *boer* is derived from the Dutch word for "farmer." Kruger's family spoke Afrikaans and lived far from any major city, and he received no formal education.

Kruger's childhood coincided with the epic event of Boer history, the Great Trek farther into the interior to escape British domination. His family joined the other trekkers in 1836, traveling initially to Natal, but ultimately settling in the region north of the Vaal River, which would become the nation of Transvaal. The Krugers were members of the Dutch Calvinist sect. They interpreted their victory over the Ndebele at the Battle of Vegkop, which the young Paul witnessed, as a sign from God that they were chosen by Him to occupy their chosen land and rule over all of its non-white inhabitants. The Boers came into conflict with many African peoples, and by the time Kruger was 17, he had campaigned against the armies of the Zulu as well as the Ndebele and had a reputation as a fighter.

In 1852, the British government recognized the autonomy of the Boers who had settled in the Transvaal, and the Afrikaners declared the Transvaal a republic. Kruger held office in the rudimentary administration of the new state and played an important role in maintaining a minimum of unity among the fiercely independent Boer leaders. He also led many raids against the neighboring African communities, such as Tswana groups on the Transvaal's western frontier in 1852, the Langa of the northwest in 1858 and 1868, and the Sotho of Moshoeshoe in 1865.

In 1863, after some internal Boer conflict, Kruger was elected as commandant-general of Transvaal forces. In 1867, in the northern Transvaal, he led the Boer evacuation of Schoemansdal, which was then burned by the Venda. The affair undermined his prestige and encouraged him to resign his command. For the next several years, Kruger settled down to private life as a farmer.

Kruger returned to politics after the Cape Colony annexed the Transvaal in 1877. He played an instrumental role in rallying Afrikaner resistance to British rule and helped to negotiate the independence of the republic in 1881. His service during the conflict with Britain restored his public image, and in 1883, he was elected president of the Transvaal for the first of his four terms in office.

In 1886, gold was discovered in the Witwatersrand region of the Transvaal. This windfall proved a mixed blessing for Kruger's government. While the South African gold rush immediately brought the government much-needed revenue, it also attracted an army of speculators, miners, and adventurers into the state. These foreigners, or *uitlanders,* as the Boers called them, threatened to overwhelm the Afrikaner population of the colony. Kruger's government responded by heavily taxing the mining operations and denying the *uitlanders* any say in Transvaal politics.

The Transvaal government proved to be a constant irritation to the officials and merchants of the British Empire. British officials worried that the Transvaal's newfound wealth would enable it to challenge the Cape's dominance of southern Africa. British capitalists resented the restrictions placed on their mining operations by the Afrikaner government. In 1895, Cecil Rhodes, a leading investor in the Witwatersrand mines and prime minister of Cape Colony, tried to organize a rebellion of the *uitlanders* against the Transvaal government. He assembled a private army led by his close associate, Leander Starr Jameson. Kruger's army easily stopped Jameson's raid and arrested the ringleaders. The aborted invasion provided Kruger with a major victory among the Afrikaners of the Transvaal, who resented the attempts of the Cape government to meddle in their internal affairs. After the raid, Kruger's government began purchasing modern weapons with their gold revenues and completed a railroad linking the republic to the East African coast.

By 1899, Kruger feared (correctly) that the British government was planning to invade and annex the Transvaal. Rather than wait for troops to arrive from Britain, Kruger issued an ultimatum to the Cape Colony in late 1899 that led directly to the Second Anglo-Boer War, which lasted until 1902. At the outset, the Boer mounted marksmen inflicted several stinging defeats on the British forces, which used traditional tactics. However, once the British adopted tactics pioneered by the Spanish fighting a similar conflict in Cuba—scorched-earth tactics and imprisoning civilians in concentration camps—the Boers were forced to surrender in 1902.

Kruger left the Transvaal in September 1900 and tried in vain to rally European states to support the Boer cause. He remained in Europe after the war and died in Switzerland on July 14, 1904.

ABC-CLIO

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer Conquest of the Kekana and Langa (1847–1868); Boer Expansion in the Eastern and Northern Transvaal (c. 1845–1867); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898); Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869); Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Jameson, Leander Starr; Makhado; Rhodes, Cecil John; Vegkop, Battle of (October 16, 1836)

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Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900)

The Siege of Ladysmith (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900), which confined over 13,000 British troops of the Natal Field Force (NFF) for almost four months, completely disrupted British strategic plans during the Second Anglo-Boer War. Its timely relief averted a tremendous military disaster.

A key component of Boer strategy at the beginning of the Second Anglo-Boer War was to capture major rail junctions and disrupt the British lines of communication. Shortly after the outbreak of war on October 11, 1899, a 14,000-man Boer force commanded by Commandant-General Petrus J. Joubert began advancing from the Transvaal to Ladysmith, the principal town and main British supply base in northern Natal and the railhead from Durban on the coast. Another 6,000-man Boer force was assembling and planned to converge with Joubert's force at Ladysmith.

Lieutenant-General Sir George S. White, V.C., had been appointed the general officer commanding Natal and landed at Durban on October 7, 1899. He decided to concentrate his forces forward at Ladysmith.

The British won an inconclusive victory at Talana Hill (October 20, 1899), and the following day routed the Boers at Elandslaagte, only 16 kilometers from Ladysmith. White then ordered all his forces to Ladysmith. An engagement was fought at Rietfontein on October 26, and the same day, the two Boer forces united and totaled about 24,000 men.

Instead of withdrawing 24 kilometers south of the Tugela River, White decided to attack the Boers before they could coordinate their efforts. White developed a plan involving a double envelopment at dawn after a night march, with secondary operations on both flanks, arguably "the greatest strategic mistake of the entire war" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 155). The result was a debacle, with the British suffering about 360 casualties and another 1,000 soldiers captured. The Battle of Nicholson's Nek (October 30, 1899)—the worst British defeat since the Battle of Majuba in 1881—was called Mournful Monday. White would have been relieved for incompetence had the Boers not surrounded Ladysmith on November 2, 1899.

Ladysmith was initially well provisioned, but disease struck, and the Boers humanely permitted the British to establish a hospital outside the town. The Boers attacked the British defenses on Wagon Hill on January 6, 1900, but were driven off. As the siege continued, disease, hunger, and misery increased. White also became ill and weak. About 810 garrison soldiers died during the siege, about 500 of them from disease.

General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., commanding the British forces in South Africa, made numerous attempts to relieve Ladysmith. Buller's attack at Colenso (December 15, 1899) failed, and he advised White to consider surrendering if Ladysmith could not hold out for another month. Other failed relief attempts occurred at Spion Kop (January 23–24, 1900) and Vaal Kraantz (February 5, 1900). Buller's force broke though Boer defenses on the Tugela River and launched a final assault on February 27, thus avenging the Boer triumph at the Battle of Majuba 19 years earlier. The 118-day Siege of Ladysmith ended on February 28, 1900,

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See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899); Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900); Talana Hill, Battle of (October 20, 1899); Vaal Kraantz, Battle of (February 5–7, 1900); White, George S.

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Laing's Nek, Battle of (January 28, 1881)

The Boer repulse of the Natal Field Force (NFF) at Laing's Nek on January 28, 1881, in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881 (also called the Transvaal Rebellion) thwarted the British attempt to relieve their garrisons besieged by the insurrectionary Boers in the Transvaal Territory.

In the late 1870s, British imperial policymakers, concerned with consolidating the empire, embarked on a policy of confederating all the colonies and states of southern Africa under the Crown. One of these states was the South African Republic (or Transvaal), established in 1852 by the devoutly Calvinist and agrarian Boers who had migrated into the interior of the subcontinent to be free of British interference. Taking advantage of the republic's parlous finances and disorganized administration, Britain annexed it on April 12, 1877, as the Transvaal Territory. The Transvaal Boers remained unreconciled to British rule and proclaimed their independence on December 16, 1880. At Bronkhorstspruit on December 20, 1880, Boer forces destroyed a British column marching to reinforce Pretoria, the Transvaal's capital, and laid siege to the small British garrisons scattered across the Transvaal. Under Commandant-General Piet Joubert, they also took up positions across the passes leading into the neighboring British colony of Natal. There, Major-General Sir George Pomeroy-Colley, the high commissioner of South Eastern Africa and governor of Natal since July 1880, hurriedly gathered the few British troops available into the NFF, with the objective of forcing the passes and relieving the Transvaal garrisons.

Laing's Nek (mountain pass) passed through the center of a rough semicircle of hills and mountains, about 10 kilometers in length. Joubert expected Colley to advance by way of the wagon road over the nek and placed the majority of his 600 men to hold it. He posted a small detachment on Table Mountain to his left, which commanded the road, another on Brownlow's Kop on the far left of his position, and a third to hold the spur between. This was a position of great defensive strength, allowing the Boers ensconced behind rocks and roughly erected stone breastworks to lay down flanking fire across the bare, steep slopes.

Colley had only 1, 459 men in the NFF. Once he had detached 248 men to guard his entrenched camp at Mount Prospect, he was not left with enough troops to attempt to take the Boer position in flank for fear of exposing his extended force to a counterthrust. He planned, therefore, to threaten the nek with half his force while the rest seized Table Mountain, the key to the Boer position, and rolled up the Boer left flank. At 9:25 A.M., the British artillery—four 9-pounder guns, two 7-pounder guns, and three 24-pounder rockets—opened a largely ineffective barrage. At 9:40 A.M., the 58th Regiment commenced its assault on Table Mountain in a packed formation of column of companies. Quickly exhausted in the summer heat, the British infantry struggled up the steep mountainside under a galling Boer fire that targeted officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

The Mounted Squadron, covering the infantry's right flank, unadvisedly charged up Brownlow's Kop at about 10:15 A.M. and was put to flight. Exposed as a result to fierce Boer flanking fire, the infantry were unable to deploy out of column into line for the final assault on Table Mountain. Caught in an untenable position, the only option left the 58th Regiment, at about 10:45 A.M., was to drive the Boers from their positions with a bayonet charge. Although gallantly executed, it failed. At 11 A.M., the troops, exposed to heavy enfilading fire, commenced a disciplined withdrawal under cover of an artillery barrage and supporting fire from two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 60th Rifles.

When the Boers failed to follow up their success with a general advance, Colley, who was in no position to renew the attack, sent Joubert a flag of truce at noon to remove the dead and wounded. He then fell back to Mount Prospect camp. A total of 16 Boers were killed and 27 wounded in the battle. The British lost 7 officers and 86 men killed and 3 officers and 113 men wounded—a disastrous casualty rate of 16 percent.

Following the humiliating British reverse at Laing's Nek, the Boers defeated the NFF again at Ingogo (Schuinshoogte) on February 8, 1881, when it fought to keep its lines of communication to Natal open, and routed it at the Battle of Majuba on February 26, 1881, when Colley, not daring to risk another frontal attack, attempted to turn the Boers' right flank. Rather than prolong the conflict, the British government opened negotiations with the Boers, who regained their independence on August 3, 1881.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Bronkhorstspruit, Battle of (December 20, 1880); Colley, George Pomeroy; Ingogo, Battle of (February 8, 1881); Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881)

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Lamine, Mamadu (c. 1835–1887)

Mamadu Lamine was born around 1835 in the town of Safalou in the southern Bundu region, which is in present-day eastern Senegal. Given that his father was a Qur'anic teacher and judge, Lamine attended a local Qur'anic school and continued his studies at the regional capital of Bakel.

In 1847, a visit to Baket by El Hajj Umar Tall, a Muslim scholar and soon to be founder of the Tukolor Empire, inspired the young Lamine. Sometime after 1855, Lamine undertook a pilgrimage to Mecca, remained in the Middle East for a while, and during the late 1870s and early 1880s made a slow homeward journey through the sultanate of Wadai (in what is now Chad) and the Trans-Saharan trading towns of Timbuktu, Massina, and Segu, which was under Tukolor authority at that time.

When Lamine returned to Bundu in July 1885, the area was under growing French colonial influence that the Tukolor Empire, now ruled by Ahmadu, did not want to challenge. Quickly, Lamine began planning a jihad (holy war) that would establish a new Muslim empire beginning in the non-Muslim state of Gamon in southern Bundu, which provided a haven for people fleeing French forced labor and possessed a good economy given its involvement in the groundnut trade with the Gambia River.

Although Lamine initially presented himself to the French as a potential ally, his recruitment of soldiers put him at odds with Ousmane Gassi, the pro-French ruler of Bundu, who he forced to flee the area. Lamine's growing army destroyed communities that did not accept his jihad and often enslaved the inhabitants. In March 1886, Lamine established a base at Koughani, just nine kilometers from Bakel, and ambushed a French patrol, which prompted the French to imprison his wives and children. During early April 1886, Lamine's 10,000-strong army tried but failed to take Bakel from its French defenders. Later the same month, a French offensive led by Joseph Simon Galliéni drove Lamine's followers into southern Bundu.

By the end of the year, French and allied Bundu forces under Gassi had pushed Lamine and his army farther south and out of Bundu. On December 8, 1887, a French and Bundu force attacked and overwhelmed Lamine's new capital of Toubacouta, where many of his supporters were killed. Lamine and a small entourage then became fugitives, moving from town to town. On December 12, at the village of N'Goga-Soukouta, close to the Gambia River, local people (with the help of some of Gassi's Bundu soldiers) tried to capture Lamine, who was wounded by a sword and died later the same day as he was being carried away by his few remaining loyalists. While Lamine's campaign had distracted the French from previous operations against the Tukolor Empire, they were continued in 1888.

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See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Galliéni, Joseph; Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Langalibalele Rebellion (October–December 1873)

The so-called Langalibalele Rebellion in 1873 in Natal, a British possession since 1843, raised extravagant fears in the settler communities of the British colonies in South Africa of a general African uprising and led to cries for disarming all blacks before it was too late. For British administrators, planning to confederate the whole subcontinent under the Crown, the rebellion provided popular justification for going to war with still-independent African neighbors and rigorously imposing gun control over the entire black population.

Langalibalele kaMthimkhulu, ruler of the Hlubi people, was renowned as a potent rainmaker and man of occult powers. Fearing him, in 1848 Mpande kaSenzangakhona, the Zulu king, drove him and his ally, Phutini of the Ngwe people, away from his borders toward Natal. There, in 1846, Theophilus Shepstone, the Agent for the Native Tribes (and from 1856 the Secretary for Native Affairs) had begun setting aside locations for important chiefs which he administered through indirect rule. In 1849, the Natal authorities settled the Hlubi and Ngwe in two such locations in the foothills of the Drakensberg Mountains to serve as a buffer between white farmers and the bands of San hunter-gathers raiding their livestock from their mountain caves. The Natal locations were meant to operate as labor reservoirs for the colonists, but the Hlubi withheld their labor because they were soon farming successfully on a commercial scale, and because they earned better wages as migrant workers on the diamond fields of Kimberley, which had opened up in the late 1860s. There, the young men bought not only ploughs, but horses and modern firearms.

The 17,000 white settlers of Natal were alarmed by the growing number of firearms in the hands of the colony's 300,000-strong African majority, and in 1873, the authorities resolved to enforce African gun registration rigorously. John MacFarlane, the resident magistrate of Weenen County, decided to single out the prominent Langalibalele for compliance to intimidate lesser chiefs. Caught between the pressures of the government and of his own young men who refused to give up their firearms, Langalibalele opted in late October 1873 to flee west over the Drakensberg to Basutoland (present-day Lesotho), which had been under the administration of the Cape

Colony since 1871. With between 2,000 and 3,000 male Hlubi and over 7,000 cattle, Langalibalele went up the steep Bushman's River Pass, leaving the women and children and the balance of his cattle with the Ngwe people to follow later.

Sir Benjamin Pine, the lieutenant-governor of Natal, deemed Langalibalele's flight a rebellion, and he advanced on the Hlubi location on October 29, 1873, with 200 men of the 1st Battalion of the 75th Highlanders in garrison in Natal, 300 Natal Mounted Volunteers, and 6,000 African levies. Major Anthony Durnford, Royal Engineers, was sent up on November 3, 1873, via the valley of the Loteni River with 80 mounted men to seize the head of the Bushman's River Pass and prevent the Hlubi from crossing into Basutoland. Captain A. B. Allison advanced in support with 500 African levies by way of another pass 50 kilometers to the north. The main body of troops under Pine held the ground between them at the foot of the mountains.

Durnford's force found the steep ascent extremely taxing, and he badly dislocated his shoulder in a fall. Only 36 colonial volunteers of the Natal and Karkloof Carbineers and 15 of the mounted Sotho auxiliaries were still with Durnford when he reached the head of the pass at dawn on November 4. Allison's levies had lost their way and failed to arrive. Most of the Hlubi had already crossed in Basutoland, but a cattle guard of 500 men under Mabhule, Langlibalele's headman, was still coming up the pass. Durnford resolved to stop them. Negotiations failed, the Hlubi surrounded Durnford's nervous and inexperienced men, and firing broke out. The Natal troops lost their nerve and galloped off, pursued for three kilometers by the Hlubi. In the fracas, three Natal volunteers from prominent colonial families lost their lives, along with that of Elijah Khambule, Durnford's interpreter, and a mounted Sotho auxiliary.

The colonial state could not accept such defiance and military humiliation. The African levies ravaged the Hlubi location, killing 200 women and children. The survivors were assigned to colonists as indentured laborers and the location was carved up between white settlers and non-Hlubi chiefs. The Ngwe were punished by confiscation of all their livestock. In December 1873, the Sotho turned Langalibalele over to the Natal authorities. He was tried in early 1874, found guilty of treason and rebellion, and banished to Cape Colony. Hundreds of Hlubi were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. In 1887, Langalibalele was allowed to return to Natal, but not to his old location.

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See also: Durnford, Anthony William; Mpande kaSenzangakhona; Settler Volunteer Regiments in South Africa

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Langeberg Rebellion (1897)

In 1885, the British annexed the territory of southern Africa's Tswana people, with the area north of the Molopo River becoming the Bechuanaland Protectorate (modern Botswana), and the area south of that river becoming British Bechuanaland. This prevented the region from being conquered by the Boers, who had established the short-lived pocket republics of Goshen and Stellaland.

Over the next decade, the southern Tswana (Tlhaping, Tlharo, and Rolong) of British Bechuanaland were evicted from much of their land and confined to reserves. In November 1895, the area was annexed by the neighboring Cape Colony, a self-governing British territory with a dominant white settler minority, which resulted in the southern Tswana being pushed into even smaller reserves. The Tswana were also aggrieved by the imposition of forced labor, taxation, colonial culling of African cattle to combat rinderpest, and loss of authority among their chiefs. These factors prompted a desperate rebellion, led by the Tlhaping chief Galeshewe, that began in December 1896 and January 1897.

A few thousand rebels sought shelter with the Christian Tlhaping chief Luka Jantjie, which meant that he also was branded a rebel. In August 1897, a 750-strong colonial force invaded his stronghold in the Langeberg Mountains. Under the leadership of Jantjie and Galeshewe of the Tlhaping and Toto of the Tlharo, the Tswana built rock fortifications from which these experienced hunters used their firearms to shoot down on attacking colonial troops. However, Tswana resistance was undermined by the contamination of their water supply—essential in this dry environment—by cattle that had died from rinderpest. With African allies from the Cape Colony's eastern Transkei region as human shields, and supported by artillery and machine guns, the Cape settler-soldiers eventually took the Tswana positions.

When Jantjie was killed in a last-ditch gunfight, his severed head, fingers, and toes were taken as trophies by colonial soldiers. Toto surrendered and was imprisoned on the infamous Robben Island, where he died in 1901. Galeshewe escaped the final battle but was captured a month later and imprisoned. A few rebels were hanged and 2,000 taken to the Western Cape as indentured laborers. As part of the Cape Colony, the former British Bechuanaland eventually became part of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

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See also: Boer "Pocket Republics" (1881–1885); Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Jantjie, Luka; Warren, Charles

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Leopold II (April 9, 1835–December 17, 1909)

Leopold II was king of Belgium from 1865 until his death in 1909. He hoped to

Leopold II (1835–1909) was the king of Belgium who orchestrated the colonial conquest of the Congo Free State in the late nineteenth century. Leopold's private regime in the Congo was so brutal and exploitative that it prompted an international outcry which led to the Belgian government taking control of the Congo in 1908. (ullstein bild via Getty Images)

be remembered for his ability to maintain Belgium's sovereignty, keeping the country out of continental wars throughout the latter half of the 19th century. Instead, however, Leopold is widely remembered for expanding Belgian power onto the African continent through his efforts to colonize an area that became known as the Belgian Congo, as well as for his brutal treatment of the African people in that region.

On April 9, 1835, Belgian's King Leopold I and his wife, Louise Marie, celebrated the birth of their second son, Louis Phillippe Marie Victor in Brussels Belgium (he would take the name Leopold II when he later ascended the throne). As Leopold's older brother had lived only a few days, his birth was greeted with great joy by the Belgians, as he was the heir to the throne. As a child, Leopold tended to be lazy in his schoolwork, although he was interested in politics, business, and geography. He received military training as part of his education, but he did not care for its strict discipline or for riding horses.

In an arrangement made by his father to shore up Belgium's European alliances, Leopold married Maria Henrietta, a daughter of Archduke Joseph of Austria, in late August 1853. They had four children: a daughter, Louise, in 1858; a son, Leopold, the Count of Hainaut, in 1859; a second daughter, Stephanie, in 1864; and a third daughter, Clementine, in 1872. (Unfortunately, the young Count of Hainaut died in 1869 from complications caused by falling from his horse, which left the monarchy without a male heir.)

After his father's death on December 10, 1865, Leopold was crowned king of Belgium. One of his greater achievements was in maintaining Belgium's neutrality amid the many warring factions of Europe. Throughout the 19th century, France, Spain, Austria, Germany, Holland, Prussia, and Russia were involved in continual political and religious disputes, often involving serious threats of war to their neighbors. With much help from his cousin, Queen Victoria of England, and his strong negotiating skills, Leopold was able to diffuse threats to Belgium's sovereignty.

Leopold was involved with many expansion and trading ventures involving business opportunities around the world. One of his first was as sponsor and chief spokesman for the Orient Express. The Orient Express was the first train to offer luxury service for diplomats and businessmen between London and the capitals of Europe, as well as to Istanbul, the gateway to the Near East. He also invested heavily in business ventures in Egypt and the Near East, including the building of the Suez Canal in Egypt. He was less successful in his dealings in the Far East and South America, mainly because the Belgian Parliament would not build a navy to back his enterprises.

Probably Leopold's most notable activity—both for good and ill—was his involvement in the exploration and development of the Belgian Congo in Africa. He had been searching for potential places to colonize for years, but most of the likely territories had already been brought under the control of other European countries. In the 1870s, the Congo River region of central Africa was the last major piece of the continent to be penetrated by Europeans, and Leopold claimed the region for Belgium, initiating efforts to colonize the area. He invited explorers and geographers to a conference that became known as the Brussels Conference of 1876. During the conference, he created the Association Internationale Africaine (AIA), with its headquarters in Brussels and himself as chairman. The AIA gave Leopold rights to the resources of the Congo, which would be honored by other Europeans. Leopold appointed the famous British explorer, Henry M. Stanley, to organize the colony and define its boundaries.

Throughout the 1880s and 1890s, Leopold was able to accumulate fabulous riches by extracting and selling rubber, ivory, and copper from what was euphemistically called the Congo Free State. He accomplished this, however, through treatment of the African laborers that was so inhuman that when his repressive policies came to the attention of the international public through the work of an evangelical religious group, Leopold was widely condemned. Conditions in the Congo Free State were so much more horrible even than those in the other European colonies in Africa that the information created a worldwide uproar. This public outrage had a significant impact on the government, and the Belgian Parliament stepped in on August 20, 1908, and reclaimed ownership of the colony that became the Belgian Congo. Leopold's reputation as an evil, uncaring man remained with him for the rest of his life.

Leopold died on December 17, 1909, a few days after an abdominal operation. His wife had died in 1901, and he had finally married his mistress while on his deathbed in order to legitimize the son that she had borne him. However, Parliament did not accept his son as his heir, and Leopold II was succeeded as king by his nephew, Albert I, who ruled Belgium until his own death in 1934.

Jim Marshall

See also: Arab War, Congo-Free State (1892–1894); Berlin Conference; Force Publique (to 1914); Stairs, William Grant; Stanley, Henry Morton

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Leutwein, Theodor (1849–1921)

Theodor Leutwein was a German army officer, military commander of German South West Africa (1894–1904), and governor of the German colony from 1898 until 1904. Although Leutwein was not officially named governor until 1898, he acted as the de facto governor beginning in 1894, after colonial administrator Kurt von François left for Germany.

Leutwein was born on May 9, 1849, in Strumpfelbronn, Germany, the son of a Protestant pastor. He joined the Prussian army in February 1868 and rose steadily through the ranks. He became a captain on January 15, 1884, a major on January 27, 1893, a lieutenant-colonel on May 22, 1899, and a colonel on June 16, 1901. He also attended the German Military Academy at Berlin.

Leutwein was detailed to German South West Africa in November 1893, arriving in the colony the following month. He would be tasked with establishing a full-fledged colonial administration and aiding German settlers, who had begun to arrive in the region in increasingly large numbers. In early 1894, he became commander of German colonial forces; meanwhile, on January 27, 1893, he was made a major-general. Leutwein's administrative setup was decentralized, with three regional administrative centers reporting to his office directly. In 1894, he commanded German colonial forces during the suppression of a rebellion by the Nama.

The general soon began to establish policies that came to be known as the "Leutwein System," which combined diplomacy, military force, and divide-and-conquer policies toward the Herero, Nama, and other African peoples. Before long, Leutwein's policies had alienated German settlers for being too permissive toward the African population. Specifically, they complained that the system had not resulted in land cessions large enough to satisfy colonial settlers, meaning that their business ventures—chiefly cattle raising—were not profitable enough. On the other hand, Leutwein's policies proved terribly disruptive to African peoples; they also brought sporadic warfare and violence, which further disrupted African society.

At first, Leutwein attempted to bribe and coerce the Herero into selling their cattle to the Germans. When he encountered resistance to this idea, he instead began forcing the Hereros to sell their land to German settlers. This resulted in overgrazing, which achieved Leutwein's original goal, but over a longer period of time. He often favored one local chief over the other in an effort to achieve his aims and coerced or bribed a number of groups into ceding huge tracts of land to the Germans; in return, they were given reservation lands and a security guarantee by the German government, most of which were never honored. These policies precipitated numerous armed clashes between German military forces and Africans, as well as among African groups.

The 1896–1897 rinderpest epidemic decimated Herero cattle herds, and a simultaneous drought and locust invasion forced many Herero to sell their land and become laborers for German settlers. Meanwhile, Leutwein initiated the first railroad project in the region, linking the coast with the interior portions of German South West Africa. A major African uprising marked the nadir of Leutwein's administration and ushered in the Herero Genocide of 1904–1908. He attempted to quash the rebellion by force, but when that did not end it, he seemed open to a negotiated settlement. In June 1904, Leutwein was replaced by General Lothar von Trotha, who had no intention of negotiating an end to the conflict. Instead, he seemed determined to annihilate the Hereros by force.

Leutwein returned to Germany in the summer of 1904. Two years later, he published an autobiography. Leutwein died on April 13, 1921, in Freiburg, Germany.

Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr.

See also: German-Nama War (1893–1894); Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Von Trotha, Lothar; Witbooi, Hendrik

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Liberian Expansion (1821–1916)

In 1821, the American Colonization Society (ACS) established a freed slave settlement called Liberia in an attempt to return freed slaves to their motherland and remove an imagined threat posed by free blacks. In December of that year, U.S. navy captain Robert Stockton and ACS agent Eli Ayers, having failed to gain land by consent, resorted to coercion. Stockton put his pistol to the head of King Peter to force him and five other local Dei rulers to sign a treaty that gave the ACS land on Cape Mesurado that became the site of Monrovia, named after U.S. president James Monroe. This led to almost immediate conflict with indigenous people.

In March 1822, the Dei under King George clashed with visiting British sailors and freed black settlers over access to water, which prompted the settlers to construct fortifications and stockpile firearms and ammunition. Perceiving the settlers as an obstacle to their continued slaving, Cuban sailors supplied locals with muskets and swords. In November and December 1822, a coalition of Dei villages under King Peter, which fielded an army of around 1,500 men mostly armed with spears, launched three determined attacks against the settler defenses but were repelled by cannon fire.

Frustrated by Liberian attempts to suppress the slave trade, Dei kings Kai Pa, Peter's successor, and Willey imposed a trade embargo on the settlement in 1832 and harassed frontier settlers. In late March, a 270-strong Liberian force advanced on Kai Pa's town, which was found abandoned; he had taken refuge with Willey, whose town was protected by a large wooden wall. The Liberian expedition used artillery to blast Willey's defenses, and within 20 minutes, the Dei warriors fled and Kai Pa was dead. The Liberians burned both settlements, and Willey accepted a treaty that reopened trade.

In June 1835, the Bassa under King Joe Harris destroyed the newly created Liberian settlement of Port Cresson, which lacked defenses because it was administered by a pacifist Quaker. Harris feared that Port Cresson would block his trade, including slaving, with visiting Europeans like the Spanish, but he underestimated Liberian military power. The ACS in Monrovia sent 120 armed settlers under General Elijah Johnson to the area and with the help of militia from nearby Edina and several other Bassa rulers, attacked Harris's town and forced him to accept Liberian authority.

In early 1838, Liberian settlers purchased land from the Sno Kru, a farming community that lived near the coast, to create Greenville or Mississippi in Africa. However, the new settlement inhibited the fishing and trading activities of the coastal Kabor Kru, who killed the Mississippi governor and were then attacked by a settler militia. Raids and counterraids between Liberians and local African slavers prompted the various Liberian settlements in 1839 to form a commonwealth to coordinate security and trade and expand their authority, given British and French competition.

The expansion of Liberian settlements led to conflict with the Vai ruler Getumbe in late 1839 and early 1840. After Getumbe's forces attacked Liberian settlers and their Dei allies and seized a Liberian delegation, ACS authorities dispatched a 200-man expedition that captured the Vai leader's capital and drove him away. In the wake of this Vai-Settler War, many Dei rulers accepted Liberian authority and unrestricted Liberian trade. With the threat that the British in Sierra Leone would annex Liberia, Joseph Jenkins Roberts, a settler hero of previous wars who was now head of the ACS administration, greatly expanded the settler militia to conquer indigenous groups.



Joseph Jenkins Roberts (1808–1876) was one of many African Americans who settled in Liberia in the early nineteenth century and became the republic's first (1848–1856) and seventh (1872–1876) president. Under his command, Americo-Liberian militias fought a series of expansionist campaigns to subjugate the indigenous people of Liberia. (Library of Congress)

In 1847, with ACS support, the settlers of Liberia declared themselves an independent republic. Although Liberia did not have a standing army, it maintained a volunteer uniformed militia of two companies that trained once a month. After independence, Liberia intensified antislaving activities with raids against groups like the Bassa of King Grando. In November 1851, Grando led 300 men, including contingents from other Bassa rulers, in two attacks on Liberian settlements, the second of which was repelled with significant loss. Within a few weeks, Grando's force grew to 2,000 men. In mid-January 1852, an army of over 1,000 militiamen led by Roberts (now Liberia's first president) defeated Grando's force and destroyed his base of operations. The presence of the warship USS *John Adams* along the Grand Bassa coastline intimidated the Bassa and provided the Liberians with communication.

During the early 1850s, various Kru groups attempted to impose a trade embargo on the coastal settlers and their African allies. In late 1855, these tensions turned violent, as the Blue Barre Kru raided a visiting British ship and kidnapped several African deckhands who had flouted Kru laws about employment on vessels. The same Kru group then attacked settler and associated African communities around Greenville. Transported from Monrovia on a German merchant vessel, a Liberian militia contingent under President Stephen Benson fought the Kru in several engagements from December 1855 to March 1856. With trade and agriculture disrupted, the Kru surrendered and agreed to a treaty bringing them under Liberian jurisdiction.

The establishment of Maryland in Africa, another settlement of free blacks from the United States to the east of Monrovia, in 1831 and its independence in 1854 escalated conflicts between local Grebo groups over land and trade. In December

1856, 200 Maryland militia and 200 local African allies supported by artillery attacked the Cape Palmas Grebo, who they accused of plotting to destroy the colony. The Cape Palmas Grebo counterattacked Maryland settlements. Another settler/African force sent out to get revenge lost 26 men and three cannon during an accidental fire and were pursued by the Grebo.

With their settlements cut off from each other, the Maryland administration in February 1857 requested help from Liberia, which dispatched Roberts with 115 men who negotiated an end to the conflict. In the subsequent treaty, Maryland gained land from the Cape Palmas Grebo in exchange for $1,000, and all Grebo came under its authority. Maryland joined Liberia later that year. In the early 1860s, Liberia formalized relations with the United States, which dispatched more naval support, and this reduced British and French encroachment and indigenous resistance.

In January 1874, the various Grebo groups around Cape Palmas in the south, under the leadership of Western-educated Christian Grebo, who had been discriminated against in Americo-Liberian society, united as a single kingdom and adopted laws meant to reduce the exploitation of Grebo working on foreign ships. While the Liberian government, controlled by the Americo-Liberian settlers, saw the Grebo as subjects and named their area Maryland County, the Grebo believed that they were independent. After the British government rejected a Grebo request for a protectorate, some British officials and merchants hinted that Britain would recognize Grebo independence if they defeated Liberia in war.

Under the mistaken belief that they had an alliance with Britain, the Grebo began to resist Liberian efforts to evict them from land to make way for new black settlers from the United States. In early September 1875, the Grebo launched a series of attacks on Liberian towns in the Cape Palmas area. For example, on September 11, 2,000 Grebo fighters surprised the settlers of Harper and Jacksonville, which were burned to the ground. With firearms and ammunition obtained from British merchants and Grebo mission employees, the Grebo army grew to 7,000 by October and reinforcements continued to arrive from inland towns like Grand Cess and Bereby.

Roberts, once again serving as Liberian president, dispatched 1,000 militiamen to Maryland. On the morning of October 10, the militiamen, who had been drinking heavily for several days and under the command of an incompetent General Clayton, attacked Grebo fortifications around Hoffman Station and, after several hours of intense fighting, retreated in disorder, leaving behind artillery pieces and ammunition. The next day, the Grebo, using captured weapons, attacked militia positions but were repelled by superior firepower.

Roberts ordered an arms embargo on the Liberian coast, but it was difficult to enforce. Since the Liberian state did not have the military resources to continue fighting, Roberts requested support from the United States, which sent the warship USS *Alaska*, commanded by Alexander A. Semmes, to end the dispute. In early March 1876, the Grebo, who Semmes threatened with direct American intervention, accepted a treaty in which they disbanded their kingdom, demobilized their army, and submitted to Liberian rule.

With both the government in Monrovia and indigenous groups weary of years of warfare, many village-states signed treaties accepting Liberian sovereignty and taxation during the late 1870s and 1880s. The Liberian state adopted a more conciliatory policy toward indigenous groups, partly because it was worried about fending off territorial claims by the French and British in the adjacent colonies of Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone, respectively.

The Liberian government became more aggressive toward indigenous peoples during the 1890s given its better economic situation and foreign threats. In Maryland, the British and French made alliances with anti-Liberian Grebo groups. In February 1893, warring Grebo leaders refused to attend a peace conference organized by Liberian president Joseph James Cheeseman. As a result, he sent a gunboat with 200 Liberian militiamen to Maryland, where they joined 300 Nyemowe Grebo allies and defeated the Kudemowe and Cavallan Grebo in a series of battles around Rocktown. While the Grebo belligerents made peace with each other and accepted Liberian authority, inter-Grebo warfare resumed fairly quickly. Between 1893 and 1900, there were dozens of small skirmishes in the south between Liberian militia and various Grebo and Kru groups who rebelled against the government and fought among themselves. In November 1894, a Liberian gunboat bombarded Kru boats unloading illegal cargo, which prompted a short-lived antisettler Kru alliance in 1895 that deteriorated because of internal disputes.

In 1906, the Liberian militia was criticized inside and outside Liberia for stealing cattle, food, and other items while trying to enforce peace between rival Kru communities. Eyeing Liberia's natural resources, Britain and France declared that they would annex the Liberian interior if Monrovia did not control warring factions threatening their colonial frontiers. Consequently, Liberia established the Frontier Force in 1908, which functioned as both a permanent military and police in the hinterland. Under British captain Mackay Caldwell, a veteran of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902, 250 soldiers were recruited and housed in new barracks in Monrovia), assisted by a dozen other British officers and sergeants. The French complained about British dominance of the Frontier Force. When it was discovered that many of the new troops were Mende from British Sierra Leone, the Liberian government sacked Caldwell, who encouraged a brief mutiny put down by the settler militia.

The Frontier Force was reorganized with Americo-Liberian officers and a rank and file recruited from the small and less Westernized indigenous groups of the interior such as the Kissi, Gbandi, Mende, and Mano. Liberian authorities believed that this ethnic diversity would discourage mutiny, and soldiers from one small group could be used to suppress another. Since they were hostile to Americo-Liberians, coastal groups like the Grebo and Kru were seen as unreliable.

During the early 20th century, the Frontier Force gained a reputation for abuse during tax collection and suppression of conflict among indigenous communities. To discourage British and French intrusion, the Liberian government turned to the United States. From 1912 to 1922, the Field Force was trained and commanded by a series of African-American U.S. army officers posted to Monrovia as military attachés and former "Buffalo soldiers" (African-American cavalrymen) on contract with the Liberian government, many of whom were veterans of the 1898 Spanish-American War. When Major Charles Young became the first African-American field-grade officer in a regular unit in 1912, he was sent to Liberia because of concerns in the U.S. army and government that white officers found it intolerable to serve under blacks. Young had been encouraged to accept the post by prominent African-American educator Booker T. Washington. Under African-American leadership, the Frontier Force grew to around 1,000 men armed with Mauser rifles who put down a series of rebellions, the most serious of which was staged by the Kru of the southern coast in 1915–1916, in which hundreds were killed and 42 rebel leaders hanged.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Roberts, Joseph Jenkins; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Libya, Italian Conquest of (1911–1912)

While Italian ambitions in Libya can be traced back to the early 19th century, planning for the invasion of the region only began in November 1884. At that point, the Italian government reached the conclusion that the French, who had recently declared a protectorate over Tunisia, were about to seize Morocco, which would have given them control of all of North Africa except Egypt and Libya. Rome worried about both Italy's maritime security, as the Mediterranean was becoming a French lake, and for Italy's future as an imperial power, a future already threatened by the French occupation of Tunisia, where many Italians lived and where Italy had played an important economic role for decades.

Italy's motives for acquiring Libya differed in some respects from those embraced by other imperial powers in Africa. Italians liked to depict their attempt to conquer Libya as the reconquest of a lost colony. The region, after all, had been part of the ancient Roman Empire. In addition, the Italian government viewed Libya—as well as Eritrea and Ethiopia—as territories to settle the country's excess population. The loss of so many citizens to the Americas was a burning issue in Italian politics during the early 20th century. This prompted some Italian politicians and journalists to make inflated claims about the agricultural and commercial potential of Libya. Some Italian politicians coveted Libya for strategic purposes. They thought that Italy's new and powerful navy needed ports and naval bases in North Africa to maintain control over the central Mediterranean. These people were often Sicilians or southern Italians, for whom Libya was a short cruise away.

Rome embarked on a successful diplomatic campaign to secure approval from the major European powers for the Italian invasion of Libya. The only power that might have opposed the Italian scheme was France, but Paris was won over by Italian support for its position in the 1905 and 1911 Moroccan Crises. The pretext used by the Italian administration of Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti to validate launching an invasion of Libya was the supposed Turkish discrimination against Italian business enterprises in Libya and the presumed powerlessness of the Ottoman authorities there to protect foreign residents. An ultimatum delivered on September 28, 1911, gave the Turkish government 24 hours to accept an Italian military occupation of Libya. Although the Turkish reply was conciliatory, Rome declared it unacceptable and dispatched its fleet into action. The army was mobilized, but since Italy used regular army conscripts to fight its wars in Africa, not a professional colonial army like France, valuable time was lost in bringing together the roughly 45,000-strong invasion force and equipping it for tropical warfare.

The subsequent Turco-Italian War was almost completely a result of the machinations of the Italian government, particularly Foreign Minister Antonio di San Giuliano and Prime Minister Giolitti, and its conduct never strayed far from the same civilian hands. The armed forces remained largely in the dark about the government's objectives until the final weeks before operations began and, once the conflict started, the guidance of the generals and admirals was sought only rarely and accepted even less often. While the Italian constitution (*Statuto*) put the military under the direct control of the king, the nation's armed forces actually marched to the orders of their civilian superiors.

The first Italian soldiers landed at Tripoli, Libya's largest city, on October 9, by which time it already had been occupied, following a short bombardment, by 7,000 sailors. The scratch force deployed in a defensive perimeter around the city within range of naval gunfire. The small Turkish garrisons in the main cities of Libya, meanwhile, withdrew to the interior, where they were joined by Arab militia and tribal levies intent on resisting the Italian invasion. The Italian army and its civilian masters had thought that the Turks would surrender and return home, but Rome had done almost everything possible to ensure that this did not happen. Before the war, there had been some talk within the Italian government about declaring a protectorate in Libya similar to the French in Tunisia and the British in Egypt. This would have allowed the Turks to retain nominal sovereignty, while yielding the actual running of the country to Italy. Mostly on the insistence of Prime Minister Giolitti, this idea was abandoned on the pretext that it would be too complicated for the Libyan people to comprehend. The real issue, seemingly, was Giolitti's belief that the increasingly nationalistic Italian population would only settle for full sovereignty over Libya. Thus, on November 5, 1911, Italy's King Victor Emmanuel III formally annexed Libya. With the benefit of hindsight, this appears to have been a grave mistake.

The Italian government and military had also decided that given their dislike for their Turkish overlords, Libya's Arabs and Berbers would greet the Italians as liberators. The facts that this belief proved false and that the shared Muslim faith of ruler and subject outweighed all other considerations made the conflict in Libya very difficult for Italy.

On October 23, 1911, a mixed force of Turkish soldiers and Arab irregulars conducted a surprise attack on a poorly defended sector of the Italian defenses around Tripoli. The ensuing massacre of Sciara Sciat, which cost the lives of some 500 Italian soldiers, provoked severe retaliation by the Italian army, including mass summary executions and the creation of concentration camps in Libya and Italy. The Italian response to the massacre stimulated widespread anti-Italian sentiment in Europe, particularly in Britain.

From October 1911 well into 1912, Italian forces made little progress against Turkish-Arab opposition, despite the arrival of reinforcements in November 1911 and enjoying a lopsided advantage in weaponry that included airplanes and dirigibles used to bomb enemy locations. This was the first instance in which aircraft were used in a combat role rather than for reconnaissance. The Italian army in Libya also pioneered the use of armored cars and developed battlefield wireless communications.

In the last months of the war, a battalion of askaris (African colonial soldiers from Eritrea on the Red Sea coast) was brought in, in the belief that these soldiers, presumably more acclimated to desert warfare, could spearhead a drive into the interior and that their Muslim faith would impress the local population. The latter hope faded when it became apparent that some of the askaris were Ethiopian Christians.

The lack of Italian progress in the conflict stemmed partly from the difficult terrain and the low morale of the mostly conscript force, but it also was a result of the army's persistent fear of being drawn into "another Adowa." This Italian rout at the hands of the Ethiopians in 1896—the bloodiest engagement in the whole of the European colonial wars—had brought down a government, and fears of a repetition were intensified by the Sciara Sciat massacre. Many of the generals who served in Libya, including the commander, General Carlo Caneva, had previously fought in East Africa.

Ottoman army leadership proved more inspired, although even with mass Arab and Berber support, Turkish regulars, denied reinforcements by an Italian naval blockade, were consistently outnumbered and rarely able to mount an offensive. The Ottoman officers who fought in Libya included Kemal Atatürk, the founder and first president of the new Turkish republic in 1923, and Enver Bey, who was the Ottoman minister of war from 1913 to 1918.

Enver played a particularly important role in effectively coordinating with the Sanusiya, the important Sufi brotherhood who served as the spiritual (and to some extent political) leaders of the Bedouin of the desert interior of Libya, particularly in Cyrenaica Province. The orthodox Sanusi had kept the Turks, not considered very good Muslims, at arm's length, and this was perceived by Italian officials as a sign that the brotherhood might support Italy or at least remain neutral during the invasion.

However, after a brief period on the fence after the Italian landings, the Sanusi, on the insistence of Enver Bey, took the leadership of Bedouin reinforcements for the Turkish regulars in Cyrenaica. As a result, Italian troops were unable to penetrate the interior of that province for the duration of the war.

Hostilities between Italy and Turkey were brought to an end only when the Italians decided to expand the conflict to the eastern Mediterranean. A naval attack on the Dardanelles was followed by the Italian occupation of Rhodes and other Dodecanese islands in the Aegean Sea. This, in addition to anticipation of renewed conflict in the Balkans, brought the Turks to the bargaining table. On October 18, 1912, a settlement was reached at Lausanne, Switzerland, granting Italy sovereignty over Libya. The Italians also agreed to withdraw their troops from the Dodecanese Islands as soon as the Turks pulled out of Libya, but Turkish participation in World War I on the side of the Central Powers allowed Italy to continue to occupy the islands until World War II.

By liberating the Dodecanese Islands from the Turks, the Italians unintentionally gave a boost to *enosis*, the movement to bring all Greek-speaking peoples in the Mediterranean region under the Greek flag. Italian refusal to concede to the islanders' demands for union with Greece would cause a rift with Athens on the eve of World War I. This dispute only deteriorated in the aftermath of the war, when the two countries fell out over the spoils from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

The impact of the Turco-Italian War, the only conflict between European powers between 1878 and the start of World War I, proved ominous. For Italy, the struggle was costly, not so much in blood as in treasure. More Italian soldiers died of disease than in combat—1,948 to 1,432—but what many called a "war for a desert" cost Italy around 527 million lire and drew off a large portion of its army and modern military equipment.

Indeed, the fighting in Libya did not end with the Peace of Lausanne. An Arab rebellion continued until 1932, when Benito Mussolini's army employed scorched-earth tactics to finally bring it to an end. In 1916, when the Italian army began its second year of brutal fighting in the Alps against the Austrians during World War I, over 40,000 of its soldiers were still fighting guerrillas in Libya. In fact, Libya became a marginal theater of World War I, as Turkish soldiers and Sanusi-led irregulars opened a front in western Egypt and Chad, compelling Britain and France to send troops to the region.

The Arab struggle in Libya against the Italians has been described as the first pan-Islamic popular mass resistance movement against Western colonialism which provided modern Libya with invaluable myths of battles, national heroes, and martyrs. Defeat in the war gravely weakened the Ottoman Empire, a development that rapidly led to the First Balkan War, casting Turkey into a losing struggle against the newly independent Balkan states and raising the long-dreaded specter of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, followed by war among the European powers eager to get their share of the spoils.

Although no one has yet blamed Italy for starting World War I, historians generally agree that the Italian conquest of the

Ottoman Empire's Libyan provinces in 1911–1912 helped set the stage for the start of the war in 1914. Italy's victory in Libya, supplemented by its occupation of the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean, persuaded the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia) that the Ottoman Empire was too weak to prevent it from liberating the rest of southeastern Europe from Turkish rule. Montenegro declared war on the Ottomans even before the Italians and Turks had ended their conflict. The resulting First and Second Balkan Wars, which saw the Turks expelled from most of the Balkan Peninsula (mostly to the benefit of Serbia) rang alarm bells in Vienna and put in motion the events that would lead to the July Crisis of 1914 and the descent into war the next month.

Bruce Vandervort

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Askari; Caneva, Carlo; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Italian Colonial Troops; Technology and Conquest

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Lobengula kaMzilikazi (1845–1894)

Lobengula became king of the Ndebele state, in what is today southwestern Zimbabwe, in 1870 during the height of its power. Yet the Ndebele lands were located in much too strategic a position to escape the encroachment of Europeans. Separating the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola, the German colonies of Tanganyika and South West Africa, and the British colonies of South Africa and Kenya, Lobengula's kingdom held off the forces of imperialism for 25 years. It finally fell to the determined aggression of the British South Africa Company (BSAC).

Lobengula was born around 1836 in the western Transvaal, the area north of the Vaal River in present-day South Africa. His father, King Mzilikazi, founded a kingdom among the Ndebele, a Nguni people. Shortly after Lobengula's birth, the Ndebele began a migration that took them north of the Limpopo River, away from the threats of the Boers and the Zulu.

Mzilikazi died in 1868, and the Ndebele national council unexpectedly nominated Lobengula to succeed his father. The acknowledged heir to the throne had been Nkulumane, Lobengula's half-brother, but he had disappeared in 1840. No one knew if Nkulumane was still alive, and Mzilikazi failed to designate another heir before he died. Lobengula's mother was a Swazi and considered of an inferior social rank. Therefore, many believed that Lobengula was not fit to become king because of his questionable heritage. He refused the kingship until the fate of Nkulumane was resolved.

In 1869, the Ndebele sent a delegation to Natal to search for the missing heir. When he was not found, Lobengula became king in 1870. Shortly thereafter, in what was likely a British colonial attempt to destabilize the Ndebele state, a man in Natal claiming to be Nkulumane solicited European support to take over Lobengula's throne. In response, Lobengula gave mining concessions to a group of Europeans represented by Thomas Baines, a British artist and explorer. This action undermined the efforts of other Europeans to influence Ndebele politics and pacified many of the so-called Nkulumane supporters, who discontinued their support of this pretender. Some pro-Nkulumane supporters within the Ndebele nation openly defied Lobengula, however, and instigated a brief civil war. Although Lobengula prevailed in his cause, such pretenders as Nkulumane continued to plague his administration.

Europeans supported such pretenders and other threats to Lobengula's power for a variety of reasons. Missionaries in the area resented Lobengula's uncooperative attitude toward their activities, and several became outspoken critics of Lobengula and the Ndebele way of life. British, Boer, German, and Portuguese imperialists coveted the Ndebele lands for their mineral deposits. These European groups desperately wanted land concessions or mining rights. Lobengula attempted to disperse mining rights and concessions in a limited manner to maintain his power, while at the same time extracting goods, services, or promises from the Europeans.

In 1888, Lobengula signed a treaty produced by one of these concession hunters, Charles Rudd, who was an agent of British imperialist and mining magnate Cecil Rhodes who then formed the chartered BSAC. The treaty allegedly granted exclusive rights to mine in present-day Zimbabwe. It is clear, however, that Rudd misrepresented the substance of the document to Lobengula. It actually stated that it was an unencumbered grant of land to Rhodes. Two years later, Rhodes's company occupied the territory of the Shona people (called Mashonaland) in what is now eastern Zimbabwe. Lobengula lacked sufficient Ndebele support to decisively resist Rhodes and the private army of "pioneers." As the forces of the BSAC pressured the Ndebele, Lobengula's troops raided into the Shona regions to make up for their losses.

In 1893, company administrator Leander Starr Jameson used one of these raids as a pretext for attacking the Ndebele. By this time, Lobengula did not have the ability to resist the company's army, and his empire was overrun. When his capital of Bulawayo was occupied by company forces, Lobengula fled north toward the Zambezi River and died en route.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Boer Trek (1835–1854); British South Africa Company; Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Jameson, Leander Starr; Rhodes, Cecil John

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Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891)

In 1885, Germany declared a protectorate over the mainland of present-day Tanzania, which became German East Africa. In 1889, German attempts to control coastal trade led to the Swahili-Arab Abushiri rebellion that was suppressed by a colonial expedition under Captain Hermann von Wissman. As a result, the German government took control of the colony from Karl Peters's German East Africa Company.

In the interior, during the 1880s, Mkwawa's Hehe expanded their territory and raided trade caravans in what is now south-central Tanzania. Around 1890, the Hehe attacked African communities that had submitted to the Germans, who had built forts at Mpwapwa and Kilosa on the trade route inland from coastal Bagamoyo. The Germans began to fear that the Hehe might attack the coast, but the former initially negotiated with them due to their lack of military resources. After a German expedition of 150 men visited the Hehe in the Usagara area, a Hehe delegation visited the coast and departed with an understanding that they could acquire guns and ammunition from the Germans.

In June 1891, reports of Ngoni and Hehe raids in the interior prompted the Germans to send a patrol under Emil von Zelewski—nicknamed "the hammer" during the Abushiri rebellion—to Usagara, where it destroyed abandoned Hehe villages, entered the core of Hehe territory (where more villages were sacked), and marched toward the main Hehe fort at Kalenga. The German column consisted of 13 Europeans, 320 African soldiers, 170 porters supported by two machine guns, and three light cannon. Dismissive of the Hehe military abilities, Zelewski neglected to deploy scouts.

On the morning of August 17, when the German column paused to regroup at a place called Lugalo (Lula-Rugaro), some 3,000 Hehe warriors unexpectedly attacked from a clump of dense bush and rocks just 30 meters away. Although the Hehe had few guns and were armed mainly with spears and shields, the colonial soldiers managed to fire only one or two shots before they were overwhelmed and the donkeys carrying the machine guns and artillery bolted. The Germans lost 10 Europeans, including Zelewski, who had been riding a donkey at the head of the column; 256 African troops and their firearms; 96 porters; three cannon; and most of their baggage. Lieutenant Maximilian von Tettenborn rallied the German rearguard on a hill and waited there for two days for survivors before withdrawing toward the coast. The Hehe set fire to the dry grass to burn any wounded trying to crawl away, and then they pulled back. Although Tettenborn estimated that around 700 Hehe had been killed, the ambush represented a major German defeat.

While French missionaries visited the Hehe to assure them that the Germans wanted peace, German garrisons were established at Kilosa and Kisaki. Their stunning victory at Lugalo emboldened the Hehe. In early October 1892, a Hehe force attacked and almost annihilated a large caravan at Mukondoa, which led to the evacuation of the missionaries. The Germans were unable to mobilize a large expedition against the Hehe quickly because a number of other African rulers took the opportunity to rebel. It would take another seven years for German colonial forces to conquer Mkwawa's Hehe. The massacre at Lugalo instilled a desire for revenge among German colonial officers like Tom von Prince, but some of their African soldiers began to develop a fear of the Hehe.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Abushiri (1888–1889); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); Peters, Carl; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); von Wissman, Hermann; von Zelewski, Emil

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Lugard, Frederick (1858–1945)

Colonial administrator and founder of the system of indirect rule in British Africa. Born on January 22, 1858, in Madras (now Chennai), India, Frederick John Dealtry Lugard was educated in England at the Rossall School and at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He was commissioned in the 9th Foot Regiment (Royal Norfolk) in 1878 and fought in the Second Afghan War (1878–1880), the Suakin Expedition (1884–1885), and the conquest of Burma (1885–1892). In 1888, Lugard, who was on leave hunting elephants around Lake Nyasa, led an African Lakes Company expedition against Swahili-Arab slavers in the northern part of what soon became the British Central African Protectorate and later Nyasaland. Leaving the army, Lugard worked for the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) in Kenya and Uganda, where he played a pivotal role in establishing a British protectorate. From 1890 to 1892, Lugard led a IBEAC intervention in favor of the Protestant side of the Buganda civil war and then returned to Britain to respond to criticism of this operation.

In 1894, Lugard was hired by the Royal Niger Company and extended that company's trading monopoly into northern Nigeria. In 1897, after a brief period of employment in southern Africa, he returned to northern Nigeria, this time in the service of the Colonial Office, and oversaw creation of the West African Frontier Force



Frederick Lugard (1858–1945) was a British soldier and colonial administrator who established the system of indirect rule in several of Britain's African territories. He led British colonial forces in Nyasaland (Malawi), Uganda and Nigeria, and became the first British governor of Nigeria in 1914. (Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo)

(WAFF). In 1900, he was appointed high commissioner for northern Nigeria and, through war, extended British political control over the interior including the large Sokoto caliphate.

During 1907–1911, Lugard served as governor-general of Hong Kong. In 1912, he was appointed governor-general of northern and southern Nigeria. By early 1914, he had incorporated the two colonies into one, revised their defense scheme, and unified the regimental system.

When World War I began, Lugard mobilized Nigerian manpower through its traditional rulers. By the war's end, more than 15,000 soldiers and 30,000 noncombatant bearers had been enlisted or conscripted for service in the conflict. Although the bulk of these men were employed domestically for defense purposes, Nigerian regiments participated in the invasions of the German Kamerun (Cameroon) in 1914–1916 and of German East Africa (Tanzania) in 1916–1918. Nigerian economic contributions toward the war effort were also substantial.

Lugard's greater autonomy in Nigeria during World War I enabled him to implement his vision of colonial rule. This philosophy of "Indirect Rule," later expounded in his book *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922), became the template for British administration in Africa. He retired from colonial service in 1918 and died in Abinger Common, Surrey, England, on April 11, 1945.

Stephen M. Miller

See also: Askari; East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); King's African Rifles (to 1904); Mwanga II; North End War/Slavers' War (1887–1896); Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (1897–1903); Royal Niger Company; West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

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Lyautey, Louis Hubert (1854–1934)

French army marshal and minister of war, as well as one of France's greatest colonial soldiers. Born on November 17, 1854, in Nancy, France, Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey entered the French Military Academy of St. Cyr in 1873. Routine assignments in the cavalry, including a tour in Algeria, followed. In France, he met writers such as Jose Maria de Heredia, Henri de Régnier, and Marcel Proust and became concerned about the social cleavage between officers and enlisted men in the army. Lyautey urged that officers take an interest in the social and spiritual welfare of their men. These views, published anonymously in 1891 in an article in *La*

Louis Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934) was a marshal of France, served briefly as French minister of war, and was one of France's greatest colonial soldiers. From 1897 to 1902 he played a leading role in suppressing resistance to French rule in Madagascar and from 1912 to 1925 he was in charge of the French colonial administration in Morocco. (Library of Congress)

Revue des Deux Mondes entitled "Du rôle social de l'officier dans le service militaire universal" ("On the Social Role of the Officer in Universal Military Service"), apparently angered his superiors and led to his assignment to Tonkin, Indochina (present-day Vietnam), which proved a turning point in his military career.

In Indochina, Lyautey became chief of staff to Colonel Joseph Galliéni, then commanding French forces in upper Tonkin. He fully embraced Galliéni's theories regarding the oil slick method of pacification, which included not only military but social action and improvement in the people's quality of life to win their hearts and minds. In 1897, when Galliéni became military governor of Madagascar, Lyautey followed him and took charge of pacifying first the northwest and then the south of the island. He was promoted to colonel in 1900, the same year that he published another important article, "Du rôle colonial de l'armée" ("On the Colonial Role of the Army"), in the influential *Revue des Deux Mondes,* in which he summarized pacification policies.

Assigned to France in 1902, Lyautey was sent to southern Algeria. In 1904, he carried out an independent action along the Moroccan border that embarrassed French foreign minister Théophile Delcassé. He continued to press for French military intervention in Morocco. In 1906, he took charge of the Oran division as a general. In 1907, he implemented the French military occupation of Oujda on the Moroccan border without the consent of French premier Georges Clemenceau. Following a tour of duty in France, Lyautey was named resident general of Morocco, with wide civil and military powers, in 1912. He gradually imposed French authority on the country.

Despite the depletion of his forces with World War I, Lyautey continued to press French pacification of the Moroccan interior, including the construction of roads, railroads, bridges, and schools. When Premier Aristide Briand reorganized his cabinet in December 1916, he appointed Lyautey minister of war. But Lyautey arrived in France to discover that he had not been consulted on the appointment of new French commander-in-chief General Robert Nivelle. Unsupported in his criticism of Nivelle's plans for a great, victorious spring offensive, Lyautey resigned on March 14, and by the end of May, he had returned to his post in Morocco.

Lyautey's purported homosexuality did not seem to hinder his career. Promoted to marshal of France in 1921, Lyautey continued to control French affairs in Morocco until French army commander Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain replaced him in 1925 following a widespread rebellion led by Abd-el-Krim known as the Rif War. A member of the French Academy since 1921, Lyautey died in Thorey, in the Lorraine region of France, on July 27, 1934.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi, Muhammad ibn; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Galliéni, Joseph; Madagascar, French Conquest of (1882–1905); Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934); Rif War (1920–1926)

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Madagascar, French Conquest of (1882–1905)

At the start of the 1880s, the French decided to strengthen their position in the Indian Ocean by subjugating the Christian-ruled kingdom of Madagascar, using its failure to honor an old 1855 agreement on mining and forestry as an excuse for invasion. When a French warship threatened the island's east coast port of Tamatave in May 1882, the kingdom's ally, Great Britain, advocated negotiation, and requests for German and U.S. assistance were refused.

In February 1883, a French naval squadron bombarded ports on Madagascar's west coast and in May occupied northwestern Majunga (Mahajanga). A subsequent French ultimatum for the acceptance of French property rights in the island's northeast, a protectorate over the autonomous Sakalava states in the west, and the payment of a large indemnity was rejected by Antananarivo, the kingdom's capital. The French moved their ships to the east side of the island, where they occupied Tanatave (Toamasina), which led to the recently crowned Queen Ranavalona III signing a treaty in which she accepted a French resident in Antananarivo and agreed to pay an even larger indemnity. While the term *protectorate* was not used in the treaty, the French believed that they had imposed one on the entire island.

In 1890, in typical "Scramble for Africa" style, the British and French agreed to divide the western Indian Ocean, with the former gaining Zanzibar and the latter Madagascar. Since Ranavalona III rejected French protectorate claims, the French navy bombarded and occupied Tanatave in December 1894 and Majunga in January 1895. The main expeditionary force under General Jacques Duchesne, consisting of 15,000 troops and 6,000 porters, landed at Majunga in May 1895 and tried to advance by constructing a road toward Antananarivo during the rainy season. Despite heavy losses from malaria, French firepower pushed back the 30,000-strong Malagasy army under General Rainianjalahy at Tsarasoatra at the end of June, and again at Andriba in late August. French conquest was facilitated by local resistance to the kingdom of Madagascar that was related to obligatory gold mining to pay for the previous war indemnity and Christianization.

The advent of the dry season allowed the French to move more rapidly, and in mid-September, Duchesne formed a "flying column" of 4,000 light infantry supported by supply-carrying mules that dashed toward the capital. After thwarting a Malagasy attempt led by Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony to attack the column's rear, the French arrived at Antananarivo, where they bombarded the queen's palace, forcing an immediate capitulation. The next day, Ranavalona

III accepted a French protectorate where the French would govern indirectly through the existing monarchy, and Rainilaiarivony was exiled to Algiers. About 4,600 French troops, one-third of the expedition, had died almost entirely from disease, and four-fifths of these were Europeans.

Popular resentment of French conquest, continued Malagasy aristocratic rule, Christianity, and forced labor provoked rebellions across the island. Violence began in November 1895, when 2,000 men ravaged Avironimamo near the capital, where they killed the Malagasy governor, two British missionaries, and three French visitors. In the subsequent weeks, 750 missions and churches were destroyed and the insurgents enslaved captives, ambushed traveling merchants, and disrupted mining. In March 1896, a 400-strong force of aristocratic Malagasy troops who had not been disarmed, led by the former governor Rabezavana and insurgent Rabozaka, took Anjozorobe, some 90 kilometers north of Antananarivo. At this stage, the French occupation force consisted of 2,600 French and Algerian soldiers and 1,800 Malagasy auxiliaries.

In May and June, after several small French expeditions had failed to hunt them down, rebel activity increased, and they besieged Antananarivo. The highly mobile rebels, later called "red togas" after the traditional warrior symbol that they wore, were organized into seven main groups and possessed 10,000 firearms, as well as many axes and machetes. In early August, France annexed Madagascar as a colony and abolished slavery on the island. Fresh from suppressing piracy in Indochina, General Joseph-Simon Galliéni and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Hubert Lyautey, arrived in October to take administrative and military control. Ranavalona III was exiled to Algeria and the monarchy abolished. Under Galliéni, Madagascar was divided into a number of districts, roughly corresponding with the old kingdom's divisions, each under a French colonel with a small security force responsible for military and civil affairs. The districts were further divided into sectors, each commanded by a captain or lieutenant with similar military and civil responsibilities who led a company or platoon garrison and was encouraged to exercise his initiative.

Gradually, insurgents were pushed out of the central province and trade routes reopened. While most rebels in the central territory of the former kingdom had surrendered by the end of 1897, it took until 1905 for Senegalese and Algerian troops under French leadership to pacify the small groups on the periphery, and some resistance continued into the World War I era. The French were the first to impose a single administration on the island and partly financed their operations by selling 900,000 hectares of land to six chartered companies and 2,000 French settlers from the Indian Ocean island of Reunion. Considered a pioneer of modern counterinsurgency, Galliéni went on to play a key role in the defense of Paris during World War I and served as France's minister of war just prior to his death in 1916. Lyautey would go on to play a central role in the pacification of Morocco.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Galliéni, Joseph; Lyautey, Louis Hubert; Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

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Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900)

The Siege of Mafeking was a sideshow of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), but it grew in significance until it became a central event of the conflict, representing the triumph of British tenacity and heroism over the Boers.

Founded in 1885, the town of Mafeking was located at a rail junction 362 kilometers north of Kimberley inside the border of Bechuanaland (today's Botswana) and close to the border of the Transvaal or South African Republic. In 1899, about 1,500 whites lived in Mafeking, and the population of the adjoining black town, Mafikeng, swelled from about 5,000 to over 7,000 with refugees. Mafeking was highly symbolic to the Boers as the base for the failed Jameson Raid (1895–1896), which probably gave them an exaggerated idea of the value of the town.

Colonel Robert S. S. Baden-Powell was sent to South Africa in July 1899. By early October 1899, he commanded a garrison in Mafeking totaling almost 700 Rhodesian troops. His mission was to protect the Cape Colony border, prevent any Boer raiding or attacks from the Transvaal, divert as many Boer troops as possible, and, if ordered, conduct raids into the Transvaal.

War was declared on October 11, 1899, and a 6,000-man Boer force commanded by Assistant Commandant-General Piet A. Cronjé began besieging Mafeking on October 13. Baden-Powell's preparations fortifying the town and demonstrations of strength, coupled with frequent raids, dummy guns, and various ruses, gave the Boers the impression that the garrison was stronger than it actually was. Later in the month, the Boers brought up a 94-pounder siege gun to fire at the Mafeking garrison. In November 1899, Cronjé took the majority of this force and moved to the south, leaving 1,500 Boers, under General J. P. Snyman, to continue the siege.

On December 26, 1899, the British launched an attack on a threatening Boer strongpoint that failed, at high cost, to seize its objective. As a British relief column neared Mafeking, the Boers conducted a daring but unsuccessful attack against the British. Finally, after a 217-day siege that cost the British 813 casualties, Mafeking was relieved on May 17, 1900.

The world's attention had been focused on this contest between the British and the Boers at Mafeking. Queen Victoria had written to Baden-Powell in April 1900, "I continue watching with confidence and admiration the patient and resolute defence . . . under your ever resourceful command" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 421). When Mafeking was relieved, unparalleled celebrations—not even rivaled by those at the end of the two world wars—broke out, especially in London, where the jubilant scenes were described as "mafficking."

The Siege of Mafeking boosted British morale. In addition, it diverted (especially during its first two months) thousands of Boers who could have been employed more effectively (and perhaps decisively) in further attacking the Cape Colony. The siege also exposed the Boer weakness and unwillingness to sustain casualties by attacking defensive positions.

The success of the Siege of Mafeking can be attributed largely to the energetic, resourceful, and professional leadership of Baden-Powell. Contributing to the achievement were the armed Africans, although this was relatively unheralded at the time. Baden-Powell has been criticized for giving less food to unarmed blacks, perhaps to encourage them to leave the town, but he acted in accordance with contemporary practices and accomplished his mission.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Baden-Powell, Robert; Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; Jameson Raid (1895–1896)

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Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899)

The Battle of Magersfontein was a debacle—the second of three humiliating defeats for the British during what came to be known as “Black Week.” It also showed the British inflexibility in adapting tactics to meet new battlefield conditions.

After the pyrrhic British victory at the Battle of the Modder River (November 28, 1899), the Boers, under the overall command of Assistant Commandant-General Piet A. Cronjé, retreated north toward Kimberley. The Boers began initially constructing defensive positions on the high ground near Scholtz Nek and Spyfontein. Based largely on the Boer experience at the Modder River and the convictions of Assistant Commandant-General Jacobus De la Rey, the Boers moved farther south and dug new positions at the foot of Magersfontein Hill, where they again would be less vulnerable to British artillery fire and could use the full range and effect of their Mausers.

The British 1st Division, commanded by Lieutenant-General Lord Paul S. Methuen, rested and received reinforcements after the Battle of Modder River. The 1st Division then had 13,000 soldiers. During this time, little was done to gather intelligence on the Boers, their intentions, and their disposition. Methuen’s plan was for the Highland Brigade (commanded by Major-General Andrew G. Wauchope) to advance at night across the open plain, deploy with three battalions abreast, and then assault the enemy positions at dawn. The 9th Lancers would advance on the right, with the 9th Brigade in reserve. Wauchope reportedly expressed his concerns about the plan to Methuen.

On the afternoon of December 10, 1899, the Highland Brigade marched forward to a slight rise known as Headquarters Hill, and at about 4:30 P.M., the British artillery bombarded the Magersfontein heights. This barrage wounded only three Boers, but it warned the Boers (numbering about

8,000, including a Scandinavian contingent) that an attack was imminent.

After midnight, in a thunderstorm and over rough terrain, the 3,500-man Highland Brigade began its advance march, with its 30 companies arrayed one behind the other in a mass of quarter columns. The 2nd Battalion, Black Watch, was in the lead, followed by the 2nd Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders; the 1st Battalion, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; and the 1st Battalion, Highland Light Infantry.

Major G. E. Benson, the navigator, performed his duties very well, and on at least two occasions, he informed Wauchope that the time had come to deploy the brigade. Even though dawn was approaching, Wauchope disregarded this information and continued the advance, wanting to get as close as possible to the objective. Thick vegetation further prevented the brigade's lines from being extended. Finally, at about 4 A.M., at daybreak, the Highland Brigade, about 365 meters from the unseen Boer trenches, began to deploy in its attack formation.

At that point, the Boers opened fire, although many of their initial shots were fired high. Suddenly, sounding like machine guns, "from every side, . . . flashed out a line of fire, and an appalling sleet of missiles swept through the close locked ranks of the Highland Brigade" (Belfield, 1975). Units were in confusion, and Wauchope was soon shot and killed. For the following nine hours, the British were pinned down on the plain, and Methuen remained relatively inactive. One Englishman fighting with the Boers wrote, "You should see our entrenchments . . . we come out of our burrows and simply shoot them down like deer. . . . It is not war, but it is magnificent" (Belfield, 1975, p. 48). Eventually, some of the British soldiers could no longer stand the strain, and their nerves broke. Some soldiers panicked and ran away, while others cowered behind bushes. The Boers did not leave their positions when the fighting was over, as they had at the Modder River.

The Battle of Magersfontein was an unmitigated disaster for the British, whose casualties totaled 902, as opposed to 236 for the Boers. The Highland Brigade alone lost, in addition to Wauchope, 201 killed and 496 wounded. The British had yet to learn that bravery was not enough to stop well-armed rifle fire and win battles.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De la Rey, Jacobus; Foreign Volunteers in Boer Forces, Second Anglo-Boer War; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Methuen, Lord; Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899); Wauchope, Andrew G.

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Maharero, Samuel (1856–1923)

Samuel Maharero was a Herero chief who was largely responsible for the 1904 uprising against German colonial rule in South West Africa (now Namibia), which triggered the Herero and Nama Genocide. He was born in 1856 in southwestern Africa, the son of Maharero (Kamaharero), an important chief of the central Hereros. As a youth, Samuel Maharero attended Lutheran schools run by European missionaries, where at one point, he was being groomed for the ministry. He was given the European name Samuel upon his baptism. In 1880, when his elder brother, Wilhelm, was killed during a raid against an enemy group, Samuel became his father's principal adviser.

During the 1880s, as the Germans began to show increased interest in the region, the elder Maharero entered into a security treaty with the Germans, although at the time, they were unable to provide protection because they had no troops in southern Africa. In 1888, Maherero repudiated the agreement, while Samuel counseled him to begin talks with the British. This development prompted the Germans to send a small detachment of troops, which also encouraged German settlers to establish homesteads in the area.

In 1890, Samuel Maharero's father died, and he assumed his position as chief. In 1894, Major Theodor Leutwein, head of the local German military and de facto governor, decided to support Maharero in the internecine conflicts. This strengthened Maharero's position (perhaps artificially so). He initially enjoyed a fairly cordial working relationship with Leutwein, but a series of troubling developments that devastated the Hereros economically and socially soon unraveled that. German encroachment on Herero lands, a devastating rinderpest epidemic, increased indebtedness to German merchants among the Hereros, large land sales to German ranchers, cattle raiding, and other events led to mounting unrest among the Hereros.

By 1903, the Germans had hinted that they hoped to establish reservations for the Hereros and other African groups while opening up more land for European exploitation. By now, Maharero had become a somewhat reluctant leader of an insurrection. The rebellion was set to begin on January 12, 1904. Maharero had instructed his men not to touch European missionaries, women, or young children. The goal was to hit German farms and garrisons hard, forcing the Germans to agree to a negotiated settlement. The first days of fighting saw scores of Germans killed or wounded. At first, Maherero's forces had the upper hand in the fighting, but Leutwein rallied his troops and began forcing Herero troops into a running withdrawal. At the same time, the German administrator seemed to hint that he would entertain a negotiated end to the hostilities.

That did not come to pass, however, because Leutwein was removed from office in June 1904 and replaced by the iron-fisted General Lothar von Trotha, who vowed not only to end the rebellion, but to exterminate the Hereros. Maharero's forces sought refuge at Waterberg, where they were decisively defeated by German troops on August 11, 1904. Maharero's men were ill prepared for the battle, and it has been posited that the chief was still holding out for a negotiated truce.

Maharero and some of his men managed to escape, and he ultimately lived in exile in British Bechuanaland (modern-day Botswana), where he lived in poverty until his death in Serowe on March 14, 1923. Although he had longed to return to his homeland, his requests were routinely denied. Meanwhile, von Trotha embarked on a murderous policy toward the Africans who remained in South West Africa, presiding over a genocide in which around 80 percent of the Herero and 50 percent of the Nama perished between 1904 and 1908.

Paul G. Pierpaoli, Jr.

See also: German Empire; German-Nama War (1893–1894); Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Leutwein, Theodor; von Trotha, Lothar; Waterberg, Battle of (August 11, 1904)

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Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah) (1844–1885)

A Sudanese religious leader named Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah claimed in 1881 to be the Mahdi, a word derived from the Arabic for "divinely guided one," a messianic deliverer. He led the Sudanese in rebellion and fought numerous battles with Egyptian and British forces, culminating in the capture of Khartoum in 1885, in his quest to establish the *mahdiya,* the Mahdist state.

Mohammed Ahmed was born in 1844 near Dongola in the Sudan. He became attracted to religious studies, learned about the Qur'an in Khartoum, and preached its message to other Sudanese.

The years 1877–1880 witnessed tremendous political, economic, and social turmoil in Egypt and the Sudan, with looming Egyptian bankruptcy, heavy taxation, and a disruption of the slave trade, a key element of the Sudanese economy and society. Religious fundamentalism increased during these years of discontent. Mohammed Ahmed preached that the Sudanese should get rid of the blasphemous foreigners ruling them, follow the path of God, and prepare for the coming of the Mahdi, who would purify the faith and offer salvation to the faithful. Another devout Sudanese, Abdullahi ibn Mohammed, met Mohammed Ahmed and became one of his most loyal followers.

In June 1881, Mohammed Ahmed publicly declared himself to be the Mahdi, and asserted that he, and not the Egyptian governor-general, would lead the Sudan. He had all the characteristics of the promised Mahdi, including a mole on his right cheek and a V-shaped gap between his two front teeth. Egyptian soldiers were sent to seize the Mahdi, but they were killed by his followers, called dervishes ("poor men"), a term later discarded in favor of *ansar* ("the helpers," men who had consecrated themselves to God in the hope of Paradise after death).

The Mahdi declared a jihad, or holy war, on August 12, 1881. His movement was very popular, especially among the common people. The Egyptians, concerned about this threat, sent a force from Fashoda that was annihilated by the dervishes in June 1882. Egypt was then involved with its own insurrection, during which more followers flocked to the Mahdi's banner.

Various forces were sent to the Sudan to suppress the Mahdi's activities and regain territory that his dervishes had captured. A 10,000-man Egyptian force was massacred at the Battle of Kashgil (Shaykan) on November 3–5, 1883, and another Egyptian force was wiped out near Tamanieb on December 2, 1883. The Egyptian Gendarmerie, commanded by Lieutenant-General Valentine Baker Pasha, was soundly defeated at El Teb on February 4, 1884. The British then sent troops to the Sudan, and they frequently defeated the dervishes in ferocious fighting.

Major-General Charles G. Gordon was sent by the British government in January 1884 to assess the situation in the Sudan. He was besieged in Khartoum by dervishes beginning that March. A relief expedition under General Lord Garnet J. Wolseley was sent to the Sudan but failed to rescue Gordon from death at the hands of the dervishes on January 26, 1885.

British troops withdrew from the Sudan in March 1885, and the Mahdi died of typhus on about June 20, 1885. Before he died, the Mahdi had appointed Abdullahi ibn Mohammed, the Khalifa, as his successor.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Baker, Valentine; Dervishes; Kashgil (Shaykan or El Obeid), Battle of (November 3–5, 1883); El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Khalifa; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tamai, Battle of (March 11, 1884): Wolseley, Garnet

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Maji Maji Revolt (1905)

The Maji Maji Revolt in the summer of 1905 in the southern provinces of German East Africa (currently Tanzania) against a new tax system, the plantation economy, and the use of forced labor highlighted the lengths that the German military was willing to go to avoid oversight from the Reichstag. The plantation economy in particular forced the African people in the area to adjust their way of life, and among other things, disrupted gender relations within these communities. The Kaiser sent two cruisers and 150 marines to reinforce the colony, but Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow was told that the cruisers and men exceeded the peacetime budget, so he found means within the military budget to pay for the mission without asking the Reichstag for more money. In doing so, however, he created the type of divided command that would continue to haunt Germany's military in the future. German forces used to quell the rebellion included both German colonial soldiers and African allies of Germany.

The revolt was a response not only to the changes in African society demanded of the inhabitants, but a religious uprising as well. A spiritual leader named Kinjikitile Ngwale (or Bokero) claimed to have found a substance that he called "war medicine," or *Maji* (water), which would turn the German bullets into water. Armed with courage and this war medicine (after which the rebellion was named), Bokero's poorly armed but numerous followers attacked small outposts and cotton plantations, including Samanga in July 1905. During this initial phase of the rebellion, Bokero was captured and hanged, but the rebellion spread. In particular, the addition of 5,000 Ngoni warriors worried the German colonial troops. However, with the help of some African loyalists and superior technology (especially machine guns), the Germans were able to eliminate the Ngoni as a threat. The use of machine guns disillusioned the rebels with the war medicine.

After the governor of East Africa, Count Gustav Adolf von Gotzen, received 1,000 reinforcements, he moved against the rebels in the south. Not only did they use their superior weaponry to disburse rebel gatherings, but they began a systematic campaign of destroying African food supplies. The rebels experienced successes as well. An ambush by the Rufiji River was the most notable success for the insurgents, and breathed new life into the rebellion.

Unlike the South West Africa campaign, extermination was never the stated goal of von Gotzen and his subordinates. However, they did intentionally starve the local people, and the death toll in East Africa actually exceeded that of Lothar von Trotha's 1904–1905 campaign. The campaign of starvation and guerilla warfare lasted until August 1907. By that time, 15 Europeans, 389 African soldiers, and between 200,000 and 300,000 rebels had lost their lives.

In the aftermath of the rebellion, the German colonial government made several key reforms so that by the beginning of World War I, German East Africa was considered a model colony. A change in governorship was key, but the spirit of the communities inhabiting the colonial territory was broken by the crushing of the rebellion.

Years later, Tanzanian nationalists would point to the uprising as a unifying event for the multiple groups that participated. Scholars have questioned this interpretation, however, pointing out how the rebellion was crushed in part due to disagreements between Africans on battle strategies and tactics. They also note the differences in religion as evidence of the confederate, rather than unified, organization of the insurgents.

While similar in geography and time period, there were key differences between the two African colonial wars. The biggest, of course, were the differing goals of the German commanders in their approach to the rebellions. Not only did von Trotha's attempt to exterminate the Herero and the subsequent starvation of prisoners in the concentration camps stand as an example of colonial brutality, but it also highlighted the uneasy coexistence between military and civilian authority. The carte blanche given to the military so long as it was at war provided an incentive for von Trotha to insist that the rebellion was not quelled, but finally the general staff in Berlin stepped in. The concentration camps also demonstrated how civilian interests in extracting labor from the Africans clashed with von Trotha's interest in punishing and annihilating the rebels.

The debates in the Reichstag reflected the German civilian unease and opposition to von Trotha's tactics. The requirement that the Reichstag appropriate funds for Germany's colonial adventures meant that German colonial goals were unrealistic fantasies from their inception. Despite the Kaiser's admonition in the "Hun speech," service in Germany's colonies required large amounts of sacrifice in comparison to service on the European continent. A lack of provisions, poor logistics, the constant bickering between civilian and military leadership, and orders to engage in cruelty that many of them found initially distasteful ensured that few German colonial soldiers looked back on their service abroad fondly. In fact, some scholars blame the poor conditions suffered by German soldiers for the escalation in violence in the colonies, especially in German South West Africa. While Germany received the colonies in part because of its desire to participate on the international stage, the lack of settlers and funding meant that German control over its territory was always tenuous and vulnerable to rebellion.

By comparison, German East Africa's war received almost none of the scrutiny that the South West African war did. In part, the absence of a controversial figure like von Trotha took the sting out of criticism at home. The ability of Governor von Gotzen to quell the rebellion with a minimum of Reichstag funds kept the war out of the parliamentary debates, therefore subduing civilian criticism. And the relatively humane treatment and stated goals of the German East African government contrasted markedly with its sister colony. At the same time, the loss of life in the second war was actually greater than during von Trotha's campaign. In addition, the successful quelling of the Maji-Maji rebellion institutionalized the use of starvation as a weapon against civilian populations, which German commanders continued to practice throughout the first half of the 20th century.

Dan Lee

See also: East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); von Trotha, Lothar

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Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881)

The Battle of Majuba Hill ("mountain of doves"), the final and decisive battle of the First Anglo-Boer War, was a humiliating British defeat.

After the outbreak of the First Anglo-Boer War on December 16, 1880, the mission of the Natal Field Force (NFF), under the command of Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, was to defeat the Boers, who had proclaimed the Transvaal a republic, and to relieve a number of British garrisons besieged by Boer forces. The only pass in the Drakensberg Mountains through which an army could travel from Natal to the Transvaal was at Laing's Nek. Accordingly, the Boers defended this pass.

The British conducted a frontal attack against the Boer positions on Laing's Nek on January 28, 1881, and were soundly repulsed. The British withdrew to the nearby Mount Prospect to await reinforcements. On February 7, 1881, the Boers attempted to isolate the British force. On the following day, a five-company British force led by Pomeroy Colley encountered and fought a large Boer force near the Ingogo River. In the ensuing engagement, 76 of the British forces were killed and almost as many were wounded.

After returning to the base camp, Pomeroy Colley learned that the Boer positions at Laing's Nek had been strengthened considerably. Rather than divert forces (and military credit) to the newly arrived Major-General Sir (Henry) Evelyn M. Wood, V.C., and conduct a more complicated operation from Newcastle to Wakkerstroom, Pomeroy Colley decided to outflank the Boer positions at Laing's Nek and seize the undefended mountain of Majuba. To the west of the Boer positions, Majuba was 600 meters higher than and dominated Laing's Nek. He believed that if 300–400 soldiers could occupy the summit of Majuba, they would be in an impregnable position and, from this vantage point, force the Boers to abandon their positions on Laing's Nek.

Pomeroy Colley led an ad hoc 600-man force at 10 P.M. on February 26, 1881, to accomplish this goal. The force consisted of two companies of the 58th Foot (the Northamptons); two companies of the 3rd Battalion, 60th Foot (the King's Royal Rifles); three companies of the 92nd Foot (Gordon Highlanders); and 64 sailors. Although of battalion strength, this force did not have the cohesion of a single battalion and had no effective chain of command.

After a night march over steep, winding paths, and having detached about 200 soldiers in laagers en route, the last British soldier reached Majuba's unoccupied summit by 5 A.M. the following day. A reserve force of 120 soldiers from all three regiments was designated and positioned in a central hollow area, and the remaining 250 or so men were deployed at 12-pace intervals around the triangular perimeter of the summit. Pomeroy Colley, arguably overconfident, did not order his soldiers, who had not received any information as to the situation and plans, to dig defensive fighting positions.

When daylight broke, the summit was further reconnoitered, but it was not appreciated that a feature named Gordon's Knoll, near the northwest angle of the British perimeter, was actually higher than the rest of the plateaulike summit, and that the lower approaches to the summit from the north and northeast were hidden from the view of the British soldiers. The soldiers were also not repositioned in any way, and there was no coordinated assault on Laing's Nek in conjunction with the occupation of Majuba Hill. At the same time, a certain listlessness is said to have overwhelmed Pomeroy Colley.

The Boers, after seeing British soldiers on Majuba Hill, expected a British artillery barrage on their positions. When nothing happened, a number of Boers rode audaciously to the northern slopes of Majuba and, covered by supporting fire from comrades, began the ascent toward the British positions. At about 11 A.M., the naval detachment commander, standing next to Pomeroy Colley, was mortally wounded. Pomeroy Colley's control of the situation seemed to deteriorate rapidly thereafter, and he then lay down to sleep.

Shortly before noon, about 60 Boers had gathered behind a ridge immediately beneath Gordon's Knoll. Alarmed at the increasingly heavy and accurate rifle fire, Lieutenant Ian S. M. Hamilton (later commander of the Gallipoli operations in 1915), in charge of that sector, ran to inform Pomeroy Colley of the danger. The general only acknowledged Hamilton's report and apparently took no action. About 45 minutes later, Hamilton reported that 400 Boers had infiltrated near his position. The staff seemed unconcerned, and Hamilton found Pomeroy Colley asleep.

The assembled Boers, at about 12:45 P.M., stood up and concentrated their fire at close range on Gordon's Knoll, killing all but two or three of the soldiers there. The surviving British soldiers fled in panic, with the Boers occupying the knoll within a few minutes. The Boers then began pouring lethal fire into the main body of soldiers. Feverish confusion reigned as the Boers infiltrated to a fold in the ground about 40 meters from the British. The British had hoped that enfilading fire from Macdonald's Kopje (named after Lieutenant Hector Macdonald, in charge of the position) on the left (west) flank of the summit would prevent such a Boer advance, but the British there were suppressed by accurate Boer sniper fire.

Some British officers, including Hamilton, realized that the momentum of the battle was shifting against them and wanted to conduct a bayonet charge. Pomeroy Colley refused permission. The Boers enveloped the British right flank, and many of the demoralized British soldiers, including the reserve, panicked, threw down their rifles, and stampeded to the rear. The Boers were close behind, shooting the fleeing soldiers. Only a half hour had gone by since the Boers had seized Gordon's Knoll.

Pomeroy Colley, overwhelmed by these unexpected events, either tried to rally his men or surrender, but he was shot in the forehead and killed instantly. He was one of the 280 British soldiers, out of a force of about 365 on the summit, who became a casualty at the Battle of Majuba Hill. The Boers had only one man killed and a few wounded. Hamilton later lamented, "Poor Colley! What a gamble is the pursuit of Fame! The neglect of a mere military detail—an aberration of ordinary soldierly practice—by a brilliant Staff Officer whose career had given him no executive experience—was to turn glory into



Major General George Pomeroy Colley leads British forces just before his death at the Battle of Majuba Hill on February 27, 1881. In this engagement, fought during the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881), the British were decisively defeated by the Boers who thus secured the autonomy of their Transvaal Republic. (Library of Congress)

disgrace, vision into blindness, triumph into defeat" (Hamilton, 1944, p. 133).

The British defeat at the Battle of Majuba Hill effectively ended the First Anglo-Boer War. Less than two decades later, while fighting the same foe, the British battle cry was "Remember Majuba!"

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Colley, Goerge Pomeroy; Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Ingogo, Battle of (February 8, 1881); Laing's Nek, Battle of (January 28, 1881); Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Makhado (c. 1840–1895)

Around 1840, Makhado, son of the Venda ruler Ramabulana, was born in the Zoutpansberg Mountains in the far north of what is now South Africa. In 1848, when Makhado was a boy, the Boers led by A. H. Potgieter arrived and employed local Africans in elephant hunting, which is how the Venda first acquired and learned to use firearms. Since Boer frontiersman Louis Trichardt had assisted Ramabulana to gain power over his brother in 1836, the Venda leader allocated land to the newly arrived Boers. Potgieter's Boers established the town of Zoutpansbergdorp (eventually renamed Schoemansdal), which became an ivory trade center that attracted hunters and merchants from the Cape Colony, Natal, Orange Free State, and Portuguese Mozambique. For the Boers, the Zoutpansberg Mountains represented the northern frontier of their expanding Transvaal (or South African) Republic.

As a young man, Makhado was hired as a gun carrier by a European elephant hunter. When the elephant population declined in the 1850s, the Boers began enslaving Venda children and exporting them south, claimed land for farming, and forced African women and children to work their fields. These issues poisoned Boer-Venda relations. When Ramabulana died in 1864, a power struggle erupted between his sons, with Davhana initially seizing power, even though he had limited support. In turn, Makhado gained the backing of several other royal sons and successful hunters and took power.

The Transvaal Republic inadvertently became involved in the Venda succession dispute when Joao Albasini, an Italian-Portuguese merchant who had become the leader of Tsonga elephant hunters in the area and also a Transvaal official, gave sanctuary to the fugitive Davhana. Makhado then toured the Zoutpansberg, securing the loyalty of subordinate Venda leaders. He also reformed the Venda military system by introducing age regiments based on existing circumcision lodges and creating permanent military detachments for specific places.

In 1865, after the Boers demanded that the Venda surrender their firearms, Makhako orchestrated raids on their farms. Attempts by the Transvaal Republic to negotiate with him failed, and in May 1867, Paul Kruger led a 500-strong commando into the Zoutpansberg, which allied with Albasini's Tsonga and attacked Venda communities. Given that ammunition shortage and mountainous terrain prevented Kruger from overcoming Venda resistance, the Boers evacuated Schoemansdal in July. Makhado's followers destroyed and looted the settlement, which earned the Venda leader the praise-name "He who fights at night." The Boers had been evicted from the Zoutpansberg after 19 years, and their attempts to negotiate a return did not succeed.

The British occupation of the Transvaal from 1877 to 1881 gave Makhado a respite that allowed him to consolidate his independence. Subsequently, the new Boer government of the Transvaal attempted to negotiate with Makhado in 1883, 1887, 1888, 1889, 1892, and 1894 but failed to achieve anything. Transvaal commandant-general Piet Joubert, who met Makhado in 1892 and 1895, called him a "naughty child" and warned him that other African rulers were being conquered. By this time, revenue from the new gold mines around Johannesburg enabled the Transvaal to buy modern weapons and defeat African communities like the Gananwa in the northwest. However, Makhado refused to pay tax to the Transvaal, rejected proposed changes to his territory, gave refuge to African leaders who had defied the Boers, and continued to attack neighboring African groups under Transvaal authority. It also appears that Makhado acquired arms and ammunition from the British South Africa Company (BSAC) which, located to the north in what was becoming Southern Rhodesia, wanted to undermine the Transvaal Boers.

In early May 1895, Makhado had a Transvaal delegation driven out of the Zoutpansberg. That September, Makhado, then in his early 50s and known as the "Lion of the North," died suddenly. It was likely that he was poisoned by some of his own people who did not want to fight the Boers, local white traders, Transvaal agents, or some combination thereof. He was succeeded by his son, Mphephu, who tried but failed to unite the Venda against

Boer invasion. In October 1898, Joubert led a Transvaal army of 4,000 Boers, supported by artillery and many Swazi, Tsonga, and Venda allies, into the Zoutpansberg. Mphephu's Venda, the last independent African group in the Transvaal, was defeated, and the Boers established the town of Louis Trichardt.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Gananwa War (1894); Boers; Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898); British South Africa Company; Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Kruger, Paul; Potgieter, Andries Hendrik

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Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898)

Samori Toure originated from a non-Muslim Mandinka-speaking merchant family in West Africa's upper Niger basin east of Futa Jalon in what had been the center of the Mali Empire. During the 1860s, to protect his family's gold and cattle trade, he developed an army equipped with firearms imported through the British enclave of Sierra Leone. From 1865 to 1875, Samori subjugated the surrounding states and established a large and powerful Mandinka Empire that promoted trade, conquered the gold-producing Bure, and encouraged the spread of Islam to which he had converted.

A major factor in the development of what quickly became West Africa's third-largest territorial empire (after Sokoto and Tukolor) was Samori's army, which consisted of male slaves armed with imported breech-loading rifles and muzzle-loaders manufactured by local blacksmiths. By the early 1880s, Samori, appealing to the memory of the Mali Empire, had mustered a force of 30,000 men, mostly firearm-equipped infantry supported by elite cavalry. The Mandinka Empire was divided into 10 provinces, 8 of which were ruled by a governor assisted by a war chief who commanded a 4,000- to 5,000-strong military force primarily consisting of conscripts led by 200–300 professional soldiers. During the war, the rate of conscription increased from 10 to 50 percent of the able-bodied male population.

Under Samori's direct control, the two central provinces provided an elite unit of around 500 professional troops, who supplied most of the senior officers of the provincial armies. At the capital of Bissandugu, the ruler's small bodyguard was armed with breech-loading rifles. On the offensive, Samori's army usually operated with four army corps: three forming an advancing arc and one held in reserve. In peacetime, the armies spent six months of the year training and another six months performing agricultural labor. Organized down to the squad level, the Mandinka army was disciplined and competent, made effective use of cavalry, and was skilled at launching ambushes. The military was supported by taxation of peasants, gold miners, and traders. Since Samori's state sold slaves in

Futa Jalon and used the profits to acquire firearms from Europeans on the coast, the empire had to wage wars constantly to maintain military power.

French attempts to push south from the Tukolor Empire to link up with their enclaves on the Ivory Coast led to conflict with the Mandinka Empire. Ignoring orders from the governor of Senegal, French military commander Lieutenant-Colonel Gustav Borgnis-Desbordes led a small column to the Niger River in January 1882 and tested Samori's military potential by attacking Mandinka forces besieging the town of Keniera. In February 1883, the French occupied Bamako, an important trading center on the Niger, where they built a fort that easily repelled an attack by the Mandinka in April. Bamako then became the forward base for a French punitive expedition that drove Samori's forces to the south and east of the Niger.

In France, Borgnis-Desbordes was lionized and support for colonial expansion grew. However, in 1885, a new French commander, Colonel A. V. A. Combes, unwisely established forts along the Niger at Niagassola and Nafadie, which had unfriendly populations and were difficult to supply. In turn, Samori's forces drove the small French garrison out of Nafadie, besieged Niagassola, and regained control over the north side of the Niger. A French relief expedition was turned back because of rain. Since the French and Samori were distracted by other conflicts, they signed the Treaty of Bissandugu in 1887, which established the Niger as Samori's northeastern border.

The French attempted to undermine Samori by encouraging dissidents in his empire to cross the Niger, and by supporting the independence of Kenedugu on his eastern frontier. In 1888, Samori was greatly weakened when his army lost 1,000 men and several skilled generals during the failed siege of Sikasso, capital of Kenedugu. In 1891, the French, under Archinard, who characteristically did not wait for permission from civilian authorities, discarded the treaty and sent an invasion force south of the Niger, where it burned Bissandugu. As the engagements of the 1880s had taught Samori to avoid direct confrontation with the superior European firepower, he led a guerrilla war in which the French were lured out of their forts to be harassed and ambushed, and local food resources were denied them. By this time, Samori's men were equipped with around 8,000 breech-loading rifles, which took a heavy toll on the French.

Although a 1,300-strong French expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Gustave Humbert (Archinard's temporary replacement) had driven Samori as far as Kerouane, it had to withdraw to Bissandugu, as it was too large to supply in the wasted countryside, and yellow fever broke out in the ranks. Since the ruler of Kenedugu had rejected French requests to supply troops for the invasion, the French had to take soldiers from garrisons in the north, which meant they were unable to deal quickly with Bambara rebellions in Tukolor.

From 1892 to 1894, Samori sought to escape the French by a general eastward movement of his state to what is now the northern Ivory Coast and Ghana. Part of his forces fought delaying actions against the French in the west, while others conquered new areas in the east. In early 1893, with the expansionist Archinard in overall political and military command of the French in the region, another French expedition under Combes chased Samori's forces farther east, beyond Gueliba to the Baoule River and prevented him from assisting the remnants of the Tukolor Empire to the north. Around the same time, another French column, attempting to cut off the Mandinka supply of firearms, moved south to occupy Farana and Erimakono on the new and still-contested frontier with British Sierra Leone.

In December, by which time Archinard had been replaced by a civilian governor, a French expedition under Lieutenant-Colonel Etienne Bonnier pushed yet farther east to block Samori's coastal trade with independent Liberia and briefly occupied Bougouni before returning to the Niger by the end of the month. Ignoring his civilian superiors, Bonnier sent two gunboats down the Niger and followed them with an overland column that occupied Timbuktu, long a goal of French colonial expansion, on January 10, 1894.

A few days later, Bonnier, a dozen French officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and 68 Tirailleurs were killed when a patrol camped near Goundam was attacked at night by Tauregs, who stampeded a cattle herd that threw the badly defended post into confusion. This was the worst French loss during the conquest of West Africa. In mid-February, a column under Commandant J. J. C. Joffre, future marshal of France during World War I, defeated the Tauregs and took Goundam and Timbuktu.

Given the Goundam disaster, a planned French offensive against Samori was suspended, which gave the Mandinka leader time to regroup. In January and February 1895, a 300-man French column led by Commandant Parfait-Louis Monteil, originally en route to Congo to assert French claims, landed on the Ivory Coast and marched inland with orders to protect Kong, a state that had accepted French protection in 1889, from Samori and potentially negotiate with him. Just before reaching Kong, the expedition, which experienced logistical problems because of its diversion, clashed with Samori's forces, suffered heavy casualties (including the severely wounded Monteil), and was compelled to retreat. This disaster, which might have been avoided by the dispatch of 3,000 troops from the north, contributed to the unification of the French colonies of Senegal, Guinea, Sudan, and Ivory Coast as French West Africa under a governor-general responsible for civilian and military issues.

Samori's eastward movement was eventually blocked by the large Asante kingdom which, in 1896, was occupied by the British, who rejected the Mandinka leader's request for protection. Indeed, during the 1890s, Samori's military power was weakened when the British, in accordance with the Brussels Declaration, stopped arms shipments to him from Sierra Leone. In March 1896, a French mission under Captain Braulot was sent to Samori to offer him authority over the provinces of Djimini and Diamanko if he paid an indemnity and accepted a French resident with military escort. After Samori rejected the offer, Mandinka fighters massacred the French mission. Bent on revenge, French forces under Commandant P. C. Caudrelier occupied Bobo-Diulasso in October 1897



Samori Toure (front left) shortly after his capture by French colonial troops in August 1898. Founding ruler of the Mandinka Empire in West Africa, Samori Toure tenaciously resisted French expansion throughout the 1880s and 1890s. (Albert Harlingue/Roger Viollet/Getty Images)

and fought the Mandinka at Kong in January 1898. In February, the French sacked Sikasso, as its new ruler had refused to supply men for the campaign.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1898 settled disputes over West African colonial borders and gave the French a free hand to deal with Samori. By this time, conflict with the French and local resistance had reduced the once-large Mandinka armies to small groups living off the land. After the French rejected Samori's offer to demobilize his forces and retire to the Niger River, the Mandinka leader, in August 1898, was captured by a French column that surprised his camp. He was exiled to Gabon, where he died in 1900.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Archinard, Louis; Borgnis-Desbordes, Gustave; Firearms Technology; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Joffre, Joseph; Monteil, Parfait-Louis; Samori Toure; Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Maqoma (1798–1873)

The greatest of the Xhosa military leaders, Jongumsobomvu Maqoma was a key figure in African resistance to the Europeans in three different wars on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony (present-day South Africa) during the 19th century. *Jongumsobomvu* was a praise-name that means "watching the sunrise" in IsiXhosa.

The eldest son of Ngqika, the head of the Rharhabe or Western Xhosa, Maqoma was born around 1798 near Burnshill in the Middeldrift district of what is now the Eastern Cape Province in South Africa. His mother was a junior wife, so he was not first in line to succeed his father; however, he was older than Sandile, the son of the great wife. When Ngqika died in 1829, Sandile was still a minor, and Maqoma and his stepmother became regent of the Rharhabe. Maqoma remained regent for more than 10 years.

In the complex political situation of South Africa, where different African peoples competed with each other for land while the British and Boers sought ever-greater territory for themselves, Maqoma first distinguished himself as a military leader in 1818 in the Battle of Amalinde between the forces of Ngqika and those of Ndlambe. In spite of this victory, a settlement was imposed on the Xhosa by the British, which required the surrender of Xhosa authority over a portion of their territory, later called ceded or neutral territory. Maqoma settled there, close to the Kat River.

In the 1820s, Maqoma launched cattle raids both against the white settlers and the Thembu to the east. It was partly as a result of those raids that in 1828, the colonial administration decided to drive Maqoma from his fertile lands, granting them to the Khoi people instead since they were under the control of Christian missionaries. His ejection from what became the Kat River Settlement in 1829 left him very bitter and was a direct cause of the major war that broke out on the frontier in 1834. In the early 1830s, however, he feared that his men were no match for the British troops and chose to bide his time.

In December 1834, Maqoma decided that the time was ripe. He led the Western Xhosa in an attack on the Cape Colony, the most serious war on the Cape frontier up to that time. After a few months of warfare, during which Maqoma skillfully exploited the rugged terrain of the Amatola Mountains, the Xhosa were defeated by the scorched-earth policy of the British. But Maqoma was widely respected among the Xhosa, and he had gained a reputation, even among the British, for being a daring warrior and an astute military leader.

In 1840, Sandile came of age and succeeded to the chieftainship, leaving Maqoma, who did not get on with his half-brother, further embittered. He began to drink heavily, and he settled near Fort Beaufort because access to liquor was easy there. While he was there, he tried to negotiate border issues with colonial officials. In the War of the Axe in 1846, he did not join Sandile in resisting the colonial forces and instead sued for peace. In the aftermath of the war, along with other Xhosa chiefs, he was publicly humiliated by Harry Smith, the new governor. At about this time, he gave up drinking.

In 1850, Maqoma backed the prophet Mlanjeni and led the Xhosa in what was to become the largest and longest of all the wars fought by the Xhosa against the Cape Colony. This time, he tried to bring the Xhosa, Thembu, and rebel Khoi together into a united force against the colony. As in his earlier campaigns, Maqoma won much praise from his opponents for his bold military strategy. He took a small group of Xhosa and Khoi fighters into the Waterkloof Highlands near Fort Beaufort, which distracted British colonial forces from the main Rharhabe stronghold in the Amatolas. When he saw that further resistance was hopeless, however, he saw no point in fighting any longer, and he skillfully sought to negotiate an end to the war.

A few years later, he was one of the leading Xhosa rulers to join in the cattle killing in 1856, and he egged Sandile on to participate in this, which was to have disastrous consequences for the Xhosa. As more and more land was being conquered by Europeans, the basis for African societies was collapsing. In 1857, the Xhosa and Thembu faced the frustration of watching their herds dissipate. They believed the prophecy that if they slaughtered their cattle and spread their grain to the winds, the white man would leave their lands. This prophecy did not come true, however. Instead, some 25,000 people died of starvation.

Maqoma was arrested and convicted by a British court-martial of receiving stolen goods and having been a party to the murder of a chief who had refused to kill his cattle; the real charge against him, however, was that he had instigated others to participate in the cattle killing. With other chiefs, he was banished to Robben Island, which was located off Cape Town and from which no one had ever successfully escaped. He was released in 1869 and allowed to return to the Eastern Cape, where he attempted to settle on a farm near Waterkloof, on land that had been taken from him. In November 1871, without any further trial, he was sent back to Robben Island, where he died a lonely death on September 9, 1873.

In 1978, during the apartheid era, Maqoma's bones were recovered and taken back to the Ciskei, where his great-great-grandson was then a minister in the government, and he was reburied as a national hero.

Christopher Saunders

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Sandile; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn

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Marchand, Jean-Baptiste (1863–1834)

Born in Thoissey, France, some 65 kilometers from Lyon, Jean-Baptiste Marchand was the son of a carpenter and the oldest of five children. Although he had won a scholarship to attend a local private junior college, he had to help support his family, and at the age of 13, he became a clerk for a notary.

When Marchand's mother died in 1883, he enlisted as a private in the Fourth Regiment of the Marine Infantry and rose quickly through the ranks. Posted to western Sudan (today's Mali), Marchand quickly caught the attention of French commander Colonel Louis Archinard, who was directing a campaign against the Tukolor Empire along the Niger River. In 1888, Marchand, now a junior officer, led the French assault that overcame the Tukolor town of Koundian and was wounded in the action. His reports of the battle attracted the attention of French journalists who began to follow his exploits in Africa.

In 1893, Marchand, now a captain, was selected to lead an exploratory expedition through the Ivory Coast with a view to enlisting the inhabitants against the Mandinka Empire of Samori Toure. Marching over 4,000 kilometers, Marchand was given the local name “He who crashes through the forest,” and French newspapers began calling him “Marchand l’Africain.” As a result of this expedition, Marchand was invited to speak at an elite procolonial organization in France, and in 1895, he was granted an audience with Foreign Minister Gabriel Hanotaux.

In the context of the rising threat of Germany, the French press portrayed Marchand as an ideal of potent masculinity and a hero of the expanding colonial empire. Consequently, Marchand used his media popularity and emerging anti-British sentiment to convince the foreign minister to sanction an unrealistically ambitious expedition meant to challenge British control over Egypt. He planned to march the vast distance from the Atlantic coast of the French Congo to the Upper Nile, where he would sign treaties with the independent Ethiopia and the Mahdists of the Khalifa in Sudan. In reality, there was little chance that the Mahdists would enter into an alliance with any European power, colonizing Sudan made little economic sense, and at the time, a large British force was about to invade the territory.

In June 1896, Marchand’s expedition of 12 French and 140 African troops, supported by numerous African supply carriers, left the Atlantic port of Luango, proceeded up the Ubangi River in a borrowed Belgian steamer, and then marched across to southern Sudan. The Marchand expedition arrived at Fashoda in July 1898 after covering some 4,000 kilometers. The French expected to be welcomed as allies by the Sudanese Mahdists. However, in August, a hostile force of 1,200 to 1,500 Mahdists in canoes towed by steamers attempted to make an amphibious landing at Fashoda and was repelled by French firepower.

On September 18, a 1,500-strong Anglo-Egyptian force under Horatio Kitchener, fresh from a victory at Omdurman, arrived at Fashoda and instructed the small French expedition to leave. Distracted by scandal at home and intimidated by British naval power, Paris backed down, and Marchand’s expedition withdrew in November.

The so-called Fashoda Incident was the closest European powers came to fighting each other over part of Africa and led to a March 1899 agreement between Britain and France that resolved their African borders and ultimately led to the 1904 Anglo-French alliance against Germany. Refusing to return home via the Nile, which was in British territory, Marchand led his men through Ethiopia and arrived at the French coastal enclave of Djibouti in May 1899. The failed expedition had lasted almost four years. The next year, Marchand, at this point a lieutenant-colonel and a commander of the Legion of Honour, joined the French expeditionary force to China that fought the Boxer Rebellion.

Promoted to general in 1915, Marchand fought in World War I and was wounded at the battles of Champagne in 1915 and the Somme in 1916. During the last years of the war, he commanded the French 10th Colonial Division on the Western Front. He retired from the military in 1919, was awarded the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour in 1920, and passed away in 1934.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Archinard, Louis; Fashoda Incident (1898); Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Samori Toure; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Maxim Gun. *See* "Firearms Technology"

Mazrui Rebellion (1895–1896)

At the end of June 1895, the British imperial government took over the East African coast of what is now Kenya from the failed Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) and continued to pay rent for the territory to the sultan of Oman, based in Zanzibar. Coastal trade immediately north and south of Mombasa was largely in the hands of the Swahili-Arab Mazrui. Since the 1860s, Mazrui leader Mbaruk bin Rashid had resisted the sultan's authority by recruiting escaped slaves, interfering with trade caravans, and attacking plantations. Mbaruk ruled the coastal town of Gazi south of Mombasa and established a hinterland stronghold at Mwele in the Shimba Hills to the south. While many of the Mazrui had been unhappy with the imposition of British rule on the coast, which threated their slave trade, the British viewed control of the area as critical to maintaining communications with Uganda in the interior.

In 1895, just as company rule was concluding, conflict brewed over the selection of a new governor of the coastal town of Takaungu, north of Mombasa. British official Kenneth MacDougall selected Rashid bin Salim, son of the late governor, over Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Khamis, who was Mbaruk bin Rashid's nephew and the son of a previous governor. In mid-June, after violence broke out around Takaungu between factions loyal to the rival leaders, a British warship landed 310 British sailors, 50 British marines, 50 Sudanese troops, and 160 Zanzibari soldiers under Governor Sir Arthur Hardinge. The invasion forced Mbaruk bin Rashid bin Khamis and his followers to flee south to Gazi. Although the older Mbaruk initially led British officers to believe that he would surrender his nephew, he then withdrew to his fort at Mwele, where he encouraged rebellion by

Swahili-Arabs and slaves along the entire coast of the protectorate.

In late July 1895, Hardinge and Admiral H. H. Rawson led a 300-strong naval force supplemented by 70 Sudanese, which took Gazi without a fight. On August 18, Rawson led a force of 220 British sailors, 84 marines, 60 Sudanese, and 50 Zanzibaris supported by four Maxim guns, rockets, and a field gun, which stormed Mbaruk's stronghold at Mwele. Although the British destroyed 48 stockades around Mwele, the Mazrui rebels pursued a guerrilla struggle that limited colonial control to the ports. Some 300 British colonial troops from India arrived at Mombasa at the end of December but were too few to have much impact. In early 1896, Mbaruk directed raids against interior communities to capture resources and slaves, who were incorporated into his force. Hardinge organized two small mobile columns, one operating north and another south of Mombasa, that attempted to pursue the rebels and deny them food.

As established allies of the coastal Mazrui, the inland Giriama assisted the rebels with supplies and information and facilitated the sale of their slaves, which provided them with arms and more resources. In turn, the British forbade the sale of cloth or food to the Giriama, demonstrated the firepower of the Maxim gun to them, and demanded that they renounce support for Mbaruk's rebels. This was accomplished with the help of prominent Giriama leader Ngonyo wa Mwavuo, who the British briefly imprisoned. British officials believed that a traditional oath ceremony rallied the Giriama to their cause, but in fact, the ritual had been misunderstood, and the Giriama changed sides because they saw that the British were stronger than the Mazrui.

The arrival of the 750-strong 24th Bombay Infantry (Baluchis) under Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Pearson from India in March 1896 and the recruitment of 100 more Sudanese soldiers in Egypt enabled British forces to embark on an offensive. In early April, after establishing a line of posts along the road to Uganda, Pearson directed methodical seizures of rebel villages and led a column into the rebel forest hideout. As a result, Mbaruk bin Rashid and some 3,000 rebels fled into German East Africa, where they surrendered to German officer Hermann von Wissmann, who had led the subjugation of a similar rebellion by coastal Swahili-Arabs in 1889.

The Indian troops were quickly sent home, and concerns within Britain's India Office that operations in East Africa were weakening the Indian army prompted the further development of former company forces into the East African Rifles, which would eventually form part of the King's African Rifles (KAR). Destruction of agricultural lands and disruption of slave workers during the rebellion caused the devastating 1896 Bom Bom famine along the coast.

Conversely, the Giriama expanded their lands and agricultural activities, more Indian traders came to their area, and the instability caused by Mbaruk bin Rashid over the previous decades came to an end. This enabled the Giriama to cope better than other communities with a more widespread famine that occurred in 1898–1899. With the end of the Mazrui Rebellion, the British consolidated control of the coast of their

East Africa Protectorate, which would be renamed Kenya in 1920.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); King's African Rifles (to 1904); Rawson, Sir Harry Holdsworth; von Wissmann, Hermann

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Mbolompo, Battle of (August 27, 1828)

During the 1820s, the Ngwane, led by Matiwane, moved from what is now the Kwa-Zulu/Natal part of South Africa west toward Lesotho, where they were driven south by local forces and horse-mounted Griqua raiders. By around 1827, they had settled at a place called Mbolompo on the upper Mtata River, in what is now the Eastern Cape.

In late July 1828, Major Dundas, a British officer conducting reconnaissance east of the boundary of the Cape Colony, led 50 armed and mounted settlers and many more Thembu allies against the Ngwane, seized 25,000 cattle and took some female prisoners. Impressed by the effectiveness of the settlers' firearms, local African rulers like Hintsa of the Gcaleka Xhosa and Faku of the Mpondo saw an opportunity to eliminate the newly arrived Matiwane and absorb his herds and subjects.

In late August, a colonial army, led by Colonel Henry Somerset and consisting of about 1,000 British infantry, Cape Mounted Rifles, armed settlers, and several artillery pieces, with roughly 30,000 Thembu, Gcaleka, and Mpondo allies, approached the Ngwane. On the morning of August 27, Somerset launched a surprise cavalry charge against Matiwane's people, supported by artillery bombardment. The terrified Ngwane put up little resistance; many hid in the nearby bush, but cannon fire, which they had never experienced before, compelled them to surrender. Over 700 Ngwane were killed, 100 women and children were taken back to the colony, and colonial African allies seized many cattle and prisoners.

Matiwane's power was broken, and many of his former subjects scattered among the Thembu and Mpondo. He fled and was later captured by the Zulu ruler Dingane, who had him executed. Somerset claimed that he had heroically defended the colony and its African neighbors from an aggressive Zulu army imagined to be advancing southwest along the coast. In reality, this massive cattle and labor raid was remembered in colonial mythology as the "Battle of Mbolompo." In Britain, humanitarian activists sharply criticized the leadership of Somerset and the brutality of the action.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Hintsa; Somerset, Henry

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Mbwila, Battle of (October 10, 1665)

The Battle of Mbwila (also called the Battle of Ulanga) was fought on October 30, 1665, between the forces of the *mani Kongo Nvita a Nkanga* (Antonio I of Kongo) and troops led by the Portuguese commander Luís Lopes de Sequeira. The Portuguese army included 450 musketeers, African and indigenous American soldiers brought from Brazil, and a unit of Imbangala warriors, totaling around 15,000 soldiers. The Kongo forces deployed a musket regiment led by a Luso-African commander named Pedro Dias de Cabral. The *mani Kongo* had a heavy infantry unit equipped with shields and swords, as well as large numbers of archers, an army that totaled around 20,000 men. Despite the advantage in numbers, the forces of the *mani Kongo* were defeated, and he was killed in battle and later decapitated.

Mbwila was strategically located in the highlands between Kongo, Matamba, and Angola, in a region known as Ndembu. The polities in the Ndembu region were traditionally tributaries of Kongo, although some chiefs had also established commercial and cultural ties to the Portuguese settled in Luanda. Participation in the slave trade strengthened the Ndembu communities, and by the mid-17th century, many Ndembu chiefs (dressed in the European fashion) prided themselves on being free potentates. By then, Ndembu comprised around 15 chiefdoms and competed with Kongo in wealth and magnitude, thanks to their involvement with the Atlantic networks.

The Portuguese took advantage of frequent disputes for the throne among mutually hostile contenders to spread their influence in the Ndembu region. In 1665, a succession dispute broke out in Mbwila, and the various local factions appealed to the *mani Kongo* or the Portuguese at Luanda for help. The *mani Kongo* subjugated many of Mbwila's vassals and secured important local military leaders on his side. The regent of Mbwila, Dona Isabel, had sworn alliance to Portugal and asked the governor of Luanda for help, but she was forced to flee Mbanza Mbwila (the capital), accompanied by her court and a number of Portuguese traders (*pombeiros*), before they arrived.

The Portuguese forces joined those of Dona Isabel on October 29, 1665. On the next day, the *mani Kongo* met them in battle. Full military capacity on both sides was displayed at the Battle of Mbwila, and the armies resembled each other. Both had a core of regular musketeers supported by a large assembly of irregulars. Although Kongo forces outnumbered the Portuguese, the latter were better prepared.

During the battle, Sequeira formed a square with his musketeers and artillery, surrounding them by irregulars. Although the *mani Kongo* quickly swept the irregulars, he was killed by a musket shot in the direct attack that followed. Sequeira then launched his Imbangala irregulars on the disorganized Kongo army, who abandoned the battlefield. Besides the *mani Kongo*, at least 98 Kongo nobles lost their lives, along with 400 lesser aristocrats. Antonio I died before he could establish a successor, and his death unleashed the forces of disintegration over the kingdom of Kongo. However, the Portuguese did not manage to establish control, and Kongo's sovereignty was not seriously threatened.

Estevam Thompson

See also: Afonso I; Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Imbangala; Kongo Empire

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Mekonnen, Welde Mikael (1852–1906)

In 1852, Welde Mikael Mekonnen was born in Derero Maryam in the Gola region of Ethiopia. As a member of the Ethiopian royal family, he began attending court at 13 years of age and received traditional military instruction. By 1881, he had been made palace treasurer and fought in a military campaign in Tajura on the Red Sea. In 1881, he participated in the important Battle of Embabo, where Emperor Menelik II defeated his rival, Tekle Haymanot, ruler of Gojjam, and joined a campaign against the Oromo. Mekonnen fought at Menelik's side during the 1887 invasion and conquest of Harar, which gave Ethiopia access to arms from the coast.

Still young, Mekonnen was promoted to the Ethiopian rank of dejazmach and appointed governor of Harar, which involved leading armies against various Muslim and Oromo groups to keep the coastal trade route open. In 1889, he was promoted to ras and sent to Rome on a diplomatic mission to ratify the Treaty of Wichale, in which Italy recognized Menelik as emperor of Ethiopia and Menelik approved the Italian occupation of Eritrea. Subsequently, Mekonnen's province of Harar was expanded, and he led raids against the Oromo in which he captured many cattle and sent them to the capital of Addis Ababa.

Mekonnon played a key role in the Italo-Ethiopian War of 1895–1896, during which he was wounded twice. In December 1895, he led a force that confronted the invading Italians at their unfinished fort at Mekele in northern Tigray until Menelik arrived with a larger army that prompted the garrison to surrender. On March 1, 1896, at the famous Battle of Adowa, Mekonnen ordered the dawn cavalry charge that overwhelmed the dispersed Italian columns.

After Ethiopia's success against Italy, Menelik sent Mekonnen to stabilize various parts of the empire. Immediately after Adowa, he was dispatched to strengthen Ethiopia's border with Sudan, which was being conquered by the British. In 1897, he negotiated with the British to establish the border with British Somaliland, and in 1898, he directed the suppression of a rebellion in Tigray led by Ras Mengesha Yohannes, who was the son of the previous emperor.

Mekonnen cultivated good relations with Britain, and in Harar, he coordinated with the neighboring British to counter a Somali insurgency led by Sayyid Muhammed Abdullah Hassan. In January 1901, he visited Britain, where he represented Ethiopia at the coronation of Edward VII.

Remaining governor of Harar, Mekonnen died in 1906 while en route to Addis Ababa. His well-educated son, Tafari Mekonnen Woldemikael, became the next emperor of Ethiopia in 1916, taking the name Haile Selassie.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Italo-Ethiopian War (1895–1896); Menelik II; Muhammed Abdullah Hassan, Sayyid; Wichale, Treaty of (1889)

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Menelik II (1844–1913)

In the 19th century, traditionalism and disunity characterized Ethiopia, which eventually prompted Emperor Menelik II to decide that he would revolutionize his country and bring Ethiopia into the community of modern nation-states.

Menelik was born Sahle Mariam in Angolala on August 17, 1844, among the Shewan people. He was the son of Haile Malakof, the Shewan king. At that time, Ethiopia consisted of several kingdoms, and competition existed among various princes for the emperorship. While Menelik was yet a boy, Emperor Tewodros II, a reformer king, made war on two kingdoms that he believed threatened his power—Gallos and Shewa. After Haile Malakof died from dysentery during that conflict, Menelik, as prince and apparent successor to his father as king, surrendered to Tewodros, and the victorious emperor ordered that the boy be held captive. He spent 10 years—1855 to 1865—as a prisoner. During his captivity, he married one of Tewodros's daughters, but he later deserted her and made his escape by sneaking carefully through valleys where Tewodros's soldiers were stationed.

Tewodros brought Ethiopia's heartland under his rule and introduced modernization to the country, yet some observers claimed that in his later years, he was mad. Whatever the case, he lost an important battle to British forces who invaded in



Menelik II (1844–1913) was emperor of Ethiopia from 1889 until his death. Under his leadership, Ethiopian forces defeated Italian invaders at the 1896 Battle of Adowa making Ethiopia the only African state to successfully defend itself during the "Scramble for Africa." (Hulton Archive/Stringer/Getty Images)

1868, as they tried to free Great Britain's consul, whom Tewodros had detained in a dispute. On the heels of his defeat, Tewodros killed himself.

That same year, Menelik secured his position as king of Shewa, but only after he captured his cousin, who had emerged as an opposing claimant to the throne, and ordered him to be bound in wax-soaked bandages and burned to death. As a tributary king under Tewodros's successor, Emperor Yohannes IV, Menelik had much power. With Yohannes's approval, Menelik used force and negotiations to expand his realm farther south, more than doubling its size. He sought a greater share of the lucrative trade in coffee, ivory, gold, and gum. Profits from trade, he believed, could be used to modernize society.

In 1889, Yohannes died from wounds received in battle, and Menelik succeeded him as emperor. As with his rule of Shewa, Menelik sought modernization, including a well-armed military and protection of his borders. Menelik wanted agreements with Britain, France, and Italy that would protect Ethiopian sovereignty, and he wanted to secure Ethiopia's ports on the Red Sea. The ambitious European nations at first resisted him.

Also in 1889, Menelik signed the Treaty of Wichale with Italy to define the boundary between Ethiopia and Italy's possessions along the Red Sea coast. Italy then declared that an article in the treaty gave it power over Ethiopia's foreign affairs and hence established an Italian protectorate over Menelik's kingdom. Menelik, however, denied Italy's claims—a view substantiated by the Ethiopian-language text of the treaty. Unable to reach agreement with Italy, he renounced the treaty in 1893.

Menelik met Italy in battle in 1896, and his army defeated the Italians at the Battle of Adowa. Although he did not launch an attack against Italy's formidable posts in Eritrea, his victory facilitated boundary agreements with Britain over the Sudan in 1902 and with Italy over Italian Somaliland in 1908. His victory also won the recognition that Ethiopia was independent according to European standards. Indeed, many historians believe that Menelik's victory at Adowa signaled Ethiopia's emergence as a modern nation.

A stroke paralyzed Menelik in 1908, and he died on December 12, 1913. In an ensuing palace intrigue, the empress and her supporters kept Menelik's death secret for months, to the extent of using impersonators at ceremonies. Menelik left a legacy of restored order, an expanded commercial base, and European recognition.

Neil A. Hamilton

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Eritrea, Italian Conquest (1870–1890); Italo-Ethiopian War, First (1895–1896); Tewodros II; Wichale, Treaty of (1889); Yohannes IV

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Methuen, Lord (Paul Sanford) (1845–1932)

Field Marshal Lord Methuen was a highly proficient and professional British army officer who was relentless in pursuing mission accomplishment. He was an unacknowledged junior member of the Ashanti Ring.

Paul Sanford Methuen was born on September 1, 1845, in England, the eldest of three sons of the second Baron Methuen. After being educated at Eton and serving two years in the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, Methuen joined the Scots Fusilier Guards as a lieutenant in 1864 and progressed steadily in his regiment. He served on Major-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley's staff during the Second Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874) and was Wolseley's headquarters commandant during the 1882 British expedition to Egypt. He also saw active service during the Bechuanaland Expedition (1884–1885), commanding Methuen's Horse.

Promoted to major-general in 1888, Methuen commanded the Home District from 1892 to 1897 and succeeded to his father's barony in 1891. He then served as press censor at the Tirah Field Force headquarters on the North-West Frontier in 1897 and was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1898.

When the Second Anglo-Boer War began in October 1899, Methuen was designated the commander of the 1st Division. He had learned his profession in colonial campaigns and his tactical knowledge was outdated, but his enthusiastic performance in South Africa, while mixed, was better than that of most other division commanders. He arrived in South Africa in November 1899 and commanded his division as one element of a three-pronged attack on the Boers. The plan for the 1st Division was to advance and relieve Kimberley, and then return to the Cape with all rescued noncombatants.

En route to his objective, Methuen won minor victories over the Boers at Belmont (November 23, 1899), Graspan (November 25), and Modder River (November 28). However, in trying to dislodge the Boers from trenches at Magersfontein, Methuen attempted a night attack on December 11, 1899—perhaps trying to replicate Wolseley's success at Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882), which he had observed. The attack turned into a horrible defeat, with 948 British casualties (210 killed and 728 wounded). On December 14, 1899, the War Office directed General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., commander-in-chief, South Africa, to relieve Methuen, but Buller countermanded this order.

While most officers of his rank had been replaced or returned to England, Methuen remained active in South Africa until the end of the war. On March 7, 1902, his force, consisting mainly of newly recruited yeomanry and irregulars, was defeated by the Boers at Tweebosch. In addition to being wounded, Methuen suffered the humiliating experience of surrendering to the Boers.

After the Second Anglo-Boer War, Methuen commanded the IV Army Corps (1904–1908) and served as general officer commander-in-chief, South Africa (1908–1912). He was promoted to field marshal in 1911 and served as governor of Malta from 1915 until his retirement in 1919. Considered "chivalrous, kindly, generous, with the highest standards of duty and expecting others to be imbued with the same ideals" (Wickham Legg, 1949, p. 615), Methuen died on October 30, 1932.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Belmont, Battle of (November 23, 1899); Buller, Redvers Henry; Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Graspan, Battle of (November 25, 1899); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Tweebosch, Battle of (March 7, 1902); Wolseley, Garnet; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

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Mkwawa (?–1898)

Mkwawa, sometimes called Chief Mkwawa or Sultan Mkwawa, was the leader of the Hehe people of central Tanganyika and oversaw the expansion of his people's realm and eventual war against the German Empire.

Mkwawa was born in the mid-19th century to Chief Munyigumba of the Hehe during a period when they were involved in the expansion and consolidation of their kingdom. While he was thought to be one of the intended inheritors of the Hehe state, upon his father's death in 1879, the leadership of the Hehe and their vassals was seized by Mwambabme, a subordinate chieftain of Nyamwezi origins who used Mkwawa's brother, Muhalwike, as a puppet to maintain his authority. Mwambabme's hostility to other possible claimants forced Mkwawa to flee to the rival state of Ugogo, where he searched for additional support for his claim.

Mkwawa returned to Uhehe (place of the Hehe) shortly thereafter at the urging of loyal subordinate rulers and launched a campaign to reclaim rulership of the Hehe. Mkwawa then led his supporters in a series of victories against the forces of Mwambabme and the encroachment of the neighboring Ngoni, which consolidated his rule. By 1883, Mkwawa was again the unchallenged ruler of Uhehe and pursued an aggressive policy against his neighboring rivals, the Sangu and the Ngoni, in the process creating a loose but powerful Hehe confederation in the central plateau of Tanganyika.

Mkwawa's downfall began in 1891, with the increasing aggression of the German colonial forces. Initially based on the coast, the Germans began sending patrols inland to conquer those local groups that had supported the Abushiri Rebellion (1888–1889) and establish their own sovereignty in place of local control. On June 16, Mkwawa's forces ambushed the column of Emil von Zelewski at Lula-Rugaro (Lugalo), wiping out the vast majority of the colonial troops while taking substantial casualties themselves. Mkwawa continued his war against the Germans by launching raids into the neighboring Sagara region and disrupting German control over the inland regions of their claimed empire.

It was not until 1894 that the Germans were able to launch an effective retaliatory attack against Mkwawa and Hehe, assaulting Mkwawa's *boma* (enclosure) at Iringa and expelling him from his capital. This began the ultimate decline of Mkwawa's rulership, punctuated by the German officer Tom von Prince garrisoning a new fort at Iringa in 1896. Over the next two years, Mkwawa pursued a guerrilla struggle against the Germans, leading raiding parties against caravans and isolated garrisons while being granted support by the local population. However, popular support was running out by 1898, and many of Mkwawa's subordinates had made peace with the Germans.

On July 19, 1898, with German patrols closing in, Mkwawa shot his last servant and then committed suicide. His body was discovered by the Germans when they followed the sound of the gunshots, and his skull was taken as a trophy to Germany. While Mkwawa's death effectively ended resistance by the Hehe to German rule, he himself is remembered as a heroic figure who resisted colonial expansion for as long as possible.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa; German Conquest of (1885–1908); German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891); von Prince, Tom; von Zelewski, Emil

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Mnyamana kaNgqengelele (c. 1813–1892)

A Zulu chief, royal councilor, and astute statesman, Mnyamana failed to fend off the colonial threat to an independent and traditional Zululand. When he became king in 1840, Mpande kaSenzangakhona assigned Mnyamana, who was born in about 1813 and enrolled in the uMkulutshane *ibutho* (age-grade regiment), to succeed to the Buthelezi chiefdom. In 1854, Mpande appointed him commander of the uThulwana *ibutho*. Mnyamana supported Prince Cetshwayo kaMpande in the civil war of 1856 to decide the royal succession, and on his accession in 1872, King Cetshwayo made him his chief councilor.

Mnyamana was hostile to white colonists because of the threat that they posed to the existing order in Zululand, but he appreciated their power and invariably advised moderation in dealing with them. During the crisis leading up to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, he pushed for a diplomatic solution. Nevertheless, once the British invaded, he unreservedly supported the war effort and exercised overall command at the Battle of Khambula on March 29, 1879, where the Zulu army suffered a crucial defeat. Following the final Zulu defeat in the Battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879, Mnyamana gave the fugitive Cetshwayo temporary refuge in his territory while he negotiated unsuccessfully on his behalf with the British. Mnyamana refused to be appointed a chief in the British settlement of September 1, 1879, which abolished the monarchy and divided Zululand into 13 fragments.

Mnyamana continued as an ardent member of the uSuthu, or royalist, faction and was prominent in appealing to the British to ask for the deposed Cetshwayo's restoration. When the British restored Cetshwayo in January 1883 to the central portion of his former kingdom, Mnyamana resumed his position as chief councilor. During the Zulu civil war of 1883–1884, he repeatedly led his Buthelezi forces against the neighboring Ngenetsheni of Prince Hamu kaNzibe, who, along with Chief Zibhebhu kaMaphitha of the Mandlakazi, was the principal foe of the uSuthu. After Zibhebhu routed the uSuthu at the Battle of oNdini on July 21, 1883, and the king took refuge in the British Reserve Territory, Mnyamana concentrated the remnants of the uSuthu forces together in the Ngome forest in northern Zululand until Hamu scattered them in April 1884.

After Cetshwayo's death on February 8, 1884, Mnyamana counseled his teenaged heir, King Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, against concluding a military alliance against Zibhebhu and Hamu with Boers infiltrating northwestern Zululand. His caution was justified when, after defeating Zibhebhu, the Boers exacted the cession of a third of Dinuzulu's territory on August 16, 1884, and imposed a protectorate over him.

Always a realist, Mnyamana acquiesced when Britain annexed the remnant of Zululand as a colony on May 19, 1887. During the uSuthu Rebellion of April–September 1888, when Dinuzulu and his uncles took up arms against the British administration, Mnyamana and his Buthelezi attempted unsuccessfully to remain aloof. The uSuthu attacked them as British collaborators, and the Buthelezi took refuge with the British forces. Formed into a force called Mnyamana's Auxiliaries, they assisted the British in quelling the rebellion. Mnyamana died on July 29, 1892.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); oNdini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884); Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Modder River, Battle of (November 28, 1899)

Fought during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the Battle of Modder River showed that leaders and tactics, in light of advanced weapons technology, needed to be flexible to meet changing battlefield conditions.

The British forces in South Africa were divided into three main forces in November 1899 to accomplish three different missions. The westernmost force, the 10,000-man 1st Division commanded by Lieutenant-General Lord Paul S. Methuen, was given the task of relieving Kimberley. On November 21, his force began the 120-kilometer advance north from Orange River Station, encountering Boer forces and winning engagements at Belmont (November 23) and Graspan (November 25). The next significant obstacle on the march was the Modder River, about 34 kilometers south of Kimberley.

On November 27, 1899, 1,500 Boers led by Assistant Commandant-General Piet A. Cronjé had arrived from Mafeking and joined Assistant Commandant-General Jacobus De la Rey's force of about 3,500 men with six Krupp guns. De la Rey, who had fought at Belmont and Graspan, began to appreciate the need to alter their conventional tactics.

The Boers had been placing their artillery on the crests of steep hills, believing them impregnable. But in fact these crests were easily identifiable targets and highly vulnerable to counterbattery fire, and the slopes of the hills protected attackers. Moreover, plunging fire from rifles greatly reduced their range and effectiveness. The horizontal, flat trajectory of the Mausers would increase their lethality and permit them to fire to the limit of their range. De la Rey decided to place his force in the bed of the Riet River (and centered on the railroad bridge that crossed over it), near its confluence with the Modder River. This was in essence a large and deep trench, and its southern lip provided ideal cover and concealment for a firing line.

Early on November 28, 1899, with inadequate intelligence, Methuen hurriedly ordered an attack. He also had inaccurate maps and believed that the rivers could be easily forded. The British advanced at about 7 A.M. on a 5-kilometer front, with the 9th Brigade on the left (west) of the railway line and the Guards Brigade on the right, toward the Modder Bridge at the river junction. When the British were 1,000 meters from the unseen enemy positions, the Boers opened fire prematurely, with a hail of bullets. The Boers' smokeless powder (also used by the British at this time) and low position meant that the British could not readily see where the fire was coming from. The British were pinned down in the scorching heat, with the Guards Brigade unable to advance. Shortly after noon, elements of the 9th Brigade moved around the Boer right flank. Boers on the right flank, subject to friendly fire from the north riverbank, retreated, and a further British advance was halted.

Methuen, who had exercised little command and control over the battle, was wounded at about 4 P.M. The operation became even more disorganized as darkness fell and the firing faded away. The British postponed a planned attack, and the Boers decided to abandon their positions that night.

The Battle of Modder River was a costly victory for the British, who suffered 70 killed and 413 wounded, as compared to Boer casualties of about 150. Methuen, with little enemy intelligence, faulty maps, and inadequate communications, rode bravely around the battlefield like a junior officer, but he failed to exercise proper command and control of the operation. Most important, the Battle of Modder River demonstrated the futility of frontal assaults against an entrenched enemy.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Belmont, Battle of (1899); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De la Rey, Jacobus; Graspan, Battle of (November 25, 1899); Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Methuen, Lord

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Monteil, Parfait-Louis (1855–1925)

A graduate of the French military academy at Saint Cyr, Parfait-Louis Monteil served in Senegal, where he conducted geographical surveys during the early 1880s. After a posting in the French territory of Annam (in what is now Vietnam) from 1886 to 1888, he studied the potential construction of a railway from Bafoulabe to Bamako in what is now Mali.

In August 1890, Britain and France agreed that the former would colonize present-day Nigeria up to and including the Sokoto Caliphate, and north of that would be French territory. As such, Monteil was dispatched on an expedition to determine the exact northern boundary of Sokoto. Arriving in Dakar, Senegal in September 1890, Monteil and a small group of Frenchmen traveled by railway up the coast to Saint Louis, where they assembled an entourage of

Tirailleurs Sénégalais and carriers and proceeded up the Senegal River by steamboat.

The expedition arrived at Kayes, in what is now western Mali, in mid-October and marched overland to Segu, recently taken from the Tukolor Empire and then the eastmost French post in West Africa, on the Niger River in mid-December. Moving farther east beyond French authority, Monteil's group passed through the trading town of San, where they signed a treaty with the local ruler, but they were not so well received by Wobogo, the Mossi ruler of Ouagadougou (in what is now Burkina Faso). In the eastern part of the present-day Burkina Faso and the western part of what is now Niger, Monteil bribed local leaders to sign treaties with France.

In late 1891, Monteil discovered that the Argungu Caliphate (in what is now northeastern Nigeria) was independent of the Sokoto Caliphate, and subsequently the Argungu conquered it, causing a point of tension between later British and French colonial borders. He also found that the British Royal Niger Company, despite its claims, was not present in the region. In late October 1891, he visited Sokoto and signed a treaty with the caliph, and then proceeded through the town of Kano. In April 1892, Monteil arrived at Lake Chad and visited the Bornu kingdom, in what is now northeastern Nigeria and Cameroon. Turning north, Monteil's expedition concluded its epic journey by crossing the Sahara and arriving at Tripoli on the Mediterranean in December.

The next year, Monteil wrote a book recounting his expedition, was awarded a gold medal by the French Geographic Society, and visited President Marie Francois Sadi Carnot. Subsequently, in August 1894, he arrived at the Atlantic French port of Luango (in what is now Gabon) with orders to lead an expedition up the Ubangi River and then overland to the Upper Nile in southern Sudan. However, Monteil was redirected given the French conflict with Samori Toure's Mandinka Empire in West Africa.

In January and February 1895, Monteil's 300-strong force landed on the Ivory Coast and marched inland with orders to protect Kong, a state that had accepted French protection in 1889, from Samori and potentially negotiate with him. Just before reaching Kong, the expedition, which experienced logistical problems because of its diversion, clashed with Samori's forces, suffered heavy casualties, including a severely wounded Monteil, and was compelled to retreat. This disaster, which might have been avoided by the dispatch of colonial troops from the north, contributed to the unification of the French colonies of Senegal, Guinea, Sudan, and Ivory Coast as French West Africa under a governor-general responsible for civilian and military issues. The aborted expedition to southern Sudan would later be led by Jean-Baptiste Marchand and result in the Fashoda Incident of 1898. Monteil tried unsuccessfully to enter politics, was involved in the extension of French rule in southern Tunisia, and died on September 29, 1925.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Fashoda Incident (1898); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900): Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Marchand, Jean-Baptiste; Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (18997–1903); Samori Toure; *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

The French occupation of Algiers in 1830 isolated Morocco from the rest of Muslim North Africa and prompted concerns about further European invasions that the deteriorated Moroccan army would have no hope of challenging. While Mawlay Abderrahman sent a Moroccan army into western Algeria in 1830, French threats and British advice caused him to withdraw it in 1832.

To secure their strategic position at the Straits of Gibraltar, the British began to support Morocco diplomatically. Abd al-Qadir, son of a religious leader, led resistance against the French in western Algeria, established a small state centered at Mascara, and called himself the Moroccan governor of the area. In 1842, the French forced Abd al-Qadir across the Moroccan border, many Moroccans joined his army, and Abderrahman, facing potential rebellion, permitted him to establish a base of operations.

Frustrated by continual raids, the French occupied Oujda, just inside Morocco, in 1844 and used warships to bombard Tangiers and Essaouira (Mogador). During the only major battle of this Franco-Moroccan War, Sidi Mohammed, the sultan's son, led a 30,000-strong army that was defeated by a French force of 11,000 commanded by Marshall Thomas Robert Bugeaud at the Isly River near Oujda on August 14, 1844. This disaster sparked rebellion within Morocco, and the sultan sued for peace. Under the subsequent Treaty of Tangiers, France abandoned Oujda, and Morocco agreed to what would eventually become its modern border with Algeria. This military embarrassment encouraged rebellion within Morocco. During the Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859–1860, Madrid enlarged its Moroccan enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, gained new territory in the south of Morocco, and secured payment of a large indemnity.

During the early 20th century, Morocco was plagued by civil war and gradually fell under French domination. In 1903, France abandoned claims to Egypt in exchange for Britain not interfering in Morocco. Anti-European violence, prompted by the ruler Mawlay Abd al-Aziz's acceptance of a substantial French loan, led to French forces landing in Casablanca on the Atlantic coast and French soldiers from Algeria occupying Oujda in 1907, and in 1911, the French seized the capital of Fez. The arrival of a German gunboat at Agadir on the Atlantic in 1911 signaled an intervention in favor of Moroccan independence but was aborted when Paris granted Berlin territory along the Congo River.

The next year, the French forced Mawlay Abd al-Hafiz, the new ruler who had recently deposed his brother, to sign the Treaty of Fez, which imposed a protectorate on the core of Morocco. Nominally independent, Morocco would be governed by a French resident with authority over administrative and military affairs. France and Spain then agreed that the latter should control Morocco's far north and south. Rebellions and army mutinies broke out almost immediately in Fez and Marrakech but were suppressed by superior French firepower.

By the start of World War I, much of the interior of French Morocco had not been brought under colonial control. Given wartime manpower demands, the French in Morocco pursued a policy of active defense, meaning that they would anticipate Berber attacks but not launch major offensives. This changed in 1917, when an ambitious French operation established new French posts and cut the large zone of resistance into three separate pockets. In August 1918, the French suffered a serious defeat when one of their columns sent to control the southeast Tafilalet area, where

French colonial cavalry from Morocco participate in a parade in Paris. Locally recruited forces played a key role in the French conquest of Morocco and other parts of Africa and continued to occupy an important place within the French military. (Library of Congress) locals had called for French intervention, was defeated by rebels and abandoned 400 rifles and ammunition. For the first time, the French decided to withdraw from an area that they had already occupied and to abandon the pro-French Moroccans.

In 1919, French forces in Morocco shrunk because of postwar demobilization and new military commitments in the Rhineland, Russia, Anatolia, and the Middle East. Although the occupation force returned to its predemobilization strength of 85,000–90,000 men in mid-1920, it had again shrunk to 62,000 by 1924, and Paris planned to reduce it further to 46,000 regulars with 10,000 reserves. For the next 10 years, the French under Resident-General Marshal Louis-Hubert Lyautey adopted a policy to defend the economically and militarily important parts of Morocco and abandon the central and high Atlas Mountains.

During the early 1920s, the French in Morocco saw continued hostilities between the Spaniards and Riffians across the border as strengthening their own position. However, the French had become concerned by 1924 that an independent Muslim state in the Rif would try to drive them out of Morocco. In April and May 1925, Riffian forces captured French border defenses after heavy fighting that cost the lives of hundreds of French Foreign Legionnaires. With the defection of 20,000 Moroccans (many of whom were armed with French weapons) to the Riffians, the French abandoned the border area.

Anticipating the arrival of French reinforcements from Algeria and Europe, the Riffian leader Abd el-Karim concentrated on the eastern part of northern French Morocco, where he sought to control the Fez-Taza-Oudja road and absorb the local population. After the French suffered heavy losses defending Fez from Riffian assault, French reinforcements began to arrive in late July and decisively turned the tide of the war. On the recommendation of Petain, who had been sent to Morocco to take command, 36 battalions were dispatched from Algeria and the Rhineland.

In September, the French launched two offensives: a limited one in the central area to regain lost territory, and the main thrust in the east to attract Riffian forces and facilitate a Spanish landing at the Bay of Alhucemas. Lyautey, resident-general since 1912, resigned over what he saw as an unnecessarily expensive and inappropriately massive campaign. Suspended in October with the onset of the rainy season, Spanish and French operations resumed in May 1926 and led to el-Karim's surrender. In late May and June, the French occupied an area south of Taza that had long resisted French rule, and 3,000 Moroccan fighters and their families escaped to the Atlas Mountains, which became a haven for dissidents who staged raids on French-controlled areas.

In the late 1920s, war-weary France returned to the policy of defending useful territory in Morocco while launching small operations that nibbled away at the dissident areas. This changed in 1930, when instability in Germany prompted French metropolitan military authorities to plan to muster all available troops for the defense of the motherland. Since using regulars to guard colonial frontiers was seen as a waste, French officials in Morocco were ordered to end the dissident problem decisively. To avoid disapproval by tentative civilian politicians in Paris, the initial offensive planned by General Antoine Hure was moderate and involved mostly local irregulars under French command with air and artillery support.

In July 1931, this force advanced 15 kilometers along a 100-kilometer-wide front into the northern dissident territory, and a more ambitious operation in November advanced another 45 kilometers. In a single-night operation in mid-January 1932, French-led forces occupied the important oasis of Tafilalet, which they had abandoned in 1918, and in February, the French captured the last dissident strongholds in the area. This meant that the road between Marrakech and Bou-Denib was open to the French and the rebel-controlled upper central Atlas was cut off.

A series of massive French operations from May to July further and dramatically reduced the insurgent areas but created a false sense of confidence about the weakness of the remaining resistance. Problems began when the French penetrated the Tazigzaout area, where many dissidents had gathered under the charismatic Muslim religious leader Sidi el-Mekki, who refused to surrender. On August 22, 1,000 colonial irregulars assaulted Tazigzaout Ridge, where they encountered stiff resistance that led to hand-to-hand fighting, in which 50 colonial troops were killed. It took the French three weeks of intense combat to take the area, and in the process they suffered 300 casualties, including 75 regulars. Nervous Paris officials threatened to halt operations. The rebels were now split into four tightly encircled pockets in the High Atlas, the blocks of Jebel Sarhro in the south, and the Anti-Atlas in the southwest.

The almost inaccessible Sarhro served as sanctuary for around 1,000 Ait ’Atta warriors and 6,000 of their relatives. These fighters began descending from the mountains to attack French convoys moving between the Atlantic coast and Algeria, as well as Moroccans who had accepted colonial rule. As a result, Hure changed his plans for an assault on the Grand Atlas in the north to moving against the Ait ’Atta in the south. Since the rough terrain restricted the use of artillery, the French recruited 7,000 local Glawa irregulars for an assault of the Sarhro and supported them with nine *goums* (companies of Moroccan mountain troops called *goumiers*) and a small contingent of legionnaires and Moroccan cavalry. In mid-February 1933, the French-led irregulars stormed the Sarhro from the east and west, but communication difficulties, firm resistance, and the refusal of some irregulars to fight their fellow Moroccans resulted in heavy colonial casualties. This prompted Hure to employ French regulars in late February to spearhead an assault on the last dissident position on the cliff of Bou Gafer, which again led to substantial colonial losses, including the celebrated and aristocratic Captain Henri de Bournazel, who was nicknamed “*l’homme rouge*” (the red man) because he always wore a bright red cloak while leading Moroccan troops.

Unable to take the area by force, the French then besieged the Ait ’Atta, whose leader, Assou ou Ba Slam, negotiated favorable surrender terms that included amnesty, continued possession of firearms, exemption from forced labor and excessive taxation, exemption from military service as irregulars for a year, and recognition of his own authority under French supervision. A total of 10 French officers, 150 French regulars, and hundreds of irregulars had been killed during the fighting, and between 1,300 and 2,000 dissidents (three-quarters of them noncombatants) lost their lives, mostly as a result of aerial and artillery bombardment and lack of water during the siege.

The capitulation at Bou Gafer demoralized rebels in other pockets in the south, who also surrendered. The French then focused on the Great Atlas; during a two-week operation in June, which cost the lives of 200 colonial troops, they occupied the ridges of the Assif Melloul. This split the remaining insurgent zone into two pockets, which the French seized in a series of operations in July and August that gained control of the highest points in the Great Atlas.

Hure gathered a force of 25,000 regulars, 1,700 goumiers, and 16,000 irregulars to overwhelm the Anti-Atlas in the southwest, which was the last dissident holdout. During late February and early March 1934, a French offensive subdued 50,000 families of the Ait Abdallah and several hundred Ait Hammou refugees from Tafilalet. Some 50 French troops were killed or wounded in the effort. With the French finally in control of the entire territory, most regular soldiers in Morocco were sent home.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi, Muhammad ibn; Abd al-Qadir; Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Thomas-Robert; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Lyautey, Louis-Hubert; Rif War (1920–1926); Spanish-Moroccan War (War of Africa) (1859–1860)

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Moshoeshoe I (1786–1870)

Moshoeshoe I (whose name is frequently spelled Moshweshwe or Moshesh) was a ruler of the Sotho people of southern Africa during a period of dramatic change in African societies. Through his talents as a military leader and diplomat, he created the Sotho state (present-day Lesotho) and preserved the autonomy of its people.

Moshoeshoe was born in Menkwaneng near the Caledon River in the plateau region of southern Africa sometime after 1785. He was the son of Mogkachane, a petty chief in a region populated by Sotho-Tswana-speaking peoples. As a young man, Moshoeshoe followed the customary practice among his people of leaving his father's village to set up his own community. There, he raised cattle, practiced some cattle raiding, and tried to attract followers to his new chiefdom.

Moshoeshoe was born during a crucial and much-debated period in southern African history. Referred to as the "Mfecane" in Nguni languages and the "Difaqane" in Sesotho (both terms mean "the crushing"), the early 19th century in southeastern Africa was a period of violence and upheaval. Old kingdoms collapsed, new ones emerged, and people fled into the mountains and far to the north. Historians differ on the causes of this destabilization, with some pointing to drought and others to colonial raids. African leaders throughout the southeast region attempted to expand their power by conquering and assimilating neighboring peoples. Several Nguni chiefdoms adopted a series of military innovations that enabled them to expand their power dramatically through warfare. The most famous of those states was Shaka's Zulu. At the same time, Griqua raiders with horses and guns took cattle and slaves from African communities in the interior and sold them in the Cape Colony to the south.

The chaos of the *mfecane* offered an opportunity to African leaders who were strong enough to offer protection to the thousands of refugees created by the incessant warfare. Under those circumstances, Moshoeshoe was able to build a following very quickly through his military skills and diplomacy. By the early 1820s, he had attracted many refugees to his Sotho state. Faced with the threat of his hostile neighbors, Moshoeshoe led his people to an impregnable mountain fortress called Thaba Bosiu ("Mountain of the Night"). From there, they were able to hold off all attackers. As news of this mountain fortress spread, thousands of refugees appeared, appealing for protection. He forged those disparate peoples into a single community that came to be called Lesotho.

Over the next three decades, Moshoeshoe's Sotho armies fought a series of campaigns with two neighboring peoples, the Tlokwa, who were also of Sotho ethnicity, and the Kora, who were mounted raiders. Although he was never able to rid himself of those enemies completely, his successful campaigns and cattle raids drew thousands of followers to Lesotho. By the end of the 1830s, Moshoeshoe was the ruler of approximately 25,000 subjects. His people would number close to 150,000 at the time of his death three decades later.

Although the Sotho remained in conflict with their African neighbors for roughly 30 years, the greatest threat to Moshoeshoe's kingdom came from encroaching Europeans. Beginning in the 1830s, Boers from the Cape Colony appeared in the Sotho lands. Faced with that new threat, Moshoeshoe decided that he needed European assistance to maintain his independence. In the early 1830s, he permitted French Protestant missionaries to settle in his territory. Although he never converted to Christianity, he established a good relationship with the missionaries, who provided him with guidance in his dealings with the British and the Boers. He also used the missionaries to provide information about the outside world and to teach skills that would enable the Sotho to compete with and defend themselves against the Europeans.

Nevertheless, the borders of Lesotho began to shrink, given expansionist wars by the Boers of the Orange Free State. Moshoeshoe entered into negotiations with the British representatives at the Cape Colony in an attempt to secure their protection against the Boers. The British could offer him little assistance in his campaigns against the Boers, and the Sotho fought a series of engagements with the Dutch farmers until the 1860s. In the meantime, the British also attacked Thaba Bosiu in 1852 but were expelled. Moshoeshoe was able to use diplomacy and his missionary contacts in London to avoid unnecessary military conflict.

In 1858, with the Treaty of Aliwal North, Lesotho lost some of its best farmland to the Orange Free State. More military engagements conducted by Moshoeshoe's sons against the Boers in the 1860s convinced the aging ruler of the need for British assistance.

In 1868, Moshoeshoe asked the British government to declare a protectorate over his kingdom in the hope that the British would save him from being conquered by the Boers. His request was granted; the Sotho kingdom became a protectorate of the British Empire, and Boer ambitions on the Sotho territory were effectively ended.

Moshoeshoe died in 1870, after he had achieved autonomy for his people in a region increasingly ruled by whites.

James Burns

See also: Berea, Battle of (December 20, 1852); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Free State–Lesotho Wars (1858–1869); Gun War, Lesotho (1880–1881)

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Mpande kaSenzangakhona (c. 1798–1872)

A Zulu king during the middle decades of the 19th century who successfully preserved his kingdom from the Boers and British settling along its borders, Mpande kaSenzangakhona was the half-brother of King Dingane kaSenzangakhona. Dingane spared him when he seized the Zulu throne in 1828 and eliminated his other rivals.

Mpande wisely kept a low profile during Dingane's reign, but his circumstances changed when Dingane was defeated in 1838 by the invading Voortrekkers (Boers) emigrating from the British-ruled Cape Colony. Dingane concluded a peace agreement with them on March 25, 1839, but with his standing as king compromised, he turned against his potential rivals. In September 1839, Mpande fled south across the Thukela River with his adherents to take sanctuary among the Voortrekkers in their newly established Republic of Natalia. He struck an alliance with the Boers on October 27, 1839, to mount a joint campaign against Dingane. On January 14, 1840, the allies invaded the Zulu kingdom, but the Boer commando had not advanced far before Mpande's army destroyed Dingane's at the battle of the Maqongqo Hills on January 29, 1840. On February 10, 1840, the Boers recognized Mpande as king.

The British took control of the Republic of Natalia on July 5, 1842. Henceforth, it was Mpande's policy to maintain good relations with the neighboring British, both to foster trading relations and to check the land-hungry Boers of the South African Republic to the northwest, who coveted the Zulu grazing lands of the so-called Disputed Territory. On October 5, 1843, Mpande negotiated a boundary between Zululand and British Natal along the line of the Thukela and Mzinyathi rivers. To cement his relationship with the British, he increasingly encouraged a missionary presence in his kingdom and stopped disrupting the regional equilibrium through raids against his African neighbors—particularly the Swazi kingdom to the north, which he attacked in 1847, 1848, and 1852.

As he grew older and increasingly corpulent and lethargic, Mpande was threatened by impatient heirs to the throne. He particularly feared the growing power and popularity of his son Cetshwayo kaMpande, whom he had acknowledged as his heir in 1839, and fostered the claim of his favorite son, Mbuyazi kaMpande, instead. The two princes went to war, and at the Battle of Ndondakusuka on December 2, 1856, Cetshwayo destroyed Mbuyazi's following and killed him and five of his brothers. The surviving claimants to the throne fled into exile. Mpande had no choice but to recognize Cetshwayo as his successor, and in May 1861, he reluctantly made him his coruler.

Thereafter, Mpande's authority diminished steadily, and Cetshwayo exercised most of his father's royal prerogatives, including conducting negotiations with the Boers over the Disputed Territory. Mpande died in late September or October 1872. His death was kept a secret, however, until Cetshwayo's succession was secured on October 22, 1872. Mpande was buried at his kwaNodwengu *ikhanda* in the Mahlabathini plain in central Zululand, the grave marked by a modern funerary monument.

John Laband

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dingane kaSenzangakhona; Ndondakusuka, Battle of (December 2, 1856)

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Msiri (1830–1891)

Msiri was the founder of the Yeke Kingdom, in what is now the southern portion of the Democratic Republic of Congo. During the early 19th century, he rose from humble origins to become one of the most powerful rulers in central Africa.

Msiri was born Ngelengwa sometime during the 1820s in what is now western Tanzania. His father was Kalasa, a minor chief of the Sumbwa and a long-distance trader. In his youth, he accompanied his father's pioneering expeditions to trade in the Katanga region of southern Congo. In 1856, he led his own expedition to Katanga, during which the king of the Lunda, Mwata Kazembe, granted him permission to trade in southern Katanga. He settled there and married into a local ruling family. The Lunda referred to the Sumbwa as "Yeke," the name that would eventually be attached to Msiri's kingdom.

From Katanga, Msiri began commercial activities throughout the region and built up a following among the Nyamwezi traders. He acquired guns from Arab and Swahili traders and used them to establish himself as the dominant military power in Katanga. By 1870, he had thrown off Lunda control and set up a powerful, independent trading state. He entered into an agreement with Swahili trader Tippu Tip and sent copper, ivory, and slaves to the coast in exchange for guns and cloth.

In 1880, Msiri declared himself king. His armies began to assert control over the neighboring Luba and Lunda states and even attacked the center of Mwata Kazembe's territories. By the middle of the decade, he had brought most of the neighboring communities into his expanding empire, although he continued to face many revolts throughout his newly conquered territories.

The first Europeans to travel in central Africa had been told that Katanga was a region blessed with tremendous mineral resources. The famous Scottish missionary David Livingstone had brought back glowing reports of the wealth of Katanga, and his account of the region drew the attention of several European powers. In 1883, two German explorers traveled to Katanga and returned to Europe with enthusiastic stories of the copper and ivory wealth of the region. Three years later, more missionaries arrived in Katanga. Msiri invited them to establish a mission at his capital, Bunkeya. One of those missionaries, Francis Arnot, returned to Britain and tried to mobilize the support of prominent philanthropists to establish a greater British presence in Katanga.

In 1885, King Leopold II of Belgium had created the Congo Free State, a private colony that theoretically encompassed Msiri's kingdom, although agents had not yet attempted to assert their control over the region. To the south, Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company (BSAC) also had designs on Katanga. In 1891, representatives from both private companies arrived in Bunkeya to negotiate with Msiri. The British agents tried to get Msiri to sign a treaty ceding the rights to his kingdom, but the missionaries warned the king of the implications of the agreement. Leopold's agents made a better impression, but Msiri refused to grant them concessions as well.

Although those initial parties did not directly threaten Msiri, their presence in Katanga emboldened Msiri's enemies, the Basanga, to carry out raids on his capital. Their attacks sowed confusion within Bunkeya, and soon refugees were fleeing the capital. Msiri remained at Bunkeya and mounted a successful counterattack against the Basanga. It was clear, however, that his authority in the region was severely undermined, and he lived in constant fear of assassination. Despite the threat to his authority, he continued to refuse offers of protection from either European nation.

Leopold hired the Canadian-born British mercenary Captain William Stairs to lead an expedition of 100 African gunmen and 300 porters that traveled from Zanzibar to the south end of Lake Tanganyika, where they killed the Yeke ruler Msiri in December 1891 and incorporated Katanga into the Congo Free State, which would eventually become the Belgian Congo.

James Burns

See also: British South Africa Company; Leopold II; Rhodes, Cecil John; Stairs, William Grant

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Muhammed Abdullah Hassan, Sayyid (1856–1920)

Amid the dusty back country of Somalia, infused with a powerful Islamic faith and angered by foreign intrusion, Sayyid Muhammed Abdullah Hassan led a holy war that stimulated Somali nationalism. His legacy became a cornerstone in Somalia's independence movement after World War II.

Sayyid Muhammed was born on April 7, 1864, at a watering place in the dry Dulbahante country in northwest Somalia. He learned the Qur'an as a boy and by age 15 became a teacher of Islam. His learning proved so extensive and wise and his piety so great that four years later, he earned the title of sheikh. He then traveled to Harar, Mogadishu, the Sudan, and Nairobi in search of more knowledge. In 1891, he returned home and married the first of his several wives.

By this time, Britain, France, Italy, and Ethiopia had begun carving Somalia into territories. The once-homogeneous land of shifting clan rivalries and alliances had become imposed on by foreign rulers and connections to a European economy that enriched only a few coastal merchants. Many Somalis concluded that Christianity and materialism posed a threat to Islam. Sayyid Muhammed denounced assaults on Islamic tradition, condemned excessive indulgence and luxury, and insisted that Somalis must unite in a common war against foreign domination. He warned that otherwise, Christian colonizers would destroy Islam.

In the late 1890s, Sayyid Muhammed preached his message, served as a mediator between warring clans, and called for interclan unity. He also became a prolific poet; his words carried a message of hope and vision. His supporters came mainly from the interior of the country. He organized them into military units and by 1900 had command of 5,000 men. He then declared a jihad (holy war) aimed primarily at the British and Ethiopians. The latter had particularly antagonized inland clans by raiding herds and religious establishments in the Ogaden region.

Sayyid Muhammed's followers became known as the *dervishes,* which meant persons dedicated to God and community. For 20 years, they fought against Somalia's foreign invaders. In 1900, Sayyid Muhammed led 6,000 men in attacking an Ethiopian post at Jijiga. The dervishes suffered heavy losses (about 170 dead) but recovered the livestock that had previously been stolen from them and made a considerable show of force. His militarism, poems, and continued calls for clan unity made him a national figure.

Between 1901 and 1904, the British mounted a series of expeditions that eventually pushed Sayyid Muhammed's followers inland. In 1910, Britain decided to withdraw its forces from the interior part of British Somaliland. That action enhanced Sayyid Muhammed's prestige but also unleashed interclan fighting. What resulted was a chaos-induced impoverishment and starvation referred to by Somalis as the "Time of Eating Filth." British policy changed in 1913, and a camel constabulary entered Somalia's interior, where it contained the dervishes. Sayyid Muhammed, however, followed guerrilla tactics, which often succeeded against far superior numbers.

In 1915, Sayyid Muhammed suffered a serious setback when British forces captured the dervish fort at Shimberberis and a coastal blockade reduced his armaments. Then, early in 1920, Britain launched a major assault that employed a new technology from World War I: aircraft. As ground forces advanced against the dervishes, British bombers leveled Sayyid Muhammed's fortress at Taleh. He fled into the Ogaden, where he reorganized his remaining forces and refused surrender. Yet new attacks occurred; this time from rival clans that inflicted a heavy defeat on Sayyid Muhammed and drove him into Ethiopia.

On December 21, 1920, Sayyid Muhammed died from influenza. He left behind a legacy of devotion to Islam and a united Somali cause against foreign oppression. When nationalist sentiment surged again in the 1940s, many Somalis felt stirred by the memory of Sayyid Muhammed, whom they called "the man who had fought great odds."

Neil A. Hamilton

See also: Anglo-Somali Wars (1901–1920)

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Mutesa I (c. 1838–1884)

Mutesa I was one of the great *kabakas* (kings) of the East African state of Buganda, in what is now the country of Uganda. Autocratic and progressive, he reigned during the period that his people were beginning to encounter the influence of Arabs and Europeans.

Mutesa was the son of Suna II, the ruler of Buganda. Little is known of his early life; he was probably born in 1838 and became *kabaka* when still in his teens, after his father died of smallpox in 1856. Buganda was a powerful and highly centralized kingdom with a sophisticated and efficient bureaucracy. The *katikiro,* similar to a prime minister, of Buganda played an instrumental role in selecting the *kabaka.* At the time of his father's death, Mutesa was only one of many candidates for the throne. The *katikiro* chose him in the expectation that he would be a pliant ruler. As he replaced his father on the throne, the *katikiro* exiled the rival claimants. Mutesa soon surprised his minister by thwarting an attempted coup by the unsuccessful candidates and quickly establishing himself as a strong ruler.

Mutesa ascended the throne on the eve of a great revolution in Buganda society. Before he became *kabaka,* the remote kingdom in East Africa had experienced little contact with the outside world. During his reign, however, several foreign groups developed an interest in Buganda. Mutesa recognized the threat to his own power posed by those foreigners and sought to use the new ideas and tools brought by the outsiders to stabilize his kingdom.

Arab traders were the first to make contact with the kingdom. Mutesa traded with them to acquire firearms, which he used to maintain his position among the Baganda, as well as to expand his power over the neighboring kingdom of Bunyoro. He also learned from those traders to speak some Kiswahili and Arabic and developed an interest in Islam. He began reading the Qur'an and practicing Muslim rituals, though he did not convert to Islam.

In 1861, the first party of Europeans arrived in Buganda, led by British explorer John Hanning Speke. Mutesa allowed Speke to stay for a while in his kingdom in the hope that the Englishman might prove an effective ally in the future. Speke left Buganda and was impressed by the power of the kingdom and by its ruler. In 1875, another European explorer, Henry Morton Stanley, visited Buganda. Stanley also formed a favorable impression of Buganda's ruler and ingratiated himself by helping Mutesa in a campaign against his enemies. When Stanley suggested that the king invite Christian missionaries to Buganda, Mutesa readily assented because he hoped that the missionaries could supply him with the weapons that he needed to fend off his enemies. In particular, he wanted help against the Egyptians, who had begun to extend their power down the Nile Valley and into the lakes region of East Africa in the 1870s.

The introduction of Christianity into Buganda did not provide Mutesa with the aid that he had expected, however. Not only did the missionaries prove unwilling to supply him with firearms, but the different Christian denominations also squabbled among themselves and created a divisive effect on the Buganda court where Mutesa forced them all to stay. The first Christians to arrive in 1877 were Anglicans, members of the Church Missionary Society. Two years later, Catholic missionaries established a mission in the kingdom. Those two groups formed rival blocs and were in turn opposed by the Muslim faction already established at the Buganda court. All three groups were viewed warily by the many Baganda chiefs, who continued to practice their traditional animist religion, but the Christians made many converts among the elite in the Buganda court.

Essentially a secular ruler, Mutesa never converted to any of the foreign religions. He expressed an active interest in the new faiths and had the missionaries debate their theological views in public, but he was principally concerned with using those faiths for diplomatic purposes. He was unwilling to permit any of the new religions to challenge his authority and massacred many Muslims in 1876, when they refused to obey his commands. When British general Charles George Gordon, working for the Egyptians as governor of Equatoria, sent Emin Pasha to visit Buganda, Mutesa assumed the title "His Most Christian Majesty." Although the Anglican missionaries may not have brought guns, their presence helped to persuade the British government to oppose further Egyptian harassment of Buganda.

By 1880, Mutesa was seriously ill, perhaps afflicted with a venereal disease. During his illness, his ministers appropriated a great deal of the royal authority. When he died in October 1884, however, he left a strong monarchy in an independent state for his son, King Mwanga II.

James Burns

See also: East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Emin Pasha (Schnnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore); Gordon, Charles George; Mwanga II; Stanley, Henry Morton

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Mwanga II (c. 1866–1903)

Danieri Mwanga II was the last independent king, or *kabaka,* of the East African state of Buganda (part of present-day Uganda).

Mwanga was born in Buganda around 1866, son of King Mutesa I. When his father died in 1884, he emerged victorious from a succession dispute to become *kabaka.* Mutesa had encouraged foreign missionaries to settle in Buganda, and by the late 1870s, separate Catholic and Protestant organizations were well established, with many converts among the Baganda courtiers. Outside the capital, the majority of the Baganda continued to practice traditional religion, and there were many converts to Islam in the kingdom as well. While Mutesa had been strong enough to prevent any challenges to his authority, after his death Mwanga inherited a kingdom divided into several hostile camps.

Mwanga initially allowed the different religious factions to continue as they had under his father, but he proved unable to control the rival groups. An indecisive and capricious ruler, he unnecessarily antagonized the leaders of the Christian parties. Eventually, he began to fear the influence of Christianity within his kingdom, and his fears were sharpened when Germany declared a protectorate over neighboring Tanganyika (present-day Tanzania) in 1885. Acting on the advice of his *katikiro* (prime minister), Mwanga ordered the murder of the British Anglican bishop James Hannington. The following year, he had many of the Christian converts murdered. He then backed away from his persecution of Christians and appointed several of them to key positions within his government.

By 1888, the three nontraditional religious factions within Buganda had organized into powerful military units. Mwanga tried to eliminate all three of them in a purge, but the feuding groups united and drove him into exile. The absence of central authority set off four years of civil war that ended with the Christian forces returning Mwanga to the throne. Mwanga was forced to appoint Christian convert Apolo Kagwa as *katikiro* and to accept limitations on his power as *kabaka.*

By that time, Germany and Britain had become interested in Buganda. The Catholic missionaries hoped that Germany would annex the region and encouraged their followers to support the German cause. The Protestants championed the British and instructed their converts to support Britain. Although Mwanga reached a settlement with the Germans, that agreement was superseded by an Anglo-German treaty signed in 1890 that recognized Britain's sphere of influence throughout the entire region. In 1892, Frederick Lugard, an agent of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), arrived in Buganda. When a civil war broke out between the two dominant Christian blocs, Lugard threw his weight behind Kagwa and the Protestants. With modern guns supplied by Lugard and support from British machine guns, the Protestants defeated the Catholics at the Battle of Mengo in 1892. Two years later, the British government declared a protectorate over the kingdom.

Mwanga agreed initially to the protectorate, but he mounted a rebellion against his new overlords in 1897. He was opposed by the Christian parties and though supported by the traditional chiefs, was unable to mobilize enough support to present a serious challenge the British position. He retreated into German East Africa and continued guerrilla resistance for two more years by allying himself with the anticolonial resistance of Kabarega in the kingdom of Bunyoro.

In his absence from Buganda, Mutesa's young son, Daudi Chwa II, was installed as the new *kabaka,* and the Christian leader Kagwa became regent. The British captured Mwanga in 1898 and exiled him to the Seychelle Islands. He died there in 1903.

James Burns

See also: East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Lugard, Frederick; Mutesa I

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Mzilikazi kaMashobane (c. 1795–1868)

Mzilikazi was born around 1795 into a community located in what is now the KwaZulu/Natal province of South Africa and was then a region settled by many Nguni groups. His father was Mashobane, a ruler descended from the influential Khumalo clan of the Nguni. Mzilikazi was raised at the court of his grandfather, Zwide, the leader of the Ndwandwe confederacy. Around 1817, however, Zwide began to grow suspicious of his son-in-law. He therefore executed Mashobane and placed Mzilikazi in his deceased father's office.

During that same period, the Ndandwe came into conflict with a rival confederacy, the Mthethwe, led by Dingiswayo, whom the Ndandwe defeated and killed in 1816. However, the Mthethwe confederation regrouped under King Shaka, one of Dingiswayo's lieutenants. Shaka proved to be a more formidable leader than Dingiswayo; under his leadership, the Mthethwe held off several subsequent Ndandwe attacks. Mzilikazi recognized the threat posed by Shaka and defected to the Mthethwe side. He led several raids against his former allies, the Ndandwe, and became a favorite of Shaka.

However, Mzilikazi eventually changed his mind again when, during one of his campaigns, he returned to his father's former chiefdom. He decided to stay among his people rather than return to continue fighting alongside Shaka. Mzilikazi had with him many cattle that he had plundered during his raids. His decision to keep those cattle instead of returning them to Shaka drew the great ruler's wrath. Shaka sent several raiding parties against Mzilikazi. Although he managed to fend off the first raid, Mzilikazi was familiar with Shaka's ambition and cruelty and decided it might be smarter to flee the region rather than continue to face Shaka's army.

The retreat from Zululand was the first phase of an odyssey that would carry Mzilikazi, 300 of his warriors, and their followers throughout southern Africa. Using military techniques adapted from the Mthethwe and Zulu armies, Mzilikazi's forces fought and defeated many of the communities in their path and incorporated the refugees into their expanding army. During a short stay in the middle Vaal region, the local Sotho people called his army the *matabele,* a name that Mzilikazi and his followers adopted. However, they were forced out of that region by the neighboring Griqua, whose use of firearms gave them a decisive advantage over the Ndebele. Mzilikazi removed his army to the north and settled around the region of present-day Pretoria in 1827. By 1832, Mzilikazi's troops had defeated the Griqua, and he ruled more than 20,000 people and controlled most of the land in the western Transvaal region.

In 1829, Mzilikazi welcomed the arrival of the first European missionary to visit his kingdom, the Scottish Protestant Robert Moffat. He developed a friendship with Moffat, who acted as a diplomat between Mzilikazi and European powers. Although he never embraced Christianity, Mzilikazi encouraged other missionaries and Europeans in general to visit his growing kingdom. In 1836, he signed a treaty of friendship with the British colonial government in Cape Colony. He revived his friendship with Moffat in 1854, after the Ndebele had settled down in the Bulawayo region of what is now western Zimbabwe.

By 1832, Shaka had died, but the new ruler of the Zulu, King Dingane, sent an army to attack the Ndebele. Although Mzilikazi fended off the invaders, he decided to move his people once again; that time, they went farther west. In 1836, a new threat appeared in the form of the Boers, Afrikaner settlers from the Cape Colony who were migrating into the Vaal River region to escape British domination. Mzilikazi was soon under threat from better-armed Boer forces, who defeated the Ndebele in a series of battles beginning with Vegkop (October 16, 1836). Caught between the growing menace of the Boers and renewed attacks from the Griqua, Mzilikazi again decided to remove his people to safer regions. He divided the Ndebele into two forces; one headed north and settled in the western region of present-day Zimbabwe, and the other contingent, led by Mzilikazi, moved farther north toward the Zambezi River but found that tropical disease made the area inhospitable. Eventually, Mzilikazi rejoined the force in Zimbabwe, only to find that his son Nkulumane had been appointed king in his absence. He ruthlessly executed his son's supporters and consolidated his position as undisputed leader of the Ndebele. Nkulumane disappeared.

Mzilikazi established his capital at Bulawayo, where the Ndebele settled permanently. His following eventually swelled to more than 100,000 people. From the 1840s to the 1860s, the Ndebele fought numerous campaigns against the Rozvi Shona, who had dominated the region before their arrival. The Shona use of hilltop strongholds and guns imported from the Mozambican coast prevented the eastward extension of Ndebele power. Mzilikazi died on September 9, 1868. After a succession struggle, his son King Lobengula succeeded him in 1870.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boers; Dingane kaSenzagakhona; Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Vegkop, Battle of (October 16, 1836)

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N

Nandi, British Subjugation of. *See* "East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905)"

Napier, Robert C. (1810–1890)

Robert C. Napier was a distinguished officer of the Indian army who served with distinction in numerous campaigns in India and China. He is best remembered as the commander of the British expedition to Ethiopia in 1867–1868.

Napier was born in 1810 in Colombo, Ceylon. His father was Major Charles F. Napier, who was mortally wounded while attacking the fort of Cornelis—the middle name given to the younger Napier—in Java shortly after his son was born. Napier was educated at Addiscombe, the college for East India Company military cadets, and was commissioned into the Bengal Sapper and Miners in 1828. In addition to participating in numerous campaigns, he planned and supervised many military and civil construction projects in India and designed the Napier system of cantonments.

Napier saw considerable action during the First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–1846). He fought at the Battles of Mudki and Ferozeshah and had a horse shot out from underneath him in each battle. Severely wounded at Ferozeshah, Napier recovered in time to participate in the Battle of Sobraon. During the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–1849), he was present at the Siege of Multan and the Battle of Gujerat. In 1852, Napier commanded the right column in the Black Mountain expedition, and the following year, he fought in another small campaign on the North-West Frontier.

Napier's star began to rise during the Indian Mutiny (1857–1859). Initially, he served as adjutant-general and military secretary to Major-General Sir James Outram at Lucknow; as a brigadier general, he developed the plan to recapture the city. In the march to Gwalior, Napier was second in command to General Sir Hugh H. Rose. Napier commanded the division in later operations in India. He also commanded the 2nd Division in the war against China in 1860 and was promoted to major-general.

In 1865, Napier assumed command of the Bombay Army. Two years later, after being promoted to lieutenant-general, he was appointed to command the expedition sent to Ethiopia to free hostages taken by Emperor Tewodros II. The Ethiopian campaign, although expensive, was a model of superior leadership and excellent planning. For his service, Napier was ennobled as the first Baron Napier of Magdala (the site of his greatest battle in Ethiopia) and Caryngton and received the thanks of Parliament and two knighthoods.

From 1870 to 1876, Napier served as commander-in-chief, India, and was promoted to general in 1874. He served as governor of Gibraltar from 1876 to 1883 and was promoted to field marshal upon his retirement in 1883. Napier served as constable of the Tower of London from 1886 until 1889.

While Napier was undoubtedly an outstanding general, he had many interests outside soldiering. He painted watercolors and enjoyed poetry. Napier also loved children. His first wife bore six children, and his second wife, nine. Napier died of influenza in London in 1890.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Tewodros II

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Natal Native Contingent

During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the British raised African levies in the colony of Natal to serve in Zululand alongside British regular infantry to provide patrols, garrisons, convoy escorts, and cattle guards. On occasion, they also engaged the Zulu in combat.

The lieutenant-governor of Natal was empowered to extract *isibhalo* (compulsory labor and military service) from the African population. In late 1878, his magistrates accordingly began raising African men for military service in the impeding campaign from the chiefs in the Natal Native Reserves. The Natal Native Contingent (NNC) assembled in December 1878 and was formed along British military lines into three regiments of seven battalions. Each battalion consisted of 10 companies, with an initial nominal establishment of 1,100 officers and men. Three white officers and six white noncommissioned officers (NCOs) led each company, which consisted of one African officer, three African NCOs, and 90 men. The Natal Native Pioneer Corps (NNPC), with 300 men, was raised to repair roads and construct fortifications. The NNC had no uniform other than a red cloth tied around the head, although the NNPC members wore red tunics and white trousers. There was considerable settler resistance to Africans being issued with firearms, so only the African officer and NCOs in each company were issued outmoded Enfield percussion rifles, while their men carried their traditional spears and shields. The white officers and NCOs were issued with Martini-Henry rifles.

The NNC proved of doubtful morale and effectiveness in the field. One problem was that the white officers and NCOs were not necessarily suitably qualified. Many were colonists with little military experience, or were seconded or former British officers who spoke no Zulu. This led to great disaffection among the men who, besides being poorly armed, were ineffectually trained in British drills and tactics.

In the first round of battles in the campaign, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Regiment and of the two battalions of the 3rd Regiment were annihilated in the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879; meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment fought uncertainly in the Battle of Nyezane on the same day. The survivors of the demoralized 3rd Regiment subsequently deserted, while all other formations of the NNC were withdrawn to Natal to regroup. In the reorganization of February 1879, regimental formations were abolished. Three battalions were created from the former 1st Regiment and two from the 2nd Regiment. Several hundred breech-loading Sniders and Martini-Henry rifles were issued to each battalion in addition to their existing firearms. The men were put into the basic uniform of a red tunic. Abler white commanders were recruited, who put their men through improved training. In April 1879, elements of the disbanded 3rd Regiment were reassembled as the Weenen Contingent, but they mustered in traditional African, rather than British fashion.

All five NNC battalions remained in the field until they were disbanded in October 1879. The 1st and 3rd Battalions (as well as the Weenen Contingent) remained stationed along the Natal-Zululand border, but the 2nd Battalion joined the 2nd Division, South African Field Force in May 1879 and fought at the Battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879. After the breakup of the 2nd Division on July 26, 1879, it joined Baker Russell's Column in pacification operations. The 4th and 5th Battalions were assigned to the Eshowe Relief Column and fought at the Battle of Gingindlovu on April 2, 1879. They subsequently served with the 1st Division, South African Field Force. When that formation was broken up on July 23, 1879, the 4th Battalion joined Clarke's Column in pacification operations, while the 5th Battalion continued on garrison duties in Zululand.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879)

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Natal Native Mounted Contingent and Associated Units

During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the British raised irregular cavalry from Africans living in the Natal Native Reserves under supposedly loyal chiefs, as well as from Christian mission stations to serve in Zululand, where they scouted, patrolled, raided, skirmished, and fought in battle.

Volunteers from among the Ngwane people in the foothills of the Drakensberg

Mountains in western Natal formed the three troops of Sikali's Horse. Chief Hlubi kaMota Molife of the Tlokwa people in northern Natal raised Hlubi's Troop (or Mounted Basutos), while Chief Mqundane (Jantze) of the Ximba people in southwestern Natal raised the troop of Jantze's (Jantje's) Native Horse. The troop of well-disciplined Edendale Horse came from the Wesleyan mission community of Edendale, outside Pietermaritzburg. All were maintained by the War Office and commanded by white colonial officers. They supplied their own horses and were armed with breech-loading carbines (some men also carried traditional weapons). Their uniforms were yellow or brown corduroy and brown hats with a red puggaree.

Initially called the Natal Native Mounted Contingent, these units formed part of the No. 2 Column stationed in January 1879 on the Natal side of the southern border of Zululand. All except Jantze's Horse were subsequently redeployed to reinforce the No. 3 Column, which was invading southwestern Zululand, and fought in the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879.

Jantze's Native Horse, which had remained in garrison along the Natal border, was reinforced by a second troop raised in early March 1879. The unit then marched with the Eshowe Relief Column, fighting at the Battle of Gingindlovu on April 2, 1879. It subsequently served on the Zululand coast with the 1st Division, South African Field Force. When that formation was broken up on July 23, 1879, it served with Clarke's Column in pacification operations in southern Zululand until it disbanded in late September 1879. The troop of Mafunzi's Mounted Natives (originally the Umlaas Corps), raised by Chief Hemuhemu of the Funzi people in central Natal, served alongside Jantze's Native Horse from March to September 1879.

Following defeat at Isandlwana, Sikali's Horse dispersed and went home, but Hlubi's Troop and the Edendale Horse remained in garrison at Helpmekaar. On February 20, 1879, they were put under the command of Lieutenant W. F. D. Cochrane and were reorganized as the Natal Native Horse. Fresh recruits were attracted, and in March 1879, the unit joined the No. 4 Column in northwestern Zululand. It participated in the disastrous raid on the Zulu fastness on Hlobane Mountain on March 28, 1879, and in the victorious Battle of Khambula on March 29, 1879. As part of Wood's Flying Column from April 13, 1879, it fought throughout the final stages of the campaign. It took part in the reconnaissance in force across the White Mfolozi River on July 3, 1879, and in the Battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879. It was disbanded when Wood's Flying Column was broken up on July 31, 1879.

The three dispersed troops of Sikali's Horse formed again in April 1879 under Captain Theophilus Shepstone, Jr. as Shepstone's Native Horse. It was reinforced from the Edendale community and by a contingent from the Christian community at Driefontein, near Ladysmith. In May 1879, Shepstone's Native Horse joined the 2nd Division, South African Field Force, in its advance into central Zululand. On June 4, 1879, it took part in the skirmish at Zungeni Mountain, and subsequently fought in the Battle of Ulundi. After the breakup of the 2nd Division on July 26, 1879, it served with Baker Russell's Column in pacification operations in northwestern Zululand until it disbanded in early September 1879.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879)

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Ndabuko kaMpande (c. 1842–1900)

Ndabuko kaMpande was a Zulu prince who was prominent in the Zulu Civil War of 1883–1884 and the Zulu (uSuthu) Rebellion of 1888. Born in about 1842 and enrolled in the uMbonambi *ibutho* (age-grade regiment), the decisive and energetic Ndabuko was King Cetshwayo kaMpande's younger full brother and his closest adviser. During the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, he fought with his *ibutho* in the victorious Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, pursuing the British fugitives as far as the borders of Natal. It is likely that he was also present at the Zulu defeat in the Battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879.

When the British partitioned the defeated Zulu kingdom into 13 chiefdoms on September 1, 1879, Ndabuko was placed under the appointed chief, Zibhebhu kaMaphitha. The two quarreled over the control of the former royal women and cattle. Ndabuko assumed the formal guardianship of Prince Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, the deposed king's heir, and was prominent in deputations in May 1880 and April 1882 to the colonial authorities fruitlessly appealing for Cetshwayo's restoration.

In January 1883, the British restored to Cetshwayo the central part of his former kingdom. Civil war ensued between the uSuthu and their antagonists, primarily Zibhebhu's Mandlakazi people. Ndabuko was the commander-in-chief of the uSuthu army that Zibhebhu crushed at the Battle of Msebe on March 30, 1883. He arrived too late with his contingent to take part in the Battle of oNdini on July 21, 1883, when Zibhebhu surprised and utterly routed the uSuthu. Ndabuko joined the fugitive Cetshwayo in the Nkandla Forest in the British-ruled Reserve Territory in southern Zululand. Upon Cetshwayo's death on February 8, 1884, Ndabuko assumed the effective leadership of the uSuthu cause during continuing strife with Zibhebhu and his allies. With two of his half-brothers, he resumed his guardianship of Dinuzulu until they installed him as king on May 20, 1884.

When Britain annexed Zululand on May 19, 1887, Ndabuko bitterly resented the imposition of the colonial administration, and his recalcitrant response was instrumental in the outbreak of the uSuthu Rebellion in April 1888. During the fighting, he was one of the commanders at the Battle of Ceza on June 2, 1888, when the uSuthu successfully saw off a British force, and again at the Battle of Ivuna on June 23, 1888, when the uSuthu routed Zibhebhu, who then was collaborating with the British.

With the British suppression of the rebellion, Ndabuko and other uSuthu leaders fled to the neighboring South African Republic on August 7, 1888. He gave himself up to the British on September 17, 1888. With the other uSuthu leaders, he was tried at Eshowe between February 13 and April 27, 1889 for high treason and public violence. Found guilty, Ndabuko, along with Dinuzulu and his half-brother, Shingana, was sent to St Helena to serve his sentence of 15 years. In December 1897, Ndabuko was permitted to return to Zululand with the other prisoners, but their royal status was no longer recognized. Ndabuko died in 1900.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Ivuna, Battle of (June 23, 1888); oDini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884); Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897)

In March 1896, some Ndebele rebelled against the British South Africa Company (BSAC) administration and besieged the colonial town of Bulawayo in the southwest of Southern Rhodesian (now Zimbabwe). Ndebele grievances included oppression by colonial police, recent taxation imposed to force them into the colonial economy as cheap labor, and the abolition of their monarchy. Ndebele society was also undermined by rinderpest, which was devastating cattle herds across Southern and East Africa.

The timing of the rebellion was determined by the absence of a large number of the colony's police who had been captured by the Transvaal Boers during the 1895 Jameson Raid. In Bulawayo, settlers constructed a wagon laager reinforced with sandbags and barbed wire, spread broken glass outside the perimeter, arranged oil-soaked bundles of wood for the purpose of being set alight during a possible night attack, and rigged outlying buildings with explosives to be detonated if occupied by the Ndebele. Frederick Courteney Selous, a famous hunter who had guided the initial occupation column in 1890, and Frederick Russell Burnham, an American scout who had escaped the last stand of the Shangani Patrol in 1893, organized the Bulawayo Field Force, which dispatched mounted patrols to rescue beleaguered settlers.

The Ndebele rebels applied lessons from their 1893 defeat by the BSAC when massed charges were devastated by colonial firepower. The rebels formed small groups that fired rifles from cover, showed improved marksmanship, and withdrew when colonial firepower became concentrated. On April 9, 1,000 Ndebele ambushed a colonial patrol of 100 mounted men and a wagon-mounted Maxim gun on the Tuli Road to Bechuanaland (now

Botswana). With the Ndebele firing from concealed positions in the rocks, the Maxim was useless, and it took the British six hours to drive them off. The colonial patrol lost 7 dead, over 20 wounded, and 33 horses killed. While the Ndebele suffered 200 to 300 fatalities, this was much less than many of the engagements that had occurred three years earlier.

Around the same time as the Tuli Road ambush, another colonial patrol from Bulawayo consisting of 100 Europeans and 39 African auxiliaries supported by a wagon-mounted Maxim was ambushed by around 1,500 Ndebele on the Shiloh Road. During a two-day, running battle, the Ndebele fired from cover, caught the British on the move, attempted to flank them, and focused most of their fire on the Maxim wagon. Unwittingly, the Ndebele broke off their attack just as the patrol's ammunition and food was about to run out. Around 200 Ndebele had been killed compared to 5 Europeans (mostly from the Maxim crew) and an unknown number of African allies. A deadlock then developed, as the Ndebele could not overwhelm the colonial patrols and the patrols could not inflict massive casualties on the Ndebele.

In late May 1896, Bulawayo was relieved by two British forces. One was an imperial force traveling north from Mafeking on the Cape Colony/Bechuanaland border, consisting of 850 mounted men, 45 wagons, 7 field guns, and 10 Maxims under Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Plumer. The other consisted of 150 men accompanied by Cecil Rhodes, the BSAC founder, riding southwest from Salisbury. With these reinforcements, the British in Bulawayo, now under General Frederick Carrington and his chief of staff, Colonel Robert Baden-Powell, dispatched more and larger patrols to drive the Ndebele away and seize livestock.

On April 25, a patrol under Captain R. Macfarlane used intense firepower to repel a sustained attack by 2,000 Ndebele at the Umguza River near Bulawayo. The first major colonial offensive against the Ndebele was launched in early June, when three colonial columns of about 450 men each swept north of Bulawayo and one of them charged about 1,000 Ndebele hiding in a line of bush and cut them down as they fled. In turn, the Ndebele rebels withdrew to their rocky strongholds at Ntabazikamambo and the Matopos Hills. At the end of June, Plumer led a force of 752 men, two field guns, and four Maxims that attacked and seized the isolated hill position at Ntabazikamambo, killing 100 Ndebele and capturing thousands of cattle, sheep, and goats.

British preparations to pursue the Ndebele rebels into the rough Matopos Hills, which consisted of 2,000 square kilometers of hills, boulders, and caves, were delayed by the mid-June rebellion of some Shona groups who had suffered oppression and taxation. This was particularly shocking to the British, who believed that they had saved the Shona from raiding by the supposedly more warlike Ndebele. Part of the colonial force in Matabeleland was sent to Mashonaland, and several hundred reinforcements were transported by ship from Cape Town to the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique and then overland to Salisbury.

Despite their limited resources, the British continued operations against the Ndebele in the Matopos. After several colonial patrols took heavy casualties in late July trying to dislodge Ndebele fighters from the rocky hills, the British established a series of fortified posts around the Matopos to confine the rebels. During early August, Plumer led an inconclusive sweep of the Matopos with around 900 men supported by four Maxims and six field guns that fought one major engagement in which 7 Europeans and 100 Ndebele were killed. In late August, Rhodes himself negotiated a settlement with Ndebele leaders in the Matopos, in which they surrendered but received amnesty. This enabled the British to concentrate on the Shona rebels.

Between June 1896 and October 1897, British forces used artillery and machine-gun fire to destroy dozens of isolated Shona hilltop strongholds, and rebels hiding in caves were blown up with dynamite. Although the Shona employed firearms, they were generally obsolete muzzleloaders with inferior ammunition compared to those used by the Ndebele. Many Shona rebels were captured and hanged, such as the spirit mediums Nehanda and Kaguvi.

Later African nationalist historians saw the Ndebele and Shona Rebellion as a unified, coordinated, and forward-looking effort by a new religious leadership. Celebrated as the “First Chimurenga,” or first struggle for national independence, the memory of the 1896–1897 rebellion inspired future African nationalist insurgents fighting white minority rule in late-20th-century Rhodesia. However, it appears that the two rebellions were related but separate events led by established political authorities who wanted to recover their independence and who used spirit mediums to mobilize support.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Baden-Powell, Robert; British South African Company; Burnham, Frederick Russell; Carrington, Frederick; Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Nehanda; Plumer, Sir Herbert; Rhodes, Cecil John; Selous, Frederick Courtney; Shangani Patrol (December 1893)

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Ndondakusuka, Battle of (December 2, 1856)

The Battle of Ndondakusuka on December 2, 1856, decided the Zulu Civil War of 1856, which was fought to decide the succession to the Zulu throne.

During 1856, the rivalry for the Zulu succession between Prince Cetshwayo kaMpande and his half-brother Prince Mbuyazi kaMpande, King Mpande kaSenzangakhona’s favorite son, tipped into civil war. In late November 1856, Mbuyazi and his iziGqoza adherents, including men, women, children, and livestock, retreated toward the fords across the lower Thukela River to the British colony of Natal where, if necessary, they hoped to take refuge. Cetshwayo advanced on them with an army of between 15,000 and 20,000 of his adherents, the uSuthu. Mbuyazi had only about 7,000 fighting men, but he secured the aid of 35 Natal Frontier Police, about 100 African hunters, and some white hunter-traders under the frontiersman John Dunn. The iziGqoza called this force the iziNqobo (the "Crushers") on account of their welcome firepower.

On November 30, the uSuthu army encamped close to the iziGqoza. It was now too late for the iziGqoza to cross to the safety of Natal because the Thukela, swollen with summer rains, was impassable. The iziGqoza had no option but to fight, and on December 1, they began to advance cautiously against the uSuthu while their noncombatants took shelter in the wooded streambeds flowing into the Thukela. The iziNqobo fired on the uSuthu advance scouts, but it was now close to nightfall, and both sides withdrew.

Early on the rainy morning of December 2, the two sides advanced against each other in the traditional chest-and-horns formation, with the uSuthu intending to envelop their outnumbered foe. The uSuthu right horn attempted to outflank the iziGqoza left to cut off any escape across the river to Natal, but the gunfire of the iziNqobo stationed there drove it back. Failing on that flank, the uSuthu reinforced their left horn and turned the iziGqoza right. The iziGqoza chest and left horn thereupon fell back, but their initially ordered retreat degenerated into a rout when they became entangled with the panicking noncombatants in the rear. A general flight to the river followed, with the remnants of the iziNqobo giving covering fire.

Although Dunn escaped, most of the iziNqobo were killed. The iziGqoza were mercilessly massacred all along the north bank of the Thukela, or they perished in its crocodile-infested waters. Mbuyazi and five of his brothers were killed, along with three-quarters of the noncombatants. Only about 2,000 of the iziGqoza warriors escaped to Natal. The uSuthu casualties are unknown, but their right horn certainly suffered heavily from iziNqobo gunfire.

With his rival eliminated, Cetshwayo's right to the throne was assured, and in May 1861, Mpande recognized him as his heir.

John Laband

See also: Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dunn, John Robert; Mpande kaSenzangakhona

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Nehanda (1840–1898)

Nehanda was a Shona spirit medium who has been credited with leading the 1896 uprising against the British South Africa Company (BSAC) in what became the nation of Zimbabwe. She remains a symbol of independence and Zimbabwean nationalism.

Nehanda was the name given to a woman named Charwe, who was an important spirit medium in the Mazowe region of what is now Zimbabwe during the late 19th century. Charwe came from a line of spirit mediums, through whom the spirit, or *mhondoro,* of Nehanda spoke. Nehanda was believed to be the daughter of the founder of the Mutapa state, a 15th-century kingdom that dominated the central plateau of Zimbabwe. The Shona believed that by committing ritual incest with her brother Matope, the historical Nehanda had received supernatural powers that aided the success of the Mutapa state. After her death, she became a *mhondoro* and spoke to the people of the region through mediums like Charwe. Charwe became known by the spirit name Nehanda, which is how she is remembered.

The region encompassing present-day Zimbabwe was populated by two major communities in the 19th century. The eastern and central regions were dominated by Shona-speaking peoples who had long inhabited the area. In the western part of the territory lived the Ndebele, an offshoot of the Zulu kingdom that had risen in the Natal region during the early 19th century. Although the region remained relatively free of European interference before 1880, the 1887 discovery of gold to the south in the Transvaal brought prospectors and adventurers seeking their fortunes.

In 1888, British financier Cecil Rhodes signed a treaty with the Ndebele king Lobengula that granted Rhodes's company, the BSAC, mineral rights in Mashonaland. In 1890, an army in the pay of the BSAC marched into Mashonaland and established a colony named Rhodesia. They met little initial resistance from the Shona people. Three years later, however, BSAC officials provoked a war with Lobengula's Ndebele. The British soldiers annihilated Lobengula's army, and the BSAC now controlled the entire region.

The new colonial regime proved odious to its new African subjects. Both Shona and Ndebele lost cattle to the new invaders and were forced to pay taxes and provide labor for European settlers. When Rhodes sent many of his soldiers on the ill-fated Jameson Raid into the neighboring Transvaal in 1895, the Shona and Ndebele rose up against their oppressors.

According to Zimbabwe nationalist historiography, Nehanda and a male medium called Kaguvi played a significant role in the planning and execution of the rebellion among the Shona. However, other historians reject this view of Nehanda, arguing that the rebellion had been led by traditional chiefs, who employed spirit mediums to mobilize their followers. The uprising was eventually crushed, but only after both sides had suffered many casualties.

After colonial troops hunted down the last rebels, Nehanda was arrested and convicted of the murder of a local colonial official, H. H. Pollard. Although her fellow spirit medium Kagubi denied his role in the rebellion, at her trial, Nehanda proudly proclaimed her support for the cause. She also refused to convert to Christianity. She continued to maintain, however, that she was innocent of Pollard's murder. She was hanged in March 1898.

Although she later came to be referred to as Ambuya, meaning "grandmother" in

Shona, Nehanda was probably only 36 at the time of her death. After Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, a street in Harare and a maternity hospital were named after her, and a statue of her was erected at the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank. The memory of Nehanda also inspired a 1993 novel of the same name by celebrated Zimbabwean writer Yvonne Vera.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); British South Africa Company; Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Rhodes, Cecil John

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New Zealanders in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902)

During 1899, New Zealanders followed the escalating tensions between Great Britain and the Boer South African Republic (Transvaal) and Orange Free State with great interest. On September 28, Premier Richard Seddon asked Parliament to approve New Zealand's offer to the British government of a contingent of mounted riflemen and the raising of such a force if the offer was accepted. Seddon's proposal was, amidst emotional scenes, overwhelmingly endorsed.

New Zealand's offer was accepted, and by the time war broke out on October 11, a 215-strong contingent was already training at a camp in Wellington. It sailed for southern Africa 10 days later. The New Zealanders, who were commanded by Major Alfred Robin, arrived in Cape Town on November 23, 1900. As Seddon had wished, the contingent arrived a few days before the first units raised by the Australian colonies. Most of the contingent were citizen soldiers of the Volunteer Force and had received only limited training. Training arrangements improved as the war dragged on, but they remained somewhat rudimentary. The New Zealanders were immediately sent to the front in the northern Cape Colony and had their first skirmish with Boer forces on December 9. The first New Zealand soldier to lose his life in a foreign conflict died of wounds at Boer hands on December 28.

The military disasters of the so-called Black Week prompted the New Zealand government to raise the Second Contingent, which sailed in February 1900. A Third Contingent, principally organized by

Soldiers from New Zealand depart for service in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). Nearly 6,500 men and over 8,500 horses were dispatched from New Zealand to South Africa during this conflict. (World History Archive/Alamy Stock Photo)

prominent Canterbury citizens, also sailed in February. A Fourth Contingent, raised in a similar manner in Otago, followed the next month. The members of the privately raised contingents were known as "rough riders," as they were good horsemen and marksmen.

New Zealand's involvement in the war had strong public support. Many Maori were eager to serve in the war, but requests by New Zealand to include Maori personnel in its units were rejected by the Colonial Office in London. A number of Maori with European names, however, did serve with the New Zealand units in South Africa.

The New Zealanders quickly established a reputation as being some of the best mounted troops in the British forces. They performed well, even though they had limited training and experience, because the men who enlisted were in general excellent raw material for mounted rifle units. The First Contingent's stout and successful defense of a hill, later renamed New Zealand Hill at Slingersfontein on January 15, 1900, was widely praised. During most of the second half of 1900, the first three New Zealand contingents operated together under Robin's command.

The First Contingent was withdrawn from service and sailed for home in December 1900. Although the terms under which they enlisted varied, most New Zealanders served for about one year. Some personnel transferred from earlier to later contingents in South Africa, providing new units with valuable expertise. The Second and Third Contingents distinguished themselves during the last conventional battle of the war, at Rhenoster Kop on November 29, 1900. They spent the rest of the time in South Africa on anti-guerrilla operations, which involved lengthy treks interspersed with skirmishes against a skillful and committed enemy.

In early 1900, New Zealand raised a Fifth Contingent in response to a British request. The imperial authorities met most of the cost of this and subsequent contingents. The Fourth and Fifth Contingents arrived in Beira, Portuguese East Africa (today's Mozambique), between late April and early May 1900. They were transported to Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe) and then went to Mafeking. Between August 1900 and May 1901, they operated against Boer commandos in the western Transvaal. A member of the Fourth Contingent, Farrier Sergeant-Major William Hardham, was the only New Zealander to be awarded the Victoria Cross during the war.

In December 1900, New Zealand agreed to raise a new Sixth Contingent to replace the First and reinforce the Second and Third Contingents. After protests by the members of the Second and Third Contingents, who believed that the British authorities were neglecting their welfare and giving them an unfair proportion of the most difficult tasks, it was decided that the new units would replace the first three New Zealand contingents. The Sixth Contingent arrived in South Africa in March 1901. It saw much hard service as part of the elite mobile columns employed by Horatio Kitchener against Boer commandos.

A Seventh Contingent to replace the Fourth Contingent arrived in South Africa in May 1901. Unlike all the other New Zealand units, the Seventh Contingent did not take with it a full complement of horses. The new unit was soon in action. In February 1902, the contingent formed part of a mounted column taking part in a "new-model" drive. On the night of February 23–24, Christiaan de Wet's forces broke through the section of the British cordon formed by the contingent at Langverwacht Hill. In a hard-fought action, 24 men were killed and 41 wounded out of the 80 New Zealanders engaged.

The 1,000-strong Eighth Contingent arrived in South Africa in March 1902. It was commanded by Colonel Richard Davies, one of the outstanding New Zealand officers to emerge during the war. The New Zealand government was unhappy at the way that its units had frequently been split up and lost their national identity; it wanted the contingent to form the basis of an all–New Zealand column. Kitchener was not prepared to group the New Zealand units together, but the new contingent did operate as a separate entity. The Eighth Contingent saw some operational service before the end of the war, but two final New Zealand contingents called the Ninth and Tenth, each of which had a strength of just over 1,000, arrived too late to see any significant action.

Nearly 6,500 men and over 8,500 horses were dispatched by New Zealand to take part in the South African War. This was a major contribution by a colony with a population of only about 800,000. In addition to these men, hundreds of New Zealanders served in other British forces, most commonly in irregular mounted units raised in South Africa. The war raised the level of interest in military matters in the colony and provided useful operational and organizational experience for New Zealand's armed forces.

John Crawford

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Australians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert

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Nigeria Regiment

The Nigeria Regiment was the Nigerian detachment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). In 1897, the British government decided to form the WAFF along the Niger River to counter a potential French threat. The initial incarnation of the WAFF was based on the Royal Niger Constabulary. The constabulary, created by George Goldie's Royal Niger Company, was a private military modeled on the East India Company's Presidency Armies. However, Goldie lost his charter by 1898, and the constabulary, along with the rest of the Niger Company's assets became part of the Niger Coast Protectorate, which in 1900 was renamed the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. The constabulary thus became the backbone of the newly formed WAFF. By 1900, when the military structure in British West Africa was reorganized, the Nigeria Regiment was combined with units from the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia to form the first multiregional WAFF.

The force was initially used as the main military means to conquer the regions in northern Nigeria that the British had agreed to seize in treaties with the French and German governments. The regiment was used to great effect in the British invasion of the Sokoto Caliphate in 1903, where a small force of less than 2,000 troops conquered the city of Kano after a short siege, using heavy artillery to breach the city's formidable walls. After the end of the conquest in July of that year, the caliphate was renamed the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. The bulk of the WAFF remained in Northern Nigeria and became the backbone of the Northern Nigeria Regiment of the WAFF. This force consisted of two infantry battalions, two artillery companies, and a reserve company.

After the creation of the Northern Nigeria Regiment, the new Southern Nigeria Regiment was reorganized and built around the Niger Coast Protective Force (NCPF). Created in 1892 in the Niger Coast Protectorate, the NCPF was merged with the parts of the Royal Niger Constabulary that did not set out on the Sokoto campaign.

Together, these created the first battalion of the Southern Nigeria Regiment. The second battalion was created out of the Lagos Constabulary. The oldest of the colonial military forces in Nigeria, it was created in 1862, a year after Lagos became a Crown Colony. Although it was initially created as a police force, it was converted in 1895 into a purely military one.

In 1914, Frederick Lugard united the northern and southern protectorates into one administrative unit, creating the modern Nigerian state. The northern and southern Nigeria Regiments were also united to form the new Nigeria Regiment, consisting of roughly 5,000 men. Later in 1914, when World War I erupted, the regiment fought in the German colony of Kamerun, and later in the East Africa Campaign, which lasted until the end of the war in 1918.

After the war ended, the British War Office reorganized the regiment in 1933, increasing its strength from four to six battalions. However, when World War II began, the British were in dire need of manpower, and by the beginning of 1942, they increased the regiment's size to 13 battalions. The regiment was used in the East African campaign against Italian forces, but it was most effective in the Burma campaign against Japan, where it was an integral part of the Chindit Special Force and formed the Thunder Brigade during Operation Thursday.

At the end of the war, the force returned home, and as independence neared, the utility of a regional force waned. In 1953, the various colonies that contributed to the WAFF decided to form national militaries. In 1956, the joint command and WAFF training school both closed, and on April 1, 1958, official control over Nigeria's armed forces transferred from London to Lagos, with full control of the military given to Nigeria's prime minister in February 1960.

Roy Doron

See also: Goldie, George; Lugard, Frederick; Northern Nigeria, British Conquest (1897–1903); Royal Niger Company; Royal Niger Constabulary; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

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North End War/Slavers' War (1887–1896)

By the 1880s, British traders and Scottish missionaries had been operating around Lake Nyasa (now Lake Malawi) for some years. During the late 1880s, Swahili-Arab slave and ivory traders clashed with the British African Lakes Company, based at Blantyre, south of the lake and near the Shire River, over control of the north part of the lake. The British allied with African groups like the Nkonde and Tonga, who had been the victims of Swahili-Arab and Ngoni raids.

In 1887, a Swahili-Arab force led by Mlozi besieged the company's half-built stockade at Karonga, where the defenders had just 13 rifles and little ammunition. The small garrison was saved by the intervention of a large number of Mambwe from the north. With supplies and reinforcements brought by steamboat, company agent Monteith Fotheringham organized a large force of Nkonde and Mambwe into companies of 200 or 300 men under their own leaders and a contingent of African company employees under Europeans. While this company army attacked and defeated Mlozi's force, Fortheringham's African allies returned home once they had captured ivory, cloth, and gunpowder.

This North End War continued in April 1888, when a company force of 8 Europeans and 500 African allies from Karonga, armed with 270 rifles and muskets, attacked and burned the stockade of Swahili-Arab leader Salema, but it was repelled by another Swahili-Arab force under Kopakopa. Company operations once again stopped, as African allies went home given the lack of booty.

In May, Captain Frederick Lugard, a British army officer visiting Blantyre to hunt elephants, led another relief expedition of 20 European volunteers up the lake by steamer to Karonga. He assembled 220 Africans, mostly Tonga, of which a third were armed with breech-loaders, a third with muzzle-loaders, and a third with spears or other hand-to-hand weapons. The group was divided into seven units, each of which consisted of about 40 Africans under a European. Distinguished by a narrow band of red cloth tied around their heads, Lugard's men were taught to shoot, cast bullets, and made grenades from jam tins.

After an unsuccessful June attack on Kopakopa's stockade, made of a thick and loop-holed mud wall topped by a 4-meter-high wooden fence, Lugard's force dispatched patrols to harass Swahili-Arab caravans. Lugard also reorganized his growing army into three companies: one each of Tonga, Nkonde, and Mambwe. In January 1889, a seven-pounder cannon, purchased by the Nyasa Anti-Slavery and Defence Committee in Britain, arrived at Karonga. While part of the company army besieged Mlozi's stockade, the rest bombarded the forts of Salema and Kopakopa, although the poor-quality ammunition failed to blast a hole large enough for men to launch an assault. Around this time, Lugard left to join the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC).

In 1889, the British, reacting to Portuguese expansion from Mozambique, claimed the territory south and west of Lake Nyasa that was eventually dubbed the Central African Protectorate and later was renamed Nyasaland. Harry Johnston, an associate of mining magnate Cecil Rhodes, was sent to establish British authority, and in October, he made a treaty with the Swahili-Arabs in which they were permitted to keep their stockades in exchange for peace with the company and its African allies. The situation in the northern end of the lake became relatively stable.

In 1891, Captain C. M. Maguire, seconded from the British army in India, brought a contingent of 70 Indian soldiers (40 Sikh infantry and 30 Muslim cavalry) to the protectorate's new administrative center of Zomba near Blantyre in the south. Hostilities now developed between the embryonic British colonial state and Yao slave traders at the south end of the lake. That July, Maguire's Indian unit, after two days of hard fighting, repelled Chikunde's Yao, who had attacked two British coffee-planters around Mount Mulanje. In September, Captain C. E. Johnson and Maguire led the Indian troops, along with 10 Zanzibari and 10 Makua mercenaries and a field gun, along the Shire River, where they built an earthwork position, which they named Fort Johnston, as a base for attacks on the area's Yao leaders. The expedition destroyed the stockades of Makandanji, Mponda, and Makanjira (the last of these was initially bombarded from a steamboat), and an intimidated Zarafi signed a treaty of submission.

Shortly after the expedition returned to Zomba, it attacked the stronghold of the Yao leader Kawinga, who subsequently accepted British supremacy. In mid-December, Maguire was killed while leading an amphibious raid against one of Makanjira's lakeshore outposts. In turn, Zarafi led an attack on Fort Johnston, now permanently garrisoned, which prompted a series of colonial raids on villages under his jurisdiction. Around this time, the Muslim cavalrymen were sent back to India, as their horses had died from tropical disease.

Yao morale was bolstered when a 200-strong colonial expedition from Fort Johnston under J. G. King attacked Zarafi's hill stockade but were repulsed with a loss of six Indians and a field gun. In June 1892, Captain Johnson arrived from India with 60 Sikhs, and by this time, the British had three gunboats on the lake. In February 1893, Johnson led operations against the Yao leader Liwonde along the upper Shire River, attacked his town, and established two new colonial forts. During that year, the British military in the protectorate grew to 3 British officers, 200 Sikhs, 150 African regulars, and a fluctuating number of African auxiliaries. Nyaserera and Mkanda, two Yao chiefs around Mount Mulanje, were subdued by separate expeditions that involved intense mountain fighting.

In November 1893, Johnson led an assault that destroyed the capital of Chiwaura, an ally of Makanjira who lived close to the lake, and released hundreds of slaves. A British gunboat chased one of Makanjira's slaving dhows to shore at Leopard Bay, where the 70-man crew was besieged on a hill. Johnson's force landed nearby and attacked Makanjira's capital, with supporting fire from the gunboats. After five hours of fierce fighting, the Yao warriors surrendered, but since Makanjira refused to submit, the British destroyed his town. The British built a fort on the site which, on January 1, 1894, was attacked by Makanjira's men, who were repelled.

In early 1895, Yao leaders Kawinga, Zarafi, and Matapwiri attempted to drive the British out of the Shire Highlands. For a few days, a post defended by Engineer Corporal William Fletcher, who commanded six Sikhs and a few Tonga troops, was besieged by 2,000 of Kawinga's men until the arrival of Tonga reinforcements. On February 17, Captain William Manning led 55 Sikhs and 200 African soldiers in an assault that destroyed Kawinga's stronghold, from which the Yao leader escaped. In September, a British force approached Matapwiri's village by night and easily overwhelmed it with a surprise attack. During the next month, a force of five British officers, 65 Sikhs, and 230 African soldiers assaulted Zarafi's villages around Mount Mangoche, and the Yao chief fled to Portuguese territory. Another expedition against Makanjira and his followers completed the conquest of the southern Yao, and the British secured the area by constructing a series of small forts.

Mlozi and the other Swahili-Arab slave traders at the north end of the lake rejected a treaty with the British and threatened the Karonga outpost. In late November 1895, several lake steamers brought six European officers and volunteers, 100 Sikhs, and 300 African troops commanded by Lieutenant H. Coape-Smith to Karonga. On the morning of December 2, with three colonial detachments guarding Mlozi's stronghold, the gunboats bombarded Salema's stockade, and a group of Sikhs and sailors captured it. The process was repeated at Kopakopa's fort. That afternoon, the British began to bombard Mlozi's stockade, which would not catch fire because of heavy rain, and the Swahili-Arabs responded with small arms fire and an old muzzle-loading cannon.

Mlozi refused surrender terms, but was then wounded when a British shell hit his house. The enraged Swahili-Arab defenders made a sortie that was countered by the Sikhs, who fought their way over the stronghold's walls. About 200 of Mlozi's followers were killed, as opposed to only 1 Sikh and 3 African troops. Sergeant Bandawe, a Tonga soldier, entered a chamber dug under Mlozi's ruined house, killed Mlozi's bodyguard, and captured the Swahili-Arab leader, whom the British tried and hanged the next day. The remaining Swahili-Arab forts were then destroyed.

Immediately after the defeat of Mlozi, a force of 40 Sikhs and 149 African soldiers under Lieutenant E. Alston was shipped to the lakeside town of Nkotakota, from where it marched 100 kilometers west to attack the stronghold of the Chewa leader Mwasi, who had been an ally of the Swahili-Arabs. While a reserve of 2,400 local auxiliaries watched, the Sikhs and African regulars stormed the stronghold, and Mwasi fled. A colonial fort was erected on the site.

In 1896, Nyasaland's colonial military establishment was formalized by the creation of the Central Africa Rifles (CAR)—renamed the Central Africa Regiment in 1900—consisting of six companies of 120 men each. Spread out at forts across the territory, the companies with ethnically oriented, with three consisting of Tonga, two of Yao, and one of Marimba. Recruitment of Makua from Portuguese territory was discontinued, as they were expensive, and British authorities began to see Yao as martial people. Sikh troops were gradually phased out; for the next few years, they provided senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and instructors and formed a 100-man quick reaction force based at Zomba. There were a few subsequent mop-up operations.

In August 1899, British and Portuguese colonial forces destroyed the villages of the Yao leaders Nkwamba and Mataka, who had harassed European traders along the protectorate's eastern border. In September 1899, a British expedition commanded by Captain E. C. Margesson marched northwest from Karonga to Abercorn on the southern end of Lake Tanganyika, and then southwest to Kazembe's Lunda, where it drove the last active Swahili-Arab slavers into the Congo Free State. The combined British efforts to subdue the Swahili-Arabs and Yao on both ends of Lake Nyasa became known as the "Slavers' War."

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Ngoni War (1896–1900); Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); King's African Rifles (to 1904); Lugard, Frederick; Rhodes, Cecil John

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Northern Nigeria, British Conquest (1897–1903)

The British conquest of Northern Nigeria was a series of wars fought mainly against the various emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, which began in 1897 with the Royal Niger Company's invasion of Nupe and ended in 1903, when the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) conquered the city of Kano.

The Sokoto Caliphate was the largest precolonial political entity in Africa. Established in 1804 through a series of jihads led by Usman Dan Fodio (known collectively as the Fulani War), the caliphate by 1808 had unified the many Hausa states under Dan Fodio's leadership and transformed the various states into emirates that owed their allegiance to the caliph of Sokoto, paying him a regular tribute. By the end of the 19th century, a series of internal political crises weakened Sokoto's control over the various emirates, especially the most powerful of them in Kano and Adamawa. In addition, the emergence of various challengers to the caliphate, such as Rabih ibn Fadl Allah of Borno and various messianic Mahdist leaders, further undermined and weakened it in the last decade of the 19th century.

After the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, the various European powers began the process of dividing Africa among themselves, with little regard for the existing political boundaries on the continent. During this process, known as the "Scramble for Africa," the British, French, and German governments signed a series of treaties, beginning in 1890, demarcating their future spheres of influence, effectively splitting the caliphate among the three colonizers.

The British invasion began in January 1897, when the Royal Niger Company sent its constabulary to assault the emirates of Nupe and Ilorin owing to tensions between Ilorin and the British Crown Colony of Lagos. The British administration had asked George Goldie to send the constabulary to assist in forcing the emir of Ilorin to acquiesce to British trade interests and ending Ilorin's slave raids against its neighbors. Goldie decided to use the request to mount a strike against Ilorin's neighboring emirate, Nupe, and quickly conquered the country, despite sending in a small force of little more than 1,000 men against Nupe's army, which numbered over 30,000. However, the constabulary's forces, armed with some of the latest weaponry, including Maxim guns and seven artillery pieces, made short work of the emir's forces, conquering the emirate in less than a month. In fact, Goldie was so confident after his victory over Nupe that he ordered only 320 of his men to march on Ilorin.

This overconfidence almost destroyed the constabulary, as they were ambushed en route. However, one of Ilorin's cavalry detachments attacked prematurely, allowing the officers to form the typical square formation that had proved so effective in defeating West African armies and would be used to even greater effect in the coming years against the rest of Sokoto's armies. By the end of February 1897, both Ilorin and Nupe had been conquered by the Royal Niger Company.

The year after these conquests, the Royal Niger Company lost its charter and its territories, which were merged with the other protectorates in the Niger Delta. The constabulary was merged into the newly created WAFF, which unified the command structure of British West African military units. Furthermore, after a series of agreements between the British and their French and German counterparts, the British appointed Frederick Lugard to administer the newly created Northern Nigeria Protectorate. Lugard believed that the only way to administer the vast territories of the Sokoto Caliphate effectively was to subjugate them first through military conquest—an approach that the Colonial Office did not share.

In 1902, Lugard finally had his pretext for war. In that year, a British colonial official was murdered, and the emir of Kano gave the murderer a warm and rapturous reception. When Lugard began his conquest, Sokoto was wracked by internal conflict and had been unable to purchase arms due to an embargo that arose from the Brussels Conference Act of 1890, which forbade the export of modern arms into areas determined to have an active slave trade. This prohibition made certain that any attempts on the part of the Sokoto Caliphate to modernize its military would be impossible.

Despite the Colonial Office's objections, Lugard set out to conquer Kano, the caliphate's commercial center and then the capital city of Sokoto. He arrived in Kano in early February 1903 and faced the imposing city. The city's formidable defenses consisted of an 18-kilometer-long wall that was 40 meters thick and ranged in height from 30 to 50 meters. Like the constabulary before it, Lugard's forces were armed with the latest artillery, and the 75-mm guns breached the city walls and the 700-strong infantry force occupied the city on February 3. Although the British conquered the city, the emir had left for Sokoto several days earlier.

On March 15, 1903, the British arrived at Sokoto. In anticipation of the attack, the caliph, Muhammadu Attahiru I, ordered the city's residents to repair the walls and prepare charms to protect the defenders against the attackers' bullets. However, when the WAFF assault force arrived, the caliph's army left the city to meet the attackers. The defenders were mowed down by the British Maxim guns and the steady fire that came from the square formations. Seeing that they were no match for the enemy, Attahiru fled to the east and left the capital to the WAFF, who found the city mostly deserted.

Attahiru found refuge in the holy city of Burmi, where he attempted to regroup his forces to oust the British from his lands.

He had several successes in keeping the British at bay, most notably against a British patrol led by D. W. Sword, whose 130-man patrol lost almost half its men before successfully retreating from Burmi. Despite these successes, on July 27, 1903, the British launched a final assault on Burmi. After a pitched battle that lasted from morning until the early evening, Attahiru was dead, along with most of his family. One of Attahiru's sons, Muhammad Bello, led the survivors into exile, while the British appointed Attahiru's main rival, who became Muhammadu Attahiru II, as the new sultan of Sokoto. Attahiru II would be instrumental in assisting the British in defeating a Mahdist uprising in 1906.

Roy Doron

See also: Berlin Conference; Goldie, George; Lugard, Frederick; Rabih ibn Fadl Allah; Royal Niger Company; Royal Niger Constabulary; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

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Ntshingwayo kaMahole (c. 1809–1883)

Ntshingwayo was a renowned Zulu commander in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and the Zulu Civil War of 1883. He was chief of the Khoza people in northwestern Zululand. His father, Mahole, had been one of the councilors of King Shaka kaSenzangakhona, the founder of the Zulu kingdom.

Enrolled in the uDlambedlu *ibutho* (age-grade regiment), Ntshingwayo probably took part in the disastrous war of 1838 against the invading Voortrekkers, as well as in King Mpande kaSenzangakhona's campaigns against the neighboring Swazi kingdom in 1847, 1848, and 1852. Ntshingwayo was by now regarded as a distinguished warrior. Mpande appointed him commander of the eMlambongwenya *ikhanda* (royal military center) and admitted him to his inner council.

During the Zulu Civil War of 1856, which decided the royal succession, Ntshingwayo supported Mpande's favorite son, Mbuyazi kaMpande, but the victorious Cetshwayo kaMpande decided nevertheless to take advantage of his talents. He appointed Ntshingwayo senior military commander of the kwaGqikazi *ikhanda* and included him in his inner council, where Ntshingwayo worked closely with the chief councilor, Mnyamana kaNgqengelele.

Both Mnyamana and Ntshingwayo advised conciliating Britain during the crisis leading to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, but once hostilities became inevitable, Ntshingwayo was influential in planning operations. Still tough despite his age, an astute strategist and powerful orator, Ntshingwayo was the senior commander in the opening campaign of the war, in which he comprehensively outmaneuvered Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford and effectively directed his forces in the victorious Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879. However, when field commander under the supreme command of Mnyamana at the Battle of Khambula on March 29, 1879, he failed to control his headstrong younger regiments, and the Zulu defeat was the turning point of the war. It seems that Ntshingwayo was present as a commander at the Battle of Ulundi on July 4, 1879, and retired with the defeated Zulu army.

Ntshingwayo surrendered to the British on August 14, 1879. When the British settlement of Zululand on September 1, 1879, divided the former Zulu kingdom into 13 territories, Ntshingwayo was appointed one of the chiefs. His loyalties were thereafter conflicted. He took part in the deputation of May 1880, petitioning for the restoration of the deposed and exiled Cetshwayo, but when the British returned Cetshwayo to the central part of his former kingdom in January 1883, Ntshingwayo resented being required to step down as an appointed chief. During the civil war of 1883–1884 that broke out between the royalist uSuthu faction and its foes led by Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, Ntshingwayo consequently hesitated before throwing in his lot with Cetshwayo. During the Battle of oNdini on July 22, 1883, he commanded the uDloko *ibutho* in the uSuthu center against Zibhebhu's surprise attack, but when the uSuthu army broke, he was killed in the rout, stabbed all over his body, which was left unburied on the field.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Mnyamana kaNgqengelele; Mpande kaSenzangakhona; oNdini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Nyabingi Cult. *See* "East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908)"

Nzinga, Queen (c. 1583–1663)

Queen Nzinga-Mbandi (also known as Njinga, Jinga, or Ginga) was a 17th-century Mbundu monarch who ruled Ndongo and Matamba, in what is now Angola. Famous for her diplomatic and military abilities, she has become one of the best-known female leaders in the history of Africa. She was the daughter of Mbandi-a-Ngola-Kiluanji, sovereign of Ndongo. Queen Nzinga ruled from the 1620s to the 1660s, a period of great development of the Angolan slave trade. European accounts of Nzinga tend to emphasize her conversion to



Nzinga (c. 1583–1663) was a seventeenth-century Mbundu monarch who ruled Ndongo and Matamba in what is now Angola. She is famous for her diplomatic and military abilities, and has become one of the best-known female leaders in the history of Africa. (New York Public Library)

Christianity and harmonious relationship with missionaries who visited her kingdom and with the governor in Luanda, especially in the last years of her life. Contemporary historiography focuses on her mastery of internal Mbundu politics and external relations with both the Portuguese and the Dutch.

Various historians have pointed out the contradictions in romanticized portraits by Angolan nationalist literature that show Queen Nzinga-Mbandi as a protonationalist resistance heroine. They have also challenged her image as a devout Christian and a Portuguese collaborator. Part of this new scholarship has questioned her authority among the Mbundu, who tended to oppose centralized and extensive political structures. Nzinga thus had to fight a constant battle to legitimize her succession to power against opposing parties who accused her of being unfit to rule. She looked for the support of outsiders and alien ideologies, which included European merchants and African mercenaries. In addition, some historians have questioned her legitimacy to rule over Ndongo by arguing that Mbundu political traditions tended to hinder female leaders from occupying royal titles. These views about Nzinga's lack of legitimacy among the Mbundu have been challenged after the discovery of new documentation about her in the 1980s.

In 1611, the Portuguese built a fortress within Ndongo, in the region of Mbaka. In 1618, the ruler of Ndongo, Ngola-a-Mbandi (Nzinga's brother), waged war against this Portuguese outpost at the Battle of Mbaka. Nzinga-Mbandi's first appearance in historical records dates back to 1621–1622, when she arrived in Luanda as her brother's emissary. During her visit to Luanda, Nzinga saw firsthand the advantages in establishing alliance with the Portuguese and engaged diplomatic relations with them by accepting baptism from Jesuit priests, being renamed Dona Ana de Sousa. Although Ngola-a-Mbandi also showed interest in being baptized, he refused to receive it from a black priest send by Luanda, who was born in Ndongo.

In October 1626, after years of war against Ngola-a-Mbandi, the Portuguese governor Fernão de Sousa sponsored the rise of the *soba* of Mbaka, Ngola-a-Ari, as ruler of Ndongo. A new capital was settled in Pungo-a-Ndongo, with a massive presence of Portuguese traders. Shortly after, Ngola-a-Mbandi died under mysterious circumstances (probably poisoning), and Nzinga replaced him (and, not incidentally, was implicated in his death). She stopped the hostilities and opened Ndongo to the Portuguese, mainly because she needed their support for her claim as ruler. This support came in the form of missionaries and slave traders. Although the Portuguese initially agreed to leave Mbaka—Queen Nzinga's main condition for allowing them into Ndongo—they never did.

Slaves had a double value for Nzinga. Besides exchanging them for goods, she recruited them to strengthen her base of supporters, which included escaped Portuguese slaves from the coastal region. These escapees helped Nzinga disrupt other slave markets frequented by the Portuguese in the interior. Luanda called for reparations through a "just war" against her, using the army of Ngola-a-Ari and mercenary Imbangala/Kulashingo troops. Nzinga was forced out of Ndongo and took refuge among an Imbangala band led by Ngola-ka-Kaza. She married this Imbangala chief and became part of his *kilombo* (military community).

Nzinga and Kaza had mutual interests. She needed military support to regain her position in Ndongo, while he needed a "first wife" who could assume the position of *tembanza* and perform the rituals for the production of the *maji-a-samba*, a sacred ointment that allegedly made his warriors invincible. According to Imbangala traditions, a powerful warrior queen called Temba Ambunda created the *yijila* laws and rituals that organized the *kilombo*. She threw her own infant daughter into a mortar and used a pounding stick to reduce the child to a shapeless mass of flesh and blood. She then cooked it with some roots, herbs, and powders to obtain the *maji-a-samba*. Nzinga Mbandi performed this same ritual, thus becoming *tembanza* of the Imbangala/Kaza. Both the marriage and the sacrifice can be understood as symbolic rituals for the military alliance and incorporation of lineageless warriors under Nzinga's command.

Ahead of her band of Imbangala warriors, Nzinga conquered the territory of Matamba around 1626–1627. She tried to negotiate peace with the Portuguese in Mbaka, but they executed her emissary. Nzinga's alliance with the Imbangala/Kaza deteriorated, and she retreated to a group of islands in the Kwanza River. She suffered a major military defeat in 1629, when both of her sisters (Kambo and Funji) were captured and sent to Luanda. Nzinga escaped to Kina, where she made an alliance with the *tendala* of the Imbangala/Kulashingo, who had fought for the Portuguese and had recently settled in Kasanje.

The Dutch occupation of Luanda (1641–1648) was a moment of generalized war. During this period, Queen Nzinga fought major battles that illustrate the complexity of alliances on both sides and the diversity of forces involved in Angolan warfare. In August 1641, Dutch troops invaded Luanda, forcing the Portuguese to retreat to Massangano. They removed restraints on Luanda's trade with Matamba to increase their supply of slaves. In 1643, Nzinga mobilized her *kilombo* to Kavanga (northern Dande River), imposing vassalage over Ndembu chiefs in the region. From this location, she could attack the Portuguese in Mbaka.

In the Battle of Ngolomen-a-Kaita (also called the "Battle of Empires"), the

Portuguese used local African soldiers known as *guerra preta* (black war) and troops from the new *soba* of Mbaka, Ngola-Kanini (João Guterres). They also brought creole soldiers from the island of São Tomé (*kangwanda*) under the command of two Luso-African captains, Ambrósio Fernandes and Manuel Álvares Kasanji. Nzinga responded to Ngolomen-a-Kaita's request for help with four large army units called *mozengos*. She personally commanded three of these units and placed a fourth one under the command of Nzinga-a-Mona, on her left flank on a hill. Nzinga's army utterly crushed the enemies; only four Portuguese survived, including a priest.

Portuguese retaliation came at Kavanga, where Nzinga's *kilombo* was stationed. In March 1646, the Portuguese attacked her with the support of Ngola-a-Ari and Kabuko-ka-Ndonga. They had more than 20,000 archers and a unit of African soldiers armed with guns, called *empacasseiros*. Nzinga's army was reinforced by the *sobas* Ifamuto and Kakulo-ka-Kaenda. She was defeated after more than nine hours of intense fighting. Nzinga's sister Kambo was captured by the Portuguese again, while Kakulo-ka-Kaenda was beheaded. Another of Nzinga's sisters, Funji, who had been kept prisoner by the Portuguese since 1629, was drowned and her body left floating in the Kwanza River. Despite the defeat, Queen Nzinga refused peace negotiations.

Nzinga retreated to Matamba and rebuilt her army. She incited the *ndembu* leaders to attack the Portuguese who had escaped the invasion of Luanda and contacted the *mani Kongo* Nkanga-a-Lukeni (Garcia II of Kongo), who had signed a treaty with the Dutch in 1642. Nzinga knitted a wide and complex alliance, combining the *mani Kongo*, his representative in the island of Luanda (Governor D. Cristóvão Corte Real), and around 500 mercenaries hired by the West Indies Company, most of them Frenchmen. They attacked the territory of Kakulo Kahoji, at the Battle of Lumbo. This time, Queen Nzinga defeated her enemies, killing one of their most important African allies, Captain Funji-a-Musungo.

On August 1, 1648, the troops of Queen Nzinga destroyed the enemy forces in the Battle of Ilamba, killing Ngola-a-Ari along with all Portuguese officials. Several months later, on October 7, Nzinga's force fought the Battle of Wambu, conquering this territory in about a week. At the same time, part of her army engaged her former *Imbangala* allies in Kasanje.

Meanwhile, on the coast, the Portuguese (commanded by Salvador Correia de Sá) expelled the Dutch and reconquered Luanda. The new Portuguese government sent emissaries to Matamba to negotiate peace. In a letter from 1651, the governor of Angola declares his respect and admiration for the African queen.

Diplomacy and trade became the basis of the relationship between Luanda and Matamba. Queen Nzinga reopened her commercial routes to slave trade agents (*pombeiros*) and allowed free transit for missionaries. In 1656, Capuchin missionaries negotiated the release of her sister Kambo, and a peace treaty was signed. In order to consolidate Matamba's political alliance with the Portuguese, Nzinga once again used Catholic rituals. She married an escaped slave from Luanda and took back her Christian name, Dona Ana de Sousa, at the age of 75. She maintained good diplomatic relations with Luanda until her death in 1663. The peace experienced between Luanda and Matamba helped the development of the Atlantic slave trade and granted the Portuguese time and resources to plan the attacks on the Ndembu region, which led to the Battle of Mbwila.

Estevam Thompson

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Imbangala; Kongo Empire; Mbwila, Battle of (October 10, 1665)

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O

Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898)

Anglo-Egyptian forces crushed dervish power at the Battle of Omdurman, the climactic battle of the reconquest of the Sudan. It was also the last great colonial battle of the British Empire.

Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian army defeated the dervishes at the Battle of Atbara (April 8, 1898) and destroyed the last remaining dervish force outside Omdurman. The Anglo-Egyptian forces then encamped to await additional reinforcements, logistical preparations, and the arrival of the campaigning season in August. The Sudan Military Railway reached Fort Atbara in early July 1898. By mid-August 1898, Kitchener had received an additional British brigade and assembled about 8,200 British and 17,600 Egyptian and Sudanese troops, 44 guns and 20 machine guns on land, and a flotilla of gunboats armed with 36 guns and 24 machine guns.

The arrival of a second British infantry brigade resulted in the formation of the British Division, commanded by Major-General William F. Gatacre. The 1st British Brigade (i.e., the 1st battalions of the Cameron Highlander, Royal Warwickshire, Seaforth Highlander, and Lincolnshire Regiments) was commanded by Brigadier-General Andrew G. Wauchope. Brigadier-General Neville Lyttelton commanded the 2nd British Brigade (i.e., the 1st battalions of the Grenadier Guards and of the Northumberland Fusiliers, and the 2nd battalions of the Rifle Brigade and of the Lancashire Fusiliers). Additional British reinforcements included the 21st Lancers, two field batteries with 5-inch howitzers and 9-pounder Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns, and a four-gun Maxim battery. Seven gunboats reinforced the troops.

The Egyptian Division, commanded by Major-General Archibald Hunter, had also been reinforced by a fourth brigade. The 1st Egyptian Brigade (12th, 13th, and 14th Sudanese and 8th Egyptian Battalions) was commanded by Colonel John G. Maxwell, and the 2nd Egyptian Brigade (9th, 10th, and 11th Sudanese and 2nd Egyptian Battalions) was under Colonel Hector A. Macdonald. The 3rd Egyptian Brigade (3rd, 4th, and 7th Egyptian Battalions) was commanded by Colonel D. F. Lewis, and the newly arrived 4th Egyptian Brigade was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel John Collinson.

The Khalifa's 52,000-man army, a third of which was armed with rifles and the remainder with swords and spears, assembled on the plains at Omdurman, on the west bank of the junction of the White and Blue Niles.

Kitchener's force began its final march to Omdurman on August 28, 1898. Three days later, the army sighted the Kerreri

BATTLE OF OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 2, 1898


ALI WAD HELU AND
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Kerreri Hills
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YAKUB AND KHALIFA ATTACKING FORCES
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Yebel Surgham
CHARGE OF THE 21ST LANCERS
Troop advance
British forces:
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Cavalry
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White Nile
Blue Nile
Khartoum
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Hills, a low ridge running perpendicular to the Nile and running westward about 3 kilometers into the desert. This high ground covered the approaches to Omdurman, and about 5 kilometers farther south was another hill called Jebel Surgham.

On September 1, 1898, the 21st Lancers and the Egyptian Cavalry reconnoitered the area and were astonished to find the dervishes advancing south of Jebel Surgham. On the same day, in a demonstration of Anglo-Egyptian firepower, the gunboats blasted the Khalifa's forts and the Mahdi's tomb. As these operations were taking place, the infantry was building a camp near the village of El Egeiga, on the Nile between the Kerreri Hills and Jebel Surgham.

Five of the six infantry brigades were arranged in an arc facing the west and with their rear to the Nile, with the sixth (Collinson's) in reserve. From north to south, these brigades were commanded by Lewis, Macdonald, Maxwell, Wauchope, and Lyttelton, with the 21st Lancers closing the gap on the south with the Nile. Maxims and artillery were positioned between the brigades. By nightfall, the dervishes had not advanced farther, and Kitchener's soldiers spent an uneasy night in their positions. The Anglo-Egyptian soldiers stood to at 3:30 A.M. on September 2, 1898. The advancing dervish horde was first observed at about 6:00 A.M. From this point, the battle is usually divided into three phases.

The first phase began when Osman Azrak's 8,000 dervishes attacked directly eastward to the Anglo-Egyptian center, supported by another 4,000-man force on their right, at dawn. The dervishes, conducting a frontal assault over open ground against an adversary with modern weapons, began to suffer significant casualties when the British guns began firing at a range of about 2,700 meters. Maxim guns opened up at 1,800 meters. Two other dervish forces under the Green Flag moved northward toward the Kerreri Hills, as they believed (wrongly) that the Egyptian troops were north of that high ground. The Egyptian Cavalry stopped this force from attacking the British right flank.

After about 45 minutes, after Kitchener's troops had fired about 200,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and at least 1,000 artillery rounds, the dervish onslaught was halted and the Mahdist units virtually annihilated. This ended the first phase of the battle, and a lull followed.

After the main dervish assault, Kitchener thought the attack was over, with no organized dervish units remaining between his army and Omdurman. At about 8:30 A.M., the 21st Lancers—which had never been in combat before—were ordered forward to Jebel Surgham to prevent the withdrawing dervishes from reaching Omdurman. Kitchener apparently did not know that a 12,000-man dervish force was assembled south of the Jebel. The 21st Lancers moved south, between the Jebel and the Nile, and observed dervishes in the open. These were men whom dervish leader Osman Digna had purposely positioned on the northern edge of the Khor Abu Sunt (a dry watercourse running east-west from Jebel Surgham), in which he hid 2,000 battle-hardened dervishes. The 21st Lancers took the bait, charged across the broken ground, and at the last moment, when they reached the edge of the *khor* (dry watercourse), realized that they had fallen into a trap. Many Lancers charged through the dervishes, but others were knocked to the ground, where they were hacked to death in the fierce fighting. Survivors regrouped on the far side of the *khor,* ready to charge back through the dervishes. Common sense prevailed as the Lancers dismounted and began firing into the dervishes, who retreated toward the Jebel. The charge of the 21st Lancers was a glorious disaster, and the regiment, numbering about 440, suffered 21 officers and men killed, 71 wounded, and 199 horses killed or wounded in the short melee. Accompanying the 21st Lancers during the charge was war correspondent Winston Churchill.

As the 21st Lancers were in action, Kitchener's brigades advanced out of their encampment and wheeled southward toward Omdurman, 11 kilometers away. From left to right, the brigades were those of Lyttelton, Wauchope, Maxwell, Lewis, and Macdonald, with the Egyptian Cavalry and the Egyptian Camel Corps protecting the right flank. Difficulties in command and control caused confusion, and a large gap opened between Lewis's and Macdonald's brigades as the force advanced southward.

As the Anglo-Egyptian army neared the Jebel Surgham, it received shots from the high ground. To the south of the Jebel, unknown to Kitchener, was the Khalifa's 17,000-man Black Flag reserve force. The Khalifa ordered the Black Flag to attack Macdonald's brigade. As this attack began, the Green Flag began its own uncoordinated attack from the Kerreri Hills. Macdonald calmly wheeled his brigade around to meet the new threat, and Wauchope marched his brigade to fill the gap between Macdonald's and Lewis's brigades. Macdonald's brigade, with 18 guns and 8 Maxims, shattered the attack of the Green Flag. Maxwell's brigade, with Lewis on his right and Lyttelton on his left, cleared the Jebel of dervishes and halted the Black Flag attack by 11:30 A.M. This ended the second phase of the battle. The third phase of the battle consisted of the advance to and entry into Omdurman, completed by the end of the day.

The Battle of Omdurman destroyed Mahdist power (even though the Khalifa escaped), reestablished Anglo-Egyptian power in the Sudan (which was confirmed at Fashoda later that month), and avenged the martyrdom of Gordon. In many respects, the battle was a slaughter, in which Anglo-Egyptian casualties were 48 killed and 434 wounded; over 10,000 dervishes were killed and perhaps 16,000 wounded by the superior British firepower and technology. Kitchener's victory seemed to be attributed more to luck than tactical ability and leadership. Indeed, one war correspondent present at the battle commented that Kitchener's triumph at the Battle of Omdurman "so crushingly and so cheaply was the gift of luck and the Khalifa" (Steevens, 1898, p. 292).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898); Churchill, Winston; Dervishes; Gatacre, William F.; Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Osman Digna; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Wauchope, Andrew G.

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oNdini, Battle of (July 21, 1883)

The uSuthu royalist faction in the Zulu civil war of 1883 was almost eliminated in the battle of oNdini on July 21, 1883.

In late 1882, the British had decided to return King Cetshwayo kaMpande, whom they had deposed after the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, to the central part of his former kingdom. Fighting soon broke out between the uSuthu and their principal opponents in northern Zululand, Chief Zibhebhu kaMaphitha of the Mandlakazi and Prince Hamu kaNzibe of the Ngenetsheni, both of whom resented Cetshwayo's restoration. Zibhebhu routed the uSuthu at the Msebe River on March 30, 1879, when they invaded his territory. Aware that the uSuthu were gathering at Cetshwayo's oNdini *ikhanda* (military homestead) in the Mahlabathini Plain for a fresh offensive, Zibhebhu decided on a pre-emptive strike.

On July 20, Zibhebhu mustered about 2,400 Mandlakazi and 600 Ngenetsheni allies at his ekuVukeni homestead, along with 10–12 mounted white mercenaries. He led them southwest on a 48-kilometer night march that brought them 5 kilometers east of oNdini before sunrise. The uSuthu army of 3,600 men quartered there was taken completely by surprise, but at about 8 A.M., they scrambled to take up positions 1,600 meters east of oNdini under the command of Ntuzwa kaNhlaka. An additional uSuthu force under the command of Chief Sekethwayo kaNhlaka at the kwaNodwengu *ikhanda* about 5 kilometers to the west was too far away to join the battle.

Zibhebhu's left horn outflanked the uSuthu right that stampeded southwestward toward the broken terrain of the White Mflozi River, and the rest of the uSuthu line collapsed at about 8:30 A.M. before their enemies could even come to grips with them. A few uSuthu tried to make a stand in oNdini itself, but the rest fled in complete confusion. Zibhebhu's pursuing forces cut off their retreat to the White Mfolozi River, and the uSuthu contingent from kwaNodwengu broke up in the general route. Another uSuthu force of 1,800 men under Prince Ndabuko kaMpande that was marching south toward oNdini turned back without engaging when they realized that the battle was already lost.

The uSuthu cause was destroyed in the remorseless pursuit. Over 500 uSuthu were killed, and almost all the uSuthu leaders were massacred after being left defenseless when the fighting men fled. Cetshwayo and the uSuthu survivors took refuge in the Nkandla Forest in the British Reserve Territory to the south. Zibhebhu, who had lost only seven men in the battle, was given a free hand to pillage central and northern Zululand until Cetshwayo's heir, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, forged an alliance with Boer freebooters in May 1884 and resumed the offensive against the Mandlakazi.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Ndabuko kaMpande; Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Osman Digna (1840–1926)

Osman Digna was a commander during the Mahdist uprising against Egyptian administration in the Sudan during the 1880s and 1890s. He led troops in many of the campaigns against the Anglo-Egyptian forces, but he also witnessed the defeat of the Mahdist forces at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898.

Uthman abu Bakr Diqna was born around 1840 in Suakin, an important port on the Red Sea in the eastern region of Sudan. During his lifetime, it was widely believed that he had been born in Rouen, France. However, his father was the descendant of a Kurdish soldier who had accompanied an Ottoman army to Suakin in the 16th century, and his mother was a member of the Beja community who inhabited the Red Sea Hills of the eastern Sudan. His father was a merchant, and as a young man, Osman Digna joined in the family business, trading slaves across the Indian Ocean between the East African coast and the Arabian Peninsula.

In 1877, a British antislave patrol captured Osman Digna and turned him over to the Egyptian authorities, who imprisoned him and confiscated his possessions. Although he was soon released, he was ruined financially and thereafter harbored a deep antipathy for the Egyptian authorities and their British allies.

Egypt claimed suzerainty over the Sudan, but the administration's hold on the vast territory was extremely weak. In 1882, when the Egyptian soldier Urabi Pasha led a revolt against the Egyptian government, Osman Digna tried to take advantage of the disorder to foment a rebellion against the local Egyptian authorities in Suakin. His efforts failed, however, and he was driven out of the province by his fellow merchants. He settled in Berber, on the Nile River, and resumed the life of a trader.

In 1883, Osman Digna became a follower of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, an itinerant Muslim preacher from Kordofan who had proclaimed himself to be the Mahdi, or "the guided one," a prophetlike figure who received visions from God and was believed by Muslims to presage the end of the world. The Mahdi made Osman Digna his emir, or representative, and sent him back to the eastern Sudan to rally support for a jihad against the Egyptian regime. Osman returned to the Suakin region and recruited an army of followers among the Beja, his mother's people, who lived in the Red Sea Hills. In 1884, his troops scored their first victory when they captured the Egyptian garrison at Sinkat.

The Egyptian government recognized the threat of the Mahdi's movement; and in



Osman Digna (1840–1926) was an important supporter of the Mahdi's rebellion against Anglo-Egyptian rule in late-nineteenth-century Sudan. He commanded Mahdist forces around Suakin in eastern Sudan in the 1880s and 1890s, and led a Mahdist army against an Anglo-Egyptian force at the Battle of Atbara in February 1898. (Henry Guttmann/Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

1883, it sent an army to the city of El Obeid to end the rebellion at its source. This army consisted of conscript Egyptian peasants and was led by William Hicks, a retired English officer. At Shaykan, Hicks's guides led him into an ambush, and the Mahdist army annihilated almost all the column's 10,000 soldiers and camp followers. With that victory, the Mahdists controlled almost all the Sudan. Their next step was to lay siege to the city of Khartoum, the principal center of Egyptian rule in the Sudan.

The British government organized an army to relieve Khartoum. Osman Digna's army engaged the advancing British army in a series of battles in and around Suakin. In those frequently bloody skirmishes, his troops inflicted many casualties on the British forces.

In 1885, Khartoum fell to the Mahdist army, and Muhammad Ahmed's conquest of the Sudan was complete. Unfortunately, he died of typhus within six months of his triumph. He was succeeded by Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, who became the new ruler of the Mahdist state and all of the diverse groups that had been held together by the war and the charismatic piety of the Mahdi. In 1889, Abdullahi (known as the Khalifa) sent commissioners to investigate complaints about Osman Digna that had arisen from the tensions between his Beja followers and the Arab soldiers also quartered in the eastern region under another commander. Believing that the loyalty of Osman Digna was essential to the defense of the Sudan, Abdullahi ruled in his favor and reinforced his authority around Suakin.

Between the late 1880s and the second invasion of Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1896, the eastern region of the Sudan was weakened by the encroachment of the Italians, who established the coastal colony of Eritrea at the expense of Ethiopia. When the Italians took the city of Kassala, Osman Digna was cut off from his support in the Red Sea Hills and eventually abandoned the area to serve in the final battles against the Anglo-Egyptian forces advancing up the Nile River.

The Anglo-Egyptian force had already enjoyed success in northern Sudan before the pivotal Battle of Atbara in February 1898. Osman Digna drew up the battle plan, which was approved by Abdullahi.

Provisioning the troops was a perpetual problem for the Sudanese armies, and though many Sudanese troops were deserting from hunger, the majority waited steadfastly to resist the oncoming enemy under the command of Lord Herbert Kitchener. On April 8, 1898, the two armies clashed, and the Sudanese were badly defeated with heavy losses. Osman Digna managed to escape, however, with the remnants of his forces. He returned to Omdurman but retreated from the city with Abdullahi to witness the Battle of Omdurman, which actually took place on the plain around Iqayqa.

After the fall of Omdurman, the Sudanese nation was defeated, although Abdullahi held out for another year to harass the Egyptian garrisons. Osman Digna returned home to the Red Sea Hills, where the British captured him in 1900. He was imprisoned at several different locations before being released in 1908. He retired to Wadi Halfa and devoted the remainder of his life to religious contemplation. He made the pilgrimage to Mecca at a very advanced age and died in 1926.

James Burns

See also: Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898); Hicks, William; Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Kashgil (Shaykan or El Obeid), Battle of (November 3–5, 1883); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Urabi Rebellion (1882)

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Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900)

The Battle of Paardeberg took place after the siege of Kimberley was lifted and ultimately resulted in the first important British victory of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

The British relieved the besieged town of Kimberley on February 15, 1900. Assistant Commandant-General Piet A. Cronjé, the Boer commander, realized that his forces were vulnerable and decided that night to abandon his position near Magersfontein and instead follow the Modder River to Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, 140 kilometers to the east. Cronjé's force consisted of about 5,000 burghers (many with families), about 500 wagons, and thousands of reserve horses. On February 17, the British detected Cronjé's laager near Paardeberg Drift, 50 kilometers upstream from the Modder River Station. While the wagons remained on the north bank of the Modder, Boer forces had dug into positions on both sides of the river.

Lieutenant-General Thomas Kelly-Kenny, commanding the British 6th Division, wanted to surround Cronjé's force and bombard it into submission. Field Marshal Lord Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., commander-in-chief, was detained elsewhere and ill, so he delegated his authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Lord Horatio H. Kitchener. This caused considerable resentment, as Kelly-Kenny was senior in rank to Kitchener. However, Kitchener, who was backed by Roberts, impatiently ordered Kelly-Kenny to use his division and immediately attack Cronjé's force.

Kitchener's plan of attack was for Kelly-Kenny's division to conduct a frontal assault from the south bank of the Modder River against the entrenched Boers. At the same time, the 9th Division's Highland Brigade would attack upstream from the south bank, while the 19th Brigade (also of the 9th Division) would cross the Modder and attack upstream from the north bank. A mounted infantry unit, with two infantry battalions, would also attack downstream along the north bank. Kitchener wanted to conduct this huge pincer movement and defeat Cronjé's force before it could move or be reinforced.

Kitchener's attack, ordered by verbal messages, began early on February 18, 1900. The 6th Division advanced across an open plain toward the Modder River, suffering many casualties, to find the river in flood. The 6th Division halted at the river while the Highland Brigade joined its left flank. Kitchener, however, seems to have ordered the Highland Brigade to conduct a frontal assault against the Boers. The Highland Brigade was pinned down in the scorching sun by Boer sharpshooters, just as it had been at the Battle of Modder River

(November 28, 1899). In the early afternoon, Kitchener ordered a limited left-flank attack, then a right-flank assault—giving up high ground to the Boers in the process—as Kelly-Kenny resisted his directives to continue the frontal attack.

Chief Commandant Christiaan R. De Wet, whose Boer force was about 25 kilometers south of the Modder, attacked and captured the hill south of the Modder that was the key to the entire ridgeline. Control of this hill made the British position untenable, while providing an avenue of escape for Cronjé.

By sunset, it became clear that Kitchener's chaotic battle, consisting of uncoordinated and haphazard frontal assaults, had failed. It was "the most severe reverse, judged by the British losses, of any day in the entire war" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 356). The British saw 24 officers and 279 men killed, 59 officers and 847 other men wounded, and 61 all ranks missing, for a total of 1,270 casualties—more casualties than the total sustained during the 1896–1898 reconquest of the Sudan. Neither Kitchener nor Roberts had ever fought against a European-type foe armed with modern weaponry. The Boers sustained about 100 men killed and 250 wounded.

Roberts arrived on the battlefield on February 19, 1900. He vacillated about what course of action to take and considered retreating. On February 21, De Wet's men abandoned the hill that they occupied, and the British regained their nerve and sense of purpose. Less than 100 of Cronjé's Boers had escaped via De Wet's position. On February 27, 1900—the 19th anniversary of the Boer victory at the Battle of Majuba—Cronjé and 4,069 of his men surrendered.

The British won the Battle of Paardeberg despite the incompetence of Kitchener and Roberts, and this was the greatest British success in the war to date. The Boers realized that they could no longer use conventional means to defeat their adversary, planting the seeds for a protracted guerrilla war.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Canadians in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Pearson, Charles Knight (1834–1909)

Charles Knight Pearson was a professional soldier who commanded the British No. 1 Column during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. He was born in July 1834 in Yeovil, Somerset, the son of a naval commander.

He joined the 99th Regiment in November 1852 as an ensign but transferred to the 31st Regiment in 1853. In 1855, he purchased his lieutenancy and served in the Crimean War (1855–1856) with his regiment as an adjutant, taking part in the siege and fall of Sevastopol. In 1856, he purchased his captaincy. In 1857, he joined the 3rd Regiment and purchased his majority in 1865. He was promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1867 in command of the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Regiment. In November 1876, he was appointed commandant of Natal when his battalion formed the colony's garrison. Pearson surrendered his regimental command in September 1878 to take up a post on Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford's staff, preparing for the invasion of Zululand.

Considered sound and reliable, he was placed in command of the No. 1 Column, with 4,750 men, during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. On January 12, 1879, the column invaded Zululand and advanced up the coastal plain in two divisions toward the abandoned Norwegian mission station at Eshowe, which it intended to use as a depot. At the Battle of Nyezane, fought on January 22, 1879, the strung-out column succeeded in closing up and using its superior firepower and discipline to fight off an ambush laid by close to 6,000 Zulu under Chief Godide kaNdlela. The defeated Zulu, who had suffered at least 300 dead—compared to the 15 lost by the British—dispersed. Pearson's column reached Eshowe the following day and immediately began building an earthwork fort around the mission buildings.

Learning on January 27, 1879, of the British defeat at the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, Pearson decided to hold fast at Eshowe to divert the Zulu from invading Natal. On January 30, 1879, he moved inside the fort with his 1,700 British infantry and sent his mounted men, African levies, and oxen back to Natal. The Zulu, under Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande, then blockaded Eshowe. Pearson was nicknamed "the Bulldog of Eshowe" for his determined defense, but his lack of initiative and mounted men meant that he had to content himself with improving his fortifications and maintaining the stalemate. The Eshowe garrison grew increasingly short of supplies before it was relieved by the Eshowe Relief Column on April 3, 1879. It was evacuated to Natal the following day.

On April 13, 1879, Pearson's column became the 1st Brigade, 1st Division, South African Field Force, for the renewed invasion of Zululand, but he was invalided home in June 1879. For his service, he was made Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George. From May 1880 to March 1884, he was governor of the Royal Victoria Hospital at Netley. In 1883, he was promoted to major-general. From 1885 to 1890, he commanded troops in the West Indies. He was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1891 and retired from the army in 1895. He died on October 2, 1909.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Dabulamanzi kaMpande; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879)

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Pedi Wars (1876–1879)

In the Boer-Pedi War of March 1876 to February 1877, the Pedi people, centered in the fertile valley of the Tubatse River in the high eastern escarpment of South Africa under their paramount, Sekhukhune waoSekwati, repulsed an invasion by the Boers of the neighboring South African Republic (SAR). In the First Anglo-Pedi War of September to October 1878, they fought off the British, who had annexed the SAR in April 1877; but in the Second Anglo-Pedi War of November to December 1879, the British finally crushed the Pedi.

The Pedi state was a form of federation where the chiefs accepted the paramountcy of the Maroteng, the senior Pedi lineage. The Maroteng paramount did not have direct command over a large army of his own because the Pedi age-grade regiments fell under the authority of the regional chiefs and he had to persuade them to release their fighting men into his service. Militarily, the Pedi usually stood on the defensive rather than risk a set-piece battle, and the paramount and all his chiefs had their own fortified strongholds. Firearms were ideal for their defense, and from the 1840s, young Pedi men had been migrant workers in the white states and colonies of the subcontinent, where they bought firearms in increasing quantities with their wages. By the 1870s, many were armed with the latest rifles in addition to obsolete muskets.

The Pedi needed to defend themselves from the neighboring Swazi kingdom, which had invaded unsuccessfully in 1852 and 1869, and from the Boers of the SAR, who coveted their land and labor and feared their military strength and territorial ambitions. On March 16, 1876, the SAR declared war. By July 1876, 2,000 burghers, 600 African auxiliaries, and 4 4-pounder Krupp mountain guns had concentrated under the command of the SAR president, the Reverend. T. T. Burgers.

Motivation and morale were low among the Boers, and factionalism rife. In 1875, the Swazi had signed a treaty with the Boers to aid them against the Pedi, and 2,400 Swazi duly joined the Lydenburg Commando of 600 burghers under Marthinus Wessels Pretorius. The Boer strategy was for the western commando, under Commandant N. Smit, to march up the Lepelle River from Middleburg, and the eastern one to advance up the Tubatse River. Both were to reduce Pedi strongholds as they went before linking for a joint attack on Tsate, Sekhukhune's capital. Tsate consisted of 3,000 huts built along the edge of the valley of the Tsate River and up the sides of the steep Leolo Mountains. The town was formidably defended by thick stone walls that fortified the mountain slopes and by rifle pits dug around its perimeter. North of the town, in the center of a flat-bottomed valley, was the Ntswaneng citadel, a hill of huge volcanic boulders fortified by stone-built breastworks.

The Pedi knew that it would be difficult to counter the Boers' mobile, mounted infantry. So they withdrew to their fortified strongholds, while some regiments moved rapidly across the country ahead of the Boers, carrying grain stocks and livestock. On July 5, 1876, Smit's Commando took Chief Mathebi's stronghold commanding the Lepelle River and Pedi resistance in the region collapsed. On July 13, 1876, the Lydenburg Commando and the Swazi stormed Mafolofolo, the stronghold of Sekhukhune's half-brother, Kgalema Dinkwanyane. Then the Swazi, disgruntled because they had borne the brunt of the fighting while the Boers gave them covering fire, withdrew from the campaign.

For their assault on Tsate, the Boers planned a pincer movement with the Lydenburg Commando advancing over the mountains from the south and Smit's Commando along the valley from the north. On the night of July 31, 1876, the Lydenburg Commando was driven back by galling fire from concealed Pedi positions as they attempted to advance. The following morning, unaware that the Lydenburg Commando was now out of the picture, Smits's men launched their own feeble attack on Tsate. They were pinned down outside the town by accurate Pedi fire, and they withdrew at nightfall. On August 2, 1876, the Boer rank-and-file decided to give up the campaign and go home.

Having failed to storm Tsate, the Boer leaders changed their strategy. They built Fort Burgers and Fort Weeber to command the eastern and western approaches to Tsate, respectively, to starve the Pedi into submission. As burghers were unwilling to man them, the forts were garrisoned by mercenaries and freebooters, who sent out incessant raids. On September 29, 1876, a Pedi assault on Fort Burgers was repulsed, and the Pedi also failed to take the stronghold of the disloyal Masemola chiefdom at Phiring because of aid received from Fort Weeber. With famine threatening, the Pedi needed peace to plant their crops.

Both sides were now eager to negotiate, as the cost of the war was unsustainable for the bankrupt SAR. Sekhukhune signed a treaty with the Boers on February 15, 1877, which defined the reduced boundaries of the Maroteng paramountcy, and in which he ambiguously acknowledged himself as a Boer subject.

Sekhukhune's authority and prestige had been tarnished by the Boer-Pedi War, but the Pedi were not defeated. When the British annexed the SAR on April 12, 1877, as the Transvaal Territory, it was uncertain whether Sekhukhune regarded himself as falling under British rule. On May 9, 1877, the administrator of the Transvaal, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, sent Sekhukhune an ultimatum, insisting that he accept British "protection." But Sekhukhune, with his people's strong support, was determined not to surrender his independence; he even proceeded to reassert the authority of the Maroteng paramountcy over chiefs who had been shaken loose by the Boer-Pedi War. Meanwhile, he continued to talk with Shepstone, who increasingly lost patience with the paramount.

The breaking point occurred in early 1878. The powerful Maserumule chiefdom in the west of the Maroteng paramountcy had split between the regent, Sekhukhune's sister Lekoglane, and Phokwane, the younger brother of a deceased chief. On February 8, 1878, Sekhukhune sent military assistance to Lekgolane, and Phokwane called on the British for help. With few troops to spare, Shepstone appointed Captain M. Clarke, RA, the commissioner for the Lydenburg District, to raise a small force of white volunteers, the Provisional Armed and Mounted Police. With the Native Police Force, they occupied Fort Weeber close to Lekoglane's stronghold, called Maserumule. Sekhukhune had no choice but to come to his sister's aid lest the chiefs west of the Leolo Mountains take his failure to do so as the signal to repudiate his authority as paramount. Accordingly, on March 6, 1878, a Pedi regiment began raiding the Lydenburg District to the east, while in the west, Clarke prudently evacuated Fort Weeber before the Pedi burned it to the ground. Having asserted his authority, Sekhukhune stayed on the defensive.

Shepstone believed that Sekhukhune's military offensive confirmed his firm belief in a burgeoning "black conspiracy" to evict whites from South Africa, and he was convinced that the paramount was cooperating in this objective with the Zulu and dissident Transvaal Boers. To break up this perceived combination, Shepstone reinforced Clarke's forces with more white volunteers and African auxiliaries. In March 1878, Clarke reoccupied Fort Weeber, and on April 5, 1878, he attacked Maserumule, but failed ignominiously. He thereupon resorted to the strategy that the Boers had adopted after their failure to take Tsate in 1876: namely, building more forts to control the passes to the Tubatse valley and starving the Pedi into submission with unremitting raids.

By the end of April 1878, Lekoglane gave up the struggle and retreated east to take refuge with Sekhukhune, while the subordinate chiefdoms west of the Leolo Mountains slipped out of the paramount's control. East of the mountains, however, Sekhukhune kept his forces mobilized and skirmished successfully with British patrols.

In July 1878, Lieutenant-General Sir Frederic Thesiger, the General Officer Commanding in South Africa, brought the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878 to a conclusion and began preparing for a likely Zululand campaign. First, however, he had to resolve the nagging Pedi conflict. He knew that by the end of October, horse sickness would likely bring any campaign to an end, but he hoped for a rapid success. He reinforced the regular troops in the Transvaal and on August 13, 1878, he placed all forces in the Transvaal, whether imperial or colonial, under the command of Colonel Hugh Rowlands, VC. Rowlands had at his disposal for the First Anglo-Pedi War 1,216 imperial infantry and 611 mounted men, 200 of whom were the Frontier Light Horse (FLH) under Major Redvers Buller, hard-bitten veterans of the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War. Rowland's strategic objective was the capture of Tsate, but to prevent Sekhukhune breaking out, he detached much of his force to garrison the posts that he had established around the Pedi heartland. Some 500 Swazi warriors reinforced these fortified posts.

On September 6, 1878, Rowland's column joined with Clarke's forces in the valley of the Lepelle River. The plan was to move forward past Fort Weeber to set up a base of operations at the abandoned Fort Burgers. Rowlands advanced across the Lepelle on September 8, 1878, brushing aside Pedi skirmishers. By September 19, 1878, Rowlands was encamped near Fort

Burgers. On October 3, 1878, he marched for Tsate, 40 kilometers to the west, with 130 men of the 1st Battalion, 13th Regiment; 338 men of the FLH and Mounted Infantry; and two 7-pounder Krupp guns. The intention was not to assault Tsate, but to establish a fortified camp nearby and, as with Maserumule, to induce Sekhukhune to surrender. The Pedi determinedly skirmished with the British as they advanced through very difficult country in drought conditions.

Without water and forage, oppressed by searing heat and with horse sickness breaking out, Rowlands realized that his force was inadequate for the task. On October 6, 1878, Rowlands pulled back to Fort Burgers. Needing at least one token success, on October 27, 1878, he successfully stormed a Pedi stronghold 8 kilometers away. With that, he abandoned Fort Burgers and all other advance posts and concentrated his troops along the Zulu and Swazi borders for the impending Zululand campaign. On February 26, 1879, Rowlands's troops were attached to the forces operating in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, leaving no imperial troops to exert pressure on Sekhukhune. Buoyed up by their success against the British, Pedi regiments went on the offensive, bringing chiefdoms that had broken loose from the Maroteng paramountcy back into the fold.

On September 2, 1879, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, appointed on May 28, 1879, the High Commissioner for South East Africa, enforced his settlement of the defeated Zulu kingdom. In his capacity as governor of the Transvaal, he next focused on the unresolved Pedi issue. If Sekhukhune would not accept his terms and submit to British rule, he was determined to destroy him by force. On October 10, 1879, Clarke presented Wolseley's terms to Sekhukhune's emissaries. Popular Pedi opinion was against any compromise, though, and negotiations with the British broke down. Although it was late in the campaigning season, Wolseley was determined to act and was convinced that only the capture of Tsate would signal the overthrow of the Pedi state. The Swazi, appreciating British military predominance in the region, were prepared to cooperate fully, and in November 1879, King Mbandzeni dispatched 8,000 warriors to Lydenburg to join in the Second Anglo-Pedi War.

Wolseley's Transvaal Field Force began its advance on November 20, 1879. It totaled 1,400 British infantry (veterans of the Anglo-Zulu War), 400 mounted volunteers, and 11,000 African allies and levies. The Lydenburg Column, under Major Henry Bushman, consisted of four companies of British regulars, the Swazi warriors, some local mounted rifles, and 400 local African levies. The main column was commanded by Colonel Baker Creed Russell and was made up of 12 companies of regulars, five units of mounted irregular horse, the Rustenburg and Zoutpansberg contingents of African levies from the northern Transvaal, Ndzundza Ndebele auxiliaries (former tributaries of the Maroteng paramountcy), two 4-pounder Krupp guns, and two 7-pounder mountain guns. Heavy rains meant that in this Pedi campaign—unlike the previous one—there was abundant pasturage and water, and horse sickness arrived late.

Russell's Column advanced up the Lepelle River and on November 25, 1879, was encamped 5 kilometers north of Tsate. On the same day, the Lydenburg Column, which had advanced from Fort Burgers, was in an entrenched camp 8 kilometers from the mountains that overlooked Tsate from the south. Wolseley's plan was a reprise of that of the Boers in 1876, with his two columns attacking Tsate in a pincer movement. The number of Pedi defending Tsate numbered no more than 4,000 men because many chiefs had kept back part of their regiments to defend themselves from British raids, or were prudently awaiting the outcome.

At 4:30 A.M. on November 28, 1879, Russell's artillery opened fire on Ntswaneng, the rocky citadel (or Fighting Kopje) north of the town, and his troops advanced south down the valley against the Pedi rifle pits and snipers posted behind rocky outcrops. The regular infantry halted before the prepared Pedi defenses because Wolseley did not intend a frontal assault, and two flanking attacks of dismounted volunteers and African levies were sent in to turn the Pedi position. However, the well-positioned Pedi defenders soon had them pinned down under fire. All depended now on the troops of the Lydenburg Column taking the Pedi in the rear over the mountain. At 6:30 A.M., they finally appeared on the skyline and charged down. Caught between the hammer and the anvil, the Pedi were overwhelmed. The struggle in the burning town was over by 9:30 A.M., but the Pedi still occupied Ntswaneng under shellfire. The British troops in the valley now assembled for a combined assault, supported by the Swazi, who seized the summit of Ntswaneng at about 10:30 A.M.

Pedi defenders fell back into the caves, and charges of gun cotton placed by the Royal Engineers failed to dislodge them. Wolseley then formed a cordon of troops around Ntswaneng to starve the defenders out, but that night, about 200 of them broke out under cover of a thunderstorm. The few remaining defenders died in the caves of thirst and starvation. A total of 13 whites were killed and 35 wounded in the battle, while between 500 and 600 Swazi died and as many were wounded. More than 1,000 Pedi must have perished, including three of Sekhukhune's brothers and nine of his children.

Sekhukhune escaped the battlefield, but on November 30, 1879, his pursuers under Clarke tracked him to a cave 15 kilometers away, where they blockaded him. He surrendered on December 2, 1879, and was paraded through Pretoria on December 9, 1879, before being jailed there. The Transvaal Field Force was broken up, and the settlement of the conquered Pedi territory was turned over to Clarke.

Wolseley allowed the Swazi free rein to raid the Pedi heartland, terrorizing the people into submission. The Maroteng paramountcy was abolished and placed under a British resident magistrate. The Pedi were disarmed and moved away from their strongholds, and their territory was carved up into Crown and mission lands and sold off as farms to land companies and settlers.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Buller, Redvers Henry; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Commando System (Boer Republics); Pretorius, Marthinus Wessel; Sekhukhune waoSekwati; Wolseley, Garnet

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Penn Symons, William (1843–1899)

Born in Hatt, Cornwall, William Penn Symons was the eldest son of William and Caroline Anne Symons. In March 1863, after a private education, he was commissioned as an ensign in the 24th Regiment of Foot (later the South Wales Borderers). In March 1877, he married Jane Caroline Hawkins, but the couple had no children.

Symons was promoted to lieutenant in December 1866 and captain in February 1878. He fought with his regiment in the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878 and the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, where he narrowly missed being with his unit at the disastrous Battle of Isandlwana. He was promoted to major in July 1881. From 1885 to 1889, he was involved in several campaigns in Burma, for which he was awarded with the Companion of the Order of the Bath. In September 1891, he was promoted to the substantive rank of lieutenant-colonel and given command of the 2nd Battalion, South Wales Borderers.

Between 1894 and 1898, he commanded brigades during several frontier campaigns in India and received the Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath. He was a keen sportsman and considered one of the best shots in the British army. In May 1899, Symons was sent, as a temporary major general, to command British forces in the colony of Natal in the context of escalating tensions with the Boer republics. In September, he became a major-general, and in October, a lieutenant-general.

Symons initially reported that he needed an extra 2,000 men to defend Natal, but then upgraded the figure to 5,000. Subsequently, London decided to dispatch 10,000 troops to Natal and sent Lieutenant-General George White to take over from Symons. Contrary to White's instructions to concentrate British forces in Natal at Ladysmith, Symons followed the governor's directions and took command of a brigade at Dundee.

On October 20, while leading an attack on Boer forces that had occupied Talana Hill, Symons was shot in the stomach and died several days later as a prisoner of war, as the British had withdrawn to Ladysmith. He was buried at Dundee, and a monument to his bravery was erected at Saltash, Cornwall.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Talana Hill, Battle of (October 20, 1899)

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Peters, Carl (1856–1918)

Carl Peters was one of the key figures in the development of the German colonial empire in Africa broadly and East Africa specifically. An active explorer, author, and colonial propagandist, he represented both the grand vision of German *Weltpolitik,* as well as its moral and practical failings.

Born the son of a clergyman, Peters attended college but did not pursue his studies, instead becoming attracted to the idea of helping create a German colonial empire. He founded the Society for German Colonization in 1884 as a propaganda organization to promote the development of an overseas empire for the newly united Germany. Not content to merely promote the dreams of a German colonial empire, he sought to actively create colonial holdings.

In 1884, Peters, along with several companions (including Joachim von Pfeil), traveled to eastern Africa to undertake just such a creation. He and his companions had to travel in secret, disguising themselves as mechanics, as their efforts were not supported by the German government and the British were hostile to any attempt to undermine their position in eastern Africa. After reaching the coastline of East Africa, Peters proceeded to travel into the interior, making "treaties of protection" with African chiefs in the Usambara region of what is now northern Tanzania. Returning to Germany in February 1885, he hoped to use these treaties to drag the anticolonial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck into supporting a colonial venture since it was basically a *fait accompli*. Peters, with the assistance of growing pressure from groups within Germany actively pushing for colonies, wrested from the German government imperial recognition in 1885.

With imperial approval in hand, Peters created the German East Africa Company in 1887 and proceeded to exploit the interior of Africa for monetary gain. The company's rule would be brutal and exploitative in the vein of Peters, who once suggested that the only way to make an impression on the "wild sons of the steppe" was through the use of the "double-barreled rifle." Such exploitation was matched by Peters's insatiable appetite to acquire more land for his colony.

Between 1885 and 1889, the company sponsored 16 expeditions to expand its holdings, which famously included an expedition to save Emin Pasha, the Egyptian governor of Equitoria cut off by the Mahdist uprising in Sudan, which was really a race against Frederick Lugard, an agent of the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), to claim Uganda. On the way to Uganda, Peters's expedition inflicted serious casualties on the Maasai at Elbejet, in what is now Kenya, in December 1889. Unsurprisingly, company rule was short-lived, as the mismanagement and brutal treatment of Africans led to the Abushiri Rebellion (1888–1889), which necessitated the use of German troops to reestablish order. The increasing demands of colonial administration, along with this revolt that proved the company had little ability to control the territory, led to the German government taking over administrative control of the colony.

As his company faltered, so did Peters. Despite his appointment as an Imperial Commissioner in 1891, his brutal treatment of Africans would lead to his censure and dismissal from public service. He avoided prosecution by settling in London, using that time to conduct several more exploratory journeys along the Zambezi River and publishing a book on his expedition. His government pension was restored by Kaiser Wilhelm II, and in 1909, Peters returned to Germany, where he would remain until his death on September 10, 1918.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Abushiri Rebellion (1888–1889); East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); Elbejet, Battle of (December 22, 1889); Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore); German Empire; Lugard, Frederick; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah)

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Plumer, Sir Herbert (1857–1932)

Sir Herbert Charles Onslow Plumer was a leading British army general. Born in Torquay, England, on March 13, 1857, he was educated at Eton. After scoring a high grade on the entrance examination to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, he was commissioned directly to the 65th Foot in 1876. Promoted to captain in 1882, Plumer served in the Sudan campaign of 1884–1885 and, as a brevet lieutenant-colonel, in the Ndebele Rebellion of 1896. During the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, he commanded a mounted infantry regiment in the relief of Mafeking in May 1900 and a column during antiguerrilla operations.

Brevetted to colonel in 1900 and promoted to major-general in 1902, Plumer commanded a brigade and then was quartermaster-general to the forces during 1904–1905. He then received command of the 5th Division in Ireland in 1906 and was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1908. He next took over Northern Command in 1911.

During World War I, Plumer was ordered to France to take command of the newly formed V Corps in early 1915. He served in the Second Battle of Ypres during April 22–May 25 and was appointed to command the Second Army, taking the place of General Horace Smith-Dorrien in May. He was subsequently promoted to full general in June. Throughout 1915 and 1916, Plumer's army held portions of the line but was not involved in the major offensives or battles.

After meticulous preparation, Plumer achieved a limited but complete victory at the Battle of Messines on June 7, 1917. The attack made heavy use of mining, artillery, tanks, and gas to support the attack of nine infantry divisions against Messines Ridge. The objectives of the attack were all achieved by midafternoon, with far fewer casualties than had been expected. German counterattacks were easily repulsed, and the British continued their attacks for another week, by which time the entire Messines salient had been occupied.

In the Third Battle of Ypres (July 31–November 10, 1917), Plumer attacked in support of the main British effort carried out by General Sir Hubert Gough's Fifth Army. After Gough suffered heavy casualties and had made only limited progress, British Expeditionary Force commander Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig shifted the main effort in the offensive to Plumer's army. Plumer chose to launch a series of carefully planned small-scale attacks and made gains in battles at Menin Road, Polygon Wood, and Broodseinde during September–October. However, further attacks later in October, at Poelcappelle and Passchendaele, were costly failures that did not achieve their objectives.

Shortly before the Passchendaele Offensive ended, Plumer was ordered to Italy in November 1917 to assist Italian forces in restoring the situation following the disastrous Italian defeat at Caporetto during October 24–November 9. However, the front was stabilized by the Italians at the Piave River before Plumer arrived. Plumer's force of six French and five British divisions took over a sector of the Italian front on December 3. Plumer established excellent relations with the Italian generals, working to steady their resolve as they rebuilt the Italian army.

Prime Minister David Lloyd George offered the position of chief of the Imperial General Staff to Plumer in the place of General Sir William Robertson in February 1918, but he declined the offer, primarily out of loyalty to Robertson. Plumer returned to France in March and resumed command of the Second Army. The brunt of the first of the German Spring (Ludendorff) Offensives, launched that same month, fell on the British Third and Fifth armies. Plumer was called upon to release several divisions to reinforce the embattled portions of the British lines. The second German attack, the Lys Offensive of April 9–29, was directed against the front held by Plumer's forces. Although severely pressed by the Germans, he maintained a steady grip on the situation and only grudgingly gave ground.

Despite being Haig's most experienced and reliable army commander, Plumer played only a subsidiary role in the Allied offensives of the autumn of 1918. His army operated outside British command under the Belgian king Albert's army group. As part of the Allied army group, he served in the Kortrijk Offensive in October 1918. After the armistice, Plumer's army was tasked with crossing the German frontier and establishing the British zone of occupation in Germany.

Promoted to field marshal and appointed governor and commander-in-chief of Malta in 1919, Plumer was appointed high commissioner for Palestine in 1925, serving there until his retirement in 1928. Designated Baron Plumer of Messines and Bilton in 1919, he was subsequently elevated to viscount in 1929.

Plumer died in London on July 16, 1932. He was one of the best British generals of World War I. A careful planner, unlike many other British generals of the war, he only attempted to achieve what was realistically feasible and never undertook blindly optimistic operations.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Portuguese-Gaza War (1894–1895)

During the late-19th-century "Scramble for Africa," the Portuguese hoped to conquer a strip of south-central African territory (today's Zambia and Zimbabwe) that would link their old colonies in Angola and Mozambique. But this Portuguese east-west axis clashed with the British ambition of ruling Africa south to north, or from Cape to Cairo. As such, in January 1890, London issued Lisbon an ultimatum to withdraw its forces from the central African strip. Portugal's subsequent acquiescence was considered a national humiliation that caused the government to fall and set the stage for the overthrow of the monarchy 20 years later. An 1890 treaty between Britain and Portugal finalized the colonial borders of Angola and Mozambique.

Previously restricted to coastal enclaves like Lourenco Marques (Maputo) and Inhambane, the Portuguese in Mozambique now considered it essential to control the interior which, in the south, was dominated by the Gaza state. Established in the early 19th century by Soshangane, who had been involved in the wars that resulted in the formation of the Zulu kingdom, Gaza had developed as a raiding state involved in exporting slaves to the Portuguese. During the Gaza civil war of the early 1860s, the Portuguese had supplied guns and ammunition to the leader Mzila, which helped him take power, although the kingdom remained independent. In the early 1890s, the Gaza ruler Gungunhana tried to secure British protection against the Portuguese but London refused, given its existing deals with Lisbon.

An excuse for war came in October 1894, when some subject Tonga rebelled against Portuguese taxation and meddling and staged an unsuccessful attack on Lourenco Marques. Two fugitive Tonga leaders took shelter with Gungunhana, who refused the Portuguese demands to surrender them. Antonio Enes, the Portuguese commissioner for Mozambique, organized an invasion force consisting of one battalion of newly arrived Portuguese infantry, another battalion of African troops from Angola, a company of paramilitary police, a large force of colonial cavalry, and local irregulars. It was supported by four mountain guns, two Nordenfelt guns, and a fleet of steamers with machine guns on the Limpopo River. Lisbon sent 2,190 soldiers to Mozambique for this campaign, which was its largest overseas expeditionary force of the 19th century. The Portuguese purchased horses, mules, oxen, and wagons and borrowed ships from the neighboring British colony of Natal. Portuguese regulars were armed with French-made bolt-action, magazine-fed rifles that gave them a massive advantage in firepower over the Gaza. Simultaneously, Gaza was suffering rebellion by subject groups, and many of its young men were engaged in migrant labor on the settler farms of neighboring Natal or the gold mines of the Boer republic of Transvaal.

On the morning of February 2, 1895, at Marracuene just north of Lourenco Marques, an 800-man Portuguese force camped in Tonga territory was surprised when a returning patrol turned out to be Tonga warriors dressed in colonial uniforms who suddenly attacked, triggering a wider assault by others hiding nearby. Although some Tongo penetrated the Portuguese defensive square, which seemed likely to break, colonial firepower repelled the attackers. Enes then split his force into two columns that were to converge on Gungunhana's capital from Lourenco Marques in the south and Inhambane in the north.

On September 8, at Magul, the 600-strong southern column was attacked by 6,000 Tongo and Gaza warriors under the war leader Maguigane. Since mounted scouts had warned of the enemy's approach, the Portuguese had built a thornbush and barbed-wire barricade around their square. This may have been the first instance where a European army used barbed wire as a defensive obstacle. In its traditional crescent formation (reminiscent of its Zulu origins), the Gaza army repeatedly attacked the Portuguese position. Despite the breakdown of both Portuguese machine guns, colonial rifle fire kept the Tonga and Gaza at least 200 meters away from the square. Hundreds of Tonga and Gaza were killed, compared to just five in the Portuguese column.

Vainly hoping for a negotiated settlement, Gungunhana demobilized 40,000 warriors encamped around his capital in October, only to recall them again at the urging of the military leader Maguigane. On the morning of November 7, the Portuguese northern column under Colonel Rodrigues Galhardo, consisting of 560 European and 500 African troops, was attacked by the main Gaza army of 10,000–15,000 men at Coolela near Gungunhana's capital. However, Gungunhana's army was demoralized by lack of food and made up partly of unmotivated conscripts from subordinate communities. African scouts warned of the impending attack, which prompted the Portuguese force to form a defensive square. Once again, the Gaza army formed a crescent and charged, coming very close to the square, but within 40 minutes, it was devastated by colonial machine gun and rifle fire. Thousands of Gaza warriors became casualties, compared to just 45 Portuguese troops.

On November 11, Galhardo's column burned the Gaza capital, and in December, a Portuguese force under Joaquim Augusto Mousinho de Albuquerque, later celebrated as a great Portuguese hero, captured Gungunhana hiding near the grave of his grandfather, the Gaza founder Soshangane. Gungunhana was shipped to Lisbon, where he was paraded through the streets, and then he was exiled to the Azores, where he died in 1906. After that, the Gaza kingdom was absorbed by colonial Mozambique.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1880–1907); Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Gungunhana; Indian Ocean, Portuguese Conquest of (1498–1698); Portuguese-Makua Wars (1585–1870); Technology and Conquest

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Portuguese-Makua Wars (1585–1870)

From the 1500s, the Makua people lived in a number of different states situated on trade routes between the interior Yao around Lake Malawi and the Portuguese on the Mozambican coast. In the late 1500s, the Makua represented a serious threat to the Portuguese, who described them as savage cannibals.

In 1585, the Makua of Mauruca (a name adopted by a series of rulers) began to terrorize Portuguese coastal settlements. In turn, Nuno Velho Pereira, the Portuguese captain of Mozambique, organized an expedition of 400 men, including 40 Portuguese, which advanced on Mauruca's capital, located about 15 to 25 kilometers inland. Under Antonio Pinto, the expedition successfully attacked the village at dawn and burned it. However, on its return to the coast, this force was ambushed by a Makua army hidden in the bush, and most of the Portuguese, overconfidently being carried in litters by their slaves, were killed. Mauruca eventually made peace with the Portuguese and traded with them, although periodic violence continued. Even though Mauruca emerged as the head of a loose confederation of Makua rulers, the area was dominated by Maravi military power throughout most of the 1600s. During the 1630s, Mauruca refused a Portuguese offer to build him a strong fort if he attacked the Maravi.

The decline of the Maravi Empire in the late 1600s presented the Makua with an opportunity for military revival and to become intermediaries in the coastal trade. It appears that Portuguese-Makua relations in the very early 1700s were peaceful, but this did not last, as there were skirmishes in the late 1720s. By the 1750s, the Makua of Mauruca had gained many firearms by trading slaves to French oceanic traders as labor for their island plantation colonies of Mauritius and Reunion in the Indian Ocean. During the second half of the 18th century, Brazilian slavers also became involved in this gun trade. Despite an official ban, some Portuguese merchants supplied the Makua with gunpowder, as that was the only commodity that they would accept in exchange for slaves. While the Makua of the 1720s fought entirely with locally made spears and arrows, they were well equipped with firearms by the 1750s, which increased their aggressiveness toward the Portuguese and Yao.

Beginning in the late 1740s, warfare between the Makua and Portuguese became endemic. The main issue was that the Makua were blocking Yao traders from bringing ivory to the coast for export. Murimuno, a Makua ruler about 45 to 60 kilometers from the coast, worried the Portuguese the most, as he was giving asylum to slaves who had escaped Portuguese enclaves. In 1753, a Portuguese military expedition that had been assembled in Lisbon arrived in Mozambique to suppress the troublesome Makua. In September, this force, consisting of over 100 Portuguese regular troops and around 1,000 local auxiliaries, moved inland and burned several of Murimuno's abandoned villages.

Conflict between the Portuguese and their allies prompted a disorderly withdrawal to the coast, during which the army was ambushed by the Makua, who killed half the Portuguese. The Portuguese then convinced the sheikh of Quitangonha, one of their coastal Swahili allies who had been involved in the disastrous campaign, to attack the Makua, who were routed, with many taken captive. Murimuno then led his forces toward the coast for a revenge attack, but they were ambushed by a Quitangonha force that pursued them for three days, inflicting heavy casualties and seizing many prisoners.

In late 1754, Murimuno moved his subjects farther inland, sent peace envoys to the Portuguese, and allowed trade to resume. However, between September 1756 and February 1758, from the end of one dry season through two of the next, Murimuno fought the Yao, which again disrupted coastal trade. The Portuguese were hesitant to act against the Makua for fear of a repeat of the 1753 expedition. However, Makua raids against both Portuguese and Yao became such a problem that in 1766, the Portuguese, assisted by Quitangonha and friendly Makua, conducted operations against their old adversaries, the details of which remain unknown.

From the 1770s, French demands for slaves increased, leading to open warfare between the Makua and Portuguese. After some Portuguese from the coastal settlement of Mosseril seized captives from communities under Murimuno, this Makua ruler led 8,000 warriors against the offending enclave, killing over 100 Portuguese and their servants. The settlement's fort and church were looted. Portuguese food supplies began to run low, as Murimuno forbade trade with them, and many Portuguese settlements were abandoned. The Portuguese then convinced Mocutoamuno, a Makua ruler from Cambira and rival of Murimuno, to lead a combined force of friendly Makua that swept through Murimuno's territory and pushed his people farther inland.

In 1782, the new Portuguese governor-general, Saldanha de Albuquerque, made peace with the Makua, but within two months, their raids resumed. Albuquerque then planned a major campaign against the Makua, but his death delayed preparations. In January and February 1784, Portuguese and local allies repeatedly attacked the hostile Makua communities. While heavy losses prompted Murimuno, whose territory was closest to the Portuguese settlements, to make peace, the Portuguese demand that the Makua agree to permanently allow other African traders to pass through their areas was unacceptable to the other chiefs, who continued fighting. This included Mocutoamuno, who now fought against his erstwhile Portuguese allies.

The hostile Makua, in June, launched another attack on Portuguese settlements like Mosseril. Nine days later, a 3,000-strong force of Portuguese and local allies counterattacked and were supported by the Makua ruler Comalla, who saw an opportunity to attack his rival, Mocutoamuno. This forced all the anti-Portuguese Makua rulers except the powerful Mauruca to surrender. At the end of July, Murimuno ceded his territory to the Portuguese, who took some land but let him continue as chief under their protection. Farther inland, other Makua rulers were more difficult to control, although peace was maintained for the next decade.

The East African coastal slave trade expanded in the 1800s, as Brazilian, French, Spanish, and U.S. slaving vessels were driven from West Africa by the British antislavery squadron. British antislavery patrols in the Indian Ocean were too small and limited in authority to have an impact until the second half of the 19th century. Following a disastrous Portuguese expedition against the Makua in 1811, there was a decade of peace between these two groups. Demand for slaves became great enough that Portuguese traders organized their own raids on the interior, which intensified competition with Makua rulers.

In 1820, the Portuguese mounted an expedition against the Makua of Mauruca. Lacking the military power to control the interior, the Portuguese engaged in a series of intrigues with a shifting network of local allies. In 1857, the Portuguese sent soldiers into Makua territory to acquire slaves, but they were repelled. A promise from the Portuguese governor-general not to seek slaves in that area prevented a Makua attack on the coast. By the 1870s, communities that were victims of slave raiding had moved farther inland, which caused Makua groups to turn on each other to gain captives for the oceanic trade. Makua states began to fragment, and their ability to resist Portuguese intrusion in colonial Mozambique was undermined.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: British Anti-Slavery Squadron; Indian Ocean, Portuguese Conquest of (1498–1698); Zimbabwe Plateau, Portuguese Invasion of (1572–1696)

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Potgieter, Andries Hendrik (1792–1852)

During the mid-19th century, the Boer Trek leader Andries Hendrik Potgieter defeated the Ndebele armies of Mzilikazi and opened up the western Transvaal for Afrikaner settlement in South Africa.

Potgieter was born in Schoemansdal, in the Eastern Cape region of South Africa, on December 19, 1792. He was the son of Hermanus Potgieter, a sheep farmer, and his wife, Petronella. The Potgieters were Afrikaners, descendants of Dutch settlers who had emigrated to South Africa during the 17th century. During the Napoleonic Wars, the Cape Colony came under British rule, and the Potgieters became subjects of the British Empire.

In his youth, Potgieter received a rudimentary education from his parents. The family was often on the move in search of better grazing land for their livestock. In 1812, Potgieter married Elisabeth Helena Botha, his first of four wives (three of whom died during childbirth). In all, he fathered 17 children. In 1813, Potgieter and his father settled their families on farms on the Tarka River. Potgieter's farm prospered, and by the 1830s, he had become a wealthy and well-respected member of the tiny Afrikaner community in the region.

The Afrikaner farmers, or Boers, in the Eastern Cape practiced a combination of agriculture and pastoralism. A Boer farm required thousands of acres to maintain enormous cattle herds. The Boers also relied on slave labor to herd their livestock and cultivate their crops. They acquired their land, labor, and many of their cattle by raiding the African farming communities in neighboring areas. Therefore, they frequently came into conflict with the neighboring Xhosa peoples. The British colonial government took a dim view of many of the Boers' activities. They pressured the farmers to end their incessant warring with the Xhosa and outlawed slavery in the region. By the mid-1830s, many of the Boers were chafing under British rule. They decided to emigrate across the Orange River and place themselves outside the Cape Colony's jurisdiction.

Despite his wealth and standing in his community, Potgieter volunteered to lead a party of settlers on a trek (migration) out of the colony. Toward the end of 1835, he and his extended family left Cape Colony and headed out across the Vaal River, joined by several local Boer families. After a long journey, the party stopped in the vicinity of the Vet River to allow their herds to graze. Potgieter and several men left the Trekkers there and went on an extended reconnaissance mission that brought them as far north as the border of modern Zimbabwe. In their absence, the settlers were attacked by the army of the Ndebele ruler Mzilikazi.

After being gone for three months exploring, Potgieter returned to the settlement and immediately organized a defense against the Ndebele. He formed a stockade called a *laager* and, with 40 Boers, held off an Ndebele force in the Battle of Vegkop in 1836, in which the Ndebele suffered 6,000 casualties. Although the Boers were victorious, they also suffered several casualties, including Potgieter's brother and one of his sons-in-law. The Boers repulsed a second attack by Mzilikazi the following year. Following his defeats at the hands of Potgieter, the Ndebele leader fled the area, ultimately settling his people in what is now western Zimbabwe.

The following year, Potgieter joined forces with Andries Pretorius, the leader of another party of Boers, and attacked the Zulu kingdom of King Dingane. However, Potgieter proved unwilling to serve under another Boer commander, and after a humiliating defeat in a Zulu ambush, he and his followers abandoned the campaign against Dingane. They traveled west for two months before settling between the Vet and Vaal rivers. Potgieter bought land on either side of the Vaal River from a chief named Makwana, who had been attacked by Mzilikazi and was happy to have a well-armed settlement nearby. Potgieter's followers spread throughout the region. They remained connected to one another through a council of war, which was under Potgieter's command. They called their new settlement Potchefstroom.

In 1840, Potgieter established contact with the Portuguese colony to the east at Delagoa Bay in the hope of completely freeing his new settlement from British domination. Later in the year, Potgieter and the members of the Potchefstroom community decided to enter a union with the newly declared Afrikaner Republic of Natalia.

The new state recognized Potgieter as "commandant and ruler of Potchefstroom." However, in 1842, the British annexed Natal. Potgieter then declared his own state independent and helped draft a set of constitutional principles that came to be known as the Potgieter Constitution.

With the British in control of Natal, the Boers at Potchefstroom felt increasingly hemmed in. In 1845, Potgieter led a new trek to establish a community farther from British rule and closer to the Portuguese settlement on the coast. However, the new territory, Ohrigstad, proved unhealthy to the trekkers. In 1847, Potgieter led a reconnaissance party north, in search of a more salubrious territory. After crossing the Limpopo, he again came into conflict with his old enemy, Mzilikazi. This time, however, the Ndebele king repulsed Potgieter's attack. In 1848, he led Boers into the Zoutpansberg area, gained land from the local Venda, began hunting elephants, and established Zoutpansbergdorp (later Schoemansdal) as an ivory trade center.

Back in Ohrigstad, Potgieter found his authority challenged by Boer trekkers who had emigrated from Natal. Potgieter in particular clashed with Pretorius over the appropriate way to deal with the British government. Potgieter preferred to retain peaceful relations with the British, so long as the Afrikaners in the Transvaal were left alone, while Pretorius favored a more aggressive, antagonistic stance. In 1852, Pretorius successfully negotiated a treaty with the British that recognized the independence of the Transvaal. This diplomatic success greatly undermined Potgieter's position among the Boers. In the same year, Potgieter, now almost 60 years old, died while out raiding against the Pedi chiefdom on December 16, 1852.

James Burns

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boers; Boer-Venda Wars (1863–1898); Dingane kaSenzagakhona; Makhado; Mzilikazi kaMashobane; Pretorius, Andries; Vegkop, Battle of (October 16, 1836)

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Pretorius, Andries (1798–1853)

Andries Wilhelmus Jacobus Pretorius was a leader of the Boer Great Trek, pressing into the interior of South Africa during the 1830s. He was the victorious general at the Battle of Blood River in 1838 and one of the founders of the Transvaal Republic.

Pretorius was born on November 27, 1798, in Graaff-Reinet, in the eastern region of Cape Colony, in what is now South Africa. His parents were farmers, and he was educated at home. Pretorius was a part of a community of European settlers in the Cape Colony who called themselves *Boers,* a word derived from the Dutch term for "farmer." They spoke Afrikaans, a dialect of Dutch, and were the descendants of Dutch colonists who had settled at the Cape in the middle of the 17th century. The British seized the Cape Colony in 1806.

The Boers in the Eastern Cape practiced a combination of agriculture and pastoralism. A Boer farm required thousands of acres in order to maintain enormous cattle herds. The Boers also relied on slave labor to herd their livestock and work on their large farms. They acquired their land, labor, and many of their cattle by raiding the African farming communities in neighboring areas, frequently bringing Cape Colony into conflict with the Xhosa peoples.

The British administration took a dim view of many of the Boers' activities and pressured the farmers to end their incessant warring with the Xhosa by outlawing slavery in the region. By the mid-1830s, Pretorius and many of his neighbors were chafing under British rule. They decided to cross the Orange River and place themselves outside the Cape Colony's jurisdiction. Pretorius and 6,000 other Boers left the colony in an exodus glorified as the Great Trek. Their moves were not coordinated, and the settlers departed at different times and in different directions. Pretorius and some followers ventured out in 1837.

One of the early trekking parties, led by Piet Retief, had migrated to the coastal plain of Natal. There, they negotiated with the Zulu king Dingane for permission to settle in the region. Dingane agreed to provide them with land if Retief's party would reclaim cattle captured from the Zulu by the neighboring Tlokwa. When Retief and his men appeared the following year with the cattle, however, Dingane massacred the entire party. He then ordered his army to attack the other Boer settlers in the region.

Pretorius was invited to organize a retaliatory strike against Dingane and his army. He mustered a force of almost 500 Boer volunteers and marched into Zululand in late 1838. Pretorius instructed his men to circle their wagons into a defensive encampment, called a *laager,* and they awaited Dingane's attack. On December 16, 1838, 10,000 Zulu warriors fell upon Pretorius's position. The coordinated gunfire of the Boers killed 3,000 warriors and drove off the Zulu attack. The Boer victory was remembered as the Battle of Blood River, and December 16 became a national holiday of the South African Republic (SAR).

Dingane survived the attack, but the defeat severely weakened his hold over his people. Pretorius joined forces with Dingane's brother, Mpande, and launched a final attack on the Zulu state. Dingane fled, and the Zulu threat to the Trek Boers receded. Pretorius and his party founded a republic called Natalia in 1840. The British refused to recognize the new state, however, and annexed the region in 1843. The British action spurred another trek out of Natal, as Boer settlers moved into the region between the Vaal and Orange rivers to escape British influence. Pretorius tried to negotiate with the British authorities on behalf of the Boers. When the British annexed the Afrikaner settlement between the Vaal and Orange rivers, however, he decided that no compromise was possible. He gathered a Boer militia and attacked the British at Boomplaats in August 1848. Defeated, Pretorius led his followers out of the region across the Vaal River. There, they came into conflict with several African states. The British claimed this territory as well, but they were unable to exert any influence so far into the Southern African interior.

Ultimately, the British recognized that they could not control the region and ceded their rights to the territory to a committee led by Pretorius. In the Sand River Convention of 1852, the British recognized the Boer's right to the territory north of the Vaal River. Pretorius's son, Marthinus Wessel Pretorius, became the first president of the new Afrikaner state, called the Republic of the Transvaal, and later the SAR. Andries Pretorius continued to lead military expeditions against the Transvaal's African neighbors, such as the Tswana to the west, until his death on July 23, 1853. After his death, his son named the capital of the Transvaal (Pretoria) after his father.

James Burns

See also: Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Boomplaats, Battle of (August 29, 1848); Dingane kaSenzangakhona; Mpande kaSenzagakhona; Pretorius, Marthinus Wessel; Retief, Piet

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Pretorius, Marthinus Wessel (1819–1901)

Marthinus Wessel Pretorius served as president in two separate Afrikaner republics in the region that is South Africa today. He worked diligently to unify several small states into the South African Republic (SAR) and helped to win his nation's independence from Britain.

Pretorius was born on September 17, 1819, into an Afrikaner family in the eastern Cape Colony region of what is now South Africa. The Afrikaners were the descendants of Dutch settlers who had begun emigrating to South Africa during the 17th century. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain claimed control over the Dutch colony, but British administration proved distasteful to many Afrikaners. During the 1830s, many Afrikaner families abandoned their settlements and migrated north away from British rule in a movement known as the Great Trek. Pretorius's father, Andries Pretorius, became an important leader of the trekkers, or as they came to be known, the *Boers,* which is the Dutch word for "farmer."

In 1837, Andries led a reconnaissance party into the Natal region to scout out areas for potential settlement. In addition, the Pretorius party sought vengeance for the massacre of an earlier group of Boers at the hands of the Zulu king Dingane. As a young man, Pretorius accompanied his father on his trek and participated in its military conflicts. In 1838, he was closely involved in the campaigns against Dingane, culminating in the Battle of Blood River in December 1838. Some 500 Boers prepared for that battle by circling their wagons into a defensive encampment to await Dingane's attack. The expected Zulu force was 10,000 men strong and fell on the position where Pretorius and the Boers were entrenched. The coordinated gunfire of the Boers against the spear-wielding Zulu killed some 3,000 of the African warriors and drove off the attack.

Just over a year later, the offensives against the Zulu continued, as Pretorius and the Boer militia allied with Mpande, the brother of Dingane, who sought to take advantage of the loss of prestige that Dingane had endured after his defeat at Blood River. With his Afrikaner allies, Mpande now decisively defeated Dingane to usurp his throne. He made peace with the Boers and granted them all of southern Natal. In other similar encounters, the Afrikaner farmers had displaced several African peoples and established several tiny, sparsely populated republics in the regions north of the Cape Colony by the 1840s.

Still, the Afrikaners had to deal with the British. As they moved outside British jurisdiction, the British administration at Cape Colony attempted to exert some control over those new communities. The Afrikaners bitterly resented these efforts. When the British annexed the Natal region, an Afrikaner force, led by Andries, tried to drive the British out of the region of the Orange River. However, Andries's expedition was defeated, and he and his followers retreated to the region north of the Vaal River. In the wake of that defeat, he sought an accommodation with the British authorities. In 1852, he signed the Sand River Convention, a document in which the British recognized the independence of the Afrikaner Republics north of the Vaal River.

The following year, Andries died. By that time, Marthinus Wessel Pretorius had made a name for himself among the Afrikaners, having participated with distinction in his father's military campaigns. He sought to unify the several tiny republics into one state. In 1855, he convinced a committee of delegates from the several states to draw up a constitution for the Transvaal Republic. He helped write the constitution for the new state, also called the SAR, and became its first president in 1857.

As president of the SAR, Pretorius began to unify his state with the Orange Free State, the other significant independent Boer state in the region. In 1860, he ran for president in the Orange Free State. He won, intending to govern the two republics simultaneously. Many Transvaalers objected to his dual position, however, and demanded that he choose between the two states. He then resigned the presidency in the SAR to become president in the Orange Free State. At that juncture, a different group of Transvaalers refused to recognize Pretorius's replacement and continued to view Pretorius as the legitimate head of state. Pretorius thus remained involved in the affairs of the Transvaal, and in 1864, he resigned his position in the Orange Free State. He returned to the Transvaal, where he was again elected president.

In 1867, European miners discovered vast diamond deposits in the area of present-day Kimberley. The Pretorius government claimed that the mines fell within its (hazily defined) borders. His maladroit efforts to secure the Transvaal's claim, however, led the miners to reject any association with the government. They instead declared themselves independent from both British and Afrikaner rule. The British high commissioner of Cape Colony convinced Pretorius to allow the British lieutenant-governor of Natal to arbitrate the dispute. The judgment went against the Transvaal, and Pretorius lost out on the tremendous potential wealth of the Kimberly diamond mines. In the Transvaal, public reaction against that ruling was severe, and Pretorius was forced to resign.

By the late 1870s, the British authorities in Cape Colony were becoming increasingly anxious to bring the Afrikaner republics under British rule. In 1877, the British took the first step of that plan by annexing the Transvaal. The republic was by that time debt-ridden and under threat of attack from the powerful neighboring African kingdoms. Yet most Transvaal Afrikaners were hostile to the annexation.

After six years of retirement, Pretorius returned to politics in 1877 to lead the resistance against British rule. In December 1879, encouraged by news of a British force's defeat at the hands of the Zulu, the Transvaal parliament raised its republican flag and called for elections of an independent government. Pretorius then formed a government with Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert, which went to war with Britain to protect the Transvaal's independence. A series of Boer victories over British armies led to a peace treaty recognizing the Transvaal's independence in 1881. With his nation's independence apparently secured, Pretorius retired from politics in 1883. He died on May 19, 1901.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boers; Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boomplaats, Battle of (August 29, 1848); Dingane kaSenzagakhona; Joubert, Petrus Jacobus; Kruger, Paul; Mpande kaSenzagakhona; Pretorius, Andries

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Pulleine, Henry Burmester (1838–1879)

Henry Burmester Pulleine was a British army officer who was killed when in command of the camp at Isandlwana during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. He was born at Spennithorne, Yorkshire, on December 12, 1838, the eldest son of the Anglican rector of Kirby Wiske. He was educated at Marlborough College and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. On November 16, 1855, he was gazetted as ensign, without purchase, in the 30th Regiment and served at various home stations. In June 1858, he joined the 2nd Battalion, 24th Regiment, as lieutenant. He became captain by purchase in 1860 when ably serving in Mauritius for four years in the garrison's Commissariat Department. After further service with his regiment in Burma and India, in 1871, he became major by purchase in the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment, which was then in Malta. After three years with his battalion at Gibraltar, Pulleine proceeded with it to the Cape Colony in January 1875. In 1877, he received his brevet lieutenant-colonelcy.

During the 9th Cape-Xhosa War (1877–1878), Pulleine was commissioned in December 1877 to raise two volunteer frontier corps. One was Pulleine's Rangers, a roughneck infantry unit which he commanded himself, and the other was a cavalry corps, the Frontier Light Horse (FLH). Between June and September 1878, he held his first field command when stationed with half his battalion at Ibeka in the Transkei, but he saw little action.

In September 1878, with war against the Zulu kingdom pending, Pulleine embarked for Natal with the advance guard of his battalion. Although lacking military dash, the genial Pulleine's organizational expertise was appreciated, as was his tactful ability to get along with prickly colonial communities. He consequently commanded at the port city of Durban before serving as commandant at Pietermaritzburg, the colonial capital. In January 1879, he took energetic charge of the remount depot. With the outbreak of the Anglo-Zulu War on January 17, Pulleine rejoined his battalion, which formed part of the No. 3 Column invading Zululand by way of Rorke's Drift. The column advanced to Isandlwana Mountain on January 20. When Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford moved out before dawn on January 22 with half of the No. 3 Column on a reconnaissance-in-force, he left Pulleine in command of the camp, with orders to defend it.

Zulu activity to the north and east kept the Isandlwana garrison on the alert. At mid-morning, Colonel Anthony Durnford arrived with troops of his No. 2 Column to reinforce the camp. He was now the senior officer present, but he decided to maintain the independence of his command and moved forward to intercept Zulu operating eastward of the camp. Obedient to his orders to defend the camp, Pulleine refused to detach troops in support. But when Durnford encountered the left horn of the Zulu army, Pulleine deployed his troops forward in a thin, extended skirmishing line north of the camp to cover Durnford's retreat to his right. The Zulu army outflanked these dispositions, and when Pulleine attempted to withdraw and concentrate his men closer to the camp, the Zulu center broke the line. He was killed among his men in the final stage of the battle, when the British were attempting to conduct a fighting retreat toward the Mzinyathi River.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Durnford, Anthony William; Holland's Shop, Battle of (December 2, 1877); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879)

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Rabih ibn Fadl Allah (1845–1900)

Born in a poor part of Khartoum, Rabih ibn Fadl Allah (also known as "Rabih Zubayr") became a slaver working under Zubayr Pasha Rahma Mansur in the Bahr al-Ghazal region of western Sudan. Through military prowess and organizational acumen, Rahih eventually became Zubayr's main lieutenant.

In 1874, Rabih led his master's army in the conquest of Darfur. After the ruler of Egypt had Zubayr imprisoned and his heir executed in 1879, Rabih took control of the slave army, which was equipped with rifles, muskets, and some cannon. To escape the Egyptian army in Bahr al-Ghazal, Rabih established a state in Azande territory from 1880 to 1884 and then moved farther west to defeat the sultanate of Wadai. Based in Dar al-Kuti, in the north of what is now the Central African Republic, and Dar Runga, in the south of what is now Chad, he incorporated local people into his slave regiments and traded slaves and ivory for firearms.

In 1892, Rabih's 20,000-strong force defeated the Bagirmi state and took control of the farming land between the Chari and Loganne rivers. Since the French were beginning to send expeditions into this area, Rabih's army moved northwest in 1896 and conquered the Bornu state near Lake Chad and planned farther westward expansion into the Sokoto Caliphate. During the late 1890s, three French expeditions set out from different origins to secure French control of Lake Chad.

In 1896, Ensign Emil Gentil led an expedition out of Brazzaville and up the Congo River by steamer toward the Lower Chari River. In 1899, Captain Paul Voulet and Lieutenant Julien Chanoine directed an expedition from Senegal eastward across the Sahara that was so violent another French force under Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Francois Klobb was sent to stop it, but Klobb was killed on Voulet's order, and eventually Voulet and Chanoine were killed by their own men. In 1898, an expedition under Major Amedee-Francois Lamy marched south from Algiers across the Sahara, defeated some Tuareg, and linked up with survivors of the ill-fated Voulet mission at Lake Chad in February 1900.

On April 21, 1900, Gentil's and Lamy's expeditions joined on the east bank of the Chari across from the town of Kousseri in today's northern Cameroon; the next day, with 700 Tirailleurs, along with 600 allied Bagirmi infantry and 200 cavalry, they attacked Rabih's camp, where his 10,000 men were routed. Rabih was killed and his severed head brought to the dying Lamy, who had also been injured in the battle, before it was displayed as proof of the French conquest. French control of what is now Chad, administered from Fort Lamy (now

Ndjamena) linked their Central, West, and North African territories. While some remember Rabih as an anticolonial hero, he terrorized and enslaved the people of southern Chad.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Chad, French Conquest of (1895–1900); Egyptian Army; Kouno, Battle of (October 28, 1899); Kousseri, Battle of (April 22, 1900); Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (1897–1896); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914); Voulet-Chanoine Mission (1898–1900)

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Rawlinson, Sir Henry Seymour, 1st Baron Rawlinson (1864–1925)

Sir Henry Seymour Rawlinson was a significant general in the British army, with several major victories in World War I. Born on February 20, 1864, at Trent Manor, Dorset, the son of a British army officer, he was educated at Eton and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. He joined the King's Royal Rifle Corps of the British army in 1884 and a year later became aide-de-camp to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts in India, on whose staff he served intermittently in following years.

Rawlinson took part in the 1886–1887 Burma campaign and the 1898 reconquest of the Sudan, where he served as deputy assistant adjutant general on Horatio Kitchener's staff. During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Rawlinson was initially appointed to the staff of Lieutenant-General Sir George White in Natal and was besieged in Ladysmith. Subsequently, Rawlinson became deputy assistant quartermaster general on Roberts's staff and accompanied him back to Britain in December 1900. Rawlinson then returned to South Africa to join Kitchener's staff. In May 1901, he took command of a mobile column hunting down Boers in the Orange Free State and Transvaal and later commented that his force had covered some 8,400 kilometers, during which they killed 54 Boers and captured another 1,376 while suffering only 12 dead and 42 wounded. In 1903, Rawlinson, now a colonel, was appointed commandant of the Staff College, Camberley. Promoted to major-general in 1909, Rawlinson received command of the 3rd Division in 1910.

With the beginning of World War I, Rawlinson briefly served at the War Office before being appointed to command the 4th Division in France. In October 1914, he was sent to Antwerp to command the IV Corps, with the task of holding the city. Antwerp fell before he arrived, however, and he was then ordered to cover the flank of the Belgian army as it retreated to the southwest.

As a corps commander in France in 1915, Rawlinson fought in the battles of Neuve Chapelle/Aubers Ridge (March 10–13) and Festubert (May 15–25), as well as the Third Battle of Artois (September 25–October 25). In early 1916, Rawlinson was promoted to lieutenant-general and appointed to command the newly formed Fourth Army. British Expeditionary Force (BEF) commander General Sir Douglas Haig assigned Rawlinson's army the leading role in the Somme Offensive (July 1–November 19, 1916). Rawlinson envisioned a limited attack but was overruled by Haig, who hoped for a breakthrough and complete victory. On July 1, the opening day of the Battle of the Somme, Rawlinson's men absorbed 57,470 casualties in what was the bloodiest single day in British military history. Haig continued the offensive with enormous cost of life until November 1916.

Despite being promoted to full general in January 1917, Rawlinson was relegated to a secondary role for that year. While generals Sir Hubert Gough and Sir Herbert Plumer directed the Passchendaele Offensive (Third Battle of Ypres, July 31–November 10, 1917), Rawlinson was tasked with planning a combined naval-army landing on the Belgian coast that was never executed. When Plumer departed for Italy in November 1917, Rawlinson replaced him as commander of the Second Army. In February 1918, the British command structure was reorganized, and Rawlinson was appointed British military representative to the Supreme War Council at Versailles. In March 1918, Rawlinson was recalled to army command, taking over the remnants of the Fifth Army, later renamed the Fourth Army.

On July 4, 1918, Rawlinson carried out a successful limited attack at Le Hamel. A month later, on August 8, he launched a much larger attack at Amiens. This latter attack was a complete success, described by General Erich Ludendorff as "the black day of the German Army in the history of this war."

Rawlinson's Fourth Army, which had a strength of 24 Allied divisions and 450 tanks, spearheaded the British offensives of autumn 1918. His army defeated the Germans at the Second Battle of Albert (August 21–22), captured Peronne on August 31, stormed the Saint-Quentin Canal (September 29–October 10) and drove the Germans from the Siegfriedstellung (Siegfried Line, known to the Allies as the "Hindenburg Line"), and participated in the Battle of the Selle (October 17) and Sambre Offensive (November 4–11). Between August 8 and November 11, Rawlinson's army advanced 100 kilometers, capturing 80,000 German prisoners and taking 1,100 artillery pieces.

In 1919, Rawlinson directed the evacuation of the Allied forces from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (Archangel) in North Russia. After briefly commanding the Aldershot Home Forces in 1919–1920, Rawlinson was appointed commander-in-chief of India in 1920. Created a baron in 1919, Rawlinson died in Delhi on March 28, 1925.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Plumer, Herbert; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Rooiwal, Battle of (April 11, 1902); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); White, George S.

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Rawson, Sir Harry Holdsworth (1843–1910)

A British admiral, born at Walton on the Hill, Lancashire on November 5, 1843, Sir Harry Holdsworth Rawson attended Marlborough College in 1854–1855 before entering the Royal Navy on April 9, 1857. He served in the Second China War, including at the capture of the Taku Forts and at Beijing. During his naval career, Rawson was twice rewarded for saving a life at sea. He served in Cyprus in 1878 and as the principal transport officer during the Egyptian campaign in 1882. In 1895, Rawson was appointed commander-in-chief at the Cape of Good Hope and west coast of Africa station.

In August 1895, Rawson organized and personally commanded a naval expedition in the East Africa Protectorate against Mbarak bin Rachid, a Mazaria chief on the coast. After a five-day march from Mombassa, the expedition, which consisted of 300 sailors and marines along with askaris and porters, captured Mweli on August 17, 1895, after a brief battle. Rawson occupied Mweli, which had been Mbarak's stronghold, for four days and destroyed the stockades before retiring. The seizing of Mweli failed to end the rebellion, which was suppressed in 1896 only upon the arrival of reinforcements from India.

After the unexpected death of the sultan of Zanzibar on August 25, 1896, Seyyid Khalid seized the palace and claimed the throne. Rawson arrived aboard his flagship the following day and, after consultations with the British diplomatic representative on the island, an ultimatum was issued to Khalid. Upon the expiration of the ultimatum, the Royal Navy squadron fired on the palace. After the 37-minute bombardment, Khalid fled to the German consulate and the British installed Hamed bin Muhammad as sultan in the British protectorate.

On January 15, 1897, Rawson received orders from the admiralty to mount a punitive expedition against Benin City, where British political officers had been massacred 11 days earlier. In less than a month, he organized the logistics required to conduct such an expedition and on February 3, 1897, he concentrated his squadron, consisting of six ships, off the West African coast. The 700-strong naval brigade, which was personally commanded by Rawson, was transported up the Benin River by river-steamers to Warrigi before making an overland advance on the city. Supported by a local contingent of the Niger Coast Protectorate Force, the brigade captured Benin City on February 18, 1897, after a march through difficult terrain with heavy skirmishing. Benin City was looted and burned by the British before Rawson withdrew on February 22, 1897. While the retirement and embarkation of the naval brigade was completed by February 27, 1897, many of the British, Rawson included, continued to suffer heavily from the effects of malaria.

In 1898, Rawson was promoted to vice-admiral and appointed commander-in-chief of the Channel Squadron. He relinquished the command in 1901 and the following year was appointed governor of New South Wales, an appointment he held until 1909. Rawson was promoted to admiral in 1903 and retired from the navy in 1908. He died in London on November 3, 1910.

Bradley P. Tolppanen

See also: Benin, British Conquest of (1897); East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Egypt, British Occupation (1882); Mazrui Rebellion (1895–1896)

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Rejjaf, Battle of (January 16, 1897)

After the subjugation of the Swahili-Arabs of northeastern Congo in the mid-1890s, the Belgian king Leopold II attempted to expand his Congo Free State to the headwaters of the Nile. As such, he entered a race with the French, who sent an expedition overland from the Atlantic coast, and the British, who dispatched a large Anglo-Egyptian force up the Nile from Egypt. All these colonial forces were pitted against the Mahdist state in Sudan, which has risen in the 1880s and expelled Anglo-Egyptian occupation.

In 1894, Leopold had leased the Lado Enclave, a part of southern Sudan that included access to the Nile, from Britain for the duration of his life. In 1896, Force Publique (FP) officer Francis Dhanis led a 30,000-strong expedition, which included many local auxiliaries, northeast toward the White Nile, but it disintegrated when African soldiers mutinied. At the end of 1896, another smaller FP expedition was assembled at Dungu, in what is now the far northeast corner of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Under Commandant Louis Napoleon Chaltin, it consisted of 800 FP African soldiers organized into seven companies, each led by a European, a single field gun, and 250 African supply carriers. The local Azande, who had been fighting the Mahdist slavers, provided the expedition with 500 spearmen, 50 gunmen, and 400 porters.

On January 1, 1897, Chaltin's force advanced northeast, and on February 14, it arrived at the old Ottoman post of Bedden just a few hours march south of Rejjaf, which represented the southern terminus of Nile river traffic and was controlled by the Mahdists. The Mahdists had first occupied Rejjaf in 1888 and given the prevalence of tropical disease, it was turned into a penal colony. Indeed, resistance by local people had recently confined the Mahdists to the Rejjaf area, which they had trouble resupplying, as river steamers from Khartoum struggled to navigate the vast Sudd swamp.

On the morning of February 17, after being harassed the previous evening by Mahdist skirmishers, the FP expedition advanced north with the Nile on its right flank and its Azande allies on its left. It quickly encountered a Mahdist force of 2,000 dug in on high ground along a three-kilometer-wide front. With his single cannon shelling the enemy, Chaltin ordered four of his companies to advance to within 200 meters of the enemy, where they engaged intense rifle fire. The other three companies and the Azande were held in reserve. The Mahdist commander sent part of his force to outflank the Belgian left wing, but they were isolated by Chaltin's reserves. All the FP and Azande fighters then advanced, turning an initially orderly Mahdist withdrawal into a disorganized rout in which many were killed.

After a two-hour rest, Chaltin's force continued its northward advance and in 90 minutes arrived at Mount Rejjaf, which was occupied by Mahdists whose defensive line stretched down to the Nile. Given that fire from the Mahdists' single cannon was ineffective, Chaltin ordered an attack by five FP companies that outflanked the enemy and trapped them at the riverbank, where they were slaughtered by close-range canister shot and rifle fire. The FP troops pursued the surviving Mahdists to Rejjaf, which, after some close-quarter fighting, was secured by the end of the day. The next morning, Chaltin's force discovered that the Mahdists had abandoned the nearby fort. The FP captured two cannon, 700 rifles, a significant amount of ammunition, and four tons of ivory. Aside from one European FP officer recorded as killed, the number of casualties suffered by both sides remains unknown. However, it seems almost certain that the Mahdists suffered serious losses.

Since Chaltin believed his force too small to advance any farther, he fortified Rejjaf and other nearby posts. With the British defeat of the Mahdists at Omdurman and the French withdrawal from Fashoda in 1898, it seemed obvious that the Nile would be controlled from London. The Belgians continued to administer the Lado Enclave until Leopold's death in 1910, when it was incorporated into the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and two years later, its southern portion was ceded to the British colony of Uganda.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–1894); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Dervishes; Dhanis, Francis; Fashoda Incident (1898); Force Publique (to 1914); Leopold II; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah)

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Retief, Piet (1780–1838)

Piet Retief led one of the parties of Voortrekkers, or Dutch-speaking settlers, who began leaving the Cape Colony in 1837 to escape British rule during the Great Trek. He and his followers were massacred by Zulu warriors in 1838 in what was eventually remembered as one of the most significant events in the history of white Afrikaner nationalism.

Retief was born into a Dutch-speaking family in Wagenmakersvallei in the western Cape region of South Africa on November 12, 1780. His family was descended from French immigrants who had arrived in South Africa during the 17th century. As a young man, Retief worked on his family's vineyard. In 1812, he headed to the eastern Cape, where he became a trader in the Grahamstown area. He married Lenie Greyling in 1814. When British settlers arrived in the area in 1820, Retief made a small fortune selling them grain at inflated prices. However, he proved to be an incautious businessman and eventually lost his fortune through risky investments.

At that time, the eastern Cape was a frontier between the European settlement radiating out of Cape Town and the Xhosa communities, whose population was gradually expanding westward. Most of the Europeans in the region were Boers, or Dutch ranchers, who lived by raising cattle. The Xhosa also raised livestock, and the two communities were in a constant struggle for cattle, pasturage, and water. Retief was born in the middle of a century of intermittent warfare between Xhosa and Europeans.

During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain seized control of the Dutch Cape Colony. British administration proved distasteful to many of the Dutch-speaking people, or as they eventually came to call themselves, *Afrikaners*. The British taxed the settlers and outlawed slavery in the colony. On the eastern Cape frontier, many Boers, like Retief, felt that the British were not doing enough to assist them against the Xhosa. Retief's anger toward the British intensified in 1832, when his business failed, the government confiscated his estate, and he ended up briefly in a debtors' prison. His fortunes revived in 1834, when war broke out once again between the settlers and the Xhosa. Retief served with distinction against the Xhosa, earning himself an administrative position in the local government. However, he became dissatisfied with the British government returning conquered land to the Xhosa, and in 1837, he published a manifesto in a Grahamstown newspaper that detailed his complaints against British rule and his desire to escape from British domination.

Retief determined to abandon life in the Cape Colony and joined with several Boer families who had decided to settle north beyond the reach of the British authorities. That movement has come to be referred to as the Great Trek, or Boer Trek. Retief's military experience and strong personality earned him the leadership of one of the Voortrekker parties. In 1837, he led several families and their servants north out of the colony in search of new territories. Retief's party initially ventured to Thaba Nchu, in modern Lesotho. There, several parties of Voortrekkers met and planned their next move. When Retief's party arrived in March 1837, he was appointed governor of the Voortrekker community. A quarrel ensued over the best route to follow, with a party under Hendrik Potgieter heading north across the Vaal River and another group following Retief across the Drakensberg Mountains into the lush coastal grasslands of Natal.

There, Retief opened negotiations with the Zulu king, Dingane, and requested permission to settle his followers along a strip of land stretching from the Tugela River to the Umzimvuba River. Dingane had been monitoring the advance of Retief and the other parties of Voortrekkers. He knew that they had defeated the Ndebele king, Mzilikazi, and feared that they would soon conquer Zululand. Wary of Retief and his party, Dingane agreed to cooperate with them if they would retrieve some stolen cattle from the neighboring Tlokwa of Sekonyela.

Retief had already signed a treaty with the Tlokwa ruler and agreed to approach him about the cattle. At the ensuing meeting, Retief captured the Tlokwa chief and took him prisoner. He then extorted the cattle claimed by Dingane, plus many more from the Tlokwa, before releasing their ruler. Retief's triumphant return to Zululand convinced Dingane that the Boers posed a threat to his kingdom. After allegedly signing a document granting land rights to Retief's party and entertaining Retief and his followers with a long evening of drinking and dancing, Dingane's men seized the Boers and put them to death on February 6, 1838.

Word of the massacre of Retief and his followers spread to the Cape Colony, where leader Andries Pretorius raised a small army of almost 500 Boer volunteers to seek revenge against the Zulus. On December 16, 1838, Dingane's army attacked Pretorius's laager, a fortified position composed of circled wagons, and sustained crippling casualties in an engagement that has come to be known as the Battle of Blood River. The battle effectively ended Zulu power in the region for four decades and opened much of Zululand to white settlement. The date became a South African national holiday, remembered as Dingane's Day (the holiday was officially renamed Reconciliation Day in 1994). The massacre of Retief and his party is commemorated at the Voortrekker monument in Pretoria.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Blood River, Battle of (December 16, 1838); Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boers; Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Dingane kaSenzangakhona; Mzilikazi kaMashobane; Potgieter, Andries Hendrik; Pretorius, Andries

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Rhodes, Cecil John (1853–1902)

Cecil John Rhodes was a successful capitalist, ardent imperialist, and prime minister of the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1896. He was forced to resign the prime ministership because of his support of the ill-fated Jameson Raid (December 29, 1895–January 2, 1896). Rhodes influenced many of the events that led to the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899.

Rhodes was born in England in 1853. Suffering from a lung illness, he was sent in about 1866 to join his brother Herbert, who was cotton farming in Natal. The farming was not profitable, so Rhodes and his brother moved to Kimberley, where diamonds had been discovered in 1867. He was a shrewd businessman and realized that a company that monopolized output would effectively control the diamond market.

By age 20, Rhodes had become very wealthy and returned to England to study at Oxford University. He frequently returned to Kimberley to oversee his business, and his activities in forming the De Beers Mining Company in 1880 delayed his graduation until 1881. While a student, Rhodes's imperialistic ambitions began to take shape, and he envisioned British imperial holdings stretching "from the Cape to Cairo," with a federated South Africa.

Rhodes returned to Kimberley in 1881 and became a member of the Cape Colony parliament. In 1885, he persuaded Britain to annex Bechuanaland (modern-day Botswana) in an attempt to curtail Boer territorial expansion. Three years later, Rhodes controlled all the diamond production in Kimberley. With a fraudulently obtained treaty from the Ndebele ruler Lobengula, he secured the charter for the British South Africa Company (BSAC), also known as the "Chartered Company," in 1889, with a mandate to administer the territory between the Limpopo River and Congo Basin in what is now Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Rhodes's ambitions were partially realized when he became prime minister of Cape Colony in 1890. He used this position to further British imperial interests. That same year, he organized a "pioneer" column led by hunter Frederick Selous to occupy Mashonaland, the eastern part of what is now Zimbabwe. In 1893, when it became obvious that Mashonaland did not contain the anticipated gold resources, BSAC forces invaded and conquered the neighboring Ndebele kingdom of Lobengula.

During an African rebellion in 1896–1897, Rhodes personally negotiated a separate peace with the Ndebele so that his forces could concentrate on crushing the Shona. The combined territories of Mashonaland and Matabeleland (the former Ndebele kingdom) later became the colony of Southern Rhodesia. Furthermore, during the 1890s, BSAC agents signed treaties with African rulers north of the Zambezi River, which became the territory of Northern Rhodesia.

Rhodes exploited the grievances of the many foreign immigrants *(uitlanders)* who had flocked to the Boer republic of Transvaal in 1886 after the discovery of gold. The *uitlanders* did not receive full political rights. To ensure that the Transvaal granted the franchise to these foreign immigrants (many of whom were British), Rhodes planned to overthrow the Transvaal government by an *uitlander* rebellion in Johannesburg supported by external forces led by Dr. Leander Starr Jameson. The newly enfranchised *uitlanders* would then vote in the next election for a government that supported Rhodes's goal of a federated South Africa under Britain. However, Jameson's force was surrounded and surrendered to the Boers; the Jameson Raid (1895–1896) was an embarrassing fiasco traced back to Rhodes.

The uproar and controversy caused by the unsuccessful Jameson Raid forced Rhodes to resign as prime minister of Cape Colony and lose his position as chairman of the BSAC. His political career was ruined. The trust between Britain and the Boers was shattered, and armed confrontation seemed inevitable. During the Second Anglo-Boer War, Rhodes was besieged in

Kimberley, where his sense of self-importance caused him to frequently interfere with the military chain of command, priorities, and operations.

Rhodes died in 1902, but De Beers still exists. Created to rehabilitate his image, Rhodes's greatest legacy was his endowment to establish the Rhodes scholarships, which provide academic opportunities at Oxford for scholars from the British Commonwealth, the United States, and Germany. His estate was also instrumental in establishing Rhodes University and the University of Cape Town in South Africa.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); British South Africa Company; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Jameson, Leander Starr; Kimberley, Siege of (October 16, 1899–February 15, 1900); Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Selous, Frederick Courtney

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Rif War (1920–1926)

Spain had held small coastal enclaves across the Straits of Gibraltar in North Africa since the 17th century. In the early 20th century, however, Spain and France reached an agreement to partition Morocco between them. German opposition to this action brought two acute international crises in 1905 and 1911 that nearly resulted in a general European war, but in accordance with the Treaty of Fez (March 30, 1912), Sultan Mulay Hafid was forced to accept a protectorate. Spain assumed de facto control of strips of northern Morocco, while France secured the bulk of the country. Although the Moroccan sultan theoretically was sovereign, he reigned but did not rule. General Louis H. G. Lyautey became French resident-general and held real power. His adroit diplomacy and pacification policies solidified French rule and extended it into the Atlas Mountains region.

Opposition to European control continued, however, notably from Berber communities in the interior Rif Mountains region, who in 1893 had threatened the Spanish enclave of Melilla and forced Spain to send substantial reinforcements to North Africa. Indeed, during World War I (1914–1918), both the French and Spanish governments continued to carry out counterinsurgency operations there. However, a new leader against foreign rule in Morocco arose in 1920 after the war, in the person of Muhammad ibn Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi. In 1921, Abd el-Krim, joined by his brother, who became his chief adviser and commander of the rebel army, raised the standard of resistance against foreign control of Morocco. This marked the beginning of the Rif War (1921–1926), although some date the conflict from 1920.

In late July 1921, determined to destroy the rebels, Spanish general Fernandes Silvestre moved into the Rif Mountains with some 20,000 men. Silverstre failed to carry out adequate reconnaissance or take sufficient security precautions, though, and at Annual (Anual) on July 21, Rif forces fell on the Spaniards, killing as many as 12,000 and taking several thousand others prisoner. The rebels also seized important quantities of arms and equipment there, as well as from Spanish regional outposts.

Some of the Rif forces now advanced on Melilla, the principal Spanish base in the eastern Rif region, held by 14,000 Spanish troops. Fearful that an attempt to take Melilla might lead to a widened war due to the many citizens of other European states living there, Abd el-Krim ordered his troops not to attack. Later, he characterized this decision as his biggest mistake of the war. Meanwhile, news of the Spanish military disaster of Annual shook Spain to its core and led directly to the establishment of a virtual military dictatorship in Spain under General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923.

Also in 1923, Abd el-Krim proclaimed the Republic of the Rif, with himself as president. He endeavored to create a centralized Berber government that would respect traditional values but override tribal rivalries. Fighting continued, and by the end of 1924, the Spanish authority was reduced to the coastal enclaves of Melilla and Tetuán. At its peak, insurgent strength numbered some 80,000–90,000 men, although only about 20,000 rifles were available to them at any one time, and many of the modern weapons in Rifian hands were poorly maintained.

Aircraft played a key role in this war. During the fighting, the Spanish army in Africa employed up to 150 planes, including British-built Airco DH-4s bombers, to drop conventional ordnance and also considerable amounts of German-developed mustard gas on Rifian villages. Targets included souks (markets), livestock, and Abd el-Krim's headquarters. The Spaniards also used their aircraft to resupply encircled posts. Rifian antiaircraft fire did bring down a number of low-flying Spanish planes, however.

On April 12, 1925, an overconfident Abd el-Krim opened a major offensive against the French part of Morocco, in what many historians call a major miscalculation. Lyautey had only limited resources, and Abd el-Krim's forces were able to overrun 45 of 66 French posts on the Ouergha River Valley. Lyautey used French air assets to good effect, however, and in July, he was able to halt the Berber advance short of Fez. Faced with the Rif threat, that same month the French and Spanish governments agreed to close cooperation against Abd el-Krim. The French contributed 150,000 men under Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, while the Spanish assembled 50,000 under General José Sanjurjo.

Pétain abandoned Lyautey's population-centric methods in favor of a highly kinetic industrial approach to the war that employed infantry along with cavalry, but also tanks, artillery, and attack aircraft. By late summer, Rifian forces were under seige by the French and Spanish from the north and south.

In September 1925, coalition forces carried out an amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay near Abd el-Krim's headquarters. Within a month, 90,000 French and Spanish troops were ashore in what was the most significant operation of its kind in any irregular war during the interwar period.

November 1925–April 1926 saw both sides in winter quarters, with only limited French and Spanish air operations. Facing overwhelming force and technological superiority in the form of modern aircraft artillery, and with his own weapons stocks dwindling and forces melting away, Abd el-Krim surrendered to the French on May 26, 1926. This action brought the Rif War to a close, although the French continued to fight various insurgent tribes in the Atlas Mountains until the early 1930s.

Dr. William T. Dean III and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Abd el-Krim al-Khattabi, Muhammad ibn; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Lyautey, Louis Hubert; Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

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Roberts, Frederick Sleigh (1832–1914)

Possibly the bravest and most capable general officer produced by the British army in the latter half of the 19th century, Frederick Sleigh Roberts mastered almost all aspects of military command. Starting with an uncommonly good grasp of logistics, he went on to display an intelligent understanding of both strategy and tactics. Perhaps most important of all, he established a rapport with both officers and men, the latter affectionately referring to him as "Bobs." When Britain found itself humiliated in the opening battles of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), it put its trust in Roberts, who amply rewarded this faith.

Born on September 30, 1832 in Cawnpore, India, Frederick was the son of Sir Abraham Roberts, a general in the service of the British East India Company, and Isabella Bunbury. Frederick returned to Britain in 1834 and eventually entered the prestigious school Eton in 1845. The next year, he entered the military academy at Sandhurst. Instead of finishing his studies at Sandhurst, he transferred to the East India Company's training school and obtained a commission in the Bengal Army.

In 1852, Roberts joined his father in India. Posted together at Peshawar on the North-West Frontier, Roberts served as his father's aide-de-camp. When the Indian Rebellion broke out in 1857, he became a member of General Sir Neville Chamberlain's staff and later served with General John Nicholson. As a staff and artillery officer, he took part in the heavy fighting that led to the British recapture of Delhi in September. Wounded in the British assault on Delhi, Roberts recovered and took part in the operations that finally culminated in the recapture of Lucknow in November 1857. In January 1858, he won the Victoria Cross for bravery at the Battle of Khudaganj.

Frederick Sleigh Roberts (1832–1914) was perhaps the bravest and most capable general officer produced by the British Army in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In addition to extensive service in India, he participated in the British invasion of Ethiopia in 1868 and commanded British forces in South Africa during a critical phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). (Library of Congress)

Having fallen ill as a result of hard campaigning, Roberts traveled to Britain in 1858. Meeting Nora Bews during his recovery, he married her in 1859. He returned to India the same year, seeing action on the North-West Frontier. In 1868, Roberts joined the Ethiopian expedition as an assistant quartermaster-general under General Robert Napier, who sought to free a number of European hostages held by Emperor Tewodros II. Roberts did not see any combat, but having participated in an impressive logistical operation, he obtained much important experience. He returned to India, where he won a reputation as an outstanding quartermaster who regularly overcame great supply difficulties. After becoming quartermaster-general of the British Indian army in 1875, he returned to the North-West Frontier to command British forces there.

For some time, Russian encroachments into Afghanistan had concerned the British in India. The British had no desire to invade Afghanistan, but they did not wish to see the region fall under Russian influence for fear that it would become a springboard for an invasion of India. In July 1878, Afghanistan's Amir Sher Ali received a Russian mission at his court but turned away a British one. After the emir refused to respond to a British ultimatum, three columns of British troops invaded Afghanistan, precipitating the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

One of these columns, under Roberts, advanced up the Kurram River and occupied the Khost Valley, threatening Kabul. Destroying an Afghan force at Peiwar Kotal with very light losses, Roberts played an important role in bringing the new emir, Yakub Khan (the successor to Sher Ali, who had died in February), to the peace table.

The Treaty of Gandamak, signed on May 26, 1879, put a British minister resident in control of Afghan foreign policy and placed the strategic mountain passes between India and Afghanistan in British hands.

In September 1879, however, Afghan soldiers murdered the British minister resident, and war began anew. Roberts invaded Afghanistan through the Kurram Pass again, defeated an Afghan force at Charasia on October 6, and captured Kabul. In mid-December, another Afghan force attacked him near Shepur. Holding the Afghans at bay for more than a week, he finally defeated them on December 23, 1879, thus ending the war.

The British government installed a different emir, Abdur Rahman. But a rival claimant to the Afghan throne, Ayub Khan, arose and besieged a British garrison at Kandahar. In a 23-day march, Roberts covered the 500 kilometers between Kabul and Kandahar. Reaching the latter place on August 31, he defeated the besieging Afghan army the next day. Because of his exploits, Roberts became a national hero. During his Afghan campaigns, he showed an excellent command of logistics and tactics. A careful planner who proved particularly careful with the lives of his men, Roberts won a great deal of loyalty among the rank and file of his army.

In 1881, Roberts became commander of British forces in Madras. Four years later, he assumed command of the British Indian Army, a post he held until 1893. In 1892, he was made Baron Roberts of Kandahar. Returning to Britain from India, he became a field marshal and was made commander of British forces in Ireland in 1895.

After General Sir Redvers Buller's forces suffered a series of defeats in the opening stages of the Boer War, the British government sent Roberts to South Africa in an attempt to salvage Britain's military fortunes. Arriving in January 1900, Roberts reorganized British logistics. Instead of dispersing the efforts of the British army in attempts to relieve besieged British garrisons at Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking, he gathered all British units in the Cape together in one main army. With this force, he concentrated his efforts on capturing Bloemfontein. After fighting and maneuvering his way forward, Roberts succeeded in capturing the town on March 13, relieving Kimberley and capturing 4,000 Boer prisoners at Paardeberg along the way.

Roberts remorselessly pursued the Boers from the Orange Free State into the Transvaal Republic and reached Johannesburg on May 31, 1900. Only a few days later, his forces captured Pretoria. Just south of the town, Roberts defeated the Boers at Diamond Hill on June 9. Pushing the Boers eastward, he beat them yet again at Middelburg on August 27. The Boer army disintegrated, with many of its troops heading toward the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. With the last organized Boer force defeated, Roberts went home, little realizing that the conflict would continue as a guerrilla war for another two years. In recognition of his services, he became a viscount and then an earl.

After returning to Britain, Roberts served as commander-in-chief of the British army from 1901 to 1904. After retiring, he devoted most of his time to the cause of compulsory military service. Believing that the Royal Navy might prove incapable of defending Britain from invasion, he became president of the National Service

League and demanded that the government employ conscription to create an army of home defense. Although Roberts did not achieve his aim—Britain did not use conscription until 1916, in the midst of World War I—he did succeed in bringing the issue of conscription to the public's attention. After World War I broke out in 1914, Roberts visited France to boost the morale of British troops stationed there. He fell ill and died at St. Omer, France, on November 14, 1914.

Hubert Dubrulle

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Buller, Redvers Henry; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Napier, Robert C.; Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900); Tewodros II

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Roberts, Joseph Jenkins (1809–1876)

When Joseph Jenkins Roberts immigrated to Liberia in 1829, he entered one of the most unusual settlements in Africa. On the inland plateau and within the vast rain forests, indigenous groups lived as they had for years, while along the coast, spotted with lagoons, marshlands, and white-sand beaches, recently arrived blacks from the United States bargained with local chiefs, gained land, and carved out a new country—a place of hope where former slaves could live in freedom, but at the expense of local Africans.

Roberts was born on March 15, 1809, to a mulatto family in Virginia; they were part of the small free black community that existed in the antebellum American South. He and other freedmen experienced severe restrictions in the United States, as laws of segregation became increasingly harsh, pushing free blacks closer to the conditions of slaves. These laws reflected white fears about liberated blacks and complemented the perplexity felt by many white abolitionists: they believed that slavery was evil and should be ended, but at the same time, free blacks and whites could never live together peacefully.

Out of this quandary came the American Colonization Society (ACS). The ACS advocated ending slavery and sending freedmen to Africa. In 1820, an ACS ship, the *Elizabeth,* left the United States and arrived on Africa's western Grain Coast, carrying 88 free blacks. While aboard ship, the settlers wrote and signed the Elizabeth Compact, which outlined their government. More settlers arrived in 1821; many died from disease, but the survivors began building a community called Liberia, the Home of the Free.

Liberia, however, nearly collapsed, and when Roberts arrived and began a merchant trade, the settlement still seemed a tenuous undertaking. Perhaps Liberia's salvation was wrought in 1822 when Jehudi

Ashmun, a white Methodist missionary sent by the ACS as director of the colony, tackled its mounting problems. He helped organize a militia, prodded the colonists to farm rather than rely on trading for food, laid out a town called Christopolis (later renamed Monrovia, after James Monroe, president of the United States), purchased additional lands, and reduced the African slave trade.

In the late 1820s, other American colonization groups acquired lands near the ACS project. In 1838, most of them merged into the Commonwealth of Liberia, under a white governor appointed by the ACS. At this time, the ACS chose Roberts as vice governor, and he became renowned for his use of force and negotiation in subduing indigenous communities. When the governor died in 1841, Roberts succeeded him, becoming Liberia's first black leader.

Roberts faced a great challenge as governor when differences within the country's population caused substantial tensions. Conflicts broke out between Americo-Liberians and Africans. The latter neither understood the concept of land sales nor supported the actions of their chiefs in transferring land to these intruders. Furthermore, the settlers always considered Liberia a nation for black American immigrants; they patterned their emerging government after that of the United States and many social customs after those of the antebellum South. They excluded indigenous people from any substantive political participation, and many Africans thus considered the immigrants interlopers, akin to white Europeans.

As a result, political clashes occurred among Americo-Liberians. Several lines of dispute emerged: between mulattoes and darker-skinned blacks, between farmers and merchants, and between city and rural dwellers. In addition, Roberts faced substantial economic difficulties and the cumbersome arrangement of ACS control.

Under Roberts, Liberia moved toward independence and recognition as a nation. After Britain rejected Liberian sovereignty under ACS rule and British agents refused all Liberian taxes levied on their trade, Roberts insisted that Liberia needed nationhood. The ACS agreed, and on July 26, 1847, the Americo-Liberians adopted a declaration of independence and a constitution. Roberts became Liberia's first president.

As a prominent merchant, Roberts applied his financial acumen to the government. He reformed policies on customs tariffs and restricted foreign traders to six designated ports where duties could be collected. In 1849, he signed a commercial agreement with Britain.

Roberts exerted his leadership in other areas as well. In the 1850s, he visited Prussia, Holland, and Belgium, as well as France, where he obtained an audience with Napoleon III. These visits earned diplomatic recognition for Liberia. He supported the final elimination of the local slave trade and in 1856, personally led an armed force that quelled an indigenous uprising. He also organized the True Liberian or Republican Party, which retained power until 1869. This party mainly reflected merchant interests and the power of mulattoes, who as an educated elite within the Americo-Liberian community had formed a governing clique.

Roberts supported the establishment of the Masons (an international secret fraternity) in 1851, and within Masonic lodges, he and other Liberian leaders often worked out political policies before presenting them publicly. This network became an important part of the young nation's elite power structure.

After five terms as president, Roberts was defeated for reelection in 1856. He subsequently became president of the new College of Liberia, a position he held until his death. In the late 1860s, a diplomatic dispute erupted with Britain over an outstanding loan, the perennial economic crisis worsened, and the legislature removed the president. Facing this severe emergency, Liberia's legislators chose Roberts to again serve as president. He held office from 1872 to 1876, during which time he rejected a transfer of territory to Britain. His term was one of the last exertions of mulatto political domination. On February 24, 1876, one month after leaving office, he died in Monrovia. Roberts is today considered the "Father of Liberia."

Neil A. Hamilton

See also: West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); Liberian Expansion (1821–1916)

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Rooiwal, Battle of (April 11, 1902)

The Boer "bittereinders" continued a guerrilla campaign against the vastly numerically superior British forces during the last phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War. By the start of 1902, there were around 3,000 Boer fighters, organized into three commando units, operating in the western Transvaal under the overall leadership of Jacobus De la Rey. In late February, they captured a British wagon train and on March 7, at Tweebosch, successfully ambushed a British column under Lord Methuen, who became the only British general to be captured during the war.

On April 6, British commander Horatio Kitchener dispatched Colonel Ian Hamilton to lead yet another sweep of the western Transvaal in search of De la Rey and his elusive Boers. They intended to trap the Boers between several moving columns and defended positions. As directed by Hamilton, Colonel Robert Kekewich, who had commanded the garrison at Kimberley, led a column of 3,000 mounted infantry, supported by six field guns and two automatic light guns, to dig in around a hill at Rooiwal, which they did on April 10. The Boers had previously observed this position and believed it to be weakly defended. The next morning, some 1,700 mounted Boers under F. J. Potgieter and Jan Kemp attacked the Rooiwal position in an attempt to break out of the British encirclement. Faced with charging Boer cavalry firing their rifles from the saddle, many of the inexperienced British soldiers abandoned their positions and ran. However, British artillery and rifle fire halted the Boers some 30 meters from the British line, causing them to retreat. At a time when the Boers could not afford to take casualties, 50 of them (including Potgieter) had been killed, 130 had been wounded, and 50 taken prisoner. Some 70 British troops were killed or wounded.

Just as the fighting ended, Hamilton and another British column under Colonel Henry Rawlinson arrived at the scene, but a pursuit was delayed due to anxieties over possible Boer ambush. Later that morning, Hamilton released mounted pursuit forces that captured another 50 Boers and recovered field guns lost at Tweebosch. Kitchener had ordered the execution of Boer prisoners caught wearing British uniforms, but Hamilton did not apply this dictate to Boer wounded at Rooiwal who were found wearing pieces of British kit.

Kekewich's success at Rooiwal resulted in his promotion to major-general. As negotiations between British and Boer delegates began the next month, the Battle of Rooiwal represented the end of fighting in the western Transvaal and was the last major engagement of the war.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); De la Rey, Jacobus; Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Rawlinson, Henry Seymour

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Rorke's Drift, Battle of (January 22–23, 1879)

At the Battle of Rorke's Drift in South Africa on January 22–23, 1879, a small garrison of British soldiers held an outpost against repeated attacks by an overwhelming force of Zulu warriors. While not particularly influential on the outcome of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879, the Battle of Rorke's Drift is one of the most celebrated military victories in British history and was a defining event of the era of new imperialism.

Command of the British forces in the Zulu War of 1879 was placed in the hands of Frederick Thesiger (Lord Chelmsford). His plan called for three columns to invade Zululand from the British-controlled Natal and converge on the Zulu capital of Ulundi. Chelmsford accompanied the center column and divided his force after it reached the base of a large hill known as Isandlwana. He marched ahead with half of the column, and in his absence, the remaining British forces were surprised by the main Zulu army and annihilated during the Battle of Isandlwana on January 22.

A supply depot and hospital for the center column had been established at Rorke's Drift, a small outpost consisting of two large structures that was situated beside one of only two crossings along the Buffalo River on the border between Natal and Zululand. Originally a farm built by a settler,

British soldiers of the 24th Regiment who defended Rorke's Drift from attack by a large Zulu army in January 1879. Unlike the unprepared British force that was annihilated by the Zulu at Isandlwana, the defenders of Rorke's Drift employed improvised fortifications and concentrated firepower to defeat the Zulu attack. (Popperfoto/Getty Images)

James Rorke, it later became a missionary post before being requisitioned for use by the British army. It was garrisoned by roughly 140 soldiers—including 35 hospital patients—under the command of Lieutenant John Chard.

The garrison could hear the sounds of the fighting a few kilometers to the east at Isandlwana, and a few survivors of the slaughter there alerted the men at Rorke's Drift during their retreat that the Zulus were approaching. Those warnings allowed the tiny garrison to avoid being caught by surprise, as their unfortunate comrades had been, and provided them with enough time to fortify the post. At Chard's direction, an enclosed perimeter was constructed using supply boxes, wagons, and mealie sacks. Loopholes were cut in the walls of the hospital to allow the sick to bear weapons against the enemy, and a secondary barricade was built inside the perimeter as a fallback point.

Following the Battle of Isandlwana, the Zulu reserve force of approximately 4,000 still-fresh warriors under Dabulamanzi kaMpande pursued the fleeing British survivors and disobeyed King Cetshwayo's orders by advancing on the border at Rorke's Drift. By early evening, they were within sight of the outpost. An assault began almost immediately, as the warriors had not shared in the glory at Isandlwana and were eager to achieve their own victory. That first assault was primarily focused against the south wall of the perimeter, and the British were thus able to concentrate their defense and easily repulse the Zulu with heavy rifle fire. The Zulu then regrouped and surrounded the entire outpost, and successive assaults along the entire perimeter forced the British to abandon the wall near the hospital and fall back to the interior barricade.

The now-isolated defenders inside the hospital maintained a stubborn resistance, falling back from room to room as the Zulu forced their way inside. After the thatched roof of the hospital caught fire, a few of the defenders managed to escape and rejoin the rest of the garrison inside the secondary perimeter. Assaults continued throughout the night, and the Zulu repeatedly breached the British lines, but they were unable to overwhelm the defenders. The attacks began to slow in the early morning hours of January 23, as the combatants grew exhausted and the accumulation of bodies made movement increasingly difficult. By dawn, the fighting had finally ceased.

Hundreds of Zulu had fallen in the face of the steady rate of fire effected by the defenders, while the British suffered fewer than 30 casualties. A total of 11 British soldiers, including Chard and his second-in-command, Lieutenant Gonville Bromhead, were subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross for their heroic defense of Rorke's Drift—more men were honored for this battle than for any other single engagement, before or since. The battle quickly become a tale celebrated in the United Kingdom as indicative of the notions of bravery and strength associated with the British army and the British Empire; it also helped assuage the humiliation of the crushing defeat at Isandlwana.

The British victory at Rorke's Drift in the face of overwhelming odds was due in large part to the fact that the garrison enjoyed two major advantages: the new Martini-Henry .45-caliber breech-loading rifles with which they were armed (breech-loading rifles could be reloaded at a much faster rate than the muzzle-loading rifles of the past) and the cover provided by their fortifications. Moreover, guarding a supply depot meant that they were in no danger of running out of ammunition, which had been the undoing of their comrades at Isandlwana. While the Zulu had acquired a limited number of rifles themselves, most of the warriors at Rorke's Drift were armed with spears and hide shields, which provided little protection against gunfire. The British victory at Rorke's Drift thus helps explain why European forces, armed with superior weaponry developed during the Industrial Revolution, were able to dominate much of the world during the era of new imperialism.

Gregory Wolf

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Bromhead, Gonville; Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chard, John R. M.; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Dabulamanzi kaMpande; Firearms Technology; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879)

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Royal African Corps

The Royal African Corps (RAC), established in 1792 in London, was largely composed of military offenders who had been sentenced by court-martials to penalties such as severe flogging. As an alternative, these soldiers volunteered for service in West Africa. Although largely comprised of white Englishmen, the RAC also included special companies of Africans, which included those landed in Sierra Leone under the auspices of the Vice Admiralty Court (1807–1819) and then the Court of Mixed Commission (1822–1863) in Freetown.

The Africans who were enlisted originated from a wide variety of birthplaces due to the nature of these courts. Variously called "recaptives" (due to having been captured from slave vessels destined for the Americas), "Captured Negroes," or "liberated Africans," these individuals were dispersed into Freetown and its surrounding villages upon their processing after release. Although some were apprenticed to local tradespeople, many of the strongest men were recorded in the registers of the Liberated Africans Department as having been enlisted into the RAC.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Maxwell (1811–1815) began the policy of enrolling the so-called top third of the healthiest and most fit liberated Africans into the Royal Navy or the RAC. In Freetown, this force was effectively used by Maxwell on multiple occasions to quell potential rebellions by the culturally distinct Nova Scotian settlers. As British interests stretched westward, the RAC was employed in a number of conflicts.

The RAC was first used to assist in the suppression of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in Sierra Leone, and later was employed in a disastrous effort against the Asante in the Gold Coast under Sir Charles MacCarthy in 1824, which cost MacCarthy both his life and the lives of the troops under his command. A second attempt was launched with another RAC force under Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Purdon in retaliation against the Asante in 1826, in which they proved their reputation as a fighting unit. In this successful venture, the tide of battle was turned primarily by the use of new technology such as Congreve rockets, which the Asante assumed were supernatural in nature.

The mortality rate in the RAC was extremely high, with reports published in 1839 reflecting that every year, the RAC lost approximately half its number to disease, with soldiers visiting hospitals three times per year on average. The white members of the RAC numbered 571 men in 1825, but their losses were 447. In the following year, they numbered 471, but 342 were lost. Ultimately, only 2 of every 100 survived, which late-19th-century reports claimed was due not only to the tropical environment in which they lived, but the poor barracks in which they were housed. No similar statistics exist for the African companies of the RAC.

Colonel Richard Doherty (who commanded the RAC from 1837–1840) recommended that the West India Regiment take over garrison duties, and the RAC was restored as the 3rd West India Regiment in 1840. It thereafter was variously sent on tours of duty in the West Indies and West Africa as it was needed, continuing to fight the Asante and putting down internal revolts in Jamaica.

Katrina Keefer

See also: Anglo-Asante Wars (1823–1826 and 1863–1864); Anglo-Asante Wars; British Anti-Slavery Squadron; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

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Royal Niger Company

The Royal Niger Company was chartered in 1886 and became responsible for administration and trade along the Niger River. Along with the Lagos Colony and the Oil River Protectorate, the company formed the basis for future administrative control of the territory that would become the Southern Nigeria Protectorate. The chartered company replaced the National African Company (NAC), which was created in 1879 by George Goldie to unify the various British trading interests along the Niger. The company was awarded a royal charter in the wake of the 1884–1885 Berlin West Africa Conference to ensure British "effective occupation," the term adopted at the conference to establish European sovereignty over African territories.

By the time that the charter was conferred, the NAC was able to sign treaties with 237 local rulers in the region from the Niger Delta to the Benue confluence. The charter gave the company the ability to act as the sole recognized economic entity in the Niger. In exchange, the company was allowed to act as the representative of the British government in administrative matters. Thus, the NAC's board of directors became the Council of the new Royal Niger Company.

The new governor of the company was Lord Aberdare, who previously had served as home secretary in British prime minister William Gladstone's government. Goldie was appointed deputy governor and political administrator, roles that gave him almost unbridled control over the day-to-day running of the company, which included administrative appointments, legislation, and all judicial matters. The NAC's trading agents were converted into district agents. These agents controlled economic and political matters for the company and could raise and maintain their own military forces. The company itself created a military force of its own, called the Royal Niger Constabulary. Alhough all these forces were ostensibly police forces charged with maintaining order and serving the courts, they acted as the military arms of the company, intervening regularly to maintain company control where it was threatened.

The provisions of effective occupation created significant tensions between the company's economic interests and the mandates that the charter required, both toward other European interests and the African polities in the region. The Berlin conference stipulated that all the European powers be allowed free navigation along all the continent's major rivers, including the Niger. Company officials interpreted this provision to mean that foreign powers were afforded free use of the river, but not any of the facilities on it. When German and French vessels operating on the Niger were denied mooring permits and commercial contacts with local traders, diplomatic crises ensued, with the Germans establishing a protectorate in nearby Cameroon and the French briefly occupying the kingdom of Bussa in 1896. In Northern Nigeria, the company engaged in several wars against Ilorin and Nupe between 1897 and 1898, creating much instability in those kingdoms.

The political pressures that conflicted directly with the company's economic success eventually ensured that the company's mandate would be untenable. Thus, in 1898, the British and French signed the Niger Convention, which ended the French occupation of Bussa and established the borders between French and British possessions along the Niger. Because of this treaty, as well as the instability that the company created in the various kingdoms along the Niger, the Royal Niger Company was dissolved on January 1, 1900, and its territories became part of the new British protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria.

Roy Doron

See also: Berlin Conference; Goldie, George; Royal Niger Constabulary; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

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Royal Niger Constabulary

The Royal Niger Constabulary was the paramilitary arm of the Royal Niger Company and served as the model for most future military forces in Nigeria. Formed in 1886 as part of the chartered company, the force was established as a constabulary with wide-ranging police powers, such as enforcing laws, maintaining court procedures, and performing any duties assigned to it from the senior judicial officer. In reality, the force was used almost exclusively as an interventionist arm of the company, with monthly incursions into territories to maintain company rule and control.

Although the charter allowed a force of only 150 men, at its height, the constabulary consisted of 424 African soldiers, recruited from outside the Royal Niger Company's region. Most of the soldiers were Fanti from the Gold Coast, with 100 from the Hausa States, including 2 *mallams* who acted as chaplains to the Muslim soldiers, and 69 from the Yoruba city states. Only 2 Africans served as officers, with 5 Britons commanding the force. The company exclusively recruited troops from outside the areas that it controlled to ensure that the soldiers would be loyal to the company, not to local rulers.

The company attracted their recruits by offering high salaries and benefits, including shoes, uniforms, and military training. The constabulary was renowned in its time for offering some of the best military training available at the time. In fact, George Goldie, founder of the Royal Niger Company, had previously served as an artillery officer in the British army, and he took special care in making the artillery contingent of the constabulary one of the most effective in Africa. Although the salaries were considered high by African standards, the enterprise proved especially lucrative for the few British officers commanding the force. The entire annual payroll for the African contingent amounted to 7,700 pounds, including the two officers, who were paid 3 pounds a month (a hefty sum in African terms for the period), while the payroll for the five European officers totaled 10,000 pounds.

Because the constabulary was never used as a police force, but as an interventionist one, its equipment and tactics reflected the military aims of the company. Based in the city of Asaba, its main use was for almost monthly punitive expeditions that ensured company control over the chartered territories. Most of these expeditions were small, but several of them were large-scale incursions that exacted high tolls on the civilian populations.

In 1888, the company attacked the city of Asaba, where the force was garrisoned, and the year after, they were used to quell a revolt in Obosi, where the Royal Niger Company itself was headquartered. The constabulary was also used to force neighboring polities to sign treaties favorable to the company. In 1895, the force used its superior weaponry and training to inflict a crippling blow on the traders in Brass, and the same year, the constabulary was used to invade the kingdom of Nupe, using its artillery to inflict heavy damage on the numerically superior Nupe army.

In 1900, the company lost its charter, and the constabulary formed the backbone of the military force of the newly established Southern Nigeria Protectorate, which unified the Royal Niger Company's territories with those of the Niger Coast Protectorate. In 1914, when the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were united to form the colony of Nigeria, the remnants of the constabulary formed the core of the Nigeria Regiment of the West African Frontier Force (WAFF).

Roy Doron

See also: Goldie, George; Nigeria Regiment; Royal Niger Company; West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903); West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

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Rwanda, German Occupation of. *See* "East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908)"

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Samori Toure (c. 1830–1900)

Samori Toure built a powerful state in West Africa that encompassed much of the upper Niger region and the Ivory Coast. His expansion ultimately brought him into conflict with the French, who fought Samori for seven years before finally defeating him in 1898. He is remembered by many in modern Guinea as a great patriot because of his fierce resistance to French imperialism.

Samori was born in Konyan, in what is now Guinea, around 1830. At the age of 17, he became a Dyula, a member of the Muslim trading class that dominated the commerce of West Africa. The Dyula usually settled and traded in non-Muslim communities. Because they were a minority, they played little part in the political life of these states. In 1835, however, a Dyula leader named Mori-Ule Cisse revolted against the Mandinka state and seized control of the government. Cisse's example would inspire other Dyula revolutions throughout the region.

In 1853, Cisse's soldiers took Samori's mother captive. Samori went to Cisse to try to win his mother's release and ended up joining his movement. Living at Cisse's camp, Samori learned military tactics and became a warrior chief in Cisse's army. He eventually left Cisse and used the training that he had received to establish himself as an independent chief. He attracted many followers and, in a series of brutal campaigns, absorbed several small chiefdoms into his growing empire. During the 1860s and 1870s, he continued to expand his control throughout the Guinea region and established a capital at Bissandugu. From this base, he began to organize the Dyula communities throughout the region, many of whom supplied weapons to his growing army. By the end of the 1870s, Dyula communities throughout Guinea recognized Samori as their leader.

Samori's rapid rise was due in large part to his skills as a military leader. He was a ruthless commander and an effective administrator. He promoted his officers on the basis of merit rather than ethnicity and equipped his soldiers with modern firearms. He received these weapons from the coast in exchange for gold and ivory. To ensure his unfettered access to the gun trade at Freetown, he conquered territory in Sierra Leone in 1884. That same year, Samori also decided to impose Islam on all his subjects in the expectation that this would provide his growing empire with greater cohesion. He built mosques and opened religious schools throughout his territories.

Samori's expanding empire ultimately brought him into conflict with the French. The two powers first collided in 1882, and their armies fought a series of engagements over the next four years. In 1886, Samori and the French signed a peace treaty. He then launched a disastrous attack on Sikasso, in present-day Mali. In the failed assault, his army was destroyed, and the defeat emboldened many of the subject peoples of his empire to revolt. By 1891, he had restored his position and put down the rebellions. By this time, however, the French were intent on smashing his power, and in 1891, a French army marched into Samori's territory. After three years of fighting, Samori realized that his position was hopeless. He retreated out of Guinea and established himself in the interior of the Ivory Coast, leaving scorched earth in his wake. There, he hoped to reestablish himself as a ruler.

Samori's bid to build a new empire was doomed to failure. During the 1890s, the British halted his arms shipments through Sierra Leone. The French pursued him relentlessly, forcing his army to remain on the move. Local chiefs further harassed his army as it retreated from the French. The exodus was arduous, and he lost half of his troops crossing the mountains of Guinea. He finally made his way into Liberia, where he was captured in 1898. The French exiled him to Gabon, where he died of pneumonia in 1900. Despite his reputation for ruthlessness and brutality, he is remembered in West Africa as a hero who boldly resisted French imperialism.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Galliéni, Joseph**;** Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898)

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Sandile (1820–1878)

Born in 1820 near Burnshill in what is now the Eastern Cape Province of South Africa, Sandile was the son of Rharhabe Xhosa leader Ngqika and his Great Wife, Suthu. Sandile was among the youngest of Ngqika's sons, but the status of his mother meant that he was the heir. Given his disfigured leg, Sandile would always struggle to match the martial reputation of his much older half-brother Maqoma, who was Ngqika's eldest son.

Ngqika died in 1829, before Sandile was old enough to undergo the traditional Xhosa circumcision ritual that would initiate him into manhood. As a result, Maqoma acted as regent of the Rharhabe throughout most of the next decade. In 1839, Maqoma attempted to retain power by delaying Sandile's circumcision and arranging for his mother to be accused of witchcraft. However, officials from the neighboring Cape Colony intervened to ensure that Sandile, who they believed would be a more pliable ruler, inherited his late father's position.

In 1846, Cape governor Peregrine Maitland created a pretext for war with the Xhosa by demanding that Sandile return a

Xhosa fugitive who had stolen an axe from a shop in the colonial frontier town of Fort Beaufort. Sandile led Rharhabe forces during the subsequent Cape-Xhosa War of 1846–1847. In April 1846, at the Battle of Burnshill, he directed an ambush of an invading colonial column that captured 65 supply wagons, and the next month, he led an attack by 8,000 warriors on Fort Hare.

In late October 1847, Sandile attempted to negotiate with the British but was detained. Subsequently, within the new territory of British Kaffraria, Sandile continued to rule his people, but under the supervision of a colonial official. In December 1850, given Sandile's refusal to attend a meeting to address rising tensions in the area, British governor Sir Harry Smith officially deposed him as Rharhabe ruler, which quickly led to a rebellion that also included formerly procolonial Khoisan and Thembu.

On Christmas Eve 1850, Sandile directed another successful ambush of a colonial column entering the Amatolas at Booma Pass. During this Cape-Xhosa War of 1850–1853, Sandile once again led the main Rharhabe force in the Amatola Mountains as Maqoma took a contingent to the Waterkloof to distract colonial forces. As in 1847, Sandile and other Xhosa leaders surrendered to avoid the starvation of their people due to colonial scorched-earth tactics. The Rharhabe were then expelled from their Amatola stronghold and given an open piece of territory on the west side of the Kei River.

After considerable hesitation, Sandile eventually declared his support for the millenarian cattle-killing prophecies of 1856–1857, which represented a national catastrophe for the Xhosa. Frustrated by colonial disarmament, Sandile led a faction of the Rharhabe into rebellion during the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878. In early 1878, he led Rharhabe warriors east of the Kei River to join the Gcaleka in their fight against colonial forces that had invaded their land. With the defeat of the Gcaleka in direct attacks on colonial outposts, Sandile and his people returned west of the Kei and fought a hit-and-run campaign against the British in the Pirie Bush on the west side of the Amatolas. It was there at the end of May that Sandile, almost 60 years old, received an ultimately fatal gunshot wound in combat with Fingo colonial allies. Although some colonial troops cut pieces of Sandile's hair as souvenirs, the British gave him a military funeral. Later rumors that his decapitated head was taken to Britain were likely false.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Burnshill, Battle of (April 16–17, 1846); Booma Pass, Battle of (December 24, 1850); Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Maqoma; Smith, Henry George Wakelyn; Somerset, Henry

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Sannaspos, Battle of (March 31, 1900)

By March 1900, after the surrender of General Piet Cronjé at Paardeberg, the Boer commandos found themselves in a demoralized state. Many burghers had also given up after the fall of Bloemfontein. In a bold move, the commandos were given leave so they could recuperate. They had to regather at the Sand River on March 25, 1900. In the interim, the Boers under General Christiaan de Wet, now the commandant-general of the Orange Free State, decided to change their military strategy. The cumbersome wagon trains and fixed conventional battles were to be replaced by mobile commandos who were to engage the British army, especially columns operating in isolation, with speed and surprise.

One such column, operating in the Thaba Nchu area to the east of Bloemfontein, was under the command of Brigadier-General R. G. Broadwood. The column, consisting of wagons, artillery, roughly 1,700 soldiers, black auxiliaries, and refugees were harassed by Boer commandos. Fearing that he might be cut off, Broadwood decided to return to Bloemfontein. To do this, they had to cross the Modder River at Sannaspos, where the commandos under Christiaan De Wet had decided to set up an ambush.

Sannaspos, on the western bank of the Modder River, located roughly 28 kilometers due east of Bloemfontein by wagon road, housed a waterworks that supplied the city. The waterworks were lightly guarded and also offered the perfect landscape for an ambush. Commandos under Piet de Wet, Christiaan's brother, took up positions on the ridges directly east of Sannaspos. De Wet and a commando of several hundred burgers positioned themselves four kilometers away in the Koringspruit, an episodic tributary of the Modder River. They were completely hidden from sight. The plan was simple—upon arrival at Sannaspos, the column under Broadwood would be engaged with artillery and rifle fire by the commandos under Piet de Wet. In retiring along the wagon road to Bloemfontein, the British column would march straight into the commando under Christiaan de Wet.

The column under Broadwood arrived at Sannaspos exhausted. Broadwood gave no specific orders and did not employ outriding patrols. When the commandos under Piet De Wet opened fire, the surprised column started to move with some speed toward Bloemfontein, marching straight into the ambush. The ensuing battle was a humiliation for the British army, as 159 British soldiers were killed and several hundred became prisoners of war. The Boers lost 13 men. Logistically, the battle was a major windfall for the commandos, as more than 100 wagons with supplies and ammunition, as well as seven artillery pieces, were captured. On the British side, Major Edward Phipps-Hornby managed to salvage some of the British artillery and redeploy them against the commandos under Piet de Wet. The British bravery in this regard was rewarded with four Victoria crosses. The column reached Bloemfontein in a state of disarray.

The Battle of Sannaspos was a major victory for the commandos and vindicated the new military strategy and raised Boer morale. On the British side, Broadwood was privately chastised, while people took heart from the individual acts of bravery. The Battle of Sannaspos was only a minor setback for the British army, but it served as a precursor to the Boer strategy that was to follow.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Cronjé, Pieter Arnoldus; De Wet, Christiaan R.; Paardeberg, Battle of (February 27, 1900)

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Schutztruppe (1889–1918)

The *Schutztruppe* were the formal protectorate militaries for the German African colonies of Togo, Kamerun, South West Africa, and German East Africa. While initially these German colonies functioned as private companies, their increasing failure to provide law and order within their territories had obliged the German Imperial government to intervene. In doing so, the new administrations created formal military units to replace the ad hoc and often ineffective local company units. While standardized within each colony, the forces had little uniformity among colonies, as the different requirements and contexts of the territory led to the formation of vastly different forces. These forces continued to serve as the military and police formations of the colonies until World War I, when Germany’s loss of colonies led to the dissolution of the *Schutztruppe*.

The general archetype of the *Schutztruppe* was the protectorate forces of German East Africa, also known as the *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Schutztruppe*. These forces found their genesis in the *Wissmann-Truppe*, which was raised by the German government in response to the Abushiri revolt in 1889. The force, raised by Captain Hermann von Wissmann, consisted of a core of German officers leading seven companies of African soldiers. The majority of these soldiers were Sudanese veterans of the Egyptian army, with a leavening of Shangaan recruits from Portuguese Mozambique. This initial force was used to crush the local forces of Abushiri Salim al-Harthi, Bana Heri, and Machemba in a series of campaigns from 1889–1890. Following this, Wissmann’s troops were made a direct Imperial force on March 22, 1891. Uniforms were issued and the command structure became more formalized, marking the creation of the official *Schutztruppe*, which had previously been an Imperial Commissioner’s force.

In the following years, the *Schutztruppe* was employed to fight and defeat the numerous local authorities that chose to resist the expansion of German colonial control. The most prominent of these campaigns include the Hehe Wars (1891–1898) and the Maji-Maji Revolt (1905–1907). Although occasionally suffering significant setbacks, such as a crushing loss at

Lula-Rugaro (Lugalo) in 1891, the *Schutztruppe* effectively suppressed all local resistance by the end of 1907. These campaigns also tended to be marked by a ruthless efficiency and often a strategy of annihilation through the destruction of their opponents' food sources.

Throughout these campaigns of conquest, the forces saw numerous changes. Although a small core of Sudanese veterans remained, the vast majority of new African troops were drawn from within the colony. Groups such as the Nyamwezi and the Yao were declared martial races and thus were heavily recruited from. The needs of military campaigns and local sources of manpower resulted in significant expansion. From its initial seven companies and approximately 800 officers and soldiers, the force eventually included 15 companies in 1907 following the campaigns to quash the Maji Maji revolt. This expansion also required the creation of a formal staff and supply system, and by 1914, the East African forces had 260 officers and 2,472 African rank and file, including a full staff and supply depot in Dar es Salaam.

The construction of the other colonial forces followed much the same pattern, although with variations depending on their colonial experiences. Togo was a small colony bounded on all sides by more established British and French possessions. Held up as a model territory and experiencing minimal resistance to the colonial administration, when the Togoland administration was absorbed by the German Empire in the 1890s the local forces remained a police force as opposed to a military one. While there was standardization involved in the transition to Imperial territory, the force remained what was called a *Polizeitruppe* and would remain in service with little fanfare until World War I.

In Kamerun, the story more closely paralleled the experience of German East Africa. Initially, the private company that ran the colony recruited a lightly armed police force in 1893 to support its rule. Apocryphally, it was said that some members of this force had been purchased from slavery by the German commissioner on the condition that they serve in the police for five years. However, within a year of their recruitment, these forces rebelled against the harsh treatment and low pay that they were subject to, marking the first and only mutiny of German colonial forces.

In response to the pleas of the colonial charter company, the German Imperial government formed a formal *Schutztruppe,* modeled on the Wissmann force, to both put down the mutiny and police the now-Imperial colony. These two forces, the *Polizeitruppe* and *Schutztruppe*, would continue to serve parallel roles in the colony, although primacy was afforded to the *Schutztruppe*. By 1914, the *Schutztruppe* had 1,550 African soldiers under arms, led by professional German officers.

The colony of South West Africa was an exception to the model. Since South West Africa was intended to be a colony for German settlers, the Wissmann model of African troops was considered unsuitable. The German authorities were concerned that African soldiers could not be relied upon to faithfully safeguard the German settlements. As such, the *Schutztruppe* of South West Africa was drawn entirely from settlers and German soldiers. These forces underwent a trial by fire in the 1904–1905



African colonial soldiers under German command in Cameroon, West Africa. Like the other European powers in Africa, the Germans made extensive use of African troops in their colonial forces, or *Schutztruppe*. (Library of Congress)

revolt by the Herero and Nama, with the local populations fighting a smart and capable guerrilla war. Eventually the German forces, under General Lothar von Trotha, undertook a scorched-earth strategy against the resisting populations and undertook what are now often considered genocidal actions to finally crush the Herero and Nama. These volunteer forces then continued as the local police and military, reaching a height of 1,954 soldiers in 1914.

All branches of the *Schutztruppe* fought in World War I. The Togolese police offered token resistance to British and French forces before surrendering on August 26, 1914. The Kamerun forces fought off several disjointed French, British, and Belgian offensives before retreating to Spanish Guinea (Equatorial Guinea) in 1916 and allowing themselves to be interned. The South West Africa troops took part in a series of short, sharp engagements against a large South African offensive before ultimately surrendering on July 15, 1915. Most memorably, the German East African forces undertook a lengthy campaign against British colonial troops. Beginning with British efforts to reduce the colony in November 1914 and continuing until the German *Schutztruppe*'s eventual surrender on November 25, 1918, the German East African campaign was the longest of all campaigns of World War I. All of the *Schutztruppe* formations were formally disbanded following the war and Germany's subsequent loss of its colonies.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); Askari; East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891); Maji Maji (1905); von Trotha, Lothar; von Wissmann, Hermann

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Sekhukhune woaSekwati (c. 1814–1882)

Sekhukhune woaSekwati, the Maroteng paramount from 1861 to 1879, was the last independent ruler of the Pedi people in northeastern South Africa. He successfully resisted the Swazi, Boers, and British until his final defeat in the Second Anglo-Pedi War of 1879.

Sekhukhune was born in about 1814, the eldest son of Sekwati woaThulare by his chief wife, Thorometsane. Sekwati was ruler of the Pedi people centered in the rich valley of the Tubatse River in the high eastern escarpment of South Africa. The Pedi state evolved under Thulare woaMorwamotse, who reigned from about 1790 to 1820, and was a federation where the chiefs accepted the paramountcy of the Maroteng, the senior Pedi lineage. In about 1821, the Maroteng paramountcy was shattered in the turmoil of the *mfecane*, a period of turmoil that ripped apart most of the precolonial societies of southeastern Africa. Sekwati, one of Thulare's surviving sons, returned to the Tubatse valley in about 1828 and rebuilt the Pedi state.

From the 1840s, most young Pedi men became migrant laborers in the white states and colonies of the subcontinent, buying firearms in increasing quantities with their wages. Pedi warfare revolved about the defense of their rocky strongholds, and firearms were ideal for this purpose.

Increasing Pedi military strength alarmed their neighbors, the Zulu and Swazi kingdoms to the south and the Boer South African Republic (SAR, or Transvaal) to the west. The energetic and resourceful Sekhukhune grew up a hardened warrior, making his military reputation in the defeat of the Zulu invasion of 1851 and of the joint Boer and Swazi attack of 1852. Sekhukhune was Sekwati's natural heir, but he had a rival in Mampuru, his half-brother. Mampuru was supported by the missionaries of the Berlin Missionary Society (who began their work in the Maroteng paramountcy in 1860) because Sekhukhune distrusted them and their religion.

When Sekwati died on September 20, 1861, Sekhukhune resolutely seized power and exiled Mampuru. In 1865, he began expelling the missionaries who had established a new fortified mission at Botshabelo, just southwest of the Pedi state, where they harbored Pedi converts and malcontents. Mampuru, meanwhile, threw in his lot with the Swazi, who invaded the Maroteng paramountcy once again in September 1869. Sekhukhune defeated them roundly and exploited his victory to reassert his authority over wavering tributaries on the margins of the paramountcy.

Sekhukhune's most dangerous enemy remained the SAR. In July 1876, the Boers joined the Swazi in invading the Maroteng paramountcy in the Boer-Pedi War of 1876–1877. The invaders failed to capture Tsate, Sekhukhune's fortified capital. On February 15, 1877, the belligerents signed a treaty defining the borders of the Pedi state, and Sekhukhune acknowledged himself a SAR subject and agreed to pay 2,500 cattle as tribute. Why Sekhukhune agreed to do so is uncertain, but it is possible that he was trimming since he knew the bankrupt SAR to be on the verge of collapse.

Indeed, the British annexed the SAR on April 12, 1877, as the Transvaal Territory. But the new administrator of the Transvaal, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, was determined that the Pedi must accept British "protection" and on May 9, 1877, issued an ultimatum to that effect. While determined to preserve his independence, Sekhukhune also attempted to be placatory, but that was made difficult by his subjects' reluctance to pay the cattle indemnity insisted upon by Shepstone. His military efforts to restore his shaken authority over some of his tributaries who turned to Shepstone for protection convinced the administrator to take action. Military operations in the First Anglo-Pedi of 1878 began in April. The Pedi resorted to their habitual tactics of harassment and ambush, and by October, the British temporarily abandoned the foundering campaign for their looming invasion of Zululand.

The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 ended in September with the destruction of the Zulu kingdom, and the British then refocused on the Pedi. In October 1879, urged on by his chiefs, Sekhukhune refused to pay the British the cattle fine acknowledging their rule. As governor of the Transvaal, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, fresh from imposing his settlement on Zululand, decided that he was done with Sekhukhune. Supported by Swazi allies, the Transvaal Field Force invaded the Maroteng paramountcy on November 20, 1879, in the Second Anglo-Pedi War of 1879. On November 28, they successfully stormed Tsate. Sekhukhune escaped, but on November 29, the British tracked him down to the cave where he had taken refuge. He surrendered on December 2. On December 9, Wolseley paraded him in triumph through Pretoria, where he was then jailed. The Maroteng paramountcy was abolished, and Sekchukhune was replaced by a resident magistrate who imposed taxes on the Pedi.

The Transvaal Boers rebelled successfully against British rule in the First Anglo-Boer War of 1880–1881. The Pretoria Convention of August 3, 1881, conceded independence to the restored SAR and permitted Sekhukhune to return to his old territory, now under Boer rule. There, Mampuru, his long-standing rival, was building up his own following. The two half-brothers jockeyed for position, and on August 13, 1882, Mampuru had Sekhukhune stabbed to death as he slept. The Boers hanged Mampuru for Sekhukhune's murder on November 22, 1883.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); The Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Wolseley, Garnet

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Selous, Frederick Courtney (1851–1917)

Born in London to an aristocratic family, the young Selous attended several prestigious British schools and showed an early interest in the study of wildlife and the writings of European hunters and explorers in Africa. At the age of 17, he survived an incident in which the ice on a frozen British lake broke, sending 40 skaters to their deaths. In 1872, he traveled to Southern Africa and gained permission from the Ndebele king, Lobengula, to hunt in his territory.

For the next two decades, Selous explored and hunted throughout the independent African area north of the Limpopo River and south of the Congo Basin. In 1890, Cecil Rhodes, dreaming of a "Second Rand" of rich gold resources north of the Limpopo River, paid Selous to stop writing newspaper articles about the independence of the Shona from the Ndebele, as it undermined the veracity of the Rudd Concession and to sign over the concession that Selous had obtained from Shona leader Mapondera.

That same year, Selous was hired by Rhodes's British South Africa Company (BSAC) to lead the first column of European settlers into Mashonaland. Celebrated in colonial history as the "pioneer column," this force consisted of 200 paramilitary volunteers armed with Martini-Henry rifles, almost 200 civilian settlers from wealthy families in the Cape Colony, 62 wagons, several machine guns and field guns, and an electric search light. The members of the column were rewarded with generous land grants and mining rights.

Since the Rudd Concession that Rhodes had obtained from Lobengula specified that Europeans would engage in mineral prospecting rather than permanent occupation, the column skirted around the Ndebele kingdom and expected an Ndebele attack, which did not take place. The column founded the colonial settlements of Fort Victoria in the southern part of Mashonaland and Salisbury farther north, which became the capital of the new colony eventually named Southern Rhodesia.

Since he was in Britain, where he had received an award from the Royal Geographic Society and married a clergyman's daughter, Selous did not participate in Rhodes's 1893 invasion and conquest of the Ndebele kingdom. However, during the outbreak of the Ndebele rebellion in 1896, Selous and American frontiersman Frederick Russell Burnham directed the defense of the besieged colonial town of Bulawayo and led the Bulawayo Field Force. Selous did not participate in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), and his public sympathy for the Boers, who he had become familiar with during his years as a hunter, were not popular in Britain.

By the start of the 20th century, Selous was well established as the archtypical "great white hunter" in Africa and became involved in the early conservationist movement. He wrote eight books, mostly about hunting and natural history in different parts of the world, and guided former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt during his 1909 expedition to East Africa.

When World War I broke out, the 64-year-old Selous was commissioned as a captain in the 25th (Frontiersmen) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, which had been formed by the Legion of Frontiersmen, a British imperial association of hunters and explorers, specifically for service in East Africa. He was killed in action near the Rufigi River in German East Africa on January 4, 1917. Selous provided the inspiration for a number of fictional characters, such as H. Rider Haggard's Allan Quartermain, Wilber Smith's Sean Courtney, and Hollywood's Indiana Jones.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); British South Africa Company; Central Africa, British Conquest of (1888–1904); Burnham, Frederick Russell; Firearms Technology; Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Ndebele and Shona Rebellion (1896–1897); Rhodes, Cecil John; Technology and Conquest

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Settler Volunteer Regiments in South Africa

During the 1850s, Great Britain began to expect the settler colonies of the Cape and Natal to take greater responsibility for their own defense. Imperial troops were withdrawn from the region during the Crimean War of 1853–1856 and the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and newly landed British settlers wanted to copy the increasingly popular volunteer units of their home country. In the Cape Colony, many ad hoc military units had been formed during the Cape-Xhosa wars of the early to mid-19th century, including settler commandos, Khoisan hunting parties, Fingo levies, and in the early 1850s, a unit of Cape Town convicts called Lakeman's Volunteers. Since they were disbanded after each conflict, these formations lacked institutional identity and were not part of a formal military system.

After the 1852 granting of representative government to the Cape, a local defense establishment emerged, consisting of the full-time, all-white Frontier Armed and Mounted Police (FAMP), Boer commandos, and permanent though part-time, all-white volunteer regiments. Mixed-race and Khoisan full-time military service in the Cape declined after the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) mutiny of the early 1850s, and this imperial unit was disbanded in 1870. Other African ad hoc formations continued to be raised for wars, but they were never made permanent.

When the Cape's 1855 Burgher Levies Act extended commando service to both white and mixed race men, whites protested and Governor George Grey suggested that they form racially exclusive volunteer units. Men interested in forming a regiment petitioned the local magistrate to call a public meeting, and if there was sufficient interest, the governor was requested to form the unit, with the magistrate usually appointed commanding officer. The first volunteer regiment in the Cape, the Cape Royal Rifles, was established in Cape Town in November 1855, and dozens of others followed in the late 1850s and early 1860s. Although Natal did not yet have self-government, settlers feared the African population, which they had not conquered, and the Zulu kingdom loomed over the border.

South Africa's first white volunteer regiment, the Royal D'Urban Rangers, was formed in Natal in March 1854, and many others appeared over the next decade. Reflecting British military structure, volunteer regiments designated themselves infantry, mounted infantry, cavalry, artillery, or engineers. While volunteer regiments held regular drill sessions, they resembled social clubs as they elected committees, officers did not have much authority, members freely expressed views at meetings, they organized dinners and other social events, and maintained club rooms in hotels or taverns. The volunteers were armed by the state, but since they had to buy their own uniforms—and saddles and horses for cavalry—and pay membership fees, poorer whites were sometimes excluded, and elitism was promoted by giving honorary membership to prominent personalities.

When Prince Albert visited the Cape and Natal in 1860, he was constantly escorted by local volunteers and saluted by volunteer gunners. Volunteer regiments performed full-time duty during crises, such as in 1857, when the Cape Royal Rifles and Cape Volunteer Artillery assumed garrison duties in Cape Town, freeing imperial units for India; and in 1858, when the elite Natal Carbineers joined an expedition to depose an African chief.

After military volunteerism declined with the economic depression in the 1860s, it was revitalized by the discovery of diamonds in the Northern Cape late that decade, which revitalized the economy, and new wars of colonial conquest raised settler martial spirit. The 1872 granting of responsible government to the Cape meant that local authorities now assumed a more active role in defense. Volunteer regiments from the Cape fought in the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878, the Griqualand West Rebellion of 1878, the Transkei Rebellion of 1880, and the Lesotho Gun War of 1880—1881. In Natal, volunteer regiments helped suppress the Langalibalele Rebellion of 1873, where they suffered their first combat casualties and fought in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 alongside similar units from the Cape. By 1888, in the Cape, the many tiny volunteer units of the previous decade had been amalgamated into 23 regiments with a total of 3,708 members.

Possibly because Natal's African population had never been conquered, the Natal administration seemed more concerned than the Cape with passing legislation related to volunteer service. The 1885 Natal Volunteer Law reduced the financial burden on members by the introduction of "marching pay" and led to an increase in regimental strength. In their campaign for responsible government, some Natal settlers advocated the creation of a permanent military force through conscription of whites, while others staunchly defended the elitist volunteer tradition. When Natal gained responsible government in 1893, it became obliged to organize its own defense, as imperial units were to be withdrawn within five years. The 1895 Natal Volunteer Act regularized orders, discipline, punishments, appeals, fines, imprisonment, privileges, and death compensation for widows. It also gave the Commandant of Volunteers the authority to coordinate and organize the colony's volunteer units.

At the start of the Second Anglo-Boer War in 1899, there were 12,000 Natal volunteers, though the law compelled only

2,000 to perform full-time military service. In 1903, the Natal Militia Act obliged all white males between 18 and 50 years of age to engage in military training and service, and boys from the age of 10 were required to participate in school cadet activities. Control of a local volunteer force enabled the Natal colonial state to finalize its conquest of its African subjects. In the 1906 Zulu Rebellion, the volunteers of the Natal Field Force imposed a reign of terror by flogging and arresting Africans and looting their communities.

At the end of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the British banned the commando system in the former Boer republics of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony and placed the responsibility for defense in the hands of the imperial occupation force. In October 1902, the British administration formed the Transvaal Volunteers, which was based on the British volunteer system and to some extent continued the volunteer units that had fought in the recently ended conflict. Meant to discourage Afrikaner and African resistance, the Transvaal Volunteers formed the core of local defense and enabled the British to reduce the imperial garrison.

By expecting the volunteers to fund the units themselves, the defense of the Transvaal was made less expensive, and the recently disarmed Boers, who the British thought would rise up, were discouraged from enlisting. Among the new volunteer units was the Transvaal Scottish, which had been formed just after the end of hostilities in 1902 with the support of Caledonian societies in the former Boer republic. When the Transvaal gained responsible government in 1907, the Louis Botha administration recreated the rural Boer commandos in the form of rifle clubs, which became popular with Afrikaners and promoted republican values such as having elected leaders. Although the Transvaal volunteer regiments continued to exist, their membership decreased, and they became restricted to primarily English-speaking urban areas.

During the South African defense conferences of 1907 and 1908, it became clear that Britain would maintain very few troops in the future united South Africa, and even those that remained would be withdrawn completely in the event of war in Europe. Britain saw South Africa, like its other dominions, as a potential source of military manpower for the defense of the mother country, and after the 1910 Union of South Africa was formed, the Botha government saw potential Afrikaner rebellion as its primary security threat. Military volunteerism had been growing in early 20th-century South Africa, particularly among English-speaking whites, and from 1908 to 1910, membership in rifle associations increased from 6,000 to 8,000. The union partially adopted a Swiss-style military system, favored by Lord Horatio Kitchener as the best system for dominions, in which all adult white males were members of a part-time reserve that could be mobilized when required.

In 1912, the South African Defence Act created the Union Defence Force (UDF), which consisted of three units: Permanent Force, Active Citizen Force, and Cadets. Due to white fear of African resistance and the corollary between military service and citizenship, blacks were excluded from the UDF except with the permission of Parliament. In 1914, the UDF consisted of the small Permanent Force of 2,500 South African Mounted Rifles, the Active Citizen Force of 23,000 volunteers and conscripts receiving part-time training, and a general reserve made up of local rifle associations and recreated rural commandos.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Bambatha; Botha, Louis; Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Griqualand West Rebellion (1878); Gun War, Lesotho (1880–1881); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Langalibalele Rebellion (October–December 1873); Transkei Rebellion (1880); Zulu Rebellion (1906)

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Shangani Patrol (December 1893)

In 1893, Cecil Rhodes’s British South Africa Company (BSAC), which had already occupied Mashonaland, organized three military columns that invaded the Ndebele kingdom (or Matabeleland), in what is now southwestern Zimbabwe. In several major battles, hundreds of Ndebele warriors, who employed their traditional chest-and-horns formation to attack colonial wagon laagers, were cut down by the firepower of BSAC breech-loading rifles and Maxim guns.

On November 3, after almost 1,000 Ndebele fighters had been killed confronting two BSAC columns at the Mbembesi River two days earlier, the Ndebele ruler, Lobengula, ordered his capital of Bulawayo burned and led some of his forces north toward the Zambezi River. The next day, November 4, BSAC forces entered the ruined Ndebele capital, where they erected a British flag and began constructing what would become a colonial settlement. BSAC official Leander Starr Jameson sent a message to Lobengula demanding that he surrender, but the Ndebele king sent a vague response and continued northward.

On November 14, a BSAC detachment of almost 500 men under Major Patrick Forbes left Bulawayo in pursuit of Lobengula. When they reached Shiloh Mission, some 50 kilometers north, the column was reorganized so that it consisted of 290 mounted men supported by five wagons and four Maxim guns. Forbes’s men followed the trail of Lobengula’s personal wagon, as well as the tracks of his large entourage and cattle, but as they were slowed by rain and mud, the detachment was reduced to 160 mounted men, with the rest sent back to Bulawayo with the wagons. On December 3, Forbes’s “flying column” arrived at the southern bank of the Shangani River, where they observed signs that a large Ndebele force and cattle had crossed. Forbes’s detachment formed a defensive position and dispatched a 20-man reconnaissance patrol under Major Alan Wilson across the river to locate Lobengula and return with the information. However, when Wilson located the tracks of Lobengula's wagon, he sent a messenger to Forbes requesting more men with a Maxim gun to be sent to his position so that they could capture the Ndebele king. Since it was nighttime and Forbes believed that the Ndebele were about to attack his position, he sent only 20 men (without a Maxim) across the river to reinforce Wilson.

With a total of 37 men, Wilson's patrol was too large for stealthy reconnaissance and too small to engage the Ndebele. On the morning of December 4, Wilson led his group toward Lobengula's suspected position, but they were shot at by an overwhelming number of Ndebele and withdrew toward the river. Upon hearing the shooting to his north, Forbes led the main body toward the Shangani, but they were ambushed by Ndebele gunmen hiding in scrub and the river began to flood, making crossing impossible. After riding two kilometers toward the river, Wilson's patrol became surrounded and he dispatched three men, including American scout Frederick Russell Burnham, to break through enemy lines and cross the river to get help from Forbes, whose group was involved in its own battle. All 34 BSAC men left on the north side of the river, including Wilson, were killed by the Ndebele. When their ammunition ran out, they reputedly stood up and sang "God Save the Queen" as the Ndebele warriors rushed to stab them with spears. Constantly harassed by the Ndebele, the main body, now effectively led by Commandant Piet Raaf as Forbes was disgraced and depressed, returned to Bulawayo on December 18, where it was received by Rhodes. Lobengula had escaped the BSAC, but a few weeks later, in early 1894, he died of disease.

The dead of the Shangani Patrol were quickly hailed as British imperial heroes, and their end became a celebrated event in the history of white settlement in Southern Rhodesia, similar to Custer's Last Stand and the Alamo in American history. It inspired a fictional and popular British stage production called *Cheer, Boys, Cheer,* which opened in 1895. In 1899, a reenactment of Wilson's last stage, with the role of Lobengula played by a man who claimed to be his son and a veteran of the battle, was performed at a London exhibition and formed the basis of a short silent film called *Major Wilson's Last Stand.* December 4, or "Shangani Day," was celebrated as a public holiday in Southern Rhodesia from 1895 to 1920, when it was incorporated into another holiday called "Occupation Day."

In 1904, the remains of Wilson and his men were reinterred at "World's View" in the Matopos Hills near Rhodes's grave and a large monument to them was constructed on the site. During the colonial era, a painting of the patrol's last stand became a common feature of white Rhodesian households. A 1966 song and a 1970 feature film, both entitled "Shangani Patrol," sought to mobilize sympathy for white minority–ruled Rhodesia that had recently and illegally declared independence from Britain to avoid granting political rights to blacks.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Ndebele War (1893); British South Africa Company; Burnham, Frederick Russell; Jameson, Leander Starr; Lobengula kaMzilikazi; Rhodes, Cecil John

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Shangi, Battle of (July 1896)

In 1895 and 1896, Leopold II of Belgium and the German government were negotiating the uncertain border between their respective colonial territories of the Congo Free State and Rwanda, with the later becoming part of German East Africa. The defeat of the Swahili-Arabs in 1894 had given the Congo Free State an opportunity to expand eastward toward Lake Kivu. As such, sometime in June 1896 a Force Publique (FP) detachment of several hundred Congolese soldiers under Lieutenant Constantin Sandrart entered Rwanda at the south end of Lake Kivu and established a fortified post on a hill called Shangi, near what is now the town of Cyangugu, Rwanda.

At this time, the kingdom of Rwanda was politically divided. The long-reigning and aggressive ruler Rwabugiri had died in September 1895, leaving an unstable situation with tension between his heir, Rutarindwa, who was installed as king, and one of his widows, Kanjogera, who became queen mother. Kanjogera was not the new king's biological mother, and she conspired to replace him with her own son, Musinga, who was still a child. Rwanda's army was divided between units led by officers loyal to Rutarindwa and others commanded by supporters of Kanjogera. In July 1896, Rutarindwa was manipulated by his rivals into dispatching an army under his supporters Bisangwa and Muhigirwa to expel the colonial invaders. In Rwandan history, there had been numerous instances where members of the royal court eliminated rivals by sending them on dangerous military missions.

In the mid-1890s, Rwandans had limited experience fighting enemies with firearms, and what little exposure they had was not helpful. In 1894, some Rwandan warriors had unsuccessfully attacked the first German colonial expedition to enter the country, but this was a small skirmish that had little military impact. More important, during 1894 or 1895, Rwandan fighters with spears and bows triumphed over the army of Nkore, a neighboring kingdom, which was equipped with firearms supplied by Arab traders. This gave the Rwandans false confidence in their ability to fight against enemies with firearms. It is likely that the FP possessed better-quality weapons and more highly trained marksmen than Nkore.

Sometime in July 1896, several thousand Rwandan warriors repeatedly attacked the FP position at Shangi, and several hundred were gunned down. Bisangwa was among those killed. The Rwandan army then withdrew, which was considered a disgrace given the society's highly martial culture. Muhigirwa subsequently changed sides and joined the royal faction allied to the queen mother. The disaster at Shangi weakened Rutarindwa's support base and provided an opportunity to Kanjogera.

Shortly after the battle, violence broke out at the royal residence of Rucunshu, during which hundreds were killed and Rutarindwa committed suicide. As a result, in February 1897, the young Musinga became the new king, with Kanjogera and other members of her Bega clan holding the real power. The next month, another German expedition arrived from Lake Tanganyika, and Kanjogera and Musinga accepted a German protectorate over Rwanda in exchange for military support against internal rivals and external forces like the Belgians. During the early 1900s, German colonial forces helped Musinga extend his authority north into areas that had not previously been part of the kingdom of Rwanda. Given mutinies within the FP, the Belgians withdrew from the Kivu area in 1897, to be replaced by German colonial forces. The border between the Belgian Congo and German East Africa was finalized in 1910.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Arab War; Congo Free State (1892–1894): East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); Firearms Technology; Force Publique: Leopold II

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Shark Island Extermination Camp

Shark Island was a concentration camp located at Luderitz Bay (also known as Angra Pequena) in German South West Africa and was the southernmost seaport in the German colony. It lies in a barren natural harbor wedged between the southern Namib Desert and the Atlantic Ocean. The town was named after Adolf Luderitz, the Bremen-based businessman who first created a beachhead for German annexation of the territory.

The Nama uprising in the south of the colony in October 1904 increased the strategic importance and size of Luderitz almost overnight. From being a dormant outpost, it rapidly became the main supply line for the German colonial army, the *Schutztruppe,* in the campaign against the Nama. There were several military installations in the town, chief among which was the supply command of the Rear, the *Etappenkommando.* The responsibility for the containment, care, and utilization of the several thousand prisoners of war sent to the town fell to the supply command.

At the edge of the harbor, sheltering the town from the gale-force winds blowing in from the South Atlantic, is a rocky outcrop known as Shark Island. The Luderitz concentration camp was placed at the westernmost tip of the island, which is fully exposed to the elements and surrounded by icy waters on three sides.

There were several reasons why prisoners were sent to Luderitz. It was a remote town surrounded by desert, which prevented escape attempts. More important, though, the prisoners, who were mainly women and children, were forced to build up the local infrastructure of the town, which until recently had been an insignificant outpost. The need for labor increased manifold by early 1906, when the German Reichstag in Berlin approved the construction of a railway between Luderitz and Keetmanshoop in the interior. This railway was built on the backs of prisoners of war, of whom some 2,000 died in the process.

From missionary accounts, it is known that mortality on the island was extraordinarily high from the outset. In the annual report for Luderitz district during 1906, compiled by local government officials, the concentration camp was given the nickname "Death Island."

In September 1906, some 2,000 Nama, mainly from the Witbooi, Bethanie, and Veldshoendrager communities, arrived in the southern town. They had been banished to Shark Island by the colonial governor, Friedrich von Lindequist, who deemed them too weak to perform meaningful labor. Instead, he hoped that their numbers might be reduced somewhat in order to bring down the costs of a potential future deportation to another German colony. In other words, he expected a number of them to die.

The Nama, who were separated from the Herero prisoners by a barbed wire fence, very quickly started to break down as a result of the climate, the violence of overseers, the bad and sparse food rations, the forced labor, and the spread of viral diseases and bacterial infections. By the end of the year, Missionary Nyhof could report to his headquarters in Wuppertal that "the nation is doomed," counting upward of 18 deaths per night. By March, 1,200 of the Nama had died, with a further 120 so sick that they were expected to die soon. The majority were women and children. In total, around 3,000 people died on Shark Island from cold, disease, exhaustion, hunger, and violence. Furthermore, German race scientists conducted forced medical experiments on some prisoners and studied their decapitated heads.

The camp was closed in April 1907 by the recently appointed head of the colonial army, Major von Estorff, who overruled the civil authorities in Windhoek by refusing to perform this "hangman's duty," as he phrased it. One of the more notable causalities of the camp was Bethanie leader and famed guerrilla fighter Cornelius Fredericks.

Casper W. Erichsen

See also: Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Von Trotha, Lothar

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Sierra Leone Regiment. *See* "West African Frontier Force"

Smith, Henry George Wakelyn (1787–1860)

Born on June 28, 1787, in Whittlesey (Whittlesea), England, Henry George Wakelyn Smith was the son of a surgeon. Widely known as Harry Smith, he entered the army in 1805, and over the following two years, he participated in the British intervention in South America, including at the Battle of Montevideo.

From 1808 to 1814, Smith served in the British 95th Rifles Regiment in the Peninsula Campaign of the Napoleonic Wars. During the assault on Badajoz in 1812, he met and married 14-year-old Juana Maria de Los Dolores de Leon, who was of noble origin and who accompanied him on most of his military campaigns for the rest of his career. After witnessing the burning of the White House in the United States by British forces, Smith returned to Europe, where he served as a brigade major during the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.

In 1828, Smith was posted to the Cape Colony as commander of British military forces. In January 1835, given Xhosa raids on the colony's eastern frontier, Smith famously rode from Cape Town to Grahamstown in six days and took command of frontier forces. During the Cape-Xhosa War of 1835, he worked directly under Governor Sir Benjamin D'Urban in directing the invasion and conquest of the independent Xhosa groups inhabiting the land between the Keiskamma and Kei rivers, which was briefly proclaimed Queen Adelaide Province. During a colonial raid east of the Kei in May, Smith was personally involved in the murder and mutilation of Hintsa, ruler of the Gcaleka Xhosa and senior Xhosa leader, who was under a flag of truce.

Transferred to India, where he was knighted, Smith played a prominent role in the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845–1846 and particularly distinguished himself at the Battle of Aliwal, where he commanded the victorious British forces. He was awarded with promotion to major-general and the title of baronet, including the special honor of using the words "of Aliwal" after his name. In 1847, Smith became the governor of the Cape Colony and imposed a British rule on the recently reconquered Xhosa of what became British Kaffraria. After landing at Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape, Smith assaulted the imprisoned Xhosa leader Maqoma. He then gathered the Xhosa chiefs at King William's Town, where they witnessed the explosion of a wagon full of gunpowder, had to choose between two brass bed knobs representing war and peace (they chose the latter), and had to kiss the governor's boots.

In early 1848, Smith annexed the area between the Orange and Vaal rivers, which he called the Orange River Sovereignty and which was inhabited by Boer farmers who had been leaving the Cape over the previous decade. At the Battle of Boomplaats, in August 1848, a small colonial force under Smith defeated some Boers under Andries Pretorius. In 1850, Smith explained to the Maqoma that the British could bring many soldiers to the area by ship, and the Xhosa chief asked if the British had ships that could sail into his Amatola Mountain stronghold. The erosion of chiefly authority and loss of land led to a rebellion by Xhosa, Thembu, and Khoisan in December 1850, in which Smith was briefly trapped at a colonial outpost.

In January 1852, Smith was recalled by London given his failure to end what was becoming a protracted conflict. In 1854, given lack of interest in the interior of South Africa, Britain agreed to the Bloemfontein

Convention that withdrew its rule over the Orange River Sovereignty, which became a Boer republic called the Orange Free State. Promoted to lieutenant-general, Smith commanded several military districts in Britain in 1853 and 1854 and passed away on October 12, 1860. The towns of Harrismith and Ladysmith in South Africa were named after Harry and Juana Smith, respectively. In addition, Georgette Heyer's 1940 novel *The Spanish Bride* is based on the experience of Harry and Juana Smith during the Napoleonic Wars.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boomplaats, Battle of (August 29, 1848); Booma Pass, Battle of (December 24, 1850); Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Hintsa; Maqoma; Pretorius, Andries; Somerset, Henry

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Smuts, Jan Christian (1870–1950)

A South African soldier, statesman, and philosopher, Jan Christian Smuts was born on May 24, 1870, on a farm near Riebeeck West, in what was then the (British) Cape Colony. He was a sickly child and went to school for the first time at age 12. Later, he studied for a combined literature and science degree at the University of the Cape of Good Hope, and law at Christ College, Cambridge. He practiced law in Cape Town (1895–1897) and Johannesburg (1897–1898). In 1898, he was appointed State Attorney (in effect, Minister of Justice) of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR), or the South African Republic (SAR), as the Transvaal was then known, and became President Paul Kruger's right-hand man.

Smuts played an important role in negotiations in the runup to the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), but when it became

Jan Christian Smuts (1870–1950) was a South African soldier, statesman, and philosopher who served as prime minister of South Africa from 1919 to 1924 and 1939 to 1948. In military terms, he fought on the Boer side during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), took a leading role in the South African invasion of German South West Africa in 1915, and commanded British forces in East Africa in 1916 and 1917. (Library of Congress) clear that war was imminent, he drew up a memorandum in which he set out a bold military strategy for the Boer republics. While he advocated quick offensive moves before British reinforcements could arrive, this was not implemented by overcautious military commanders, who squandered what were probably their only chance (however slim) to win the war. During the first few months of the conflict, Smuts visited the commandos at the Natal front on several occasions and reported back to the government. A few hours before the British forces occupied Pretoria (the ZAR capital), on June 5, 1900, Smuts went east to join the Boer forces along the Delagoa Bay railway line. He was present at the battle of Diamond Hill/Donkerhoek (June 11–12, 1900) and took part in the war council that followed at Balmoral on June 15. Henceforth, the Transvaal forces would also, as their Orange Free State counterparts had already done, resort to guerrilla warfare.

General Koos De la Rey, with Smuts as his assistant from June 1900 on, was placed in command of the Boer forces in the Western Transvaal. From De la Rey, Smuts learned the art of military command. Soon, Smuts was placed in command of the South-Western Transvaal and led his forces in several successful attacks. By December 1900, he was an acting general, and on January 21, 1901, he was officially made general, while also continuing to be State Attorney. Smuts was present at several crucial meetings with leaders of the Transvaal and Orange Free State concerning the continuation of the war.

In line with the Boer strategy to take the war back to the original British colonies, Smuts left the Gatsrand in the Western Transvaal with a small Transvaal force to invade the Cape Colony. They trekked through the Orange Free State, and in the early hours of September 4, 1901, Smuts's commando of some 250 men entered the Cape Colony in the Eastern Cape district of Herschel. They moved south, then west, north, south once more, then west and eventually northwest to the Vanrhynsdorp district, which they reached by November 20, 1901. In the North-Western Cape Colony, he was joined by other Boers, as well as Cape rebel forces that had been operating in the area for some time.

This was indeed an epic trek of 1,040 kilometers, during which Smuts and his men had to endure many hardships, including serious illness, and clashed with British forces on at least 12 occasions, either to drive back pursuing columns or to attack camps in an effort to capture arms, ammunition, provisions, and horses. Of Smuts's original unit, 45 commandos were lost (mostly captured), while it inflicted some 800 casualties on the British forces, including about 400 taken prisoner. They captured many rifles, as well as more than 1,000 horses. Several hundred Cape Afrikaners joined Smuts's commando as rebels.

Smuts now commanded 19 commandos (with more than 2,000 men). He reorganized the commandos and dispatched them to various areas in the remote North-West Cape Colony, in an effort to fan the flames of rebellion and draw more British forces away from the Transvaal and Orange Free State. Smuts planned to lead a campaign southward, but the losses that he sustained in a clash on the farm Windhoek (February 25, 1902) led to a change in plans. He subsequently concentrated on mining towns in Namaqualand. Smuts captured the towns of Nababeep, Springbok, and Concordia, and besieged the copper mine town of Okiep.

At the end of April 1902, Smuts left the North-West Cape operational area and traveled via Cape Town to the Transvaal to take part (as legal advisor to the Transvaal government) in the peace negotiations that took place at Vereeniging and Pretoria. Fluent in English, and with his firsthand knowledge of Britain, Smuts became the leading Boer spokesperson in talks between the Boers and Lord Milner (British high commissioner) and Lord Kitchener (British commander-in-chief). Smuts believed that although the Boers could still continue their resistance for a short while, they could no longer win the war, and that the generous British peace proposals should be accepted. This indeed happened, and the war ended on May 31, 1902.

Smuts then returned to the North-West Cape Colony to disband his commandos, and continued with his legal practice, now in Pretoria. Just like Louis Botha, Smuts worked to reconcile Boer and Briton, and to foster good relations with Britain. After the Transvaal gained responsible government status in 1906, Smuts became colonial secretary and minister of education in 1907. In 1908–1909, he played a leading role at the national convention that led to the establishment of the Union of South Africa on May 31, 1910. In Louis Botha's first cabinet, Smuts held the portfolios of home affairs, mining and defense (exchanging the first two for finance in 1912). Smuts drafted the South African Defence Force Act, which led to the establishment of the Union Defence Forces (UDF) in 1912. In 1914, Smuts successfully deployed UDF soldiers against striking mineworkers.

When World War I broke out in 1914, and the Union government decided to invade German South-West Africa (GSWA; today's Namibia), Smuts had to plan the campaign. But soon his attention was diverted to the suppression of the revolt by those Afrikaners who opposed the planned invasion and saw an opportunity to restore the Boer republics. While Botha led the main UDF forces in the field against the rebels, Smuts stayed in Pretoria to coordinate the administration with regard to the campaign against the rebels and plan in advance for the invasion of GSWA. The fact that he declined to reprieve Jopie Fourie (the only rebel to be executed) would haunt Smuts politically for the rest of his days.

With the rebels defeated, the UDF invaded GSWA on a large scale in February 1915. Smuts, once again, had to stay behind in Pretoria to deal with administrative matters and logistical planning, but at the beginning of April, he traveled to GSWA to take command of the southern UDF force (8,000 men, with 18 pieces of artillery). He occupied Keetmanshoop unopposed and defeated a German force at Gibeon. By mid-May, he returned to Pretoria, and by July 9, 1915, when the remaining German forces surrendered to Botha, the GSWA campaign was over. Smuts's UDF had acquitted itself very well.

In February 1916, Smuts reluctantly accepted the post of commander-in-chief of the Allied forces that were ordered to conquer German East Africa (Tanganyika; today's Tanzania), and became the youngest lieutenant-general in the British army. Smuts drove the German forces of Paul von

Lettow-Vorbeck out of British East Africa (Kenya), and then conquered large portions of German territory, albeit that the Germans were not decisively defeated in the field. In due course, von Lettow-Vorbeck would resort to guerrilla warfare, but Smuts had laid the foundation for an Allied victory.

In March 1917, Smuts arrived in London to take part in the Imperial War Conference. He then visited the Western front. Back in London, he propagated the establishment of a British Commonwealth. In June 1917, he accepted membership of the British War Cabinet as minister without portfolio. Eventually known as the "handyman of the British Empire," he traveled extensively (for military, strategic, and diplomatic purposes), delivered many speeches, played a leading role in the establishment of Britain's Royal Air Force, and laid the foundation of the League of Nations. After the war, he (together with Botha) represented South Africa at the Paris peace conference.

When Botha passed away suddenly on August 27, 1919, Smuts became South Africa's second prime minister. He had to grapple with several postwar challenges, including poverty. In May 1921, he used force to suppress an armed protest by a black religious sect at Bulhoek in the Eastern Cape, and in May 1922, he subdued the Bondelswart community in South-West Africa. In the meantime, in March 1922, Smuts proclaimed martial law in certain areas of the Transvaal and used the UDF to suppress a strike by white mineworkers, after they had resorted to violence.

Along with many other factors, Smuts's harsh tactics led to his defeat at the polls in the 1924 general election (although only white males participated). Although continuing with his work as leader of the South African Party and now also as leader of the official opposition in parliament, Smuts henceforth had more time for intellectual pursuits, including botany and philosophy; and in 1926, he published his book *Holism and Evolution*. In 1933, Smuts's South African Party entered into a coalition with the governing National Party, with Smuts becoming minister of justice and deputy prime minister. The two parties merged in 1934 to form the United Party (UP).

When World War II broke out in 1939, J. B. M. Hertzog's neutrality motion was defeated in parliament, and Smuts once again became prime minister. On September 6, 1939, South Africa entered the war on the side of the Allies, but the UDF was in a sorry state due to years of neglect. In an amazing process of reconstruction, Smuts built up the UDF, as well as the country's armaments industry. Soon, small South African naval vessels were able to patrol the Cape sea route, while Smuts's internal security measures ensured that there would on this occasion be no rebellion, although isolated acts of sabotage did occur. In July 1940, 1 SA Infantry Brigade was sent to East Africa, where they, together with aircraft of the South African Air Force (SAAF; which Smuts established in 1920), played a significant role in the defeat of the main Italian forces (May 1941).

On his 71st birthday, May 24, 1941 (which was also Empire Day), Smuts was made a field marshal in the British army. Soon, South African forces were also deployed to North Africa, suffering a huge defeat at Tobruk (10,722 South African soldiers were part of some 33,000 that surrendered on June 17, 1942), but regrouped and contributed to Erwin Rommel's ultimate defeat. From there, Smuts's forces were sent to Italy, while SAAF units operated in several operational areas.

Smuts visited his troops on several occasions, met with Winston Churchill and several other Allied leaders, and was the driving force and inspiration behind the war effort of the UDF (and South Africa). After the war, he played a role in establishing the United Nations. But all his international fame did not help Smuts in the local political arena, where he and his South African Party were defeated in 1948 by the National Party, heralding the era of apartheid. A dejected Smuts died on September 11, 1950. Although no longer honored by the majority of South Africans, he is (together with Nelson Mandela) probably the most important South African of the 20th century.

André Wessels

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Churchill, Winston; De la Rey, Jacobus; Diamond Hill (Donkerhoek), Battle of (June 11–12, 1900); Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Somerset, Henry (1794–1862)

Henry Somerset was born on December 30, 1794, in England and was the eldest son of Lord Charles Somerset, then commander of the 103rd Regiment of Foot, and Elizabeth, daughter of William, Second Viscount Courteney and Earl of Devon. In December 1811, the 17-year-old Henry became a junior officer in the Prince of Wales's Own Royal Regiment of Light Dragoons also known as the 10th Hussars. During 1813 and 1814, he fought with his regiment in the Peninsula campaign of the Napoleonic Wars and participated in the notable battles of Vitoria, Orthes, and Toulouse. After transfer to the 18th Hussars, Somerset served as aide-de-camp to his uncle, Major General Lord Edward Robert Somerset, when he commanded the first brigade of British cavalry at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815; shortly afterward, he was promoted to captain.

In 1818, soon after his marriage to Frances Sarah, who was the eldest daughter of Admiral Sir Henry Heathcote, Somerset was posted to the Cape Colony, where his father was serving as governor. Henry Somerset became an officer in the mounted section of the new Cape Corps, which consisted of British officers and local Khoisan soldiers. Henry learned Dutch in order to communicate with his men. Furthermore, his father appointed him as the colony's Commissioner of Stamps, which gave him an extra annual income of 600 pounds.

Henry Somerset arrived in the Eastern Cape in May 1819, just after the failed Xhosa attack on the regional colonial capital of Grahamstown, and participated in the subsequent offensive against the Rharhabe Xhosa of Ndlambe. In 1828, Lieutenant-Colonel Somerset became commanding officer of the new Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), which was essentially a renamed Cape Corps that focused on patrolling the eastern frontier of the colony. In late August of that year, Somerset led a force of 1,000 British soldiers, CMR, and armed settlers across the colonial border and, together with several thousand Mpondo and Thembu allies, attacked the Ngwane of Matiwane at the Battle of Mbolompo and seized cattle and prisoners.

Somerset commanded the CMR during the Cape-Xhosa Wars of 1834–1835 and 1846–1847 and was promoted to major-general and given command of military forces during the Cape-Xhosa War of 1850–1853. In April 1846, he was responsible for the loss of 65 supply wagons at the Battle of Burnshill, and that June, he led the colonial cavalry force that surprised and rode down 500 Xhosa at the Gwangqa River.

Although some critics, like Governor Harry Smith, accused Somerset of lack of nerve and incompetence, he was popular with his men and local settlers. There were rumors that he traveled with an entourage of Khoisan concubines, that his illegitimate children were enrolled in the CMR, and that he had corruptly made a fortune from the Cape-Xhosa Wars. In 1853, after 35 years in the Cape, Somerset was appointed Knight Commander of the Bath and transferred to India, where he commanded the Bombay army from 1855 to 1860 and was promoted to lieutenant-general. He died in Gibraltar on February 15, 1862.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Burnshill, Battle of (April 16–17, 1846); Cape Mounted Rifles; Cape-Xhosa War, Sixth (1834–1835); Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Seventh (1846–1847); Cape-Xhosa War, Eighth (1850–1853); Grahamstown, Battle of (April 21, 1819); Gwangqa, Battle of (June 8, 1846); Mbolompo, Battle of (August 27, 1828); Smith, Henry George Wakelyn

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Southern Nigeria, British Conquest of. *See* "Anglo-Aro War (1901–1902)" and "Benin, British Conquest of (1897)"

Spanish Invasion of Algiers (1775)

Under nominal Ottoman authority, Algerian ports became bases for Barbary pirates, who captured merchant vessels in the

Mediterranean, ransomed their crews, and sold their cargo. The ruler of Algiers accepted protection money from European powers so that their ships would not fall victim to the pirates. After Morocco's failed attempt to capture the Spanish enclave in Melilla in 1774, Madrid sent a fleet to the North African coast to assert its power and rescue some 10,000 Spanish captives held by Barbary pirates in Algiers. The Spanish expedition consisted of 50 warships, 230 transport vessels, and 20,000 men under Alexander O'Reilly, an Irishman who had joined the Spanish army at a young age and led the suppression of an 1868 rebellion by French settlers in Louisiana after that territory had been transferred to Spain.

The invasion fleet was assembled at Cartegena, Spain, and arrived off the coast of Algiers in early July 1775. Supported by guns from the warships that hugged the coast, the Spanish troops landed at the wrong beach, where their artillery became bogged down in deep sand. Since Algerian merchants had observed the preparations of the expedition before it left Spain and sent intelligence back home, the Algerians were well prepared for the landing and had assembled a large army from the interior. Initially, the Algerians offered limited resistance and conducted a feigned retreat that resulted in the Spanish ground forces becoming surrounded. Consequently, the Spanish lines broke and the men fled back to their ships in confusion. A complete massacre was avoided when some Spanish ships came dangerously close to the coast to fire grapeshot at the charging Algerians. Some 3,000 Spaniards were killed, including 5 generals, many were taken prisoner, and they abandoned 15 cannon and 9,000 other weapons.

O'Reilly wanted to bombard Algiers in retaliation, but this proved impossible, as the ships did not carry enough provisions, which meant the fleet returned immediately to Spain. In 1783 and 1784, Spanish warships unsuccessfully attempted to bombard Algiers. Under the sponsorship of Morocco, Spain and Algiers signed a treaty in 1785 that facilitated prisoner exchange and eventually, in 1792, led to the end of almost three centuries of Spanish rule in the Algerian port of Oran. During the early 1800s, the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands conducted a naval campaign against North African–based pirates known as the Barbary Wars.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Barbary Wars (1783–1815)

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Spanish-Moroccan War (War of Africa) (1859–1860)

In 1842, Abd al-Qadir, the leader of Algerian resistance against French occupation, was forced to cross into neighboring Morocco, where he assembled a new army and was tacitly supported by the Moroccan ruler Mawlay Abderrahman. This led to a war between France and Morocco in 1844, in which the French army from Algeria occupied Oujda and defeated the Moroccan army in a major battle and French warships bombarded Moroccan ports. Subsequently, Abderrahman reformed the Moroccan military using European organization, training, and weapons, and ordered the construction of coastal defenses. However, it proved easier to import European weapons than train Moroccan soldiers, and in 1847, the new army was easily defeated by rebels led by Abd al-Qadir.

In 1856, to pay for the new weapons, Morocco undermined its sovereignty by entering into a customs treaty with Britain. In October 1859, a minor incident at the Spanish enclave of Ceuta gave a weak government in Madrid an opportunity for foreign success by going to war with vulnerable Morocco. In what the Spanish would call the "War of Africa," it took almost a month to transport the expeditionary force across the 13-kilometer-wide strait of Gibraltar. The Spanish army was commanded by Leopoldo O'Donnell, a general and politician of Irish descent, who had been prime minister and foreign affairs minister in 1858. By the end of November, it was assembled at Ceuta. It then took another month for the army to advance 33 kilometers from Ceuta to the Moroccan city of Tetuan.

The Spanish military culture of emphasizing personal bravery over tactical adaptation caused problems, as just 40 or 50 Moroccans could tie down a Spanish battalion. Gradually, the Spanish began deploying long chains of skirmishers to prevent envelopment by extended Moroccan lines and conducted their own flanking attacks. In February 1860, the Spanish army took Tetuan, which was the first time in 200 years that Europeans had occupied part of Morocco. During the campaign, more Spanish soldiers were killed by cholera than the enemy, and 38,000 of a total force of 55,000 had been hospitalized. In April, given British mediation, the conflict ended with a treaty that enlarged the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, gave Spain new territory in the south of Morocco, and forced the sultan to pay an indemnity of US$4 million to secure Spanish withdrawal from Tetuan.

O'Donnell returned home, where he was given the title "Duke of Tetuan" and served a second term as prime minister and foreign affairs minister from late 1860 to early 1863. Sidi Mohammed IV, who inherited power in 1859, put Morocco into debt to pay the indemnity and continued efforts to Westernize the military. Mawlay Hassan, who succeeded his father, Sidi Mohammed, in 1873, transformed the Moroccan military from a loose group of local contingents to a national standing army. He imposed a fixed levy of conscripts from each city, who were enlisted into new regiments. Rifles were imported from Belgium, coastal batteries from Britain and Germany, and field artillery from France. The Moroccan army grew from 3,000 infantry and some artillery in 1869 to 16,000 infantry, 9,000 cavalry, and 1,000 artillery pieces in 1893.

Until his death in 1894, Hassan used the army to impose central authority in remote areas and suppress rebellions against a new tax system. To maintain diplomatic stability, military instructors were imported from Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, and Spain, who worked more for the benefit of their home governments than for Morocco. As a result, the late 19th-century Moroccan army, though expensive, was ill-disciplined, fragmented, and ineffective, which left it susceptible to later French intervention.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Abd al-Qadir; Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Morocco, French Conquest of (1834–1934)

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Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900)

The Battle of Spion Kop (known as "Spioenkop" in Afrikaans) was a disastrous attempt by the British to relieve the besieged garrison at Ladysmith during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

After the unsuccessful Battle of Colenso (December 15, 1899), General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., had been replaced as commander-in-chief of the South African Field Force and became commander of British troops in Natal. Buller's force was strengthened by the arrival of the 5th Division (10th and 11th Brigades), under Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Warren, in January 1900. This permitted Buller to execute the plan that he had initially considered before Colenso: attacking to cross the Tugela River farther upstream before relieving Ladysmith.

Buller intended to cross the Tugela at Potgieter's Drift to the west of Colenso, then cross the Brakfontein Ridge and advance the 30 kilometers northeast to Ladysmith. Vaal Krantz dominated the eastern end of the Brakfontein Ridge, which rose in the west to the peak of Spion Kop and extended 5 kilometers farther along the Tabanyama range.

Buller's force consisted of 5 infantry brigades (1 remained at Colenso), a mounted brigade, 8 artillery batteries, 10 naval guns, and support elements. On January 16, 1900, British troops crossed the Tugela at Potgieter's Drift and established themselves on the north side of the river, at the foot of the Brakfontein Ridge, occupied by about 7,000 Boers under the overall command of Transvaal commandant-general Louis Botha. Buller decided to send about two-thirds of his force, under Warren, to cross the Tugela 8 kilometers upstream at Trikhardts Drift, where there were fewer Boers. Warren's 13,000-man force (with 36 guns) was to form a second bridgehead across the Tugela, and then advance north through the hills, west of Spion Kop, onto the plain, and threaten to outflank Potgieter's Drift. At that point, Buller would lead the remainder of the force, about 8,000 soldiers with 22 guns, across the river and hills to join Warren's force, and together they would advance to Ladysmith.

Warren's attack was ponderously slow, giving the Boers time to reinforce their right flank. His soldiers began crossing Trikhardts Drift on January 17, 1900, and on January 23, Buller rode to Warren and directed him to launch an attack. Warren decided to attack the precipitous Spion Kop at night, arguably the key to the entire Boer position commanding the wagon road and to Ladysmith. The attacking force consisted of 2,000 men of Major-General E. R. P.

Woodgate's 11th Brigade, 200 soldiers of Lieutenant-Colonel Alec Thorneycroft's mounted infantry, and engineers with 20 shovels and picks. It assembled at Three Tree Hill, about 10 kilometers southwest of Spion Kop, at 8:30 P.M. on January 23.

After moving slowly in the foggy dark over the rocky path, the lead British element reached the foot of Spion Kop and was challenged by a Boer sentry. The British fixed bayonets and charged, and at a cost of 10 men, they occupied the hill. Trenches were dug on what was thought to be the forward crest of the summit.

In the early morning of January 24, 1900, the Boers attacked up the gentle slope from the north but were repulsed by the British. The fog cleared at about 8:30 A.M., and the British realized that their trenches were too shallow and incorrectly placed and should have been sited 200 meters farther north. The British, not knowing the topography, had failed to seize Conical Hill, about 700 meters to their front, or Aloe Knoll, 400 meters to their right. The Boers seized these two hills and began to enfilade the British trench, while their artillery pounded the British. The battle was a scene of confusion and carnage.

Warren received a request for assistance, dispatched a number of soldiers, then he forwarded the message to Major-General Neville Lyttelton near Potgieter's Drift. Lyttelton, without consulting Buller, sent two battalions and mounted troops in the direction of Spion Kop.

On the hill, the Boers wanted the British to surrender. Thorneycroft, appointed the commander after the death of senior officers, refused to permit any more soldiers to surrender (170 British soldiers had already done so), and led his troops to a line of rocks behind the trench. At this crucial moment, reinforcements sent by Warren reached Spion Kop. With fixed bayonets, they charged the startled Boers and, with Thorneycroft's men, occupied the trench. By mid-afternoon, the situation had stabilized. Lyttelton's reinforcements attacked the Twin Peaks, respectively 1,800 and 2,700 meters to the east of Spion Kop, later that day, but withdrew from them after dark.

The demoralized Boers abandoned Spion Kop after nightfall. In the nighttime uncertainty, Thorneycroft, without communicating with Warren, also ordered the British to withdraw from the hill. During the retrograde move, Thorneycroft met a rescue force of 1,400 infantrymen with sappers and gunners but refused to go back to the peak, and the entire element returned to Warren's camp. The British abandoned Spion Kop, with corpses stacked three deep in the shallow trench. The Boers were amazed to return the following morning and find that the summit was in their possession.

The Battle of Spion Kop was another dismal defeat for the British, who retreated south of the Tugela River. The hilltop battlefield, an "acre of massacre" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 310), was a horrific scene of death and destruction. Official British casualty figures at Spion Kop were 322 men killed, 585 wounded, and 300 captured, although these numbers, especially of men killed, seem very low. The number of Boers killed probably exceeded 150. Ladysmith continued to be besieged by the Boers.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Buller, Redvers Henry;

Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Warren, Charles

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Stairs, William Grant (1863–1892)

Born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, William Grant Stairs studied engineering at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario. In 1885, he was commissioned in the Royal Engineers and stationed in Britain, where he became a captain. In January 1887, Stairs joined the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition, led by the famous explorer Henry Morton Stanley, which traveled from the mouth of the Congo River in the west to Bagamoyo on the East African coast. During this grueling journey, Stairs became the first outsider to climb the Ruwenzori Mountains, also known as the Mountains of the Moon, on the border of what are now Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The expedition used violence to force its way across Central Africa, and Stairs was wounded in the chest by a poisoned arrow during a skirmish with Africans. Although the expedition was later criticized for its brutality, he subsequently became a fellow of the Royal Geographic Society and the Royal Scottish Geographic Society.

On the recommendation of Stanley, Leopold II hired Stairs to lead a military expedition to conquer the mineral-rich Katanga on the southern frontier of the expanding Congo Free State, which is today's DRC. Starting on the east coast, the Stairs expedition was led by five Europeans (including Stairs) and consisted of 400 Africans, of whom 100 were soldiers (askari) equipped with French-made, breach-loading, single-shot rifles. Staging from Zanzibar and flying the sultan's flag, the Stairs expedition set out from Bagamoyo in late June 1891, marched through Tabora in the interior of German East Africa (now Tanzania), crossed the southern part of Lake Tanganyika by boat, and marched southwest into Katanga, which was dominated by the Yeke leader Msiri. The expedition had traveled around 1,500 kilometers in 120 days.

On December 17, 1891, the expedition's European leadership met Msiri at his capital of Bunkeya, but the negotiations went nowhere. Stairs believed that Msiri was planning to play the European powers against each other and was delaying until the anticipated arrival of another colonial expedition from Cecil Rhodes's British South Africa Company (BSAC) from the south. After Stairs sent Msiri a message demanding that he sign a treaty accepting Congo Free State authority, the Yeke leader fled to a nearby fortified settlement at Munema.

On December 20, 1891, Stairs dispatched 100 askari under Omer Bodson, the expedition's Belgian second-in-command, to Munema. A meeting with Msiri went badly, and the Yeke leader was shot dead by Bodson, who was himself gravely wounded. The askari then looted the compound and Msiri's followers, armed with swords and outdated muskets, ran away.

Although the expedition's Europeans had been disgusted by Msiri's display of the decapitated heads of his defeated enemies, they cut off the Yeke leader's head and hung it over the stockade to prove to his subjects that their ruler was dead. By January 1892, Msiri's successor, Mukanda-Bantu, and the formerly subject communities had signed treaties to come under Congo Free State rule, which precluded a BSAC takeover.

Another Congo Free State expedition from the north arrived at the end of January, which saved the Stairs expedition from starvation and tropical disease. A total of 76 of Stairs's askari had died that month. The survivors of the Stairs expedition, with many of the sick Europeans carried in litters, left Katanga and traveled along Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi today) and the Zambezi River. Stairs died of malaria on June 9, 1892, just before they reached Chinde on the coast of Mozambique. Many of the African members of the expedition had died or deserted, with only 189 out of 400 returning to Zanzibar. The Stairs expedition resulted in the takeover of Katanga by the Congo Free State and defined the border between today's DRC and Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia).

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Askari; British South Africa Company; Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore); Firearms Technology; Leopold II; Msiri; Rhodes, Cecil John; Stanley, Henry Morton

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Stanley, Henry Morton (1841–1904)

Journalist and explorer Henry Morton Stanley uttered his famous phrase, "Dr. Livingstone, I presume?" upon finding David Livingstone in Africa in 1871. Stanley's life up until that time was one of adventure, as he had served on ships, fought in the American Civil War, and reported to the *New York Herald* on events in Ethiopia and the Spanish Carlist War. His discovery of Livingstone began a dedication to the exploration of central Africa and the Congo, and his work there led to the European colonization of that region.

Stanley was born John Rowlands to unmarried parents on January 28, 1841, in Denbigh, Wales. His parents split while he was an infant, and he was left in the care of his grandfather, Moses Parry, then 80 years old. Parry died when Stanley was 4, and Stanley was shuffled between various relatives for the next two years. In 1847, he was placed in the St. Asaph Workhouse, where he would remain for nine years. Stanley's later tales of ill treatment there and a daring escape at the age of 15 have been disproved, but there is no doubt that institutional life and parental neglect left permanent marks on his character.

In 1859, Stanley sailed away from his troubled life in England. He enlisted as a cabin boy on the *Windermere,* scheduled to sail from Liverpool to New Orleans, a six-week journey. Upon arrival in the United States, Stanley jumped ship and was befriended by a local merchant, Henry Hope Stanley, whose first and last names the young man adopted in order to make a fresh start in life (he added "Morton" later). When the American Civil War broke out in 1861, he enlisted in the Confederate army and fought in the Battle of Shiloh in April 1862. He was captured and transferred to a prisoner's camp in Illinois, from which he escaped only by joining the Union army. Ill from his time in prison, Stanley was discharged and returned to Liverpool in November 1862.

For the next seven years, Stanley continued his roving lifestyle. He sailed to New York and joined the merchant marine and traveled throughout the West Indies, Italy, and Spain. He was the lone survivor of a shipwreck, and he wrote in his diary, "Wrecked off Barcelona. Crew lost, in the night. Stripped naked, and swam to shore." In July 1864, he enlisted in the U.S. navy and served during the naval battles of the American Civil War. In the navy, Stanley recorded the ship's notes, and he began sending stories of his naval experiences to U.S. newspapers. He deserted the navy in February 1865 and began work as a freelance journalist for the *New York Evening Post* while roaming all over the West. Returning to New York in July 1866, he decided to go to Turkey, where he was robbed and imprisoned. Stanley recorded the events of those years in *My Early Travels and Adventures in America and Asia* in 1895.

In 1867, Stanley began working as a special correspondent to the *New York Herald,* and his first assignment was to cover the British overthrow of Tewodros II in Ethiopia. His reports made such an impact that he was sent to the Spanish Carlist War, and in 1869, he was instructed to travel to the Middle East, where one of his assignments was to locate Livingstone, who had not been heard from in several years. A medical missionary, Livingstone made several important discoveries and observations about the African interior before he set out to find the source of the Nile River in January 1866. Aged and ill, he had pressed farther inland than any European had gone before, but he lost communication with the Royal Geographical Society, his primary supporter.

It took Stanley 15 months to reach the island of Zanzibar, the opening to the African continent. During that time, he reported on the Suez Canal; visited Jerusalem, the Crimea, and the Persian Gulf; and waited for two months in Bombay, India, for a ship to Africa. It then took three months to get to Zanzibar and six more weeks to procure supplies and porters upon arrival. Provisioned for two years, the expedition finally set off on the 1,200-kilometer trek to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika, Livingstone's last-known location, in March 1871.

After journeying through rough country inhabited by dangerous wild animals, warring African groups, and tropical disease, Stanley and his remaining men finally reached Lake Tanganyika on November 3, 1871. Prior to entering the village, he ordered his men to dress in clean, white clothes, and he himself wore a new flannel suit and shined Wellington boots. He marched into the village with flags waving and found Livingstone, 58 years old, sick, and weary from his travels. Stanley approached him with the now-famous words, “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?” and Livingstone answered, “Yes.”

Stanley stayed with Livingstone until March 1872, and the two became close friends, remaining so until Livingstone’s death in the swamps of Lake Bangweulu on May 1, 1873. Stanley arrived back in England in the late summer of 1872 and published his book *How I Found Livingstone* soon after. The experience fueled his interest in the exploration of Africa, and he participated in the Anglo-Asante War of 1873–1874 as a war correspondent with the *Herald* and later published *Coomassie and Magdala: The Story of the Two British Campaigns in Africa* (1874).

Stanley’s African explorations continued for the next 10 years. His activity in central Africa and the Congo did much to open it to Christian missionaries and the European governments, although his personal goal was to solve Livingstone’s question of the source of the Nile River. From November 1874 to August 1877, he explored throughout what is today the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and eventually reached the Atlantic Ocean. He described those years in his 1878 work *Through the Dark Continent.*

Stanley worked in the Congo for Belgium’s King Leopold II between 1879 and 1884; he supervised the building of roads and paved the way for the creation of the Congo Free State, Leopold’s personal domain. He later wrote about his work as Leopold’s agent in *The Congo and the Founding of Its Free State* (1885). In the spring of 1887, he ventured to Central Africa for the last time to assist Mehmed Emin Pasa, an Egyptian governor who had been stranded by the Mahdist wars that began in 1882. After he rescued Emin Pasha, Stanley started back to Africa’s eastern coast in April 1889 and, on the way, cleared up the question of the Nile River sources. The account of his last African expedition was published as *In Darkest Africa* in 1890.



Henry Morton Stanley (1841–1904) was an Anglo-American journalist, explorer, and colonial conqueror. Made famous by his 1871 finding of Dr. David Livingstone, he worked for Belgian king Leopold II during the early 1880s to establish colonial rule in the Congo Free State. (Chaiba Media)

Home for good in Britain, Stanley began a series of lecture tours on Africa that would take him to the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and other parts of the world during the next several years. In July 1890, at the age of 49, he married Dorothy Tennant and finally found the domestic happiness that he had longed for as a child. Stanley was renaturalized a British citizen in 1892 (he had become a U.S. citizen in 1885) and was elected to the British Parliament as a Liberal Unionist from 1895 to 1900. In 1896, Stanley and his wife adopted an infant son, Denzil, and moved onto a small estate in Surrey in 1898. That year, he wrote his final book, *Through South Africa,* about a trip to South Africa for the opening of a railway in 1897. He was knighted in 1899, but the next years were filled with ill health that culminated in a stroke in April 1903. Stanley had another stroke in April 1904 and died in London on May 10, 1904.

Melissa Stallings

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Emin Pasha (Schnitzer, Eduard Carl Oscar Theodore); Force Publique (to 1914); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Leopold II; Tewodros II

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Stewart, Herbert (1843–1885)

Major-General Sir Herbert Stewart was a leading cavalry commander of his day. He was mortally wounded during the Gordon Relief Expedition.

Born on June 30, 1843 in Hampshire, Stewart was educated at Winchester and was commissioned in the army in 1863. He served in India with the 37th Regiment, and when he returned to England in 1873, he exchanged into the 3rd Dragoon Guards. He attended the Staff College in 1877 and in 1879 saw service in the Anglo-Zulu War as a brigade major of a cavalry brigade. Ostensibly disgusted with the slow rate of promotion and poor career opportunities, Stewart was considering retirement when General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley arrived in July 1879 to assume command of the troops in South Africa and made him his military secretary.

After the conclusion of the Anglo-Zulu War, Wolseley's Transvaal Field Force attacked the stronghold of the Pedi leader Sekhukhune in a campaign that lasted two months. Stewart remained on Wolseley's staff, and when Wolseley returned to England in 1880 and was replaced as governor and commander-in-chief of Natal and the Transvaal by Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley, Stewart became Pomeroy Colley's chief of staff. At the Battle of Majuba Hill (February 27, 1881), Stewart was captured by the Boers and briefly held prisoner.

When Wolseley was appointed commander of the British force sent to Egypt in 1882 to suppress the Urabi Rebellion, he selected many of the members of his "Ashanti Ring," plus Stewart and a few others, to accompany him. Stewart served as chief of staff of the cavalry division, and after the Battle of Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882), he was responsible for the rapid pursuit of the vanquished enemy to Cairo and the surrender of Urabi.

Stewart, then a brigadier general, commanded the cavalry in the British force commanded by Major-General Sir Gerald Graham, V.C., that arrived in Egypt in early 1884 to help fight the dervishes. He led, rather impetuously, the charge of two regiments at El Teb on February 29, 1884, and was knighted for his services in the Sudan.

In the fall of 1884, when Wolseley was commanding the expedition to relieve Major-General Charles G. Gordon in Khartoum, Stewart returned to the Sudan. When Wolseley formed the River and Desert Columns in December 1884 to hasten the relief, Stewart was given command of the latter. Stewart's Desert Column fought a fierce battle at Abu Klea on January 17, 1885, and two days later, at Abu Kru, in another fight with the dervishes, Stewart was wounded. The wound turned out to be mortal, and he died in the desert on February 16, 1885, shortly after he had been promoted to major-general. Wolseley bemoaned Stewart's death: "I feel as if I had lost my right arm in this business & I cannot hope to see his like again" (Preston, 1967, p. 149).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Abu Klea, Battle of (January 16–18, 1885); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Colley, George Pomeroy; Dervishes; El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Graham, Gerald; Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

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Steyn, Marthinus T. (1857–1916)

Marthinus T. Steyn served as president of the Orange Free State in the years preceding the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). He was considered a reasonable man and a moderating influence, and after the Second Anglo-Boer War broke out, he campaigned in the field and was a determined nationalist.

Steyn was born in the Orange Free State on October 2, 1857, and studied law in London. He returned to the Orange Free State and began practicing law in 1882. In 1889, Steyn became state attorney and a judge, and he was elected president in 1896. He arranged and hosted the unsuccessful Bloemfontein Conference (May 31–June 5, 1899) between President Paul Kruger of the South African Republic (SAR, also called the Transvaal) and Sir Alfred Milner, British high commissioner for South Africa and governor of the Cape Colony.

After the outbreak of war on October 11, 1899, Steyn spent considerable time visiting the Boer commandos in the field. The capital of the Orange Free State, Bloemfontein, was captured on March 13, 1900, and after the capture of Johannesburg at the end of May 1900, Kruger seemed on the verge of surrendering. Steyn sent Kruger a telegram basically accusing the Transvaalers of cowardice, that it seemed they were then ready, "as the war reached their own borders, to conclude a selfish and disgraceful peace" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 458). Steyn's spine-stiffening message "was the most important telegram of the war" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 458).

After July 1900, the seat of the Orange Free State government was in the field, and for most of the rest of the war, Steyn remained with Chief Commandant Christiaan R. De Wet's unit. Although relatively young, Steyn's health suffered considerably. He refused to surrender, however, and resisted all attempts by others to end the war. Steyn participated in the initial peace negotiations in May 1902, but, almost completely paralyzed, he resigned the presidency and departed for medical attention on May 29, 1902. As a result, he did not sign the Treaty of Vereeniging on May 31, 1902, that ended the war.

Steyn spent a number of years overseas seeking medical aid. After returning to the Orange Free State, he supported the aspirations of his countrymen. He died on November 28, 1916.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kruger, Paul; Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Stormberg, Battle of (December 10, 1899)

The Battle of Stormberg was the first of three tremendous British defeats, followed by the battles of Magersfontein (December 11) and of Colenso (December 15), during a period that came to be called "Black Week" during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

Lieutenant-General Sir William F. Gatacre arrived in South Africa in November 1899, nominally to command the 3rd Division. Except for one battalion, his entire division had been sent to Natal. By early December 1899, Gatacre received reinforcements, including three additional battalions, 300 regular mounted infantry, two artillery batteries, and 1,000 Cape volunteers. His mission was to guard the northeastern border of Cape Colony from Boer invasion.

On November 26, 1899, the Boers occupied Stormberg Junction in the northeastern Cape Colony, a vital rail junction on the line from the port of East London to Aliwal North, and where another line branched out to the west. While Gatacre had been told not to take any risks until he received more soldiers, he was an aggressive leader, determined to attack the Boers.

Gatacre's ad hoc force, numbering less than 3,000 men, was located at Sterkstroom, about 50 kilometers south of Stormberg. He moved his soldiers by train to Molteno, about 16 kilometers southeast of Stormberg, on December 9, 1899. His plan was to then march his force overnight and attack the Boers on the Kissieberg Heights, about 4 kilometers southwest of Stormberg, at dawn.

Gatacre had expected to receive reinforcements before his march, but, due to coordination problems, they did not materialize. Gatacre, called "Backacher" by his troops because he was in superb physical condition and marched his soldiers hard, expected to lead his force through the pass, traversed by both the railroad and a road. The column departed Molteno at about 9 P.M. on December 9, 1899. At the last minute, Gatacre heard that Boers were defending the pass, so he changed the route to the west, over rugged terrain that had not been reconnoitered. He did not use scouts, and his medical and supply elements were unable to reach him.

The British soldiers, inexperienced in night operations and weary from the aimless plodding, had unknowingly swung around and behind Boer positions. Boer rifle fire from the Kissieberg position to their east crashed incessantly into their packed ranks as they were caught in the open at first light on December 10, 1899. Gatacre tried to attack, and some British soldiers climbed the Boer-held Kissieberg, but outcroppings hindered their progress. Poorly aimed British artillery hit many British infantrymen, and the operation turned into a frantic retreat, with the force soon coming under Boer fire from the west.

During the course of this disaster, it seemed that Gatacre "forgot" about 600 of his soldiers near the Kissieberg, who later surrendered. British casualties in this ignominious defeat were 28 killed, 51 wounded, and 634 captured.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Black Week (December 10–15, 1899); Colenso, Battle of (December 15, 1899); Gatacre, William F.; Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899)

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Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

Under the modernizing rule of Mohammed Ali, Egypt conquered Sudan in the 1820s and 1830s in an attempt to acquire military slaves and gold. The Egyptians imposed a

Westernized state that taxed the Sudanese and sent their agricultural and other products north. Sudanese frustrations increased in the 1860s and 1870s with the start of an Egyptian antislavery campaign that threatened local economic interests and brought Christian Europeans into this Muslim country. In late June 1881, the increasingly popular religious leader Muhammad Ahmad proclaimed himself the Mahdi, a savior chosen by God to restore Islam to its pure form, and organized an army for holy war against Egyptian occupation.

Political turmoil in Egypt itself meant that the Egyptians failed to suppress the rebellion. The first major victory for the Mahdi occurred in 1882, when his supporters captured the Egyptian military base at El-Obeid, west of the Nile. Although Mahdist forces initially tried to storm the fort and were cut down by breech-loading rifles, they eventually undertook a successful siege. Given this lesson, the Mahdi formed part of his army into a near-professional infantry corps equipped with firearms.

The 1882 British occupation of Egypt drew them into Sudan, as control of the upper Nile was important to control Egypt, and hence the strategically vital Suez Canal. In November 1883, an Egyptian force of 8,500 soldiers under British colonel William Hicks, complete with artillery and early manual machine guns like the Nordenfelt, invaded Sudan to suppress the insurrection. Letting Hicks's expedition advance in order for harsh desert conditions to take their toll, the Mahdi's troops eventually surrounded and annihilated them at the Battle of Kashgil (also called Shaykan). The British then decided to abandon Sudan; in early 1884, they sent Charles Gordon, who had governed part of south Sudan for the Egyptians, to organize the withdrawal. However, Gordon was not committed to London's plan, and he delayed long enough to be trapped in Khartoum by the Mahdi's forces. Around the same time, the Sudanese leader Osman Digna led a rebellion against Egyptian rule in the eastern region of Suakin. A British column under General Gerald Graham pushed back the rebels at the hard-fought battles of El Teb and Tamai, but then was ordered to pull out. Britain's Gordon Relief Expedition, led by General Lord Garnet Wolseley, failed to break through to Khartoum in time, and Gordon was killed when the Mahdists stormed the city in January 1885. Although the Mahdi died that June, a Mahdist state had been created, with its capital at Omdurman, a few kilometers from Khartoum.

Abdallahi al-Taaisha, the Mahdi's successor known as the Khalifa, imposed strict Islamic law, and his aggressive policy of conversion brought conflict with neighboring states, as well as people in south and west Sudan. In 1889, the Mahdists suffered several reverses. In March, they suffered serious casualties fighting the Ethiopians at the Battle of Gallabat, where the Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV was killed, and in August, a British-led Egyptian force defeated them at the Battle of Toski, which secured Egypt's southern frontier. In 1895, the Mahdists ventured into western Eritrea and were confronted by Italian colonial forces. In the mid-1890s, with the "Scramble for Africa" in full swing, the British government became concerned about forestalling French and Italian claims to the Upper Nile region. Moreover, the defeat of an Italian army by the Ethiopians at Adowa in March 1896 could have encouraged a possible alliance between the anti-British Ethiopian emperor Menelik II and the Khalifa, which the British wanted to prevent. The British occupation of the Sudan would preclude another power from controlling the Nile water flow and possibly destabilizing Egypt, which in turn could threaten the Suez Canal, Britain's imperial link with India. In addition, such a program could capitalize on the public's desire to "avenge Gordon."

In March 1896, the British authorized the Egyptian army, under the command of the sirdar, Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener, to begin the advance up the Nile. Kitchener concentrated on establishing a logistical and transport infrastructure and advanced methodically. The reconquest of the Sudan was a three-year campaign, divided into annual phases. The first phase was the recapture of the province of Dongola in 1896. The second phase included the construction of the Sudan Military Railway from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed (which was captured), and concluded with the occupation of Berber. In 1898, the Anglo-Egyptian army returned to the Sudan and crushed the dervish forces at Omdurman, near Khartoum.

The Egyptian army was mobilized, and by June 4, 1896, Kitchener had assembled a 9,000-man force, consisting of 10 infantry battalions, 15 cavalry and camel corps squadrons, and 3 artillery batteries at Akasha, south of Wadi Halfa and near the dervish positions at Firket. All soldiers were Egyptian or Sudanese, with the exception of a few hundred men from the North Staffordshire Regiment and some Maxim machine-gunners. On June 7, Kitchener's forces defeated the dervishes at Firket.

Disease and severe weather slowed the advance in the summer of 1896. A land force, supported by a flotilla of Nile gunboats, entered the city of Dongola on September 23, 1896, only to find it deserted. Kitchener's forces occupied Merowi and Korti, which ended the first phase of the reconquest of the Sudan.

Kitchener knew that logistical support and an effective line of communication in the barren desert would be key to his success, and he was eager to continue the advance to seize Abu Hamed and Berber. On January 1, 1897, construction of the Sudan Military Railway began. Its 360-kilometer route was straight across the Nubian Desert from Wadi Halfa to Abu Hamed. By July 23, 1897, 165 kilometers of track had been laid, but the line was vulnerable to dervish raids from Abu Hamed.

Kitchener ordered Major-General Archibald Hunter to advance from Merowi and eliminate the dervish threat at Abu Hamed. Hunter's force, consisting mainly of a Sudanese brigade, traveled 235 kilometers in eight days and attacked Abu Hamed on August 7, 1897. After the dervishes lost Abu Hamed, they also unexpectedly abandoned Berber. Kitchener was concerned about extending his forward positions ahead of the railway, but his forces advanced and occupied Berber on September 5, 1897. The railway reached Abu Hamed on October 31, 1897, and Kitchener's advance forces remained in Berber, which would be the starting point for the concluding phase of the campaign.

Intelligence suggested that the Khalifa was assembling his forces for a possible attack on Berber, and it became apparent that the Egyptian army would need British reinforcements before it could destroy the dervish army and win the campaign. On January 4, 1898, Kitchener was appointed supreme commander of all Egyptian and British troops south of Aswan. The first khaki-clad British brigade, under the command of Major-General William F. Gatacre, arrived in the Sudan in late January 1898.

As the British reinforcements arrived, Kitchener sent one Egyptian army brigade forward to the Atbara fort, located on the northeastern side of the confluence of the Atbara and Nile rivers, about 320 kilometers north of Khartoum. As the dervishes marched north to a possible engagement with the Anglo-Egyptian forces, Kitchener assembled his forces near the Atbara fort. When the location of the dervish forces was pinpointed on March 30, 1898, Kitchener was not sure if he should attack first or wait to be attacked.

Kitchener resolved to attack, and his army advanced closer to the enemy on April 4, 1898. At dawn on April 8, the Anglo-Egyptian force conducted a frontal attack with three infantry brigades on line and one brigade in reserve. In less than an hour, with the Sudanese troops having fought especially well, Kitchener's force won the battle. Anglo-Egyptian casualties were 81 all ranks killed and 478 wounded; over 3,000 dervishes were killed.

After the Battle of Atbara, logistical preparations continued for the final advance to Omdurman, the Sudan Military Railway was extended farther, and additional reinforcements arrived. By mid-August 1898, Kitchener's 25,800-man force consisted of the British Division, commanded by Major-General William F. Gatacre, with two British infantry brigades, and the four-brigade Egyptian Division, commanded by Major-General Archibald Hunter. Cavalry, artillery, Maxim guns, and gunboats also supported the force.

Kitchener's army began its final advance to Omdurman on August 28, 1898. On September 1, 1898, advance elements stumbled onto the attacking dervishes north of Omdurman, and the main body of the Anglo-Egyptian force established a camp on the Nile River near the village of El Egeiga.

The Battle of Omdurman began at about 6 A.M. on September 2, 1898, and consisted of three phases. The first phase included the dervish main attack against the Anglo-Egyptian center, but this frontal assault was halted and the dervishes were annihilated by a combination of rifle, artillery, and Maxim gun fire. At the same time, two other large dervish forces under the Green Flag moved north to the Kerreri Hills, believing that enemy troops were located in the area. Egyptian cavalry blunted the advance of this force before it could attack Kitchener's right flank. The first phase ended at about 8 A.M.

Kitchener thought that the battle was over and sent the 21st Lancers south to cut off any fleeing dervishes before they could reach Omdurman. This resulted in the charge of the 21st Lancers, the most famous single action of the battle, and perhaps of the entire reconquest of the Sudan. This cavalry action was a failure and resulted in large casualties, but the Lancers' heroism, for which three Victoria Crosses were awarded, was revered by the British public and press, who learned of it through the writing of military journalist Winston Churchill, who had participated in the charge.

As the 21st Lancers engaged the enemy, the main body of the army marched out of its encampment and wheeled southward toward Omdurman. As it did so, the Khalifa's 17,000-man Black Flag reserve force attacked the Anglo-Egyptian right-flank brigade, commanded by Colonel Hector A. Macdonald, which had lost contact with its nearest brigade. At about the same time, the dervish Green Flag made an uncoordinated attack from the Kerreri Hills to the north. Macdonald calmly wheeled his brigade to meet the threat from the north, crushed the dervish attack, then wheeled again and helped shatter the Black Flag onslaught. By 11:30 A.M., the second phase of the battle was over. The third phase of the engagement consisted of the march to Omdurman, which was completed by nightfall. Anglo-Egyptian casualties at the Battle of Omdurman numbered 48 killed and 434 wounded. The dervishes lost about 10,000 killed and perhaps twice that number wounded.

The Battle of Omdurman was the decisive engagement of the reconquest of the Sudan. Even though the Khalifa escaped from Omdurman and was killed at the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat on November 24, 1899, the Mahdist state had been destroyed at Omdurman and the Nile watershed secured. Gordon had been avenged. While the sultanate of Darfur on the Sudan's western frontier initially regained autonomy after the Anglo-Egyptian defeat of the Mahdists, the British invaded in 1916 and absorbed it into the Sudan.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr. and Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898); Churchill, Winston; Dervishes; Dongola, Capture of (September 23, 1896); Darfur, British Conquest of (1916); Egyptian Army; El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Fashoda Incident (1898); Gatacre, William F.; Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Graham, Gerald; Hicks, William; Kashgil (Shaykan or El Obeid), Battle of (November 3–5, 1883); Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Menelik II; Osman Digna; Tamai, Battle of (March 11, 1884); Toski, Battle of (August 3, 1889); Wingate, Reginald; Wolseley, Garnet; Yohannes IV

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T

Talana Hill, Battle of (October 20, 1899)

At the start of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), British reinforcements arrived in Natal and moved north, but not far enough to prevent a Boer invasion through the Drakensberg mountain passes. The Boers wanted to occupy Natal to prevent the British from landing more forces on the coast. The British commander in Natal, Lieutenant-General George White, wanted to withdraw his forces from Glencoe (Dundee) and concentrate them at Ladysmith. However, the British governor, Sir Walter Hely-Hutchinson, did not want to evacuate the coal-rich Glencoe for political and economic reasons, so he sent Lieutenant-General William Penn Symons to take charge of the forces there.

At Dundee, Penn Symons commanded a brigade consisting of four infantry battalions, elements of a cavalry regiment, three companies of mounted infantry, and three artillery batteries. On October 12, Boer forces invaded Natal. On October 19, two Boer columns from the Transvaal consisting of 4,000 men each, one under Lukas Meyer and the other under "Maroela" Erasmus, advanced on Dundee. Before dawn on October 20, Erasmus's men occupied Impati Mountain, north of Dundee, and Meyer's Boers took the lower Talana Hill, east of the town.

At dawn, Meyer's Krupp guns fired ineffectually on the town. Consequently, two British artillery batteries moved to within range and opened fire on Talana Hill. With one battery and the 1st Battalion Leicestershire Regiment defending the town, three battalions comprising the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC), and 1st Battalion Royal Irish Fusiliers attacked the front of the hill. However, when passing through a small wood at the foot of Talana Hill, the British infantry became pinned down by Boer rifle fire. Penn Symons rode forward to encourage the men, but he was mortally wounded in the stomach and later died in Dundee.

With Brigadier James Herbert Yule taking command, the KRRC reached the top of the hill, supported by the Royal Irish Fusiliers. The British soldiers on Talana Hill were killed by their own artillery. Meyer's Boers then abandoned their position and rode away, with the British artillery hesitant to fire on them for fear of again hitting their own men. Pursuing Meyer's force, British cavalry and mounted infantry moved close to Impati Mountain, where they were trapped and forced to surrender by Erasmus's men, who had played no part in the engagement up to that point.

After two days of maneuvering around Impati Mountain, on which the town's water supply was located, British forces withdrew during the night and marched four days to Ladysmith, 103 kilometers away. The British short-term tactical victory of forcing the Boers off Talana Hill had been costly and served no purpose, as they soon evacuated Dundee. British forces suffered 41 killed, 185 wounded, and 210 captured, while the Boers sustained 23 dead, 66 wounded, and 20 missing.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Penn Symons, William; White, George S.

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Tamai, Battle of (March 11, 1884)

The British government had to take decisive action to restore stability to the Sudan after the dervish massacre of Major-General William Hicks Pasha's Sudan Force at the Battle of Kashgil (November 3–5, 1883) and the Mahdist rout of Lieutenant-General Valentine Baker Pasha's Egyptian Gendarmerie at the Battle of El Teb (February 4, 1884). Accordingly, the British sent a force under the command of Major-General Sir Gerald Graham, V.C., to restore the situation.

Graham's force defeated Osman Digna's dervishes at El Teb on February 29, 1884. After Graham received additional reinforcements and assembled his force near Suakin, he decided to attack Osman's camp near the Tamai wells, about 25 kilometers to the west. Graham's force consisted of two infantry brigades, with the 10th and the 19th Hussars and artillery. The 1st Brigade (1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders; 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Fusiliers; and 3rd Battalion, 60th Rifles) was commanded by Brigadier General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C. Major-General John Davis commanded the 2nd Brigade (1st Battalion, Black Watch; 1st Battalion, York and Lancasters; and Royal Marine Light Infantry, with a Gardner machine-gun detachment).

On March 11, 1884, Graham's 4,000-man force moved out from Suakin and advanced 17 kilometers before bivouacking for the night. The next day, the British were under constant enemy rifle fire while marching. On the morning of March 13, cavalry scouts reported only a few dervishes to their front. The British force then advanced in two brigade-sized squares, with the 1st Brigade on the right and the 2nd Brigade about 500 meters to its left. As the force neared Tamai, the 2nd Brigade reached a ravine, from which many hidden dervishes began the attack. In the confusion, it seemed that Graham, collocated with 2nd Brigade, ordered the Black Watch on the left front of the square to charge the dervishes. This created a gap in the brigade formation, and the rapidly assaulting dervishes were able to penetrate the square, which was "soon broken up into small groups of desperately fighting men, once again sword and spear against bayonet, the dervishes slashing first at the hands to disarm and then at the head and body to kill and maim" (Keown-Boyd, 1986, p. 32).

Immediately, British cavalry to the left of the 2nd Brigade dismounted and fired volleys into the dervishes, as did the artillery and Buller's 1st Brigade (which was also attacked on all sides) from the right, thus checking the Mahdist attack and permitting the 2nd Brigade to reform its square. The courage of the dervishes could not overcome the British cold steel and accurate rifle and machine-gun fire.

Shortly after 10 A.M., the battle was over, and Graham's force crossed the ravine and occupied Tamai. In three hours of intense fighting, the British lost 109 all ranks killed and 112 wounded, and Osman Digna admitted losing 2,000 killed. The desert route from Suakin to Berber was open, from which Khartoum could have been reached via the Nile River. Rather than take a chance on a dash across the desert, Graham's force withdrew to Egypt.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Baker, Valentine; Buller, Redvers Henry; Dervishes; Egyptian Army; El Teb, Battle of (February 4, 1884); Graham, Gerald; Hicks, William; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Osman Digna; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Technology and Conquest (Transportation, Communications, and Medical)

Until around 1880, the European presence in Africa was mostly confined to the coast, with some settler colonies in the north and south. African resistance, tropical disease, and geographic challenges had kept Europeans out of much of the interior of Africa. These obstacles to conquest were overcome by a series of technological innovations that resulted from the Second Industrial Revolution, which took place in Western Europe and North America during the mid-19th century. The rapid development of more accurate, longer-range, and fast-firing guns represents one of the best known aspects of this process and prompted the satirical line, "Whatever happens, we have got. The Maxim Gun, and they have not."

Although Africans had acquired firearms during the previous century of trading with Europeans visiting the coast, they generally had not had a chance to obtain the most up-to-date versions, such as magazine-loading rifles and machine guns. Other mid-to-late-19th-century inventions were equally important in facilitating European colonial conquest in Africa. Oceangoing steam-driven and steel-hulled ships reduced the travel time between Europe and parts of Africa. Steam-powered railways and riverboats allowed European-led armies to gain access to the African interior and made it viable to extract raw materials for the world market. In most regions, the construction of rail lines from the coast inland happened almost simultaneously with the process of colonial conquest. During the late 1800s, for example, the French built a line from Dakar in Senegal to the Niger River, the British built one from the Kenyan port of Mombasa to Uganda, and the British in Southern Africa laid tracks from the Cape going north through what is now Botswana into Zimbabwe and Zambia.

In the late 19th century, Congo Free State steam boats were carried in pieces, first by porters and then by railway, some 400 kilometers from the Atlantic coast to the navigable part of the Congo River, where they were assembled and used to extend colonial rule around 1,400 kilometers upriver to Stanley Falls, and then another 800 kilometers up the Lualaba River into Katanga. In the late 1890s, the British reconquest of Sudan involved steam-powered gunboats on the Nile River that were taken apart and rebuilt after every cataract and the construction of a parallel railway to transport supplies and reinforcements.

Communications technology was important as well, as heliographs and telegraphs, also products of the mid-19th century, allowed Europeans to react quickly to African resistance. Around the same time, European medical research on tropical diseases began to produce results such as important discoveries about malaria and the employment of quinine as a prophylaxis. By the 1860s, European colonial powers had established plantations of cinchona trees, indigenous to parts of South America, in India and South East Asia where the bark was used for the mass production of quinine, which remained the primary antimalarial drug up to the 1920s.

While the average mortality rate for European troops on the West African coast in the early 19th century was 483 for enlisted men and 209 for officers out of 1,000, the number for both categories fell to under 100 out of 1,000 between 1881 and 1897. It was now much safer for Europeans to live in tropical Africa. Other recent inventions used by colonial armies during the "Scramble for Africa" included dynamite, searchlights, and barbed wire as a defensive obstacle.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–1894); East Africa, British Conquest of (1890–1905); Firearms Technology; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882)

Tel el-Kebir (from the Arabic *El Tel el-Kebir,* or "The Great Hill") was the site of the main Egyptian army encampment during the 1882 Urabi Rebellion. This heavily defended fortification was located on the Sweetwater Canal, about 32 kilometers

Battle of Tel el-Kebir, September 13, 1882


British forces:
Troop advance
Artillery
Cavalry
Infantry
N
HOUSEHOLD CAVALRY
1ST DIVISION
ARABI'S ENTRENCHMENTS
2ND DIVISION
Tel el-Kebir Station
RESERVES
ROYAL MARINES
HUSSARS
CAIRO AND ISMAILIA RAILWAY
SWEET WATER CANAL
IRRIGATION CANAL
Tel el-Kebir
Tel es-Saghir
INDIAN CONTINGENT
BENGAL CAVALRY
0 1/2 1 mi
0 1/2 1 km
BRITISH FORCES
EGYPT
Tel el-Kebir
Cairo
© ABC-CLIO

west of the Suez Canal and 64 kilometers northeast of Cairo, on the shortest overland route from the Suez Canal to Cairo.

The British expeditionary force sent to suppress the Urabi Rebellion was commanded by General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley. The main force gathered at Ismailia, on the western side of the Suez Canal, on September 1, 1882. A week later, the British force was on the outskirts of Tel el-Kebir. Ahmed Urabi Pasha was said to have over 26,000 regular and Bedouin troops, 2,500 cavalry, and about 60 guns defending this position, thought by Wolseley to be "a very hard nut to crack" (Williams, 1967, p. 270).

Wolseley determined that the best course of action would be to assault the strong Egyptian position at dawn, when it was most vulnerable. In order to do so, the British would have to conduct an unusually large-scale night march. To enhance success, Wolseley had earlier directed the engineers to plant a line of telegraph poles, pointing directly toward the enemy fortifications, which would aid navigation at night.

At 3:00 P.M. on September 12, 1882, the soldiers were told that they would move out that night and attack the Egyptian stronghold of Tel el-Kebir. To deceive any observing Egyptian spies, the British soldiers did not take their tents down until after sunset. They then marched silently to assembly areas. At 1:00 A.M. on September 13, the British forces, numbering about 17,401 men and 61 guns, began their stealthy march across the trackless desert. Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley's 2nd Division was on the left, marching in half-battalions in double-company columns, with Lieutenant-General G. H. S. Willis's 1st Division, advancing in half-battalions in columns of companies, on the right.

The British force, assisted by a Royal Navy navigator, followed the stars to their assault positions. By doing so, however, they were slightly off course and had fortuitously missed an Egyptian outpost. Shortly before dawn, a single shot was fired from the Egyptian positions, and this alerted the defenders. Because of the angle of the attack, the 1st (Highland) Brigade of the 2nd Division was then nearest the enemy. Fixing their bayonets, the Highlanders, followed by the rest of the force, assaulted Urabi's fortifications. The Cavalry Division, commanded by Major-General D. C. Drury Lowe, swept around the crumbling enemy left flank, wreaking havoc in the Egyptian rear areas. Fighting was fierce, often hand to hand, with men hacked or stabbed to death, or blown apart by cannon. But the Egyptians, caught off guard by Wolseley's night march and surprise assault, were no match for the disciplined, well-led British soldiers. The battle was over in 35 minutes.

Tel el-Kebir was Wolseley's most decisive and overwhelming victory. The battle was won at a relatively low cost of 57 British dead, 382 wounded, and 30 men missing, as compared to about 2,000 Egyptian dead. A rapid pursuit of the vanquished enemy followed, and Wolseley entered Cairo two days later. The war was over on September 15, 1882. Wolseley considered the Battle of Tel el-Kebir the decisive factor in "the tidiest little war ever fought by the British Army in its long history" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 338). It probably was.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Alexandria, Bombardment of (July 11, 1882); Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Egyptian Army; Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet

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Tewodros II (c. 1818–April 13, 1868)

Through banditry and military prowess, Tewodros II took over the throne of a crumbling Ethiopia and restored central government over the rebellious regions. Tewodros miscalculated in his dealings with the ancient Ethiopian Orthodox Church, however, and his progressive plans for national unity foundered on questions of religion and taxation.

Tewodros was born Kasu Haylu around 1818. His father was Haylu Welde Giyorgis, the ruler of the Qwara district. Tewodros was raised by his stepbrother, Kenfu, one of many petty warlords who ruled the separate regions of the fractured Ethiopian Empire. Together, they raided their neighbors until Kenfu died in 1839. Tewodros replaced his stepbrother as the leader of the bandit army, living more as a brigand than a ruler. He earned the appreciation of the local peasantry, however, by sharing the spoils of his raids with them.

During this era, the once-united empire of Ethiopia had fallen apart and was ruled by a series of petty warlords and princes. The emperor exerted little control over the provinces. In 1845, Tewodros married Twabech Ali, the granddaughter of the empress, and became the ruler of the province of Qwara as a part of his wife's dowry.

In spite of this marriage, Tewodros turned on the imperial family the following year. He first captured Empress Menen, and when Emperor Yohannes III sought to free his wife in 1847, Tewodros took him prisoner as well. In exchange for their release, their son, Ras Ali Alula, gave Tewodros the lands to the north and west of Lake Tana. These concessions did not satisfy him for long, however. In 1852, he attacked the ruler of the Gojam region, and in 1853, he again made war on Ras Ali Alula and his family, defeating their army handily. In 1855, he conquered Dejazmach Webe of Semen, one of the last warlords to challenge him. He then crowned himself Tewodros II, emperor of Ethiopia. He soon consolidated his gains and reconstituted the decaying empire, conquering the dissident Showa province ruled by the man who would become Emperor Menelik II.

Tewodros had received a Christian education as a youth and named himself after a legendary figure who, it was prophesized, would save Ethiopia from Islam and ultimately conquer Jerusalem. As emperor, he embarked on an ambitious program of reform that was intended to strengthen the empire, as well as to help it resist and conquer its Muslim neighbors. Tewodros created a professional army, established factories to produce military equipment, reformed the imperial tax system, and built ships and roads.

To pay for his projects, Tewodros used funds from the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which brought him into conflict with the clergy. The Ethiopian church dated back to the fourth century, and its clergy did not appreciate an upstart like Tewodros. They attempted to rally support against his rule from among the Ethiopian peasantry. In response, Tewodros turned to European, Protestant missionaries to aid him in his attempts to modernize his kingdom. He allowed them to proselytize in the country for several years. He also demanded that they help produce weapons for his army, however. His encouragement of Protestant missionaries further poisoned his relationship with the established church.

Relations with the clergy worsened after Tewodros attempted to end the church's tax-exempt status. Finally, exasperated by the obstructionism of church officials, in 1864 he imprisoned Abune Selama, the head of the church, and looted and burned 41 churches in the Gondar region. He also became frustrated with the European missionaries, who were not able to supply him with the modern firearms that he desired. Tewodros sent a message to Britain's Queen Victoria requesting aid against his Muslim enemies. When his letter received no reply, he arrested the British consul and several of the European missionaries. In response, the British government sent an army to Ethiopia to free the hostages.



Tewodros II (c. 1818–1868) was emperor of Ethiopia from 1855 until his death. Frustrated with lack of British support, he took European hostages and then committed suicide after his forces were defeated by a British punitive expedition. (The Print Collector/Print Collector/Getty Images)

By 1866, Tewodros's campaign against the church had backfired. Several provinces of his empire were in open rebellion against his rule, and there were widespread desertions from his army. In 1868, the British expeditionary force arrived under Robert Napier. After Tewodros released the prisoners, his army mounted a weak assault on the British forces but was swiftly defeated. Tewodros retreated to his fortress of Magdala, where he committed suicide in 1868 with a pistol he had received as a gift from Queen Victoria.

James Burns

See also: Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Menelik II; Napier, Robert C.; Yohannes IV

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Tippu Tip (1837–1905)

As a trader and leader of caravans, Tippu Tip's control of the markets in East and Central Africa extended for thousands of kilometers north and northwest of Lake

Tanganyika. His knowledge of the African interior and its peoples was not only useful commercially, however. In the 19th century, as European powers sought to usurp the imperial power that Arabs held over East African coastal cities and penetrate ever deeper into the continent, Tippu Tip's expertise and diplomacy brought him into contact with a wide variety of powerful men.

Tippu Tip was born Hamed bin Muhammad Juma bin Rashid el Murjebi in 1837 to a successful Arab trader in East-Central Africa. The wealth of his family derived from the trade in ivory and enslaved Africans, who were brought out of the inland areas of East Africa and exported to a variety of places around the Indian Ocean, including Arabia, Persia, and India. Although much of the territory on the coast of East Africa owed allegiance to the sultan of Zanzibar (an island off the coast), this relationship was fragile and owed much to the loyalty and support of Swahili and Arab traders. Britain had committed the Royal Navy to ending the international slave trade in 1807, but the sultan of Zanzibar was allowed by the Moresby Treaty to buy and sell slaves, so long as they were not exported. As the great clove plantations of Zanzibar came to require ever more labor, they absorbed a large percentage of the Africans brought forcibly out of the interior. The British maintained patrolling squadrons in the Indian Ocean to discourage the export of humans but did not obstruct the labor relations under the Zanzibari royalty within their own territory.

As a child, Tippu Tip received Islamic instruction in a Koranic school, but he was more interested in traveling with his father on large caravan expeditions. On these trips, which often lasted for months, his father would barter for slaves and ivory, which he would transport back to Zanzibar to sell in the great markets there. When Tippu Tip was 15 years old, he accompanied his father on a caravan expedition for the first time. Not long after that, he began to conduct his own trading expeditions regularly, always returning to Zanzibar with large quantities of ivory and slaves. Often, he obtained his goods through successful armed struggles and thus earned the reputation as an effective caravan leader and capable trader. As Tippu Tip continued his raids in the interior, he entered into business with his half-brother and enlarged his fortunes immensely.

In 1867, while on a caravan expedition, Tippu Tip met David Livingstone, a missionary and explorer from Scotland. The missionary was very ill and unable to leave the area due to prolonged warfare between the Arabs and local people. He aided Livingstone by giving him guides and enough supplies to leave the area. Livingstone later returned and traveled with Tippu Tip's caravan for several months. Although he disapproved of the Arab's slaving, the missionary admired his diplomacy. Nearly 10 years later, Tippu Tip met Henry Morton Stanley, the Welsh-American journalist who had been looking for Livingstone and intended to complete the missionary's exploration of the Congo River on behalf of the king of Belgium. After a journey of several months, Tippu Tip led Stanley to the river, but the two parted on ambivalent terms.

By the early 1880s, Tippu Tip was the acknowledged ruler of large parts of central Africa, but he controlled his territory only for trade, with no thought for building



Tippu Tip (1837–1905) was a Swahili-Arab warlord and slaver who controlled the area just west of Lake Tanganyika from the 1860s to 1880s and considered himself a nominal subordinate of the Sultan of Zanzibar. In 1887 he agreed to work for Leopold II as governor of the same area which was now part of the Congo Free State. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

a state or organizing the population. The trade in ivory and slaves kept the area in a constant state of upheaval, and his territories were characterized by oppression.

After many years in Central Africa, Tippu Tip traveled eastward to Ujiji on Lake Tanganyika in present-day Tanzania. It had been 20 years since he had visited this important trading post, and many European Christian missionary settlements had sprung up there. Moreover, these Europeans had befriended Mirambo, the preeminent Nyamwezi leader in the area. Mirambo held a long-standing hatred for the local Arab trading coalition, against whom he had waged prolonged warfare. Yet Tippu Tip obtained a cordial communication from Mirambo, whom the Arab admired. Mirambo aided Tippu Tip in leading his caravan to the coast despite continuous attacks by local chiefs. Upon his arrival in Zanzibar, Tippu Tip was summoned by Sultan Barghash, who recognized his influence with Mirambo and hoped to take advantage of his diplomatic expertise.

The sultan entrusted Tippu Tip with the task of consolidating Arab interests between the coast and Lake Tanganyika. In 1883, Tippu Tip left Zanzibar with his largest caravan ever, determined to carry out the sultan's mission. Very soon, however, the sultan summoned him back because the German East Africa Company was making aggressive and widespread claims in East African territories formerly controlled by Zanzibar. After Sultan Barghash agreed to certain German appeals, the British became alarmed and involved themselves in negotiations in 1885.

By this time, however, all the relevant European powers were seeking to entrench themselves in Central and East Africa, hastening to snap up territories before their competitors could claim them. The Berlin Conference in 1884–1885 had partitioned Africa, but it also required effective occupation of territory before another European nation could honor any claims. The conference had completely ignored all Zanzibari claims.

In 1886, however, the Zanzibaris, Germans, and British reached a settlement that allowed the sultan to retain the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba, Lamu, and Mafia as well as a 16-kilometer strip of land on the continent. The sultan also granted the Germans a lease on the harbors of Dar es Salaam and Pangani (in present-day Tanzania) and thus sanctioned the first official European colonial rule in East Africa. The presence of Europeans reduced Tippu Tip's control of the interior, and in 1887, he agreed to act as governor of Stanley Falls on behalf of Belgian king Leopold II in the Congo Free State. In this position, Tippu Tip was supervised by Stanley, who had been hired by Leopold to establish the foundations of colonial rule.

Tippu Tip knew that the complete takeover of East-Central Africa by the Europeans was inevitable. His interest lay only in maintaining his commercial power. Yet missionaries, among other Europeans, were putting great pressure on the African slave traders, who until this point had enjoyed autonomy. As the European presence in the region grew steadily, colonial administrations erected laws and other obstacles to the slave trade. While Tippu Tip had managed to use diplomacy with the secular European authorities, ideological differences posed a great problem in communication between the Christian missionaries and the Arab.

Feeling hopeless, Tippu Tip returned to the coast in 1890, essentially abdicating his vast sphere of influence. On the coast, he found German colonists firmly in control. Armed battles between the Swahili-Arabs and various European forces raged throughout the region. Tippu Tip suffered great financial losses as a result of this turmoil, although these were dwarfed by the acute loss of his son, Sefu, who was killed resisting the advance of Leopold's forces in eastern Congo.

Tippu Tip remained relatively wealthy, with properties in Zanzibar and along the mainland coast. He was able to enjoy time with his family. On June 13, 1905, he died of malaria at his home in Zanzibar.

Shobana Shankar

See also: Arab War, Congo Free State (1892–1894); British Anti-Slavery Squadron; East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); Leopold II; Stanley, Henry Morton

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Tirailleurs Sénégalais (up to 1914)

The *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* was a light infantry force developed by France that was used in its 19th-century wars of colonial conquest and later in warfare on the European continent. The term refers both to the military organization and the men who fought in it. *Tirailleur* translates as "sharpshooter" or "skirmisher" in French, and those noted as *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* hailed from throughout colonial French West Africa. Originally under the auspices of the Ministry of the Marine, they came under the Ministry of War in 1900. Without the

Tirailleurs Sénégalais, the French would not have been able to take over the vast swaths of territory in West and Central Africa that they did. African soldiers were in part responsible for the spread of French control in Africa.

Prior to 1857, a few African soldiers, predecessors of the *tirailleurs,* were in French armies for aesthetic purposes during the *ancien régime* and in colonial Louisiana. In addition, two companies of West African "Wolofs" were sent to Madagascar and Guyana, and African troops served in the Crimean War, in Mexico, and in the Franco-Prussian War. Many of those who initially served came from the position of *laptot* (sailor, slave-sailor, or intermediary), who had a long history of working for French businessmen. The first company of what would become the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* dated to 1823. Governor Louis Faidherbe created the first four battalions of *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* in 1857 as the French government wanted to expand its presence into the interior of West Africa after years of mostly trading contact in coastal enclaves. African soldiers were less expensive in terms of the cost of their salaries and maintenance and were less affected by tropical maladies. Although their impact was great, their numbers were not. According to Charles Mangin, there were no more than 1,500 Africans serving as soldiers, sailors, or cavalrymen for the French military in lower Senegal during the Second Empire (1852–1870). It was not until 1884 that there was a full regiment of *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*.

Throughout its history, recruitment would be a challenge for the organization. One of the first methods was *rachat,* or the purchase of African slaves to turn them into *tirailleurs*. This also worked toward the French goal of eradicating slavery, although some French officers had slaves for their personal use and for bartering with local rulers. Before Europeans arrived, wives accompanied their husbands on military campaigns and the French colonial army allowed wives to follow their husbands to their garrisons, and the army accommodated polygynous marriages of the *tirailleurs* through the Morocco campaign of 1912. When the French tried to get the sons of chiefs into the army, it was not unusual for them to send slaves in their stead. Thus, the organization was tainted by its association with slavery.

Remuneration, war booty, and escape from both slavery and agricultural work also motivated young men to join the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais.* Faidherbe also believed that the attractive uniforms that he designed were sufficient enticement. In a time of rapid and confusing change, the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* offered continuity of profession to some, and the ability to change one's circumstances in life to others. Free men, slaves, and prisoners of war found themselves in the army of the conquering power.

French colonial expansion coincided with Islamic jihadist movements that sought both to purify Islam and establish political control. The leader of one of these jihads, El-Hadj Umar Tall, collided with Faidherbe. Tall was the caliph for the Tijanyyia brotherhood for the western Soudan, who emerged from what is now Guinea with a group of soldiers who wanted to eradicate elements of traditional worship from Islam and create a Tukolor empire.

By 1852, Tall had organized a large following of warriors from his native Futa Toro. Faidherbe and Tall had their initial encounter in 1857. Tall's forces were armed with light European weapons and they fought valiantly but ultimately lost. After Tall's death in 1863, the French pressed forward, and Faidherbe established more posts along the Senegal River. The *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* also fought against Samori Touré, another formidable foe who combined religious and secular authority with great military prowess, for 17 years until his arrest in 1898.

After territories in western Africa came under French rule, the *tirailleurs* continued to fight in the conquest of Madagascar in 1895, at Fashoda in 1898, and in the pacification of Morocco from 1908 to 1914. African soldiers in Faidherbe's and later armies provided key assistance to the fledgling colonial state in French West Africa. Not only did the *tirailleurs* assist with the military conquest, but they also introduced the French language, aspects of European ideas, and advanced ideas about how to negotiate the new world that the French brought.



Recruited throughout French West Africa, the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* was a light infantry force developed by France which was used in nineteenth-century wars of colonial conquest in Africa and later in warfare in Europe and Asia. (Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo)

The French military sought to civilize the masses and the *tirailleurs* at the same time. Africans were taught an inferior version of French (that was often referred to as "tirailleur") to communicate with officers and men of other ethnic groups. Africans who were citizens of France (mostly *originaires*) served in *tirailleur* units until 1915. The rank and file was African and the officers usually European, but there were a few indigenous officers, and the French were especially excited by those who came from the ranks of sons of defeated chiefs. A 1912 law then put the onus for recruitment on traditional chiefs.

After France's loss to Germany in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), Lieutenant- Colonel Charles Mangin developed a solution to France's perceived problem with its declining birthrate: the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*. Mangin began his military career in the French Soudan in 1890, and he later officered African troops in Morocco, where he envisioned a greater future for the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*. Because of Mangin's exhortations about the effectiveness of these troops via his 1910 *La Force Noire*, the French military began using African soldiers in European conflicts beginning with World War I. Their vital role in conflicts outside Africa would give these soldiers and the African politicians who represented them a bargaining chip to play in colonial and metropolitan politics.

Jacqueline Woodfork

See also: Faidherbe, Louis; Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Samori Toure; Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

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Toski, Battle of (August 3, 1889)

The Battle of Toski, fought almost entirely by troops of the Egyptian army, was a notable success and halted the one serious dervish attempt to invade Egypt from the Sudan.

The dervish advance took place in 1889 under the Khalifa (the Mahdi had died in 1885). Fresh from victories in Ethiopia, they marched across the northern frontier of the Sudan. The 8,000-man dervish force was under the command of Emir Abdel Rahman Wad el Nejumi, who had led the final assault into Khartoum in 1885. Nejumi's force was small for such a major operation, due to either Nejumi's belief in the invincibility of his soldiers or the Khalifa's desire to dispose of a rival.

After leaving Dongola on July 1, 1889, Nejumi's plan was to march west into the desert, outflank British outposts, and attack on the Nile River near Aswan. British intelligence received early warning of this enemy advance, and the sirdar, Major General Sir Francis W. Grenfell, assumed personal command of this operation to intercept the dervishes.

Early on August 3, 1889, Egyptian cavalry (one squadron of the 20th Hussars, three squadrons of Egyptian cavalry, and one Camel Corps company), under the command of Colonel Horatio H. Kitchener, found the dervishes breaking camp west of the village of Toski, about 100 kilometers north of Wadi Halfa. Grenfell realized that the dervishes, numbering about 3,000, wanted to avoid fighting in the open desert, where Egyptian firepower would play a key role in the battle and he could maneuver his units easily.

Grenfell's force consisted of the 1st Brigade (9th, 10th, and 13th Sudanese Infantry Battalions) and the 2nd Brigade (1st and 2nd Egyptian and 11th Sudanese Infantry Battalions), armed with Martini-Henry .450s, with two artillery batteries. Before waiting for reinforcement by a British brigade, Grenfell ordered Kitchener to prevent the dervishes from reaching a rocky area to the north and ordered his two brigades to advance from Toski. By 10 A.M., the two brigades were in a position to block the dervish advance from reaching Toski and the Nile. Nejumi's men courageously charged the Egyptian army units but were mowed down by accurate rifle fire, Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns, and artillery.

At about noon, Grenfell's force attacked and drove the dervishes to a small hill, which the latter defended bravely by repeated counterattacks. The Egyptian soldiers finally forced the survivors to retreat, but the pursuit was called off due to the ferocious heat.

While the dervish threat may have been exaggerated, the battle was a clear victory for the Egyptian army. Nejumi was killed and less than 1,000 dervishes survived, with one British officer referring to the battle as a "feast of blood" (Hunter, 1996, p. 33). The dervishes never again threatened Egypt.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Dervishes; Egyptian Army; Grenfell, Francis; Khalifa; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Transkei Rebellion (1880)

During the second half of the 19th century, the Cape Colony, a British territory with a white settler–dominated internal self-government, continued its eastward expansion subjugating various Xhosa-speaking people. In 1865, the eastern border of the Cape Colony officially advanced to the Kei River with the absorption of the previously separate colonial territory of British Kaffraria. That same year, armed Fingos (or Mfengu), Xhosa-speaking allies of the British during previous Cape-Xhosa Wars, crossed east of the Kei to establish Fingoland, which came under informal Cape protection.

Following the Cape-Xhosa War of 1877–1878, the Cape's eastern border officially advanced across the Kei River to the Mbashe River with the conquest of the Gcaleka Xhosa and the absorption of Fingoland in what was now called the Transkei Territory. In 1878, the Mpondomise and Thembu, located in the central-west part of Transkei, were bullied by Cape officials into voluntarily accepting Cape authority, but erosion of chiefly power, loss of land to Fingo colonial allies, and the opportunity presented by a rebellion in nearby Basutoland (the Gun War of 1880–1881) convinced them to take up arms.

In late October 1880, Hamilton Hope, colonial magistrate at Qumbu in the Cape-governed Transkei Territory, met with Mhlonhlo, leader of the Mpondomise, and around 800 of his men, who had indicated their willingness to fight against the rebels in Basutoland if given firearms. Hope had arranged for the delivery of 265 Snider breach-loading rifles and 15,000 rounds of ammunition. However, on Mhlonhlo's order, the magistrate and his two white clerks were killed and the Mpondomise, seizing the weapons, cut telegraph wires and looted European stores. Interestingly, Mhlonhlo spared the life of a third white clerk, as he was the son and brother of missionaries, and the chief emphasized that the action was specifically against the Cape administration.

The Mpondomise were rebelling. Within days, Mhlonhlo was joined by some Thembu people and Mditshwa, the other major Mpondomise leader, who later claimed that he had been pressured by his hot-headed sons. Since the procolonial Fingo in Transkei had just been stripped of their firearms by new Cape legislation that sought to disarm all Africans, they could hardly defend themselves, let alone combat the rebellion. Wagons full of firearms and ammunition, as well as parties of Cape settler volunteers, rushed into Transkei. Fingo and other African loyalists were quickly rearmed and organized into military units.

On November 15, the rebels suffered their first major defeat when 65 European volunteers and 500 Fingo intercepted 800 Mpondomise rebels under Mditshwa looting Fingo communities near the town of Umtata. After less than an hour, 50 rebels were dead and the rest fled east across the Umtata River, while on the colonial side, only two Fingo had been wounded. The armies of Mhlonhlo and Mditshwa gathered near Umtata and on November 23, a force of 30 Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR) members, 50 settlers, and 1,500 African allies ventured out and drove them away. Some 30 or 40 Mpondomise were killed, compared to just one Fingo on the other side. The support of the neighboring and still independent Mpondo for the Cape represented another major blow to the rebellion.

Colonial forces launched an offensive against rebel communities in Transkei. Raids against Thembu settlements in December 1880 killed several hundred rebels and captured many cattle and sheep. In early December, a mounted patrol from Mount Frere attacked Mhlonhlo's people, killing 120 and wounding many others. Facing a colonial scorched-earth campaign, many Mpondomise prepared to move to the Drakensberg Mountains, and others surrendered to European outposts. The defeated Mhlonhlo and Mditshwa withdrew their remaining forces into the rugged Tsitsa Gorge.

On December 18, Mhlonhlo's people were trapped in the ravine by two converging colonial columns consisting mostly of African allies, including a contingent of 750 Bhaca, who were also from Transkei. One column engaged the Mpondomise in an intense firefight from across the river, while the other moved around and descended upon them from the opposite direction. A total of 200 Mpondomise horsemen attempted to flee, but most were overtaken by colonial cavalry. While Mhlonhlo was one of the few who escaped by horse and took refuge in Basutoland, over 300 rebels were killed, with the colonial side sustaining minimal casualties. The next day, colonial forces observed 400–500 of Mditshwa's people abandoning the gorge.

In Transkei, the Cape regime replaced rebel chiefs with loyalist ones and rebel land was given to colonial allies like the Fingo, which caused resentment, division, and violence in this area for many years. While Mhlonto was eventually captured by colonial forces, he was put on trial and acquitted for the murder of Hope, when acquitted, he was allowed to return home in 1906. Mditshwa surrendered to colonial forces and was convicted of sedition but received a light three-year term of imprisonment as he had spared most whites in his area, and in 1885, he returned home. In 1894, Pondoland (home of the Mpondo people), in the northeast, became the last part of Transkei incorporated into the Cape.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Cape-Xhosa Wars (1778–1880); Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Firearms Technology; Gun War, Lesotho (1880–1881)

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Tshaneni, Battle of (June 5, 1884)

The Battle of Tshaneni in northeastern Zululand on June 5, 1884, was the climax of the civil war of 1883–1884 between of the Zulu royalist faction, the uSuthu, and their main rivals, the Mandlakazi. The uSuthu were victorious only because of the military alliance that they had forged on May 21, 1884, with Boer freebooters from the neighboring South African Republic.

In early June 1884, the uSuthu under Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, whom the Boers had recognized as the Zulu king and to whom they had promised military aid in return for extensive lands in Zululand, concentrated an army in the territory that they controlled in central Zululand. The uSuthu and their Boer allies pushed northeastward through Mandlakazi territory, while Zibhebhu kaMaphitha, the Mandlakazi chief, fell back before them with all his followers and livestock, finally making a stand where the Mkhuze River flows through a defile in the Lubombo Mountains. He placed all the noncombatants and cattle on a spur north of the river and positioned most of his 3,000 fighting men and three or four white mercenaries in dense bush on the slopes of Tshaneni Mountain to his rear. The rest of his men lined a deep gulley in advance of the Mandlakazi right.

On June 5 the 6,000 uSuthu cautiously advanced in traditional formation, with Adolf Schiel's 20 Luneburg Volunteers supporting the left horn and Commandant Lukas Meyers's commando of 120 men at the chest and right horn. The uSuthu on the left overran the Mandlakazi in the gulley, but the Mandlakazi rolled up the uSuthu right horn and forced it back onto the chest. The Boers fired from the saddle over the wavering uSuthu and drove the Mandlakazi back. Repeated Boer volleys into their flanks caused the Mandlakazi to give way and flee toward the river. Unluckily for them, some of the uSuthu left horn had already seized the ridge on the north side of the Mkhuze, cutting down several hundred fleeing noncombatants and preventing the Mandlakazi fighting men from crossing. Pinned against the river, they were slaughtered where they stood. Zibhebhu and some of his men did manage to escape across the river and up the slopes of the Lubombo Mountains where they were joined by surviving noncombatants. For the next two days, the uSuthu hunted down fugitives and rounded up close to 60,000 cattle. There were no Boer casualties and the number of Zulu killed is not known, although Mandlakazi losses must have been heavy.

Their defeat at Tshaneni meant that the Mandlakazi could not sustain themselves in their territory against further uSuthu and Boer attacks. In September 1884, they had to find sanctuary in the British Reserve Territory south of the Mhlathuze River, and for the time being, Zibhebhu stopped being a player in the affairs of central and northern Zululand.

John Laband

See also: Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

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Tukolor Empire, French Conquest of (1879–1893)

Based at the West African ports of Dakar and Saint Louis, the French under Louis Faidherbe expanded eastward up the Senegal River to secure trade and hinder the westward expansion of the Tukolor Empire during the 1850s and 1860s. This was accomplished by establishing a French colonial army initially based on purchasing local slaves who, trained and equipped with modern firearms, came to be known as the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais.* Defeat by Prussia in 1870–1871 encouraged the French to expand their colonies in West Africa to promote national prestige, but with locally recruited forces that would not detract from the defense of France.

From 1879 to 1883, the French pushed down the Niger River and constructed a series of forts and a railway between Senegal and Bamako, now the capital of Mali, in the southern part of Tukolor that was weakened by civil war and French encouragement for the subject Bambara population. The French focused on employing artillery to destroy the forts that the Tukolor Empire used to control its vast territory. However, the French moves against Tukolor were undermined by lack of continuity in French colonial policy and underfunding, as well as the rise of Mahmadu Lamine's Muslim state of Futa Bondu between the upper Gambia and Senegal rivers, which threatened both.

From 1885 to 1887, Tukolor ruler Ahmadu Seku supported the French, with whom he signed a treaty, in the suppression of Futa Bondu. Nevertheless, once Mahmadu Lamine was defeated, the French returned to sponsoring Ahmadu's enemies, such as the Bambara and rival Tukolor aristocrats, and the Tukolor ruler requested support from neighboring leaders, such as Samori Toure of the Mandinka Empire and Ali Bouri of the Jolof, who had been resisting French encroachment in the southern part of Senegambia. In April 1888, the French captured the fort of Koundian, which was the Tukolor base in the gold-producing Bambuk area and central to the Tukolor frontier defense system. Tukolor forces eventually retook the fort. The French built up their forces in the Senegambia area, turned Tukolor chiefs against one another, and placed an embargo on the shipment of firearms to the Tukolor Empire.

In mid-February 1889, the French military commander Colonel Louis Archinard led a 500-strong expedition, including about 400 local auxiliaries, to attack Koundian, where they overcame stiff Tukolor opposition and used artillery to destroy the fort. Typical of French military leaders in the area, Archinard informed the French civilian governor of this action after it had taken place. The destruction of Koundian buoyed Bambara support for the French, which had declined during the conquest of Futa Bondu, and cut off Ahmadu's communication with outlying areas. Ahmadu planned a counteroffensive, but it did not take place because of famine, which made it difficult to feed an army, and fear of internal Bambara rebellion. In early May

1889, the French built a fort at Nyamina on the Niger River near the Tukolor capital of Segu. Ahmadu prepared for war by importing firearms from the coastal British territories in the south, and to his relief, the harvests at the end of 1889 were good.

In December 1889, Archinard concocted a border dispute with the Tukolor Empire and gave Ahmadu an impossible ultimatum that served as a pretext for all-out war. Just before he was overthrown by the French in early 1890, Ali Bouri sent large Jolof contingents to assist Tukolor. On the morning of April 6, 1890, a 3,600-strong French force attacked Segu, which surrendered that afternoon after bombardment by 2,776 artillery shells. The conquest of Segu pushed Ahmadu's forces east, which made it hard for them to cooperate with Samori to the south. In late April, Archinard, largely to encourage Bambara cooperation with the French, led his forces northwest to destroy the fortress of Ouelesssebougou, which was a symbol of Tukolor authority in the Beledougou area.

In early June, Ahmadu directed a counterattack west into the vast Kaarta area that represented the western half of his empire. Although his army's advance on the main French base at Kayes was stopped a few kilometers short at the village of Bougoura, Tukolor troops occupied various places in Kaarta, such as the town of Koniakary, which became a rallying point. Responding quickly, the French captured the fort at Koniakary in mid-June and used it as a base to raid Tukolor forces across Kaarta. Ahmadu's troops attempted to retake Koniakary but were hampered by the rainy season, which caused communication and transport problems; desertion of non-Tukolor soldiers; superior French firepower; and the defection of the ruler of the Khasso district who sent troops to assist Archinard.

By the end of September, the Tukolor army had withdrawn from Koniakary eastward to the town of Nioro. After losing a series of battles with the French from September 1890 to January 1891, Tukolor forces abandoned Kaarta, where more subordinate rulers began siding with the French. Ahmadu fled to Masina, which was the easternmost section of his disintegrating empire. Disappointed that the French would not restore their pre-Tukolor independence, the Bambara staged several rebellions in 1892 and supported Ahmadu in his campaign.

Ahmadu used diplomacy to settle the conflict between Samori and Tieba, ruler of the Kenedugu area (centered on the town of Sikasso), who had been supported by the French but now saw them as a threat to his own independence. This created a broad anti-French alliance and reopened Ahmadu's access to firearms from the southern coast, which had been blocked by Kenedugu when he withdrew east. However, since the French intensified their operations against Samori in 1892 so he could not help Ahmadu, Tukolor efforts to recapture Segu failed and Ahmadu lost many men and horses.

With a French expedition sent to distract Samori, Archinard led another force into the Masina area in early April 1893, where many of the demoralized local rulers and soldiers began to desert Ahmadu. In mid-April, the French defeated the weakened Tukolor army and captured the important Niger River center of Jenne. A few days later, the French took the other Niger trading town of Mopti, which the Tukolors had abandoned.

At the end of the month, a disheartened Tukolor army of just 1,500 men was easily defeated by the French and their allies at Bandiagara, the capital of Masina. The French proclaimed Aguibu, a rival half-brother of Ahmadu and their ally, as the new Tukolor ruler, who was then accepted by many local chiefs. Ahmadu fled east to the Sokoto Caliphate, in what is now northern Nigeria, and many of his followers moved south to join Samori's fight against the French.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Archinard, Louis; Borgnis-Desbordes, Gustave; Faidherbe, Louis; French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Mandinka Empire, French Conquest of (1882–1898); Samori Toure; *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914)

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Tweebosch, Battle of (March 7, 1902)

During the last phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Boer forces fought a guerrilla war against the British occupation of their former republics. In turn, the British commander Horatio Kitchener employed blockhouses connected by barbed wire to contain the Boers. However, this system was not employed in the western Transvaal, as there were few water sources to maintain the small garrisons, and Kitchener dispatched nine columns to hunt elusive Boer commanders like Jacobus De la Rey.

In late February 1902, a Boer commando under De la Rey attacked a British wagon train and killed, wounded, or captured 12 officers and 369 soldiers. Consequently, a British column consisting of 1,000 mounted infantry and four field guns under Lord Methuen was dispatched to find De la Rey. On the morning of March 7, De la Rey's 2,000 Boers ambushed Methuen's column at Tweebosch, and the mostly inexperienced British troops fled in panic. A few troops continued the futile fight, including Canadian lieutenant T. P. W. Nesham, a Royal Artillery officer, who operated a gun alone after the crew had been killed, and was ultimately shot and killed. Among the British, 68 were killed, 121 were wounded, and 205 were captured, including Methuen, who was twice wounded and had broken his leg falling from his horse. The Boers also captured all four British field guns.

De la Rey sent Methuen to a British field hospital under a flag of truce despite the objections of some of his own men who, in the context of the British destruction of their farms and relocation of their families to concentration camps, wanted to execute the British general. De la Rey was court-marshaled for releasing Methuen but was let off, as the wounded general would not be able to continue his war service. Upon hearing about the events at Tweebosch, Kitchener took to his room and refused to eat for two days, but then dispatched more troops under Colonel Ian Hamilton to the western Transvaal, which defeated a Boer force at the Battle of Rooiwal on April 11, 1902.

Since Methuen was the only British general captured during the conflict, questions were asked in the British Parliament about why he had been allowed to continue commanding troops, given his earlier defeat at Magersfontein. However, Kitchener took most of the blame for the Tweebosch fiasco, as he had provided Methuen with inexperienced troops. For the Boers, Tweebosch convinced some that they could achieve an honorable peace, and their delegates began negotiations with the British that eventually led to the Treaty of Vereeniging and a Boer surrender at the end of May.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Blockhouses, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); De la Rey, Jacobus; Hamilton, Ian S. M.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Methuen, Lord; Rooiwal, Battle of (April 11, 1902); Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

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Tweefontei/Groenkop, Battle of (December 25, 1901)

On November 28, 1901, during the last phase of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Christiaan De Wet held court with a number of other Boer commando leaders to plan an attack. The target identified by De Wet was the incomplete British blockhouse line in the Orange Free State, running from Bethlehem to Kroonstad, which had reached the farm Tweefontein, a hilly area to the east of Bethlehem. The British officer in charge was Lieutenant-General Leslie Rundle, who commanded a motley crew of soldiers organized into four units and deployed to guard the builders of the blockhouse line. One unit, consisting of 470 men and supported by two cannon, was led by Major J. Williams at Groenkop on the farm Tweefontein. The isolated unit at Groenkop, with its stockpile of provisions and ammunition, was identified by De Wet as the target for his unit.

The British tented camp at Groenkop occupied a strong defensive position—at least in theory. It was on high ground, which provided a good view of the surrounding area. One side of Groenkop was very steep, and it was argued that due to the terrain, it would not be conducive to any attacks, so it was not defended or guarded. On the less steep side, entrenchments were created and guards posted. At about 2 A.M. on Christmas 1901, a commando of roughly 500 burghers under De Wet attacked Groenkop via the steep unguarded side. The difficult terrain and a gully running down the hill were used as cover. The sleeping camp, possibly recovering from holiday celebrations, was charged and a short sharp firefight ensued. The camp guards were taken out first, and the surprise night attack meant that many of the British soldiers had no time to leave their beds and tents. In the onslaught, 58 British soldiers, including Major Williams, were killed, and roughly another 100 wounded. The captured British soldiers were stripped of their uniforms and instructed to march to Rundle's camp.

The commando under De Wet, at this stage of the war deprived of logistical support, found the provisions, ammunition, and uniforms taken from British soldiers very useful. The surprise night attack, using the terrain and the festive season as cover, gave the Boer commandos new hope and served to make De Wet even more notorious. The attack left the British army nervous, as they realized that it was impossible to guard all the outlying posts successfully. Nevertheless, the disaster was blamed on Williams's neglect for failing to place guards on both sides of Groenkop. The Battle of Groenkop prompted British commander Lord Horatio Kitchener to step up the efforts to capture De Wet and his unit, for this was deemed as the key to ending the war. As a consequence, more drives followed, and the blockhouse lines were extended farther, resulting in the mop-up of smaller commandos on a regular basis.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Blockhouses, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert

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Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879)

The British called the final battle of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 "Ulundi," after the Zulu king Cetshwayo kaMpande's principal *ikhanda* (military homestead), whereas the Zulu referred to it as "kwaNodwengu," after the nearest *ikhanda* to where it was fought.

In May 1879, Lieutenant-General Lord Chelmsford launched his second invasion of Zululand following his withdrawal after defeat at Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, to regroup. Advancing eastward through Zululand with the combined 2nd Division, South African Field Force, and Wood's Flying Column, on July 2, Chelmsford marched to the south bank of the White Mfolozi River in the Mahalabathini Plain. This was the heart of the Zulu kingdom, where oNdini and many other military homesteads were clustered. In mid-June, Chelmsford, upon learning that General Sir Garnet Wolseley was on route to take command, hastened the advance to conclude the campaign before the arrival of his replacement.

Before dawn on July 4, Chelmsford marched 5,170 men (1,005 of them African) to a favorable position facing oNdini from the west that had been identified the previous day by a reconnaissance in force. The British formed an infantry square four ranks deep, interspersed with 7-pounder, 9-pounder, and Gatling guns. The Zulu forces had been slowly concentrating over the past month for a last-ditch defense of their kingdom and 15,000 to 20,000 of them under Prince Ziwedu kaMpande loosely surrounded the British square. At about 8:40 A.M., a British irregular horse led by Redvers Buller sallied out to draw them into range of the British guns. The Zulu, unable to break through the British fire, and with their reserves advancing out of oNdini broken up by artillery fire, began to withdraw at 9:20 A.M.

The British cavalry, mounted infantry, and irregular horse then counterattacked, supported by artillery, and turned the Zulu retreat into a rout. While African infantry killed the Zulu wounded, the British systematically burned all the military homesteads in the plain before withdrawing. The British lost 13 killed, and the Zulu an estimated 1,500.

The British hailed their victory as decisive, but some historians point out that pacification operations continued for two months afterward and that the British finally evacuated Zululand only at the end of September. On the other hand, subsequent to the battle, only a few very minor skirmishes took place between reduced British forces and Zulu irregulars along the margins of Zululand. The Zulu army itself, acknowledging the hopelessness of the military situation following the severity of its defeat at Ulundi (coming on top of its previous routs at Khambula on March 29 1879



Fought on July 4, 1879, the Battle of Ulundi represented a decisive British victory during the Anglo-Zulu War. After a disastrous Zulu attack on the British square, British cavalry pursued the Zulu and turned their retreat into a rout. (Universal History Archive/Getty Images)

and Gingindlovu on April 2 1879), immediately dispersed, never to reassemble. King Cetshwayo fled north a fugitive, his power irrevocably broken, and the principal notables of the kingdom hastened to come to terms with the British on September 1, 1879.

John Laband

See Also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Buller, Redvers Henry; Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Gingindlovu, Battle of (April 2, 1879); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Wolseley, Garnet J.

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Urabi Pasha, Ahmed (March 31, 1841–September 21, 1911)

Ahmed Urabi Pasha was a charismatic Egyptian army officer and ardent nationalist leader who repeatedly challenged the authority of the khedive (viceroy) of Egypt by threatening a military coup. Eventually, Urabi became the war minister but was dismissed; with the army in open defiance, he was reinstated by an increasingly impotent khedive. Urabi's actions eventually resulted in confrontation with the British and the defeat of the Egyptian army.

Sayed Ahmed Bey Urabi (Urabi Pasha), born in 1840, claimed to be descended from Hussein, the grandson of the prophet Mohammed. The son of a small village sheikh, Urabi was conscripted into the Egyptian army at age 14. Tall, intelligent, and hardworking, he caught the attention of his superiors. Three years later, Urabi was commissioned a lieutenant. Soon he became an aide-de-camp to the progressive ruler Mohammed Ali and was promoted to lieutenant-colonel within three years.

After Ismail became khedive in 1863, Urabi fell out of favor and his once-promising military career stagnated. His personal discontent increased, especially during the debacle of the Egyptian army's invasion of Ethiopia (1875–1876). The British persuaded the Ottoman sultan to depose Ismail and replace him with Tewfik, Ismail's son.

Loss of sovereignty, indebtedness, and related issues were keenly felt by many Egyptians. Urabi became a leader of the nationalists who were trying to overthrow foreign domination. On February 1, 1881, and again on September 9, Urabi and other colonels used the threat of a coup by their troops to issue ultimatums to Tewfik for government and military reforms. On both occasions, the khedive gave in to Urabi's demands.

In February 1882, Urabi became the war minister. The British and French sent a joint naval squadron that arrived at Alexandria in late May 1882 and demanded the dismissal of Urabi. The khedive consented and his entire government resigned in protest. The Egyptian army was in open defiance and the country was in chaos. Urabi was reinstated as war minister. Riots erupted in the afternoon of June 11, 1882, in Alexandria; over 50 Europeans were killed, and many more were injured, including the British consul.

British ships bombarded the Egyptian fortifications at Alexandria on July 11, 1882, the same day Urabi was appointed commander-in-chief. Later in July, the British sent an expeditionary force to Egypt, under the command of General Garnet J. Wolseley. The force began to disembark at Alexandria on August 12, 1882, but after a ruse, the British troops reembarked. After the British secured the Suez Canal, the troops landed at Ismailia.

Urabi seems to have eventually ascertained Wolseley's actual plan. After moving to the main Egyptian army camp at Tel el-Kebir, Urabi attacked the British at Kassassin on September 9, 1882, and was strongly repulsed. Urabi commanded the Egyptian forces at Tel el-Kebir and was decisively defeated by the British on September 13. After the British crushed the Egyptian army, they hurriedly advanced to Cairo, hoping to prevent a rumored burning of the city.

When the British arrived in Cairo on September 14, 1882, they learned that Urabi was in his house there. Later that evening, Urabi and other senior Egyptian army officers surrendered their swords, and with the arrival of Wolseley in Cairo the following day, Urabi's rebellion came to an end.

In December 1882, Urabi was brought and charged with rebellion before an Egyptian military court. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death. The British government, concerned about further unrest if Urabi was executed and made a martyr, recommended leniency. The khedive commuted Urabi's sentence to "perpetual exile." Urabi was transported to Ceylon, and in 1901, he was permitted to return to Egypt, where he died in 1911.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Alexandria, Bombardment of (July 11, 1882); Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Egyptian Army; Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet

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Urabi Rebellion (1882)

The Urabi Rebellion of 1882 was a nationalistic and military revolt, led by Egyptian army colonel Ahmed Urabi Pasha, against British and French domination of the internal and financial affairs of Egypt. To bolster the Egyptian khedive's (viceroy's) authority, protect Europeans living in Egypt, and ensure control of the Suez Canal, the British sent an expeditionary force to Egypt that soundly defeated the nationalists in a short, decisive campaign. This victory paved the way for the British occupation of Egypt.

British strategic interest focused on Egypt with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which dramatically reduced the sailing distances and times from England to India and elsewhere. The British were initially concerned that the Suez Canal was controlled by Khedive Ismail and the French, the latter influencing the Suez Canal Company. By 1875, the profligate khedive was in serious financial difficulties and was forced to sell his shares in the Suez Canal Company to pay his creditors. Realizing the strategic importance of the canal, and with four-fifths of all shipping through it sailing under the British flag, British prime minister Benjamin Disraeli raised the money and purchased the khedive's outstanding shares. For 4 million pounds, the British acquired a controlling interest in the Suez Canal.

Ismail's indebtedness continued to grow, a situation made worse by the Egyptian army's debacle during its invasion of Ethiopia in 1875–1876. Egypt could not even pay the interest on its foreign debt. The British were concerned about their financial stake in Egypt and the Suez Canal, the strategic importance of the latter increasing with the Russian victory in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War and Russian expansion in central Asia. The British and French imposed a system of "dual control" over Egyptian finances, an arrangement that expanded into the other Egyptian ministries by 1878. In addition, this indebtedness forced an 80 percent reduction in the strength of the Egyptian army. The British and French persuaded the Ottoman sultan to depose the obstructionist Ismail in favor of his more pliable son, Tewfik, in 1879. Egyptians' distress over loss of sovereignty was exacerbated by heavy taxation, religious fundamentalism, and ethnic friction in the military.

Urabi, personally disgruntled about his stagnated career and concerned about the perceived emasculation of Egypt, became a leader of nationalists who were trying to overthrow foreign domination. On February 1, 1881, Arabi and two other colonels used the strength of and threat of insurrection by their troops to demand the ouster of the war minister from Tewfik. The khedive acquiesced to Arabi's demands. This incident demonstrated the weakness of the khedive, and when it became known that the French agent may have been in collusion with the colonels, the khedive pressured the French government to recall its representative.

On September 9, 1881, Urabi again used the threat of military interference to confront the khedive and demand the dismissal of his entire ministry, government reform, and an increase in military strength and expenditures. The khedive, intimidated by the military's bayonets, yielded to Urabi's demands. Urabi's reputation and prestige as a fearless nationalist leader rose and spread throughout the country.

To alleviate Egyptian concerns, the British, who were not averse to the gradual development of a democratic system of government, declared they had "no other aim than the prosperity of the country and its full enjoyment of that liberty which it has obtained from the Sultan" (Barthorp 1984, p. 29). To further reinforce the khedive's authority, the British and French signed an agreement, the Joint Anglo-French Note, published in Egypt on January 8, 1882.

Instead of placating the Egyptians, the note enraged the nationalists. The following month, a new government took power with Urabi as war minister. Internecine tension and intrigue spread in the Egyptian army to such an extent that the public safety of the country, as well as the 90,000 Europeans living there, was threatened. To support the khedive and protect the Europeans living in Egypt, the British and French dispatched a joint naval squadron that arrived at Alexandria on May 20, 1882.

Five days later, British and French agents demanded the dismissal of Urabi. The khedive consented and his entire government resigned in protest. With the army in open defiance, Urabi threatened the khedive with being deposed (or worse), unless he was reinstated as war minister. The khedive consented, and the nationalists saw in Urabi's victory the imminent expulsion of all foreigners and their influence from Egypt. Egyptian nationalism grew in popularity, along with anti-Christian sentiment, and soon exploded in a riot on the afternoon of June 11, 1882, in Alexandria. Urabi eventually ordered the army to restore the situation, but not before more than 50 Europeans had been killed and many more injured, including the British consul. Fear and discontent grew in Egypt as soldiers, fearing an Anglo-French attack or invasion, reinforced seaward fortifications at Alexandria.

Britain's government, led by Prime Minister William Gladstone, considered the possibility of intervention and began to draw up contingency plans to send an expeditionary force to Egypt, initially hoping that it would only have to protect the Suez Canal. Secret orders were issued to send two infantry battalions and an engineer company, under the command of Major-General Sir Archibald Alison, from Malta to Cyprus to be prepared to assist the Royal Navy.

The Egyptians continued to work feverishly on their fortifications at Alexandria. The British naval commander, Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour, issued an ultimatum to the Egyptians on July 10, 1882, to surrender the forts or face bombardment within 24 hours. That night, the French ships, unwilling to become involved in hostilities, sailed away. The following morning, Seymour's 8 battleships and 11 gunboats began their bombardment, and by nightfall, the Egyptian forts had been silenced. Urabi, who had been named Egyptian commander-in-chief on July 11, 1882, withdrew his troops inland the following day. The British sent landing parties, reinforced later by Alison's troops, into Alexandria to restore order and prepare to defend the city.

The British began to assemble a powerful force of about 16,400 soldiers from Britain, 7,600 from Mediterranean garrisons, and almost 7,000 from India under the command of General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, who had been serving as adjutant-general at the War Office. His chief of staff was Lieutenant-General Sir John M. Adye. On July 27, 1882, the House of Commons approved funding for the expedition, and three days later, the force began to sail from England to Egypt. The force began to disembark at Alexandria on August 12, 1882, and Wolseley arrived on August 15.

Wolseley's objectives were to seize the Suez Canal to ensure free passage, destroy Urabi's army, and capture Cairo, the Egyptian capital. In order to seize the Suez Canal, before Urabi could shift his troops from Alexandria to defend the canal or block it and then swiftly capture Cairo, Wolseley knew that he would have to take advantage of his superior mobility and amphibious capabilities. To avoid fighting through the countless flooded irrigation ditches of the Nile Delta or the treacherous desert west of Cairo, Wolseley decided to shift his base of operations to Ismailia, on the western side of the Suez Canal, and attack westward to Cairo, parallel to a railway and the all-important Sweetwater Canal. It was also the shortest overland route to Cairo, as well as the main Egyptian camp at Tel el-Kebir. On his first day in Alexandria, Wolseley coordinated the campaign plan with Seymour.

In order to deceive Urabi about British intentions, Wolseley devised a cover plan for the British to conduct a coordinated ground and naval attack on the Egyptian forts at Aboukir Bay, about 50 kilometers east of Alexandria. Wolseley issued guidance to Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Hamley, commanding the 2nd Division, to develop a plan for his division to move overland from Alexandria and attack in conjunction with troops reportedly scheduled to disembark and attack at Aboukir Bay.

Wolseley planned and implemented a ruse to reinforce the idea that he was going to attack at Aboukir Bay. On August 18, 1882, British troops reembarked on transport ships, apparently bound for the assault on the Aboukir forts. At noon the following day, the powerful British fleet sailed east to Aboukir Bay. The British fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay, its purported destination, four hours later. The British warships appeared to prepare for action, and the Egyptian gunners stood by in anticipation of a heavy naval bombardment. At nightfall on August 19, 1882, the two small craft from the British fleet approached the shore and opened fire, giving the impression of a major bombardment. The naval firing was in fact a subterfuge, as the fleet, under cover of darkness and while seemingly engaged in a naval bombardment, weighed anchor and sailed farther to the east. The stunned Egyptians at Aboukir woke up the following day to see that the British armada had disappeared. The British ships arrived at Port Said, at the northern entrance to the Suez Canal, after sunrise on August 20. By that time, British naval forces had secured the entire length and key points of the Suez Canal.

As soon as Wolseley arrived at Ismailia the following day, he began preparations for the final advance on Cairo. Pushing out from Ismailia, Wolseley's units had a number of skirmishes (at Magfar on August 24, 1882, and at Kassassin two days later, where an Egyptian counterattack was repulsed on September 9) before Hamley and his division rejoined the main force at Ismailia on September 1, 1882. It took the British forces over a week to inch their way to the outskirts of the heavily fortified Egyptian camp at Tel el-Kebir. Wolseley determined that the best course of action was to assault the Egyptian position at dawn after an almost unprecedented, large-scale night march. After sunset on September 12, 1882, the British marched silently to assembly areas. At 1:00 A.M. on September 13, the British troops began their stealthy march across the trackless desert. Shortly before dawn, the British force assaulted Urabi's fortifications. After fierce, often hand-to-hand fighting, the British soundly defeated the Egyptians in 35 minutes. This led to the collapse of the Urabi Rebellion.

A rapid pursuit of the vanquished enemy followed. Urabi surrendered on the night of September 14, 1882, and Wolseley entered Cairo the following day. The war was over on September 15, 1882.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Alexandria, Bombardment of (July 11, 1882); Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Egyptian Army; Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Urabi Pasha, Ahmed; Wolseley, Garnet

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V

Vaal Krantz, Battle of (February 5–7, 1900)

The Battle of Vaal Krantz (called *Vaalkrans* in Afrikaans) was the third unsuccessful British attempt to relieve the besieged Ladysmith during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

After failure at the Battle of Spion Kop (January 23–24, 1900), General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., commanding the British troops in Natal, prepared another offensive operation to relieve Ladysmith. The Boer left flank was anchored on Vaal Krantz, a hill that dominated the eastern end of the Brakfontein Ridge and was about 6.5 kilometers east of Spion Kop. Buller's plan was to seize Vaal Krantz and, after artillery was positioned on the hill to provide supporting fire, to send forward his cavalry to relieve Ladysmith.

The British attack began at 6 A.M. on February 5, 1900, with a feint from the British-held Maconochie Hills, north of the Tugela River, toward the Brakfontein Ridge. British guns on numerous hills supported the feint, while artillery on Swaartz Kop bombarded Vaal Krantz.

Determined to avoid the confusion that had dominated the Spion Kop battle, Buller, who had about 20,000 men, did not commit the main attack until the feint was completed. This reduced the element of surprise and permitted the Boers to concentrate their forces in the area of the expected attack. A hesitant Buller allowed Major-General Neville G. Lyttelton's 4th Brigade to attack Vaal Krantz in the late afternoon.

With two of Lyttelton's battalions across the Tugela, two battalions of Major-General H. J. T. Hildyard's 2nd Brigade were prepared to cross the river and support the main attack by capturing Green Hill. The plan was that with both Vaal Krantz and Green Hill in British hands, the defile between the two hills would be secured, and British cavalry and infantry could advance to Ladysmith. Buller vacillated, however, seemingly concerned about being responsible for yet another failed attack. He halted the advance of Hildyard's troops, which condemned the plan to failure, even if Lyttelton's force could have captured Vaal Krantz alone.

Lyttelton's troops continued the assault, and by 4 P.M., they had established weak positions on the southern and eastern sides of the hill. Buller ordered Lyttelton to withdraw, but he ignored the directive. Under intense pressure, Lyttelton moved his men to the western side of the hill to dig entrenchments and await reinforcements. Buller, however, refused to attack Green Hill or reinforce Lyttelton's men, deferring a decision to the next morning.

As Buller slept the night of February 5–6, 1900, the Boers reinforced their positions and moved artillery onto nearby hills, dominating Vaal Krantz. On the morning of February 6, Buller gave a number of contradictory orders, and then contacted his superior, Field Marshal Lord Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., ostensibly for guidance, but more likely to receive an order to retire and be absolved of responsibility for doing so. But Roberts ordered Buller to continue the attack to relieve Ladysmith. Desultory artillery firing and skirmishes occupied the day, and some of Hildyard's troops replaced Lyttelton's on Vaal Krantz.

Buller held a council of war with many of his subordinate generals in the afternoon of February 7, 1900. After heated discussions, the generals unanimously agreed with Buller to withdraw. Buller had apparently underestimated the Boer tenacity and lost his resolve, and "his generalship was so singular that he had again managed to manoeuvre a British force much superior in numbers into a hopelessly untenable position" (Symons, 1963, pp. 257–258). The British lost about 30 men killed and 350 wounded in this feeble attempt to relieve Ladysmith, while the Boers suffered about 30 men killed and about 50 wounded. Surprisingly, the British troops did not lose confidence in Buller, although officers behind his back called him "Sir Reverse Buller" and "the ferryman of the Tugela" (Powell, 1994, p. 170).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900)

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Vegkop, Battle of (October 16, 1836)

In 1836, parties of Dutch-speaking white settlers called *Boers* left the British-ruled Cape Colony and moved into the interior of what is now South Africa. At that time, the Ndebele kingdom of Mzilikazi, originating from the Indian Ocean coast, represented a dominant African power on the western Highveld. Since previous Griqua raids had taught Mzilikazi about the dangers of horse-mounted gunmen, he dispatched an army of 3,000 men under senior military commander Mkhaliphi to expel the Boers, who had established camps in his area.

On October 16, 1836, a group of around 35 Boers, led by Andries Potgieter, rode out to meet the Ndebele about 16 kilometers from a Boer laager at the base of the hill later called Vegkop (Hill of the Fight). Although it appears that the Boers wanted to negotiate, one of them fired into the Ndebele, who then charged. The Boers, utilizing a fire and movement technique, rode back to their laager, pursued by the Ndebele. The laager was tightly formed, with wagons tied together and thorn bushes placed in the gaps. When the Boers reached the laager, they secured their horses inside and manned the defenses. The Ndebele stopped just out of musket range to prepare for the attack, which gave the Boers additional time to prepare.

After a few hours, Mkhaliphi launched a typical envelopment attack on the laager by surrounding it and charging on all sides. After 15 minutes of Boer shooting, in which scatter shot from muskets proved particularly effective, Ndebele corpses were piling up. The Ndebele then withdrew with 6,000 cattle and 40,000 sheep that the Boers had kept outside the laager. In the assault, 150 Ndebele died, and 450 may have been killed in the entire engagement; meanwhile, only two Boers were killed and a dozen wounded. Boer horsemen then pursued the retreating Ndebele but failed to recover their livestock.

Bolstered by Boer reinforcement and newly recruited African allies, the Boers conducted a successful surprise attack on the Ndebele town of Mosega on January 17, 1837, in which they captured 7,000 cattle and killed 400–500 Ndebele. The Ndebele abandoned the settlement. The weakened Ndebele now became a target for neighboring groups such as the Zulu, who sent a raiding army against them in June. The Griqua and Hurutshe Tswana attacked them in August. In November 1837, a Boer commando fought a nine-day running battle against the Ndebele north of Mosega, which convinced Mzilikazi to withdraw north of the Limpopo River into present-day Zimbabwe.

Later, Afrikaner nationalist historiography would celebrate the Battle of Vegkop, together with the 1838 Battle of Blood River against the Zulu, as central events in the Great Trek and proof that divine providence was at work in their history.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Boer Trek (1835–1854); Boer-Ndebele War (1836–1837); Boers; Commando System (Boer Republics); Mzilikazi kaMashobane; Potgieter, Andries Hendrik

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Vereeniging, Treaty of (1902)

By the start of 1902, both sides wanted to end the vastly destructive Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). The British had occupied the Boer republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, which they had declared British colonies, but some Boer fighters called "bittereinders" refused to surrender and conducted a guerrilla campaign.

Facing criticism at home for the conduct of its counterinsurgency campaign against the Boers, which included farm burning and concentration camps, the British government wanted to avoid further devastation, as it might jeopardize the chances of creating a friendly civilian administration. Boer leaders were divided, with Transvaal commandant-general Louis Botha and Jan Smuts favoring negotiation, and Orange Free State president Marthinus Steyn, Jacobus De la Rey, Christiaan De Wet, and

J. B. M. Hertzog wanting to continue the struggle. In April 1902, the Boers reopened talks with the British, who rejected demands that the republics remain independent. At this time, the Boers had 15,000 to 17,000 men in the field, while the British had 250,000.

Each Boer commando from the Transvaal and Orange Free State elected a representative to attend peace talks held at Vereeniging, just south of Johannesburg, from May 15–31, 1902. When the hitherto-isolated Boer guerrilla leaders learned the hopelessness of their military situation, many hardline fighters such as De la Rey and De Wet changed their minds. On the last day of the conference the Boer delegates voted, 54–6, to concede independence. Many Boers in the field were horrified when they learned the news. The Boer fighters would all surrender, disarm, and swear loyalty to the British Crown.

Eager to gain Boer political cooperation, the British granted many concessions, including the return of all prisoners, general amnesty, protection of property rights, nonpunitive taxation, up to 3 million pounds toward reconstruction, the promise of eventual self-government, assurances that black political rights would not extend north from the Cape, and preservation of the Dutch language in the education and legal systems. High Commissioner Lord Alfred Milner and the British military commander, General Lord Horatio Kitchener, signed the treaty on behalf of Britain.

In 1907, the Boers of both the Transvaal and Orange River Colony were granted responsible government. In 1910, the British colonies of the Cape and Natal and the two former republics combined to form the Union of South Africa, a self-ruling British dominion such as Canada and Australia. Within the new union, only members of the white minority could vote and the qualified nonracial franchise of the Cape became a provincial oddity that was phased out during the 1930s. As a result, disappointed black Westernized elites formed the South African Native Nation Congress (later renamed the African National Congress) in 1912 to oppose racial discrimination.

The first three prime ministers of the Union of South Africa were the former Boer leaders Botha, Smuts, and Hertzog, which perhaps inspired the popular phrase "The Boers lost the war but won the peace." However, the memory of the Second Anglo-Boer War became a powerful grievance for many Boers and an important factor in the rise of Afrikaner nationalism during the early 20th century.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Bittereinders, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); Botha, Louis; Concentration Camps, Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902); De la Rey, Jacobus; De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kitchener, Horatio Herbert; Smuts, Jan Christian; Steyn, Marthinus T.

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Viljoen, Benjamin Johannes (Ben) (1868–1917)

Ben Viljoen was born in the Cape Colony. In 1890, when in his early 20s, he moved to the Boer republic of the Transvaal. It did not take him long to make his mark in journalism, commando duty against African groups, and action countering the Jameson Raid. In the process, he rose to the rank of field-cornet, a position he had to give up when he successfully ran, as a supporter of President Paul Kruger, for the Krugersdorp seat in the Volksraad (legislature).

At the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War, Viljoen was appointed commandant of the Johannesburg Commando. This commando partook in the invasion of Natal, and its ranks were swelled by members of the Dutch and German corps. The Natal campaign war record of Viljoen and his commando is a checkered one. On the one hand, his commandos were accused of looting Newcastle, which were apparently also renamed Viljoensdorp for a time, and performed poorly at the Battle of Elandslaagte (October 21, 1899). On the other, Viljoen and his commandos redeemed themselves along the Tugela line, especially at the Battle of Vaal Krantz (February 5–7, 1900), where he was wounded. Viljoen was frustrated by the collapse of the Tugela line, as well as by the manner in which the burghers abandoned their positions in withdrawing from Natal.

Back in the Transvaal, his commando tried to halt the march of the British army on Johannesburg and Pretoria. When this failed, he sent his family to Europe and withdrew, alongside General Louis Botha, to the Eastern Transvaal. When the Boers in the Transvaal adopted guerrilla tactics from September 1900 onward, Viljoen emerged as an influential leader. His commando was successful in disrupting rail traffic and took part with some success in the Battles of Renosterkop (November 29, 1900) and Helvetia (December 29, 1900). By dint of his personality and military exploits, he was appointed assistant commandant-general of the Transvaal in November 1900—a meteoric rise through the ranks. The exploits of Viljoen resulted in several drives launched against him by the British, but he managed to escape. He was finally caught, along with a few of his officers, during an innocuous night patrol in January 1901.

Viljoen was deported to St Helena as a prisoner of war. After the war, he had to deal with rumors that he had treasonably collaborated with the British army. He denied this charge vehemently. Viljoen did not take kindly to the adoration expressed for Boer generals like Christiaan De Wet and Koos De la Rey, while his role was not recognized.

Not being a landowner, and unable to find his feet in postwar South Africa, he relocated permanently to the United States. Here, he participated in various schemes, ranging from the "Boer War Circus," which reenacted war scenes; unsuccessfully working toward a Boer Colony in Mexico; dabbling in local politics; and serving in Germany as a consul. Viljoen died in 1917 and was buried in New Mexico. His flamboyant, strong-willed individualistic nature, awareness of class differences among Afrikaners, his Cape origins, and the nature of his capture meant that he never became a hero in the same vein as other Boer generals.

Johan Wassermann

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boers; Botha, Louis; De la Rey, Jacobus; De Wett, Christiaan R.; Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899); Foreign Volunteers in Boer Forces, Second Anglo-Boer War; Jameson Raid (1895–1896); Kruger, Paul; Vaal Krantz, Battle of (February 5–7, 1900)

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Volta-Bani War (1915–1917)

The Volta-Bani War of 1915–1917 in the vast Haut-Senegal-Niger region of French West Africa offers a prime example of African resistance to the French during World War I. The entry of the Ottoman Empire on the German side of the global conflict prompted a local French administrator, who already had a violent reputation, to whip and torture a number of Muslim leaders in public. The conscription of local men into the army during 1915, colonial taxation, and the weakening of French authority in an area with a population of around 900,000 caused a league of 11 villages to declare war on the French, whom they vowed to expel at all costs.

In the initial fighting, the rebels lost around 1,400 people but were able to evict local French forces. In late December 1915, the French assembled the largest military expedition that they had ever put together in West Africa. A total of 1,000 soldiers, supported by several artillery pieces, confronted 10,000 rebels at the village of Yankaso. After the French expended all their artillery shells, they were forced to retreat in the face of overwhelming rebel numbers. In February 1916, an even larger French force of 1,500 colonial African soldiers and 2,000 African auxiliaries, supported by artillery and machine guns, invaded the rebel area. They defeated rebel armies on several occasions, destroyed rebel villages and crops, seized women and children as hostages, and executed rebel leaders.

In May 1916, at a battle fought near Bobo-Dioulasso, French firepower claimed the lives of some 2,000 rebels, mainly armed with old flintlocks. In some cases, inhabitants of rebel villages fought against inhabitants of loyalist villages in what became a civil war. By the end of 1917, the Volta-Bani area had been “pacified” in a military campaign that had targeted an entire society and caused the deaths of 30,000 local people, as well as around 300 black and white French colonial soldiers.

In 1918, Blaise Diagne, the first black African elected to the French Chamber, was appointed High Commissioner for the Recruitment of Troops in West Africa, in exchange for false promises that some of the harshest aspects of colonial rule would be modified. His recruiting efforts were a great success with the largest continent of 21,000 volunteers coming from the previously rebellious Haut-Senegal-Niger region.

The French continued to persecute potential rebels well into 1919, when the area was divided into two new administrative territories that in 1960 became the independent states of Burkina Faso and Mali.

Although it is not well known, the Volta-Bani War represented one of the most significant instances of African armed resistance to colonial rule.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914)

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von Prince, Tom (1866–1914)

Tom von Prince was an officer in the German East Africa *Schutztruppe* who took part in the majority of the campaigns of conquest for that territory. Born on Mauritius in 1866, he was the son of the British police commissioner of that island and his German missionary wife. Prince was initially raised in England, but with the death of his family, he was instead enrolled in the Kassel Military Academy by his maternal relatives. After gaining his commission, he served briefly in the German army but found few avenues for advancement.

In 1888, now a second lieutenant, Prince joined Hermann von Wissmann's newly formed *Schutztruppe* in their expedition against the Abushiri Rebellion in East Africa. He was granted the command of a company of Shangaan troops and led them with skill throughout the campaigns of 1889–1890. In 1891, his company was dispatched as a part of the ill-fated Zelewski expedition against Mkwawa and the Hehe. Due to underestimating the strength and ability of the Hehe, von Zelewski ordered Prince's company back to the coast, meaning that Prince was absent when the fatal Hehe ambush was sprung at Lula-Rugaro (Lugalo). Prince then led his troops in the initial operations to reassert the German's authority in the wake of the devastating loss, including further operations against the Nyamwezi leader Siki. Prince earned his nickname, *Bwana Sakkarani* (or "the crazy one"), while charging and taking the fortifications of Siki's capital, Quikuru-kwa-Siki, in 1892.

In 1894, Prince took part in the counteroffensive against the Hehe, playing a key role in the taking of Mkwawa's capital at Iringa. He then became deeply involved in the suppression of Mkwawa's continuing revolt. In 1896, he established a new German fort at Iringa to deny the area as a base for further resistance, going so far as to settle his wife at the station. Later that year, he hosted Mkwawa's brother, Mpangile, who had surrendered and who was now being considered as an alternative leader for the Hehe. Unfortunately, after a series of devastating ambushes and raids by Mkwawa's followers, Mpangile was suspected of feeding information to the resisting Hehe, and Prince executed him in 1897. Following this, he increased patrols in the region while continuing to carry out a strategy of denying any food or shelter to Mkwawa's followers. By 1898, with Mkwawa's suicide and the paucity of food in the region, the Hehe resistance had ended.

Prince continued to serve as an officer in the *Schutztruppe* throughout the Maji Maji rebellion from 1905 to 1907. Following the suppression of the uprising, Prince was knighted and formally named Tom von Prince. He then retired as a captain from the German forces and settled with his wife at Usambara. However, with the start of World War I in 1914, von Prince returned to the colors and rejoined the *Schutztruppe* under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow Vorbeck. Tom von Prince was a leading voice demanding aggressive action against the surrounding British colonies and helped organize the German forces. He led two companies of German troops in the Battle of Tanga, where he was killed on November 4, 1914.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891); Maji Maji Revolt (1905); Mkwawa; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); von Wissmann, Hermann; von Zelewski, Emil

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von Trotha, Lothar (1848–1920)

Lothar von Trotha was the German commander who suppressed revolts of the Herero and the Nama in South West Africa in 1904–1905, and whose extermination order contributed to the deaths of thousands.

Born on July 3, 1848, in Magdeburg, a city in the Prussian province of Saxony, von Trotha served with distinction in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars that led to the unification of Germany in 1871. As Germany began to acquire colonial possessions, he participated in quashing the Hehe Rebellion in German East Africa during the 1890s and the Boxer Rebellion in China (1899–1901). He was called upon to perform a similar function in German South West Africa, where Governor Theodor Leutwein faced a stubborn revolt of the Herero.

Leutwein had maintained a carrot-and-stick policy toward the Africans, combining diplomacy with military coercion to keep them in check, as well as following a divide-and-rule strategy by playing indigenous rivals against each other. Despite a number of years of comparative peace, however, the Nama and Herero had been stirred to discontent by increasing white encroachments against African lands and cattle. Open hostilities erupted suddenly on January 12, 1904, with the murder of a number of German settlers by Hereros under Samuel Maharero. Leutwein and the *Schutztruppe,* the colonial armed force, engaged the Herero in battles at Onganjira and Oviumbo, but won no conclusive victory.

On his arrival in South West Africa, von Trotha rejected Leutwein’s flexible approach to dealing with the African chiefs, eschewing anything but outright conquest. Supported by 15,000 new reinforcements from Germany, he routed the Herero at Waterberg in August 1904. Survivors of the battle fled into the Omaheke Desert, where von Trotha's troops pursued them and killed men, women, and children alike. The Germans also blockaded the desert to prevent the return of the Herero, and guarded or poisoned water holes. As a result, thousands of Herero died of thirst or starvation, as well as from the direct actions of the German soldiers.



Lothar von Trotha (1848–1920) was the German commander who suppressed the 1904–1905 revolts of the Herero and Nama in South West Africa (today's Namibia). His "extermination order" initiated a genocide against both these communities. (Ullstein Picture/Ullstein Image via Getty)

On October 2, 1904, von Trotha issued a proclamation declaring the Herero to be German subjects no longer. Within German boundaries, he ordered every male Herero shot, and all Herero women and children to be driven back into the desert, where, he admitted, it was best that they die. Leutwein and others had sought a victory that would preserve the Herero as an eventual labor force for the colony. In contrast, von Trotha openly pursued the extermination of the Herero nation to ensure white victory in an impending race war that he had predicted some years earlier in a report from East Africa. He had less success confronting the rebellious Nama, who lived in more remote areas and engaged in guerrilla warfare rather than massing for a decisive battle. The war against the Nama lingered even after von Trotha returned to Germany in November 1905. In 1910, he was promoted to general of the infantry. He died on March 31, 1920, in Bonn, Germany, of typhoid fever.

Although von Trotha's extermination order was canceled by the German imperial government in December 1904, it continued to be applied to the Herero and Nama throughout most of the rebellion. Perhaps 65,000 Herero, or 80 percent of the prewar population, as well as some 10,000 Nama, died in the war and in labor and concentration camps.

Karl Yambert

See also: German Empire; German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Leutwein, Theodor; Maharero, Samuel; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); Shark Island Extermination Camp; Waterberg, Battle of (August 11, 1904)

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von Wissmann, Hermann (1853–1905)

Hermann von Wissmann was a German soldier, explorer, and colonial administrator best known for his role in pacifying and governing German East Africa. Born in Frankfurt in 1853, von Wissmann enlisted in the military in 1870 and was eventually commissioned as a lieutenant in 1874. His service was uneventful until a meeting with the explorer Dr. Paul Pogge in 1879. Lieutenant von Wissmann would accompany Dr. Pogge on his second long expedition through Africa from 1880–1884. During this time, von Wissmann worked for Leopold II's Congo Free State and helped map some of the regions of the Congo Basin. Upon his return to Germany, von Wissmann was feted as a hero, and his African explorations were lionized.

In 1888, his combination of military experience and African knowledge led to von Wissmann being placed in command of the expedition to crush the Abushiri Revolt in German East Africa and promoted to captain. He gathered together an irregular force of German officers and African mercenaries and, after a short period of training, attacked the rebelling factions of Abushiri ibn Salim al-Harthi and Bana Heri. The German forces under von Wissmann's command first assaulted the camp of Abushiri on May 8, 1889 and managed to drive back Abushiri's forces.

This initial victory did much to cement von Wissmann's authority over the African troops and also severely damaged Abushiri's reputation among the coastal notables who were his primary power base. A series of further engagements crushed much of the coastal resistance, leaving von Wissmann in control of the region while driving Abushiri into the interior to seek support from powerful inland groups such as the Mafiti and the Hehe. In November 1889, the German forces defeated a large force of Mafiti supporting Abushiri, leading to Abushiri's eventual capture in December. Then von Wissmann's forces continued the subjugation of other rebel groups, notably those of Bana Heri, a popular ruler of the region around Sadaani. His successes also saw him promoted to major within the German army. By early 1891, von Wissmann's forces had largely pacified the coastal region and the immediate hinterland.

Given the successful execution of his mission, von Wissmann was recalled to the coast and gradually placed into a more administrative role. In 1895, he was declared governor of German East Africa and oversaw many efforts to create a formal colonial government over the loose confederation of German allies and sympathetic local states. However, by 1896, his health had deteriorated, and he returned to Germany, where he would spend the rest of his life lecturing and writing about his experiences in Africa.

Despite this return to Germany, von Wissmann's health remained fragile, an issue exacerbated by his addiction to morphine, which had been noted even throughout his successful campaigns in Africa. He died on June 15, 1905, in a hunting accident. A monument was erected to him and his victories in Dar es Salaam in 1911, but it was torn down with the British occupation of Dar es Salaam in 1916.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; Leopold II; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918)

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von Zelewski, Emil (1854–1891)

Emil von Zelewski was a German military officer who served both as an agent of the *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Gesellschaft* (DOAG, or German East African Company) and an officer within the *Deutsche Ost-Afrika Schutztruppe.* His military career began with being commissioned as a lieutenant in the 99th Infantry Regiment of the Imperial German Army in the late 19th century. However, like many of the middle-class German officers of the 1880s, Zelewski lacked either the noble connections or local prospects to advance socially in the army.

Given opportunities in the new German East African Company, run by Carl Peters, Zelewski took leave from the German army to serve in Africa. In 1888, he was appointed the local representative of the DOAG in the thriving town of Pangani and immediately asserted his authority as not only an agent of the company, but also as the sovereign representative of the sultan of Zanzibar, who nominally held control over the city. Within days, Zelewski had engaged in a public and heated argument with the local governor, finally using German soldiers to force the issue. The incident then escalated with a small riot by the local populace, which Zelewski quelled with the marines of a nearby German steamship. In response, Zelewski and several soldiers then forced their way into the local mosque to arrest the local governor while at his prayers, sparking a violent uprising by the local populace against the entire German encroachment in East Africa, which would come to be known as the Abushiri Rebellion.

Zelewski led German troops throughout the Abushiri Rebellion and was appointed an officer in the now-Imperial-controlled *Schutztruppe.* He also was knighted for his continued service in East Africa at the head of the African soldiers of the empire, formally becoming Emil von Zelewski. His aggressive and sometimes cruel actions also led to his being granted the nicknames of *Bwana Mikono wa Damu* ("Mr. Hands of Blood") and *Nyundo* ("The Hammer") by the Africans he led.

Despite this severity, as well as concerns about his heavy drinking, von Zelewski was retained by Hermann von Wissmann as a senior officer in the new East African administration. In June 1891, von Zelewski was appointed the head of a major expedition to defeat the Mafiti and Hehe and given command of five officers, eight noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and 362 African rank and file to accomplish this task. Having encountered little resistance in the early going, von Zelewski ordered Lieutenant Tom von Prince and his company to return to the coast. Von Zelewski's reduced force was then ambushed at Lula-Rugaro (Lugalo) by the bulk of the Hehe army on August 17, with the vast majority of the column being broken by the first assault. Out of the initial forces, only 1 officer, 2 corporals, and 64 African troops survived. In addition, von Zelewski was killed in the battle, which would prove to be the most severe defeat of the *Schutztruppe* to date, and which was the opening engagement of the seven year-long Hehe Wars.

Charles G. Thomas

See also: Abushiri Revolt (1888–1889); East Africa, German Conquest of (1885–1908); German Empire; German-Hehe Wars (1891–1898); Lugalo, Battle of (August 17, 1891); Peters, Carl; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); von Prince, Tom; von Wissmann, Hermann

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Voulet-Chanoine Mission (1898–1900)

The French Voulet-Chanoine mission left Dakar, Senegal, in November 1898 bound for Lake Chad far to the east. Led by Captain Paul Voulet and his second-in-command Lieutenant Julien Chanoine, it consisted of 9 Europeans, 50 *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*, 20 mounted African spahis, 400 African auxiliary troops, and 800 supply carriers. It was well armed with up-to-date rifles, cannon, machine guns, and a large amount of ammunition. Both Voulet and Chanoine, who two years earlier had captured the Mossi capital of Ouagadougou in what is now Burkina Faso, already had reputations for cruelty.

The Voulet-Chanoine mission was meant to eventually link up with two other French expeditions heading for Lake Chad: one under Emil Gentil, which began in Brazzaville and traveled up the Congo River by steamer; and another under Major Amedee-François Lamy, which marched south from Algiers across the Sahara. Voulet had lobbied French politicians to approve his mission with the help of Chanoine, whose father was a general and future war minister. With vague instructions, Voulet was directed to impose French authority on the area between present-day Niger and Lake Chad.

The expedition divided when it arrived at Koulikoro, in what is now Mali, on the Niger River. While Chanoine led most of the men overland across the 1,000-kilometer Niger Bend and looted villages for supplies, Voulet took the remainder by boat to Timbuktu, where they visited the French garrison under Lieutenant-Colonel Francois Klobb and acquired an additional 70 *Tirailleurs* and 20 Spahis.

In January 1899, the mission came together at Say, the easternmost outpost of French Sudan, in what is now western Niger. Since the expedition's 2,000 members could no longer be fed from their own supplies, Voulet's men began sacking villages, where they murdered and raped. One of the most outrageous incidents took place on January 8 at Sansanne-Haoussa, where 101 people, including women and children, were killed in retaliation for the injury of several soldiers. The expedition continued such practices as it moved east, away from the Niger River and across the semidesert. When one of the French junior officers objected to this conduct, Voulet dismissed him, and he subsequently wrote a letter to his fiancée in France describing the atrocities, which eventually found its way to the French government.

In April, officials in Paris, concerned that the mission's violence was occurring in the British territory of what is now northern Nigeria and would therefore create an international incident, ordered the governor-general of French Sudan to have Voulet arrested and replaced with Klobb. On April 16, Voulet's expedition used its considerable firepower to defeat local forces under Queen Sarraounia at Lougou near the modern Niger-Nigeria border. On May 8, Voulet, seeking revenge for this resistance, committed one of the worst atrocities in French colonial history by ordering the massacre of possibly thousands of people at the nearby community of Birni-N'Konni.

By this time, Klobb and 50 *Tirailleurs* from Timbuktu were pursuing the Voulet expedition, which it followed for 2,000 kilometers, encountering ruined villages and corpses along the way. On July 10, Klobb's detachment caught up to the Voulet mission near Zinder in present-day south-central Niger. Klobb sent a message to Voulet informing him that he had been removed from command, and Voulet replied that he would fire on his pursuers if they approached. Voulet and Chanoine did not tell their French colleagues about Klobb's message, and on July 13, they committed their last massacre, slaughtering 150 women and children at a village where soldiers had been killed.

When they finally met at Dankori, Voulet had his men fire on Klobb, who was killed. On July 16, the expedition's *Tirailleurs* mutinied, killing first Chanoine and then Voulet, who fled but tried to return. Now under Lieutenant Marc Pallier, the mission attacked and seized the town of Zinder at the end of that month. Subsequently, Pallier took 300 soldiers to scout the route to Lake Chad, but another mutiny by men who wanted to return to French Sudan forced him back to Zinder. The mission then divided, with Pallier taking 300 soldiers west to French Sudan and Lieutenant Paul Joalland, the expedition's artillery officer, proceeding toward Lake Chad with 270 men, including the late Klobb's detachment, now led by Lieutenant Octave Meynier.

Known as the Joalland-Meynier mission, this new Lake Chad force spent a few weeks subjugating the Zinder area and in mid-September killed its former ruler, Amadou, in a skirmish. At the start of November, Jolland and Meynier continued toward Lake Chad with 170 soldiers and an artillery piece, leaving the remaining 100 men to occupy Zinder and await the arrival of the Lamy expedition from Algiers, which happened later that month.

The Lamy mission left Zinder in January 1900, and the next month, it linked up with the Joalland-Meynier mission on the eastern shore of Lake Chad. The two groups combined under Lamy and returned to Joalland's base camp, where the Chari River enters the southern end of Lake Chad. On April 21, Lamy and Joalland were joined by the Gentil mission, which had been waiting in the area. The next day, at the Battle of Kousseri, all three French expeditions defeated the army of Sudanese slaver and warlord Rabih ibn Fadl Allah, who was killed in the fighting. Lamy was mortally wounded.

In September, France founded the military territory of Chad with an administrative center called Fort Lamy. Joaland and Meynier returned to French Sudan via the Niger River and eventually became generals. When the French government released information about the massacres, the French press was outraged, but public opinion was tempered by the ultimate success in Chad, and an official enquiry in December 1902 concluded that Voulet and Chanoine had been driven insane by the African heat.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Chad, French Conquest of (1895–1900); Kousseri, Battle of (April 22, 1900); Rabih ibn Fadl Allah; *Tirailleurs Sénégalais* (up to 1914)

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W

Warren, Charles (1840–1927)

General Sir Charles Warren, a Royal Engineer officer, had a varied military career, most noteworthy for his archeological achievements and his command of British troops at the disastrous Battle of Spion Kop (January 23–24, 1900) during the Second Anglo-Boer War.

Warren was born in North Wales in 1840. His father was an Indian army officer who later became a general, and the younger Warren was seemingly destined for a military career too. Warren was educated at Cheltenham and commissioned into the Royal Engineers in 1857. He conducted surveys of Gibraltar from 1858 to 1865, when he became an instructor at the School of Military Engineering at Chatham. Between 1867 and 1870, he carried out explorations in Palestine of the topography of ancient Jerusalem and the archaeology of the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sherif area.

In 1876, Warren surveyed the border between the Orange Free State and Griqualand West, and he was in South Africa when the Ninth Cape-Xhosa War broke out in 1877, in which he commanded the settler volunteers of the Diamond Field Horse. In 1878, Major Warren led this unit during the suppression of an African rebellion in the diamond mining area of Griqualand West and was involved in assaulting several insurgent mountain strongholds. Warren then led patrols through the independent area between Griqualand West and the Molopo River, where he apprehended rebels and obtained the submission of African rulers to British authority. In 1881, this territory was absorbed into the Cape Colony. Warren returned to engineer instructor duty in England in 1878 and was selected for a special mission in 1882. His task was to find a Professor E. H. Palmer and his party, who had disappeared while trying to rally the support of Sinai Bedouins in the British war against Egypt. Warren was able to ascertain that Palmer had been killed and brought the culprits to justice, receiving a knighthood for his performance.

Warren returned to Chatham in 1882. In 1885, Major-General Warren commanded the 5,000-strong British military expedition to Bechuanaland (present-day Botswana) to separate the Germans in South West Africa (present-day Namibia) from the Boers of the Transvaal. In March, Warren established a fixed border with the Transvaal; the Boers of the mini-republic of Stellaland accepted British authority, and those of Goshen moved back into the Transvaal. In April and June, the Warren expedition traveled north of the Molopo River and entered into agreements with Tswana rulers, such as the particularly anti-Boer Khama of the Ngwato.

By September 1885, the area south of the Molopo River, inhabited by the Rolong and Tlhaping Tswana, became British Bechuanaland and was eventually incorporated into South Africa; and the territory north of that river became the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which later became Botswana. Subsequently, Warren commanded the British garrison at Suakin, on the Red Sea, for a short time before becoming commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in London. His tenure was controversial, including the use of heavy-handed measures to suppress socialist meetings. The failure of the police to solve the Jack the Ripper murders in 1888 forced both the home secretary and Warren to resign their positions.

In 1889, Warren became the commander of troops at Singapore, was promoted to major-general in 1893, and returned to England in 1895 to become general officer commanding the Thames and Medway district. He was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1897. After the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War in October 1899, Warren was appointed to command the 5th Division in South Africa, under General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., who was attempting to relieve Ladysmith.

Warren's selection was somewhat surprising, because of his age (59), tactlessness, disagreeable temper, lack of recent troop experience, and previous disagreements with Buller. The relationship was made worse when Buller was informed that Warren held the "dormant commission," which meant that he would succeed Buller if he were killed or incapacitated.

Warren was put in charge of the January 1900 operation to relieve Ladysmith by outflanking the Boers to the west of Spion Kop. The ponderous advance began on January 16, and initial efforts to seize Spion Kop were ineffectual. A night assault, January 23–24, was successful, and by dawn on January 24, the British had taken the hill—and then realized their defensive trench was in the center of a large plateau sloping toward the enemy in the north. Boer artillery, virtually unopposed, pounded the British infantry, and Boer marksmen enfiladed the British trench. Command and control was a problem, both on Spion Kop and between British forces there and Warren, who had to rely on messengers. When Warren became aware of the critical nature of the battle, he failed to order a diversionary attack. Despite British reinforcements straggling in, the ebb and flow of battle and fierce hand-to-hand fighting continued for much of the day. When night fell, the British thought that they were in an untenable position and withdrew from Spion Kop; the Boers, discouraged by their apparent failure to dislodge the British, were about to give up but reoccupied the summit and claimed victory. The British claimed their losses as 322 killed, 583 wounded, and 300 prisoners of war, but this may have been an underestimate. Buller placed the blame for the debacle on Warren, who was reassigned to Griqualand West and returned to England in August 1900.

Warren was promoted to general in 1904, retired the same year, and died in 1927.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Boer-Tswana Conflicts (1844–1857); Boer "Pocket Republics" (1881–1885); Boers; Buller, Redvers Henry; Cape-Xhosa War, Ninth (1877–1878); Griqualand West Rebellion (1878); Khama III; Laydsmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Spion Kop, Battle of (January 23–24, 1900)

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Waterberg, Battle of (August 11, 1904)

Fought in German South West Africa (now Namibia), the Battle of Waterberg was a decisive victory by the Germans over the Herero in 1904. As a result of the battle (also known as the Battle of Ohamakari), Herero resistance was snuffed out, and many thousands of Herero were killed by the Germans, perished of hunger or thirst in the desert, or died as German slave laborers.

The German–Herero war was precipitated by Herero attacks on German settlers on January 12, 1904. Despite earlier collaboration with the German colonial government, the Herero, led by Samuel Maharero, arose in armed rebellion against the ongoing loss of their grazing lands and water sources to white settlers, and in reaction to the announcement that the government intended to concentrate the Herero in relatively small and poorly resourced reserves while building railroads and furthering white access to the colony's best lands.

Some 200 German settlers were killed during or shortly after the initial attack, although the rebellion's leaders also directed their warriors to spare non-Germans, missionaries, and women and children. The governor of German South West Africa, Theodor Leutwein, assembled his colonial armed force, the *Schutztruppe*, and set off in pursuit of the Herero. After two fierce encounters at Onganjira and Oviumbo in April, the Herero withdrew to the Waterberg Plateau, while Leutwein suspended his campaign and requested reinforcements from Berlin.

The German government responded by sending fresh troops, as well as additional artillery and machine guns. Although Leutwein remained governor, the military command passed to Lieutenant-General Lothar von Trotha, a veteran of wars in Europe and of suppressions of the Boxer Rebellion in China and indigenous uprisings in German East Africa. He was under orders to eschew negotiations with the Herero and to subdue them by force of arms.

Since the railway did not extend farther inland than the colonial capital of Windhoek, German forces took three months to transport men and supplies to the Waterberg. In mid-August, six German columns, with a total of 1,500 soldiers, 12 machine guns, and 36 cannon, converged on the Herero, who had 4,000–6,000 men armed with rifles and thousands more noncombatants. On August 11, the main German column under von Trotha, advancing from the south, overcame stiff Herero resistance to capture the important waterholes at Hamakari and bombarded Herero positions. The Herero evidently expected to negotiate and, despite the long buildup of German forces in their vicinity, were relatively unprepared for battle, especially on the unprecedented scale being mounted by von Trotha. On August 11, 1904, German artillery began bombardment of the Herero. A gap was inadvertently left in the German lines, through which most Herero and their cattle escaped into the Omaheke Desert. The Germans blockaded the routes of return from the desert and barricaded or poisoned wells. Among the survivors were Samuel Maharero and about 1,000 of his followers, who managed to cross 320 kilometers of desert to British Bechuanaland (modern Botswana), where they were allowed to remain after pledging not to resume their rebellion.

On October 2, 1904, von Trotha issued an order that any male Herero found within German borders was to be executed, and that women and children were to be driven away. Thousands perished in the desert from hunger or thirst, or by being killed directly by the Germans. Thousands more, mostly women and children, were placed into concentration camps, where the mortality rates were appallingly high. The 1985 United Nations Whitaker Report estimates that approximately 65,000 Herero, or 80 percent of the total population, died between 1904 and 1907.

Karl Yambert

See also: Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); Leutwein, Theodor; Maharero, Samuel; *Schutztruppe* (1889–1918); Shark Island Extermination Camp; von Trotha, Lothar

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Wauchope, Andrew G. (1846–1899)

Major-General Andrew G. Wauchope fought in many of the British military campaigns of the last quarter of the 19th century. He was killed leading the Highland Brigade at the disastrous Battle of Magersfontein (December 11, 1899) during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902).

Wauchope was born on July 5, 1846, in Edinburgh, a scion of a wealthy family with a distinguished record of service to the Crown. He became a naval cadet in 1859 and a midshipman the following year. In 1862, he was discharged from the Royal Navy and became an ensign by purchase in the 42nd Highlanders (Black Watch). After routine training and garrison duty, Wauchope deployed with his battalion to serve in the Second Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874), where he led West African troops from the so-called Hausa Force, was wounded severely on two separate occasions, and was mentioned in dispatches.

After recuperating, Wauchope rejoined his battalion and served on Malta (1875–1878) and Cyprus (1878–1880). He returned to Britain and was in the group of reinforcements sent to Natal in late 1880 during the First Anglo-Boer War (1880–1881) but saw no action. In 1882, he served in the expedition sent to Egypt to suppress the Urabi Rebellion and fought at Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882). Wauchope subsequently served on occupation duty in Egypt, participated in the Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885), and was wounded at the Battle of Kirbekan (February 10, 1885).

Wauchope again served on Malta (1886–1889), then on Gibraltar (1889–1891). After returning to Scotland, he assumed command of the 2nd Battalion, Black Watch, in 1892. A wealthy man with interests in coal mining, he ran for Parliament in 1892 and 1899 but lost both times. Wauchope and his battalion performed well in the military maneuvers in Sussex in the fall of 1897, and the following summer, when a British force was being assembled for the reconquest of the Sudan, he was designated the commander of the 1st Brigade, British Division. At the Battle of Omdurman (September 2, 1898), Wauchope, "cool as a statue" (Baird, 1907, p. 154), moved his brigade at a crucial moment to fill a gap in the British force threatened by enemy cavalry. For his superb leadership, Wauchope was promoted to major-general.

Only days after the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War on October 11, 1899, Wauchope was appointed commander of the 3rd (Highland) Brigade. After arrival in South Africa and movement to the Modder River area, the Highland Brigade participated in operations designed to relieve Kimberley, protected by the Magersfontein and Spytfontein ridges. To capture the former, the British planned a night approach and dawn bayonet attack, similar to the assault on Tel el-Kebir, led by the Highland Brigade.

Wauchope reportedly had misgivings about the plan but did not mention this to his superior, Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen, 1st Division commander. An artillery bombardment was conducted on the afternoon of December 10, 1899, but it did little except alert the Boers to an imminent attack. After midnight, the 3,500-man Highland Brigade, in stormy weather and over rough terrain, began its approach march. Surprisingly, navigation was initially accurate, and the British were within 1,000 meters of the Magersfontein hill when dawn began to break. The staff officer navigating and two battalion commanders recommended to Wauchope that the brigade lines be extended, but he recklessly pressed on with the advance. When the lead elements were about 400 meters from the hidden Boer trenches, the Boers opened fire, and the British were pinned down for about nine hours. Even though British reinforcements were sent, the nerve of the Highland Brigade soldiers, during a period of confusion and terror, broke, and they ran. Wauchope was killed, as were 201 other soldiers of the Highland Brigade, with 496 wounded. He was initially interred on the battlefield but was reburied a week later near Matjesfontein, 650 kilometers to the south.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Magersfontein, Battle of (December 11, 1899); Methuen, Lord; Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13,1882); Urabi Rebellion (1882); West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

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Wepener, Siege of (April 9–25, 1900)

After the Boer defeat and surrender at Paardeberg (February 27, 1900), Lord Frederick Sleigh Roberts, commander-in-chief of the British forces in South Africa in 1900 during the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), advanced with his main British army via Poplar Grove (March 7) and Abrahamskaal/Driefontein (March 10) on Bloemfontein, capital of the Boer republic of the Orange Free State, which was occupied unopposed, on March 13. Four days later, at a council of war meeting held at Kroonstad, the Boers decided to henceforth wage guerrilla war.

In the meantime, British forces, including the (Cape) Colonial Division, advanced from the Eastern Cape through the southeastern Orange Free State. Some of these troops occupied the town of Wepener on the Orange Free State–Basotholand border. They took up a defensive position at Jammerberg Drift, approximately 5 kilometers northwest of the town, north of the Caledon River and adjacent to the road bridge across the river. On April 4, Colonel E. H. Dalgety, the officer commanding the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), took charge of the British force, consisting of some 111 officers and 1,787 other ranks, mostly Cape colonial forces (1st and 2nd Brabant's Horse, Kaffrarian Rifles, CMR, and Driscoll's Scouts), plus members of the Royal Scots Mounted Infantry. Their artillery consisted of seven guns and six Maxims (machine guns).

After the first clash of the guerrilla war (Sanna's Post, March 31, 1900), Orange Free State general Christiaan de Wet followed up his success by defeating a British force at Mostert's Hoek (April 3–4, 1900). He then decided to turn his attention to the British force at Wepener, in due course concentrating perhaps as many as 6,000 men, with at least five pieces of artillery, including two pom-poms (i.e., Maxim-Nordenfeldt or Vickers-Maxim quick-firing 37-mm guns) against the British. What followed was the siege of Wepener, or rather, Jammerberg Drift, which lasted from April 9–25, 1900.

It started with a Boer bombardment and an all-out attack on April 9, followed by another heavy attack on April 10, and on the night of April 10–11. Although the British sustained relatively heavy casualties, they were able to fend off the attacks. Always wary of casualties, the Boers now resorted to the siege tactics that they had earlier (and also unsuccessfully) applied during the futile sieges of Ladysmith, Kimberley, and Mafeking (today's Mahikeng)—namely, sporadic artillery bombardments. They dragged at least two guns to the top of the Jammerberg in an effort to improve the accuracy of their fire. Although the Boer artillery did cause casualties, the British defenders were well dug in. They suffered soaking rain and an increasing lack of sufficient provisions; ammunition also became scarce.

Roberts sent Lieutenant-General H. M. L. Rundle with some 12,000 troops from Bloemfontein to relieve the Wepener/

Jammerberg Drift garrison, while other forces also moved in that direction. The eventual relief forces were commanded by Brigadier General E. Y. Brabant and Major-General A. F. Hart, with some 4,000 troops and eight guns in total. With such overwhelming forces on their way, De Wet decided to discontinue the siege on April 25, and he slipped away unharmed with his commandoes, moving northward and soon causing much damage to the British military infrastructure—and prestige. But his decision to besiege a British force at Wepener/Jammerberg Drift was ill conceived and a waste of time and resources; his actions were motivated by hatred of the British colonial forces (which included Cape Afrikaners), rather than by military considerations.

In the course of the 16-day siege, the British defenders lost at least 33 killed or having died of their wounds, and at least 133 wounded, while the Boers lost 11 killed and about 25 wounded. The British forces soon continued their advance northward, while De Wet would continue to wage guerrilla war for more than two years.

André Wessels

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Cape Mounted Rifles; De Wet, Christiaan R.; Kimberley, Siege of (October 15, 1899–February 15, 1900); Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Mafeking, Siege of (October 13, 1899–May 17, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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West Africa, British Conquest of (1851–1903)

During the 19th century, British expansion in West Africa was often justified by the antislavery campaign but was mostly motivated by the desire for raw materials related to emerging industries. The British navy bombarded Lagos in December 1851, which forced Kosoko, the existing ruler, who did little to suppress the slave trade, to flee. He was replaced by the rival Egba leader Akitoye, who signed an antislavery treaty. Since Akitoye and his successors failed to stabilize the area, the British took direct control of Lagos in 1861, and it eventually became a center for further colonial expansion into what is now western Nigeria, hastened by French and German competition in the 1880s.

In 1886, the British intervened in the interior Yoruba states to end a 15-year war between Ibadan and a coalition of Ekiti, Ijesa, Ijebu, and Ife. The war-weary Yoruba rulers agreed to call upon the British governor in Lagos to resolve future disputes and to encourage free trade that gave British merchants greater access. In 1891, the ruler of Ijebu, a state that had kept out Europeans for most of the century, refused to discuss trade conditions with the Lagos governor, which was seen as a violation of the treaty. In May the following year, it took a 1,000-strong, British-led force less than a week to conquer Ijebu, using machine guns to route a 7,000- to 10,000-man army equipped with obsolete firearms. The intimidated Yoruba leaders signed away their sovereignty and became part of an enlarged Lagos colony in 1893. In November 1894, New Oyo, the only Yoruba state to have rejected British supremacy, was bombarded and came under colonial rule.

Beginning in the 1850s, local rulers and British traders in the Bight of Biafra looked to the British consul to solve disputes. The consul imposed treaties that promoted British free trade, suppression of the slave trade, and assistance to missionaries. In Calabar, around the 1850s, the consul intervened to place pro-British rulers in power in Creek Town and Duke Town. In 1855, the consul ordered the bombardment of Old Town to end the practice of human sacrifice and killing of twins.

An 1869 civil war in the city-state of Bonny prompted Jaja, a former slave who had become head of an important trading house, to break away to establish the new city-state of Opobo. In 1873, the British formally recognized Jaja, who was by this time the most powerful ruler in the Bight of Biafra. With the arrival of French and German agents in the mid-1880s, the British consul secured treaties of protection with all rulers, including Jaja. In 1885, Britain, having gained control of the foreign affairs of local states, declared the Oil Rivers Protectorate (renamed the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893). In 1887, Jaja, who had violated his treaty by refusing British traders free access to Opobo, was lured to negotiations by the British, where he was arrested and exiled to the Caribbean.

In early 1897, the kingdom of Benin, which had rejected several British treaty offers and massacred a British diplomatic mission, was invaded by the 1,200-strong Benin Punitive Expedition under Rear Admiral Harry Rawson, consisting of marines, sailors, and Niger Coast Protectorate forces. The expedition looted and burned Benin City, the capital's rich artwork was sold to defray the cost of the invasion, and King Ovonranwen was captured and exiled to Calabar.

In 1886, George Goldie's National African Company was granted a charter by the British government to gain control of the Niger and Benue rivers by making treaties with local rulers and suppressing the slave trade. While the British Protectorate had secured the coast and Niger Delta, Goldie's renamed Royal Niger Company was meant to forestall French and German penetration of the navigable rivers of the Nigerian hinterland. The Royal Niger Company established the Royal Niger Constabulary, with headquarters at Lokoja, signed a series of treaties (although it is unclear if the signatories understood that they were giving away their sovereignty), and created a monopoly by imposing high import duties that excluded other European and African merchants. Since the Brass people of the Niger Delta were therefore restricted from their historic trade farther up the river, they could not afford to import food and began to starve. As a result, in late December 1894, a Brass army under King Koko attacked the Royal Niger Company headquarters at Akassa, destroyed warehouses and machinery, looted trade goods, and captured several company employees, who were later eaten as part of a ritual to counter smallpox.

Although Royal Niger Company policies had caused Brass resistance, Goldie was unwilling to expend company resources in response and called upon British Protectorate forces, which bombarded the Brass town of Nembe. French competition continued as in December 1894, when a French gunboat proceeded 160 kilometers up the Niger before running aground, and in 1897, when a French post was established in the west at Bussa on the Niger. During January and February 1897, Royal Niger Company forces, prompted by concerns about the French, conquered the kingdoms of Nupe and Ilorin, which were tributary states of the large Sokoto Caliphate to the north. With superior firepower, including seven artillery pieces and six Maxim guns, a Royal Niger Company force of 1,000 African soldiers and 32 European officers easily defeated the 30,000-strong Nupe army. A smaller Royal Niger Company contingent of 320 African infantry and 22 Europeans, supported by two field guns and four Maxims, invaded Ilorin. As it was marching, this force was almost ambushed by Ilorin cavalry, but the horsemen sprang the trap prematurely, which gave the Royal Niger Company troops time to form a defensive square.

In 1898, the British government purchased the Royal Niger Company from Goldie and sent Frederick Lugard to the area, where he transformed the company's constabulary into the West African Frontier Force (WAFF). During the next year, Lugard led troops into Borgu and French forces withdrew west into Dahomey (today's Republic of Benin). At the beginning of 1900, the Royal Niger Company territory south of the Niger and Benue, in the palm oil zone, was joined to the Niger Coast Protectorate to form the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. Former Royal Niger Company territory in the north, plus Ilorin on the south side of the Niger, became the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, with Lugard as its first commissioner.

The Sokoto Caliphate presented the British with two problems; its tributary relations with neighboring states such as Ilorin could encourage resistance to colonial rule, and it could serve as an avenue for French encroachment from the north. In 1899, the Sokoto ruler had rejected a Royal Niger Company request to establish a military post and British resident in the caliphate as a foil to French ambitions. The British now saw military conquest as the only way to secure northern Nigeria. Sokoto's decentralized government and lack of a standing army meant that each of the caliphate's subordinate rulers or emirs faced British invasion on their own. In addition, the Sokoto Caliphate's army consisted primarily of traditional cavalry because it had not modernized, partly because of European prohibition on selling firearms to Africans. Lugard justified his invasion of Sokoto on the basis that it practiced slavery and was a threat to regional peace.

Initially, Lugard invaded the emirates of Bida and Kontagora on the Niger, and Yola on the Benue, where he installed compliant new rulers. The WAFF, with soldiers from the commoner Hausa population, then moved against Bauchi and Gombe, and by 1902 they had taken Zaria. One incident illustrates how most of these battles were easy victories for the British. In February 1903, a WAFF force of 722 African infantry under 24 European officers, with four Maxims and four artillery pieces, advanced on the walled market city of Kano, which Emir Aliyu had abandoned, taking with him a large portion of the army. The British artillery breached the 12-meter-thick city walls, allowing WAFF soldiers to storm Kano.

Lugard's next target was the city of Sokoto, where Caliph Attahiru II, perhaps wanting to avoid bombardment of the city, led the army outside the gates to await the British. On March 15, a WAFF expedition of 656 African infantry and 25 European officers, supported by four Maxims and four artillery pieces, fought a 90-minute battle against the far-larger Sokoto army. After repeated but failed charges by his sword- and spear-wielding cavalry and infantry against the WAFF square, the caliph and his army withdrew east, and Lugard's men occupied the city. Although Lugard declared victory, installed a new caliph, and left for Britain, Attahiru rallied followers for a last stand on the sacred ground of Bima Hill near the town of Burmi, which was 320 kilometers southeast of Kano on the Gongola River.

In May, a 130-man WAFF patrol under Captain D. W. Sword was surrounded near Burmi and withdrew, suffering very heavy casualties, mostly from arrow wounds. On July 27, the WAFF attacked Burmi in the war's most intense battle. Attahiru and his two sons were killed early, and by the end of the day, British artillery and machine guns had squashed resistance in the town and killed over 600 people, mostly from the Fulani aristocracy. This marked the end of resistance, and the Sokoto Caliphate was absorbed into the protectorate. The following year, British forces occupied Borno, which had been weakened by the 1893 conquest of Sudanese slaver Rabih ibn Fadl Allah, who had been killed by the French in 1900, which was also annexed to Northern Nigeria.

Throughout the 19th century, the Asante Empire and the British struggled over control of the Fante communities and trade along the Gold Coast (now Ghana). The British also disliked the fact that after the abolition of the coastal slave trade, Asante redirected much of its commerce to the Muslim states of the north. The 1871 British purchase of Dutch forts along the Gold Coast threatened Asante's supply of firearms. Asante invaded the coast in 1873 and besieged the small British garrison at Cape Coast Castle, while the African inhabitants of the former Dutch enclaves rebelled. Some Asante leaders favored a negotiated peace, including the Queen Mother and top military leader Asamoa Nkwanta, who had recently seen a demonstration of the firepower of the new British Snider breech-loading rifle. At this time, the Asante army was still using muzzle-loaders fired from the hip, with an effective range of around 50 meters.

In August 1873, Major-General Garnet Wolseley was placed in command of a punitive expedition against Asante and appointed administrator of the Gold Coast Protectorate. Aware that British soldiers would be vulnerable to tropical diseases, Wolseley planned a quick invasion and had his men issued with quinine, a light uniform, and a pamphlet on jungle survival.

To lead the expedition, Wolseley selected a group of officers, some of whom he had come to know while subduing the Metis in Western Canada in 1870, and others who had reputations for bravery or intellect. To get the British troops in and out during the short dry season of January and February 1874, Wolseley arranged the improvement of the road that ran from the coast 112 kilometers inland to the forward staging area at Prahsu, on the Pra River, which included the construction of 237 bridges and a supply base every 16 kilometers. Once the army had reached the Pra, it would make a lightning strike on the Asante capital of Kumasi another 100 kilometers inland. Supplies were transported by thousands of carriers press-ganged from coastal communities.

The expedition itself consisted of 1,500 British regulars and 700 black troops, including the West Indian Regiment of Barbados and a unit of Hausa from Northern Nigeria supported by several artillery pieces and rockets. Since the thick forest meant that small units could easily become separated from the main body, Wolseley's expedition had a disproportionally high number of officers—1 for every 20 men.

Suffering from smallpox and dysentery, the Asante army had withdrawn inland across the Pra and sought to fight a delaying action to lure the British to a strongly defended position at Amoafo, 30 kilometers from Kumasi, where they would be outflanked and trapped by the destruction of a bridge. The British expedition, formed into a loose square with the artillery in the center, advanced on Amoafo, where it clashed with the Asante army on January 31. Taking heavy casualties, the Asante slowly withdrew, although they launched a determined counterattack that came to within 100 meters of the British headquarters. Other attacks in the rear of the square cut off British supplies.

Although defeat at the Battle of Amoafo propelled the peace party to power in Kumasi, harsh British surrender terms were rejected and another Asante army mobilized under Asamoa Nkwanta. Despite mounting fierce resistance, the Asante were defeated by the advancing British at the Battle of Odahsu, and Wolseley's expedition entered nearby Kumasi on February 4, which was burned two days later. Asante emissaries eventually caught up with Wolseley's force as it was returning to the coast and agreed to surrender. In the subsequent Treaty of Fomena, the Asante renounced claims to the coast, agreed to pay an indemnity, and promised to accept free trade. Both sides wanted to end the war, as the British expedition was unable to stage further operations and the weakened Asante wanted to prevent its provinces from declaring independence. Perhaps around 3,000 or 4,000 Asante were killed and twice that many wounded, while the British suffered 68 dead, 367 wounded, and 1,018 victims of illness.

In 1890, Asante, which had recovered under the new ruler Prempeh, rejected a British offer to become a protectorate. In 1894, Prempeh rejected a British proposal to pay him a stipend in exchange for accepting a British resident at Kumasi and not attacking coastal groups. An Asante delegation to London in 1895 failed to prevent British invasion. In January 1896, fearing that the French to the west or the Germans to the east would intervene, British forces consisting of West Indian troops and African auxiliaries led by Robert Baden-Powell occupied Asante without a fight. The British declared a protectorate, built a fort at Kumasi, and exiled Prempeh to the Seychelles Islands in the Indian Ocean.

In late March 1900, after Gold Coast governor Sir Frederick Hodgson refused to return the exiles and insisted on the surrender of the sacred golden stool, the Asante rebelled under the leadership of Queen Mother Yaa Asantewa and besieged the British fort at Kumasi defended by several Maxim guns. Given British involvement in South Africa, the organization of a relief force from the coast was delayed. In late April, a small relief force of 250 soldiers that had been rushed to the Gold Coast from Lagos fought its way through a series of Asante ambushes and entered the fort at Kumasi, although 5 had been killed and 139 wounded. Another relief force of around 200 African soldiers pushed through to the fort from the north in May but achieved little. Within the fort, deaths from hunger and smallpox amounted to two or three dozen a day.

In late June, the governor and most inhabitants of the fort broke out, leaving behind about 100 men too sick to march. On July 15, the main relief force from the coast, consisting of 1,000 African soldiers and 1,600 porters led by Colonel James Willcocks, arrived at Kumasi and relieved the fort's desperate defenders. By September, British colonial troops at Kumasi had increased to 2,000 and attacked nearby Asante towns, and in October, some Asante leaders accepted amnesty.

The last battle between the British and Asante took place on September 30, 1900, at Aboasu just northwest of Kumasi. Supported by field guns and Maxim guns, Willcocks led 1,200 men from the Central African Rifles, West African Regiment, WAFF, and Sikhs Indian units. With intense hand-to-hand fighting, the Asante were slowly driven up a hill, where they were outflanked and fled into the forest to avoid being completely surrounded. Kobina Chere, a defiant rebel leader accused of killing prisoners, was later captured and brought to Kumasi where he was tried and publically hanged. Yaa Asantewa and 15 other rebel leaders were also captured and sent to join Prempeh in the Seychelles.

The British administration quietly dropped the issue of the golden stool. In this last Anglo-Asante war, the British lost 692 soldiers and carriers, and 732 troops were wounded, and the Asante estimated their dead at over 1,000. In 1902, Asante was incorporated into the Gold Coast Protectorate, and in 1935, the monarchy was restored under British supervision.

During the 1880s, the borders of the British freed slave colony of Sierra Leone, where the British Anti-Slavery Squadron was based at Freetown, had been established with neighboring Liberia and the French in what is now Guinea. Around the same time, local British and Creole traders began to demand that the British extend their authority into the hinterland. In 1887, trade competition prompted the Yoni Temne to attack Senehun, a Kpaa Mende town ruled by Madam Yoko, who had allied with the British. As a result, a British military expedition defeated the Yoni Temne and established a garrison in the area.

In 1890, with the French driving Samori's forces south and east, the British signed treaties with chiefs in the Sierra Leone interior who promised to reject other European powers and accept the presence of a newly created Frontier Police. In 1893, the 1st West Indian Regiment drove some of Samori's followers out of Sierra Leone territory toward the French, which led to an accidental skirmish between French and British forces at Waima. The Frontier Police gradually gained power over local chiefs, which meant that there was little resistance when the British declared a protectorate over the area in 1896. However, the imposition of tax in 1898, abuse by the Frontier Police, the abolition of the internal slave trade, and loss of chiefly authority caused a widespread rebellion known as the "Hut Tax War." In the south, the Mende attacked symbols of British power and killed missionaries and Africans wearing European clothes, particularly Creoles. In the north, the Temne were led by experienced warrior Kasseh chief Bai Bureh, who had learned British military methods as part of a 1892 British punitive expedition.

After an attack on Port Loko in early March was thwarted by the arrival of a British gunboat with reinforcements, the Temne avoided direct confrontation with superior colonial firepower, staged sudden raids, ambushed columns on narrow bush paths, sniped at British officers, employed a network of spies, and fought delaying actions from behind clusters of well- positioned small wooden or stone stockades. British forces concentrated on trying to keep the roads open, burning Temne towns and establishing garrisons and regular patrols to prevent the building of more fortifications. In one day, a column of 100 West Indian infantry, supported by several hundred local porters, could destroy 20 stockades and fight four or five intense battles.

By October, the British, to supplement West Indian troops and localize the war, had formed a 1,000-strong battalion of the West African Regiment, recruited from interior communities such as the Mende and Temne and based in Freetown. During the rainy season (from May to October), the British suspended operations, and the war came to an end in mid-November, when a colonial patrol captured Bai Bureh, who was exiled to the Gold Coast until 1905.

While the British controlled the port of Bathurst at the Gambia River mouth and a narrow strip along either side of that river, the French occupied the hinterland. Local African opposition derailed British attempts to exchange the Gambia with France for the Ivory Coast. One reason why the British had wanted to give away the territory was the adjacent Soninke kingdom of Kombo, which since the 1850s had been embroiled in a series of civil wars between traditionalists and Muslim reformers. In 1887, the French occupied towns along the river, where they assisted local traditionalist rulers against Muslim forces. As a result, British agents made treaties with the chiefs along the Gambia and negotiated a border with the French that led to their withdrawal in 1889.

Since four decades of warfare had damaged or destroyed many Soninke states and divided the Muslim leaders, the British occupied the 22-kilometer-wide and 320-kilometer-long strip of territory in 1891 without much resistance. Muslim leader Fode Silla fought stubbornly but was defeated in 1894, and Fode Kabba, who had taken up jihad in the 1850s, continued resisting until 1900 by slipping in and out of French territory.

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See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Asamoa Nkwanta; Baden-Powell, Robert; Bai Bureh; British Anti-Slavery Squadron; Goldie, George; Hut Tax War, Sierra Leone (1898); Lugard, Frederick; Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (1897–1903); Rabeh ibn Fadl Allah; Royal Niger Company; Royal Niger Constabulary; Samori Toure; Southern Nigeria, British Conquest; West African Frontier Force (to 1914); Wolseley, Garnet

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West African Frontier Force (to 1914)

By the late 1890s, the British in West Africa had formed a number of colonial armed constabularies and paramilitary forces composed of local people. During the 1860s, Royal Navy captain John Glover formed several hundred Hausa and Yoruba (many of them escaped slaves) into a military force based at the newly acquired colony of Lagos that served as a base for further British expansion. Called "Glover's Hausas" and eventually the "Hausa Force," it established the martial reputation of the Muslim Hausa in British eyes.

Glover led a detachment of his men during the 1873–1874 British campaign against Asante in the Gold Coast. In 1879, this Hausa Armed Police was reformed into the 1,200-strong Gold Coast Constabulary, and in 1894, it was separated from the local police and transformed into an infantry regiment. In 1885, the British declared the Oil Rivers Protectorate (renamed Niger River Protectorate in 1893) over the coast of what is now southeastern Nigeria and created a local military force that participated in the subjugation of Benin in 1897.

In 1886, George Goldie's Royal Niger Company was granted a charter by the British government to gain control of the Niger and Benue rivers by making treaties with local rulers and suppressing the slave trade, and discouraging French and German intrusion. Goldie's company established a coercive arm called the Royal Niger Constabulary, with headquarters at Lokoja. In early 1897, Goldie's constabulary conquered the kingdoms of Nupe and Ilorin, which were tributary states of the Sokoto Caliphate to the north. In 1897, the British government, concerned about French expansion in the interior of West Africa, decided to establish the West African Frontier Force (WAFF) along the Niger River. The next year, with the British government's acquisition of Goldie's company, the WAFF absorbed the constabulary and Frederick Lugard arrived to take command. At that point, the WAFF consisted of two battalions, one at Ibadan in the west and the other at Lokoja in the east, recruited from Hausa, Yoruba, and Nupe, and was led by a small number of seconded British regular officers and noncommissioned officers.

The expense of employing British imperial troops in Asante in 1895–1896 prompted London to delegate West African security to a unified regional force. In 1900, the WAFF, given its success, was expanded to include almost all colonial military forces in the British West African territories of Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia. Although it was under the British Colonial Office, the WAFF continued to employ officers seconded from the British army who commanded an African rank and file. Within a few years, the new WAFF consisted of eight infantry battalions plus some artillery elements.

In what is now Nigeria, the new military structure reflected the new broader administrative division of the Northern Nigeria Protectorate (with Lugard as its first commissioner) and Southern Nigeria Protectorate, which was also imposed in 1900. The Northern Nigeria Regiment consisted of the two battalions of Lugard's original WAFF, based at Kaduna and Lokoja, and a new mounted infantry battalion formed at Kano in 1903. The Southern Nigeria Regiment consisted of a battalion from the old Niger Coast Protectorate Force and the remainder of the Royal Niger Constabulary based at Calabar; and in 1906, a second battalion was created from the Lagos Constabulary popularly known as the Hausa Force. In 1901, the over 2,000 men of the Gold Coast Constabulary became a battalion of the Gold Coast Regiment as part of the new WAFF. Its recruits came mostly from communities in the territory's far north, such as the Dagomba, Mossi, Grunshi, and Frafra.

In Sierra Leone, the Frontier Police, created in the 1890s, was transformed into the single-battalion Sierra Leone Regiment in 1902 as part of the WAFF. In the small territory of the Gamiba, the WAFF was represented by one rifle company. However, the West African Regiment, formed in Sierra Leone from Mende and Temne during the Hut Tax War of 1898, remained under War Office control to protect the strategically important port of Freetown until it was abolished for economic reasons in 1928.

Between 1900 and 1904, the WAFF participated in the suppression of revolt among the Asante of Gold Coast, subjugated the Aro of southeastern Nigeria, and conquered the large and decentralized Sokoto Caliphate and Borno, which were annexed by the Northern Nigeria Protectorate. In January 1914, the British merged Northern and Southern Nigeria into the single colonial territory of Nigeria, which meant that the Northern and Southern Nigeria regiments were also amalgamated into the Nigeria Regiment, although the process was not complete when World War I broke out in August.

Since the headquarters of the Nigeria Regiment was located at Kaduna in the north and recruiting continued to focus on the supposedly martial Hausa of that region and came to include minority groups from the "Middle Belt," the allegedly nonmartial communities of the south were not represented. The working language of the WAFF in Nigeria and Gold Coast became Hausa, while in Sierra Leone and the Gambia it became pidgin English. In 1928, it became the Royal West African Frontier Force and represented the military of British West Africa until decolonization in the late 1950s.

Timothy J. Stapleton

See also: Anglo-Aro War (1901–02); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Asante Wars (1895–1900); Benin, British Conquest of (1897); Hut Tax War, Sierra Leone (1898); Lugard, Frederick; Northern Nigeria, British Conquest of (1897–1903)

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West African Regiment (WAR). *See* "West African Frontier Force"

White, George S. (1835–1912)

Field Marshal Sir George S. White was a British army officer with extensive experience and service in India, earning the Victoria Cross during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). During the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), he commanded Ladysmith during its 119-day siege, and as a result, he and the garrison came to personify courage and determination.

White was born in Ireland on July 6, 1835. After attending Sandhurst, he was commissioned into the Inniskilling Fusiliers and fought during the Indian Mutiny. White was second in command of the Gordon Highlanders during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). He led an attack at the Battle of Charasia (October 6, 1879) and another later at Kandahar—gallant actions that earned him the Victoria Cross. He also served in the Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885).

As a brigadier general, White commanded the 2nd Brigade in the short Third Anglo-Burma War (1885) and remained in Burma, pacifying the area. He received his first knighthood for his services in Burma. He commanded the punitive expedition to the Zhob Valley of the North-West Frontier in 1890, and three years later, he succeeded General Lord Frederick S. Roberts, V.C., as commander-in-chief, India. White advocated an aggressive forward policy in India.

In 1898, White returned to England and became quartermaster-general at the War Office. After the outbreak of the Second Anglo-Boer War the following year, White was appointed second in command to General Sir Redvers H. Buller, V.C., and the general officer commanding Natal. After arriving in Natal, White, who was seemingly ignorant of the realities of modern warfare, again began to think of a forward policy. In late October, White dispatched a

British force under John French that seized the railway station at Elandslaagte, but then he ordered all forces to withdraw to Ladysmith. After two small battles, he considered achieving what he thought would be the decisive victory of the war.

White devised a rigid, reckless plan to attack the Boers at Lombard's Kop, near Ladysmith, and attempted to execute the attack on October 30, 1899. This was arguably "the greatest strategic mistake of the entire war" (Pakenham, 1979, p. 155), and the result—Mournful Monday—was Britain's worst military defeat since the Battle of Majuba during the First Anglo-Boer War. White was on the verge of being relieved of command for incompetence when his force was besieged in Ladysmith on November 2, 1899. White's health deteriorated during the siege, and when it ended on February 28, 1900, he returned to England.

White then served as governor of Gibraltar (1901–1904) and was promoted to field marshal in 1903. In 1905, White became governor of Chelsea Hospital. He died on June 24, 1912.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Buller, Redvers Henry; Elandslaagte, Battle of (October 21, 1899); French, John D. P.; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Ladysmith, Siege of (November 2, 1899–February 28, 1900); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh

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Wichale, Treaty of (1889)

The Treaty of Wichale (sometimes spelled *Wuchale* or *Ucciali*) was an agreement signed between the kingdom of Italy and Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia on May 2, 1889. It granted control of modern-day Eritrea and parts of Ethiopia to the Italian government in exchange for diplomatic, military, and monetary support. Despite serving as a treaty of friendship and cooperation, the differing interpretations of this treaty would lead to war between the two states.

The context of this treaty is rooted in the fractured political situation of Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia during the 1870s and 1880s. The decline of Egypt was paralleled by the rise of a threat to European interests by the self-proclaimed Mahdi, Muhammad Ahmed. Not only did his religiously motivated Muslim forces pose a threat to European interests, they also threatened Ethiopia and its ruler, Emperor Yohannes IV. Yohannes allied with the other powers in the region to go to war against the Mahdi. Yohannes also faced European threats in the form of Italian encroachment on Ethiopian territory, which he successfully resisted by defeating Italian forces at the Battle of Dogali.

Despite the many threats to his state, Yohannes did not possess a strong base of support within Ethiopia. Yohannes's kingdom was ethnically and regionally fractured. Italy, in response to its defeat, began intriguing with Menelik, the king of Showa in southern Ethiopia, to see Yohannes as a common enemy. This relationship meant that upon hearing of the death of Yohannes IV in March 1889 while battling the Mahdi, Menelik proclaimed himself *negusa negest* (king of kings). The solidification of Menelik's relationship with Italy was the Treaty of Wichale.

The treaty granted Italy certain privileges in trade and commerce and formally recognized Italian territorial gains, in return for recognition of Menelik II and immediate access to funds and a line of credit. Article 17 of the treaty, however, would prove problematic. The Italian text of the treaty indicated the Ethopians "must" rely on Italy in dealing with other powers, functionally making Ethiopia an Italian protectorate. The Amharic (Ethiopian) copy, in contrast, only noted the Ethiopians "could" rely on Italy.

The differing visions of Article 17 would linger, noted and protested by Menelik II only a year after the treaty was signed, but it would not cause a diplomatic breach until further Italian encroachment into Ethiopian territory. The Italian occupation of Tigray territory, in the northern part of Ethiopia, was a threat to Menelik II's legitimacy. From Showa, Menelik II possessed a power base in the south, but his kingship rested on his claim, and ability to control, the Tigray north; this claim was only further solidified by his marriage to the Tigrayan empress, Taytu. In response to this Italian expansion, Menelik mobilized his forces in 1895 and formally repudiated the Treaty of Wichale. A new, and equal, relationship between Italy and Ethiopia would be established after his defeat of the former at the Battle of Adwa, in the Treaty of Addis Ababa in 1896.

Robert H. Clemm

See also: Addis Ababa, Treaty of (1896); Adowa, Battle of (March 1, 1896); Dogali, Battle of (January 26, 1887); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Italo-Ethipian War, First (1895–1896); Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Menelik II; Yohannes IV

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Wilson, Charles W. (1836–1925)

Major-General Sir Charles W. Wilson was a highly professional Royal Engineer officer who took part in numerous boundary, ordnance, and topographical surveys around the world. Although his career culminated as director-general of military education, Wilson is probably best known for his role in the 1884–1885 Gordon Relief Expedition.

Wilson was born in Liverpool on March 14, 1836. Educated at Cheltenham College, he was commissioned a lieutenant in 1855 in the first open admission to the Royal Engineers. After military training and postings in England, Wilson was assigned in 1858 to the North American Boundary Commission in Canada. He returned to England in 1863, and from 1864 to 1869 conducted the Ordnance Surveys of Jerusalem (and other explorations in Palestine), Scotland, and the Sinai.

In 1869, Wilson became executive officer of the Topographical and Statistical (T&S) Department of the War Office. The following year, the Ordnance Survey was separated from the T&S Department, and Wilson, only a captain, became director of the latter. He was instrumental in the reorganization of the department and establishment of the Intelligence Branch in 1873, of which he became assistant adjutant-general, serving in that position for three years. Wilson was in charge of the Irish Ordnance Survey (1876–1879), then served in sensitive political-military positions in Serbia, Anatolia, Rumelia, and (after being knighted in 1881) as official observer to the trial of Urabi Pasha in Egypt in 1882. He returned to Ireland in 1883.

Wilson was appointed deputy adjutant-general and chief of intelligence for the 1884–1885 Gordon Relief Expedition, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley. Wilson accompanied the Desert Column, commanded by Major-General Sir Herbert Stewart, in its dash to relieve Gordon in Khartoum. At the fierce Battle of Abu Klea (January 17, 1885), Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick G. Burnaby, Stewart's second in command, was killed. Outside Metemmeh, located on the Nile River, dervish forces attacked the Desert Column on January 19, 1885, and Stewart received an incapacitating wound. The command devolved on Wilson, as the next senior officer.

Wilson was not sure what to do. A half-hearted attack on Metemmeh took place on January 21, 1885, when four steamers from Khartoum appeared on the Nile. Rather than use the steamers to immediately travel the 155 kilometers to Khartoum, Wilson spent January 22 reconnoitering the area. Finally, at about 8 A.M. on January 24, Wilson took two of the steamers and headed for Khartoum, sighting the town at about 11 A.M. on January 28. Khartoum had fallen and Gordon had been murdered two days earlier, on January 26. While political procrastination and logistical difficulties had plagued the expedition from its beginning, it is difficult not to speculate that the outcome of the expedition would have been better if Wilson had steamed to Khartoum on January 21 or early on January 22. A scapegoat was needed for the failure. Wolseley recorded: "Sir Charles Wilson is clearly responsible for all those delays, but poor devil, he had lost any nerve he ever possessed" (Preston, 1967, p. 164).

Wilson returned to England in 1885, received a second knighthood, and immediately wrote his version of events in the Sudan, *From Korti to Khartoum: A Journal of the Desert March from Korti to Gubat, and of the Ascent of the Nile in General Gordon's Steamers.* He was in charge of the Ordnance Survey of Ireland for a short time before being appointed director-general of the Ordnance Survey of the United Kingdom in 1886. Promoted to major-general in 1894, Wilson then served as director-general of military education from 1895 until retiring in 1898. He died in Kent on October 25, 1905.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Abu Klea, Battle of (January 16–18, 1885); Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Stewart, Herbert; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Urabi Pasha, Ahmed; Wolseley, Garnet

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Wingate, Reginald (1861–1953)

British general Sir (Francis) Reginald Wingate devoted his life to service in Egypt and the Sudan. He was first assigned to Egypt as a lieutenant in 1883 and departed from the region for the last time in 1919. Despite his almost continuous and distinguished service in Egypt and the Sudan, Wingate's reputation has been eclipsed by those of Major-General Charles G. Gordon, Field Marshal Earl Horatio H. Kitchener, and others.

Wingate was born on June 25, 1861 in Scotland. After graduating from Woolwich in 1880, he was commissioned a Royal Artillery lieutenant and posted to India the following year. Highly ambitious and having a skill for foreign languages, he was transferred in 1883 to Egypt and the Egyptian army and participated in the Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885). In 1889, Wingate became chief of military intelligence of the Egyptian army. A contemporary journalist observed that "whatever there was to know, Colonel Wingate surely knew it, for he makes it his business to know everything" (Steevens, 1898, p. 64).

Wingate was active in the quest to avenge Gordon and defeat the French in the imperial scramble for the Sudan. Wingate was with Major-General Sir Horatio H. Kitchener at the battles of Atbara (April 8, 1898) and Omdurman (September 2, 1898), and at Fashoda later that month. He was knighted for his services in the Sudan campaign. Wingate also commanded the forces at the Battle of Umm Diwaykarat (November 24, 1899), where the Khalifa and many of his key subordinates were killed, thus ending the Mahdiya in the Sudan. In 1899, in succession to Kitchener, Wingate became sirdar (commander-in-chief) of the Egyptian army and governor-general of the Sudan (1899–1916). In 1915, he pressed London to approve a British offensive against the sultanate of Darfur, where he falsely claimed that German/Ottoman agents were encouraging an attack on the British in the neighboring Sudan. Wingate also realized that the French wanted to expand east from Chad into Darfur, and with the winding down of the Cameroon campaign, they would soon have the forces to do so. With permission from his old Sudan colleague Kitchener, Wingate organized the 2,000-strong Western Frontier Force (WFF), led by Colonel Philip Kelly, which conquered Darfur in 1916 and added it to the Sudan. Finally, Wingate served as high commissioner in Egypt (1916–1919). Wingate died at age 91 on January 29, 1953.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Atbara, Battle of (April 8, 1898); Darfur, British Conquest of (1916); Egyptian Army; Fashoda Incident (1898); Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Khalifa; Kichener, Horatio Herbert; Omdurman, Battle of (September 2, 1898); Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Witbooi, Hendrik (1830–1905)

Hendrik Witbooi, an extremely astute leader of a group of Nama people in what is now southern Namibia, managed to unite almost all of southern Namibia behind him to become one of the most important resistance fighters against German colonization in the region.

Witbooi was born at Pella in what is now the Northern Cape, South Africa around 1830. His Nama name was !Nanseb. His grandfather, Kido Witbooi, was the leader of a group of Nama who moved into southern Namibia. At first, they lived a largely nomadic existence, but when they settled at the mission station of Gibeon, Witbooi was taught by a Rhenish missionary, from whom he learned to write in Dutch. He was baptized in 1868, and in 1875, he became an elder in the Rhenish mission church. In the late 1850s, he married !Nanses (also known as "Katharina"), who bore him at least 12 children in the course of 20 years.

In 1880, Maherero, the Herero ruler of much of central Namibia, attacked the Nama, and Witbooi was briefly taken prisoner. After his release, he had a vision that he interpreted as a command from God to lead his people against the Herero, who routinely raided Nama villages and stole their cattle. From then on, Witbooi claimed to act by divine revelation. Early in 1883, he resigned from his position as elder of the mission church in order to take up his duties as heir-apparent, for by then he had become the eldest surviving male heir of his grandfather's throne. As Kido Witbooi had died by this time, Witbooi's father was ruling the kingdom, and tensions between the two men intensified as Witbooi became an increasingly public figure.

In 1884, Witbooi moved northward with a group of followers and engaged the Herero in battle. In the following years, he attacked the Herero on a number of occasions, ransacking their settlement at Otjimbingwe and seizing large numbers of Herero cattle in 1887. His prestige grew, and in 1888, after his father's death, he became undisputed leader of the Witboois. He defeated his most important opponent, Jan Jonker Afrikaner, in 1889 and by 1890, he had emerged as the dominant figure in southern Namibia.

From his mountain stronghold at Hoornkranz, west of Rehoboth, Witbooi continued raiding the Herero. The Herero had signed a "protection treaty" with the Germans, but after Witbooi refused to sign one, the Germans decided to subdue him by force. They attacked him at Hoornkranz in 1893, but it was not until September 1894 that forces led by Theodor Leutwein defeated him, forcing him to sign a treaty. The Witbooi, however, were allowed to keep their arms and ammunition. Witbooi's personal diary, into which he had copied his correspondence beginning in 1894, fell into German hands about this time. The Germans preserved the diary and subsequently published it in 1929. It is a remarkable document, showing Witbooi's exceptional intelligence and courteous nature.



Hendrik Witbooi (left, 1830–1905) was a Nama leader in South West Africa (now Namibia) who fought against German colonial rule in 1893–1894 and 1904–1905. Theodor Leutwein (center, 1849–1921) commanded German forces in South West Africa from 1894 to 1904. Samuel Maharero (right, 1856–1923) was ruler of the Herero from 1890 to 1923, and led a rebellion against German rule in 1904. (Fotostock/Getty Images)

For 10 years, Witbooi lived in the Gibeon district with his people and abided by the terms of the treaty. He proved a loyal ally of the Germans during this time, helping them to subdue other African peoples who rose in revolt against colonial rule. He even sent men to aid the Germans when the Herero rose in revolt in 1904.

On October 3, 1904, the day after the German commander Lothar von Trotha ordered the extermination of the Herero, Witbooi suddenly decided to take up arms against the Germans, perhaps under the influence of a prophet, Stuurman, who preached a philosophy of "Africa for the Africans." He convinced other African leaders to join in the rebellion, which spread through much of southern Namibia. After leading guerrilla resistance against the Germans for a year, Witbooi was fatally wounded in an attack on a transport convoy near Vaalgras, not far from Keetmanshoop. He died on October 29, 1905. Each year, the people of Gibeon remember Witbooi's life and struggle to maintain his independence.

Christopher Saunders

See also: Herero and Nama Genocide (1904–1907); German-Nama War (1893–1894); Leutwein, Theodor; Maharero, Samuel; von Trotha, Lothar

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Wolseley, Garnet (1833–1913)

Field Marshal Viscount Garnet J. Wolseley dominated British military affairs to such a large extent during the second half of the 19th century that he was known as "our only General" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 283). He epitomized unmitigated gallantry in battle and coolness under fire, was wounded on numerous occasions, and was a leading progressive and reformer with the goal of modernizing the British army. His career culminated as British army commander-in-chief (1895–1900).

Wolseley was born on June 4, 1833, in County Dublin, Ireland. His father, a retired army major, died when Wolseley was a child. After repeated applications to the Duke of Wellington, Wolseley received a commission without purchase on July 21, 1852. He was initially gazetted into the 12th Foot but immediately transferred to the 80th Foot, then on orders to active service in Burma.

Wolseley had a burning desire, an obsession, to excel in his military career and reach the pinnacle of his profession. He was brave almost to the point of being suicidal, and he was convinced "the best possible way to get ahead in the army was to try to get killed every time he had the chance" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 13). He distinguished himself in action during the Second Burma War (1853); the Crimean War (1855–1856), when he was recommended for the Victoria Cross; the Indian Mutiny

Given his domination of British military affairs during the late nineteenth century, Garnet J. Wolseley (1833–1913) became known as "our only General." He commanded British forces during the Anglo-Asante War of 1873–1874, the Anglo-Pedi War of 1879, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and the Gordon Relief Expedition of 1884–1885. (National Archives of Canada)

(1857–1859); and the Second China War (1860). At the age of 27, Wolseley was a lieutenant-colonel—having earned each promotion without purchase—who had distinguished himself in four campaigns and had been mentioned in dispatches nine times.

In 1861, Wolseley was assigned as assistant quartermaster-general in Canada, where he spent the next decade and devoted himself to the study of the profession of arms and the testing of his theories of military organization and training. He visited the Confederate leadership during the American Civil War, and in June 1865, he was promoted to full colonel and assigned as deputy quartermaster-general. His collection of practical military information for the use of regimental officers and soldiers in the field, *Soldier's Pocket Book for Field Service,* was published in 1869. The blunt comments in this volume offended many traditionalists, but it brought him to the attention of the reform-minded secretary of state for war, Edward T. Cardwell.

In 1870, as the quartermaster-general in Canada, Wolseley was appointed to his first independent command—to lead an expedition to suppress a rebellion led by Louis Riel. The Red River Expedition (August–September 1870) was noted for its careful planning and logistical preparations, especially crucial considering the vast distances involved and lack of resupply capability. This expedition was an unmitigated success at minimal cost, and Wolseley was knighted on his return to England.

Wolseley was gaining the reputation of a reformer and progressive thinker. He was summoned by Cardwell to the War Office in 1871 to serve as assistant adjutant-general and adviser to Cardwell on issues such as terms of service and the abolition of purchase. At the War Office, Wolseley was constantly at odds with the Field Marshal H. R. H. Prince George F., Second Duke of Cambridge, the commander-in-chief, over military reforms, and their adversarial relationship continued until Wolseley succeeded the Duke of Cambridge in 1895.

In 1873, the Second Anglo-Asante War broke out and, based on his earlier successes and as a reward for his staunch support of and assistance to Cardwell, Wolseley was selected to command the expedition.

He took with him a select group of officers, some of whom had served on the Red River Expedition and most of whom were to serve with him for the remainder of his career. This group, which became known as the Ashanti Ring (later the Wolseley Ring or Wolseley Gang), was the target of much jealousy. Critics claimed Wolseley was "using the finest steel of our army to cut brushwood" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 166), but in the absence of a general staff or permanent divisional structure, Wolseley was trying to be as effective and efficient as possible.

Wolseley reached Cape Coast Castle on the Gold Coast (in what is now Ghana) in October 1873, and his troops landed the following January. His plan was to keep his troops in the country for as short a time as possible, thereby diminishing the chances of casualties and disease contracted from the pestilent climate of West Africa, known as the "white man's grave." On January 21, 1874, his troops defeated King Kofi Karikari at Amoafo, and four days later, the capital, Kumasi, was occupied. Again, this campaign epitomized flawless preparations. As a result of his relatively quick and inexpensive success in the Anglo-Asante War, Wolseley was showered with honors on his return to England, including promotion to permanent major-general and two knighthoods. Wolseley's recognition was probably also intended to subtly recognize and reinforce Cardwell's reforms.

Wolseley became a popular hero in England. George Grossmith made himself up as Wolseley to sing "The Modern Major-General" in Gilbert and Sullivan's *The Pirates of Penzance* and caricatured his mannerisms and dress (Davis and Weavers, 1927, p. 588). The press sang the praises of Wolseley, whom Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli gave the sobriquet of "our only General," and it became a national habit, in an emergency, to "send for Wolseley" (Morris, 1973, p. 402). "All Sir Garnet" became the universal tonic for every national ailment, and "cough syrup and boot-polish manufacturers, as well as music-hall lyricists, who used his brand name to admonish the public, helped to perpetuate the legend of his enduring effectiveness" (Preston, 1967a, p. xiii).

Wolseley continued to rise in his profession. He was assigned as governor of Natal in 1875. As a lieutenant-general, Wolseley was selected in 1878 to be the high commissioner and commander-in-chief of the newly acquired island of Cyprus. After the British debacle at Isandlwana (January 22, 1879) during the Anglo-Zulu War, the government chose Wolseley to restore the situation. He replaced Lieutenant-General Frederick A. Thesiger, Second Baron Chelmsford, as commander of Her Majesty's forces in South Africa, but Chelmsford won the Battle of Ulundi (July 4, 1879) before Wolseley arrived in South Africa. After the capture of the Zulu king Cetshwayo kaMpande and the suppression of Sekhukhune's Pedi state in the Transvaal, Wolseley returned to England in 1880. Wolseley then served as quartermaster-general before being selected as adjutant-general in 1882.

In January 1882, the Egyptian army under Colonel Ahmed Urabi rebelled, threatening the khedive (viceroy), as well as British financial interests in and control of the Suez Canal. The British sent an expeditionary force under Wolseley's command to Egypt. This force eventually totaled 40,560 officers and men from

England, and Mediterranean and Indian stations, and was one of the largest single expeditions ever dispatched by Britain to that time. Wolseley left England on August 15, 1882.

Through a feint at Alexandria and a plan that deceived some of his own generals, Wolseley captured the Egyptian garrison at Port Said and then secretly transferred his troops down the Suez Canal to Ismailia. A sharp action at Kassassin brought his force before Urabi's fortifications at Tel el-Kebir. Conducting a night march in battle formation—a maneuver almost unprecedented and seldom replicated—Wolseley seized the rebel stronghold at dawn on September 13, 1882, routed Urabi's forces, and promptly occupied Cairo. The secretary of state for war, Hugh Childers, called this "the most perfect military achievement England has seen for many a long year" (Barthorp, 1984, p. 73). As a result, Wolseley was promoted to full general and raised to the peerage as Baron Wolseley of Cairo, and Wolseley in the County of Stafford.

After his return to England, Wolseley resumed his position of adjutant-general. In January 1884, his friend, Major-General Charles G. Gordon, accepted a special mission to go to the Sudan and investigate the possibility of evacuating the region after it was overrun by Muslim fanatics called *dervishes.* Gordon reached Khartoum in early February 1884, and on March 12, 1884, the dervish army descended on the Nile and laid siege to Khartoum. After considerable public and private debate and government procrastination, funding for an expedition to relieve Gordon was authorized in August 1884. Wolseley was appointed to command this expedition, and he arrived in Cairo on September 9, 1884. Finally, on September 19, Wolseley received the order authorizing him to proceed to Gordon's rescue, and on October 8, 1884, he received the final instructions that were to guide his mission.

The Gordon Relief Expedition, due to government procrastination and other factors, including Wolseley's route selection, was arguably a forlorn hope from the beginning. After tremendous efforts against the Nile River, deserts, and the dervishes, the expedition arrived near Khartoum on January 28, 1885, only to learn that the city had fallen and Gordon had been killed two days earlier, after holding out for 317 days.

Wolseley had believed totally in the cause of the expedition, telling his wife that "the campaign to save Gordon was on the highest level of chivalric enterprise," and that it was "the very first war in the Victorian era in which the object was entirely worthy" (McCourt, 1967, p. 168). The murder of Gordon and military defeat shattered Wolseley mentally, physically, and professionally, at a time when he was seemingly at the apex of his power. Although he received other honors, promotions, and selection to serve as commander-in-chief, Wolseley never recovered from this devastating blow and never received another command in the field. Returning again to his assignment as adjutant-general, Wolseley continued to champion military reform, especially promotion based on merit, rather than seniority, and increased his military writing.

In April 1890, it was proposed that Wolseley replace General Sir Frederick S. Roberts, V.C.—his rival and "leader" of the opposing Roberts Ring—as commander-in-chief, India, a position that Wolseley had coveted a decade earlier. But Wolseley had aged considerably in that ten-year period and preferred the less strenuous and less controversial position of commander-in-chief, Ireland. Eventually, Roberts was persuaded to remain in India, and Wolseley wanted to be close to home—and the War Office—in the event of an unexpected vacancy in the position of commander-in-chief.

Wolseley received his field marshal's baton in 1894, and when the aged Duke of Cambridge finally retired in 1895, Wolseley succeeded him as commander-in-chief. Thus, he found the long-sought position greatly reduced in power, importance, influence, and autonomy.

Wolseley's memory, unfortunately, faded quickly after he became commander-in-chief, and his effectiveness was reduced. Amid advances in preparedness and mobilization procedures, as well as the initial controversies of the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), Wolseley, "the greatest soldier England produced since Wellington" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 388), retired in November 1900. Wolseley was a prolific author and military commentator, and his autobiography, *The Story of a Soldier's Life,* an incomplete and sketchy document covering his life up to the Second Anglo-Asante War, was published in 1903. Wolseley then faded away and died quietly near Mentone, France, on March 26, 1913. He was buried near Wellington's tomb in St. Paul's Cathedral.

There can be no question as to Wolseley's courage and indomitable spirit, his dynamic leadership attributes and organizational abilities, and his advocacy of reforms to modernize the British army. Wolseley led a magnificent, adventurous life, but as one member of the Ashanti Ring commented, "The tragedy of Wolseley's life was that he never encountered a foe worthy of him" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 391). In any event, Wolseley—heroic, ambitious, efficient, ruthless, outspoken, and generally progressive—was a dominant force in Queen Victoria's army during the zenith of the British Empire.

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Amoafo, Battle of (January 31, 1874); Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Dervishes; Egyptian Army; Gordon, Charles George; Gordon Relief Expedtion (1884–1885); Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Kofi Karikari; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Sekhukhune woaSekwati; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Tel el-Kebir, Battle of (September 13, 1882); Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring); Urabi Rebellion (1882)

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Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

The Ashanti Ring, which later evolved into the Wolseley Ring, was the collective name—used either admiringly or derisively, depending on one's perspective—for a group of talented, reform-minded British army officers originally handpicked by Major-General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley to accompany him as staff and special service officers on the 1873–1874 Ashanti campaign. Wolseley generally employed this same group of professional and battle-proven officers in his subsequent proconsular assignments and active service expeditionary force commands.

Wolseley became assistant adjutant-general at the War Office in May 1871, a period of rapid and fundamental reform of the British army under the Liberal Secretary of State for War Edward T. Cardwell. Wolseley staunchly supported both army reform and Cardwell. In 1873, when plans were being considered to send a British expeditionary force to the Gold Coast to drive the invading Asante (Ashanti) back across the Pra River to their homeland, Cardwell ensured his protégé Wolseley received the command.

On August 13, 1873, Wolseley was appointed commander of the force, over the heads of many senior, older, and more experienced officers. He departed for the Gold Coast aboard the *Ambriz* on September 12, 1873, taking 36 staff and special service officers handpicked from a list of army volunteers. Wolseley selected these officers, the group that came to be known as the "Ashanti Ring," based on their proven qualifications, their reputations, and even their military writings.

The nucleus of the Ashanti Ring consisted of officers who had served under Wolseley and proven themselves during the 1870 Red River Expedition in Canada. The first was Lieutenant-Colonel John McNeill, V.C., as chief of staff, the same position he had held under Wolseley in 1870. Captain Redvers H. Buller and Captain G. L. Huyshe, both Red River veterans who were given special permission to depart the Staff College course prior to completion, served as deputy assistant adjutant and quartermaster-generals in the Asante expedition. (Huyshe died of fever near Fomena in late January 1874.) Two other Red River participants, Captain William F. Butler and Captain Hugh McCalmont, served in Ashantiland as an African auxiliary force commander and aide-de-camp, respectively.

There were a number of other members of the Ashanti Ring. Lieutenant-Colonel (Henry) Evelyn M. Wood, Major Baker Russell, and Lieutenant Lord Gifford all appealed to Wolseley because of their reputations for bravery. During the Second Anglo-Asante War, Wood and Russell raised and led irregular regiments, and Gifford won the Victoria Cross during the fighting for Amoafo. Other officers had already distinguished themselves by their insightful military writing. Captain Henry Brackenbury, who was serving as professor of military science at Woolwich, served as Wolseley's military secretary. An instructor of tactics at Sandhurst who had defeated Wolseley in the 1872 Wellington Prize Essay competition was Lieutenant (John) Frederick Maurice, who served as Wolseley's private secretary.

Joining the campaign in progress was Colonel George R. Greaves, who took over as chief of staff after McNeill was severely wounded in a skirmish on October 14, 1873, and Lieutenant Colonel George Pomeroy Colley. The latter, who had served with Wolseley at the War Office on the Cardwell Reforms, was considered the most brilliant of the ring. He voluntarily left his professorship at the Staff College to serve in Ashantiland, assuming all force transportation responsibilities on December 22, 1873.

The creation of the Ashanti Ring was a controversial result of the highly successful Second Anglo-Asante War. Wolseley conscientiously tried to employ Staff College graduates, such as Colley, Wood, Buller, and Maurice, whenever possible. Wolseley observed later, "I do not believe that any general ever left England with an abler or more daring body of assistants" (Bond, 1972, p. 128).

After the Second Anglo-Asante War, the Wolseley Ring continued. Wolseley employed a large number of its members on his staff in Natal in 1875 and on Cyprus in 1878–1879. Many members of the ring returned to active service when Wolseley became the commander during the closing stages of the Zulu War in 1879 and during the Pedi campaign later that year. Wolseley served as commander of the British expeditionary force sent to quell the Urabi Rebellion in Egypt in 1882, and attempted to muster his circle of loyal acolytes. By that time, however, Pomeroy Colley was dead (killed in action against the Boers at Majuba Hill in 1881), and Wolseley's senior subordinates—Buller, Brackenbury, Wood, and Butler—had achieved relatively high rank that would make them difficult to employ in a small expeditionary force. Moreover, in such a select group of talented and ambitious officers, jealousy, rivalry, hubris, and other factors resulted in friction and an occasional lack of cooperation. The problems that Wolseley encountered with his ring in 1882 were even worse during the unsuccessful 1884–1885 Gordon Relief Expedition in the Sudan, Wolseley's last command in the field.

In the early 1870s, the British failure to create a General Staff, coupled with the abolition of the purchase system, made the establishment of the Ashanti Ring (and its continuation thereafter as the Wolseley Ring), as well as the creation of rival "rings," arguably inevitable. Factionalism, intrigue, and unhealthy competition frequently resulted, to the detriment of efficiency and esprit de corps within the British army officer corps. Conservative and traditionalist officers tended to gather around Field Marshal H. R. H. Prince George F., Second Duke of Cambridge, commander-in-chief of the British army. While members of the Wolseley Ring were also occasionally called the "Africans," because of their campaigns in Ashantiland, Zululand, Egypt, and the Sudan, another competing ring became known as the "Indians," or the "Roberts Ring," generally represented by General Sir Frederick S. Roberts, V.C. A significant difference between the Africans and the Indians was the strategic priorities of the British Empire. In any event, beginning with the Second Anglo-Asante War, the Wolseley Ring was the dominant clique in the British army, in the field and at the War Office, for the remainder of the 19th century.

These officers—McNeill, Buller, Huyshe, Butler, McCalmont, Wood, Baker Russell, Gifford, Brackenbury, Maurice, Greaves, and Colley—were the primary members of the Ashanti Ring and the beneficiaries of Wolseley's patronage. Wolseley knew that surrounding himself with the most professional, dedicated, loyal, and courageous officers available would increase the chance of success for his force, as well as for himself. Such a small circle of subordinates generated considerable resentment and criticism; one contemporary critic complained that Wolseley was "using the finest steel of our army to cut brushwood" (Lehmann, 1964, p. 166). Wolseley was convinced that "he could not have done the work with the very ordinary humdrum men usually told off from a Horse Guards register, and that the claims of seniors should never be allowed to interfere with selection of the best officers in the army for all the little campaigns we so often have to carry out" (Maxwell, 1985, p. 15).

Harold E. Raugh, Jr.

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Buller, Redvers Henry; Gordon Relief Expedition (1884–1885); Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Pedi Wars (1876–1879); Colley, George Pomeroy; Roberts, Frederick Sleigh; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet; Wood, Henry Evelyn

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Wood, Henry Evelyn (1838–1919)

Sir Henry Evelyn Wood served in many of Britain's colonial wars during the second half of the 19th century. A competent officer and commander, he led British troops in the Indian Rebellion, the Anglo-Zulu War, and during the British conquest of Egypt.

Wood was born on February 9, 1838, in London, England. Having completed his studies at Marlborough College, the 14-year-old signed on as a midshipman in the British Royal Navy and was sent to the Black Sea aboard the *Queen* to serve in the ongoing Crimean War (1853–1856). By the time he was 17, Wood had already been knighted, received several medals and honors, and been nominated for Britain's newest and highest military honor, the Victoria Cross, for his outstanding conduct in battle. In addition, he was well on his way to establishing a reputation as "the most accident- and illness-prone officer in the British army," having on several occasions nearly died of wounds or ailments caught on the battlefield.

At the close of the war, Wood made the unusual move of transferring from the navy to the army, in the service of which he was shortly assigned to India to take part in the suppression of the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Between May 1858 and October 1860, his duties centered around the recruitment and command of a regiment of local Indian cavalry, which he led in two noteworthy, if minor, skirmishes at Sindwaha on October 19, 1858, and Sindhara on December 29, 1859. One of the influx of British army officers transferred to India following the rebellion, Wood played a substantial role in helping the British to reestablish their control over the colony.

Wood returned to England in 1860 and entered the staff college two years later. He graduated in 1864. For the next seven years, he held a series of staff positions, but his career seemed to have stalled. In 1871, however, he purchased his promotion to major (a common practice in the British military that was abolished shortly thereafter), and his career began to show renewed signs of promise. Two years later and newly promoted to the rank of brevet lieutenant colonel, Wood was selected by Sir Garnet Wolseley to join his staff of officers on a punitive expedition against the Asante Empire in West Africa's Gold Coast (modern-day Ghana). Again wounded in action, he finished the war by receiving a promotion to the rank of colonel.

By 1878, growing tensions between Boers and Britons in southern Africa had led to a buildup of military forces there, and Wood's regiment was among those assigned to quell the Boer challenge to British authority in the Cape Colony. Not long thereafter, with Zulu forces under the leadership of King Cetshwayo perceived as a growing threat to British power, Wood was again called in as part of a military solution to a thorny political problem. Under Lord Chelmsford's command, the British army was divided into three columns (with Chelmsford himself at the head of the central column, and Wood and Colonel Charles Knight Pearson in charge of the others). When Chelmsford's column moved forward to engage the Zulu, leaving half its men behind at base camp, the stage was set for one of Britain's worst military disasters of the 19th century. At the Battle of

Isandhlwana, where the camp was located, nearly 900 Europeans and 550 African soldiers lost their lives on January 22, 1879, trying to fend off an attack by an enormous and well-trained Zulu force. Of the three column commanders, only Wood could claim a significant victory over Zulu forces at the important Battle of Khambula (March 29, 1879). Chelmsford then regrouped his forces, which reinvaded the Zulu kingdom and inflicted a final defeat on Cetshwayo at the Battle of Ulundi (July 4, 1879).

Wood's successes in the war against the Zulu were soon offset, however, by his unfortunate association with another military disaster, the Battle of Majuba Hill on February 27, 1881, during the First Anglo-Boer War. Here, not only were British troops routed by their Boer opponents, but among the day's casualties was Sir George Pomeroy Colley, the field force commander in Natal and Wood's immediate superior. Although there was a general outcry in Britain for avenging Colley's death, Prime Minister William Gladstone's government insisted that Wood, now the ranking officer in Natal, negotiate an immediate peace with the Boers. He was denounced by the opposition party in Britain for participating in these talks, but he maintained that it was his duty to obey the orders of civilian authorities, so long as these orders did not compromise the security of his troops.

In 1882, Wood again followed Wolseley into a battle zone, this time in Egypt, where Ahmad Urabi had led a rebellion against British and French dominance over his country's domestic affairs. The Europeans used the Urabi Rebellion as a pretext for an all-out invasion and occupation of the country, although the actual impetus was a desire to protect their enormous financial and strategic interests in the Suez Canal. At the war's end, Wood was assigned the task of rebuilding the devastated Egyptian army.

Finally, in 1886, Wood returned to England, where he set about implementing much-needed reforms in the training, maintenance, and transporting of troops. In 1893, he was named quartermaster-general in the War Office and in 1897, became adjutant-general to the forces. In this last position, he oversaw the recruitment and mobilization of troops headed to South Africa for the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902). In 1903, Wood was promoted to field marshal. He was too old to see action during World War I, however, and died on December 2, 1919.

Kelli M. Kobor

See also: Anglo-Asante War (1873–1874); Anglo-Boer War, First (1880–1881); Anglo-Boer War, Second (1899–1902); Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Chelmsford, Lord (Thesiger, Frederick Augustus); Colley, George Pomeroy; Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Egyptian Army; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Majuba Hill, Battle of (February 27, 1881); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Urabi Rebellion (1882); Wolseley, Garnet; Wolseley Ring (Ashanti Ring)

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Y

Yohannes IV (1837–1889)

One of Ethiopia's great soldier-emperors, Yohannes IV played a critical and progressive role in his country's history. Beginning in the 1870s, he reunified the nation after the disastrous reign of Emperor Tewodros II, bringing a definitive end to the era of regionalism that had undermined imperial power since 1769. In foreign affairs, Yohannes established Ethiopia as a power to be reckoned with, resisting hostile attacks by outside powers.



Yohannes IV (1837–1889) was emperor of Ethiopia from 1871 to 1889. He was one of Ethiopia's greatest warrior-emperors and was killed in battle against invading Mahdist forces from Sudan. (Arco Images GmbH/Alamy Stock Photo)

Born Kassa Mercha in Ethiopia's northern province of Tigray in 1831, Yohannes came from one of its most important families and was thus positioned to become a warlord in the system of autonomous local leadership that kept Ethiopia divided. His early military career progressed under the leadership of Wag Shum Gobaze. Gaining in prestige and power, Yohannes ascended to the aristocratic rank of *dajjazmatch* and became governor of Tigray in 1864.

Initially, Yohannes enjoyed cordial relations with the eccentric Emperor Tewodros II. Yet they soon disagreed on questions of religion. Yohannes was a devout Coptic Christian and reacted angrily when Tewodros sacked the ancient churches of Gondar and imprisoned high church officials. In 1867, Yohannes declared Tigray to be independent of Ethiopia and sent to Egypt for a new bishop.

That same year, international affairs exacerbated the internal political difficulties of Ethiopia. An Anglo-Indian army invaded Ethiopia in 1867, seeking to free British hostages held by Emperor Tewodros. Its commander, Sir Robert Napier, sent envoys to Yohannes asking for supplies and unhindered transit through Tigray. Yohannes gave his support in exchange for several benefits. First, as Napier marched forward to destroy Tewodros in 1868, he created a power vacuum that Yohannes hoped to fill. Second, the British paid for their supplies in hard currency, much of which ended up in Tigray's treasury. Finally, as a parting gift, Napier turned over nearly 1,000 rifles, ammunition, and a small artillery park to Yohannes. Possession of these modern weapons instantly made Yohannes one of the most potent military leaders in Ethiopia.

The death of Tewodros set off a three-way struggle for the throne among Yohannes, Gobaze, and Emperor Menelik II of Showa. Gobaze struck first, declaring himself emperor and taking the royal name Takla-Giyorgis. He negotiated an alliance with Menelik and then turned on his former subordinate. Yohannes had moved in the meantime to secure his control of Tigray. The inevitable showdown with Takla-Giyorgis took place at the Battle of Assam on July 11, 1871. Yohannes's troops, although outnumbered five to one, used their new weapons to great effect. His victory at Assam was decisive enough to carry him to the throne, and he was crowned Yohannes IV on January 21, 1872, in the city of Aksum.

As emperor, Yohannes's first priority was to reestablish centralized imperial authority. Powerful regional forces had dominated the country for much of the 19th century, an age known to Ethiopians as the *zamana masafent* (era of the nobility). After the fall of Tewodros, his own attempts to create a more centralized regime collapsed at Maqdala, and there was every indication that regionalism would again split the nation. Yet Yohannes was a far more reasonable man than Tewodros, and he was able to induce some aristocrats into his camp. He was also able to defeat some regions militarily, after which he gained their loyalty by treating them in a conciliatory fashion.

The most powerful regional leaders, however, remained aloof. A few even seemed ready to challenge him for the throne. Adal, Gojjam, and Showa were the main centers of resistance. As Yohannes attempted to subdue these regions, a confused game of cross and double-cross pitted Ethiopian against Ethiopian in many battles between 1872 and 1881.

Menelik, the ruler of Showa, was the most powerful of Yohannes's rivals. Like the emperor, he was not above helping foreign invaders if they could increase his own power. Menelik appealed for aid from the Ottoman governor of Egypt, Ismail Pasha. Ismail saw Ethiopia as easy prey, expecting his army to march in, like Napier's, and destroy imperial authority, after which he and Menelik would divide up the spoils. For the Egyptians, the goal was Yohannes's home province of Tigray. For Menelik, it was the throne.

Neither conspirator counted on the tremendous improvements made to the imperial army since 1867. Under Yohannes, Ethiopian soldiers now had better weapons and training and were far more numerous than the paltry force with which Tewodros had faced Napier. Ismail directed his forces to invade via Eritrea, and the result was disaster for the Egyptians. Despite a well-equipped army that included a significant staff of American mercenaries, the Egyptians were decisively defeated at Gundat in 1875, and again at Gura the following year. Although the Egyptian-Ethiopian War did not officially end until 1884, no significant battle was fought after Gura.

Yohannes, who had personally led his troops into battle, gained great national prestige. He had routed a foreign invader and, equally important, captured another considerable haul of advanced military hardware. There was no doubt that he now possessed the most powerful army in Ethiopia. Turning south, Yohannes pushed into Showa. By 1878, he was on Menelik's frontier and prepared to fight a decisive engagement.

Negotiations presented another possibility, however, and one that appealed to both parties. For Yohannes, there were still other wars to fight. For Menelik, it was obvious that resistance to Yohannes carried the possibility of total defeat. A compromise resulted—the Leche Agreement of March 20, 1878. A major event in Ethiopian history, it legalized the status of Emperor Yohannes IV. Menelik carried a traditional stone of penitence that he placed before Yohannes, kneeling in an act of homage, which signified an end to the war between them. For his part, Yohannes recognized Menelik's title as king of Showa and promised that Menelik would succeed him on the imperial throne. In 1882, this arrangement was further cemented when Yohannes's daughter, Zauditu, married Menelik's son.

Yohannes had always envisioned the Ethiopian church as a basis for national unity. Once his pressing military needs were met in 1878, he convened a Church Council at Boru-Meda, which established an official orthodoxy. This council restored unity in the Ethiopian Coptic Church, albeit at the cost of persecution for those who were branded heretics. Even more radical was the emperor's decree that all his subjects be Christian or else leave the country or die. With a significant Muslim minority, this conversion program was both difficult and dangerous to enforce. Eventually realizing that such a measure would threaten rather than improve national unity, Yohannes abandoned the campaign.

A far greater threat to Ethiopian unity was posed by external forces. When British general Charles George Gordon came to negotiate a favorable peace for the Egyptians, Yohannes refused any terms that did not reflect his victories. Gordon ruefully noted that the Ethiopian monarch was an adroit diplomat who demanded "an eye for an eye, and 20 shillings for a pound." When peace finally arrived, in the form of the Hewett Treaty of June 3, 1884, he obtained most of his diplomatic objectives.

Yet the ink was hardly dry before new enemies arrived to contest his gains. From Europe, Italians moved in to take over the former Egyptian colony of Eritrea. With it, they claimed inheritance of Ismail's old claims to Tigray. As Italian troops marched into old Egyptian fortifications, Yohannes prepared a massive army of 80,000 soldiers. In 1888, taking these men to Saati, he laid siege to the most advanced Italian position. Asked by a British diplomat to cede this town to Italy, Yohannes responded, "I will not give an inch of land. If they cannot live without Saati, let them leave." A major battle was averted only by more ominous news from the west.

Out of the Sudan poured a host of Muslim zealots—followers of the charismatic Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi), believed by his men to be a messiah. Part of the Mahdist movement that controlled the Sudan from 1885 to 1898, these men were battle-hardened veterans who had already destroyed several Egyptian armies. In 1888, under Abu Anja, the Mahdi's troops captured and sacked the historic Ethiopian town of Gondar. Yohannes responded by marshaling his troops and marching for the Sudanese border town of Gallabat.

His armies arrived at this heavily fortified center on March 9, 1889. Led by Yohannes himself, Ethiopian troops burst through two defensive lines. At the point of victory, Yohannes was shot in the stomach. Mortally wounded, he was carried from the field while his army collapsed. A day later, on March 10, 1889, Yohannes died. His body, captured by the Mahdists, was decapitated, and his head sent to Khartoum as a trophy.

John Dunn

See also: Anglo-Ethiopian War (1868); Eritrea, Italian Conquest of (1870–1890); Gordon, Charles George; Mahdi (Mohammed Ahmed ibn Abdullah); Menelik II; Napier, Robert C.; Tewodros II; Sudan, British Conquest of (1881–1899)

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Z

Zibhebhu kaMaphitha (c. 1841–1904)

Zibhebhu kaMaphitha was the most innovative and resourceful Zulu general of the 1880s, but his later collaboration with the British made him a destabilizing factor in the settlement of Zululand. A cousin of King Cetshwayo kaMpande, Zibhebhu was enrolled in the uMxhapho *ibutho* (age-grade regiment) and succeeded in 1872 as chief of the Mandlakazi people in northeastern Zululand. He supported the victorious Cetshwayo in the Zulu civil war of 1856, which decided the royal succession, but subsequently exerted his regional authority to flout royal control and forge strong trading contacts with the colonial world.

Zibhebhu counseled against risking war with Britain, but he nevertheless fought gallantly throughout the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. He was wounded at the victorious Battle of Isandlwana on January 22, 1879, while serving as senior officer of the uDloko *ibutho*, and was one of the junior commanders at the disastrous battle of Khambula on March 29, 1879. On July 3, 1879, he was in command of the mounted scouts who successfully drew a British reconnaissance-in-force into an ambush in the Mahlabathini plain the day before the final Zulu defeat at the battle of Ulundi.

In the settlement of September 1, 1879, the British appointed compliant chiefs (including Zibhebhu) over the 13 chiefdoms into which they divided the former kingdom. Zibhebhu remained Britain's staunchest ally in Zululand, collaborating to suppress the aspirations of the dispossessed royal house and their supporters, known as the *uSuthu.*

When the British restored Cetshwayo in January 1883 to the central part of Zululand, they awarded Zibhebhu an enlarged chiefdom in northeastern Zululand to check the king's ambitions. Civil war broke out between the uSuthu and Mandlakazi. At the Battle of Msebe on March 30, 1883, Zibhebhu made effective use of mounted riflemen (supplemented by white mercenaries) to ambush, outflank, and pursue the numerically superior uSuthu army. After a forced night march, he surprised and routed the regrouping uSuthu at oNdini on July 21, 1883, annihilating the uSuthu leadership and compelling Cetshwayo to take refuge in the British Reserve Territory in southern Zululand. Zibhebhu proceeded to ravage uSuthu territory, and in 1884, Cetshwayo's desperate son and successor, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, formed an alliance on May 21, 1884, with land-hungry Boersfreebooters. The Boer commando's firepower proved crucial on June 5, 1884, in defeating Zibhebhu, who attempted to ambush his advancing foes at Tshaneni, and in turn, Zibhebhu was forced to take refuge in the Reserve Territory.

On May 19, 1887, the British annexed Zululand, and in November 1887, they restored Zibhebhu to his enlarged chiefdom to act as a counterweight against Dinuzulu and the uSuthu, who were resisting their administration. This favoritism embittered the uSuthu, who broke into open rebellion in April 1888. On June 23, 1888, Dinuzulu surprised Zibhebhu at Ivuna after a night march and routed the Mandlakazi.

With the suppression of the uSuthu Rebellion by September 1888, the British decided that their willful ally, Zibhebhu, constituted a threat to the peace. In 1889, he and the Mandlakazi were resettled in southern Zululand. In 1898, the colonial authorities allowed him to return to his old chiefdom as part of a general settlement of the warring Zulu factions. But the rifts went unhealed, and only Zibhebhu's death on August 27, 1904, at his Bangonomo homestead prevented another outbreak of violence.

John Laband

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Isandlwana, Battle of (January 22, 1879); Ivuna, Battle of (June 23, 1888); Khambula, Battle of (March 29, 1879); Ndondakasuka, Battle of (1856); oNdini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Tshaneni, Battle of (June 5, 1884); Ulundi, Battle of (July 4, 1879); Zulu Civil War (1883–1884); Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Zimbabwe Plateau, Portuguese Invasion of (1572–1696)

Between the Limpopo and Zambezi rivers, by around 1000, the Zimbabwe Plateau was home to various pastoral and agricultural Shona-speaking communities, some of which exported gold east to the Indian Ocean. Founded around 1420, the Mutapa kingdom located on the northeast of the plateau took over the gold trade that was shifting north toward the Zambezi River, on which the coastal Swahili established inland trading posts at Sena and Tete. In the 1530s, these were seized by the Portuguese, who had taken over the Indian Ocean trade and were moving up the Zambezi River looking for gold and ivory.

The Portuguese became determined to conquer Mutapa's gold mines. After a failed attempt to convert the Mutapa ruler to Christianity (in which a priest was killed), the Portuguese sent an invasion force, under Francisco Barreto from Lisbon, to the port of Sofala in present-day Mozambique, where it marched upriver to Sena. In July 1572, after numerous delays, Barreto proceeded overland from Sena with an expedition of 650 Portuguese gunmen, supported by 30 ox-drawn wagons and around 2,200 local African slaves to carry supplies. He also relied on 20 supply-laden canoes, which headed up the Zambezi.

Barreto's first target was the Tonga, led by Samungazi, who had rebelled against Mutapa in the 1550s and more recently had been fighting the Portuguese at Tete. After a monthlong trek that covered just 250 kilometers, the Portuguese were caught in the open by an army of 10,000–13,000 Tonga, who attacked in traditional crescent formation. Portuguese firepower forced them to withdraw. Barreto inflicted a psychological blow on the Tonga by having his men shoot a female Tonga diviner who was spraying water in the air, proclaiming that it would blind the Portuguese. The next morning, a Tonga attack on the Portuguese camp was repelled. Three days later, in a battle where gunpowder smoke engulfed an entire valley in darkness, an army of 16,000 Tonga was once again repulsed by Barreto's expedition. While the Tonga lost between 4,000 and 6,000 men, only 40 Portuguese were killed.

With the Tonga offering tribute to end hostilities, Barreto led his force back to Sena to regroup. Tropical disease and lack of water turned a second Portuguese attempt to march on the Tonga capital, where a peace treaty was to be concluded, into a disaster, and once again, Barreto returned to Sena. The timing of Barreto's invasion, July–September, was problematic, as the withdrawing Tonga could take recently harvested crops with them, which deprived the Portuguese of food and water that was scarce during the dry season. Barreto's army had not left the Zambezi Valley.

Mutapa attempted to placate the Portuguese by giving them control of a few marginal gold mines on the plateau. A Mutapa army then subjugated the Tonga, who had been weakened by Portuguese intrusion. By mid-1573, Barreto had died, and only 180 members of the original Portuguese expedition survived. Vasco Fernandes Homem, Barreto's successor, returned to the coast to rally a new force of 412 Portuguese. In 1575, Homem led an invasion of the Teve state that blocked the trade route between the Portuguese and the gold-exporting Manyika kingdom in what is now Zimbabwe's eastern highlands. The Portuguese were harassed by the Teve, who spoiled waterholes, abandoned villages, and concealed food.

Homem's force defeated a Teve army at Sotabotonga Hill, which blocked passage to Manyika, and then burned their capital. Although Homem entered Manyika and established cordial relations, the Portuguese found that they did not have the labor or technology to exploit local gold sources, so they departed for Sena. With reinforcements from Portugal, Homem built a fort at Tete and invaded the Chikova area, where there were rumored to be silver mines, which they ultimately could not find. Homem left 200 men in Chikova to continue the search, but local people lured them into an ambush with the promise of silver, and all of them were killed.

In 1597, Gatsi Rusere, the relatively new ruler of Mutapa, obtained Portuguese military assistance against two Maravi groups that had invaded his territory from north of the Zambezi. Escaping a Mutapa army supported by some Portuguese, the Maravi of Kapampo fought a scorched-earth campaign back across the Zambezi. Conversely, the Maravi of Chikanda built a stockade surrounded by a deep trench, and a high, thick wooden wall with loopholes for shooting arrows. It was defended by 600 men. In 1599, a 30,000-strong Mutapa army, along with 75 Portuguese and 2,000 Africans from Tete, assaulted Chikanda's fort but could not penetrate it. After Gatsi Rusere refused Chikanda's peace offer, the Mararvi attempted to escape under cover of darkness but were discovered, and many were killed.

Pleased with Portuguese support, Gatsi Rusere lifted the ban on them carrying firearms within Mutapa territory and gave them land on the plateau. Rusere triggered a protracted Mutapa civil war by having his uncle, who had led the army against the first Maravi group, executed for letting Kapampo escape. The rebel faction, led by Matuzianhe, seized power and drove Rusere and his followers into exile. The Portuguese intervened on behalf of Rusere, as the rebels began interfering in Portuguese trade. In 1607, the exiled Rusere declared that the Portuguese would own all the mines in Mutapa, since a contingent under Diogo Simoes Madeira had recently helped him earn some victories against Matuzianhe. The next year, Rusere, who had sent his Portuguese allies back to Tete, led unsuccessful operations against supporters of Matuzianhe. Rusere, suffering from two arrow wounds, and with his eldest son killed in the fighting, was saved by a relief expedition of 20 Portuguese gunmen and 1,000 African allies.

In 1609, Rusere led an advance up the Zambezi and defeated some rebel supporters with the help of Madiera's 100 Portuguese and 2,000 African allies. The Portuguese used swivel guns to drive rebels off an island and into canoes, which were then overturned in the bombardment. That same year, the forces of Rusere and Matuzianhe met in a climactic battle. Two-thirds of Mutuzianhe's 20,000 men used a crescent formation to attack Rusere's contingent, and the other third assaulted the Portuguese. Rusere's position was bleak until the Portuguese, having repelled the enemy sent against them, turned to help their ally and routed Matuzianhe's remaining forces. Rusere reclaimed his capital after three years in exile.

Withdrawing to Mount Matarira, the wounded Matuzianhe reorganized his force and launched a night attack on the capital. Once again, he divided his forces, with one division devoted to attacking Rusere's enclosure and the other the Portuguese. In a now-familiar pattern, the Portuguese repelled their attackers and moved to save Rusere and his followers from being overwhelmed. Leaving most of the Portuguese at his capital, Rusere led an assault on Mount Matarira that drove off Matuzianhe and his associates and captured 8,000 cattle. Rusere later had the fugitive Matuzianhe assassinated.

Securely in power, Rusere sent Madiera's Portuguese back to Tete except for 10 gunmen who became his personal bodyguards. Relations between Mutapa and the Portuguese deteriorated, as the latter delayed sending tribute to Rusere, who then vacillated on giving them access to the mines. While the Portuguese took land from Mutapa and its neighbors and built forts, conflict between Portuguese leaders enabled Rusere to recover territory around Tete.

The 1624 death of Gatsi Rusere plunged Mutapa into civil war. Kapararidze, the late ruler's son, seized power even though his uncle, Mavhura, a Christian convert close to Portuguese missionaries, was the legitimate heir. When the traditionalist Kapararidze ordered the death of a Portuguese emissary in 1628, the Portuguese from Sena and Tete intervened on behalf of Mavhura. In December 1628, Mavhura's army of 15,000–30,000 Africans and 250 Portuguese clashed with Kapararidze's supposedly 100,000-strong force, and the latter was compelled to withdraw. In May 1629, Kaparidze's army attacked Mavhura's force and was repulsed, suffering heavy casualties; shortly thereafter, Mavhura's warriors and the Portuguese captured the Mutapa capital. Mavhura then became the new Mutapa ruler and signed a treaty that made him a Portuguese vassal. Muslim traders were expelled and Portuguese missionaries given full access to Mutapa.

The Portuguese in Mutapa were exempt from the authority of its ruler and given control of more land and the gold mines. In effect, Mutapa became a Portuguese puppet. Portuguese settlers (holders of land grants called *prazos*) expanded across the country and built forts as bases for their private African armies and trade. Expanding beyond Mutapa, Portuguese settlers and their African mercenaries defeated Shona communities, seized mines, and enslaved locals. In 1631, Kaparidze, supported by some Muslim traders, led an army against Mavhura that was backed by the Portuguese. Given rivalry among the Portuguese leadership, Mavhura's force suffered a major defeat, losing around 6,400 men, including 300–400 Portuguese in one battle. This was the most serious Portuguese military disaster in the region. Consequently, Africans south of the Zambezi rebelled against their Portuguese overlords, who took refuge at fortified Sena and Tete.

Diogo de Sousa de Menezes, the Portuguese captain of Mozambique, mounted an offensive that moved inland from the coastal enclave of Quelimane and defeated Kaparidze's forces, killing around 2,000 and seizing slaves and cattle. This expedition reoccupied the territory up to Sena and then invaded Manyika, killed its ruler, and replaced him with a Portuguese vassal. The Portuguese then moved against Kaparidze. Around the same time, Mavhura, assisted by Portuguese priests, assembled a 20,000-strong army, including many Maravi warriors from north of the Zambezi and some Portuguese. News that Mavhura had a vision of a light and a cross in heaven motivated his army to inflict a massive defeat on Kaparidze's followers, who retreated. According to the Portuguese, 35,000 Africans, mostly from Kaparidze's army, were killed in the terrible battle.

Kaparidze then organized another army with support from most Mutapa nobles. However, Mavhura's army was now joined by de Menezes's expedition to create a total force of between 12,000 and 40,000 men, including 200–300 Portuguese gunmen. In June 1632, Kaparidze's force was again overpowered, suffering between 2,000 and 12,000 dead and with many women, livestock, weapons, and supplies captured. The battle took place on the feast of St. John, and the Portuguese claimed that a mysterious and splendid man—perhaps the saint himself—had appeared before Mavhura's army. Kaparidze fled north of the Zambezi and continued to represent a threat to Mavhura for the next 20 years. Mavhura regained control of Mutapa and was more dependent on Portuguese military support than before. The Portuguese *prazos* and forts expanded, including into Manyika, and by 1634, the captains of Tete and Sena could field 8,000 and 30,000 African mercenaries, respectively.

Despite several rebellions (including by the Tonga), a smallpox epidemic, and the partial revival of Mutapa under new rulers in the 1670s and 1680s, the Portuguese continued to dominate the area south of the Zambezi River. With the decline of Mutapa as a regional power and the increase of violence, local Shona rulers with cattle developed their own armies. Beginning as one of these emerging local warlords, Dombo gained the title *Changamire* (lord) and developed an effective army known as *Rozvi* (destroyers) that, by the 1670s, became a major force in the northeast Zimbabwe plateau.

During the early 1680s, Dombo led his army to the southwest, where he defeated the Torwa state of Butua, occupied its capital of Danagombe, and began absorbing the local Kalanga people. He then challenged the Portuguese of the Zambezi Valley. Dombo's first military encounter with the Portuguese and their African mercenaries took place just before June 1684 at the Battle of Maungwe, which pitted Rozvi bows and arrows against Portuguese firearms. Dombo nearly managed to rout the Portuguese four or five times, but his army took heavy casualties. Both armies camped on the battlefield intending to resume fighting the next day.

At 1 A.M., the Portuguese awoke to see that they were surrounded by fires made by the *Rozvi* women on Dombo's order. Believing they were surrounded, the Portuguese and their African allies ran off into the night, and when the sun came up, Dombo's army looted their abandoned camp. Dombo did not pursue the Portuguese because of the heavy casualties that his army had suffered, and he had to contend with a Mutapa force, including some Portuguese, invading Butua, which he eventually defeated, killing 5,000.

In 1693, a new Mutapa ruler called Nyakunembire, who wished to establish independence, invited Dombo's Rozvi to assist him against the Portuguese. In November of that year, a Rozvi army attacked unprepared Portuguese settlements, destroyed churches, defiled holy objects, displayed the skins of two priests as war trophies, and dug up Portuguese graves and used the remains to make war medicine. Many Portuguese fled to Tete. A combined force of Portuguese and African supporters of Pedro Mhande, a rival of Nyakunembire, seized the Mutapa capital and installed their candidate. Dombo's Rozvi did not intervene, as they were invading Manyika, where they replaced the ruler and destroyed the Portuguese presence.

Further Rozvi campaigns to the northeast were delayed by Dombo's death in 1696 and the outbreak of a civil war. The Rozvi threat and civil war in Mutapa in the 1690s and early 1700s prompted many Portuguese settlers to leave the plateau and move down into the Zambezi Valley. During the early 1700s, rival Mutapa rulers, at different times, gained support from either the Rozvi or Portuguese. As Mutapa waned, Rozvi emerged to dominate much of the Zimbabwe plateau. Trade was maintained with the Portuguese, but they were confined to the Zambezi Valley.

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See also: Angola, Portuguese Conquest of (1575–1648); Ethiopia, Portuguese Involvement in (1541–1633); Firearms Technology; Indian Ocean, Portuguese Conquest of (1498–1698); Portuguese-Makua Wars (1585–1870)

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Zouaves

Zouaves were Moroccan and Algerian troops that fought in French service during the 19th century. This name also refers to American units that copied the Zouave uniform style and fought in the American Civil War.

The original Zouave troops were North African soldiers of the Zouaoua community recruited by the French during their campaigns in Algeria and Morocco in 1830. They developed a reputation not only as outstanding soldiers, but also for their attire. Most notable were the *serouels,* baggy pants reminiscent of the Arabian Nights. Those were combined with a short coat and a fez, creating a thoroughly Middle Eastern look. The *French Military Annual of 1831* describes the Zouaves as wearing “jacket with sleeves and waistcoat closed in front, in blue cloth. Moorish pants in wine-colored cloth. Turban and red riding breeches.” Considering the usual uniforms of the day, they were not really more colorful, although the cut was certainly distinctive.

The French formed local forces in North Africa into the Army of Africa, not only because of the need for soldiers, but because they hoped that local recruiting would create a bond between the population and the occupying power. The Zouaves originally had two battalions, but because of their early success and their rapidly gained reputation for dash and courage, the unit was much in demand by commanding generals in Algeria. That demand, coupled with the strong desire of soldiers to join an elite and distinctive unit, led to the expansion of the Zouaves until they ultimately numbered 10 regiments that served not only in North Africa, but everywhere the French army fought. Although they attracted sufficient volunteers from the French army to fill the ranks of noncommissioned officers and regular officers, the rank and file remained Algerian. There was no lack of volunteers, and therefore no lack of replacements for the high number of casualties that the units incurred.

After meritorious service in North Africa, Zouave regiments served with the French expedition to Russia during the Crimean War in 1854. They suffered immense losses, as did most units in this war, not only from combat but also from disease (notably cholera). The Zouaves distinguished themselves in every battle in which they took part, but the number of dead and wounded French officers was high. They also made a name for themselves in Russia as cultivated and refined in their taste in food. One Zouave hijacked a flock of sheep kept by the British commander so that the French always had plenty of fresh meat; they did, however, share that with British troops, and stories are told of French Zouaves and Scottish Highlanders sharing British mutton cooked by French soldiers. The Zouaves also became well known for their entertainment. In the evenings, men would dance and sing music hall numbers, giving rise to the comment that the Zouaves were at the same time Parisian and Arab.

After the Crimean War, the entire Army of Africa fought with French forces in Italy during Italian unification. Some regiments fought in Syria, while others were sent along with Ferdinand-Joseph Maximilian's ill-fated expedition during the French intervention in Mexico from 1862 to 1867. Zouaves also served in France during the Franco-Prussian War from 1870 to 1871. Although later troops were of lesser quality and suffered heavy casualties, the officer corps always remained first rate, and the spirit of the regiments immediately infused those who transferred in.

The reputation earned by the Zouaves in French service became well known in the United States in the 1850s. Their romance and exotic uniform motivated many units on both sides of the American Civil War to adopt the Zouave heritage. Most of the early units on the Union side were from New York, and many contained French immigrants, even some who had served in French Zouave units. Over time, the idea spread westward, and Zouave units were formed in Ohio and Indiana. The Confederate army also had Zouave units that originated, not surprisingly, in Louisiana.

More than 50 regiments were formed during the American Civil War, and American Zouaves had uniforms that were variations of those worn by French Zouaves. Officers usually did not wear the baggy pants, but red and blue were the primary colors. The uniform coats were usually decorated with contrasting piping sewn into elaborate cloverleaf designs and with *tambeaus,* or false pockets. The hats varied from fezzes to kepis to turbans to stocking caps. One unit, known as Wheat's Tigers, wore baggy white pants with blue pinstripes, but most were either solid or trimmed red or blue.

One other aspect of Zouave units is the position of *vivandière,* a mixed French and Latin word literally meaning "hospitality giver." The *vivandière* was a woman, often the wife of one of the men in the unit, who acted as sort of an unofficial (and later official) commissary. She wore a skirted uniform and marched with the men on campaign. The *vivandière* was responsible for acquiring such necessaries as tobacco, liquor, and extra food for the troops. The *vivandière* tradition started with the French Zouaves, and the women traveled to French battlefields in the Crimea, Italy, and Mexico. Although they usually stayed out of combat, in some cases, women fought and were decorated for valor. *Vivandières* also traveled with the American Zouave formations on both sides.

After the Franco-Prussian War, some military units continued to wear the Zouave uniforms, but with the adoption of more subdued uniforms by armies worldwide, men in such elaborate and decorative garb never saw combat again.

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See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Army of Africa, France; Morocco, French Conquest of (1844–1934)

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Zulu Civil War (1883–1884)

Following Zulu defeat in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 and the imposition of flawed settlements by the British victors, Zulu factions engaged in a vicious civil war. General Sir Garnet Wolseley imposed peace terms on the defeated Zulu chiefs on September 1, 1879, in which he complied with the British government's instructions to avoid the expense and responsibility of annexing Zululand, while simultaneously ensuring the security of its British neighbors. Accordingly, Wolseley suppressed the Zulu monarchy along with its centralized military system, and partitioned the former kingdom into 13 territories under appointed chiefs. Since these insecure new chiefs would fear a resurgent royal house, Wolseley calculated that they would collaborate with the British to preserve their positions, hence keeping Zululand weak and divided. In northern Zululand, where royalist supporters, or the uSuthu, were strongest, Wolseley appointed two powerful and ambitious Zulu magnates as chiefs to suppress them: Prince Hamu kaNzibe of the Ngenetsheni and Chief Zibhebhu kaMaphitha of the Mandlakazi.

Wolseley's was a recipe for internecine conflict, as the victims of his settlement drew together against their oppressors. In May 1880 and April 1882, the uSuthu sent unsuccessful deputations to petition for the restoration of the deposed and exiled King Cetshwayo kaMpande. Sporadic fighting broke out in September–October 1881 between the uSuthu and their enemies, but both sides drew back from a major confrontation.

Meanwhile, the British government realized that Wolseley's settlement was breaking down. Cetshwayo was brought to London and was pressured on December 11, 1882, to accept a new settlement of Zululand. He was restored to central Zululand under the supervision of a British resident. To hem Cetshwayo in, Zibhebhu was awarded an enlarged chiefdom in northeastern Zululand that included the uSuthu heartland. The creation of the Reserve Territory to Cetshwayo's south formed a military buffer between him and the colony of Natal and was administered by colonial officials. This new settlement proved even more disastrous than the first. Cetshwayo's return to Zululand on January 10, 1883, intensified the simmering conflict between the uSuthu and their foes, some of whom, such as Hamu, had been deprived of their independent chiefdoms.

While Cetshwayo started building his principal homestead of oNdini in the Mahlabathini plain in central Zululand, fighting broke out in January 1881 to the north between the uSuthu and the Ngenetsheni and Mandlakazi. On March 30, 1883, Zibhebhu utterly routed the uSuthu army at the Battle of Msebe. After a period of inconclusive fighting, Zibhebhu led his army in a surprise attack on oNdini, and on July 21, 1883, destroyed the uSuthu forces and massacred most of the Zulu leadership loyal to Cetshwayo. Cetshwayo took refuge in the Nkandla Forest in the Reserve Territory in August 1883 and was followed there by many uSuthu, including his teenaged heir, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo.

During August and September 1883, Zibhebhu and Hamu ravaged central and coastal Zululand, while in September 1883, Boer freebooters from the South African Republic (SAR) began to occupy northwestern Zululand. On September 20, 1883, the Etshowe Column, drawn from the British garrison in Natal, moved into the Reserve Territory to support the African levies, raised by Melmoth Osborn, the resident commissioner; maintain order; and deter Zibhebhu from entering British territory. On October 15, 1883, Cetshwayo took refuge with the British in Eshowe. Between September 1883 and February 1884, chaotic fighting continued across Zululand, particularly in the north, with the Mandlakazi and Ngenetsheni still in the ascendant.

Cetshwayo died suddenly on February 8, 1884. He was succeeded by Dinuzulu under the guardianship of his uncles. Fighting continued in the coastal region between the uSuthu and the Zibhebhu's allies, the Mthethwa; while on April 29, 1884, the Ngenetsheni scattered the uSuthu concentrating in the Ngome Forest in northern Zululand. Despairing of defeating his enemies by any other means, on May 2, 1884, Dinuzulu met with Boer freebooters at Hlobane Mountain to negotiate an alliance. On May 21, 1884, a committee of Boer mercenaries known as Dinuzulu's Volunteers proclaimed him king of the Zulus and promised him military assistance in return for land. On June 5, 1884, the Boers and uSuthu crushed Zibhebhu at Tshaneni Mountain in northeastern Zululand and went on to ravage Mandlakazi and Ngenetsheni territory. Zibhebhu and his defeated adherents took refuge in the Reserve Territory on September 7, 1884. On August 16, 1884, the Boers proclaimed the New Republic, incorporating the huge swathe of territory in northwestern Zululand that Dinuzulu ceded them, and made claim to a protectorate over the rest of Zululand outside the Reserve Territory.

Meanwhile, in May 1884, uSuthu concentrated in the Nkandla Forest under Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande resumed their struggle against their Zulu enemies and British authority in the Reserve Territory. On May 10, they dealt Osborn and his African levies a severe reversal. British troops of the Natal garrison came to Osborn's assistance on May 27, 1884, and Dabulamanzi was defeated on June 1, 1884. Nevertheless, the uSuthu continued to resist in the Nkandla Forest until they finally submitted on September 9, 1884. Fighting then ceased for the time being, and on May 19, 1887, Britain annexed all of Zululand outside the New Republic as a colony. However, the bitter animosities that divided the uSuthu and their foes remained deeply seated and would resurface with fresh violence during the uSuthu Rebellion of 1888 against British rule.

The scale of operations in the civil war was far smaller than that of the Anglo-Zulu War, when the Zulu had fielded armies of over 20,000 men and the British had 17,000 troops in the field. In no battle of the civil war did the combined forces of the uSuthu and their enemies exceed 9,000 combatants. The British deployed no more than about 600 regular troops and 300 mounted African auxiliaries, as well as several thousand untrained African levies.

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See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Cetshwayo kaMpande; Dabulamanzi kaMpande; oNdini, Battle of (July 21, 1883); Tshaneni, Battle of (June 5, 1884); Wolseley, Garnet; Zibhebhu kaMaphitha; Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Zulu Rebellion (1888)

The Zulu, or uSuthu, Rebellion of 1888 was a spasm of resistance to the newly imposed British administration of the colony of Zululand, which took the British five months to suppress.

On May 19, 1887, the British annexed the entire former Zulu kingdom except for a large territory in the northwest, which they had recognized on October 22, 1886, as the Boer-ruled New Republic. The new colony of Zululand was divided into six magisterial districts under white resident magistrates who reported to Melmoth Osborn, the resident commissioner in Eshowe. Order was kept through the small, locally recruited paramilitary Zululand Police (ZP) of 250 Africans under white subinspectors, supported by a small detachment of regular troops from the British garrison in neighboring Natal, stationed at Fort Curtis in Eshowe.

Osborn and his officials were determined to limit the pretensions of the former Zulu king, Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo, and other members of the royal house who had their homesteads in the Ndwandwe district in northern Zululand, where their adherents, the uSuthu, were concentrated. The Ndwandwe magistrate, Richard Hallowes Addison, was zealous in implementing this policy, and soon the uSuthu leadership, chafing at their reduced status, were subverting his administration. Because the skeleton Zululand administration lacked the coercive resources to enforce its authority, it resorted to a disastrous expedient. The longstanding Zulu ally of the British and irreconcilable foe of the uSuthu was Chief Zibhebhu kaMaphitha of the Mandlakazi. In September 1884, Zibhebhu and the Mandlakazi had fled to British protection after their defeat by the uSuthu and their Boer allies in the final act of the Zulu civil war of 1883–1884. Now, in November 1887, the Zululand officials restored him to his former chiefdom in the east of the Ndwandwe district. In January 1888, Addison demarcated an enlarged location for him that deliberately placed many of the recalcitrant uSuthu under his authority.

Unsurprisingly, these measures only inflamed uSuthu antagonism toward the administration. Further acts of disobedience ensued, culminating in armed resistance when on April 26, 1888, the uSuthu prevented the ZP from arresting their leaders at oSuthu, Dinuzulu’s homestead. Dinuzulu retired to the stronghold of Ceza Mountain, where the uSuthu began to raid Zulu loyalists and white traders. These events were deeply embarrassing to the civil authorities, but Sir Arthur Elibank Havelock, the governor of both Natal and Zululand, was reluctant to call in reinforcements of British troops since this would admit the failure of his administration. However, he was left with no alternative. The scale of ensuing operations was small, with the uSuthu never raising an army of more than 4,000 men, and the Mandlakazi only some 800. The small Zululand garrison of regular troops was reinforced on June 6, 1888, to about 1,000 cavalry, artillery, infantry, and mounted infantry that moved forward to Entonjaneni, Nkonjeni, and other bases in central Zululand. About 2,000 African levies and auxiliaries were raised across Zululand.

At Addison's request, on May 31, 1888, Zibhebhu moved his men up to help defend his magisterial post at Ivuna. On June 2, the uSuthu repulsed the ZP, supported by British troops, when Addison attempted to arrest the uSuthu leaders on Ceza Mountain. Meanwhile, Dinuzulu's uncle, Shingana kaMpande, concentrated his forces on Hlophekhulu Mountain in central Zululand. Dinuzulu then seized the initiative and led a surprise uSuthu attack on Zibhebhu's camp at Ivuna on June 23, routing the Mandlakazi. The Ivuna garrison was evacuated the next day to Nkonjeni, and the British withdrew south of the Black Mfolozi River. They also lost control of the coastal region, where at the Battle of Ntondotha on June 30, 1888, the uSuthu unsuccessfully attacked Fort Andries, the seat of the magistrate of the Lower Umfolosi district, and then blockaded it.

In response to this escalating crisis, on June 28, 1888, the general officer commanding in South Africa, Lieutenant-General Henry August Smyth, took personal command of operations in Zululand and ordered an immediate counteroffensive. On July 2, 1888, British troops and African auxiliaries under Colonel Henry Sparke Stabb drove the uSuthu from Hlophekhulu Mountain and regained control of central Zululand. The Eshowe Column under Major Alexander Chalmers McKean relieved Fort Andries on July 9, 1888, and then returned to Eshowe, burning uSuthu homesteads along its march.

During late July and early August, a new Coastal Column under McKean marched up the coast enforcing uSuthu submissions. Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Martin's Flying Column from Nkonjeni concurrently reestablished civil authority in northwestern Zululand. On the night of August 6, 1888, Dinuzulu disbanded the uSuthu still on Ceza Mountain and sought refuge in the South African Republic (SAR). McKean's and Martin's columns then rendezvoused at Ivuna on August 7, 1888. Between August 18 and 30, the columns marched together to Eshowe, subduing the last pockets of uSuthu resistance as they went. During August and early September, some fighting continued in northeastern Zululand between the uSuthu and Mandlakazi, but by September 30, 1888, Smyth considered the rebellion over and withdrew from all advanced posts. On November 2, 1888, the Zulu garrison was reduced to its normal level.

Dinuzulu surrendered to the civil authorities on November 15, 1888, to stand trial with his uncles the following year for high treason. Found guilty, they were sent to serve their sentences on the island of St. Helena. The British arrested Zibhebhu on November 17, 1888, and resettled him and his followers in southern Zululand.

The rebellion had taught the British that the partisan deployment of Zulu collaborators against those resisting the imposition of their administration was a threat to the peace of Zululand, not a solution.

Henceforth, they worked toward dampening down factional tensions and brokered the reconciliation of the warring parties.

John Laband

See also: Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Hlophekhulu Mountain, Battle of (July 2, 1888); Ivuna, Battle of (June 23, 1888); Zibhebhu kaMaphitha

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Zulu Rebellion (1906)

The Zulu Rebellion of 1906 was an eruption of Zulu-speaking peoples seeking to overthrow the government of the British colony of Natal. It has also been called the Bhambatha (or Bhambatha's) Rebellion, the Natal Rebellion, the Natal Native Rebellion, the Poll Tax Rebellion, the War of the Heads (*impi yamakhanda*), and most recently, favored by the present South African government, the Zulu Uprising of 1906.

The immediate cause of the rebellion was the government's imposition of a 1 pound capitation on adult males, falling most heavily on the African population, which constituted about 83 percent of the population. There were several demonstrations against collection of the poll tax in the Thukela Valley in January and early February of 1906, and on February 8, a band of armed tax protesters resisted arrest and killed two police officers near Richmond in southern Natal. The government proclaimed martial law on February 9 and mobilized militia to nip incipient rebellion in the bud.

The rebellion, during the period that martial law was in effect (February 9–October 2, 1906), had three phases. The first phase, from February 8 to March 31, consisted of a demonstration of force by the militia in southern Natal, which overawed the hostile chiefs and their communities.

The second phase of the rebellion, April 3 to June 16, comprised operations in the middle Thukela region, initially in Natal and then in Zululand. In March, Bhambatha, a petty Natal chief, was dismissed for misconduct and fled to Dinuzulu, former king of the Zulu, now a chief in Zululand but ambitious to regain paramountcy. He returned and early in April attacked the magistrate of and a police detachment in his district, then fled again to Zululand, where he was protected by the important Chief Sigananda. Sigananda joined and expanded the rebellion in his district, and the rebels made their base in the rugged and difficult Nkandla district. Government militia and police cordoned off the district, and Colonel Duncan McKenzie was given command of the reinforced Zululand Field Force. McKenzie struck boldly wherever rebel forces were reported to be, yet they always managed to avoid his blows; however, they suffered great losses of matériel, which affected morale. The militia was plainly overextended, and the government was obliged to recruit special service units (even one of Native Horse) and to accept others from the Transvaal and Cape colonies to augment McKenzie's force.

Meanwhile Sigananda sent emissaries, and Bhambatha himself went to find out why Dinuzulu was not giving the rebels support. Dinuzulu was too closely watched by the government to do so openly; however, Mehlokazulu, an important chief in the Nquthu district, rebelled and joined forces with the rebels in Nkandla late in May, and the rebel army advanced to the Thukela on June 2 and threatened to invade Natal. Dinuzulu appears to have been fomenting a rising among the eastern Zulu and lower Thukela Natal communities, and the rebel army moved eastward, perhaps to support it. McKenzie learned of the movement and intercepted the army at Mome on June 10. The army was destroyed, and the remnant dispersed. Mehlokazulu and many other leaders were killed; Bhambatha was never seen again. The great rising was aborted. McKenzie reported on June 16 that for all practical purposes, the rebellion in Nkandla was over.

The third phase of the rebellion, from June 19 to July 15, took place in the lower Thukela district of Natal. In view of the crushing defeat of the rebels in Nkandla, the rising of the Africans in this district seems incomprehensible, but less so if it is regarded as the partial realization of Dinuzulu's diplomacy. Local militia managed to contain the rebellion, and McKenzie shifted his forces to the lower Thukela, where he arrived on June 30. He directed four columns to converge on the kraal of the principal rebel chief Messeni on July 2. The rebels attacked the columns without success, and they dispersed. Messeni's kraal was taken and burned on July 3–4. A large rebel force, which took refuge in the Izinsimba gorge, was surrounded and massacred on July 8. For a week, militia columns harried fugitives, resistance disintegrated, and on July 15, major operations were suspended.

There was much mopping up to do, in Nkandla as well as Maphumulo, so the militia was demobilized in stages over the next two months, first active units and reserves between July 15 and 30, followed by special service units in August. Three special service squadrons and the Natal Native Horse were retained for policing purposes, and these were demobilized during the first half of September. On October 2, martial law was lifted.

It is impossible to give exact numbers for all the forces engaged during the rebellion. On the government side, militia, including special service units, and police exceeded 5,000, and were assisted at various times by loyal African levies, altogether numbering over 4,500. On the rebel side, active participants in the rebellion were officially reckoned at 3,873 in Natal and 2,031 in Zululand; but it is doubtful that there were ever more than 1,500 in the field at one time. Government casualties were 36 dead and 67 wounded, and rebel dead were reckoned to be at least 2,652. Martial law courts and courts martial convicted 4,368 persons, but many others were discharged for lack of evidence. Sentences included imprisonment, fines, and flogging (which, like the death penalty, the government quickly curtailed), and varied according to the actions of the accused. Prisoners were employed in public and certain private works, and a few ringleaders of rebellion were exiled. Most prisoners were



Colonial troops from the British colony of Natal during the Zulu Rebellion of 1906. The main cause of the rebellion was the imposition of a new tax by the white settler-controlled Natal government. (Natal Witness Archives/Gallo Images/Getty Images)

released within two years. The rebellion was not followed by bloody repression, nor was it characterized by atrocities against civilians.

The crushing of the rebellion, and the later arrest, trial, and exile of Dinuzulu in connection with it (1907–1909), effectively deterred further violent expressions of African discontent, which was channeled into constitutional (but ineffectual) political activity. The Natal government appointed a Native Commission (1906–1907), which looked into the causes of the rebellion and made recommendations for the melioration of conditions. The government practically ignored the recommendations (as it had those of the South African Native Affairs Commission in 1905), except to make changes for more efficient administration of the African population. The threatening experience of rebellion may have influenced European settlers in Natal, anxious for their security, to vote in 1909 to join the new Union of South Africa.

Paul S. Thompson

See also: Anglo-Zulu War (1879); Bhambatha ka Mancinza; Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo; Zulu Civil War (1883–1884); Zulu Rebellion (1888)

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Chronology

1482	Portuguese construct El Mina Castle, Gold Coast
1483	Portuguese first visit to the Kongo kingdom
1498	Portuguese enter the Indian Ocean
1505	Portuguese seize Mozambique, Sofala, Kilwa
1509	Battle of Diu
1541–1633	Portuguese intervention in Ethiopia
1572–1696	Portuguese invasion of Zimbabwe Plateau
1575	Portuguese establish Luanda
1585–89	Swahili Rebellion against Portuguese
1587–1857	Portuguese-Makua Wars, Mozambique
1648	Dutch seize Luanda
1650–98	Omani offensive against Portuguese, Indian Ocean
1659–60	First Dutch-Khoi War
1665	Battle of Mbwila
1673–77	Second Dutch-Khoi War
1722	Establishment of Dutch East India Company Militia, Cape Colony
1775	Spanish Invasion of Algiers
1778–81	First Cape-Xhosa War
1781	Formation of the Corps Bastaard Hottentotten, Cape Colony
1787	Foundation of Sierra Leone settlement
1792	Establishment of Royal African Corps
1793	Second Cape-Xhosa War
1795–1803	First British occupation of the Cape
1799–1803	Third Cape-Xhosa War
1801–1805	First Barbary War
1806	Second British Occupation of the Cape
1806	Formation of Cape Regiment
1807	British abolish slave trade
1808	Sierra Leone becomes a British colony

1811	Fourth Cape-Xhosa War
1815	Second Barbary War
1819	Fifth Cape-Xhosa War
1821	Settlement of Liberia
1823	Battle of Dithakong
1823–1824	First Anglo-Asante War
1828	Battle of Mbolompo
1830	French invasion of Algeria
1834–1835	Sixth Cape-Xhosa War
1836–1854	Boer Trek
1836–1837	Boer-Ndebele War
1838	Battle of Blood River
1844	Franco-Moroccan War
1846–1847	Seventh Cape-Xhosa War
1847	Republic of Liberia
1850–1853	Eighth Cape-Xhosa War
1851–1857	Boer-Tswana Wars
1848	Battle of Boomplaats
1857	Establishment of *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*
1858	First Free State-Lesotho War
1859–1860	Spanish-Moroccan War
1863–1867	First Boer-Venda War
1865	Second Free State-Lesotho War
1867	Third Free State-Lesotho War
1868	British invasion of Ethiopia
1871	British army adopts Martini-Henry rifle
1873	Langalibalele Rebellion, Natal
1873–1874	Second Anglo-Asante War
1876–1877	Boer-Pedi War
1878	First Anglo-Pedi War
1877–1878	Ninth Cape-Xhosa War
1878	Griqualand West Rebellion
1879	Anglo-Zulu War
1879	Second Anglo-Pedi War
1879–93	French Conquest of the Tukolor Empire
1880	Transkei Rebellion
1880–1881	Gun War, Lesotho
1880–81	First Anglo-Boer War
1881–85	Mahdi’s rebellion in Sudan
1882	British occupation of Egypt
1882–1898	French conquest of Mandinka Empire

1883–84	Zulu Civil War
1884	Berlin Conference
1884	Invention of the Maxim gun
1884–85	Gordon Relief Expedition
1885	Creation of Force Publique
1886	Establishment of Royal Niger Constabulary
1887	French military adopts Lebel rifle
1887	Battle of Dogali, Eritrea
1887–89	Emin Pasha Relief Expedition
1887–96	Slavers' War, Nyasaland
1888	British army adopts Lee-Metford rifle
1888	Zulu Rebellion
1889	Battle of Toski, Egypt
1889	Abushiri Rebellion, German East Africa
1889	Battle of Elbejet, Kenya
1890	First Franco-Dahomey War
1890	British intervention in Buganda
1891	Establishment of German *Schutztruppe,* East Africa
1891–1892	Stairs expedition to Katanga
1891–1900	Rebellion in the Gambia
1891–1898	German-Hehe Wars
1892–1894	Second Franco-Dahomey War
1892–1894	Arab War, Congo Free State
1893	Anglo-Ndebele War
1893–1894	German-Nama War
1894	Boer-Gananwa War, Transvaal
1894–1895	Portuguese-Gaza War
1895	Jameson Raid
1895–1896	Mazrui Rebellion, Kenya
1895–1896	First Italo-Ethiopian War
1895–1900	French conquest of Chad
1895–1905	British subjugation of the Nandi, Kenya
1895–1905	French conquest of Madagascar
1896	British occupation of Asante
1896	Battle of Shangi, Rwanda
1896–1897	Ndebele and Shona Uprisings, Southern Rhodesia
1896–1899	British reconquest of Sudan
1896–1900	Anglo-Ngoni War, Nyasaland
1897	German military expedition to Rwanda
1897	British conquest of Benin
1897	Langenberg Rebellion, Cape Colony

1897	British conquest of Nupe and Ilorin
1897	Battle of Rejjaf
1898	Battle of Omdurman
1898	Fashoda Incident
1898	Hut Tax Rebellion, Sierra Leone
1898	Establishment of West African Frontier Force
1898	Establishment of West African Regiment, Sierra Leone
1898	Second Boer-Venda War
1899–1902	Second Anglo-Boer War
1900	Asante Rebellion
1901–1902	Anglo-Aro War
1901–1920	Anglo-Somali Wars
1902	German subjugation of Burundi
1902	Formation of King's African Rifles
1902–1903	British conquest of Sokoto
1904–1907	Herero and Nama Rebellion/Genocide
1905	Maji Maji Rebellion, German East Africa
1905–1906	Rebellion in Burundi
1906	Zulu Rebellion
1907–1911	French occupation of Morocco
1911–1912	Italian invasion of Libya
1914–1918	World War I
1915–1917	Volta-Bani War
1920–1926	Rif War, Morocco
1927–1932	War of the Hoe Handles, French Equatorial Africa
1935–1936	Second Italo-Ethiopian War

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